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Bonum est homini ut eum veritas volentem, quia malum est homini ut eum veritas vincat
invitum. Nam ipsa vincat necesse est, sive negantum sive confitentum.

S. AUG. EPIST. ccxxxviii. AD PASCENT.

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KANT'S SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY.

Critique of Pure Reason, translated from the German of Immanuel Kant, by J. M. D. Meiklejohn. London : George Bell & Sons, York Street, Covent Garden. 1878.

Works of Thomas Reid, in three volumes. New York. 1882.

KANT originated a system of philosophy which was entirely new to the schools of higher learning. It presented human thought, and the nature of the mind's faculties, under a strange aspect, one under which they were never before viewed by any philosopher ; and the novelty of his conception soon gained for his writings the attention of speculative minds in Germany, France, and England. On completing his work, *Criticism of Pure Reason*, with long painstaking industry, he offered, at its conclusion, the result of his venture as the projector of a new theory, to all who might wish to pursue "a scientific method," in preference to "Wolf's dogmatism" and "Hume's skepticism." He assures the inquisitive reader that his own "critical path," though "hitherto an untravelled route," will lead him who follows it to that perfect contentment in the possession of certain truth not before reached by any scientific method.

But Kant's philosophy does not redeem his bright promise ; on the contrary, it is another proof how impossible it is for any human ingenuity to contrive a system of science which can be consistent, and at the same time either disregard or contradict well-

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known facts and evident first principles. That his works show him to have possessed an extraordinary intellect cannot be justly denied. While it may not happen, perhaps, that mankind will ever finally agree in awarding him the title given him by his enthusiastic admirers, the "Aristotle of modern times," it is quite certain, however, that the learned world will not allow Kant's theories to pass away unanswered and undiscussed, even if it result, in the end, that his doctrine, like that of Spinoza and that of Hume, prove only a negative help to true science.

The obscurity peculiar to all Kant's writings is generally recognized; and this, with the darkness in which his interpreters have enveloped his theories, has helped to give celebrity to the saying, "German philosophy is obscure and incomprehensible." The obscurity which distinguishes Kant's philosophy comes, in part, from his style, which is diffuse and involved; but it results mainly from the impossibility of verifying his doctrine by reflection on what we observe actually to take place in our own minds; for we can discover in ourselves no such thoughts, no such mental operations or processes, as those which he ascribes to the mind. Indeed, Kant admits no one fact, and no one principle, understood precisely according to the manner in which it had been previously understood by mankind in general. The human mind originates no one idea for itself precisely in the manner described by Kant's theory; and it reaches no one scientific conclusion according to the method which he points out. He has changed the supposition of terms, or the meaning of all the words ordinarily employed to signify the mind's primitive conceptions, and uses those terms to express things which no one ever thought before him, and which no one after him can comprehend, or define, except in Kant's own words.¹ In his transcendental logic he may even be said to have given to logical terms, which are terms of the second intention, a sort of third intention. It is not surprising, then, that his captivated interpreters, Fichte, Hegel, Schelling, etc., explain his system into conflicting theories of skepticism, transcendental idealism, pantheism, etc., through elaborate volumes of speculation, in which the ingenuous student can scarcely find a thought that is clear, or a proposition that is intelligible.

Kant is more generally understood by impartial readers as teaching a system of philosophy which is reducible to pure subjectivism or idealism; that is, a system which supposes the denial that there is anything real outside of the mind's ideas.

¹ The translator of his work on "Pure Reason" says in his preface: "It is curious to observe in all English works written specially upon Kant, that not one of his commentators ever ventures, for a moment, to leave the words of Kant, and to explain the subject he may be considering in his own words." Preface, page xii., *note*.

It is not proposed herein to follow Kant's reasoning through all the special subjects or branches of philosophy treated by him ; some salient points of his doctrine will suffice to convey a general notion of his system, comprehensive enough for the present aim ; which is that of considering it as a method of science, or of philosophical reasoning.

Kant, like Descartes, builds up a system of knowledge beginning absolutely *a priori*, and rejecting as "mere dogmatism" all previously admitted principles with the conclusions derived from them, and even all primitive facts, as previously understood and assented to ; because those principles and facts, he maintained, are only assumptions, without due critical proof or explanation. His own presupposition, by way of fundamental "dogma," is, that science or philosophy must be completely originated *a priori*, by the mind for itself, without the concurrence of objects known ; hence, objects can have no existence outside of the mind's ideas, for it must be assumed that in so far as they are things known, they are produced by those ideas. By "*a priori* ideas of pure reason" he seems to mean ideas which have reason alone for their primitive and total cause ; they thus precede experience, and, under that aspect, they are also styled transcendental ideas.

It is not possible for us to conceive how a dependent or created intellect can thus be the absolute and total cause of its own knowledge and the objects known by it ; for we attribute such a mode of knowing objects, by creating those objects, only to the infinite mind of God. The divine intellect is the cause of objects created conformable to archetypal and absolutely transcendental ideas. Hence all created things are related to the divine intellect as that which is measured to its measure ; or as the effect is related to its cause ; but knowledge of objects is produced in the created intellect by the concurrent influence both of the object and of the faculty. Man's intellect, considered in itself and *a priori*, is undetermined to this or that act ; it must be determined to its act by the object of that act duly presented to the intellect. It is not correct argument to lay down the principle, "no object can exist independently of intelligence," and conclude "therefore the human intellect produces the objects of its own ideas." It is true that no object can exist independently of divine intelligence ; but objects exist whether they be known to man's intellect or not. But how must we conceive the *a priori* ideas of pure reason to originate in the mind according to Kant's theory ? Some of his interpreters explain his meaning to be that those ideas are infused into the mind naturally, or that they are innate ; others, with Fichte, contend that these ideas are produced by the spontaneous, natural action of the intellect itself, determining itself to act without help or influence from ob-

jects, or any extrinsic cause; for Kant attributes to the intellect a peculiar spontaneity of action.¹

The most completely self-determining power in man is his will, when acting freely; but even then it cannot act without the concurrence of an object as end intended. Just as it is absolutely impossible for a non-existent body to move itself from a state of mere possibility into actual and real existence by its own virtue or action, so is it impossible for the reason to pass from the state of merely possible act into that of positive action, without any determining influence from an extrinsic cause.² A created agent is not absolutely sufficient for itself, and for its own action; it is only the First Cause that is the absolute principle of its own action.

Fichte goes so far as to assert that the intellect, or its idea, produces itself; but this includes a supposition which destroys itself, since it implies that one and the same being is the cause of itself, and the effect of itself. The divine ideas are absolutely *a priori* eternal, and are thus transcendental; but for that very reason those ideas are unproduced, or they were never preceded by a state of non-existence. The assertion that man's ideas are absolutely *a priori* and transcendental, and that they produce their own objects, and thus transcend all experience, is to use language that is incomprehensible, unless we identify the human and the divine modes of knowing truth, which is not to be done, as is evident.

Kant's *Criticism of Pure Reason* has for its aim to show how the reason as *pure*, or as independent of all experience, produces *a priori* its own ideas, and the principles by which we can know objects when their phenomena are presented to the mind.³ Not, however, that it thereby knows real external objects, for they are unknowable; only phenomena are known, and phenomena have no real existence except in the mind's faculties. The objects which reason knows are furnished by the *a priori* ideas, not by any realities external to the mind. Pure reason forms out of its *a priori* ideas, by means of analysis, universal ideas or judgments; they

¹ As when he says: "Transcendental Logic," i, p. 45: "We call the faculty of spontaneously producing representations, or the spontaneity of cognition, *understanding*."

² "Nihil reducitur de potentia in actum nisi per aliquod ens actu." P. i., qu. 79, a. 3 in C.

"De potentia non potest aliquid reduci in actum nisi per aliquod in actu." I P., qu. 2, a. 3 in C.

"A thing cannot be reduced from the potential or possible state into the actual state except by something else which is itself actual or in action."

"Omne quod exit de potentia in actum potest dici pati; etiam cum perficitur. Et sic intelligere nostrum est pati." P. i., qu. 49, a. 1, ed. 2.

"Everything that passes out of the potential or possible state into the actual state, can be said to suffer, or receive, and this even when it is perfected thereby, and thus for our own intellect to act is to *suffer*."

³ "Idea of Transcendental Logic," I., where he explains the understanding as the "Spontaneity of Cognition."

are deduced analytically from the essences expressed by *a priori* ideas. These judgments thus formed have necessity and universality; and twelve of them have the office of categories.

The schoolmen¹ taught, with Aristotle, that man's intellect knows primarily and directly the universal; it knows the singular material thing secondarily and reflexly. Berkeley and Hume hold that the mind knows only its own impressions and ideas, and that it does not know objects or things external to them at all; Kant agrees in this opinion with Hume and Berkeley.

Aristotle's categories are founded on real objects, which they classify into ten families or supreme genera; Kant's twelve categories are *a priori* abstractions which, as he asserts, determine their objects. Aristotle's categories are made by their objects; Kant's categories make their objects.

Kant's categories, which he describes as *a priori* forms or ideas by which the mind knows objects of intuition, are of four classes; first class, of quantity, unity, plurality, totality; second class, of quality, reality, negation, limitation; third, of relation, substantiality, causality, community (reciprocity between agent and patient); fourth, of modality, possibility, existence, necessity.—*Transcendental Logic*, sect. iii., Categories, p. 64.²

Aristotle's categories, which are classes of real things, are: substance, quantity, relation, quality, action, passion (action received), place, time, posture, habilitment or thing possessed. Aristotle's post-predicaments are not supplementary categories, as Kant asserts; they are merely modifications, consequent to real things as constituted into the categories; but they are not themselves distinct genera of real things; they are opposition, priority, simultaneity, motion and mode of possession. These are not distinct kinds of realities, but only modifications of real things.

Kant teaches that the category, *substance*, for example, is an *a priori* or a transcendental deduction of reason from its own *a priori* conceptions; that is, such object is antecedent to experience, and is not furnished by experience, as are the objects of Aristotle's ten categories. Hence, when the mind knows an object, say, this tree, which it judges to be a substance, the "substance" which it attributes to the tree exists only as a category or object of a universal idea in the reason; we cannot even know that a "substance" is possible outside of the mind's idea; for "beyond the sphere of phenomena all is mere void."³

¹ P. i., qu. 86, a 1: "Singulare in rebus materialibus intellectus noster directe et primo cognoscere non potest . . . Intellectus noster directe non est cognoscitivus nisi universalium . . . quod a materia individuali abstrahitur est universale."

² "It is only by these categories the mind can render the manifold of intuition conceivable, in other words, think an object of intuition." Ibid.

³ "Analytic of Principles," ch. iii.: "Division of all objects into phenomena and noumena."

His theory is that all scientific knowledge consists of two elements or constituents; one is an *a priori* idea of pure reason, or, what is here the same thing, a category, which is an *a priori* judgment; the other element is a synthesis, or a synthetical judgment, furnished by experience; and experience is the same thing as intuition, whether the intuition be consciousness¹ or sensation. A judgment composed of these two elements, the *a priori* and the synthetical constituents, is what Kant styles a "synthetical judgment *a priori*;" and he maintains that such judgments are the only ones which augment our knowledge. For analysis, by which we deduce a predicate from an essence, adds nothing to our knowledge, he tells us, since the predicate was included in what was already known; as "a part is less than the whole," such analysis teaches us nothing of that "whole" not previously known. But synthesis, as "bodies are heavy," teaches us something not previously known by merely knowing the essence, for it is not of the essence of bodies to be "heavy." Hence, synthesis augments knowledge; analysis of an essence does not.

It seems certain and evident, however, that to deduce a predicate from an essence in which it was not previously known to be contained, is to augment knowledge; just as, despite Locke's assertion that "the syllogism is not a means of discovering truth," to deduce a conclusion from premises not previously known as containing it is to "discover truth." Knowledge is truly and properly augmented by each of these operations.

But how, in Kant's theory, is an empirical or synthetical judgment formed? How does the mind acquire experience of things represented through sensation? The answer is, sensation gives or represents in the imagination a "manifold," that is, sensation represents, say, a tree, or a lawn, not as one distinct total, but as a confused collection of particulars or points. Then consciousness and the understanding have an intuition of that confused "manifold" or collection of particulars, and are thereby enabled to reduce this representation to "synthetical unity" in a judgment affirming the object.² This is experience, or it is thus the empirical element of knowledge is acquired.

But neither the representations of objects in a "manifold" nor the synthesis of the "manifold" furnished by sensation would be possible he tells us, unless we concede to the imagination two

¹ "In *Transcendental Logic*," I., p. 45, he distinguishes intuition as pure, or without sensation, and intuition as empirical, as having sensation from the presence of an object.

² "It is necessary for the mind to make its ideas sensuous, that is, to join the object to them in intuition, and to make its intuitions intelligible, that is, to bring them under ideas. Thoughts without content are void; intuitions without ideas blind."—"*Transcendental Logic*" I., p. 46.

a priori transcendental forms or principles, namely, time and space. These forms are only in the imagination; for time and space have no existence outside of the imagination.¹ They are the formal principles in sensation, and impression is the material principle or the occasion. They are necessary for representing objects, since there must be succession in time, and relation of parts in space, for objects to be imaged at all. But these conditions or principles, time and space, are furnished by the imagination, they are not in or of objects external to the mind.

The next operation of the mind is the one by which knowledge is made perfect; and it consists in combining together the *a priori* judgment and the synthesis or synthetical unity acquired by means of experience. The *a priori* judgments of pure reason which the mind thus applies to the synthetical conceptions furnished by experience are the twelve categories.

It may be seen, from what has been thus far said, that Kant proposes to explain theoretically, and to prove absolutely anew, even the primitive truths which the human mind has hitherto accepted on their own self-evidence as neither requiring nor admitting proof, because themselves first principles. He aims to go beyond those first truths, and to show how all knowledge is ultimately the product of *pure reason*, and how reason gives, even to the empirical object represented, what it takes back from that object; and thus that all science, in the last analysis, has a purely subjective origin. He does hypothetically admit the possibility of an external objective order; that is, if it be necessary "to explain the possibility of experience;" but he denies that the noumena, or objective reality of that order, is knowable. He gives what he styles a "refutation of idealism;" but his argument is found by all that read it to be obscure and unintelligible; it is entirely *a priori*, and from the subjective side of the question, for it is a radical principle of his theory that objects must conform to the ideas of them in reason (preface to second edition, xxi., where he insists on this point). The total reason of all truth in the mind must be found; according to Kant's system, in the mind's own idea, not in anything extrinsic to those ideas; "inasmuch as the object, as in the case of right and

¹ "We have intended then to say that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of phenomena, that the things which we intuit are not the same as our representation of them in intuition; nor are their relations in themselves so constituted as they appear to us; and that if we take away the subject or even only the subjective constitution of our senses in general, then not only the nature and relation of objects in space and time, but even space and time themselves, disappear, and that these, as phenomena, can not exist in themselves, but only in us. What may be the nature of objects considered as things in themselves and without reference to the receptivity of our sensibility is quite unknown to us. We know nothing more than our mode of receiving them," etc.—"*Transcendental Aesthetic*," sec. 9.

wrong, is not to be discovered out of the conception."¹ Or, as he expresses the relation of ideas to their objects (*Principles of Pure Understanding*, sect. ii., p. 117): "The possibility of experience is that which gives objective reality² to all our *a priori* cognitions." The object, therefore, derives its reality from the cognition of it in such case; the cognition does not depend on the object. But this is not to refute idealism, it is to defend idealism.

After the understanding has combined the "manifold of sensation" into a synthesis or whole, reason then applies to that synthesis the corresponding category, for example, the category "cause;" and this is done by "subsuming" the particular synthesis under the category, which gives to reason a "synthetical judgment *a priori*." Mathematics, all science, all genuine metaphysics contain these synthetical *a priori* judgments or propositions; and, as before said, it is only such judgments that augment knowledge. Hence, such synthetical *a priori* judgment consists of two elements or constituents; namely, the category, which is an *a priori* judgment of pure reason;³ and the empirical judgment, which is a synthesis from experience or intuition.

We may be helped towards conceiving what Kant perhaps here means by his "synthetical judgment *a priori*," if we translate it into more familiar terms, and style it a "mixed judgment," or a "direct universal," understanding a direct universal to signify the same thing in this case as a simple universal applied to a particular included under it.

A judgment which is synthetical in its primitive origin, however, could not be formed by reason, since reason would not know its subject and predicate as separate, before making their synthesis. Either the intellect first knows the subject and predicate as separate, and then combines them into this synthetical judgment, or it does not first know them as separate; if it does first know subject and predicate separately, then the synthetical judgment

¹ "Antinomy of Pure Reason," sec. iv.: "In the general principles of moral there can be nothing uncertain, for the propositions are either utterly without meaning or must originate solely in our rational conceptions."—*Ibid.*, p. 299.

² He often insists on this notion, as in "Transcendental Dialectic," bk. i., sect. ii., p. 225: "Pure conceptions *a priori* represent objects antecedently to all experience."

³ Kant aims to prove in his "Transcendental Logic," sect. 18, that in cognition the only legitimate use of the category is its application to objects of experience (p. 90). By "subsuming" a synthetical judgment under the category, he means simply the connecting of a particular with the universal, by way of minor premise, in order to make an inference. For example, "The sum of the angles in the rectilinear triangle is equal to two right angles; A is a rectilinear triangle," etc. Here the triangle A is *subsumed* under the general truth, in Kant's use of the term. "If reason is the faculty of deducing the particular from the general, and if the general be certain *in se*, and given, it is only necessary that the judgment should subsume the particular under the general, the particular being thus necessarily determined."—"Transcendental Dialectic," appendix.

a priori does not really differ from any other synthetical judgment. If the intellect does not know subject and predicate separately, or before knowing them as conjoined in a judgment, in that case the intellect does not form the judgment at all, and consequently such judgment would not be a rational operation. Judgments not formed by the intellect, as affirming or denying predicate of subject, must needs be infused, or be naturally implanted by way of instinct, as are instinctive judgments in brute animals. It is certain that brutes can practically discriminate between some objects as good and harmful to them; and it is equally certain that they are unable to know the subject and predicate of a proposition, or synthesize them into a judgment. Kant seems to regard the judgment in question as primitively, or *a priori*, a synthesis. Yet all the judgments of human reason are comparative; the human intellect can form no judgment unless by first apprehending subject and predicate separately, and then comparing and conjoining them. What answer, then, must be given to Kant's question, which, he tells us, "proposes the great problem of pure reason," namely, "How are synthetical judgments, *a priori* possible?" He himself gives no intelligible or satisfactory answer to the question.

Kant contends that Hume was correct in denying the possibility of knowing cause, as inferred from an observed fact as effect, for the reason that there is no "medium," no "interposed idea," which can certainly found such inference. But when Hume concludes, with universality, that all our knowledge of real cause and effect is "merely the customary experience of constant conjunction," Kant finds Hume thereby to show that he failed to conceive the whole problem, namely, "how is a synthetical judgment *a priori* possible in such case?"¹

Kant answers that we know such cause and its effects in "a synthetical judgment *a priori*," or by a mixed judgment. But, as this is not explicitly to answer Hume's denial of any assignable medium, or "interposed idea," through which the inference of cause from its observed effect is made, Kant proceeds to ascertain that medium:² "Now what is this *tertium quid* that is to be the medium of all synthetical judgments? It is a complex in which all our representations are contained; internal sense, to wit, and its form, time." This, then, is the *tertium quid*, third thing, or medium, in which,

¹ Introduction, sec. vi.

² "Hume could not explain how it was possible that conceptions which are not connected with each other in the understanding must, nevertheless, be thought as necessarily connected in the object; and it never occurred to him that the understanding itself might, perhaps, by means of these conceptions, be the author of the experience in which its objects were presented to it."—*Transcendental Deduction of the Categories*, p. 78.

³ *Analytic of Principles*, sec. ii., p. 117.

according to Kant, the *a priori* principle and the synthetical principle meet, and by which they are united into a synthetical judgment, *a priori*; with this medium the mind is able to connect cause, which lies outside of its effect, with that effect, so as to make the tie or synthesis of the two.

But this answer is mere fanciful theorizing; and, moreover, it is based on what is not true as a fact; because, even if we perceive in our minds such "complex," we do not employ any purely subjective medium in deducing a cause from its effect. Instead of answering Hume's statement, which, though false, is not obscure, Kant merely involves both the point in question and his own peculiar synthetic judgment in more complete darkness.

His most intelligible statement, perhaps, as to what is this medium of the synthetical judgment, *a priori*, is contained in his "Conclusion of Transcendental Æsthetics," p. 44. But that, too, is purely speculative theorizing, not founded on fact; and it does not explain what we see to be the operation of our own minds when we infer cause from its observed effect. He returns to this fundamental principle of his theory, by which he entirely shuts out from the mind the real objective order, in *Transcendental Principles*, conclusion, p. 174, where, like one striving to reconcile the inconsistencies of a false story, he only burdens his previous assertions with new incongruities.¹

As heretofore seen, the medium, or this *tertium quid*, by which we truly deduce causes from their effects, first observed as facts, is the real relation between them which we discover; and this real relation is something objective, not a mere conception of the mind itself.

It is true that we do not know real cause and its effect as intrinsically and essentially connected with each other, for this would be to know such cause and effect *a priori* as they are primordially known only to infinite intelligence, which is presupposed both to the cause and its effect. Our knowledge of them is *a posteriori*, or from the objects, for we know them by way of related facts or realities; and the principle of causation, which is first acquired by us analytically as a necessary and universal judgment, furnishes

¹ Kant makes a remark (Transcendental Doctrine of Method, ch. 3, p. 510), which, perhaps, has reference to this medium between the *a priori* principle, or category, and empirical element related to it: "Even thinkers by profession have been unable clearly to explain the distinction between the two elements of our cognition, the one completely *a priori*, and the other *a posteriori*; and hence the proper definition of a peculiar kind of cognition, and with it the just idea of a science, has never been established." This seems to be a surrender to Hume, whose skepticism is based on the assumption that there is no medium or bond of relationship between any cause and its effect which can ever be known with certainty; a doctrine which it is the avowed claim of Kant to have refuted with his "synthetical judgment *a priori*."

the absolute major premise, whether it be expressed or only implied, when we infer a cause from its observed effect.

It could be conceded to Kant, however, that the mind's inference of cause from its observed effect furnishes a synthetical judgment, *a priori*, in the sense that such judgment includes both a particular and a necessary universal element as absolute major principle; but the medium of inference, as said, is, in all cases, the real relation of the effect and its cause. The medium founding such inference perplexed Kant much; and he states the difficulty also in his introduction (iv.), where he defines the analytical and synthetical judgments. His error is in assuming that such medium must be purely ideal and subjective, or that it must be sought for in the mind alone, and not in the objects. The true reason why a cause is formally and really such is in the cause or object itself as presupposed to our knowledge, or our ideas of it; and therefore our knowledge of a cause must proceed fundamentally from the object, not from any merely subjective affection, or pure figment of the mind.

It has been suggested that Kant borrowed the ideal of his "synthetical judgment *a priori*" from Dr. Reid. The peculiar judgments attributed to the mind by Dr. Reid, supposed to be the original copied by Kant, are described in vol. ii., essay vi., chap. i., of Dr. Reid's works. He says there may be judgment which "is a solitary act of the mind, and the expression of it by affirmation or denial is not at all essential to it. . . . Our judgments of this kind are purely the gift of nature, nor do they admit of any improvement by culture. Nature has subjected us to them, whether we will or not Philosophers have never been able to give any definition of judgment which does not apply to the determinations of our senses, our memory, and consciousness, nor any definition of simple apprehension which can comprehend these determinations." He restricts these judgments, however, to "persons come to the years of understanding." He admits, also, that "judgment is an act of the mind, specifically different from simple apprehension, or the bare conception of a thing." He should have admitted, moreover, that there can be no judgment without affirmation or denial; or, what comes to the same, there can be no judgment without comparison of subject and predicate, and assent or dissent as to their agreement.

Dr. Reid seems not to have distinguished duly between the mind's obvious first judgment of what is evident by way of primitive fact and the act by which the intellect simply apprehends, or has "a bare conception." While analysis, synthesis, and judgment may be required to form our first clear conceptions, both of incomplete things, as "being, one, essence," etc., and of sensible objects,

yet it does not thence follow, as Reid assumes, that such sensible objects cannot afterwards be apprehended by the intellect without a judgment. The intellect can readily either apprehend or judge when objects previously known are presented by "the senses, memory, or consciousness;" it can apprehend even a complex object, as a judgment; and it can thus apprehend a judgment without making that judgment its own act, or without affirming or denying the agreement of its subject and predicate. But obvious first judgments of things, evident by way of primitive facts, are not "solitary acts of the mind." They are comparative judgments, which affirm or deny connection of subject and predicate. Reid's "judgments, which are purely the gift of nature," which are "solitary acts of the mind," would not give logical truth to the intellect, since they would not be comparative judgments, and would not explicitly include either composition or division; indeed, they would not express formal truth in the mind any more than the instinctive appreciation or *quasi* judgment of sensible things expresses formal truth in the brute's faculties.¹

Kant must have weighed all these objections to Reid's "judgment of nature," which is "a solitary act of the mind;" for Kant's "synthetical judgment *a priori*" includes, as he often tells us, the synthesis of subject and predicate, made somehow, *a priori*, by "pure reason." His embarrassment is to ascertain and assign the medium, or the nexus of predicate and subject, which must be seen by the intellect when it forms this incomprehensible judgment. If the medium is something learned empirically, then the judgment is purely synthetical; if the medium be known only *a priori* then the judgment is purely analytical. He seeks for a mixed or dual principle, that will account both for the synthetical and the *a priori* character of such judgments.

It is not easy to conceive how all mathematical judgments are synthetical, as asserted by Kant, especially if we accept his own definition of the synthetical judgment, in which he describes it as one attributing to a subject or essence a predicate which lies entirely outside of that subject or essence; as, for example, "bodies gravitate." It is true that he subsequently amends this definition so as to include the case in which a mathematical predicate implicitly or logically contained in the subject is attributed to that subject, though not explicitly known by merely knowing the es-

¹ There is inchoative but imperfect formal truth in the intellect's simple apprehensions; but yet, as St. Thomas says, p. 1, qu. 16, a, 2, truth is in such acts as in things, it is formal truth properly so called only in judgments of composition or division: "Veritas quidem potest esse in sensu, vel in intellectu cognoscente quod quid est, ut in quadam re vera, non autem ut cognitum in cognoscente."

sence itself, which predicate, however, is found by analysis.¹ But no explanation can do away with the obvious fact that all purely mathematical conclusions are properly and truly analytical judgments, and are learned by means of analysis.

It seems true that the mind never employs analysis, which, under all respects, excludes synthesis, as Aristotle implies, *Posterior Analytics*, bk. ii., ch. 9, where he says: "It is manifestly necessary that primary things become known to us by induction," which includes experience. But yet, the final inference in the example given by Kant, that $7 + 5 = 12$, or that "a straight line is the shortest distance between two given points," is analytical, though it is a judgment of composition; and his reasoning merely shows at the most that some synthesis must precede this judgment and help towards it. Yet the two operations, synthesis and analysis, are here distinct from each other, and therefore they do not so combine as to constitute one composite operation, which is a "synthetical judgment," *a priori*.

The absolutely necessary, he asserts, is out of and beyond the world, or the "cosmological;" it is not an object of experience or intuition, nor can it be concluded from the world. But this is not logically correct, for the necessary can be validly deduced, *a posteriori*, from the contingent. "Supreme Being is a mere ideal of speculative reason," he says; yet, though "a mere ideal," he concedes that it is a faultless one for its theoretical uses. "Necessity and contingency are not properties of things themselves, they are merely subjective, or are of ideas."² In this language, again, it may be seen how universally Kant denies all reality which is external to the idea. If objects external to the ideas of reason have neither contingency nor necessity, then they have no reality; they become, as Fichte would say, merely "things posited by reason," for all conceivable real things must, as a fact, be either necessary or contingent; and, consequently, if there be no real things that are contingent, nor any that are necessary, then there are no real things at all, since there is no medium between the necessary and the contingent.

Kant concludes his work, *Criticism of Pure Reason*, with a treatise on the *Transcendental Doctrine of Method*, in which he explains his "architectonic of all cognition," or how all science may be systematized into a high philosophy, based on principles of an upper pure reason, which, it would appear, transcend all his other transcendentials. He says: "It is possible to frame an architectonic of all human cognition, the formation of which, at the present time,

¹ Transcendental Æsthetic, § 9. Also, Transcendental Doctrine of Method, chap. I, sec. I.

² Transcendental Dialectic, bk. ii., chap. iii., sec. 5, p. 378.

considering the immense material collected, or to be found in the ruins of old systems, would not, indeed, be very difficult. Our purpose at present is merely to sketch the plan of the architectonic of all cognition given by *pure reason*. By *reason* I understand here the whole high faculty of cognition, the *rational* being, placed in contradistinction to the *empirical*."

He then proceeds to construct this "architectonic of all human cognition" by giving each branch of science its proper place in the edifice. Logic, Natural Philosophy, or Physics and Mathematics, he maintains, are not philosophy; they are merely instruments used by the philosopher. He distinguishes philosophy as historical, or philosophy as learned from a teacher; but not understood scientifically and in its principles; and as rational, or philosophy which is understood in its principles, its conclusions being seen as apodictic, or demonstratively true. But if philosophy be considered as something objective, or in itself, it is an archetype which has never been reached yet. Reason can philosophize, he tells us, and thereby tend to that archetype as to "a possible science," but cannot certainly reach it.

Also, philosophy as cosmical is the teleology of reason, or it gives the ultimate end of reason. That final end of reason, or its ultimate perfect state, is, as yet, something ideal. When reached or realized by reason, then the philosopher can legislate for human reason, or give the entire law of rational knowledge. Finally, philosophy is either propedeutic, that is, critical and explanatory of pure reason; or, it is metaphysical, including metaphysics of nature and ethics. The metaphysics of nature comprehends all pure rational principles and all theoretical cognition; understanding, as regards such theoretical cognition, that the theory itself is founded on pure *a priori* ideas or principles. Ethics contains all the principles which determine *a priori* and necessitate all action. Ethics is philosophy which is purely *a priori*; hence, it is not based upon anthropological considerations, nor, indeed, upon any empirical matter. Ethics supposes, as a fundamental truth, the will's necessary tendency to good as its object; but the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God, are not demonstrable, though they may be admitted as presuppositions for theoretical convenience. The whole system of metaphysics includes four principal parts, namely: ontology, rational physiology, rational cosmology, and rational theology.

The argument of Kant's entire work is briefly this: "Granted that pure reason originates for itself *a priori* all its universal ideas, and that time and space exist only as *a priori* forms or principles, which determine representations in the imagination; then all my system follows as a necessary conclusion."

But neither does he deduce a congruous system from his supposed first principles, nor are his first principles themselves true; and thus it happens that, by repudiating all first principles and all primitive facts, as previously understood by the human mind, Kant has built up, *a priori*, a theory which does not defend one proposition, peculiar to itself, that is simply true when viewed under all respects. Nor is this assertion too sweeping, since the human mind has no such ideas, and no such principles, as those on which he bases his entire system, and from which he derives all his conclusions. It is not too much to say, furthermore, that no distinguished philosopher before Kant's day had ever gone so far as he went into that arbitrary and gratuitous "dogmatism" which he full often censures in his predecessors. On his own "dogmatic" assumptions he founds a theory of man, of the world, and of God, which does away with the objective reality of them all, and reduces all real truths to a maze of *a priori* abstractions, to a mere barren and meaningless idealism, which is more completely unfounded than that of Berkeley, or than was the skepticism of Pyrrho. Kant affirms neither the existence of God nor the immortality of the soul. His theory incloses man's soul in himself, where it is to become learned without seeing any real truth; where it has no object to know except the unrealities of a blind idealism. The student, educated entirely according to this ideal, must soon come to see his own life as aimless, and even existence itself as without purpose. If he looks upon the dreary and perplexed theories of his own subjective philosophy, he finds only ideas with which nothing, no object, is thought. What wonder if his spirit then sink down within him, baffled and hopeless!

Some few salient principles of Kant's ideal philosophy, which are above briefly considered in this article, are: 1. Pure reason has various *a priori* transcendental ideas not derived from objects external to them; 2. The imagination has two *a priori* forms or ideas, space and time, which do not exist outside of that faculty; 3. Phenomenon is from impression, but it is only subjective; and the forms of the imagination, space and time, are the active determining principles that give existence to all representations in the imagination, the impressions being the matter or the occasion; 4. The mind acquires scientific truth only by means of synthetical judgments *a priori*, the synthesis alone being augmentative of knowledge; all mathematical judgments are synthetical *a priori*; 5. The medium through which a synthetical judgment *a priori* is inferred, as, when cause is inferred from an observed fact or effect, is purely subjective, is obscure and is undefined in Kant's system; 6. The mind knows nothing of external things beyond phenomena, and *a priori* ideas or judgments are the only means by which phe-

nomena can be manifested to the mind; 7. Objects must conform to our cognitions, for intelligence and ideas are presupposed to all their objects; 8. The noumena, or the objects from which phenomena proceed, are unknowable.

Since the human mind knows naturally, and by way of primitive facts, both that the external objects around us are realities, and that time and space are things independent of man's imagination, this article will not be lengthened with arguments adduced to refute Kant's "mere dogmatism" in gratuitously denying these evident truths.

A complete exposition of Kant's *Criticism of Pure Reason* could not be made within the small compass of a few pages. It is intended herein merely to convey some notion of that author's philosophical method, which may prove useful to the student who wishes to read for himself the influential writings of this distinguished founder of a new school in speculative philosophy.

THE LIFE AND TIMES OF FREDERICK THE SECOND.

PART FIRST.

AS the same landscape, surveyed from different points of view, necessarily presents different aspects, so any period of history must be differently viewed by students of history in succeeding centuries. Moreover, as from a lofty eminence a wide prospect may be surveyed and relations between its parts detected which closer proximity would hide, so the progress of historical science gives breadth of view and often reveals before-unsuspected connections between familiar facts which may thus gain a new significance.

Historical finality is, then, impossible to us, and many an important act of the great drama of human history must needs be again and again described, in the light afforded both by the acquisition of new data and by the removal of old overshadowing prejudices. This is especially the case with respect to such periods as form critical epochs in human evolution, or which have been the battle-fields of opposing political and religious beliefs.

One of the consoling facts of the present time is the comparative justice of most of our historical writers compared with those of the preceding century, as is conspicuously apparent in their treatment of the history of the Middle Ages.

Now, of those ages it is the thirteenth which has come to be regarded as that which witnessed the culmination of a political and social civilization emphatically Christian. It is true that not only then, but in the Middle Ages generally, the Christian revelation—that is, the authority of the Church—was officially recognized as the true and proper guide of public, no less than of private, life, throughout that comity of nations which then formally merited the denomination of "*Christendom*." It is also true that not a little may be advanced in favor of the Christian pre-eminence either of the twelfth or of the eleventh century. Nevertheless, it is the century which beheld the reigns of Innocent III., St. Louis, and St. Ferdinand, which was distinguished by the establishment of the great Franciscan and Dominican orders, and which closed with the Knights Templars still in possession of their commanderies, that has not without reason been generally accepted as the typical age of Christian supremacy.

According to the ideas prevalent in that age, the world was to be conjointly governed by two supreme powers: by the Pope in all things spiritual, and by the Roman Emperor in matters temporal. It is, then, in the relations existing between the popes and the emperors that we have the key to the general history of the period. On account, however, of the short duration of many pontificates, and because the life of Frederick the Second extended through the first half of the thirteenth century, it will be convenient to make use of the history of this emperor as a means of depicting the condition of the world generally during that most eventful half-century.

There are three other considerations which invite our attention to the career of the second Frederick. These are: (1) The remarkable character of the man himself—the so-called wonder of the world; (2) The fact that his career occasioned the first appearance of evils which did not show their full deformity till three centuries later. The lurid light thrown by the conflagration of the sixteenth century upon events of the thirteenth, which prepared the way for that calamity, makes plain to us how well-justified were certain actions of mediæval Popes which have been ignorantly or inconsiderately reprobated. (3) The third consideration which lends interest to the biography we propose to sketch out, is the tendency which exists amongst both Catholics and non-Catholics to regard our own time as one of exceptional anti-Catholic triumph. Recent sacrileges, persecutions, and defections from the faith have induced a depression on the part of some churchmen, and an exultation on the part of the Church's enemies, which are, both of them, alike unreasonable. A study of the history of Frederick the Second is well fitted to correct this unreasonableness, by showing how great were the religious evils which existed in that "age of faith," and thus bringing home to us the greatness and solidity of the religious gains we now enjoy, in what many persons too hastily deem to be an "age of infidelity."

Frederick the Second was born on the 26th of December, 1194, and with that date our story begins.

It will be well, however, before beginning that story, to take a somewhat preliminary survey of the condition of the civilized world at his birth, and especially to note such antecedents of his empire, his kingdoms, and his ancestry, both male and female, as may enable the reader to understand the meaning of the various facts to be afterwards related. Without a preliminary comprehension of such introductory matters, a survey of the multifarious transactions of his reign would hardly instruct, but rather bewilder, the reader. The plan, which it appears most reasonable here to pursue, is to begin with the series of Supreme Pontiffs, to follow on

with a brief summary of Frederick's imperial predecessors, and with notices concerning those countries included within their empire. The countries external to that empire should next come under review, and, finally, his maternal ancestors, with the domains which acknowledged their sway.

THE POPES.

By briefly surveying the series of Supreme Pontiffs for about a century and a half before Frederick's birth, we shall possess ourselves, as it were, of a continuous thread of history, whereby we may subsequently connect together all the historical facts to which reference will have to be made.

The long line of the Popes, after various alternations of eminence and insignificance, with many examples of distinguished piety, and some sad cases of lamentable demerit, may, for our present purpose, be considered from the Pontificate of the illustrious and saintly German, Leo IX., although the names of some earlier Pontiffs will have to be incidentally mentioned in noticing the earlier of the Roman Emperors after Charlemagne.

Leo IX. was designated Pope in the year 1048 by his powerful kinsman, the Emperor Henry III. He, none the less, however, but rather more, submitted himself to the election of the Romans, an act to be expected of one so jealous for all that was canonically regular and from so stout an opponent of simony and all unworthy conduct on the part of clerics. In the first days of his Pontificate, Leo visited the great abbey of Clugny, and thence brought with him to Rome the renowned monk, Hildebrand,¹ whom he made sub-dean and treasurer of the Holy See. Leo had to do with some of the remote maternal ancestors of Frederick the Second, namely, with certain Northmen, or Normans, who had not long before appeared in Southern Italy. In contending with them he fought and lost, in 1053, the battle known as the battle of Civitella. After becoming their prisoner, he, in 1059, accepted their chief, Robert Guiscard, as his vassal Duke of Apulia, and thus gave him legal power and status.

Pope Leo, after receiving from the Emperor the duchy of Beneventum, died in 1054, and was succeeded by Victor II. and Stephen IX., whose Pontificates together lasted but four years, throughout which the influence of Hildebrand prevailed, as it also did through that of their successor, Nicholas II., who reigned from 1058 to 1061. Nicholas is renowned, amongst other things, for restricting the right of electing the Sovereign Pontiffs to Cardinals only (of whom Hildebrand was one), and for his efforts to enforce

¹ Hildebrand had been chaplain to a preceding Pontiff, Gregory VI.

clerical celibacy—efforts which encountered much opposition in Northern Italy. Upon the death of Nicholas, the North-Italian prelates elected (in spite of the new law as to Papal elections) an Antipope of their own, while the Cardinals at Rome canonically elected Alexander II., whose power was successfully maintained in spite of the efforts of the then Emperor to support the Antipope. On the death of Alexander in 1073, Hildebrand was elected Pope, and, as Gregory VII., carried on that well-known struggle with the Emperor Henry IV. which led to the besieging of the Pope in the Castle of St. Angelo, to his rescue by Robert Guiscard above mentioned, and to his retreat to Salerno, where he died in 1085. This great Pope was, as every one knows, zealously supported by the powerful Matilda, known as "the great Countess." She was daughter and heiress of Boniface, Count of Tuscany, and she had given up to the Pope her wide domains during her lifetime, reserving to herself only a life interest. She was no less a supporter of Gregory's successors, Victor III. (1086–1087), Urban II. (1088–1099), and Pascal II. (1099–1118), who were all duly elected by the Cardinals without imperial interference, and who zealously carried forward the policy of the great Hildebrand. Urban II. was the Pope who promoted the first Crusade. After the very short reign of Gelasius II. (1118–1119) came Calixtus II. (1119–1124), who, in the year before his death, terminated the long strife about investitures by the celebrated Concordat of Worms. By that treaty the Emperor renounced the manifest abuse of giving investiture of Episcopal temporalities by unmistakably spiritual symbols—the ring and crosier—while his right to receive homage from newly appointed Bishops for their lands was recognized, the sceptre only being made use of to bestow investiture of them. During this Pontificate the Holy See became legally entitled to the domains of the Countess Matilda through her death, though possession of them was far from being attained.

The next Pontiff, Honorius II., who reigned from 1124 to 1130, and who directly intervened in the election of the Emperor (Lothair), received from him an engagement expressly to exclude ecclesiastical affairs from the matters respecting which Bishops had to take an oath of allegiance. The Emperor also engaged to yield up to the Holy See the lands of Matilda, and to solicit Papal sanction for his election, recognizing that sanction as a condition essential to its validity. The next Pope, Innocent II. (1130–1143), further secured the recognition of the important regulation that no bishop should be invested with his temporalities before his consecration. He had long to contend with two Antipopes—Anaclet II. and Victor IV.—and towards the close of his reign there broke out that revolutionary movement of Arnold of Brescia, which troubled the

very short Pontificates of his two successors, Celestine II. and Lucius II., the latter of whom actually lost his life, in 1145, in a revolutionary tumult. To these two Pontiffs succeeded the pious Cistercian monk known as Eugenius III. (1145-1153), who, though unable to enter Rome for his consecration and subsequently compelled to take refuge in France, yet regained, in 1149, possession of the Holy City, though only by a compromise with the so-called Republic. It was he who caused St. Bernard to preach the second Crusade. The next Pope, Anastasius IV., was but the very short-lived predecessor of the only English Pope who has as yet been chosen—Cardinal Nicholas Breakspeare of St. Albans. He took the name of Hadrian IV., reigned from 1154 to 1159, and is noted for his supposed action respecting Ireland and Henry II. of England. Wishing to restore the full temporal jurisdiction of the Holy See (which had lapsed under his predecessors), he excommunicated Arnold of Brescia, laid Rome under an interdict, and retired to Orvieto. These actions led to the expulsion of Arnold by the Romans themselves, followed by his recapture and death in the early morning on the day of an imperial coronation in the subdued but still tumultuous city. Next came the illustrious and energetic Alexander III. (1160-1181), during whose Pontificate there were no less than three Antipopes, who styled themselves Victor IV., Pascal III., and Calixtus III., respectively, as will be more fully noted in speaking of the simultaneous Imperial rule. To Alexander there succeeded Cardinal Ubaldo di Ostia, called Lucius III. (1181-1185), and afterwards came Uberto Crivelli (a Milanese), who took the title of Urban III., and is said to have died of grief, in 1187, at the loss of Jerusalem by the Christians. The next Pontiff, Gregory VIII., was Pope but for two months, and his successor, Clement III. (1187-1191), was long kept from his city by revolutionary disorders, and only entered it in 1188, in consequence of a treaty made with his subjects. Three days after his death, which took place on Lady-day, 1191, Cardinal Hyacinth was elected at the advanced age of eighty-five. He took the title of Celestine III., and he was in the occupation of St. Peter's chair when Frederick the Second first saw the light.

Such being the list of Pontiffs from 1048 till Christmas, 1194—for the most part illustrious for energy and single-minded devotion to the cause of the Church—we must next also survey the antecedents of Frederick's empire, from the time of its foundation till his birth. This part of our task, as it includes both the male ancestors of the subject of this memoir and the history of the central and greatest temporal dominion of Christendom, will have to be treated at greater length than any other section of this introduction.

THE EMPERORS.

When Leo III., by his coronation at Rome of the great Karl, revived, in the year 800, the Western Roman Empire, that Empire included the following countries: All modern France and North-eastern Spain down to Barcelona, Belgium and Holland, the duchy of Holstein, modern Germany and Bohemia as far as the river Elbe and somewhat to the east of it in the north, Hungary as far as the river Theiss, Istria and the inland parts of Northern Dalmatia, Switzerland, and Italy as far south as about to the border of the modern kingdom of Naples. This vast domain, after various temporary divisions, came with one exception into the possession of Charlemagne's grandson, Charles the Fat. The exception referred to is the kingdom of Burgundy,¹ which passed into the possession of Boso, brother-in-law of Charles the Bald, yet another grandson of Charlemagne. This kingdom is a region of much historical importance, and included the modern French province of Provence, with an adjacent strip of Languedoc, the eastern part of the Lyonnais, Burgundy east of the Soane, with Franche Comté, Dauphiné, Savoy and the western half of Switzerland. On the deposition of Charles the Fat, in 887, his dominions were divided into the following four parts: (1) The kingdom of the East Franks, or the Teutonic kingdom; (2) The kingdom of the West Franks, or Karolingia; (3) The kingdom of the Mid Franks, a portion intermediate between the East and West Franks, called Lotharingia; and (4) The kingdom of Italy. *Lotharingia* included modern Holland and Eastern Belgium, with Hainault, part of Picardy, and about half of Champagne, with what of Lorraine and Alsace that was lately or is still French. It also included modern Germany west of the Rhine, except a tract to its left south of Mainz, and a strip on its right bank northwards from Coblenz, so that Aachen, Köln, Trier and Strasburg were included in Lotharingia, which extended west almost to Rheims. Southwards it was bounded by the kingdom of Burgundy. The kingdom of *Karolingia* included all the domains of the Empire to the west of Lotharingia and Burgundy, while those to the east of Lotharingia and north of the Alps formed the *Teutonic kingdom* of the East Franks, separated from Denmark by the river Eider. The *kingdom of Italy* embraced the Imperial domains south of the Alps and east of Burgundy. Lotharingia oscillated for a short time between the East and West Franks, but soon became solidly united with the former, so that the Teutonic kingdom and Lotharingia came to constitute together

¹ The reader should be careful not to confound this *Imperial* Burgundy with the *French duchy* of Burgundy, which consisted for the most part of the province of Bourgogne west of the Saone.

the *kingdom of Germany*; and it is that kingdom that will for a time especially occupy our attention, and form, as it were, the foreground of our historical sketch.

This kingdom was subdivided (as indeed was the Empire generally) into great military districts, the commander of each of which was termed a *Herzog* or *Duke*. Within each duchy were more or fewer subordinate divisions, the superintendent and judge of each of which was called a *Graf* or *Count*. The border lands of the Empire were termed *Marches* or *Marks*, and each such region was placed under a *Margrave* or Count of the March (also called a *Marquess*), who was charged with its defence and extension. Other dignitaries set over the various royal estates were called *Palsgraves* or Counts of the Palace—more briefly Counts Palatine—and one of these, the Palsgrave of the Rhine or *Archpalsgrave*, came to rank with the highest officers of the Empire. Important cities which owed obedience to no one but the Emperor only, were often governed to a greater or less degree by the *Burgraf* or Count of the City. Besides these temporal Lords there were (sooner or later) six great spiritual Princes, the Archbishops of Mainz, Köln, Trier, Bremen, Magdeburg and Salzburg, and to these by degrees were added other spiritual powers holding directly of the Emperors by fief granted to them, so that there came to be many Prince Bishops and Princely Abbots and Abbesses. The secular functions of the Abbeys were committed to some lay-noble, who was called the *Advocatus* or Steward of such Abbey, and who too often sought to appropriate to himself the property confided to his management.

All these dignitaries, of whatsoever degree, generally agreed in one respect. This was their desire and endeavor to transform themselves from mere administrators of domains into their possessors, the first step towards which was the obtaining of a right to transmit their offices hereditarily, and, if possible, through females as well as males.

The great duchies into which Germany was divided were the following: (1) That which was of the whole Frankland, the Frank duchy *par excellence*, i. e., *Franconia*. This included the valleys of the Main and the Neckar. It was bounded on the west by Lotharingia; on the south by an undulating line running from a little south to a little north of 49° north latitude, and rising northward towards the east; on the north by the duchy of Saxony, and on the east by the river Saale and a line running thence south by Bayreuth, and a little west of the longitude of Munich. (2) The duchy of *Saxony*, which included what is now Mecklenburg, Hanover, and Rhenish Prussia, almost as far west as the Rhine. (3) *Lotharingia*, which from a kingdom thus became a duchy. (4) *Suabia*, or *Alemannia*—the land in which both the Rhine and the Danube

arise—a region bounded on the south by the Rhætian Alps, and therefore including much of Switzerland; on the west by the Rhine, and so including modern Baden and Wurtemberg; on the north by Franconia, and on the east by an undulating line continuing southward for a space the eastern boundary of Franconia, and then curving westward so as to exclude all but the uppermost part of the valley of the Inn. (5) *Bavaria*, a region very different from the Bavaria of to-day, and bounded on the south by Italy and the Alps (including what is now Southwestern Austria and the valley of the Inn), and on the west by Suabia and Franconia. North-eastwards it was obliquely bounded by the southwestern mountains of Bohemia, and southeastwards by an undulating border extending from near Linz to near Lienz. Besides these five duchies, Bohemia and certain marches should here be noted. *Bohemia* was practically the Bohemia of to-day without Moravia. Of the marches one was *Austria*, a tract extending eastwards north and south of the Danube, towards and ultimately to Vienna. It was bounded on the north by the river Taga, and on the south by the lower slopes of the highlands south of the Danube. From the last-mentioned boundary to the Adriatic, or the east of Italy, was the march of *Carynthia*; while north of Bohemia, and east of Franconia, was the march of *Meissen*, extending between the Elbe and the Oder, north of Bohemia, and including the Saxony of to-day, with an adjacent parallel slip of Prussia. Later instituted marches were those of *Moravia*, which adjoined the duchy of Bohemia on the southeast, and of *Brandenburg*, which lay north of Meissen and east of Saxony.

East of the Elbe was the land of the *Obotrites*, in the great island of *Rügen*, lying off its eastern end, east of which was *Pomerania*; while elsewhere, north and east of Germany, some Scandinavian, Finnish, and Slavonian peoples, who may be more conveniently noticed later on. Of this great kingdom of Germany Duke Arnulf was, on the deposition of Charles the Fat, elected king, and was crowned emperor at Rome in 894. The short reign of his son, the child-king Lewis, is notable for the irruption into the empire of the fierce and pagan Hungarians. In 918 Conrad I., a Franconian count,¹ was elected king, to whom, by his own desire, succeeded an opponent, Henry I. (surnamed the Fowler), who was Duke of Saxony and founder of the Saxon dynasty of Roman emperors. He warred successfully with the Hungarians, made the refractory Duke of Bohemia do homage for his duchy, and finally

¹ On his accession he resigned his county to his brother, who was already Palsgrave of Franconia; and he was made Palsgrave of Lotharingia by Henry I., in consideration of his making no claim to succeed his brother in the empire. Thus these offices became and remained united.

annexed Lotharingia to the German kingdom. He also founded many great towns, and he transferred his own duchy of Saxony to a relative, who founded the Billung line of dukes, to which there will be occasion more than once to refer. Upon his death his son, the great Otho I., was elected, and, in 936, crowned king at Aachen, being attended at his coronation by the dukes of Franconia, Lotharingia, Suabia, and Bavaria, as carver, chamberlain, cross-bearer, and horse-master respectively. He compelled both the King of Denmark and the Duke of Poland to do him homage, and finally expelled the Hungarians from Germany. Crossing the Alps, he made Berengar, King of the Lombards, become his man, and was subsequently himself crowned King of Italy at Milan, and emperor at Rome on December 2d, 962, by Pope John XII., being the first German king so crowned since Arnulf. Otho brought all the great duchies into his own hands or into the hands of members of his family.¹ He won lands from the Slaves, and founded the archbishopric of Magdeburg. He associated his son Otho with him, crowning him king at Aachen in 961, and making him co-emperor in 967. This son succeeded to his power as Otho II. in 973, and died ten years later, leaving his infant son, Otho III., under the guardianship of his mother, Theophania, daughter of Romanus II.,² Emperor of the Eastern Roman Empire. Otho III. was crowned emperor at Rome in 996, and died childless in 1002, being succeeded by the saintly Henry II.,³ who was crowned King of Italy in 1004 and Emperor in 1014. Before he obtained the title of emperor he took that of "King of the Romans," a title thenceforward assumed by German kings up to the time of their imperial coronation. It was now a fully established custom that the elected King of Germany should become Roman emperor, although his assumption of that dignity was only to follow upon his coronation by the Sovereign Pontiff. Henry II. died in 1024 and was buried at Bamberg, the seat of a bishopric of his foundation. It was this emperor who first sanctioned the settlement of the Normans in Southern Italy, an important event, indeed, as regards the history of Frederick II. With Henry ends the line of the Saxon emperors.

The next dynasty, of Franconian emperors, was initiated by Con-

¹ Thus, though king and emperor, he also remained Duke of Franconia. He gave Lotharingia to his son-in-law, Conrad, husband of Leitgarde. His son Rudolph he made Duke of Suabia, and his brother Henry Duke of Bavaria, in the place of a member of the ancient Bavarian family of Schyren, who was deposed for rebellion. Subsequently Otho made one of this family a palsgrave of the duchy.

² Of the Basilian dynasty of Greek emperors. She was also daughter-in-law of Nicephorus II., Phocas (who married her widowed mother, Theophania), and sister of Basil II., the conqueror of the Bulgarians, who extended his empire to the Danube.

³ He was the grandson of that Henry who, as has been noted, was made Duke of Bavaria by Otho I.

rad II.¹ (called the Salic), who was elected King of Germany in 1024, crowned King of Italy at Milan in 1026, and emperor the year following. About this time certain changes were made which should here be noted. Carinthia had been erected into a duchy by Otho III. Lotharingia was also divided into (1) Lower or Riparian Lotharingia, and (2) Upper Lotharingia, or that of the Mosel, separated by a boundary running roughly parallel with the river Mosel, but a little north of it. Conrad II. bestowed the duchies of Suabia, Bavaria, and Carinthia upon his son, Henry, and on another relative, the Archpalgrave, the united Palatinates of Franconia and Saxony, and the *Palatinate of the Rhine*, a region comprising most of Franconia west of the Rhine, with more than the trans-Rhenish part of modern Bavaria. One of Conrad's most important acts, however, was the addition to the empire, in 1032, of the kingdom of Burgundy,² which had been separated from it since the time of Charles the Fat.

Of the emperors since Charlemagne no one was so great and powerful as the first Otho. After him the imperial power had become diminished to the advantage of that of the great nobles, who especially profited by the long minority of Otho III. to extend their power and influence. Their power was still further extended by an edict of Conrad II. making fiefs legally hereditary. This decree was, indeed, intended to strengthen the emperor by giving greater power to the lesser nobles who held under the Dukes. Nevertheless, in the long run, it still further diminished the power and influence of the emperors themselves. Conrad died in 1039 in Italy, but was buried at Speyer, where his monument still remains. His son Henry was but twenty years of age at his accession, and the year before he had been crowned King of Burgundy at Solothurn. He became a more powerful emperor than any of his successors till 1194, or any of his predecessors, save Charlemagne and the great Otho, giving away the duchies at his will to men who were content to act as his agents,³ retaining Franconia himself, and bestowing Bavaria upon his wife Agnes. He enlarged the march of Austria, and made the Hungarian kings do homage for their crowns. In 1040 he raised to the Papal throne the saintly

¹ A count of Franconia, cousin to its duke, and descended from Leitgarde, daughter of Otho I.

² This he inherited from the father of his wife, Gisela, namely, Rudolph, third Burgundian king of that name. This kingdom, founded, as before mentioned, by Duke Boso, in 879, after having been divided (into the two kingdoms of Upper and Lower Burgundy) was reunited by Rudolph II. in 933, to whom succeeded Conrad the Pacific in 937, followed by Rudolph, the father of Gisela, in 993. Rudolph II. had acquired the kingdom of Arles from Hugh, King of Provence, as the result of their contention for the kingdom of Italy.

³ He gave the duchy of Upper Lotharingia to another relative, whose descendants retained it till the time of the Empress Maria Theresa.

Leo IX., with whom our list of Popes began. He died in 1056, and was succeeded by his unfortunate and unworthy child, Henry IV., under the guardianship of the widowed empress, under whom the power of the crown underwent serious diminution. She resigned her own duchy of Bavaria to Otho Graf von Nordheim, and made her son-in-law Rudolph, Count of Rheinfelden (husband of her daughter Matilda), Duke of Suabia, to the injury of a certain powerful Suabian earl, Graf von Breisgau (to whom her late husband had promised it), whom she sought to propitiate by making him Duke of Carinthia, who took the title Duke of Zäringen.¹

It was during the reign of Henry IV. that the renowned struggle with Gregory VII. took place,—of which the well-known visit to Canossa was an incident,—during which horrible disorders prevailed in Germany. Great disputes and struggles between the leading nobles, partly as Papal or imperial partisans, partly as men seeking merely their own selfish views, and partly probably in most cases from mixed motives. Some of the descendants of these nobles play more or less important parts during the life of Frederick the Second, and on this account it will be desirable to record here some details which might otherwise be omitted. Thus Henry deprived Otho of Nordheim of his duchy of Bavaria and bestowed it on Welf IV., son of the Italian marchese, Alberto Azzo II. of Este, who had married a descendant of the ancient Bavarian house of Welf, and from whom proceeded a notable personage known as *Henry the Black*. By way of compensation Otho was made administrator of Saxony. Now the duchy of Saxony had long been in the possession of the race of Herman Billung; and with Magnus, son of its then Duke, Ordolf, the discontented Otho conspired and rebelled, with the result of imprisonment to both; and Magnus (by the death of his father in 1073) succeeded to his claim to that dukedom while in prison.

Owing to the Papal excommunication inflicted upon Henry IV., the German nobles met in 1077 at Forchheim, and there elected as their king the empress's son-in-law, Rudolph, owing to which the latter was deposed from his dukedom by the emperor; and at a diet, held at Ratisbon in 1079, the duchy of Suabia was then and there bestowed upon Frederick of Hohenstaufen, who also received the hand of Agnes, the emperor's daughter. Here, then, we first meet with a person more notable for us, since this same Frederick was a direct ancestor—a great-great-grandfather—of Frederick the Second. It is important, also, to note that this ancestor enters upon the scene in the character of an imperial and anti-papal partisan.

"Hohenstaufen" was not the original name of Frederick's ancestors. They were more anciently known as lords of *Büren*, a vil-

¹ From the name of one of his ancestral possessions.

lage not far from Stuttgart. Near it is a chain of hills called Staüfele, and close to their village was a hill yet higher called the *Hohe Staufe*, to the top of which the Lord of Büren removed his dwelling, building a castle on its top, and becoming the Lord of Hohenstaufen. In addition to the dukedom of Suabia the Lord of Hohenstaufen also possessed considerable private domains in Elsass, inherited from a female ancestor.

The Emperor, Henry IV., got together at Brixen, in 1080, an assembly of German prelates, who affected to depose Pope Gregory VII., and to elect in his place the Archbishop of Ravenna, who called himself Pope Clement III. Henry then entered Italy, and, triumphing at Rome, was crowned emperor by his Antipope in 1084, the true Sovereign Pontiff, Gregory, remaining shut up in the Castle of St. Angelo. The Norman, Robert Guiscard, before mentioned, coming, however, to his rescue, the emperor was compelled to retreat northwards; while his own son, Conrad, supported by the great Countess, and next his son Henry,¹ rebelled against him. The struggle ended by the abdication of the emperor at Ingelheim. In 1106 he died, excommunicated, at Liège, his body lying in an unconsecrated chapel at Speyer till 1111.

His son, Henry V., on his accession, at the age of twenty-five, bestowed the Archbishopric of Mainz and the dukedom of Saxony respectively on Adalbert of Saarbruck and on Lothar Graf von Suplenberg,² who had aided his rebellion.

Duke Magnus, who, the reader will remember, succeeded to the duchy while in prison, had died, leaving two daughters. One of these, Elike, married Otho Graf von Anhalt, and bore him a very notable son, known as *Albert the Bear* (of whose claims to the duchy we shall have more than once to make mention); the other, Wulfhilda, married *Henry the Black*, before referred to, and conveyed much the larger share of her father's patrimonial possessions in Saxony to her husband, who also succeeded Welf as Duke of Bavaria.

Henry V. still maintained against the Pope the contest respecting investitures, and, marching to Rome, he made Pascal II. prisoner, and forced him, in 1111, to crown him emperor. He was so triumphant that the great Countess, who, though aged, married Welf, predecessor of Henry the Black in the dukedom of Bavaria, was forced in this last period of her life to receive him, and whose lands

¹ He had been crowned King of Germany in 1079.

² His wife, Richenza, was heiress of all that part of the duchy of Saxony which has come to form the duchy of Brunswick and part of the kingdom of Hanover. Her father was Henry of Nordheim, a relative of Otho of Nordheim, the dispossessed Duke of Bavaria, who had been appointed administrator of Saxony. Lothar himself was the son of a Saxon count, who, in 1075, had married Gebhard, a great-granddaughter of Otho III.

on her death he seized and held during the rest of his life. Being excommunicated, he held a diet at Worms in 1122, whereat was entered into that concordat, some of the stipulations of which were mentioned in the before-given summary of contemporary Papal history.

Meantime, Frederick, Duke of Hohenstaufen, had died in 1105, leaving two sons, Frederick and Conrad (aged fifteen and twelve respectively), to the care of the emperor, who gave the hand of their widowed mother—his own sister—to Leopold, Margrave of Austria. He married the elder boy, Frederick, to Jutta, daughter of Henry the Black;¹ the younger, Conrad,² he made, in 1115, Margrave of Tuscany and Duke of Ravenna. On his death, in 1125, he left his patrimony³ to the two brothers, and intrusted the imperial insignia to his empress Matilda.⁴ With Henry V. the Franconian dynasty of German kings and Roman emperors came to its end.

Now was strongly manifested that hostility between Saxony and Franconia which was of old standing, and ever latent when not patent. Franconia formed the very heart of Germany, and its great city, Worms, was distinguished for its fidelity to the Franconian emperors even during the heat of their struggle with the Holy See. Saxony, on the other hand—the conquest of Charlemagne—was, for the most part, hostile to the emperors who had succeeded its illustrious Saxon dynasty, and was proportionally papal in its policy, as were both its Duke Lothar and its Archbishop of Mainz, Adalbert. Papal, also, was the great Duke of Bavaria, the Guelf Henry the Black.

Frederick of Hohenstaufen, Duke of Suabia, with his possessions in Elsass, as well as in Suabia and Franconia, and with his imperial descent, through his mother Agnes, not unnaturally expected to be elected emperor,—an expectation strengthened by identification and fidelity, as well as by half-blood, with the great Franconian line. His very Franconian and imperialist attributes, however, made him objectionable to the Saxons, as also to the faithful adherents of the Holy See.

Though the empire was elective, yet the precise mode of election was as yet unfixed by any rules, and on this occasion no less than sixty thousand nobles are said to have claimed to vote and to have proceeded to Mainz to record their suffrages. After various disputes ten nobles were, by the rest of the nobility, chosen as

¹ Frederick was thus powerfully connected, not only through his wife, but also through his sister, the spouse of Conrad, Duke of Zähringen. His mother's second husband was Margrave of Austria, while maternally he could claim descent from Charlemagne.

² He was for a short time before this Duke of Franconia.

³ Chiefly estates in Franconia.

⁴ She was daughter of Henry I. of England.

electors, from each of the four duchies, (1) Suabia, (2) Franconia, (3) Saxony, and (4) Bavaria. The Papal legates were for the first time present to add their influence ; and also, strange to say, the renowned Frenchman, Suger, Abbot of St. Denis, near Paris. The result was the election, in August, 1125, of Lothar as emperor.¹ In return he granted to all nobles, even the dukes (whose interests in this respect were the most opposed to his own), the right of hereditary succession in their fiefs. He gave his daughter Gertrude to Henry the Proud, Duke of Bavaria (who was the son of Henry the Black), adding to it the duchy of Saxony also, Henry the Bear being made Margrave of Lausitz.² Scrupulous to do all that was right, Lothar sought from the Holy See a ratification of his election, and endeavored to conciliate the disappointed Hohenstaufen brothers, confirming them in the lands inherited from Henry V., and in the duchy of Suabia. His efforts in this respect were in vain; for, though the brothers submitted to Lothar, doing homage for their lands and swearing allegiance to him, we soon find them in rebellion against the emperor, and the emperor redemanding the bequeathed possessions of Henry V.

The younger brother, Conrad, even got himself crowned King of Italy at Milan by its antipapal archbishop in 1128, and was subsequently supported by the Antipope, Anaclet II. By the advice of St. Bernard, Lothar descended into Italy, drove both the now excommunicated Conrad back to his brother in Germany and the Antipope into the Castle of St. Angelo, while he himself was crowned emperor by Pope Innocent II. in 1133. The good Lothar then swore to allow freedom in episcopal elections, and formally acknowledged that a bishop must be consecrated before receiving his temporalities. He also yielded all claim to the territories of the great Countess, beyond a life-interest which he accepted as a vassal of the Holy See, and he was subsequently allowed to transfer the margravate of Tuscany to the Duke of Bavaria,³ also as a vassal of the Holy See. Peace was then made through the influence of St. Bernard, the Hohenstaufen brothers renewing their oaths of allegiance. The elder was allowed to remain Duke of Suabia, while Conrad was rewarded for his submission with the duchy of Franconia, with precedence over the other dukes, and with the office of standard-bearer of the Holy Roman Empire.

¹ Thus we have a solitary Saxon emperor coming in between the Franconian and Hohenstaufen dynasties, as we had a solitary Franconian between the Carolingian and Saxon dynasties.

² Or Lusatia. Henry the Bear was, as already mentioned, grandson of Magnus, Duke of Saxony. Losita, or Lausites, was a Slavonic march north of Bohemia, and forming part of what is now the modern kingdom of Saxony.

³ He was heir of the great Countess's second husband.

During his reign, Lothar was occupied in various important transactions external to the kingdom of Germany. In conjunction with Innocent II. he subdued the Normans in Sicily, jointly investing its conquered king¹ with the dignity of Count of Sicily; and he also did something to check the rising evil influence of Arnold of Brescia. In Scandinavian and Slavonian regions he settled a dispute as to the crown of Denmark,² intervened in certain contentions with respect to a people inhabiting what is now Mecklenburg and Eastern Holstein, and known as the Obotrites.³ He also waged an unsuccessful war with Boleslas of Poland,⁴ and a more successful one with Duke Sobieslas of Bohemia.⁵ One very interesting and novel appointment was also made by Lothar. The region of Thuringia—ever memorable to Catholics from the name St. Elizabeth—occupied the southeastern angle of the duchy of Saxony, and had formed a margravate. This region (the margravate having become vacant through crime) was bestowed by Lothar upon his kinsman Graf Ludwig, with the novel title of its *landgrave*, but with ducal rights.

With the death of Lothar we come to another hotly contested election. His son-in-law, the great and powerful Duke Henry the Proud (who had received the imperial regalia from his dying father-in-law), expected to be called to the throne of the empire. But a similar expectation was entertained by Conrad of Hohenstaufen, who, in addition to the great resources of himself and his brother, had the moral support of the Pope, and the energetic aid of Albert the Bear, ever seeking to regain the Saxon duchy of his grandfather Duke Magnus.

The princes, with the papal legate, met at Coblentz in 1138, and there and then elected as emperor Conrad, Duke of Franconia,

¹ The Normans had supported the Antipope Anaclet, who sent a cardinal to crown Roger as "King of Sicily."

² He settled it in favor of Niel, the illegitimate brother of a deceased King Eric.

³ They had been tributary to Charlemagne and the Saxon emperors; but their condition had varied with the strength of the empire, and it had of late been a Christian kingdom in vassalage to the dukes of Saxony. In this case, their Christian sovereign being murdered, they had renounced both their vassalage and their Christianity. The revolt ended with two heathen princes, Nicklot and Pribislaff, agreeing to be feudal dependents on and to pay tribute to the Duke of Saxony.

⁴ Who had withheld from the emperor both homage and tribute, and who (in his efforts to convert, with the help of St. Otho of Bamberg, the lapsed heathens of Pomerania) was subjecting to Poland tribes deemed by the emperor to be rather his own vassals. The emperor was aided in this war by Albert the Bear, who married a daughter of Leopold, Margrave of Austria, and half-sister to Frederick, Duke of Suabia.

⁵ Whom he compelled to do homage, a custom which had become neglected during the intestine struggles of the German kingdom under Henry IV.

who was crowned by the legate¹ King of Germany at Aachen. Certain important changes now took place;² Saxony and Bavaria were separated, the son of the deceased Henry the Proud, called Henry the Lion, being ultimately made Duke of Saxony, and resigning Bavaria to Henry Margrave of Austria, who had succeeded his brother Leopold and had married the widowed Gertrude, daughter of the Emperor Lothar. Albert the Bear, who had for a time regained the coveted duchy of Saxony, resigned it, but took instead its margravate, enlarged with the town of Brandenburg and a large district attached to it, which was separated altogether from Saxony and made immediately dependent on the emperor, its holder taking the title of *Margrave of Brandenburg*.³

Herewith Berlin first appears upon the scene, and about the same period we first hear of Vienna and Munich. Bohemia, Poland, and Hungary all called for and received Conrad's attention, and he was urgently summoned to Italy by Pope Innocent II., who, in 1139, had assembled a council at the Vatican, which condemned the heresies of Arnold of Brescia and vainly enjoined silence upon him. Meantime the Antipope Anaclet had died, and schismatic cardinals had elected another Antipope, Victor IV. The latter yielded to the arguments and persuasion of St. Bernard, and, resigning, made full submission to the vicar of Christ. The Antipope's Norman supporters, however, still resisted, and Roger, Count of Sicily, took the Pope prisoner,⁴ who was treated by his captor with such extraordinary respect and deference that Innocent II.⁵ sanctioned the assumption by Roger of the title of king, and invested him with large possessions on the mainland and with

¹ There was at this time no archbishop of Mainz.

² Henry the Great, Duke of Bavaria and Saxony, loyally yielded up the regalia to Conrad, who at a diet at Wurzburg declared it unlawful for Henry to hold two duchies, and also that Albert the Bear was lawfully entitled to his ancestral duchy of Saxony. The double duke, rebelling against this decision, was deprived of both his duchies, which led to prolonged civil war, terminated by the results stated in the text.

³ A dissentient voice made itself heard on the part of the brother of Henry the Proud, Welf, who claimed for himself again and again the duchy of Bavaria.

⁴ The repeated domestic struggles of Germany had again given Bohemia the opportunity of asserting its independence, but the emperor soon forced Vladislas, its duke, to once more acknowledge the imperial suzerainty. On an appeal from Ladislas of Poland, the competitors for that throne also acknowledged the emperor's sovereignty over Poland proper, as well as over Pomerania and Rugen, which had been rendered before by Boleslas III. Boris of Hungary also appealed to Conrad, who intervened in that country with but indifferent success.

⁵ Roger invaded the territories of the mainland, whence he had been previously excluded by Innocent and Lothar. For this the Pope attacked him, and it was thus that Innocent was taken prisoner together with his cardinals.

⁶ The Romans had made war with and conquered Tivoli, and eagerly desired to expel its inhabitants and burn the city. Its protection by the Christian zeal of Innocent was declared to be one of the ill results of clerical rule.

legatine authority in both Sicily and Apulia, the king on his part engaging to pay an annual tribute and resigning to the Pope the principality of Beneventum. In Rome itself Innocent met with rebellion, partly on account of his benevolence towards Tivoli, and partly from the revolutionary spirit which dominated in the Eternal City. An *imperial* Roman republic was then proclaimed, a senate instituted, and the emperor personally invited to return and once more rule the world from its ancient centre. The disorders continuing, as has been mentioned, through four succeeding pontificates, the emperor's presence in Rome was sought by both the city and its pontiffs, and alike in vain, as circumstances drew him not to Italy but to Palestine. The fall of Edessa¹ in the Holy Land had led to the preaching of a Crusade by St. Bernard,² but his efforts had to be seconded by those of St. Hildegarde before Conrad could be prevailed upon to take the cross a second time (he had been a Crusader in his youth), in spite of the example set him by Louis VII. of France. The dukes of Bavaria, Bohemia, Lotharingia, and Suabia³ also took the cross; but the dukes of Saxony⁴ and Zäringen⁵ remained behind, promising to spread the faith in Northern Europe.

At Easter, in 1147, the Crusaders assembled at Ratisbon, and thence proceeded through Hungary to Constantinople. This Crusade was extremely disastrous. They were well received by King Geisa of Hungary, but as soon as they entered the domains of the Eastern emperor, Manuel Comnenus, their troubles began.⁶ They were cheated and otherwise ill-treated on their way to his capital, and subsequently betrayed by his subjects.⁷ After being compelled to return to Constantinople, Conrad sailed thence to Acre, and thence made ineffectual attempts on Damascus and Ascalon. Ultimately the emperor, with the relics of his expe-

¹ This took place during the reign of the young King of Jerusalem, Baldwin III., and his mother Melisenda.

² He preached it only in obedience to the commands of Eugenius III.

³ This duke was the son of the duke who was the elder brother of the Emperor Conrad. He was also named Frederick, and had already distinguished himself in Germany. He ultimately became the successor in the empire of his imperial uncle.

⁴ This duke, the reader will recollect, was Henry the Lion, to whom was restored, by the Emperor Conrad, that Saxon duchy of which his father Henry the Proud had been deprived.

⁵ The representative of that Graf von Breisgau to whom the Empress Agnes (widow of Henry III.) had given the dukedom of Carinthia, as before stated in the text.

⁶ This was the more surprising because Conrad had entered into negotiations with the Emperor Kalo-Johannes, Manuel's predecessor, with reference to Sicilian affairs, and because the actual Emperor Manuel's wife was the sister of the Western empress.

⁷ They betrayed the emperor, and that portion of the Crusaders who had elected to traverse Iconium with him, into the hands of the Turks, so that they only escaped with much difficulty and loss. The French king Louis VII. and his queen Eleanor were much better treated by the Greeks than were the Germans.

dition, set sail for Acre, to return home, on the nativity of the Blessed Virgin, 1148.¹ On his journey home Conrad lingered at Constantinople, and there effected an alliance with the Emperor Manuel against Roger, King of Sicily, and brought back with him to Germany the Eastern Princess Theodora as wife for the Duke of Bavaria.

During the prosecution of this ill-starred Eastern expedition, the emperor's elder brother Frederick prosecuted a Northern Crusade in conjunction with Henry the Lion, of Saxony, and Albert the Bear. This effort resulted in another temporary Slavonian conversion, and the marriage of the Duke of Saxony with his cousin Clementia, daughter of the Duke of Zäringen. Fresh disorders soon arose in Germany under the young King of Germany, Henry, the elder son of the Emperor Conrad. Welf, brother of the deceased Henry the Proud, rebelled, asserting his claims to the duchy of Bavaria, and the Duke of Zäringen joined in the rebellion. They were supported by Geisa, King of Hungary,² but the rebels were overcome by the young King Henry. Next, the Duke of Saxony (Henry the Lion) affirmed that his surrender of Bavaria had not been final,³ and also claimed that duchy, whereupon Saxony was invaded by the Emperor Conrad, supported by Albert the Bear. In these troublous times the young King Henry died (in 1151), whereupon the Emperor Conrad recommended as his successor, not his own younger son, the child Frederick, but his nephew Frederick, who now, through the death of his father, had become Duke of Suabia. In the very next year the Emperor died at Bamberg, after confiding the imperial regalia to his nephew just mentioned, and before he himself had found an opportunity to be crowned emperor. In fact, death surprised him in the midst of preparations for an expedition to Italy for his imperial coronation.

The princes met at Frankfort to elect an emperor, and this was the first occasion on which such an election took place at that city. In March, 1152, the princes accepted the recommendation of the deceased Conrad, electing his nephew, Frederick of Hohenstaufen,

¹ Leaving the young King of Jerusalem, Baldwin III., only ten years of age, to do as best he might. Amongst the causes of the great failure of this Crusade were probably the jealousies which unhappily existed between the various Christian (or Frank) states then existing in Syria, and not unnatural apprehension felt by the Greeks at the advent of the Western warriors, seeing that the Normans were then invading Athens and other parts of Greece. The Greeks also detested the Westerns, as, in their eyes, unorthodox. Before long (in 1204) their apprehensions were to be justified and their hostile conduct avenged.

² A debatable land caused dissensions between Austria and Hungary, since formerly the Austrian territory had extended to the Raab, while more lately Hungary had reached the Ems.

³ He affirmed that he had only surrendered Bavaria to his mother, of whom, as her only child, he was the heir.

afterward known by his surname of "Rothbart," and generally called in history *Frederick Barbarossa*. He was the grandsire of our Frederick the Second, and thus for the first time a direct male ancestor of the subject of our memoir ascends the steps of the imperial throne of the Holy Roman Empire.

THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC AND THE IRISH NATIONAL LEAGUE OF AMERICA.

THE only serious criticism made upon the Irish National League of America is that it is in some undefined way a menace to American institutions. It has not been absolutely assailed as an *imperium in imperio*, for that would be too severe a strain upon American intelligence. But there have been assertions to the effect that it may be indiscreet for the people of the Republic to encourage within its confines a great association composed of men of a single race, ardently and avowedly devoted to the creation of a foreign state, beyond the jurisdiction of the American government.

In reply to this criticism I venture to affirm concerning the Irish National League of America these propositions :

I. That to assist Ireland in obtaining her national independence is only a reciprocation by the American people of the service Ireland rendered the Republic in establishing its independence.

II. That the American Republic is directly and selfishly interested in the achievement of the national independence of Ireland.

III. That the organization of the Irish race in the United States is beneficial to this country, because it tends to remove the evil effects of English misgovernment upon that important element of the American people who are of Irish origin.

I. Little needs to be said upon the first of these propositions. Doubtless, it is because the precise data have been difficult of access, that American historians have not allotted to the Irish immigration prior to the Revolution, the proportionate value to which it was entitled. There has been, moreover, a curiously illogical disposition to conceal with rhetoric the truth the fathers of the Republic struck into immortality with the sword. Some of our recent historians and certain conspicuous politicians are exceedingly de-

sirous that we should believe the American Republic a political organization evolved from an Anglo-Saxon cell. Anglo-Saxonism has been studiously feeling its way into our national good-will, anxious that its infamous behavior to North and South twenty years ago, should be speedily and permanently forgotten. The most effective and the most gracious way by which it can hope to keep our countenance is to persuade us that we are, after all, of common blood, that our constitution is modelled upon the British constitution, that our Revolution was only a stronger assertion of the principles of the British constitution, and that, in a word, England is the "mother" of America. Some American publicists unite with English politicians in promoting this absurdity; and the voluminous pages of some American historians suppress, misrepresent, or gloze over the array of facts which completely expose it.

Every American of sound sense knows that the yoke which the fathers of the Republic felt upon their shoulders was the yoke of Anglo-Saxonism; and birth in the American colonies was not essential to the dignity of being a father of the American Republic. Its paternity was uniquely heterogeneous; but it was homogeneous in one vital characteristic,—its abhorrence of that which the whole world recognized as essential Anglo-Saxonism; not the Anglo-Saxonism of mere brute force, but ideal Anglo-Saxonism, legal and constitutional Anglo-Saxonism. That kind of Anglo-Saxonism was the principle of the attitude of England toward the colonies and toward Ireland; and that principle included these claims: that the imperial power might constitutionally impose and collect taxes without consulting the people who were to pay them; might suspend all safeguards of personal liberty and annihilate all rights recognized as national or individual; might regulate trade for the exclusive profit of Anglo-Saxon monopoly; might enter into the domestic life of the governed for the purposes of spoliation, coercion of conscience, or moral and intellectual debasement;—might, in brief, do anything and everything unconstitutional with a ruffian pretence of constitutionality. That was Anglo-Saxonism as then known and applied in the colonies, and as known and applied in Ireland to this hour.

The American Revolution was inspired by a political principle the precise negative of that; and the foundations of the American Republic are laid upon the ruins of the Anglo-Saxon constitution of the eighteenth century, as applied upon this continent. The United States of America is the monument of history to the infamy and tyranny of the British constitution; and political Americanism is essentially the antitype of political Anglo-Saxonism. The attempts that have been occasionally made in recent days to represent the Republic as the daughter, the child, the heir of the

British constitution, only illustrate the facility with which facts which stand like pyramids in political history may be completely forgotten by those whose faces are turned away from them.

It was inevitable that Ireland, in which the same Anglo-Saxon constitution was in force, should unite with the American colonies in their effort to expel it; and it is perfectly reasonable to say that had the war in America lasted longer, Ireland, like the colonies, would have achieved independence. She was recognized by English statesmen as one with the colonies in the Rebellion; and every battle won in America by the rebels, native and foreign, illuminated the Irish hill-tops and forced from the crown some concession to Ireland. The history of Ireland and that of the colonies are blended during the Revolution. Ireland was the only ally America had from the beginning; the progress of her struggle was watched with anxious solicitude and its triumph hailed with the wildest joy. The interest of Ireland in the outcome was not merely that of hope for her own independence; it was the interest of race and blood.

For more than a century before the Revolution the Irish race had been hurrying in a thick and increasing tide to the colonies. The numerical magnitude of the emigration it will never be possible to ascertain. That it began as early as 1649, is indisputable; that it became more and more copious is certain. Whether the emigrant were a prisoner of war, destined to be sold to planters not yet in possession of black chattels; whether he marched to the seaboard with one of the numerous bands whom poverty, made by the law, compelled to accept the terms offered by trafficking agents of New England merchants who were in urgent need of labor; or whether he voluntarily deserted his land to seek in the colonies the liberty of craft, of commerce, of conscience, denied him there by that brutal power which made education penal in Ireland, obliterated her commerce, and strangled her manufactures,—in whatever way he reached the colonies, he disembarked a justified hater of the sham called the British constitution; and in Irish immigration there was no increment for American Toryism.

The economist Anderson, who was engaged upon his essay on the colonies when he heard of the surrender of Cornwallis, claimed that, for obvious reasons, partisans of colonial interests exaggerated the growth of the population, as they did the virtues of the climate and soil of America, in order to tempt immigrants. He contended that the population of the colonies, prior to 1630, was about 2000, and that between that and 1660 about 40,000 European immigrants were added to it. From unquestionable data it may justly be claimed that, between voluntary and enforced emigration, the Irish in the colonies at this time could not have been far below 10,000. But the Navigation Acts of 1660, applicable to Ireland

and the colonies, swept the Irish ships off the Western seas ; and thenceforth, for a considerable time, the Irish emigrants to the colonies, compelled to ship from England, are necessarily included in the immigration statistically denominated English. It is certain that of many tens of thousands of the Irish people who disappeared after the Cromwellian version of the British constitution in Ireland, many thousands must have found their way to the colonies. Indeed, so close became the conscious sympathy of the colonies and the island that as early as 1676 Ireland sent a thousand pounds to the New England colonies to assist the families impoverished by the King Philip war. It was an Irishman who was president of the society for "Promoting the Propagation of the Gospel in New England;" and in 1677 to Robert Boyle was dedicated an "Historical Account of the Doings and Sufferings of the Christianized Indians in New England." Ten years before that, in the city of Cork, William Penn had enjoyed more than a taste of the British constitution. He resolved on embracing the tenets of Quakerism, and was promptly thrown by the British constitution into the place that constitution still maintains in Ireland for those whose opinions are objectionable to it—into jail ; and it was while imprisoned there that Penn avowed those principles of perfect toleration which attracted to Pennsylvania, a few years later, an immense Irish immigration, whose love of the island was perpetuated in the names of so many of its cities and counties. It was one of the first of these immigrants, John Logan, who governed Pennsylvania for two years after Penn's death, and who bequeathed to the City of Brotherly Love the invaluable library which bears his name.

Swift's loud complaint of the flight of the Protestants of Ireland to the colonies only corroborates the evidence of many others of that epoch of the numerical strength of the exodus, terribly accelerated by the successive English statutes which crushed the incipient Irish manufactures in order to promote the manufactures of England. "This malady of emigration has appeared at many different periods during the century," wrote the Protestant provost of Trinity College, in 1779. Speaking of periods prior to that year, he says the Irish manufacturers were emigrating by thousands. It is said that the emigration from the single province of Ulster amounted to 100,000 persons ; and another authority estimates the departures for the colonies at 3000 a year. Anderson estimates the total emigration from Europe to the colonies at about 12,000 a year between 1690 and 1780 ; and with their prolific race characteristics it is no exaggeration to claim that when men were needed for the army that was to send the British constitution out of the colonies, the statement of Robertson before the Parlia-

mentary committee was below rather than above the truth ; for, if half the rebel army was Irish, as we shall find it declared to be, fresh from Ireland, a very considerable part of the other half must have been Irishmen's sons. Long before the Revolution, Irish immigration was pouring into Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, Delaware, New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Maine, Connecticut. It was the Irish idealist, Berkeley, who presented his farm and library to Yale College, and wrote among the rocks of Narragansett Bay the prophetic line,

“ Westward the star of empire takes its way.”

If we are to accept English evidence on the subject, the service the Irish race rendered in expelling the British constitution from the colonies, and in completing the enterprise of the revolutionists, was indispensable. Not to mention the financial aid given by Irish merchants to Washington, at a critical juncture ; to say nothing of the strength and influence of that race in the Continental Congress, of which Franklin's Irish friend, Charles Thomson, was secretary ; to say nothing of the navy ; not to allude to the nine Irish signers of the Declaration of Independence,—we have singularly strong testimony concerning the preponderance of Irish in the army itself. English statesmen of that period employed the word “ American ” to designate persons born in the colonies, the descendants of early settlers. “ Emigrant ” was applied only to foreign-born persons newly arrived in the colonies. When the House of Commons ordered an inquiry into the conduct of the war, among the witnesses who appeared before the committee was Joseph Galloway, a native American. He testified that “ not a fifth part of the Americans from choice have supported the present rebellion.” Lord George Germain stated on information that there were more native Americans enlisted in the British corps in the colonies than there were in Washington's army. General Robertson, who had lived in the colonies twenty-four years, and been quartermaster, with excellent opportunity for knowing the *personnel* of the “ rebel ” army, when asked how that army was composed, whether mostly natives or emigrants, answered that General Lee told him that “ half the continental army was from Ireland,”—emigrants, not natives of the colonies. General Lee had excellent opportunity for knowing the truth about the army ; and so highly did the Congress value him, that, when captured by the English, six English field officers were offered as an equivalent for his exchange. If, then, half the revolutionary army was composed of Irish immigrants, born in Ireland, and in the other half were the sons of earlier Irish immigrants, it is within good taste for Americans of Irish descent or of Irish birth to remind their fellow-Americans of other races that

this is our republic quite as well as theirs, and that in its maintenance and perpetuation we propose to follow the example left by our countrymen who participated in its foundation.

II. That the American republic is directly and selfishly interested in the achievement of the national independence of Ireland, is so obvious that to assert it seems almost a waste of time. It must be clear to every reflecting American that just so long as Ireland is a political dependent of England, she will be an actual dependent on the United States. The causes which create and maintain her phenomenal poverty are political. They do not exist in the soil, which ranks among the most fertile. They are not in the habits of the people, to whose industry the concurrent tributes of English and Continental observers might be easily adduced, and whose activity and thrift in England and the United States are notorious. Under English law, and restrained by English arms, the people dwell in a state of serfage, from which there can be no effectual and final escape except by changing the political system itself. That system has engendered a land tenure by which the soil of the country is practically owned by aliens, who spend little or nothing of its annual money-product in Ireland. The soil, speaking broadly, is the only capital-maker ; and since the money thus obtained is taken out of the country, nothing remains to invest in manufactures. It is too late to tell any intelligent man that a community cannot safely live by agriculture alone, since, if generally the surest means of life, it may at any time wholly or partly fail. But what shall be expected of a people, almost exclusively agricultural, who do not own the soil they are born on, and who till it, not that they may live by honest labor, but that absences and idlers may live in luxury in foreign lands? It may be said that I am ignoring the sweeping benefits of the recent land legislation. Unfortunately, land bills, which have been numerous enough in the British Parliament for fifty years, are rarely read in this country ; and the rosy exaggerations of their contents made by partisans of a ministry are necessarily accepted as accurate. The most that can be said of the land legislation can be said in a sentence. The landlords cannot for fifteen years raise the rents that have been fixed by the land court, or have been agreed to by landlord and tenant, without recourse to the court. But there are large numbers of the tenants who, on account of the unfavorable clauses of the acts, were unable to seek their advantages ; and for all who have availed of them the heavy legal expenses will for several years fully cancel the benefits accruing. But in fifteen years, unless national independence be achieved, the whole land question will be on its feet again. It has not been settled. It has been merely lulled.

There has been no legislation to remedy the radical evil of the country,—the 'draining of Ireland of the capital which, if kept at home, would speedily find its way into manufactures, giving employment all the year, and promoting domestic exchanges, without which no community may be said to be safe. The causes of the chronic and desperate poverty of the country have not been as much as touched by imperial legislation; and, while those causes exist, Ireland will be a direct tax upon the people of the United States. Only an Irish Parliament, elected by all classes of the people, can or ever will legislate thoroughly and equitably upon these causes. The interests which are paramount in the imperial Parliament, and will continue to control its course toward Ireland, are interests selfishly but solidly allied against removing the causes of poverty in Ireland. The Irish people in the United States must continue to save the lives of their kindred, and supply such comforts as their means will permit, so long as the political system which keeps them poor survives. The amount of money thus annually extorted from this country is at least five million dollars. In 1851, when there were several millions less of the race here than there are now, the amount remitted reached the enormous sum of nine hundred and ninety thousand pounds. Five million dollars is a low estimate for the yearly remittances since then; and a single generation of the Irish in America must have deprived themselves and their children of nearly two hundred million dollars to pay rack rents and support the British constitution in Ireland. This money, earned in the United States, should have remained in the United States. It is a pirate's toll. Five million dollars a year is a cruel and unjust burden for the British constitution to levy upon Irish labor in the United States. It will continue to be levied and delivered until the Irish people govern themselves and remove the causes of poverty in Ireland, which are purely political.

Those fastidious persons who complain of Irish agitation in the United States would show more reasonableness if they attached their censure to the causes of the agitation. It may be of more importance to them that the newspapers should have less to say about the affairs of a little island three thousand miles away, than that the labor of a portion of their fellow-citizens should be taxed to pay a pirate's toll to a foreign government; but they may as well make up their minds to this simple truth: the Irish race will never cease agitation, in whatever part of the world its people may be found, until Ireland shall have achieved its national independence. And the race will employ, in the phrase of Mr. Gladstone, all the resources of civilization to that end. The agitation does no harm to the American Republic. A tax of five million dollars a year sent from the American Republic to Ireland is a substan-

tial injury to the Republic. Let the critics of Irish agitation in the United States contemplate this serious fact, and manfully unite with their fellow-Americans of Irish origin in repairing the injury. The material interests of the Republic imperatively require the expulsion of the British government from Ireland, in order that the latter may cease to be a burden upon the United States.

III. The influence of the League in the United States is a positive Americanizing influence and beneficial to the Republic, because it helps to remove the effects of English misrule upon Irish-Americans, thereby increasing their usefulness as American citizens. Let us examine for a moment the political and social ideas the native of Ireland has acquired from the British constitution. He has learned from that symbol of Anglo-Saxon Christianity that it is the duty of every man to hate his fellow-man for the glory of God, if his fellow-man's religious convictions differ from his; and that it is his right, if he have the power, to deprive his fellow-man of liberty, property, and life, on account of that difference. The Irish National League brings face to face the Protestant, the Catholic, and all others, in the name of their motherland, and teaches them to reject that blasphemy, and to adopt instead the principle of toleration and brotherhood. The British constitution has taught the Irishman that education may be denied his fellow-man in order to coerce his conscience. In the Irish National League that infamous doctrine is repudiated, and its members learn to value education as a right pertaining to every member of the human family. The British constitution has taught the Irishman that the inheritance of a title gives a man a claim upon the homage and the labor of his fellow-man. In the National League the Irishman learns that character and conduct alone give a man a claim upon the respect of his fellows, and that no human being is born with a hereditary right to the labor of his fellow-man. The British constitution has taught the Irishman that labor is base, degrading, ignoble. The National League teaches him that labor is the noblest thing on earth, and that the laborer has the first right to live off the results of his labor. The British constitution has taught him that childhood has no rights and old age no sanctity, for he has constantly seen infancy cast naked into the ditches, youth condemned to ignorance and unrewarded toil, and tottering age left to die on highways, or treated like felony in workhouses. The National League inspires him with the resolve to keep his children in school, that they may become useful men and women, and to shelter and love the gray hairs of those who bore him.

In fact, the National League is the school in which thousands of men, deprived by the British constitution of the opportunity of acquiring education in their native land, unlearn all the lessons which

English misrule has taught them concerning politics, government, labor, caste. If it did only this it would have ample reason for existence, for the lessons it teaches are those of political equality, religious and civil liberty, industry, love of law, and manly self-respect as the substitute for cringing subserviency.

But the National League in America and the societies affiliated with it—the temperance, charitable, mutual benefit, military, and other societies—do still more to render the Irish in the United States more useful men, and therefore more useful citizens. It is difficult for an American to realize how thorough-going and how complete are the mischievous influences of political misrule in Ireland. Let him contemplate a country without foundries, without factories, without mills, without workshops, without elevators or granaries, without shipping, without industrial arts. His imagination will be subjected to a severe strain. Let him contemplate such a country overawed by soldiery, its people cowed by ubiquitous police; the right of public assembly almost permanently suspended, religious hatreds spasmodically incited to keep the people from uniting; every home liable to rough midnight intrusion, and every citizen liable to capricious arrest and indefinite imprisonment without trial. What business habits will the mass of such people have? What will they know of self-discipline? What knowledge can they possibly possess of trade, manufactures, machinery, of sanitary laws, of literature, the progress of the world, of science? What acquaintance can they have with those methods which experience and competition have been creating for rendering life cleaner, happier, brighter, more beneficent? There is not one of these societies which does not perform an educational function. Their members are brought into contact with living thought, many of them for the first time in their lives. In these societies they learn the value of thrift. Thrift in Ireland has always been a misfortune for the mass of the people, because it exposed them to increased rent. Many of the Irish tenantry have to discover, when they come to the United States, that political freedom is necessary before thrift can be considered good fortune. All these societies encourage, if they do not actually enjoin, sobriety. All teach their members self-denial, economy, frugality. All help to diminish pauperism in the United States, because each has its own treasury, and takes care of its sick members, aids their widows, makes some provision for their orphans. To keep the treasuries full, the men must deny themselves indulgences to which they would otherwise resort. Thus the societies improve health, promote virtue, and render homes more comfortable. In the meetings of the National League and all the affiliated organizations the members learn the duty of mutual respect and forbearance, of courtesy to each other

and to all men. They learn to think before speaking, and to confer before acting. Many of the societies have reading-rooms, lectures, music, discussions upon many questions wholly disconnected from the politics of Ireland, and thus in still another way they are educating, informing, and refining. They discipline their members to transact business in business-like ways. They enable men engaged in diverse occupations to convey to each other practical and useful knowledge which it would be utterly impossible for many of them, working all day and at night weary, to acquire by more expensive or more fatiguing methods. In a word, all the Irish organizations in the United States, which were fused at the Philadelphia Irish Race Convention into the National League, to assist their kindred in Ireland in securing national independence, are calculated to make Irishmen better men and better American citizens.

Instead, therefore, of being a menace to American institutions, the Irish National League in the United States is a benefit to the Republic.

IS IT THE WILL OF GOD THAT ALL MEN SHOULD BE SAVED?

ONE of the most difficult facts for the human mind to realize is the intense individual interest taken by the Creator in each and every one of the creatures He has made. Even those which have no share in reason have their life mapped out by Him with thoughtful care, so that there is every reason to believe that the pleasure of their brief existence overpasses the pain, and that it is better for each one of them to have lived than never to have lived at all. But His love for them is as nothing compared with His fond affection for each individual being who is made in His own image and stamped with a likeness to Himself. Men know and confess the fact of God's love, but it makes no vivid impress on their intelligence, it is relegated to the region of theoretical rather than of practical truths. Tell a man that God loves him just as much as if he was the only rational being in the world; that he is never absent from the thoughts and memory of God; that every circumstance of his life has been planned from all eternity with a view to his good and advantage; that all the world around has been made for him, and to serve the Divine purpose to his profit; that friends, companions, enemies, persecutors, benefactors; that father and mother, brothers and sisters, wife and children, were all destined to be aids to his solid and lasting happiness; that the Incarnation took place for him; that it was for him that Christ suffered and died, so that if he alone had lived upon this earth, Christ would have willingly shed His blood for him alone; that he was present to the mind of Christ all through His sacred passion; that for him the scourging, mockery, crucifixion took place, and that no thought of other men interfered with or set aside the longing, yearning love that Christ felt for him during His long agony; that for him—not as one out of a crowd, but by himself and apart from all else—Christ died and rose again;—tell him all this, and he will accuse you of pious exaggeration, of an appeal to his feelings based on poetry rather than on fact, of making him out to be of an importance in the eyes of God which seems to him impossible.

Yet all this is not poetry but fact. *Dilexit me et dedit semetipsum pro me*, "He loved me and gave Himself for me," is true in the mouth not merely of one of the princes of the Church of God, nor merely in the mouth of those who in their turn love Him by whom these words were spoken, nor merely of those who will sooner or later make the act of submission which at present they refuse, but of

every single member of the human race. It is true of the greatest criminals as well as of the most virtuous of men; of those most deeply dyed in sin as well as of those who shine with the most exalted saintliness. It was true of Cain, Esau, Judas Iscariot, during every moment of life, just as it was true of Abraham, David, St. John the Divine. On each was fixed the yearning tenderness of the heart of God; for each Christ died; each the mercy and compassion of the God of mercy sought to win by graces, blessings, inspirations, ever present from the first to the last moment of the period of their earthly probation.

Now this love, fondness, tenderness, compassion, mercy, was all directed to one end. It had not for its object the present welfare and enjoyment of him on whom it was bestowed, nay, lavished with an extravagance of generosity. The Divine Lover did not destine for the loved a smooth, tranquil journey through life, a bed of roses, a feast of delights, an absence of pain and suffering, a round of unbroken pleasure which should beguile the passing hours in a delicious indulgence of every wish and every desire. It was no earthly paradise by which the yearnings of the Divine heart over the child of its love could find their satisfaction. The Lover looked beyond the shifting scene so soon to pass away; it was an eternal, not a temporal happiness that He designed to confer; *æterna charitate dilexi te*, "I have loved thee with an everlasting love" (Jer. 31 : 3). Nothing would satisfy the cravings of that love save the bestowal of a happiness which should be without measure and without end. If in this world it had its gifts for those who accepted it and reciprocated it, those gifts were but the dim shadow of the gift to come. They were like a single drop of some delicious wine given to the weary traveller as a foretaste of the rich draughts he would enjoy when his journey should be at an end, and his Divine entertainer should hand to him the inexhaustible cup of heaven's bliss. Drink, O! my friends, and be inebriated, O! my dearly beloved. The fondest caresses of the Divine Lover bestowed upon His faithful spouses during the days of their toil and labor and suffering on earth, were to be as nothing to the rapture of the soul when the time should come when it would be merged in the ocean of the Divine love, and be bathed in the fires of the Divine charity till it becomes like to its God, as the iron dipped in the furnace partakes of the glowing intensity of the fire around it.

All this God wills to give to every one who at this moment lives upon the earth; no matter what their degradation now, God desires to raise them to a throne in heaven with a real, hearty, serious desire; however befouled they be with the mire of sin, He desires to clothe them in the white garments of the elect;

however ungrateful, base, filthy, corrupt, hardened they may be, God longs to change their ingratitude to the gratitude of a heart overflowing with joy, their baseness to nobility, their filthiness and corruption to purity and unspotted cleanness. However proud they are, cruel, debased, self-willed, depraved, rebellious, He none the less longs for the love of each, seeks to draw them near to Himself, is anxious to make them friends, willing to forget the past if only they on their part do not frustrate His Divine desire that they may share His glory and reign with Him in heaven.

I have called this desire a real, hearty, serious desire, and it is the more important to appreciate its reality as applied to every sinner as well as to every saint, because the Jansenists refused to acknowledge it. They said it could merely be called the will of God in a metaphorical and improper sense, just as it was the will of God that Isaac should be put to death when God gave his father His command to slay him. They limited its reality to the elect, to those who God foresaw would avail themselves of the Divine mercy and would attain to eternal bliss. With respect to those who would throw away their chances, and so were destined to perish, they said that God, foreseeing this, loved them and desired their love and willed their repentance and salvation in no truer sense than he desires the love or wills the repentance of the rebel angels. It is, they say, a mere manner of speech to indicate what would be the will of God under different circumstances, not what it is now. But this is not the doctrine of the Catholic Church. She teaches that in the case of the most abandoned and profligate it is God's will and good pleasure that they should do penance, return to Him against whom they have rebelled, be cleansed of their filthiness, restored to His love, and so be sharers of His kingdom in heaven. "As I live, saith the Lord God, I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live" (Ez. 33 : 11). "God dealeth patiently, not willing that any should perish" (2 Pet. 3 : 9), not even the blasphemer who curses Him and is destined to curse Him to all eternity; not the unbeliever who fights against Him, denies His goodness, mercy, power, nay, His very existence, and will continue to deny them to the very end. None is so utterly hopeless but that God loves him, longs after him, prepares sweet allurements which may entice him back to virtue, and persuade him to an acknowledgment of his fault, for "Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of those things that Thou hast made, for Thou didst not appoint or make anything hating it. Thou sparest all, for they are Thine, O Lord, who lovest souls" (Wisd. 11 : 25, 7).

This universal love of God for all without exception has for its natural corollary another Catholic doctrine that many heretics

deny. It follows, from the seriousness and reality of the Divine will desiring the salvation of all without exception, that Christ our Lord died for all without exception, for those who would reject Him at the last as well as for those who were to form part of that *semen longævum*, that long-lived seed whom He should see and be satisfied. His thirst upon the cross was a thirst, not for the souls alone whose happy lot it is to be that to all eternity they should hunger no more and thirst no more, but also for those whose tongues will be parched forever in agonizing misery. He longed with no fictitious longing for their salvation; each pang, each additional element of suffering, was endured for their sakes, and not for the sake of the elect alone. Each one of them was present to His soul as He knelt in Gethsemane, swaying to and fro in the agony of that Divine conflict; each one of them was in His thoughts when the lash tore open His sacred flesh, when the piercing thorns sent drops of blood trickling over His forehead, when the spittle befouled His face, when the jeering insults rang in His ears. He gave Himself a ransom for *all* (1 Tim. 2 : 6). He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world. What greater proof could God give of this universality of His desire for man's salvation than that He took upon Himself this crushing weight of sin that would not be propitiated, that He thirsted for the souls of those who refused to slake His sacred thirst, that He offered His sufferings, endured fresh sufferings, piled up the bitterness and repulsiveness of those sufferings, for the sake of those who would wilfully reject those sufferings as well as those whose grateful acceptance was to be a drop of consolation in the chalice of His agony?

I am anxious that my readers should have this fact of the universality of God's will for man's salvation clearly and distinctly present to their minds before I pass on to the serious difficulty which offers itself to one who carefully thinks over the relations of God to man. I am anxious that they should understand that it is no fiction of a desire, no unreal wish for what is impossible, no imaginary benevolence which we read into the Divine nature, but which does not exist there in reality. I am anxious that they should know that it is the doctrine of the Church, which to deny or doubt is heresy, that God does not desire only the salvation of the elect or busy Himself only with those whom He foreknows will turn to profit His mercies and benefits, but that He definitely sets before Himself as an object of His desire the salvation of every one whom He creates, that He thinks out means by which they may be drawn to Him, that He provides supernatural graces and helps which shall enable them ultimately to subdue temptations and conquer all difficulties, that He supplies means of making

virtue easy and attractive to them, that He pursues them with graces to the very last, that He never ceases from His desire, His longing after them until the sands of life's hour-glass have run out, and the soul quits the scene of its struggles, and failures, and successes, and sufferings, and joys.

But now comes our difficulty, our apparently insuperable difficulty. If this is the will of God, the genuine serious desire of Him who is omnipotent, how is it possible that it should be frustrated? If God desires all men to be saved, why are they not saved? You may talk (I fancy I hear my objector saying) of man's perverse will, but what is the use of God's being omnipotent if man's opposition can disappoint this? Does not the Apostle say: "Who has resisted His will?" And how can this be true if every sinner who dies impenitent resists the will of God with complete success—if success it can be called—disappoints the longings of the Divine love, renders nugatory and worse than nugatory all the graces God has conferred upon him, defeats the designs of God in his regard, prevents Him from carrying out His purpose, a purpose too which you tell me is a genuine reality and no mere figure of speech or metaphor?

The answer to this difficulty is to be found in a technical distinction, familiar to every Catholic theologian. Every will, desire, purpose, is either an *antecedent* or a *consequent* will or desire or purpose. The *antecedent* will is one which a man entertains antecedently to certain circumstances hereafter to happen; a *consequent* desire is the will entertained by him after these circumstances have happened, or after he has admitted them into his intelligence as a factor to be included in the case that is being considered. If I engage a servant, my *antecedent* desire is that he may serve me faithfully, and may succeed and prosper in his employ, but if I discover that he has robbed me, I have a consequent desire that he shall lose his place and be punished with imprisonment. If at any moment I can put out of my mind his ill deeds, I have a genuine and real desire that he may prosper; but the recollection of his dishonesty induces as the consequence a desire that he may suffer. I have an *antecedent* will satisfied with and favorable to his welfare; a *consequent* will inclining me to be satisfied at and favor his well-merited misfortunes. If I purpose to spend my summer holiday in Europe, I have an *antecedent* will to cross the Atlantic and spend the summer months in Switzerland, or Bavaria; but some pressing business makes my presence in America desirable, and I have a *consequent* will to spend my holiday at Newport, or camping out among the Northern lakes. My will to cross the Atlantic was a genuine, hearty, serious will; but the circumstances changed, and I was equally content to remain at home.

This difference between the *antecedent* and *consequent* will exists, *mutatis mutandis*, in God. He cannot change His will; in His case the distinction is not between an antecedent will ignorant of the future and a consequent will developing itself simultaneously with the development of unexpected circumstances. In God there is no past, no present, no future; everything is an eternal *now*; each detail of the life of every individual is ever present to His omniscience, and has been present from all eternity. But yet the distinction exists; not involving a distinction of time, but a distinction of logical order conceived by us to exist in the mind of God, so that He loves the sinner, heartily and truly desires his salvation, antecedently to and apart from the fact that in the end he will wilfully and deliberately reject the love of God, refuse His offers of mercy, and so die impenitent. It is as though God turned His thoughts away from and refused to look forward to this future and final impenitence, regarding the sinner as one who is, *hic et nunc*, an object of the Divine compassion, a possible recipient of the Divine goodness, one who, as far as his nature is concerned, is capable of becoming a saint of God in heaven, one who is, as far as the Divine action in his regard is concerned, intended for the company of the redeemed and for eternal happiness. It is by reason of this capacity for perfection that God wills his salvation with a will antecedently true and real, though always depending on the condition of man's co-operation. It is by reason of God's foreknowledge that he will reject the offer of salvation that He consequently wills his eternal punishment. What men will at different times and under altered circumstances God wills at the same time and under the same circumstances, and the incompatibility of the two simultaneous wills is the result of what men would call a different aspect of the matter, a different view of the same individual man, whether he is regarded as he is at the present moment, or as he will, through his own deliberate agency, be at some time in the future.

But perhaps it may seem that the difficulty still remains, or that I am degrading God to a human level when I suppose that first of all (in the logical order) He desires absolutely and in itself the salvation of man, and then afterwards is driven forth from His first desire by human malice and perversity, that He is disappointed and has to fall back on what is second best and the will of God only because He has been foiled of His earlier intention by man's exercise—even though it be a forbidden and unlawful exercise—of freedom. But this objection, like all others, brought against the providence of God and His dealings with the creatures He has made would ultimately lead to a contradiction. It is based on the hypothesis that God, whilst He leaves man free, is at the same time

bound to prevent that freedom from being freely exercised. It implies that man is to be free to obey, but not free to rebel; free to do right, but not free to do wrong; free to follow the dictates of conscience, but not free to follow the suggestions of pride, or appetite, or covetousness, or desire. Taking men as they are, such freedom would be no freedom at all. Assuming that God has decreed to give each one a certain amount of grace, sufficient indeed, and more than sufficient to enable him to avoid serious sin, but not sufficient to determine him to unbroken virtue, the liberty to depart from virtue and deliberately commit sin is attached to human nature, such as God has created it. Even before the fall and under the surpassing advantages resulting from the absence of original sin and consequent concupiscence; this liberty was an integral factor in the nature of our first parents. And after the fall, with the gifts of integrity and innocence withdrawn, with the debased nature handed down by Adam to his posterity, this liberty to offend as well as to obey is still more fatally prominent in the list of man's moral faculties. Except in the case of Him who, by reason of the hypostatic union, was necessarily impeccable, and of her whom God exempted from the universal vow, a special and unexampled interference, rebellion, partial or entire, inherited or self-originated, was the heirloom of every child of Adam. Even if there had been ten thousand cases of a submission, perfect and unbroken, to the Divine law instead of a single one, still this power to resist would none the less have been present in all, and the power of resistance implies that God, by the gift of freedom, chose for His own greater glory to allow the rational creature to escape as regards his individual action from the necessary submission to God's antecedent will. This greatest of all God's gifts to man was not only a partaking in the Divine nature in a sense in which no other gift was or could be, but also carried with it a sort of limiting of the Divine omnipotence, at least in appearance, if not in reality. He who had all His creatures under His perfect and absolute control allowed one portion of them to proclaim for a time a kind of mock independence, so that they deluded themselves sometimes into a belief that "God does not hear and the God of Jacob does not regard their assertion of independence and proclamation of open rebellion." They even could blind themselves for a time, though with difficulty, and only after a long course of stubborn perversity, to the very existence of the Supreme Controller, whose sway they refused to acknowledge, and whose claims upon their obedience they had long ignored; they could at last say in their heart as well as with their lips: There is no God.

I call this a mock independence, and an apparent limitation of the Divine omnipotence, because nothing more clearly brings out

God's infinite power and absolute supremacy than the way in which man, though he can defeat God's antecedent will, fails hopelessly and entirely when he makes an attempt to set aside God's consequent will. Vainly and fruitlessly does he struggle against that which God has decreed to effect independently of man's consent. His highest wisdom then turns to utter folly, and his most brilliant efforts prove ludicrous and contemptible failures; his most magnificent displays of strength do but display his puny weakness by the side of his Creator's power. Of all instances of such failure, the circumstances surrounding the death of Jesus Christ form the most striking and the most complete. Never was there a more brilliant triumph apparently achieved by the enemies of God. They had mastered One whom they recognized as at least Divine; even though they knew not that He was God, they had full power to wreak their utmost malice on an adversary such as they had never encountered before or since; they had completely in their power (*ut more humano loquar*) the Son of God. They had seduced one of his favorite disciples; had surprised and captured Him without a struggle; had overcome the scruples of the Roman governor who sought to save Him; had surmounted all the difficulties in their path, the contradictions of their false witnesses, the groundlessness of their accusations, the influence they knew that He possessed with the majority of the inhabitants of the city; they had not only secured their main object of getting rid of Him (as they thought) once and forever, but they had done it with an elaboration of malicious cruelty and brutality, with an accumulated refinement of barbarous tortures, insults, and mockery, which one would have thought would have satisfied the malignity even of the devil himself. The Son of God had become a poor, bleeding, helpless thing, in which the form of man was scarcely recognizable. His body was one great wound; His face was covered with bruises, and blood, and spittle; every outrage had been heaped upon Him; and the sight, the heart-rending sight of the Victim of Calvary would have moved a heart of stone. In this condition of agony and prostration they had sought to force Him to carry His cross up the hill of Calvary; they had devised tortures ever new; they had pierced His hands and feet, scoffed at the extremity of His agony, fed Him with gall, laughed at Him in His abandonment, scoffed at His torturing thirst, gloated over His approaching death. Yet, in each detail of this scene of incredible horror, every agent, every persecutor of Christ, every blasphemer of His name, scribes who jeered, and Pharisees who mocked at Him, slaves who scourged Him, soldiers who pierced His hands and feet, were but carrying out in its every detail the consequent will of God; not that God willed their sins either by an antecedent or

a consequent will, but He willed the death of His Son, and permitted the sinful actions which led up to it. They were, in spite of themselves, simply executing the Divine decrees, fulfilling His purposes of mercy, working out the redemption of the world, founding the Church of God, opening the fount of supernatural graces to mankind, crushing the serpent's head; nay, the devil himself, as chief agent in the work, was ruining his own power, heaping up for himself fresh torments, thrusting himself deeper down in the abyss of his prison-house to all eternity. They were but the slaves of Divine Omnipotence, carrying out His will, while they fancied themselves independent; while they thought they were destroying the Lord and His Christ, He who dwells in the heavens was laughing them to scorn. They were but the instruments in His hands, and the executioners of His designs, bringing about that revolution in the world's history by which the kingdoms of this world became the kingdoms of God and of His Christ. While they thought to overturn the throne of the Highest, they were but preparing themselves to be His footstool; at the moment of their most brilliant victory they were inflicting on themselves a crushing, irrevocable, eternal defeat.

The history of the world is but a series of scenes of which the crucifixion was the prototype, in which the malignity of the enemies of God is turned in some way or other to His honor and glory, to the advantage of His faithful servants and friends, to the final triumph when He shall crush all enemies beneath His feet. All men are, in fact, in spite of themselves, continually engaged in carrying out the consequent will of God. It is the consciousness of this fact, the knowledge that whatever happens is the will of God, that renders the servants of God so perfectly calm and untroubled amid all miseries, contradictions, and persecutions; nay, amid all the sins and ingratitude of wicked men. They know that it is—if I may be allowed the expression—God's will that His will should not always be done; that it is sometimes His consequent will that His antecedent will should be defeated. Thus the zealous missionary, eager for the salvation of souls, spares no pains, labors, prayers on behalf of his flock. No sacrifice is too great for him; no personal suffering counts for aught; no loss of health, comfort, friends, weighs for a moment in the scale, if he sees that the eternal welfare of one of those for whom Christ died, one of His wandering sheep, is in any proximate danger; eagerly, intensely, earnestly, he is ready to devote himself to promote the honor of his Master. As long as there is any hope of the antecedent will of God being also his consequent will, no effort is too great for his anxious zeal. But, when once the die is cast, when the sinner has passed away, to all outward appearance impenitent, or turned his

back on the offers of mercy ; when he sees that it is not the consequent will of God that he should succeed in bringing that soul back to God, then no vain regrets disturb his peace of mind. Sorrowful he is, indeed, for the alien lost for a time, and perhaps forever, but not sad. No shadow of despondency, because of his apparent failure, falls on the brightness of his path. "God's will be done," that is, God's consequent will, is his consoling thought ; and the knowledge that it must be done under all possible circumstances, the continual consciousness that nothing can hinder it, the union of our human will with the consequent will of God, is the only solid foundation of all peace and happiness for men.

It is this which is the secret of the unbroken joy and ever abiding satisfaction of the holy angels who are employed in ministering to men. We should at first sight imagine that a large proportion, perhaps a majority, of these guardians of men must be always sad. What miserable failures seem to beset their loving care and vigilance ! They seek to ward off temptation, but the perverse children of men deliberately seek it. They dart into the minds of their clients holy thoughts, good desires, aspirations after virtue, only to have those thoughts, desires, aspirations wilfully rejected and set at naught. They see those committed to their care, and over whose eternal happiness they long with an insatiable longing, plunging into the filth of sin, or proudly raising the standard of rebellion against their God ; and, worst of all, they witness a sight that the human lover of souls never witnesses,—they see the child of their love, the soul, made in the image of God, the destined denizen of heaven, through its own fault cast down in eternal reprobation to the depths of hell ! What a failure, to all appearance, of that holy angel's mission, whose client thus dies impenitent ! What a miserable disappointment, as men would term it ! We should fancy almost that the guardian angel would be half ashamed to appear before his God when he had to confess such failures as these occurring, not once or twice, but many times. We should imagine him reproaching himself because he had not done more, and sadly fancying that, if he had been more active and vigilant, his poor client might have been saved. Not so, however, the happy spirits who see God face to face, see all the other beings in the light of God. No cloud passes over their unalloyed, their perfect happiness, when they have failed in their mission. They are none the less full of joy, and exultation and gratitude to their God, when their efforts on behalf of the child of earth committed to them have been a series of defeats, than when they rejoiced over his return to virtue, and witnessed his happy struggles with temptation, and enjoyed delicious repose in watching his perseverance in virtue and his advance towards perfection. True, in the one case, the antecedent

will of God was done; in the other it was not. But in the one case and in the other His consequent will was accomplished; the order of his providence ordained from all eternity was accomplished; the means he had chosen in His eternal wisdom for the manifestation of His glory were accomplished; and, therefore, those whose will was perfectly united to the Divine will desired nothing better than the unfailing accomplishment of the Divine decrees.

We may thus describe the antecedent will of God as that which God seriously desires, apart from any free choice of his rational creatures. The consequent will is that which He desires and determines when He looks forward to and takes into account the actions that He foresees they will freely perform. If man had persevered in original justice this distinction would not exist; had there been no sin, no imperfection, no falling away from the perfect will of God. God's antecedent will, inasmuch as it would always have met with obedience from His rational creatures in all its details, would thus have been also His consequent will. Man would have freely done what God desired him freely to do, just as the brute creation carry out the designs of God instinctively and spontaneously after the fashion of their own nature. Their action, indeed, is in one sense free, in that no external necessity forces them to this act rather than to that. But it is not voluntary; it proceeds from an internal principle, not from the mere action of an exterior motive force; but it does not proceed from a formal knowledge of the end in view, and from a deliberate choice of the means to be used to gain it. But man chooses deliberately the means necessary to gain his end, and he is free to choose them or reject them. He can wilfully set aside that which he knows is a necessary means to lead him to the end for which God has ordained him. It is this fatal privilege which gives him the power to commit sin; and it is by reason of sin that the consequent will of God differs from His antecedent will. Sin has introduced disorder into the world, and, as order is the law of God's creation, God must necessarily intervene to adjust the balance and restore the harmony which has been disturbed. There is a jarring element as long as there is a single rebel who has not been reduced to submission, willing or compulsory.

The consequent will of God leads up to and finally secures the universal submission of every creature to its Creator. Heaven will contain all those who have made a willing act of submission. Hell will be the lot of those who have been forced to bow the knee, and who do it with reluctance,—nay, with a loathing hatred of Him whom they acknowledge with an interior repugnance that will be one of the chief elements of their eternal misery. But, voluntary or involuntary, this final submission will be the culminating act of God's consequent will. Till then He is,

indeed, supreme; but this supremacy is disputed. He shall, indeed, reign until He has put all enemies beneath His feet; but His reign is one which, for the sake of free obedience and difficult obedience, tolerates the presence of rebellion,—a rebellion which throws into relief the generous devotion of His faithful ones and their true-hearted loyalty, where loyalty involves severe suffering, while treachery holds out the tempting bait of pleasure. For, though it is never the will of God that man should sin, yet it is His will that man should be free to sin. It is His will that sin should carry with it its necessary consequences of suffering, and misery and death. It is His will that it should work for the advantage of the elect, and indirectly for His own glory. In other words, it is the consequent will of God that sin and virtue should alike carry with them their appropriate fruits and consequences.

Thus in the first instance, and apart from all foreknowledge of the way in which man will use his freedom of choice between good and evil, God really and truly, not by any fiction or figure of speech, desires that man should enjoy a career of unbroken peace and happiness on earth, and should without fail attain to the joy of the redeemed in heaven. He wills all to be saved and come to a knowledge of the truth. Christ died for all, in order that all might avail themselves of the Divine will respecting them. He gave Himself up as a redemption, not for the sins of the elect alone, but for the sins of the whole world. It is in this sense that the salvific will of God is universal. But, given the fact of sin persevered in to the end, given man's persistent misuse of his own free-will and rejection of the Divine mercy, it is God's will that all who thus freely remain rebels until life is over should suffer the just punishment of obstinate rebellion and malice.

What concerns every one of us as individuals is, that we should remember that God's consequent will is still suspended as regards any final determination of our future destiny. He is waiting for us to see how we shall decide,—whether we shall submit or rebel. His antecedent will is therefore in full force, as far as we are concerned. He looks, longs, hopes, with a genuine and real desire, a yearning love, an affection that never ceases as long as life lasts, for our loyal declaration of obedience, for our voluntary act of submission. To this act He draws us, entices us, allures us, attracts us, invites us; sometimes seeks almost to drive us to it; sometimes holds out inducements that it would be thought none but a mad-man could set aside. In fact, he does everything but force us. He will not violate the freedom He has bestowed on us. We can disappoint Him if we choose; but, if we disappoint Him, it is we alone who suffer for it. His eternal, immutable, omnipotent will merely appears under a new phase; majesty takes the place of mercy; vengeance at last succeeds to long-enduring clemency.

THE CHINESE IN AMERICA.

WITHIN a comparatively recent period the public attention of the whole American people has been drawn to the question of Chinese immigration. The populations of the Pacific coast have been deeply interested in the subject for over twenty years; in fact, it has been the most important public question there for the greater part of that time; but it is only within the last three years that they have succeeded in attracting to it the attention of the States east of the Missouri. The Chinese immigration law has been the result; but, though its passage has officially prohibited the influx of Chinese immigrants, public opinion is by no means unanimous either as to the justice or the wisdom of the law itself. Not a few public men have pronounced in favor of making the United States the receptacle of every race of mankind, and treat the law which excludes the Chinese as opposed to justice, and to the true interests of the country at large. On the other hand, some of the advocates of exclusion have indulged in language against the Chinese as a race which cannot be justified either by reason or justice. To describe the Asiatic immigrants as a body of lepers or slaves, as has been occasionally done, is alike absurd and unjust. It is not by the use of indiscriminate abuse, nor of petty persecutions, that any great national question like this should be settled. The points at issue in the Chinese question, as regarded by American Catholics, may be briefly summed up thus: Is it just, morally, for the people of the United States, acting through their Government, to refuse the right of settlement here to the Chinese or any other race? Is it wise to do so? With these questions we propose to deal to the best of our ability.

With regard to the absolute right of any organized nation to admit or not to admit members of other nationalities to its soil, there cannot be a question. It is claimed and admitted by every civilized power, and has been admitted from the earliest times. Here in the United States, where a stream of immigration, unparalleled in any other age or country, has been pouring in during the last century, this right has scarcely been exercised, until now many have almost forgotten that it exists. A moment's glance, however, will show that it is fully recognized and acted on by every civilized government at will. Republican France sends unwelcome foreigners beyond her frontiers without ceremony; and in republican Switzerland a monthly tax has to be paid by foreigners for the privilege of residing in the city of Geneva, non-payment of which

entails expulsion. It is only a few years since many thousands of the natives of Alsace-Lorraine were forced to expatriate themselves in default of taking the oath of allegiance to the German Empire; and, however harsh the measure might be, it has never been asserted that Germany was not within her strict right in enforcing it. The passport system, which, till within a few years, prevailed all through Europe, was founded on the right of each nation to admit or refuse admittance to whom it might please; and it has never been deemed necessary to denounce the passport system as a national injustice. Custom, it is true, of late years, owing mainly to the increase of travel, has introduced a sort of international comity, which prevents the exclusion *en masse* from any country of the people of another in ordinary times; but the right still exists, and is from time to time exercised without remonstrance. As regards China, even such an international comity cannot be said to exist with this country. The Celestial Empire has never opened her territory to American settlement. The vast territories to the north and west of China proper, which equal nearly the whole territory of the United States in extent, are forbidden ground to all foreigners; and even in China itself settlement and travel are limited by the strictest law for all foreigners. Neither in strict justice nor in international courtesy is the United States bound to allow any immigration of Chinese into its own territory.

The discussion of the justice or morality of a nation's act may seem to many a waste of time in the present age. We may be told that nations, like corporations, have no souls to save, and no bodies to punish, and that the interest of the people is the highest law, to which all other considerations should bend. To that proposition we cannot, as Catholics, assent. In this country, at least, every citizen has a share, however small, in shaping the public policy, and it is his bounden duty to oppose, as far as his ability goes, every public, no less than every private, injustice. If the Chinese had a natural right in this country, such as the Indian tribes or the Southern negroes possess, we would condemn to the utmost of our power any attempt to deprive them of it, however such an attempt might command popular favor. As no such right, however, can be shown to exist, we shall proceed to the second and much wider question: Is it expedient for the present people of the United States to allow free entry into their country to the Chinese?

There is, perhaps, no point on which the public opinion of the country is more decided than that of inviting immigration of kindred races. From the earliest days of colonial settlement down to the present, the natives of every country of Europe have been welcomed to our shores. Germans, Swedes, French, Spaniards, Ital-

ians, Irish, and English Portuguese, and Russians have all been welcomed, as more or less desirable partners in the work of building up a great and free nation on this continent. That this policy has been a main cause of the astonishing material growth of the United States is not open to question. The experiment of transplanting the civilization of the Indo-European race to the New World, has been tried both on the system of inviting all its nationalities to a free share in the virgin soil, and on that of restricting immigration to a single people. The latter has been tried for three centuries in the Spanish colonies, and the former for scarcely two on this northern continent. What the result has been in each case is too well known to need description here. It is enough to say that a movement of peoples such as has never been since the break-up of the Roman empire, has built up peacefully a united nation in America, greater, even now, than any of Western Europe in numbers and wealth, and which promises soon to surpass in both any empire yet seen in the modern world. The settlers from the military empire of Germany, from the old monarchy of France, from republican Switzerland and oppressed Ireland, have all equally taken a part in building up this nation, and it would be impossible to decide what element is entitled to claim any superiority in the formation of its character. But it would not be safe to conclude that because the different nationalities of Europe have fused and are still fusing into an American nation, without serious difficulty, therefore every other race of mankind can join in the fusion. Great as are the differences of government, of language, and of social training, that distinguish the different nations of Europe from one another, they are trifling when compared with those which separate the whole European race from those of other origins. The bond of a common Christian civilization, the recognition of the equality of all men before the Creator, and the common right of all to just treatment from their fellows, the feelings of patriotism, and at least the traditions and love for political liberty, are common to all the races of Europe, while they are wholly foreign to the populations of the greater part of Asia and Africa. It scarcely needs argument to prove what a part the existence of these common feelings and traditions has played and still plays in blending together harmoniously the different race elements here. That the blending has gone on successfully where they exist gives no warrant that it would succeed with races such as the Chinese, among whom they are unknown.

The comparative ease with which some races unite into a common nationality, while others seem wholly incapable of blending together, even after the lapse of thousands of years, is a well-known fact in history. The Celts of old Gaul and the Iberians of the

Spanish Peninsula readily adopted the language and civilization of their Roman conquerors, and a century after their conquest were as much Romans as the Italians themselves. The German and Slavonian tribes, that moved in on the decaying Roman Empire, in like manner became soon amalgamated with the older populations. Celt, Saxon, and Norman gradually combined into the modern English people, just as Frank, Celt and Latin had previously grown together into the French nation, and as all the races of Europe are now combining to form the American people. Very different, however, was the case when the Semitic Arabs and Moors settled in Spain, or the Turanian Turks possessed themselves of Constantinople. While the paganism of the Germanic tribes, and even of the fierce Danish vikings, gradually yielded to Christianity, and the savage warriors of the North insensibly adopted the habits of their subjects, the alien races, Arab or Turk, remained to the last wholly distinct from the populations of European origin. Turkey to-day is not a nation in the same sense as the other countries of Europe are. It is rather a bundle of nationalities, held together by a central despotism, but showing no more tendency to unite into one people, and possessing no closer common interests, than they did four centuries ago when Mahomet the Second planted the crescent on the walls of Constantinople. The case was the same in Spain during the seven hundred years of Arab and Moorish dominion. Both instances serve to show the danger of bringing radically distinct races together, and the difficulty of uniting them into a common people. It is well to bear them in mind when there is question of opening the ports of America to a race still more foreign to European cultivation than either Turk or Arab.

We are aware that it is the fashion with a large class to-day to speak contemptuously of the teachings of history in judging modern events and their probable consequences. A certain class of writers and speakers seem to imagine that there is some hidden charm in our free institutions which will change the nature of men brought under their influence from any race. Writers of this class contend that Chinese or Hindoos only need to be admitted into our midst to convert them in a generation or two into genuine Americans. How childish such hopes are, a glance at the present condition of Asia will prove. For over three centuries European powers have held sway over different parts of the Asiatic continent. Portugal, France, Holland and England have all long ruled more or less extensive territories there. All four have tried colonization on different principles, and all four have also tried colonization in America. The fact remains, that while on this continent the Knickerbockers of New Amsterdam, the Creoles of Louisiana,

and the English settlers of Virginia and New England have each helped to build up the modern American nation, nothing like a new nation has been founded by any of them in Asia. The English in India, and the Hollanders in Java, are, to-day, merely foreign garrisons among Asiatic populations, and be their rule good or bad it produces nothing like the Europeanization, if we may use the word, of the native races. But, of all the races of the far East, none is more tenacious of the national character, or less inclined to mould itself on a strange civilization than the Chinese. Their form of government, their literature, their social system, and their policy, have remained almost unchanged since the days of Cæsar. The Roman empire has risen and decayed, the whole face of the Western World has been changed again and again; new languages have sprung up on the ruins of the old; despotism has succeeded republicanism, feudalism has grown up and died away, representative government has displaced absolutism, and often disappeared again, throughout the Western World, but still China continues almost as she was before the earliest of those mighty changes. Is it reasonable to expect that such a people will fuse into a nation like ours, because it offers them political advantages which they are incapable of appreciating, and a material civilization which they look down on compared to their own? If we allow an Asiatic population to grow up within our borders, we must expect to have such relations with it as exist between the Hollanders and Malays in Java, or between the English and Hindoos in India. To maintain such relations permanently would imply the existence side by side of a superior and a subject race. Could self-government exist alongside of such a state of things? We believe not; and it is too serious a matter to imperil our whole form of government for the sake of trying the experiment.

It may be asked whether China is capable of or likely to send such an immigration to our shores as would build up an Asiatic population on any part of this continent. With the facilities offered by modern navigation, nothing seems more likely. The population of the Chinese empire, however estimates of its exact numbers may differ, is certainly larger than the whole Indo-European race. By some it is placed as high as five hundred millions, and considering the density of both city and country population throughout the eighteen provinces of China proper, which is at least twenty times the extent of England, the estimate does not seem an extravagant one. From countries of Europe whose aggregate inhabitants do not reach a hundred and fifty millions the present generation has received six millions of immigrants. It would be easy for China to send double that number to the United States now

that her people have begun to share in the general movement which is so marked a feature of modern history. The number of Chinese who have already crossed the Pacific cannot be less than a quarter of a million, and is probably much over that number, considering the deaths and returned immigrants. At present there is only one line of steamers plying between China and San Francisco, just as forty years ago there was only one between Europe and New York. The passenger trade is a gainful one, and unless some legal obstacle be interposed there is no reason why the one line of to-day may not be followed by twenty or thirty lines in less than a generation, as has been the case on the Atlantic. These are more than mere possibilities. They are what the experience of mankind shows to be almost certain to come to pass, and it behooves the public to deal with the problem while it is yet time.

Even without reckoning with an influx of such dimensions, a much smaller immigration of Chinese is capable of producing very serious results.

The Pacific coast of the United States, though unsurpassed in natural resources by any section, is much less thickly peopled than the States east of the Missouri. The white population of California, Oregon, Nevada, Washington Territory and Arizona scarcely reaches a million and a half, and its remoteness from the thickly settled parts of the Union renders any such influx of immigrants as has built up Illinois and the adjoining States unlikely to come for many years. The flood of settlement, great as it is, rolls on gradually from State to State, as the older lands are filled up, and the comparatively barren belt between Nebraska and California has a marked effect in checking its rapid advance across the continent. An Asiatic population of a few hundred thousands would suffice to produce in California and Oregon all the difficulties which one of eight or ten millions would on the Atlantic seaboard and in the Mississippi Valley. Nor is it only that it would disturb the existing state of public affairs seriously by its presence, but it would surely be a serious bar to further white immigration. Nothing seems to have such an effect in turning away modern settlement from a country as the existence of an alien laboring population. Compare the progress of South Africa, where a large native population exists, with that of Australia or Canada, though all three are colonies of the same power, and this fact will be admitted even without reference to countries like India or Algeria, where difference of climate might be supposed to have offered a bar to white settlement. Let it be known once that on the Pacific coast the immigrants of European race will have to compete for work with Asiatics, and the flow of immigration will be quickly arrested. It is useless to urge the unreasonableness of such a course. Immi-

grants will not come. As a natural consequence the Asiatics will increase and become every year a more important element in the population. They may not be the ruling class, but they will form the masses, and to establish a distinction between the ruling class and the majority is to abandon the leading principle of the American constitution.

That unchecked Asiatic immigration is capable in a few years of changing the whole population of a country, even when already thickly settled, is not a mere matter of speculation. A very tangible instance of it is furnished by the British colony of Mauritius, which less than half a century ago was peopled almost exclusively by whites and negroes. The island is small, scarcely seven hundred square miles in extent, and the population was actually denser than that of New York or Pennsylvania to-day. About 1838 the system of importing coolies to work on the plantations was introduced, and to-day they form nearly two-thirds of the whole population. What has occurred in densely-peopled Mauritius is far more likely to happen in California and Oregon with their population of five or six at the utmost to the square mile. Indeed, we can see nothing to prevent it if no obstacle be raised by domestic legislation. The number of Chinese ready to leave their own crowded cities are counted by millions, the facilities for transporting them across the Pacific are practically unlimited, and the wide territory of the United States offers a far more inviting field of labor than the plantations of a small tropical island in the Indian Ocean.

In reckoning up the probabilities of Asiatic colonization on this continent, it is well to bear in mind that it is only within the lifetime of the present generation that the population of the Chinese Empire has begun to spread itself abroad. For centuries the law of the empire, as well as the profound contempt of the people for foreign lands, kept the teeming millions of China inclosed within their own wall. Even the Tartar provinces, the fertile wastes of Mongolia and Mantchuria, over which a few hordes of warlike shepherds, scarcely more numerous than the Sioux and Piutes of our Western territory, roamed, were closed to the natives of China. The Abbé Huc, who traversed those countries in 1840 and the following years, describes the overflowing population of China as insensibly flowing into the desert by isolated families, while emigration was strictly forbidden by the Imperial laws. Towards foreign countries the isolation of the Empire was complete. It was a maxim of public policy that all intercourse with the "outside barbarians" could only bring injury to the subjects of the Celestial Empire, and emigration was forbidden not less strictly than the admission of foreigners. The war by which England forced the opening of the five ports to foreign commerce, little over

forty years ago, was the first breach in the wall of exclusion with which China had for centuries surrounded itself. That the war in question was a gross violation of justice and a mere piece of unjustifiable violence on the part of a strong power towards a weak one, there is no longer any question. It is, however, with its effects, and not with its causes, we have here to deal. The opening of the ports led rapidly to the commencement of a movement of emigration in China, where the crowded population had long experienced the difficulties of a struggle for life far keener than any other nation can easily realize. The Chinese Government strove for many years ineffectually to hinder this movement, and retain its people at home. The British colony of Hong Kong, within a few miles of the coast, and the old Portuguese settlement at Macao offered facilities for slipping out of the Empire which Chinese adroitness was not slow in utilizing. In many of the European colonies, and in some of the lately emancipated South American states, there was a keen demand for slave labor, or at least for bond servants. China could supply this demand, and Chinese merchants quickly found the means to convey their working countrymen to the foreign lands, in spite of Imperial prohibitions. The Coolie traffic, or the export of Chinese laborers under bond to serve a certain number of years in payment of their passage, sprang to great dimensions. Peru, Cuba, and numerous other countries were eager to obtain Coolie laborers, and once the movement was set going, the emigration speedily extended. The Chinese speculators, among whom the love of gain is as fully developed as in the keenest speculators of our stock markets, quickly found that they might utilize the surplus labor of their countrymen for their own profit, without the necessity of selling them for a term of years to the planters of Cuba or Demerara. Companies were organized to transport Coolies or laborers to California, after the discovery of gold in that State. The projectors counted on being repaid for the cost of passage, and reaping besides a handsome profit for themselves out of the surplus wages of the Coolies. In fact, they proposed to deal with them on a large scale, much as the Italian "padroni" deal with the boys, whom they hire from their parents, to work at organ-grinding in London or New York. The experiment proved successful, and its field of operation was gradually enlarged. The war of 1857, between China and Great Britain aided by France, though still more unjust than the earlier war, resulted in a further "opening up" of China, as it was then termed. Among the articles of the Treaty of Tientsin, which ended that war, was one which permitted Chinese of both sexes to emigrate freely. The English press was loud in its self-congratulations over this article, which it was hoped would largely increase the productive

power (for England, of course, but not for the natives) of the British colonies in the Chinese and adjoining seas. In a purely commercial spirit the English Government wished to fill up its colonies in Asiatic countries with the population from which the largest revenue could be obtained, quite independent of any other considerations. It believed that such a population was the Chinese, and accordingly it desired to substitute them for Malays, Bornese, and Sumatrans in the districts which it held inhabited by these races. That such an arrangement was bad for the Malays and Sumatrans aforesaid was unquestionable, but as they were mere subject-races, the English people troubled itself little about their complaints.

Under the impulse thus given by pressure from abroad, the immigration from China rapidly assumed larger proportions. Not only the neighboring countries of Asia, but the English colonies in Australia and the Pacific coast of the United States, and even the West Indies, received it on a vastly increased scale.

Complaints began soon to arise against the new form of slave labor which the "assisted emigration" from China took, and by a curious irony of fate the earliest protest against Chinese immigration came from the colonies of the very power which had wrung permission for it from the reluctant Chinese Government. The colonists of New South Wales and Melbourne raised their protests against the influx of Chinese Coolies, which the Government of Great Britain had brought on them. A population of Chinese might furnish a larger revenue to the Home Government and the English merchants than a white population would, but it was found to be by no means so beneficial to the white colonists themselves. As usual, public feeling in England was interested in behalf of the Chinese laborers, from whom so much profit might be reasonably expected. The bombardment of the defenceless city of Canton, because its authorities had seized the smuggling, "Lorcha Arrow" under British colors, had been indorsed at a general election by the people of England as a righteous vindication of "national" honor. The encouragement of Chinese immigration to Australia was subsequently treated as a duty of national humanity. The colonists, however, were stubborn in their opposition to the Coolie traffic, by whatever name it might be called, and large head taxes were levied in several of the Australian Parliaments on all Chinese immigrants. The consequence has been greatly to reduce Chinese immigration to the great southern island, though a large Chinese population is still found in Queensland, the most northern of its provinces, and a certain proportion of inhabitants of the same race exists in all the colonies.

In America the Chinese question did not assume prominence as

soon as it did in Australia. California, during the early mining excitement, was the only part of the United States that received any number of Chinese laborers, and for some years the confusion of races was too great in California to permit any special attention being paid to one more than another. The immigrants, who came in thousands during 1849 and 1850, hailed from every part of the globe. Mexicans, Chilians, Kanakas from the Pacific islands, and men from every nation of Europe were mixed up with immigrants from every part of the Union, and no one nationality had a decided prominence over the others. The new-comers were all in search of gold, and troubled themselves but little over the character or nationality of their fellow gold-hunters. To the majority of the immigrants the presence of Asiatics on American soil was merely one new feature in a whole panorama of novelties. They scarcely distinguished the Chinese from the native Indians, or from the mixed races of Spanish America, which at that time formed a much larger part of the population. Gradually, however, as the mines ceased to be the only industry of California, and the attention of its mixed population began to be turned to other pursuits, and to the regulation of life on a social basis, the peculiarities of the Chinese element began to attract first remark and then complaint. It was observed that the Chinese, while gradually growing in numbers, made no attempts to establish any closer fellowship with the rest of the population. They lived apart and worked in bodies by themselves, and as far as their acts were regulated by law it was Chinese law, not that of California. The Chinese quarter was as distinct a feature in every Californian camp as is the European quarter in a Chinese city. Few cared to penetrate into its internal economy, as difference of language was to most an insurmountable barrier; but it was seen easily that the whole system of life was carried on there in a manner radically different from that of the white race. Family life there was none, and, as the rough ways of the early miners gradually changed to the normal conditions of civilization, the Chinese peculiarities in this respect attracted more and more comment. It was also noted that certain "companies" of the wealthier Chinamen exercised despotic sway over the mass of their countrymen. They regulated the rates of labor, the nature of business in which they should engage, the payment of debts among themselves, and in fact nearly all the concerns of life, with as much authority as the ministers of the emperor could in China itself. The punishment of stripes, and even of death, was freely inflicted by the courts of the companies, and all attempts on the part of the regular authorities to interfere with such practices were baffled by the veil of mystery which surrounded these proceedings for all but the Chinese themselves. Slavery, too, though pro-

hibited by the laws of California, was well known to exist among the Chinese; and slaves, chiefly women, were (and still for that matter are) regularly bought and sold for the vilest purposes. It was by no means rare for the Chinese speculators in slaves to call in the aid of the State authorities to recover runaway or kidnapped slaves. As a matter of course the claims were not made on that ground, but a pretended husband or father would apply to the police for the recovery of his wife or child; and, when the parties in question had been so recovered, they would be utterly unable to explain the facts to the court, and easily frightened into confirming through an interpreter the false statements of their owners. The repeated occurrence of facts of this kind has had no small share in forming public opinion in California into its present attitude on the Chinese question.

A very distinctive character of the Chinese population in the United States is its essentially migratory nature. The Chinaman, unlike other immigrants, does not come to stay. He only seeks to accumulate as much during his foreign sojourn as will enable him to live at ease in his own country, to whose habits and traditions he closely clings. He rarely or never brings his family with him, or cares to establish himself permanently outside the "flowery kingdom." As a natural consequence he can live more cheaply and compete advantageously in the labor market with the white workingmen who have families to maintain, and the usual duties of citizens to discharge, with which the Chinese never care to meddle, even were they permitted. In fact, the labor competition between whites and Chinese on the Pacific is not between workingmen under similar conditions of life, but between the surplus Coolies of China and Americans working under the ordinary conditions of human life. Chinese labor is not merely cheaper, but it is much more easily transferred from place to place, and generally speaking more under the control of the wages-payers. On a small scale similar migrations of laborers who have no intention of remaining permanently away from their homes take place in many other countries. The mountaineers of Savoy regularly descend into the French cities to accumulate the means of subsistence for their later years from their savings abroad. The West of Ireland reapers in their annual excursions to reap the English harvests, the Gallegos of the North of Spain in their annual journeys to help in gathering in the vintage in other provinces of the Peninsula, and the Italian railroad laborers in their excursions to Germany and France, are types of the kind of migration practised by the Chinese in America. But, while such movements among people of the same or closely-allied countries may be useful, they cannot but be objectionable when they threaten to supersede the

actual native workingmen. The effect, too, on the travellers themselves is very often highly demoralizing, and especially so has this been the case among the Chinese in America. A number of European laborers may leave home annually for a few months without losing the home influences which play so important a part, ordinarily speaking, in the maintenance of order and morals in every country, but they could hardly do so if their absence was to extend over a number of years. One or other might escape the danger, but the moral deterioration of the great majority would be inevitable. So it has been with the Chinese in America. We have no desire to sit in judgment on the character of the Chinese race, as compared with others under the ordinary conditions of life. That without Christianity there can be no high moral qualities in a nation, we know, but we do not feel ourselves called on to enter here into a discussion of the moral shortcomings peculiar to the Chinese people, except as far as they clash with the ordinary laws of society amongst ourselves. With those laws the Chinese immigrants here certainly do come into collision to a much greater extent than other classes of the population. The number of Chinese convicts in the State and county prisons of the Pacific coast is exceptionally large for their proportion to the population. To morality, in the restricted sense of the word, they scarcely make any pretension, and if they are tolerably free from the vice of drunkenness, they more than compensate themselves by the still grosser indulgence of opium-smoking. That, on the whole, their presence has a distinctly demoralizing effect on the surrounding populations, is recognized by every class in the States where they are largely represented. It is scarcely reasonable to attribute a conviction so widely felt, and which has only grown stronger with a quarter of a century's experience, to mere race prejudice. The men who employ Chinese laborers, and presumably profit by them, acknowledge it as freely as the workingmen who compete with them in the labor market. "The fool knows more in his own house than the sage in his neighbor's," says a Spanish proverb; and the people of California and Oregon must certainly be better qualified to form a correct opinion on the morality of the Chinese among them than the people of other sections of the Union, and this opinion has been unmistakably expressed.

What has been said now will enable us to form a pretty accurate idea of the value of the Chinese immigration as a means of spreading Christianity among the population of that empire. It would be unworthy of us as Christians to speak of the conversion of any heathen people, and much more of so large a portion of the human race as the population of China, as a matter of trifling importance. As Catholics we know that the possession of the true

faith, and the means of salvation which it affords, is the greatest of all treasures for humanity; and we cannot but earnestly desire that all the nations of the earth should share in its benefits. The spirit which led Francis Xavier and Peter Claver to devote their lives to spreading the doctrines of Christianity among the heathen populations of Asia and America must, in at least some degree, animate the heart of every true Catholic. But it is not because an object is desirable that every means is to be adopted for its attainment. The promiscuous mingling together of Christian and non-Christian peoples is so far from being a likely means of spreading a knowledge of the Faith that it often serves rather as an obstacle to its diffusion. The Turks, quartered among the Christian nations of Eastern Europe, have shown a far more inveterate hate towards Christianity than did their Turcoman ancestors in the time of Gengis Khan. The Hindoos of to-day, after a century of European dominion, are more inaccessible to Christianity than were their ancestors when first visited by the Portuguese in the sixteenth century. We have no time at present to discuss the reasons of this fact; we only state that it is a fact which cannot be denied. There is nothing in the conditions of modern Chinese immigration to America which would warrant us in looking for more favorable results from it than have followed the settlement of Europeans in India. As a matter of fact, the immigrants are totally indifferent to religion in any shape. The absence of anything like home-life or settled habits among them, coupled with their isolation from the populations around, renders them far less liable to receive religious impressions than they would even be in their own country. The result has been, scarcely any instances have occurred of the conversion of Chinese in America to any form of Christianity. A certain number attend the mission schools opened by some of the Protestant denominations in San Francisco and a few other places, but it is admitted that their only motive is to learn English; and, certainly, if any of the pupils have become Christians in consequence, the fact has entirely escaped the public notice. Some Catholics are to be found among the Chinese, it is true. In San Francisco there are probably a hundred and fifty, or thereabouts, but the great majority had received the faith before coming to America, or were the children of Christian parents. Nothing leads to the conclusion that life in America has done anything to promote the growth of Christianity among the Chinese who come to its shores.

Our readers can judge from the foregoing facts whether the recent prohibition of Chinese immigration is wise or not. We believe it is, and in that we are actuated by no feeling of dislike or contempt for the excluded nationality. Their civilization and habits

appear to us to be incompatible with ours, and we believe both races are better apart. They have their land as we have this continent, and let each possess his own peaceably. That the Chinese already among us are entitled to the full protection of the law and to the same treatment as any other class of strangers, we firmly hold; we entirely condemn any petty persecution or manifestations of race enmity towards them, and we believe they should be allowed to work their way in their own fashion as far as it does not conflict with our laws. At the same time we hold that their unlimited immigration is a serious danger to our well-being, and that its prevention by law is an act of wise statesmanship, alike conformable to reason and to justice between man and man.

PURITANISM IN NEW ENGLAND.

History of New England. By John Gorham Palfrey. 3 vols. 8vo. Boston. 1865.

The Puritan Commonwealth. An Historical Review of the Puritan Government in Massachusetts. By Peter Oliver. Boston. 1856.

Notes on the History of Slavery in Massachusetts. By George H. Moore. New York. 1866.

Nicholas Upsall. By Augustine Jones. Boston. 1880.

Notes on the History of Witchcraft in Massachusetts. By George H. Moore. Worcester. 1883.

The Puritan Conspiracy against the Pilgrim Fathers and the Congregational Church, 1624. By John A. Goodwin. Boston. 1883.

NEW ENGLAND has framed not only her own history, but to a great extent the whole history of this country as it is generally read and popularly understood. While other parts of the country were more or less cosmopolitan, with populations descended from settlers owing their origin to various parts of the British Isles and the continent of Europe, whose different views of civil and religious government and theory brought about some mutual forbearance and a spirit of toleration, New England, colonized chiefly from one part of England with men of determined and aggressive opinions, maintained a unity of purpose and a homogeneity not elsewhere observable. This gave its people a

distinct and peculiar character ; and when emigration began from its comparatively bleak and sterile shores to more favored parts of our domain, the New Englander went forth, if not with the old faith of the original settlers, at least with the same faith in himself, and the same determination to make his views prevail and to force them upon less concentrated and self-willed communities. The New England influence is thus not confined to the original limits of the colonies between the Hudson and the Atlantic, it has to a considerable extent moulded the thought and activity of the West, and exercised a great influence in the Middle States, and in the Federal legislation.

Schools made New Englanders a reading and writing people, and no subject was more palatable than themselves. The first generation wrote its annals, and each succeeding generation has written of the past. Changes occur, and in each cycle of change New England writers adapt their writings to the exigencies of the time, and, according to the state of current public opinion, maintain the character of their ancestors by employing all the resources of the intellect to portray the theories, religious and civil government, public and private life of past generations, as from the modern point of view types of the highest excellence ever reached by mortal man.

The consequence is that the works on New England history exceed those of all other parts of the country. There are histories of New England, histories of each of the States from Maine to Connecticut, histories of counties and towns ; histories written in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries reproduced and carefully edited ; works on the ecclesiastical history in manifold forms, from Cotton Mather's " *Magnalia* " to anniversary sermons ; and with these stand the imposing array of volumes issued by the Historical Societies. These are all in the main pervaded by the same spirit of eulogy and praise, or carefully-studied justification and apology.

There have been few dissenting writers. It is to one not brought up in this literature a task of no slight magnitude to study up in detail any feature or character of New England life. It is a most repelling task to wade through the immense mass of printed material, and delve as far as life and leisure permit into unpublished material to fill out a truthful and impartial picture, and as the result will be to demolish some New England idol, the writer gains the ill-will of that part of the country and its scattered sons, and pleases few, leaving him only the consciousness of having endeavored to re-establish the truth of history. For his thesis, whatever it may be, the general public will care little, and popular history will continue its psittaceous utterances, as though he had never labored to set matters aright.

While the general histories of the United States, like those of Bancroft and Hildreth, are written from the New England point of view, and Palfrey's "New England" embodies in an especial manner the whole genesis and development of their distinctive autonomy, with all the extenuating circumstances, the deprecatory apologies, the clever and artistic arrangement in the background of the picture of all that might offend the present taste, very few writers have undertaken to present a different picture to the public eye.

The most extended work on this side is that of Peter Oliver, of the Suffolk bar. It was entitled "The Puritan Commonwealth. An Historical Review of the Puritan Government in Massachusetts in its Civil and Ecclesiastical Relations, from its rise to the abrogation of the first Charter. Together with some general reflections on the English Colonial Policy, and on the character of Puritanism." Though not a work to which the author's short tenure of life allowed him to give the years of study that would have made it of the highest authority, its plan covered the whole ground, and the book is a necessary guide to any one who studies New England history, as it leads the inquirer to sources overlooked or suppressed in current works.

In considering what may in general terms be called New England Puritanism, though the term "Puritan" is often misapplied, the great points are the ingenious system by which, professing to be guided and governed by English law, and to establish a free system, they centred the whole power in the hands of an oligarchy, the Church members, who could keep out of their body or expel from their body whomsoever they chose, and that without appeal; next, as a natural result of this, for assuming the power to grant or take away civil and religious rights, they could not regard the rights of conscience, property, or life, the tyrannical and persecuting spirit that pervade it, and the utter disregard of the rights of others to profess and exercise their religious views and practices, even those established by the authority of the English Government, which they professed to obey.

Under this come their hatred of the Catholic religion, their banishment of Episcopalians, their persecution of Mrs. Hutchinson and the Baptists, their persecution and illegal execution of Robinson, Stevenson, Mary Dyer, and other Quakers, and their persecution of Upsall, the only man who dared gainsay their acts.

Next comes, as emanating from this intolerant self-righteous spirit, the famous Witchcraft episode in New England history.

The treatment of inferior races, as instanced in their whole intercourse with the Indians, and the history of negro slavery and the slave trade in New England, form another department of history, which needs essentially an independent study.

During the minority of Edward VI. the Catholic religion, as it had been maintained by Henry VIII. in spite of his schism and persecution, was swept away. In the name of a boy-king a new set of doctrines and a new form of worship were set up by authority of the regent and a subservient Parliament. This vanished during Mary's brief reign, but reappeared in a modified form under Elizabeth, when the Church of England, in its present form as a state establishment, began the existence which has continued to the present time. By this time many in England had imbibed doctrines and ideas from the swarm of so-called reformers on the continent, and some of the more active of these had, during Mary's reign, taken refuge in various countries where their opinions were freely held. Returning to England under Elizabeth, these men were by no means disposed to take creed and worship from the government. What right God may have had to lay down to man what man was to believe, and what public worship he was to render the Divine Majesty, seems to have been a point regarded as of little importance; but as between the state and themselves, each set of believers held that it had as absolute a right as government to establish a code of belief and a form of latria. As neither side could show any authority from Scripture or reason, the whole question became one of power to compel obedience on the one side, and on the other of power to resist. Luther upheld the power of the prince, and where his doctrines prevailed the state did all and enforced submission. Calvin was essentially revolutionary, and in his view those who accepted his doctrines had the inherent right to frame their own church organization, their own ecclesiastical polity and worship, and overthrow any government that attempted to restrain them. Cranmer in England attempted to carry out the Luther view, and won the Calvinists by concessions. It is very evident that at first no importance was attached to priestly orders or episcopal consecration, to apostolic succession, or any union with the Church of the past. To all, these things seemed as of no importance; and it was only when pressed by the extreme Calvinists that the Church of England set up any claim to them. Episcopacy, a gown and surplice, some accessories of public service, were retained or introduced. Here began the first trouble. Some who returned from Switzerland inveighed against all this, and soon denied the power of the state to make any laws in regard to religion, unless they themselves were the state. The more moderate hoped in time to gain sufficient control to do away with what they deemed objectionable, and in the meantime were disposed to let things take their course. These were the Puritans, properly so called, who did not break away absolutely from the Established Church, though they censured many of its ideas and

practices. "The thorough-going Separatists denied that the state church was a Christian body, or that its ministrations and ordinances were of any validity."

The little band who came over on the first voyage of the "Mayflower," and landed at Plymouth belonged to this separatist body; their extreme views had brought upon them the heavy hand of the law in England, but they were gradually, as Independents, beginning to hold fellowship with Calvinistic bodies, though without adopting their system of government. Though then showing some disposition to recognize the Church of England as in their eyes Christian, they would not recognize its ministry, holding it to be fatally unsound from its descent from that of the Catholic Church. The Plymouth Pilgrim Fathers came over without any minister of religion, and for some years had none, choosing one of their number as Elder to officiate. The Rev. John Lyford, an ordained minister of the Church of England, of Puritan views, came over in March, 1624, but he never officiated at Plymouth, though he did subsequently at Salem.

The settlers of Massachusetts Bay were, however, Puritans; of the party who came over in 1629 and landed at Salem in May, two, Skelton and Higginson, were ordained clergymen of the Church of England, and in the settlement Skelton was chosen pastor and Higginson teacher.

Cotton Mather represents Higginson as saying, when England was receding from the view of those on the deck of the vessel: "We do not go to New England as Separatists from the Church of England." Speaking of Salem, Goodwin says: "For the first three years of its existence that ancient town worshipped exclusively in the form of the Church of England, as also at that time did all the scattered settlers around Boston Bay."

There was thus in the outset a broad line between the Separatists at Plymouth and the Puritans of the Massachusetts Bay colony. Yet the influence of Endicott and his friends at Boston soon made the Massachusetts settlement absolutely separatist. Higginson drew up a confession of faith and church government; the ministers were ordained by the imposition of the hands of the congregation. Obedience to this new form, probably concerted in England, was enforced rigorously. Of five persons, appointed by the Massachusetts Company as counsellors to Endicott, two, John and Samuel Browne, declined to accept this new system. Instead of attending its services, they continued to read the Book of Common Prayer together. They were at once arraigned before the Governor, and sent back to England, not having been permitted to breathe American air for more than five or six weeks. In this same early period we find Philip Ratliffe sentenced, in June, 1631, to

"be whipped, have his ears cut off, fyned £40, and banished out of the lymitts" "for uttering malicious and scandalous speeches against the government and the *Church of Salem*."

This was a decisive step. The Puritans at Massachusetts Bay, still under the obedience of the company, and of the English Government which created it, deliberately placed its veto on religious freedom, on all toleration of dissent, and they did this while the ink was still wet on the plan of faith and church polity which a few individuals had assumed the power to frame and enforce. Toleration, although it is now hypocritically and in sonorous phrases of deceptive form and sound proclaimed as one of the great virtues of the New England Puritans, who are portrayed by their descendants as champions of religious liberty, was in reality something so utterly distasteful to them that they denounced it in unmistakable terms. There is "no room in Christ's army for tolerationists," says Johnson, one of the pioneers. Cotton declared that toleration made the world anti-Christian. Shepard, in an Election sermon delivered in 1672, and styled in the eccentric style of the day an *Eye-salve*, maintained it to be Satan's policy to plead for an indefinite and boundless toleration. Nathaniel Ward, author of a revolting work, in which he styles himself "The Simple Cobbler of Agawam," says: "My heart hath naturally detested toleration of divers religions, or of one religion in segregant shapes." Others spoke of "the evil egg of toleration." President Oakes, of Harvard, laid down his principles unmistakably when he said: "I look upon toleration as the first-born of all abominations." "God forbid," said Dudley, "our love for the truth should be grown so cold that we should tolerate errors; I die no libertine." And Ward sums up all in one phrase: "To say that men ought to have liberty of conscience, is impious ignorance."

When, therefore, men talk of the founders of New England as advocates of the liberty of conscience, it is a clear and palpable perversion. The very words of the early founders and framers of its polity refute it.

The Brownes were not the only Church of-England men sent out of New England. Morton and Gardiner shared the same fate. Bancroft, in his *Apology*, treats the matter in this extremely strange fashion: "The Puritans established a government in America, such as the laws of natural justice warranted, and such as the statutes and common law of England did not warrant, and that was done by men who still acknowledged a limited allegiance to the parent state. The Episcopalians declared themselves the enemy of the party, and waged against it a war of extermination; Puritanism excluded them from its asylum." How the law of natural justice, which, if it means anything, means doing to others as we would

have others do unto us, justified the polity of the Puritans, is utterly incomprehensible, unless laws are to be construed as the same people construed some texts of Scripture, by the judicious insertion of a negative particle. But history is utterly silent as to the Episcopalians who, in New England, declared themselves the enemy of the Puritan party, or who "waged a war of extermination on it." That the Brownes read the book of Common Prayer, as had already been done, is true; that they denied the right of their fellow-emigrants to prevent them, is also true; but there is not a particle of evidence that they attempted in the slightest manner to interfere with those who differed from them. They did not declare themselves the enemies of Puritanism, or wage against it a war of extermination. "Puritanism," he admits, "excluded them from its asylum."

The religious intolerance of Puritanism and the natural cry for tolerance of an amiable heart were strikingly displayed in Roger Williams. Under the cry raised by Luther that the Church was Antichrist, the swarm of sects that pullulated throughout Europe all took up the cry. That the Church of Rome was absolutely wrong, its hierarchy a usurpation and a tyranny, its worship and rites, ceremonies and vestments, hideous in the eye of God, was adopted as a series of axioms. No one attempted to prove it, but all their votaries re-echoed it. This was adopted as a proposition that required no examination or investigation. A man must not take anything for granted without examination, but this he must take.

We have seen that the ministry of the Anglican Church was disregarded at Plymouth, and treated as worthless at the Bay, where the congregation reordained ministers. Roger Williams came, and, carrying his fanatical hatred of the old faith to the very highest point, condemned them for not going far enough. The orders of the Anglican Church were but an offshoot of those of Rome; if the latter came of Satan and not of Christ, the former must be not something merely to be laid aside as indifferent, they must be formally and openly rejected as sinful and unchristian. He declined to hold communion with any who would take this position, or would not publicly declare their repentance for having ever been in communion with the Church of England. The very flag of England, which still floated over them, little as they respected its church and laws, raised another fury of intolerance in this strangely constituted heart. There was the sign of Satan himself, the Cross emblazoned on it. No Christian could tolerate such an idolatrous symbol floating over his head. Impelled, as there is every reason to believe, by Roger Williams, John Endicott cut the Cross from the flag, and the community was at once embroiled.

As new questions of controversy arose between Williams at Salem and the other churches, he addressed a letter to his church, moving them to renounce all communication with the others in the colony, and he carried his power of excommunication so far that he refused to join in family prayer in his own house, or say grace at table when his wife was present, because the disobedient woman, rejecting his authority as husband, pastor and supreme pontiff, continued to frequent the communion of other New England churches. As Palfrey remarks: "While the imputed intolerance of others provoked Williams's vehement displeasure, he indulged himself in the largest liberty of being exclusive in ways of his own."

The General Court refused to admit the Salem delegates, and, as an ecclesiastico-political body, "ordered that the said Mr. Williams shall depart out of this jurisdiction within six weeks now next ensuing; which if he neglects to perform, it shall be lawful for the governor and two of the magistrates to send him to some place out of this jurisdiction, not to return any more, without license from the Court."

Thus was the intolerant future champion of toleration disposed of. On this affair Palfrey remarks: "The Brownes had been shipped back in the first year of the company's occupation. . . . Gardiner, Stone, Walford, Gray, Lynn, Smith, and various others, named and unnamed, had been sent away for various reasons, resolving themselves into the persuasive reason that their presence was found inconvenient and dangerous by men who had a right to choose their company." A band of brigands or secret conspirators would in this reasoning find a justification for murder; it is the principle underlying their saying that "dead men tell no tales."

This banishment was in itself a direct violation of the whole theory of New England Puritanism, which was based on the independence of the individual churches. The system of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland, of the Episcopal Church of England, and others secondarily constituted, was here followed, in disregard of all their boasted love of independence. According to their own theory, the Salem Church had a perfect right to choose its own minister, yet it was censured for taking one without the sanction of the General Court, the assembly of the delegates of the whole colony. This made them virtually the appointing power, and not the members of the separate church. To exclude the Salem delegates, and then sentence the Salem minister without trial, without an opportunity of defending himself, was an utter violation of all principles of justice—a strange commentary on Mr. Bancroft's statement that the Puritan government was such as the law of

natural justice warranted; in this case, as in many others, it was one in which that law was foully disregarded.

The General Court had here assumed to be the highest ecclesiastical judicial and executive power. When Mrs. Hutchinson began to disseminate her doctrines, and divided the church people into those who believed that good works ought to show the reality of conversion and justification, and those who, with this female theologian, denounced such an idea as a covenant of works, the General Court went further, and consulted the ministers, who gave it as their advice, "that, in such heresies or errors of any church members as are manifest and dangerous to the state, the Court may proceed without tarrying for the church." Yet they allowed her a form of trial, then passed sentence of banishment on her; subsequent to this, "the church, with one consent, cast her out." Then she was driven forth to perish by the hands of Indians. Of her adherents, many were fined, several were banished, others were disfranchised, and seventy-six disarmed. So shallow were the reasons put forth for these proceedings by the ministers and magistrates of the colony, that their apologist, Palfrey, calls our attention to the fact "that the government's exposition and defence of its course sometimes failed to do it justice." He concludes his own apology by saying: "If the treatment was harsh, it was effective." That is to say, all free discussion of religious doctrines was relentlessly suppressed, and we are asked to praise these Puritans as advocates of freedom of conscience.

About 1644 some Baptists troubled the church in Massachusetts, and a law was promptly passed, banishing any who came into the colony, as well as any settler who embraced their views, or who condemned infant baptism, or left the meeting-house when it was to be administered. Under such laws Obadiah Holmes was expelled from Plymouth and flogged at Boston. In 1647 another law forbade any Jesuit to enter the territory, pronounced the penalty of banishment on any who, in spite of this warning, presumed to land in Massachusetts, and if, after being banished, any one returned, he was to be put to death. This law all Puritanism held to be so consonant to reason and liberty of conscience, that it was used as an answer to those who remonstrated when a similar law was passed against Quakers.

The next to feel the heavy hand of Puritan persecution were the Quakers. In 1656 Mary Fisher and Ann Austin, who had embraced the doctrines of Fox, arrived in Boston harbor. They were seized on the vessel before they could land, imprisoned, and sentenced to banishment. A penalty of £5 was imposed upon any one who spoke to them, though, as the windows of their cell were boarded up, this was no easy task. Nicholas Upsall, a friend of

Roger Williams, and the earliest advocate of toleration in Massachusetts, offered to pay the fine for liberty to speak to them; he asked to be allowed to furnish them with food, and when this was refused, he bribed the jailer, and kept them from starving. This, be it remembered, is not a tale of the Spanish Inquisition; the persecutors were Puritans of New England, supposed by many to be the very exponents of religious freedom; Nicholas Upsall was not a Catholic but a Puritan, but it is not to be wondered at that some of his descendants ceased to be Protestant and Puritan.

There was no Massachusetts law against the Quakers, but the defect was soon remedied. The General Court passed an act on the 14th of October, 1656.

At the instance of the commissioners of the United Colonies, Connecticut, New Haven and Plymouth passed similar enactments. When the Massachusetts law was proclaimed by beat of drum, Upsall, before whose door it was read, expressed his disapproval, and in temperate language said that the magistrates should look to it that they were not fighting against God. The first man who dared to raise his voice in favor of toleration in New England was not permitted to do so long. He was at once arrested. He was an ancient citizen, a man of means, had been one of the first settlers, coming over with Winthrop in 1630, was one of the founders of a military company, the Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company of Boston, but his doom was sealed. He was sentenced to pay a fine of £20, and to depart the jurisdiction within one month, not to return under the penalty of imprisonment. The fine was exacted, Governor Endicott saying, "I will not abate one groat;" and in the thirty days allotted him, the time spent in prison was made part, so that, with little space for preparation, this aged pioneer was driven into the wilderness at the beginning of winter, and while thus wandering his way out of the jurisdiction, property of his was seized to pay fines imposed on him for not being in his place in the meeting-house in Boston on the regular Sunday services! After three years' wandering he returned, and in compliance with the sentence was thrust into prison, and spent most of his remaining years in confinement.

Such was the New England penalty for advocating toleration. It was a crime and punished as such with unrelenting rigor.

The Quakers, in the enthusiasm of their faith, were not deterred by any fear of Puritan punishments. They came in defiance of the penal laws. Mary Clarke was scourged; Holden, Copeland, and Dowdney were whipped and imprisoned; Lawrence and Cassandra Southwick imprisoned for harboring Quakers. Penal laws failed to keep out Quakers or to crush sympathy out of the human heart. Then came new penal laws, inflicting mutilation on the undesired im-

migrants. One ear was to be cut off, then another; then the tongue was to be bored with a hot iron. Even this failed; then came an enactment inflicting the penalty of death on any Quaker who, once expelled, dared to set his foot again within the limits of Massachusetts Bay. William Robinson, Marmaduke Stevenson, and Mary Dyer were banished, but bravely returned. They were arraigned at the bar of the General Court for "rebellion, sedition, and presumptuously intruding themselves, notwithstanding their being sentenced to banishment on pain of death." They were all sentenced to be hanged on the eighth day following. There was such a general feeling against this cruel act, that the General Court set about justifying its conduct, and called out a strong military force to surround the place of execution. When the victims of Puritan intolerance endeavored to address the spectators, their voices were drowned by the roll of the drums. On October 27th, 1657, the two men, for Mary Dyer was spared for a time, met their death for professing the doctrines of Fox; the first execution under a penal law for religion that had yet taken place within the limits of this country. The place was Boston Common, their bodies swinging from a tree which tradition says was that afterwards known as Liberty Tree. Other executions followed, that of Mary Dyer among the rest, the bodies of the victims being stripped and thrust into pits.

The government in England had paid little attention to its American affairs, but the cry of these murdered Quakers reached the throne, and an order was issued from Whitehall requiring the immediate cessation of all capital and other corporal punishments of those of the king's subjects called Quakers. The hand of persecution was stayed. But as Bancroft says truly, the royal order "could not erase the stains which indelibly rest upon the Puritan church of Massachusetts."

Recent efforts have been made to excuse and palliate the conduct toward the Quakers, but these efforts only serve to bring the details into clearer light. As Protestants, claiming the right of private judgment, they could not fairly deny it to others. They had no law of England to justify their course; and on the side of the Quakers the acts complained of and paraded by the advocates and apologists amount simply to religious extravagance, such as under the Protestant idea so often occur. No resistance to authority, no plot to overthrow the government or incite Indian hostility, no injury to property or person of any resident is even alleged. They were punished simply and avowedly for the tenets which they professed. They suffered in both Plymouth and Massachusetts, and in a minor degree in the Connecticut colonies.

Rhode Island did not persecute, Roger Williams confining his dislike to writing a book against them.

Encouraged by the declaration of the royal commissioners "that liberty should be given to all sorts and sects of men," some Baptists in 1667 attempted to organize a church of their own, but flogging, fine, disfranchisement, and imprisonment, with banishment as a last resource, soon broke up the little congregation, nor was it till 1679 that a Baptist meeting-house was stealthily opened.

For writers to claim for the Fathers of New England the high honor of establishing liberty of conscience, or of favoring religious freedom, is a farce too contemptible for consideration. The whip, the pillory, the gallows, loom up from the pages of history to denounce such perversion of truth. An outlying part of the British realm, New England had no autonomy. And to quote the startling words of Oliver, himself a Boston lawyer, "regarded simply in a legal view, every execution was a murder; every mutilation a maiming; every whipping a battery; every fine an extortion; every disfranchisement an outrage, and all were breaches of the charter." The arguments put forward to justify the New Englanders for putting Quakers to death will serve the Mormons to justify them in putting to death persons whose presence in Utah is undesirable.

Both put forward the same claim to deep religious conviction, and sincere belief that they alone of all mortals exactly know, understand, and appreciate the revelation of God; both moved to a remote and inhospitable land to enjoy their own religious views; both treat the central government as a foreign rule to be obeyed only by compulsion, and both seek to govern themselves by laws of their own exclusive making; both combine civil and ecclesiastical powers in such a way that all power is in and through the Church.

History repeats itself. As the New England theocracy grew by the neglect of England to control it, till it become too strong to control, so Mormonism has thriven under the neglect of our Federal government till it is so strong as to defy all attempts to punish its disregard and defiance of laws.

The religious system established in New England pervaded the colonies it embraced. Church membership was a step to the rights of a freeman. A man whom the church in his own place would not admit as a member, could exercise no prerogative of a freeman. If he offended the church, he could be disfranchised as well as expelled from membership. No dissent was allowed; the right of private judgment, in so far as man used it to reject the doctrines and authority of the Church of Rome, was inalienable; but it did not authorize any man to question the views of any New England minister whom the General Court upheld. Such a use of private

judgment was the work of Satan. The right of private judgment was limited to judging that New England churches were right; freedom of conscience consisted in being free to justify praise and uphold the Congregational system. The man forced to walk a pirate's plank had just as much freedom.

Religion as they held had no softening characteristics, nothing to refine, to move the heart, to call out the affections or inspire a happy joyousness. It proscribed art, music, all exterior beauties that could serve as auxiliaries, or lead the minds of the less thoughtful, and that is the masses, of mankind to think of eternal things. With them all was severe, stern, and forbidding. Men were to be led to heaven by the threats of hell, not by bidding them look on the love of God and of the Incarnate Word. Their very meeting-houses condemned the Almighty for his gorgeous worship, his tabernacle, and temple under the old law.

The mind was there concentrated; all was severe. No joyous holidays divided the year, or allowed the heart to exult and be glad. Such a community could not but become intensely morbid. One of the strange inconsistencies of Protestantism is that while they deny that man can have any intercourse by prayer or otherwise with the good angels, they have held and maintained that men could hold intercourse with the fallen angels, obtain powers from them, and be controlled by them. It is a puzzle of puzzles to understand how they could regard the blessed spirits who always see the face of the Almighty, whose powers have never been marred or diminished by sin, as less potent than spirits suffering for their rebellion the wrath of God.

Yet such is the case. New England believed in no power of God's faithful servants, angelic or human. They were all impotent creatures, unable to acquire any knowledge of human affairs, or exercise any influence over them. But they did believe in Satan, and New England believed that Satan's great object was to overthrow their ecclesiastical and civil institutions. As Palfrey puts it, "the honest, *bonâ fide*, contemplative believer in that theory of man's nature, which is set forth in the Westminster Catechism, logically understood himself to be living in the midst of crimes of dark and mysterious enormity."

That Satan was endeavoring to gain influence over some of the weaker brethren, and use them to harm the Israel of New England, was too firmly believed not to call for legislative action. Plymouth, in 1636, declared the death penalty for "solemn compaction or conversing with the devil by way of witchcraft, conjuration, or the like." Massachusetts in December, 1641, and Connecticut, a year later, declared, "if any man or woman be a witch (that is, hath or consulteth with a familiar spirit), they shall be put to death." The

New Haven laws, printed in 1656, have a similar provision. In this they had a precedent in a law of Elizabeth, and one of James I., passed in 1615.

Much of the early history of New England Puritanism is occupied with the relation of marvels, sometimes shocking, generally childish, but never appealing to the nobler sentiments of the heart. The Puritans were inadequate to romance or poetry. The strange sounds they heard, the appalling sights they witnessed, the mysteries that encompassed their fields and waters, the witches who teased them by day, are mentioned in startling detail and cold matter-of-fact expression, which could neither point a moral nor adorn a tale. They derided the sign of the cross, but saw magic in a broomstick. They scorned the sacrificial service of the altar, but trembled before the senseless mummeries of old women. If the leaves of a prayer-book were gnawed by mice, they adored the wonder-working Providence of God; but let the lightning blast one of their most famous destroyers of Indian life, and it was only a deplorable accident. Their superstition was selfish as well as blind."¹ It is not astonishing, therefore, to find early executions for witchcraft in New England. Thus Margaret Jones, of Charlestown, was put to death in 1648; Ann Hibbins in Boston, in 1655; and, not long after, Goodwife Bassett and Goodwife Knapp, Green-smith, and others. The belief in diabolical machinations was steadily increasing and spreading. New Hampshire was persecuted by stone-throwing devils, who annoyed residents in different places, and made their homes unendurable. The Protestant feeling, roused against Catholicity under Charles II. and James II., gave new impulse to the belief in witchcraft. Hence, when a poor, old ignorant, Irish Catholic woman, named Glover, was accused, there was no hope of escape for her. How came she to New England, unless sold there as a bondwoman? She could say her prayers in Irish, and the Lord's Prayer tolerably in Latin, but, as she could not say it in English, that was deemed proof sufficient. Had she been able to say it like her persecutors, who repeated spurious words as the words of our Lord, she might have escaped. But as she said it correctly, and they spuriously, they hanged her.

Early in the year 1692 Salem became the scene of a witchcraft excitement. The daughters of Rev. Mr. Parris, the minister, accused several of bewitching them. Older persons supported the charges, and arrests followed. The mania spread to other towns, and in a short time more than a hundred women, many of them of unblemished character and worthy families, were apprehended, and examined with so little regard to justice that they were in all cases committed. Every means was then employed to extort con-

¹ Oliver.

fessions, and many yielded to the moral torture brought to bear, and confessed all that was required of them. In some cases they recanted all this, and endeavored to undo the work, but it did not avail.

The governor and his council took the advice of several ministers in the colony, but their words served only to increase the popular belief.

Bridget Bishop was tried, convicted, and executed in June, 1692; a few weeks subsequently, five more women were brought to trial. The jury found one of them, Rebekah Nurse, not guilty; but the people raised such an outcry, that they asked to be sent out again, and soon brought her in also guilty. Among the next victims was the Rev. George Burroughs, John Proctor and his wife, John Willard, George Jacobs, and Martha Currier. All were convicted, and all but one executed. In September, eight other women were hanged. Giles Corey refused to plead, and, under an old English law, was pressed to death, by the *peine forte et dure*. Nineteen had been executed; the prisons were full of accused women and men; no one was safe; children accused their parents; husbands accused their wives; one clergyman had already been sacrificed; but, when the wife of one of the most active ministers in arresting supposed witches was herself accused, when suspicion rested even on the wife of the governor and other ladies of position, the tide of feeling began to change. There were more acquittals and few convictions. Some clung to the old belief in the supernatural character of things that had occurred, but most people believed that the whole originated in the knavery and wickedness of a few young girls. Some of these actually confessed that their whole stories were pure inventions.

Many families were utterly ruined. The odium cast on them, the cost of maintaining and defending the accused till it absorbed all their means, the seizure of property where an accused person fled,—all these combined to hurl worthy people from comfort and prosperity to penury and distress.

The clergy were mainly at fault; they ere long admitted how grievously they had erred; but, though the victims or their descendants appealed to the General Court for redress, the New England clergy, who had helped to increase the delusion, made no effort to secure justice for those who suffered.

As early as October, 1692, a proposition was made for a Fast and a Convocation of the Ministers, and though the long preamble shows that the conviction was already strong, that innocent persons had perished, the ministers as a body made no effort, and the proposition failed. Cotton Mather, in 1696, admitted the fact. "Wicked sorceries have been practiced in the land, and in the late

inexplicable storms from the Invisible world thereby brought upon us, wee were led by the Just Hand of Heaven unto those errors whereby great hardships were brought upon innocent persons, and (wee feare) Guilt incurr'd, which wee have all cause to Bewayl, with much confusion of o Face before the Lord."

Chief Justice Sewall, when a general fast was finally appointed, "made his public confession of fault and repentance for his part in that bloody Assize of Witches at Salem," but the repentance of the ministers and leaders of the Puritan Church never reached the point of reparation which must be regarded as essential to true contrition. Though many historians state as a fact that an act was subsequently passed, reversing the several convictions, judgments, and attainders, Dr. Moore has shown clearly that no such act ever became a law. "A private act was passed in 1703 with reference to *three* of the surviving sufferers, and a few years later sundry appropriations were made from the public treasury in aid of families who had been ruined by this storm; but none," continues Dr. Moore, "were adequate to the occasion; all were scanty and insufficient, and, although the subject was revived from time to time during the next half century, nothing else was done." The whole sad affair stands a stigma on the Puritan Church of Massachusetts. More than the rest of the Puritan population, these men were, as John Russell Lowell says, "narrow in thought, in culture, and in creed," but they were none the less infallible in their own eyes and spiritual pride. They fanned the flame, they hounded in persecution and prosecution, they cut off the accused from communion, and, even when they acknowledged that they had sent innocent men and women to the gallows, and reduced innocent families to want and misery, they never exerted their potent influence to make reparation for the wrong.

Passing to another point, the treatment of inferior races, the native American Indian and the Negro, we find that New England Puritanism had not attained any high or noble position. The few leaders who arrogated to themselves the dignity of elect of God, making really God's election of the rest of mankind subject to their will, looked down on all whom they deemed unworthy of admission to church membership as reprobates doomed hereafter to eternal flames, and here spared for the benefit of the elect. Those in the colony, whom they excluded from church and civil rights, were a sort of helots, useful to some extent at least, but they were admitted to no ordinances of the church; for a long time, their children were not deemed fit subjects for baptism; the two sacraments nominally retained became, so far as a large and increasing body of colonists were concerned, practically null and void.

To their eyes, however, the Indians were worshippers and con-

federates of Satan, Chanaanites whom they were to exterminate. Many and great as were the cruelties perpetrated by Spaniards, there were from the first discovery zealous priests who strove to inculcate the doctrines of Christianity on the Indian minds, and to disabuse them of their errors. Every Spanish, French, and Portuguese colony has its mission annals, reaching back to the primeval settlements. But Robinson, writing from Holland, deplored that the Pilgrims at Plymouth began to slay the Indians before they began to convert them. His reproof fell unheeded. They traded with the Indians, fought with them, but it was long before they made any attempt to raise their thoughts to acknowledge God. The Indians were not slow in perceiving the difference. When a chief was reproached for liking the French, he replied: "Whenever I came to Boston, I was asked whether I had furs to sell; when I went to Canada, men met me who did not look at my furs; they asked me whether I knew of God."

Catholic missionaries labored and died on the upper Rio Grande, on the rivers of the Chesapeake, in Florida, on the upper lakes, before the Pilgrims or Puritans had breathed a whisper of religion to the native Indians within ten miles of Plymouth and Boston. The Indian's right to the soil was recognized as to what they actually cultivated. Roger Williams aroused indignation by asserting that the Indians had a title to their lands, and should have been paid for the territory taken from them. No compensation was made, and, as the tribes saw their hunting grounds gradually wrested from them, their sullen wrath took deadly form. No attempt was made to shield them from the influence of strong liquors. These men, who deemed themselves the elect of God, who prided themselves on not being as the rest of men, sold liquor to the Indians, and allowed others to sell it. The Puritan churches never raised their voices to denounce the unholy traffic; and what a contrast Catholic Canada presented! There the Jesuits and secular clergy, with their bishop, as soon as one was appointed, used every argument and weapon in their power to prevent the sale. They opposed the traders, and bravely met with censures the governors and other officials who favored the destructive commerce. Now, in some New England States, the use of spirituous liquors is regarded as a greater sin than any forbidden in the Decalogue, yet their lauded forefathers used it, and plied the Indians with it, and not till 1657 were even ineffectual attempts taken to check it.

In time missionary efforts were made; but the labors of Eliot, Mayhew, and their associates, were hampered by their dreary theological system; and their attempt to transfer to Indian dialects the abstruse theological arguments produced a result that must have

been utterly incomprehensible. They never lived among the Indians, so as to become familiar with their modes of thought, with the stock of real knowledge which they possessed. Their books remain,—Elliot's Indian Bible, chief of all, a work of wonderful labor. But there are more Catholic Indians to-day in New England, more by hundreds than there are of those whom Puritan missionaries won.

The origin of the New England wars does not impress us favorably. It has been said, and with truth: "Ten years before the Puritan Pilgrims began to inquire whether the aborigines had souls to be saved, an armed expedition sailed from the harbor of Boston on an errand of blood. Endicott, the general, received sanguinary orders. He was directed to put to death the male inhabitants of Block Island; to take captive their wives and children; and to possess himself of their little islet. He failed in his expedition, but provoked the Pequots to war. When that tribe was exterminated the adult males taken prisoners were put to death in cold blood; the boys sold in the West Indies; the girls and women kept as slaves. The Narragansetts, employed as aids in exterminating the Pequots, were in turn annihilated by the help of other savages, who paved the way to their own destruction."

The Puritans never won a single tribe in New England as lasting allies; and in this fact their conduct receives its strongest condemnation. The French secured the friendship of every tribe from the Kennebec and St. John's to Lake Superior; not a tribe ever warred against them till the Foxes, instigated by English agents, gave trouble for a time. The Iroquois, beyond their limits, influenced by Dutch and English, became the foes of Canada, but were often won by missionary zeal to peaceful intercourse; and at this day the mass of survivors of that once proud confederacy are on Canadian soil. The Dutch secured the friendship of these tribes; and the English of New York retained it; Penn secured the Delawares; Lord Baltimore the Patuxents; but the Puritans of New England, men who are lauded to us as the very embodiment of human sanctity, never could win, and, indeed, never used the means of charity and justice to win the enduring attachment of a single Indian tribe.

New England endured the horrors of Indian wars, and provoked them. When in time European wars threatened to involve the French and English colonies in America in hostilities, Canada sent to New England to propose a neutrality and a concerted action, so as to avoid Indian hostility. The application failed. When, at a later date, the complications in Europe led to a long series of wars, Canada renewed her proposal, New York accepted it, and the borders of the two colonies rested in security; but New Eng-

land rejected it, resolved to employ such Indian auxiliaries as she could. That her frontiers were ravaged far and wide was the result of her own obstinate folly. In our Declaration of Independence the use of savage auxiliaries is one of the crimes charged upon the English government. The Puritans were the first to use them; and used, when the more truly Christian sons of France asked that on neither side should the services of the red men be enlisted in the war. When the tale is thrillingly told of what New England suffered at the hands of the French and Indians, it should never be forgotten that this mode of warfare was forced on the French, who adopted it reluctantly when the Puritans insisted on adopting it.

The whole Indian policy was stern, unjust and cruel, with scarcely a redeeming feature that shows any Christian heart or feeling. When Charles II. was restored to the throne of his father, Indians, Quakers, Baptists alike appealed to the throne against the oppressions of Puritanism.

Puritan greed encouraged Indian wars, as it gave women and children as slaves and boys to sell to the West Indies. It thus established slavery and the slave trade. Roger Williams, indeed, argued against perpetual slavery of captives, but he asked captives for his own use. With all the loud professions of religion and morality in these Puritan leaders, some of their words sound strange. Thus, after the Pequot war Captain Stoughton wrote to Governor Winthrop: "There is one I formerly mentioned, that is the fairest and largest that I saw amongst them, to whom I have given a coate to cloathe her. It is my desire to have her for a servant, if it may stand with your good liking, else not. There is a little squaw that Steward Culacut desireth, to whom he hath given a coate. Lieut. Davenport also desireth one."

Not only did these Puritans believe in enslaving Indian captives taken in war, but in purchasing negro slaves. As early as 1638 the Salem Ship *Desire* brought in negro slaves from Providence, in the West Indies, and subsequently New England vessels brought slaves from the Coast of Africa. That negro slavery as practiced in New England had the more repulsive features of human bondage is evident from Josselyn and other early writers. This trading in slaves was directly sanctioned by the General Court of Massachusetts; and there is no trace that a single minister ever raised his voice in condemnation of either Indian or negro slavery. The clergy of Puritan New England had no Montestino, no Las Casas, no Peter Claver.

In some of the Indian wars the obtaining of slaves was an object directly in view, as much as it was with the petty African rulers on the slave Coast. Downing, writing in 1645, says: "A warr

with the Narragansetts is verie considerable to this plantation wee might easily have men, women, and children enough to exchange for Moores which will be more gayneful pilladge for us than wee conceive."

The Body of Liberties in 1641, renewed in 1660, authorized the enslavement of captives taken in war, the purchase of slaves from other parts, and authorized moreover persons selling themselves into slavery.

The child of a slave mother was a slave, and the property of her master "liable to be sold and transferred like other chattels." This is the opinion of Chief Justice Parker, of Massachusetts, and it shows that the assertion of New England historians to the contrary is false. In Connecticut it was decided in 1703, that "according to the laws and constant practice of this colony, and all other plantations, such persons as are born of negro bondwomen are themselves in like condition, that is, born in servitude."

New England made intercolonial regulations for the return of runaway slaves, and thus was the first to institute a Fugitive Slave Law.

As to the treatment of slaves, we find testimony in Eliot who, in 1675, remonstrated against "selling away such Indians unto the islands for perpetual slaves, who shall yield up y^mselves to your mercy." Cotton Mather says of Eliot, "He had long lamented it with a Bleeding and Burning Passion, that the English used their Negro's but as their Horses or their Oxen, and that so little care was taken about their immortal souls; he look'd upon it as a prodigy, that any wearing the Name of Christians should so much have the heart of Devils in them as to prevent and hinder the Instruction of the poor Blackamores." Still later, in 1680, Governor Bradstreet reported few blacks as born in Massachusetts, "none baptized that I ever heard of!"

The importation of slaves, especially at the beginning of the last century, increased greatly, and the first Massachusetts census is one of slaves. With a large slave population we find all the vices of the system; marriage was not encouraged among slaves, and when a marriage ceremony was performed, it was no bar to a separation by a sale of one of them; young children were deemed incumbrances, and were frequently sold, and sometimes given away, as appears by advertisements of the time.

The first general direction for the instruction and baptism of slaves in America came not from the self-righteous Puritan of New England, who left them in ignorance, vice, and immortality, untaught in Christian doctrine and morality, and unbaptized, but from the Catholic king James II., who, in 1685, at the Council Board

ordered "that the negroes in the Plantations should all be baptized, exceedingly declaiming against the impiety of their masters prohibiting it."

Catholic usage everywhere in French and Spanish America, and in Maryland, treated slaves as possessed of immortal souls, as beings to be instructed and made partakers of the graces of the sacraments.

The theories and opinions of modern New England on slavery, the use of spirituous liquors, as on many other points, are completely at war with those held by their ancestors. The denunciations of Southern slavery which fanned the flames of the late civil war, all directly condemned the early Puritans of Massachusetts; the denunciations of liquor traffic, now prohibited under severe penalties in some New England States, are equally applicable to the founders of New England; the indignant protests against the modern treatment of Indians have but petty grounds compared with those furnished by Puritan history; the modern cry for religious toleration and freedom of conscience would have roused the wrath of the seventeenth-century Puritan. Evidently, the New Englander must either forego his present opinions or stop lauding to the skies the old Puritans who committed the very sins they now denounce; men who, saints in their own eyes, were tried by the standard of to-day, were the grossest of sinners.

Tried by the impartial standard of truth and history, the Separatists and Puritans of New England were narrow-minded, tyrannical, and intolerant in religious thought; cruel and unmerciful to white or red man who refused to submit to their ruling; grasping and avaricious in their intercourse with the Indians; full of superstition and easily led by it into any excess. In the original settlement they showed an utter want of forecast, and came over without learning anything from the experience of others, an experience which should have taught them to avoid such errors as swept away so many settlers at Plymouth and Boston; they were, in fact, far behind Lord Baltimore in wisdom and judgment, as may easily be seen by comparing the first years of Maryland life with those of New England.

But when the survivors bravely set to work to build up homes in the New World, we cannot but admire their energy, courage, and determination. With a rugged soil that gave sparingly and only by severe toil, with seas often stormy, they went on building up a commonwealth of energetic, industrious men. Though no cultivators of science, literature, or art, with nothing refined or refining, they made a limited degree of education general, laying a foundation at least, but only a foundation. It is, indeed, curious

to note how the terrible bondage of religious slavery cramped and narrowed the mind. New England had no school, or indeed scholars, devoted to the topography of America, its botany, natural history, to mineralogy and geology, to natural philosophy; for two centuries this reading people added scarcely a line to human knowledge, while Canada was far in advance, aiding the study of botany by contributions, some of them of considerable extent; it mapped the vast interior of the country, noted its mines, its mineral resources, studied and recorded the languages, manners, and thoughts of the Indians, preserving data that enable us to supply in some measure the neglect of similar work in the English colonies.

To the New England Puritans we can give credit where it is due, and more credit to the men excluded from the membership in the churches and from the rights of freemen, than we can to the exclusive arrogance of the pharisees who ruled with a rod of iron. It was the outcast masses who really built up New England, and who, in the enforced simplicity of their homes, were often models. That many, as in Connecticut, returned at the first opportunity to the Church of England to escape the tyranny of standing order, is but a sign that, in their independence, they would have yielded submission to the true Church had her claims been presented to them, as in our century so many of New England origin have, down from the days of Thayer, the Barbers, Kewley, Young, Brownson, Tenney, Shaw, till in our day there are in every one of the great cities of the land enough Catholics of old Puritan stock to make a New England Catholic Society, which would honor their ancestors without canonizing the very faults entailed by their erroneous belief.

THE IMPENDING CONFLICT IN FRENCH POLITICS.

FRANCE is once more the country upon which the civilized world looks with anxious expectations and ill-concealed misgivings. In every direction her future seems to be shrouded in obscurity and her "to-morrow" hidden from sight by a heavy fog. Leroy Beaulieu, the famous French economist, acknowledged quite recently that "seldom in the whole course of history has the situation of France from an international standpoint been more precarious." We may, therefore, well ask, why is this so? Is it because of the foreign complications?

The foreign policy of France, it is true, has been a policy whose wisdom it is difficult to perceive, for it certainly involved the country in unnecessary and quite serious difficulties in the East. The affair in Madagascar is not yet over before Tonquin looms up. The military necessities of the French forces in that territory and their conflict with the possessorial rights of China may almost at any day result in a complete rupture of diplomatic relations and a declaration of war. Open hostilities are being carried on for some time, though only in a semi-official way, and produce, as was to be expected, a strained political tension which seems to defy the skill and ingenuity of Marquis Tseng and the French cabinet. The prospect of a peaceful adjustment of the difficulties through the good offices of England appears very uncertain, and the indications, at the date of writing these lines, point strongly towards war between France and the Celestial Empire. What little hope of a different issue may still be entertained, rests simply upon the fact that the commerce of England as well as of China would be seriously jeopardized, if France and China go to war. In that event the French nation will, of course, be called upon to make heavy sacrifices both in men and in money. The mere distance of the theatre of war from home would entail an enormous outlay for transports and require the expenditure of immense amounts of money. Then, again, we must remember how jealously France watches her "*gloire militaire*." The prestige of the French armies was so much impaired by the Franco-German war, that as this is the first opportunity of the French Republic to show its military strength, it is safe to presume that France will insist upon the rehabilitation of the lost prestige at any cost. These brief considerations suffice to render it perfectly clear that the imbroglio in Tonquin presents, indeed, no cheerful aspects. Nevertheless, we

would strangely deceive ourselves by the belief that these foreign troubles make Europe and the civilized world rivet their attention upon France. If Tonquin is perhaps the most threatening cloud on the horizon, it is by no means the darkest. The real cause of general apprehension is not of political, but of social character.

France has been for some time pregnant with a social disturbance. The events transpired within the last year (1883) prolong this state beyond its natural term, and the crisis brewing within the borders of the Republic must, now before long, come to an issue. Père Hyacinthe quite recently predicted a communistic outbreak of appalling dimensions within a year, and it is some such event which is looked forward to by all observant minds. The social problem, as is well known, awaits a solution not only in France, but in nearly every state of Christendom, and the reappearance of the Ghost of the Revolution of 1789 after a lapse of nearly a century would consequently possess a very deep significance even outside of France, for it convulsed almost the whole Continent of Europe by its first appearance. France seems of all countries the one where the much-dreaded problem will come first to an issue, and it is this consciousness, or belief, or conviction which imparts an unusual and otherwise inexplicable importance to the present ominous state of affairs in the young French Republic.

Socialism, communism, nihilism, etc., acquired prominence on the political stage at a comparatively recent date. When they first appeared, society and even astute political leaders displayed a wonderful and long-enduring indifference towards them, from which they were unpleasantly roused but yesterday. Thiers, great statesman as he was, spoke shortly before his death of socialism as an *epidemic*, as if it were only a momentary scourge. The credit of having sounded the first note of warning belongs beyond contradiction to Disraeli, who afterwards, as Lord Beaconsfield, watched the growth of the monstrous giant with a keen eye. Bismarck, the iron chancellor, found himself also compelled to acknowledge that his dead reckoning with the new force had been false, and he prepared himself accordingly to fight the new enemy. But it was Russia which opened, as it were, the eyes of the world. The convulsions in that empire and their tragic culmination left no room for doubt, even to skeptics, as to the character and nature of the spectre which endangers our times with its pale face. Society began to realize that its strata had been permeated by an element whose existence had too long been ignored, and in nearly every state party-lines were drawn, based upon the views entertained in regard to it. Everywhere there is now a conservative element arrayed against a radical element, but nowhere are these found in stronger antithesis, nowhere more perfectly personified by typical figures than

in France. And since "communism," the form under which the social discontent is best known in France, has principally risen into prominence since the advent of the radical party into power, it may be well to define here what is to be understood under Radicalism.

This is all the more necessary, because of a common and widespread belief that Radicalism and Republicanism are interchangeable terms. But this is a grave mistake. For one may hold that a limited monarchy and a hereditary second chamber have no place in an ideally perfect constitutional scheme of government without accepting a single radical principle. Radicalism, as opposed to conservative views, holds that religion, as far as it withdraws men's minds from earthly objects of concern and fixes them upon the unseen future in the world beyond the grave, is for society a source of evil and not of good. This view, utterly subversive of true progress and liberty, must not be believed, however, to be an upstart of to-day. It has gone for nearly a hundred years, through a process of evolution, which it may not be superfluous to sum up in a few words.

The disorganizing doctrines of the French philosophers originated the revolution of 1789. They called for the destruction of monarchy and for the abolition of religion. Thus the spirit of revolution pursued to a certain extent the same objects as Freemasonry, in which it found on that account a powerful ally. During the reign of Napoleon I., Freemasonry celebrated its resurrection in France; and the open opposition to religion, and particularly the Church of Rome, which manifested itself from the restoration of the Bourbons in 1814 up to 1830, is now being ascribed to the working of the various lodges. During this period of fifteen years, which has been well termed "*la comédie de quinze ans*," the influence of Freemasonry is, however, not so pronounced as from 1830 to our days. Most of the events of these fifty years can be traced directly to the universal agency of the secret societies. Their influence, and their influence alone, enables us to account for the otherwise inexplicable occurrences of the revolution of 1848, its rapid spread, its almost simultaneous appearance all over middle Europe. Under Napoleon III., himself a member of the Carbonari, Freemasonry flourished in France and threw largely the secrecy aside which generally covers up its tortuous path. Several books that appeared lately acquaint us not only with the policy pursued by Freemasonry as such, but give also an insight into the Internationals and the part which that central organization plays in directing unsuspecting trades-unions, labor-associations, and the like to such work as will further ulterior objects. One of these objects being the emancipation of society from religion, it is, of course, natural that Radicalism and Freemasonry joined hands in fighting

the greatest stronghold of Christianity, namely, the Catholic Church. For the attainment of what both aim at in common, war against Rome is an imperative necessity, because the Catholic Church has ever been an outspoken opponent of both, possesses a perfect and powerful organization, and a social influence which so far has held its own against the most virulent attacks. Catholicity is, therefore, the foe most hated, most persistently hunted down, because the foe most to be dreaded. How far socialism, communism, etc., are indebted for their phenomenal development to assistance granted by Freemasonry under the direction of the International, it is for historians to ascertain; it suffices for us to note that coöperation between them is a pretty well-established fact. And in this alliance of Radicalism and Freemasonry which has now found general recognition at the hands of most statesmen and governments; in the ramifications of secret societies, with objects undefined, employing means that shrink from daylight; in this influence hostile to existing institutions which looms up here and there, the key for a proper understanding of the interest taken in the affairs of France is furnished.

The present condition of things in France is, of course, the resultant of the forces at work in the past, and we will, therefore, cast now a hurried glance over the last few closed chapters of French history.

The erection of a Republic, after the downfall of the second Empire upon the smoking ruins of abandoned battlefields and communistic incendiaryism, was watched by all governments with considerable uneasiness, for the establishment of a Republican form of government in France had heretofore proved a rather dangerous experiment. The fears, however, were considerably allayed when Thiers, the statesman, was put into the office of chief-magistrate of the nation. His administration, like that of his successor, MacMahon, was practically conducted on the principles of a monarchical government, that is, on strictly conservative principles. Instead of a titled chief-magistrate, clad in royalty, which we are wont to associate with monarchies, France offered thus the spectacle of a republic without republicanism. During Thiers's and MacMahon's presidency the conservative elements gradually lost their strength. Gambetta, who had suddenly risen into prominence as Minister of War and the Interior during the siege of Paris, acquired more and more influence, and secured finally, after the memorable campaign against the "Septennate," a ruling majority. The Marshal-President, finding a longer tenure of office incompatible with his views, and not prepared to sacrifice his principles for the sake of continuing in office, resigned on January 30th, 1879. In the April number of this REVIEW for 1879 we took occasion, in a

paper on "The Outlook, Political and Social, in Europe," to remark that the change in the person of the chief-magistrate meant a transition from conservative to radical principles. Mr. Grévy, the new incumbent, a distinguished member of the French bar and one of the "*batonniers*" of the bar of Paris, had, by his firm opposition to the plebiscite of 1870, made for himself a name and the reputation of an irreconcilable enemy of the Empire. The esteem in which he was held and the popularity which he enjoyed are well-illustrated by the majorities by which he was elected President of the Assembly, namely, by 519 against 17 votes in 1871, and in 1876 by 462 against 6. That he stepped without bloodshed and barricades into the presidency was an agreeable surprise to everybody, and an event quite acceptable, in as much as it promised a prolongation of the status quo. Under Mr. Grévy's régime the line of demarcation between the Conservative and Radical party was unmistakably drawn. The feud between the French government and the authorities of the Catholic Church increased in severity, because free-thinking and irreligion were now openly made the creed of the party led by Gambetta. Since Gambetta's death, the party of the left is without a leader, and the government may be said to be playing the part of the Satyr, blowing hot and cold air with the same mouth. Mr. Grévy's administration is, however, chiefly memorable because during its term two Frenchmen died who are equally deserving of our notice because they are typical figures not only of the parties in France, but of the two opposite principles asserting themselves everywhere, and these two are Gambetta and the Comte de Chambord. While the direct influence of the latter upon France and French politics has been very limited, being in fact confined to the manifesto issued in 1871, he stands indirectly in the very closest relationship to that party which ever is a staunch and fearless opponent of Radicalism. Two greater contrasts can hardly be conceived than Gambetta and Chambord. Nowhere outside of France can two historical figures be found who serve as better apostles and exponents of principles and party, nowhere two men separated by a wider gulf from birth to grave. There is nothing in common between them, save that they are both Frenchmen filled with a strong love for their country and eager to serve France each in his own way. If ever the saying, "*les extrêmes se touchent*," was with singular appropriateness applicable to two men, it is so to the Demagogue-Dictator and to the putative King of France. The one, the last male descendant of the elder branch of Bourbons, was, in the popular meaning of the word, all failure; the other, the tribune of the people was all excess. The one failed through unswerving adherence and high-minded loyalty to those principles which had come down to him from his ancestors as a bequest of

ages. The other was all success through "opportunism," that is, lack of principles. Thus the strength of the one forms the weakness of the other.

Gambetta was raised into prominence in the confusion subsequent to the crushing defeat of the French armies by the united German forces, by the part he took in proclaiming the downfall of the Empire. A man of unbounded energy and unquestioned ability, he espoused the cause of Radicalism, and expended his vital power, his nervous force, his mental ability with prodigious prodigality in its furtherance. The cry, "*Liberté, égalité, fraternité*," uttered by him, thrilled again the country, and conjured up the ghost of the Revolution of 1789. Gifted with matchless oratorical powers, he possessed in the highest degree the faculty of electrifying vast assemblies with the magnetism of his own ambient genius. With an ambition as great as his energy, he combined a singular adaptability to circumstances. His eloquence, in swift succession, swept with overwhelming force through the depths of passion, of ire, of joy, of patriotic fervor, to combat successfully the foe of his selection, "clericalism." He threw down fearlessly the gauntlet, and openly declared war, *à l'outrance*, against religion and the Church of Rome. Unrelenting in his hatred against that institution, his main efforts were directed to the removal of all that tends to preserve religious feeling in society. His strenuous efforts to remove that great stumbling-block out of the way of his ambitious schemes, sharpened by his keenness of perception, led him to proclaim that, to begin at the beginning, religion must be rooted out from the hearts of the little ones by making education a matter of state, and by excluding from it religious instruction. The sworn antagonist of the source of all authority, he appealed constantly to the human propensity of rebellion by proclaiming "*L'alliance du prolétariat avec la bourgeoisie*." His greatest success was achieved when he assailed MacMahon and the "Septennate," and succeeded in placing the government in the hands of the Radical party. It was then that he coined the famous apothegm, "*Se soumettre ou se démettre*." The short ten weeks of his premiership, in the fall of 1881, are distinguished principally through the failure of the "*scrutin de liste*." As a statesman he belonged to the category of those who say, "What care I what happens after me," and not to those who never neglect to consider what the following age may bring. Nor did he hold, like Cicero, that "nothing can be truly useful unless it be completely just;" he went even far beyond the slippery maxim of Macchiavelli, that "many things are useful that are certainly not just." His unscrupulous desire to complete the ruin of religion led him even to forget that, no matter how strong political sentiments and political passions may be, the

religious sentiments and religious passions are always stronger. Raised in a moment to the highest pinnacle of popularity and influence, he perished with equal suddenness. A child of the Revolution, in every sense of the word, he is, as such, a typical figure indeed. His career was the brilliant flashing of a light which had but a short time to live. His greatness was based mainly upon the strange personal influence which he knew so well how to wield. Almost before his obsequies were over he ceased to be an influence, and continues only as a memory, growing fainter and fainter as he recedes into the past. Such is the representative of Radicalism; such its polity, its creed. Some critics questioned the sincerity of his purpose by trying to turn his patriotism into egotism. With these we cannot agree. We tried to do no injustice to Gambetta, but to sketch truthfully the traits most prominent, the influence most pronounced, the party politics most conspicuous in that type of Radicalism which expired on December 31st, 1882, a few minutes before the advent of the new year, as if the same year should not bury also that other type, "Chambord."

Henri Charles Ferdinand Marie Dieudonné d'Artois, Comte de Chambord, et Duc de Bordeaux, was born on September 29th, 1820, seven months after the assassination of his father, the Duc de Berri. Baptized in water brought from the Jordan by Chateaubriand, he travelled while his education was being completed until 1843, when he took up his residence in Belgrave Square, London. Three years later he married the daughter of the Duke of Modena, Princess Maria Theresa, but the marriage remained without any issue. The largest portion of his uneventful life was spent in quiet retirement at Frohsdorf, a castle which he had purchased in Austria, not far from the capital of that empire. He was neither highly gifted nor did he become prominent through what he accomplished; but he was a character such as is rarely seen in our times, far above the material grossness of this world, true to himself and to his principles, not open to bribe, even by a throne. When, after the capitulation of Paris, in 1871, the country was struggling to restore order out of the chaos into which disastrous foreign and civil wars had plunged it, the throne of France lay within his grasp on condition that he would waive the *fleur de lis* for the tricolor. It was then that he issued the manifesto to which we have already alluded. Assuming the name of Henry V., he declared that "France could be saved only under the white flag of his historic dynasty." This act will ever serve as an unequalled proof of that high-minded loyalty to principle of which he was a unique prototype. The tricolor, let it be remembered, forms the emblem of revolutions. Upon the smouldering embers of the Revolution did the empire itself rest. The acceptance of the tricolor on his part would have meant,

therefore, a compromise with the spirit of '89, and no compromise, so Chambord correctly believed, could restore France to her greatness. He was ready not to ascend the throne rather than waive what he considered one of the conditions under which alone it became him to do so. He was ready to make this great sacrifice, but he was not ready to part with honor, with self-respect, with loyalty to God, to country, and to the trust put by his ancestors into his safe-keeping. He gave the throne for the *fleur de lis*, an act which has been called that of a senseless fanatic. If it was an act of fanaticism, it was an act of the highest type of chivalrous fanaticism, which weighs not what is at stake whenever it is a question of doing what is recognized as right. Chambord has been called an incongruous relic of an earlier world, and so he was; but it was of the world in which virtue was preferred to success, in which religion, gallantry, patriotism, and true liberty had taken up their abode. His was the world where probity is chosen before wealth, character before fame, integrity before position; the world in which men did not pause with hesitation before immolating prospects of their own advancement upon the altar of moral righteously. He was, indeed, a believer in the divine rights of kings, but for that reason he respected all the more the rights of his fellow-man. It is this rare steadfastness of character, this insurmountable propensity to be truthful in small and in great things, that made him also declare openly, with genuine French valor, in the manifesto of 1871, that he was a supporter of the temporal independence and sovereignty of the Pope. That declaration was made in the face of the very powers who had made the Vicar of Christ a prisoner at the Vatican. It was made at a time when silence on that point would have secured to him powerful allies among the Protestants of Europe in his aspiration to the throne of France. The support of the governments was then all-important. But his very aspirations led him to undeceive a world, which, by silence, he might have deceived. Of such high-minded nobility of character history has but few instances on record. It was his imperturbable firmness also which, in 1873, secured to him the formal recognition as head of the royal house by the Orleans princes, thereby healing up the breach which had existed between the Bourbons and Orleanists since the days of Philip Egalité. He, like Gambetta, personified a principle and a party, *that* principle of the full meaning of which the words, "noblesse oblige," convey, perhaps, a better definition than any verbose explanation; and *that* party which, under the name of "conservative party," is found everywhere alongside of its deadly enemy, "Radicalism." With his death the regal claim descended upon the Comte de Paris; and the world, in admitting as much, admitted also that Chambord, apart from royalty, was,

indeed, a type of those signally French virtues which depend not upon personality. Chambord is dead and buried, but what he personified lives in his heirs, in the French as a people; nay, in society at large, and will continue to live on until mankind loses forever the knowledge of the principles of truth and righteousness. If material success alone measured the greatness of men, history could refuse to assign a conspicuous place in the annals of France to the illustrious dead exile. But history accords to posterity the privilege of burnishing up the records of the past, of giving fame to those whom their own times did not recognize as famous. Death already surrounded Chambord's name with that priceless halo with which fidelity to God and country, integrity of purpose and firmness of will, are rewarded by mankind,—a tribute which society has not yet unlearned to pay, and which has been paid to the dead at Frohsdorf as soon as he had passed away to join the great majority, even before his calm and lifeless features had been interred in mother earth.

If we compare the two great men whose lives and characters we have endeavored to sketch with a few strokes of the pen, as exponents of the two opposite cardinal principles which, though encountered in nearly every civilized state, appear in such pronounced form in France; if we take their careers as prophesies indicative of the fate of the parties they represent; if we look at the sudden rise of the one, like a meteoric flash, his short-lived, brilliant triumph, purchased at the expense of character, his sudden and ignominious death, and if we look at the other, coming down from the past and reaching into the future, because what shaped and fashioned his course forms the unchangeable patrimony of the human race, if we look at them in this light, as well we may, then we have before us a picture of the Radical and of the Conservative parties, bold, indeed, but true in all important features. Lest we be accused of too free, if not of an altogether illegitimate, use of the word "conservative," we will state, by way of parenthesis, that it has been used throughout this paper in its broad sense, meaning the opposite of what has been defined as Radicalism. In that sense "conservative" may comprise Legitimists, Bonapartists, and even Republicans.

From what has been said so far it is evident, we trust, that the real issues in France are not of political but social character, far outweighing the import of any war with China or any other country. It would not be striking at the root of the problem to ask, simply, Will France again kindle the torchlight of revolution and throw its firebrands of desolation across the frontier? Has a long century of revolution, of despotism, of anarchy, broken by but a few placid intervals, paralyzed the French character, and dis-

solved the unity of the nation? Has the vitality of France ebbed away, and is she succumbing to the disintegrating influences which distort her fair features? For the problem, stated in its full force, is the repercussion of an echo of old that reverberates from age to age, ever since man revolted against His Maker. The existence of the old, time-honored Christian society, which is based upon the acceptance of natural and revealed spiritual truths, appears threatened by the substitution of the universal rule of naturalism and materialism in its place. Shall the practice of the decalogue and of the gospel-law and the injunctions of the sermon on the mount, shall these disappear as a low superstition in the presence of the "rights of man?" Shall morality have, henceforth, no other sanction than the penal code? Shall the family as a unit of the social order be dissolved in the turbulent sea of animalism? These, we take it, are the questions to which France, and society at large, must soon frame final answers. It is a choice between religion and atheism, between the worship of God and the worship of "self." Freedom through self-restraint stands on one side, slavery through license on the other; order and prosperity through legitimate authority battles against anarchy and desolation through the law of force.

The social upheaval, which the flight of time brings nearer from day to day, embraces, in point of fact, all that from the beginning of history commanded the deepest and best thoughts of the greatest intellects of all times. It endangers all that concerned the human race more than anything else in every age. Every form of social life and of domestic felicity is involved, and hence it is impossible to affect indifference. It would be suicidal policy to trifle with matters which reach back into the very dawn of antiquity and forward into countless unborn generations. If *that* is withdrawn which makes life worth living, personal safety, right to property, family, state, all is abolished, because deprived of the sanctification which makes men respect these institutions.

France, in all probability, will be called upon to make her choice before other countries will be compelled to do so. Now, we may safely hold that, inasmuch as there is no darkness impenetrable to light, nor darkness that does not fade out of sight before light, France's children will not be led away into a state of fatal intoxication. The masses in the cities, laborers discontented, lawyers without practice, fomenting strife and revolt, demagogues haranguing the scum of large cities, they may, for a time, upset the social equilibrium. But the marrow of a nation is not made up of these elements. It is the rural population, which follows the plough, tills the field, and gratefully takes from the soil the bounteous gifts of nature, which more than counterbalances the proletariat of the

cities. Less learned and less read, maybe, than the malcontent city-inhabitants, their earnings suffice for their wants because they are free from the expensive vices contracted by city-life. To them a kind Providence is not an empty sound, and they bless the bell that rings them from labor to rest, and bids them return into their families' gladsome circle. It is not this great majority whose life-blood is poisoned. Their views do not parade before the world in high-sounding empty phrases, but are content to rest as convictions within their hearts. They also love their country, but not with the loud-mouthed destruction-seeking love of Radicalism, but the love that is ready to suffer for the beloved. In their meekness they may submit even to a temporary reign of Radicalism, but as true props of society they will shake off with a mighty shake the fiend of peace, of disorder, of despair.

If the views of anti-Catholic German thinkers possess any value, we must believe with them that, after all, material pleasure and satisfaction are neither the highest ambition of our nature nor able to satisfy its yearnings. With genuine German depth and gravity, Schoppenhauer has drawn a dreary picture of life if deprived of all immaterial enjoyments. True, he did not look to religion and a God-man as the corner-stone of felicity, because his whole tendency of thought was negative and not positive. But as a pessimist he furnishes in his opinions incontrovertible proofs that no solution promises social permanency which ignores a proper recognition of the supratelluric forces and their direct bearing upon human concerns. It is asserted that not one in a thousand is influenced in the daily pursuits of life by the thought of what may be waiting for him after death. If this be so, it would only show that we have become triflers and neglectful of what is of the most lasting import. It is not, under any circumstances, an argument in favor of discarding a belief in a Creator, and a direct relationship between him and his creatures. Mankind cannot be made to disbelieve in the existence of such independence, and as long as this belief remains alive, so long society must needs rest upon the plane established by that dependence. Every effort to effect a social organization upon a platform ignoring the power above has proved abortive. Reconstruction can be brought about only by using again that great corner-stone which defies decay, grows firmer with time, and laughs at the puerile attempts to build a structure on quicksand. Men neither can nor will be brought to believe that "after death" means staring blankly at absolute nothingness. Our inner consciousness forever revolts against this arbitrary and unjustifiable view. That view denaturalizes nature, and is contradicted by science itself, which concedes the possibility of a future existence to a form of force of sufficient complexity to constitute

individual consciousness. Science shrinks to call this "soul," because it shrinks to acknowledge that theology taught, ages before the development of any evolution theory, what the latter discovered only at this late date.

The "*élan*," an element belonging in a peculiar manner to the character of the French, that strange impulsiveness which drives them to give heart and soul, and life even, for the object of enthusiasm, has singled out the nation from all others as the one in which political as well as social questions come to a focus within a shorter lapse of time, and in more vehement forms, than elsewhere. It is the dreary philosophy of life which found in England, in George Eliot, such an ardent and highly-gifted expounder, which asks in vain for general acceptance in France. No God, no soul; and as their substitute, love for humanity, indefinite unrealities for a definite reality, this is propounded by the English apostle of modern sociology. But it is difficult to conceive that devotion or self-sacrifice in the cause of the "*grand être humain*" can ever take the place of belief. All truism, in whatever shape it may be presented, will never drive out Christianity. Paris, the great metropolis, has been and still is that strange place, with two opposite elements in its bosom, two such different cities, that strangers, not acquainted with both, can, according to the sphere in which their lot is cast, with equal truth declare, one, that in the whole world there does not exist a more dissipated, insane, and boldly-wicked town; and the other, that nowhere can there be found one more devout, more exemplary, more exceptionally pious, or more actively charitable. The more religion is antagonized by Radicalism the more is the true Catholic spirit roused. Nor is it true that, as Young said, it is

" This hard alternative, or to renounce
Thy reason or thy sense—or to believe,"

which society in France as elsewhere must choose between. For it is self-deception to believe that the subjection of Church to State is conducive to the welfare of the greatest number; it is an untenable and irrational proposition to assert that authority can have its origin in man, without resulting in the absolute control of society by the strongest; it is fatal to look upon an indefinite licence of divorce as not dissolving the family. Reason is surrendered only by discarding the lessons of the past in judging of the future. The doctrines of Radicalism and freemasonry are wanting in this, that they banish from sight "experience," and an empty promise has never yet succeeded in outliving the collapse of its emptiness. There is in France, as we took pains to emphasize in a paper in the January number of 1881 of this REVIEW, not only the proletaria of large populous cities that has to be reckoned with. The

great majority of the nation, living in rural districts, is as yet untainted by the contamination of anti-religious communism. Radicalism has there failed to gain any important victories. The pulse of the nation can, therefore, not be measured by the feverish pulsations of the large cities alone.

Outside of France the "culturkampf" has been practically ended by the iron Chancellor by a second Canossa. The Church of Rome, uncompromising in principle as ever, has found recognition as the one conservative element without which the social problem in Germany cannot be brought to an issue. The Crown-Prince's visit to the Pope is still fresh in every memory, and proclaims the bowing down of the great power "state," before that still greater power "religion." This event cannot remain without its influence even in France. It will certainly be weighed in its full import by those who inherited the claims of the Comte de Chambord. The Comte de Paris and the other Orleans princes have shown themselves to be true and loyal Frenchmen, courageous soldiers and sailors, well-trained and sagacious statesmen. They have been content to serve their country in any position where it placed them, under any form of government, and without consideration of personal advantage. In the event of a restoration of a monarchy, any of them would rule with wisdom and moderation and due respect for the legislative authority. In the new deal, however, a republican form of government, with perhaps an Orleans at the head of affairs, is by no means excluded, though we, at least, incline to the belief that republicanism will not succeed in establishing itself in France as more than an ephemeral phase of transition. In any case, we take it, the conservative, loyal, genuine French character will carry the day, and the nation become once more the most Catholic daughter of the Church of Rome, as which she will prosper and earn again the epithet, "la grande nation."

THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF FAMILY AND STATE
IN REGARD TO EDUCATION.

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“THE child belongs to the State before belonging to his parents.” This winged word of a sanguinary revolutionist is, either implicitly or expressly, the basis of modern public education in most European States. By the Reformation the bond of religious unity has been severed. Christian traditions have been abandoned, and religious principles framed to the caprice of men. Matrimony, established by God as a holy institution, and elevated by Christ to the dignity of a sacrament of His Church, was degraded to a mere natural contract, or, in the quaint phrase of Martin Luther, to a “worldly thing.” The State, with uplifted hand, ratifies and blesses the marriage-union of the youthful couple, and receives again into his loving arms the hopeful citizen that may chance to be born of that blissful alliance, and if he consign the babe to the solicitous and tender care of its natural mother, to be nursed for a few years, it is only to reclaim it again to be educated and trained in the evils of peace and war for the aggrandizement and protection of that country in which it has had the privilege first to see the light. If the child happens to be of the weaker sex, it will, none the less, be received under the State's tuition, that, in its turn, it may one day become a Spartan mother, who will embrace her son and say: “Go, my boy, fight for your country; conquer or die.” Sparta was no more delicate in her

parental attentions to her subjects than are our modern European States.

Also, from this side of the Atlantic, we look across with no small amount of admiration upon this Spartan policy. Educationalists have been, for many years, hard at work in this country compiling and popularizing European systems of education. In imitation of revolutionary Europe, we have established a system of secular or godless education. We are educating millions of American citizens without religion and without God. Compulsory education has, also, to some extent, been introduced into several States of the Union. Americans, too, have made the acquaintance of the novel dignitary called truant-officer. In short, American, like European States, are gradually turning schoolmasters. How far this is in keeping with the genius of the American constitution, with American character and American freedom, we will leave to politicians to decide. In this struggle, however, between individual, domestic, and religious liberty on the one hand, and State monopoly of education on the other, it is well to fix some principles as landmarks by which we may be guided in our views on this all-important subject of education.

Taking for granted that man, coming into this world as a rational being, helpless, and dependant on others for his physical, mental, and moral development as a social being, with social qualities and social wants, as a religious being, having certain fixed religious duties towards his Creator in common with his fellow-men, is, by the very fact of his existence, a member of three distinct societies, each complete in its own sphere—the domestic society or family, the civil society or State, the religious society or Church—the question arises, which of these three societies has the duty and right of procuring his education, or, if this task is common to all the three, what portion of it falls to the lot of each? The object of this article is to give a clue to the solution of this question. For the present, however, we will confine ourselves to the rights and obligations of the family and State. We shall begin with the rights and duties of the *family*.

The family, or domestic society, has been instituted by God himself at the creation of our first parents. He not only laid down as a general law in the nature of man, but also sanctioned by a positive command (touching the species in general, not the individual) that man and woman should leave father and mother and cling to each other for the propagation and education of the human race, for the multiplication of His children, for the extension of His kingdom on earth and in heaven. So firm are the bonds of this union between man and wife that, being once legitimately contracted, they cannot, without divine intervention, be severed

except by death. So sacred is this alliance, that the Apostle calls it a great mystery, and does not hesitate to compare it with that holy union which exists between Christ and His Church. If this union is so inviolable and holy in the eyes of God, its object must be of the highest dignity and moment. It must be something of a more exalted character than the procreation and rearing of citizens for the State. It is nothing less than the accomplishment of the eternal design of God to communicate His goodness and felicity to His creatures. It is the grand object for which He has created the universe, and made it subordinate to the dominion and subservient to the use of man, the same divine end for which His only-begotten Son has assumed our nature and expired on the Cross—the eternal happiness of man in the enjoyment of his Creator. The marriage-union, so holy in its institution, and sublime in its object, must have certain sacred and inalienable rights and binding and indispensable duties consequent upon it. Foremost among those rights and duties is the education of that offspring with which God may chance to bless that holy alliance, according to the intent of the Creator, to His service and glory.

Now, what is meant by education? This question can be best solved by the consideration of the concrete circumstances in which man first appears upon the stage of this world. While inferior animals, by the providence of the Creator, enter existence endowed, to a great extent, with the means of self-preservation and self-defence, we see man come into this world as a helpless creature, destitute of all means of self-subsistence and self-development. If abandoned to himself, he would soon pine away and die. For years he is dependent on others for his support and for his bodily and mental development. Yet God has deposited in the child the most wondrous faculties. He has impressed upon him the image of His own greatness, power, wisdom, and goodness. But this image must be brought out and perfected by the coöperation of his fellow-man. His physical, intellectual, moral, and religious faculties still slumber. They must be aroused, moderated, trained, by external agents. Should the child be excluded from human intercourse, though his bodily organism might be developed, yet he would grow up in deplorable idiocy. But, besides those natural faculties which God has deposited in the child, He has also implanted in the soul of the Christian the germ of supernatural life, a new creature of His omnipotent hand, when, in the sacrament of baptism He regenerated him of water and the Holy Ghost. This supernatural principle of life will live on in the soul of the child until it is blighted by sin. But it, too, is a fruitful principle, endowed with as many supernatural forces as there are infused virtues, theological and moral. This supernatural germ, also,

which we call sanctifying grace, and which far transcends in perfection the natural principle of life with all its admirable faculties, must be aroused, actuated, and developed by the early and continued practice of Christian virtue, else it will not take deep root in the soul, and like a languid spring-flower it will be killed by the first onset of the nightly frost of temptation. Now this is what is meant by education: The harmonious development of both body and soul of the child, by exterior training, according to the idea of the Creator; the developing and perfecting of all his faculties, whether corporal or spiritual, natural or supernatural; the bringing out of the image and likeness of his Creator, which is impressed upon him; his habilitation for the fulfilment of his duties towards himself, his fellow-men, and his Creator,—above all, the practical initiation and direction on the way that leads to eternal happiness. Anything that does not take in all those functions is defective and cannot be called education.

Thus man, that wonderful little world of natural and supernatural treasures, is cast into this world by the Creator altogether at the mercy of his fellow-beings. Yet, weak and helpless as is the child, he has received from the Creator an inviolable right which is stronger than all the military forces of nations. With his whining, inarticulate cry, he can claim the assistance of his fellow-man, and woe to him who despises or tampers with his right. Every child, then, who is born into this world has an inviolable right to the necessary education, else the Creator should be wanting in His providence to him whom He has made king of creation. This being the case, there must exist a corresponding obligation of imparting to him this education, for every right implies a corresponding duty, otherwise it were no right. With whom, then, does this obligation rest? Certainly, in the first place, with the child's parents.

By the very fact of procreation there arises the strict obligation on the part of both parents to preserve the life and procure the spiritual and temporal welfare of their progeny. For this end the Creator has infused into the hearts of parents an inborn and indelible affection for their children. For this end He has inviolably sanctioned the unity and indissolubility of matrimony. For this end sacramental grace is dispensed to Christians who join in lawful wedlock. But in this sacramental contract they also undertake the sacred and strictly binding duty of procuring their offspring a physical, moral and religious (Christian) education. From this obligation they cannot be dispensed. How far this duty extends cannot so easily be defined, as it depends a good deal on particular circumstances, and especially on the parents' position in life. Neither does it lie within our present purpose to investigate the extent of this obligation in detail. So much, however, is certain

that parents are strictly bound to provide for their children such a physical development that they may be at least able to procure their living honestly by the work of their own hands, and such a mental development as to insure their possible success in the ordinary pursuits of life. For this physical and mental training of their children, however, neither the study of pedagogies, as Herbert Spencer would recommend for intended parents, nor a course of hygiene such as is sometimes pleaded for with much pathos in American journals of education, is required for parents. That parental love and solicitude implanted in their hearts by their Creator, aided by common-sense, is a sufficient guide, as long as it is not stifled or obscured by vicious habits. Still greater care, however, than on their physical and mental development must be bestowed by parents on the moral and religious education of their children. They are obliged to watch over their innocence, to guard them against all demoralizing influences and associations, to imbue them practically with an early sense of modesty, truthfulness, filial piety, obedience, etc. But above all they must, at an early age, endeavor to imprint upon their yet tender hearts religious sentiments—love of prayer, reverence for whatever is holy, fondness of the Christian doctrine, and of all religious practices, love of God and detestation of sin, etc. It is scarcely necessary to add that they are bound to procure them a solid religious instruction.

Those duties are common to all parents. The duties of a higher education, literary or scientific, vary according to particular circumstances and conditions of life. Here the question might be put whether parents, in general, are bound in conscience to have their children taught to read, write, and reckon. Certainly, if we abstract from particular circumstances, no such obligation can be proved, as such knowledge is necessary, neither for the temporal nor spiritual well-being of man. Neither is it required for an ordinary mental, moral and religious development, as may be seen in the case of many illiterate persons who have more mental grasp and a good deal more delicate and defined moral and religious sense than many of their comparatively well-informed brethren. We know that some of the poets of the Middle Ages, whose works take the highest rank in literature, could neither read nor write. We need only recall the name of Wolfram von Eschenbach, the sweet Minne-singer, who is known as the author of the famous "Parceval," one of the finest literary productions which have reached us. However, if we take the circumstances into consideration, such are the inconveniences of illiteracy, in our days, in most places, and such the facility of acquiring those rudiments of knowledge, that the parents who, in normal social circumstances, brought up their children unlettered, could scarcely be considered blame-

less. Yet, reading, writing, etc., as may be readily seen, constitute the least important part of education. Such knowledge is only accessory to the true essentials. Whatever, then, may be said of those useful and ornamental acquirements, with which civilized society in our days can hardly dispense, it is certain that parents are strictly bound to procure the essential physical, moral and religious education of their children. The sense of this duty is so deeply impressed on the nature of man by the Creator that it cannot be wholly effaced even by the grossest barbarism.

To facilitate the fulfilment of the duties of education, parents have been gifted by the Creator with the most wonderful educational talents. He has infused into their hearts an unspeakable love and tenderness for their offspring, an unwearied patience with their children's weaknesses, an unremitting watchfulness over their every step and movement. Who has taught the mother to enter into the very soul of her child, to read his thoughts and desires, to take the liveliest interest in his childish pastimes? Yet no *Kindergärtnerin* of Fröbel's school has ever learned to penetrate into the secrets of the mystery of childhood as does the untutored mother, guided only by the voice of nature. Who is better adapted to make early and lasting impressions on the susceptible heart of the child than his own mother? How often do we find that an early lesson of a mother, recalled to the mind of a wayward son, effects that which no other motive, however strong, can accomplish? 'Tis true, those natural gifts are not dispensed in like measure to all parents, and can be wholly or partially eliminated by vicious habits; but this does not weaken the force of the general fact, which evidently proves the intention of the Creator that parents should be the educators of their own children.

To this intent, also, God has infused into the hearts of children a love and reverence for, a confidence and docility towards their parents which they can rarely acquire towards others, and this dictate of filial piety has been sanctioned by the positive law of God: "Honor thy father and thy mother." It requires no small degree of depravity to stifle this voice of nature in the heart of the child. As the parent, then, is by divine institution the natural teacher of the child, so the child is the divinely-appointed pupil of his parents. The family, therefore, is a divinely-constituted school, with an inviolable charter, framed and written by the finger of the Almighty in the hearts of parents and children. This school has existed before all universities, and will survive them all, because it is a divine institution which forms part and portion of human nature. Whoever, therefore, meddles with this divine creation, violates the most sacred rights of parents and children, and thwarts the intentions of the Creator. For, if parents have the strict duty of edu-

cating their children according to their own convictions, they have also the inviolable right to do so; and, if children are bound by the law of nature to submit themselves to that education which their parents are, in conscience, obliged to give them, they have also the right not to be impeded in the fulfilment of this duty. They may be arrested by truant officers, and dragged into State-schools against their own will and that of their parents; they may be submitted to educational tyranny worse than Spartan, but the voice of injured human nature cries up to the Creator for vengeance against that State which thus disregards the unprotected rights of its subjects.

Though the duty and right of parents to educate their offspring is inalienable, and though this obligation is personal, yet it does not follow that they may not make use of the assistance of others in discharging this office. As parents can employ a trusty servant to nurse their children, so they can employ a reliable teacher to instruct them in reading, writing, good manners, Christian doctrine, and the various arts and sciences, to superintend their physical, mental, and religious development. And as parents frequently have not the necessary time and knowledge to give their children a complete education, there is nothing more natural than that they should call in the aid of others, to whom they should consign a share of their parental office, with a corresponding portion of their parental rights. But, as it would involve too great inconvenience and expenditure for every family to employ one or more pedagogues, and one teacher can instruct and train several with the same or with greater facility than he would a single child, the suggestion is obvious that several families should unite and employ one or several trustworthy teachers in common to assist them in the education of their children. This circumstance first gave rise to *schools*, which are nothing else, in reality, than supplementary institutions to assist parents in the work of education. Whatever, then, may be the lofty idea which the worthy pedagogue may have of his exalted calling, he has only a subsidiary office, and so much authority and jurisdiction, in the natural order, as parents choose to confer on him. But, like every other employé, he, too, can contract with his employer. He can propose certain conditions on which alone his services are obtainable. Hence, it is quite natural that schools should, in course of time, acquire a certain degree of autonomy, should have certain constitutions, certain laws and regulations, to which parents and children should be obliged to submit if they wished to avail themselves of their advantages. Yet, from the nature of things, schools should be ultimately at the mercy of parents, for, on them should finally depend whether

they sent their children to such institutions or had them otherwise instructed and educated.

Such was the *idea* of school which prevailed with all ancient nations, if we except *Sparta*. In this commonwealth the children were born, so to say, into the arms of the State. Immediately after its birth the child was laid upon a shield and addressed with the words of the Spartan mother: "Either with this or upon it." It was then submitted to a wine bath to test its physical soundness. After this it was examined by the elders, and if found free from bodily defects it was allowed to live and to be reared for the service of its country. If any symptoms of physical inability were discovered, it was condemned to be flung into a crevice of the Taygetus as a useless specimen of humanity and a burthen to the State. Those children who were allowed to live were left to the care of their parents up to their seventh year, when they were removed from the family to begin the rough routine of State education, no more to taste the sweets of family life.

Very different was the system of education in *Athens*, the high school of classic antiquity. Here, too, the supreme end of education was good and enlightened citizenship, but the duty and rights of education rested with the parents. It was only on condition of the fulfilment of this duty on the part of parents that the children on their part were by law obliged to support them in their old age. Up to the seventh year the child was consigned to the care of a nurse, who was usually required to be well up in years. At the age of seven, the boy was intrusted to a pedagogue, whose ordinary office it was not to teach, but to watch over his charge and conduct him to and from school, while the girl was left to the care of her mother, to be brought up in close seclusion. The schools were exclusively the undertakings of private individuals, though the edifices used as schools were built at the expense of the State for this and other public purposes. The instruction given in those free schools, however, was subject to the inspection of the State.

In ancient *Rome* parents enjoyed a still more perfect freedom in the education of their children. Till after the fall of the republic there were no such things as public schools. The child was educated in the family circle. The father remained the natural educator and instructor of his own children. At an early period, however, we find schools of a private character in Rome, which were at first held in the streets and public places, and received the name of *ludi* (plays), as the teachers bore the title of *ludi magistri* (masters of play), to attract the playful children. These primitive institutions gradually assumed the form of real schools, with a graded course of instruction, but still maintained their private character. It is only under the emperors that we find the first at-

tempt at public schools, with teachers paid by the government. Such was the Athenæum erected by Hadrian in Rome, and the auditorium of Constantine in Constantinople—the latter, a university, with thirty-one professors paid by the State. But, besides those imperial institutions, private schools continued to work as formerly.

By the *coming of Christ*, the great Educator of the nations, new life was breathed into education. There was no more the narrowness of national prejudice, no more the distinction of Jew and Gentile, Greek and Barbarian. All men were destined to become one great family, the children of God and heirs of His Kingdom. Education has received a higher aim, which was not mere citizenship and national character, but the Sonship of God and the conformity with His only-begotten Son, Jesus Christ. And what were the principles of this divine pedagogy? The same principle which God had established in the beginning,—*family-education*. Wherefore, our Lord recalled matrimony to its primeval purity, unity, and indissolubility, and raised it to the dignity of a sacrament of the Church. He Himself is born, grows up, is educated (as far as this can be said of the Son of God) in the bosom of the family. It is only once we read of His sitting at the feet of the Jewish doctors. For the rest, He remained with His parents in the Holy Family of Nazareth, and “was subject to them” until the hour of His public teaching arrived. But Christ not only infused a new soul into education, and reestablished the rights of parents. He Himself came into the world as the teacher of the nations, who taught “as one having power.” And like all His other saving institutions, He made His teaching-office permanent in His Church. With the same divine power, which He had received from His Heavenly Father, He invested His apostles to teach all nations, assuring them and their successors of His infallible assistance unto the end of the world. He has conferred on His Church a divine charter to teach, which the world can violate, but not invalidate. Christianity has given a new aspect to education, restoring it to the primordial ideal of the Creator. The child should no longer be the pupil and property of the State. He is to be “taught of God,” and for God by divinely-appointed teachers—the parents who have received their divine mission in the Sacrament of Matrimony and by the Minister of God, sent by the Church, in the power of Christ. The history of the Church might almost be summarized in the exercise of this function of education. Nor did she ever cease to raise her voice in vindication of the inviolable right of parents to educate their own offspring, nor fail to remind them of this important duty.

But in modern times the old Spartan system has been in great

part resuscitated. The germ of the present system of State monopoly of education was sown by the Reformation. The teaching-office or the Church, instituted by Christ, was abolished, and private judgment enthroned in its place. Every man alike, according to the new Gospel, was priest and teacher. The Supreme teaching-office was transferred into the hands of the people, and right well they made use of their prerogative to dispense themselves from the duty of being taught by others. In his own days, Martin Luther could complain with reason that already "the village parson was the most despised of all men, that every peasant considered him as mud and dirt, to be trodden under foot, the which, he was sorry to say, was not seldom literally executed."

No better was the lot of the teacher, as is natural to expect, for Luther's abuse was levelled alike against priest, monk, and scholar. Hence we soon hear the general complaint that no parent would any more send his child to school. To this was added that the greater part of the school property was confiscated, and the salaries of teachers so curtailed that few were found willing to devote themselves to the work of education. The result of all this was a general decadence of education in the reformed countries. What, then, was to be done but have recourse to the State, into whose hands the properties of educational establishments had fallen, to erect and endow new schools, and thus resuscitate education from the tomb. This the State also did, but tardily, and, at first, only for the privileged class. But the foundation was thus laid for what is now called State education.

This modern system is a complete revival of the ancient Pagan form of national education, nay, it even surpasses in absolutism anything we find in the civilized nations of Pagan antiquity. It is Spartanism on a refined scale. This modern Spartanism has found its heralds among the lights of modern philosophy, especially in Germany. *Gottlieb Fichte*, in his "Addresses to the German nation," pleads for national education in the true Spartan sense. He will have great *public* institutions in which the students are to be educated *in common* in the *national spirit*. Those should be *exclusively State institutions*, besides which no others should be tolerated. The State should be the only educator of the nation. His worthy follower, *Hegel*, proceeding from his evolutionary pantheism, came to the same conclusions. In his phrase, "education is the art of regenerating man to a new spiritual nature. The growing youth," he says, "who is suckled on the breast of morality (the State), but lives yet as a stranger in her absolute contemplation, is brought more and more to her acquaintance, and thus passes over into the universal mind (Geist). The (youth's) mind must divest itself of its individuality, and thus make its transit into

the universal mind." This pantheistic metamorphosis, which he calls education, is nothing else than the total sacrifice of individual liberty and character to the all-absorbing omnipotent deity of the State, which he describes as the "realization of the moral idea, the self-conscious moral substance, the moral mind, the manifest, self-revealing will;" in other words, the last and highest evolution of the God-universe. Who can dispute the right of the State, thus deified, to educate the children it has begotten and nourished in blissful unconsciousness on its all-embracing bosom? And who can refuse to doff the swathings of individuality, and don this magic cloak of national universality? Let this sample of the theories, on which State education is brought to rest, suffice, and let us now proceed to examine the natural rights and duties of the State with regard to education.

Man is by nature a social being, says the Stagyrte. His social wants and inclinations extend beyond the limits of the family circle. Without a more extensive coöperation of his fellows, the individual is unable to procure for himself that peace and comfort which constitute our temporal happiness in this life. The individual and the family must be defended in their personal and domestic rights. Those material goods which make life enjoyable, and without which felicity cannot subsist, must be brought within the reach of all. This cannot be done without the coöperation of many,—at least of those who live within certain fixed boundaries. But as coöperation is impossible in our present (fallen) state without a ruling authority, possessing legislative and co-active jurisdiction, there arises the natural necessity of civil authority, or the power of efficaciously directing a given community to temporal prosperity. Civil society, therefore, or what we generally call the *State*, is a natural institution, the outgrowth of our rational human nature. There is no need of a social contract to explain its origin and existence. Wherever on the face of the globe a certain number of human beings exist in contiguity a civil society will soon spontaneously spring up, whether individuals will or not.

Therefore we find civil society and civil authority in a more or less developed state with all nations. But as the necessity, so also the object, and the limits of civil authority are defined by nature, its object is to procure for the individual and the family by common effort those necessary goods which they cannot procure for themselves by private and domestic means,—the protection against the assailants of their rights, and the promotion of such comforts and facilities as tend to the general temporal prosperity, without the violation of personal, domestic, or divine rights. The State, therefore, exercises two functions towards its subjects,—one pro-

tective of their natural or acquired rights, another promotive of their temporal well-being.

Now, does education fall within the scope of civil power? In other words, has civil authority been instituted by the Creator to teach the nations? Certainly education does not fall within the protective function of the State, for no right is thereby violated that parents educate their own children, or intrust them to private individuals or institutions to be educated, according to the dictates of their conscience. On the contrary, this, as we have seen, is the intention of the Creator, and the most perfect execution of the Divine order. The only case in which State interference can be warranted is that in which the necessary education of children is notably neglected, as in case of exposed children and orphans, for whom provision is not otherwise made by the Church, or by private charity. Every child has a right to the necessary education, and if his claims are not satisfied in the natural divinely sanctioned order, it is the business of the State to take measures that the child may come to his right. By so doing the State does not act as an educator more than it becomes the administrator of public property by punishing theft, or enforcing the restitution of stolen goods. It only defends the personal rights of its subjects within lawful bounds. But the State that takes education into its own hands, and monopolizes schools, violates in the most glaring manner personal, parental, and divine rights.

The child under ordinary circumstances has an inviolable right, though he may have no means of enforcing it, to be educated in the way intended by the Creator, not under the iron rod of the State official, but under the loving care of his parents, either in the bosom of the family or in that place where parents believe him to be best cared for,—not according to that manner of pedagogy which may seem to philosophers to make him an enlightened citizen and patriot, but in that way which will bring him nearer to his Creator, and guide him most effectually to his last end. Therefore the child who is violently wrested from the arms of his parents and thrust into a public school is injured in his most sacred personal rights; and this violence is the more crying in the sight of heaven because the child has no means of self-defence, nor even the consciousness of the wrongs inflicted upon him.

State education is, furthermore, a violation of domestic rights,—nay, it frustrates the object of domestic society, which is not merely the procreation, but mainly the education of the human race. Procreation without the divinely-intended education, is a curse rather than a blessing for the individual as well as for the race. It were better for that child not to be born who is not educated in the way of the Commandments of God; and parents cannot be indifferent,

whether they are the cause of a blessing or a curse, to their children. They cannot, therefore, leave them a prey to the ambition of the State. It is their duty and their inalienable right to have their children brought up according to their conscientious convictions. Hence the State that compels parents to send their children to schools which in their minds do not direct, but impede, them in the attainment of their last end, tramples their most sacred rights under foot.

But the State which monopolizes education goes still further in its injustice, it violates the divine right ; for, if God has both naturally and positively sanctioned the law of domestic education, He cannot be indifferent as to its fulfilment. Whoever, then, conduces to or connives at the upsetting of this divine ordination, not only violates the rights of men, but lifts his unhallowed hand in rebellion against the Creator Himself. He opposes himself to the teaching of Christ, and impedes His Church in the discharge of her teaching office ; for, supposing even the best case in which the minister of the church has access to the schools to teach the Christian doctrine, yet this is not the full exercise of the charge the Church has received from her founder. Abstracting from the fact that primary education is essentially religious, and is consequently altogether subject to the jurisdiction of the Church, in virtue of the commission given her by Christ to teach, preserve, and defend His doctrine, the Church has the divine right of supervision over the teaching of the various branches of profane science, in this sense that she can assure herself that those branches are taught in such a way as not to convey any error in faith, or anything manifestly leading to such error, nor to contain anything dangerous to morals. Hence a profession of faith is exacted by law not only of the professors of sacred but also of the teachers of profane sciences in ecclesiastical institutions. Therefore the State that takes education into its own hands, though it may permit religious instruction, violates the most fundamental of the divine rights of the Church. Whatever view, then, we choose to take of State education, it is a most flagrant injustice, a most impious and sacrilegious violation of the holiest rights of God and man.

If State education subverts the natural order instituted by the Creator, we may justly expect that it entails the most serious consequences for morality. And in fact we need not go far to find the pernicious moral effects of State or secular education. The catalogue of crime which is daily and weekly chronicled in our newspapers bears ample testimony to the effects of our public education. And how could it be otherwise if the schools are secularized, religion no more taught, if children are no more impressed with the eternal maxims, which alone (though only aided by the interior

grace of God) can restrain the impetuosity of the passions of man? History, sacred and profane, should have long since convinced the nations that man cannot be made moral without religion.

"Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure," says George Washington, in his last injunction to his country, "reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle." We are well aware that the advocates of godless education in this country are fond of telling us that crime is committed by the unlettered, not by the educated. They love to wax eloquent on the chastening and civilizing influence of the typical American schoolmarm, and the salutary moral effects of the coeducation of the sexes. And yet proverbial "young America," with all its amiable qualities, has, in great part, sat at the feet of those victims of civilization, and enjoyed all the blessings of mixed education, with "Bible-reading without note or comment," and "daily instructions in morals and manners." And who are the writers and readers and venders of dime novels and such like trash, which is deluging our country? Who are those who exercise and promote peculation and corruption and all manner of public dishonesty and swindling? Who are the Socialists and Communists and Nihilists who are now disorganizing society all over the world? Who are bursting the bonds of domestic society in this country, and practicing and abetting those abominations which Dr. Morgan Dix has recently revealed to the American public? Is it the much-decried, illiterate mass? No; those are men and women who have enjoyed all the blessings of education, *minus* religion, and we doubt not but the bulk of them have received "moral instructions" not inferior to those generally supposed to be given in our American common schools. And yet American educationalists muster numbers, and endeavor to prove to us statistically that illiteracy is the cause of crime, and express a holy horror of illiteracy as the source of all moral and social ills. "Let us fill the schools," they say, "and we shall empty the prisons," as if there was any connection between secular education and morality, or the exemption from crime.

A glance at the progress of crime in countries, where State education is in fullest bloom, and illiteracy a thing almost unknown, will convince the reader of the fruitlessness, or rather the demoralizing influence of public education. Let us take a few instances from the German fatherland, which, being eminently the land of modern civilization and public schools, cannot but be considered a fair representative. The growth of crime is simply alarming, especially amongst the youth. A Berlin preacher, in a report on the progress of crime in that city (1873), says: "At present

the prison cells, allotted to juvenile criminals, are so crammed that the room is no longer sufficient for them. In the course of 1872, no fewer than 392 such juveniles, from twelve to eighteen years of age, have been imprisoned, among whom 158 were under sixteen years. A lad, of fourteen, being asked in court of what denomination he was, replied: 'Denominations no longer exist; religion is no longer taught in the schools.' And then the reporter goes on to say: "The great mass of crime has grown upon the soil of religious indifference and radicalism. Most of the criminals show an appalling ignorance and carelessness in religious matters, and such a confusion of all moral ideas as would move any thinking man to compassion." This growth of crime has alarmed even the great champions of modern culture. Herr von Puttkamer, then minister of public instruction in Prussia, after expressing his regret that the influence of religious education was paralyzed in the State, said (1879): "I am convinced that on the day on which we cease to make the saving teachings of the Gospel the basis of education, the fall of our national civilized life will be inevitable." *Video meliora proboque; deteriora sequor*.¹ Such are the fruits of State education in Germany; and yet we must remember that German State schools, as a rule, are not non-religious. Cases of non-religious schools have been exceptional, and religious instruction has been generally given according to the denomination of the children, in a solid and systematic way; but this circumstance affords a striking evidence of the inefficiency of religious instruction if the education is secular, or, as it frequently happens, hostile to religion. When will our American advocates of non-sectarian schools learn this lesson?

If such are the moral fruits of State education, what must be its social effects? If citizens are brought up without religion, without conscience, without God, is it to be wondered at that society is disorganized, that the social order is shaken to its centre, that rulers are trembling on their thrones? If religion and morality, which, to use the words of George Washington, are "indispensable supports of political prosperity," the two "great pillars of hum in happiness and the firmest props of men and citizens," are once undermined, the whole

¹ The percentage increase of crime in *Prussia*, from 1871 to 1878, was an average of 100 per cent., or double the number, the increase of population being only 4.4 per cent. Increase of crimes against morality, 148 per cent.; personal outrages, 143 per cent.; murders, 45 per cent.; against property, 226 per cent. In *Saxony*: murders, 85 per cent.; against morality, 181 per cent.; personal outrages, 200 per cent.; the increase of population being 7.4 per cent. In *Baden*: murders increase 69 per cent.; against morality, 122.9 per cent.; against property, 127 per cent. In *Wurtemberg*, 1872-77: average increase of crime, 83.5 per cent.; the increase of population, 3.3 per cent. In *Bavaria*, 1872-76: average increase of crime, 32.6 per cent.; of population, 3.3 per cent.

structure of society must needs totter to its fall. This is the practical outcome of State education.

But considered even from a theoretical point of view, the principle of State education is fraught with the most baneful consequences. "If the State owes its children an education at the common expense," says Bishop McQuaid, in a recent number of the *Journal of Education*, "there is no escape from the Communists' demand for food, clothing, and shelter at the common expense." The principle of State education, therefore, is essentially communistic. "If the mental wants of the rising generation ought to be satisfied by the State," says Herbert Spencer, "why not their physical ones? The reasoning which is held to establish the right to intellectual food will equally well establish the right to material food; nay, it will do more, will prove that children should be altogether cared for by the government." Spencer logically concludes that the principle of State education annuls all parental responsibility. And Stewart Mill does not hesitate to call State education an insupportable despotism, inasmuch as it forms the opinions and sentiments of the people in such a way that the State may lead them whither it pleases.

We are no admirers of the philosophy of Spencer and Mill, but the greater their aberrations in other respects the more importance must be attached to their views on this one point, in which they did not allow themselves to be carried away from the path of common-sense by the current of modern notions. And, in fact, if the State may regulate and superintend the mental development of its children, we do not see why it should not, in like manner, watch over their physical growth. If the State supply the schoolmaster, why not the nurse? If it prescribe the mental régime, why not also the physical? Why not enact a national bill of fare, based on the most approved medical principles? Why not legislate on the clothing, habitation, corporal exercises, of its youthful subjects? This principle of State education, if synthetized to its last consequences, would with logical necessity lead us to the adoption of the famous black-soup mess of the Spartans. However humane and philanthropic, then, the principle of State education may appear at first sight, if once admitted it necessarily paves the way to communism and despotism. And it matters very little whether the State that adopts it is a republic, or an oligarchy, or a monarchy. History teaches that the one of these forms as well as the other is liable to those excesses, as soon as it begins to disregard the natural laws which the Creator has traced out on human nature for the direction of civil society.

It is needless to point to the pernicious effects of State education on *religion*. When teachers and pupils are subtracted from

the salutary influence of the Church, when God and religion and all those things which appertain to man's last end and should be first and foremost in the training of youth, are proscribed for six days of the week, how is it possible to imbue children with religious sentiments, to ground them in the principles of their faith, so that they may learn to act on religious motives through life? Religion, at most, will be a matter of secondary importance with them. And even though regular religious instructions may be permitted, yet the education will be far from being a religious one. Primary education, especially, must be blended with religion; the children must be brought up in a religious atmosphere; religion must become familiar and easy, and, as it were, a second nature to them, and this is a thing impossible if the instruction is secular, if the Church does not exercise a direct influence on teacher and pupil. Infidelity or religious indifference is the inevitable consequence of such secular instruction. We have many sad instances to illustrate the truth of this assertion in our own country. For what is the cause of the progress of infidelity in this country, if not mainly the godless education given in our public schools? And if the number of Catholics in the United States which, thanks be to God, is considerable compared with other denominations, is not more than half what it ought to be, we believe that this is chiefly, though not solely, owing to public-school education.

But State education, we maintain furthermore, far from being beneficial, is highly injurious to the advancement of true *civilization*, to the true progress of education. Here we must remind the reader that the true civilization of a nation does not consist in its material power and resources, nor in the most perfect utilizing of the forces of nature for social comfort and industrial facilities. All these things of course are the outcome of culture in a certain department, which, though of great importance, is by no means the highest of civilized life. Neither does true civilization consist in the total exemption from illiteracy; for, as we have already shown, a high degree of mental culture and good taste is not incompatible with illiteracy. Many an unlettered Italian will pass a better judgment on the artistic merits of a work of art than an American high-school graduate, who has heard much talk of good taste and æsthetics. The true civilization of a nation is the perfect, harmonious development of the higher faculties of the people as such. Now, can this harmonious development of the higher faculties of a nation be obtained under State education? We emphatically deny the possibility; for how can the development be harmonious if the religious and moral side of human nature be altogether or partially neglected? How can even the intellectual faculties be properly de-

veloped when, as is generally the case in State schools, the whole education has a materialistic drift? How can the æsthetic faculties be awakened, chastened, and cultivated, if Christianity, in which alone lofty ideals are to be contemplated, is banished from the school-room and expunged from the school-books?

But the most lamentable effect of this purely secular education is the rise and spread of error. As soon as science is divorced from positive religion there is no safeguard against error. Science has no longer the bulwark of infallible authority to keep it within the proper bounds. The human mind has no longer the unerring monitor to check its vain curiosity, to say to it: "So far shalt thou come, and no farther!" It has no longer the beacon-light of faith to light it on its way through the shoals and cliffs, with which the great ocean of the intelligible is beset; therefore it is that, in our days, in which the human mind has emancipated itself from the restraint of authority, "men have become vain in their thoughts, and their foolish hearts are darkened, and, professing to be wise, they have become fools." They have, in truth, changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the image of the corruptible world, and rational men into the likeness of the ape, and reduced Creator and creation to a mere combination of matter and movement. This lamentable degradation of science in our days is the natural outcome of its divorce from positive religion. If any one looks on this as progress, he may boast that secular education is the mother of civilization. We will not reason with him.

Science has its God-appointed moderatrix in revealed religion. Nor does this subordination in any way derogate from the dignity of science; nay, it enhances the same, inasmuch as it guards science from error, which alone can degrade it. On the other hand, who does not see that it is the most unmitigated despotism against the human mind and against science, that their growth and development should be ruled by the State, which has no vocation, not to say capacity, for that task. Instances of this intellectual thralldom are not wanting in the history of modern philosophy. It is a patent fact that, as long as Hegel was in favor in the cabinet of Berlin, almost exclusively his followers were promoted to the higher chairs of learning in Prussia, which circumstance, more than anything else, has given popularity to his absurd system of philosophy and pedagogics among the learned; but, as soon as the wind of doctrine began to veer in ministerial circles, the young Hegels were almost systematically debarred from professional eminences.

Moreover, as competition is the life of trade, so also of education, and as State monopoly is prejudicial to any branch of business, so it must be to education. Of course, the State, having extensive resources at its disposal, can afford material facilities,

which private communities in our days can hardly attain to ; but the faculty or teacher, whose position is secured by government funds, will rarely devote the same energy to the work of education as those who altogether depend on their own efficiency for their support. Still greater will be the self-devotion of those who have sacrificed every temporal emolument for God's sake, in order the more freely to give themselves up to the task of education, whose affections are undivided by the cares of this world, and whose every thought belongs to the youth intrusted to their care. But State monopoly destroys that healthy competition, and leaves no room for those higher impulses. State professors, who have large numbers of pupils, will always have as many clever ones as will be able to save their reputations, but, if they are not actuated by higher motives, what cannot be indiscriminately supposed, they will allow the weaker talents to lag behind, or abandon their studies in despair. Anyone who is in the least acquainted with European State schools, knows what a wide gap separates teacher and pupil, what an absolute want of sympathy exists between them. One need only set his foot in a private institution to experience the difference. Here you can find the greatest mutual confidence and sympathy ; students having the greatest attachment to their teachers, and teachers having the most lively interest for the progress of every individual of their pupils. Whatever view, then, we take of State education, whether moral, social, religious, or pedagogic, we find it highly prejudicial to the cause of true education, culture, and civilization, a bane to the individual and to society, a crying outrage against the claims of human nature and the laws of the Creator.

It might seem to the reader as though we exempted the State from all concern for the education of its subjects. This, however, is far from being the case. It is the task of the State, or civil government, to provide for the weal of the community, as far as this can be done without infringing on the personal and domestic rights of its subjects, or on those no less sacred and inviolable rights which Christ conferred on His Church ; and nothing contributes more to the well-being of a people than a good education. It follows, then, that the State has the duty and the right to promote education within the limits of right. But to promote education it is not necessary to monopolize it ; nay, such monopoly, as we have shown, is highly injurious to the progress of education. The State has, then, undoubtedly the right to erect and endow schools at the public expense, where such are necessary or useful and not otherwise provided for. For such schools the State may make regulations and appoint teachers ; provided, however, it leave the Church full freedom to superintend and conduct the religious ed-

ucation in the same. The State may, also, and ought to, supply such facilities for higher education, as are too expensive for private enterprise, such as museums, observatories, art galleries, public libraries, botanical and zoölogical gardens. It should, moreover, organize and equip scientific expeditions, patronize all kinds of useful scientific research, and reward men of eminent literary and scientific merit in such a manner as to stimulate, not to pamper, genius.

That education, then, may be an object of government legislation is certain beyond all exception. The limits of this right of legislation must, as we hinted, be defined, on the one hand by the common good as a positive norm, and on the other hand by personal, domestic, and religious rights as a negative norm. We cannot in this paper enter into a detailed investigation of these limits. One question, however, we do not wish to pass over in silence. It is the vexed question of *compulsory education*. Can the State enforce compulsory education; that is, can it force parents to send their children to school up to a certain age, say twelve or fourteen years? Certain it is that the State cannot oblige them to send their children to any school in particular, much less to a school whose teaching is merely secular or hostile to their religious convictions. This would be against the most sacred rights and highest interests of parents and children. Neither can the State compel parents to send their children to any school at all if their education is otherwise provided for. So far, we believe, all right-thinking men agree. Now, the question arises whether the State can by law oblige parents to have their children taught reading, writing, reckoning, and the other elements of secular knowledge. On this point even Catholic authors are at issue. For our own part we believe that parents in our days are, under ordinary circumstances, bound in conscience to give their children the advantage not only of a religious education, but also, at least, of an elementary secular education; but we deny that the State can make or enforce laws to this effect. Parents are also in conscience bound to afford their children healthy food, clothing, and habitation; yet who will infer from this that the State has a right to regulate the kitchen, nursery, and other apartments in families, or make laws to prescribe the material and make of the children's dress according to the various seasons of the year? God has given this responsibility to parents, and it is only in cases of utter neglect that they are to be interfered with by outside authority. This extreme case of utter neglect in education cannot occur unless the child is altogether abandoned; then it is the duty of the State to interfere and provide for the necessary education.

But the advocates of State education urge that it is the duty of

the State to defend the rights of its subjects, and that the children have a right to an elementary secular education at least; that the State, therefore, can and must provide that every child within its jurisdiction is taught at least the elements. Here we must distinguish in education what is essential from what is non-essential. What is essential in mental education is the knowledge of those things which are necessary for the attainment of our last end, as in physical education that is essential which is necessary to preserve the physical life of the child, and to this the child has a strict right *ex justitia*. All further knowledge is non-essential, and can only be claimed by the child *ex æquitate*; in other words, the parents are bound to give their children more education than is merely essential to their eternal salvation, in virtue of the law as to what they owe to their offspring; but they are not bound under the title of justice, and cannot therefore be compelled by coercive measures to the fulfilment of that duty of parental piety; the same way as a rich man who disinherits his children, and disposes otherwise of his property, sins against parental charity, but does not violate the right of another, because he only disposes of what is his.

But cannot the State legislate also in cases of mere equity? Certainly it can, but only within its own sphere and for the general good. But neither of these conditions is realized in the case in question. Education, as we have shown, does not fall within the sphere of the State, but is the proper function of domestic society. It is, therefore, only in utter default of parents that the State can assume this duty, and further interference is not for the common good, as we have seen, but leads to communism and despotism.

They further advance that the honor of a civilized State requires that all its subjects are able to read and write. Illiteracy, they say, is a disgrace to the nation. We do not plead for illiteracy, but we are unable to perceive any great ignominy or serious inconvenience to a State in the fact that some of its colliers and ploughmen and cowboys and dairymaids are not able to read the morning paper and carry on an epistolary correspondence with their friends, provided they are honest and thrifty and understand the simple science of their own craft. But such citizens, they say, are not fit for free suffrage. Why not? Unless because they are debarred of their franchise by their literate brethren. Further, they exclaim, such citizens are unfit to be true patriots and to defend their country. We have seen spectacled German students under arms, but we could not imagine that they were braver than the unlettered Crusaders of old, or more patriotic than the illiterate portion of the Irish Brigade.

All the arguments which are advanced in favor of compulsory education are, to our mind, utterly void of convincing force. All

they prove is, that the State should favor and promote education within its due limits, and that we fully agree to. In our days there is no need of coercion to induce parents to give their children the necessary secular education, if facilities are offered them. Self-respect and self-interest suggest this so strongly, where the state of society requires it, that coactive measures are needless. Where illiteracy is a considerable inconvenience, it will generally be found that in those cases in which mental education has been notably neglected, the physical has been a good deal more overlooked. And yet, though it is a true principle in education,—*prius est vivere ; dein philosophare*,—no State ever thinks of making inquiries into the physical rearing of children, which falls within the province of the State more than the mental training. Why, then, should the State be so solicitous that the physically-neglected child, whom it has permitted to be half-starved, ill-clad, and ill-housed, should at the age of twelve con his A, B, C ? Such delicacy we consider highly preposterous, not to say pharisaical. Compulsory education, therefore, in whatever shape or form it may be adopted and enforced by a State, we hold to be an overstepping of the divinely-constituted limits of political authority, and an egregious outrage against private and domestic rights.

To sum up our views in a few words: Abstracting from the prerogatives of the Church, we say that, according to the natural law, which is the basis of the moral order and of all positive legislation, education is the business of parents to the exclusion of all others ; that they have, therefore, the sacred and inviolable right to educate their own offspring, or intrust them to the care of those who will educate them according to their moral and religious convictions ; that the State, according to the same divinely-constituted order, should not be the educator of its children, but only the promoter and patron of education ; that this is its only function with regard to education, by which alone it can lead the people to true civilization ; that any further interference on the part of the State in the matter of education is not only violent and unjust, but must needs prove destructive to religion, to morality, to genuine culture, and to the social order of nations.

WHAT DID "THE REFORMATION" REFORM?

THE so-called Reformation of the sixteenth century started out with the professed object of removing evils which, it was claimed, had crept into the Church. The claim, in some respects, was entirely true. On this point there is no room for controversy, and about it there never was a controversy between the "Reformers" and those who opposed them. The real questions in dispute were, what the actual evils were, and how and by what means they should be removed? Both parties at first agreed that the existing evils, whatever they might be, were not inherent in the Church, and did not originate in her essential constitution, nor grow out of it.

But very soon the "Reformers," hopeless of bringing the Church and its hierarchy over to their ideas, took other ground, and maintained that the Church was corrupt in its very constitution; that from the temple of God it had become a synagogue of Satan; that its visible Head, the Pope, was Antichrist; that the Papacy must be destroyed; that new doctrines, different from and opposed to those which were taught, and had been taught, must be introduced, and, in fact, a new Church created. The Bible, it was alleged, furnished the necessary instruction and authority for such an undertaking.

But the followers of the "Reformers" soon found that such an attempted justification of their movement must be qualified, so as to conceal, and, if possible, explain away its direct contradiction of our Blessed Redeemer's declarations respecting the perpetuity and indefectibility of His Church. Accordingly, in their various, divergent, and contradictory creeds and confessions, they resorted to various rhetorical subterfuges to keep out of view the real thought which underlay all those creeds and confessions, and the realization of which was the real object of their movements.

They set up the figment of an *invisible* Church of Christ, to be created and re-created at the will and pleasure of its members, though all history testified that, from the day of the Church's first establishment, it had been a visible, divine constitution, in the world yet not of it, endowed with divine authority and powers, which it was perpetually to possess, and with a divinely constituted hierarchy to exercise that authority and those powers. They tried, in some instances, too, to trace up a succession from the Apostles, through various despicable, heretical sects and schisms, the

Hussites, the Waldenses, the Albigenses, the Lollards and the Cathari, and their Manichean predecessors. But the claim was too preposterous to be generally and vigorously made. Conceding that they were the legitimate successors of those sects, it simply proved that they were bad descendants of bad ancestors. For those sects had advocated principles and practices plainly incompatible with pure morality, and utterly irreconcilable with social and civil order. But even this miserable claim could not be made good. Many of the ideas of previous heretical sects, it is true, were adopted by the "Reformers;" but there was no connection between those sects and the so-called Reformation showing any real historical continuity. Luther, Melancthon, Carlstadt, Osiander, Munzer, Zwingli, Beza, Bucer, and Calvin, on the Continent of Europe, and Henry VIII., Cranmer, Ridley, Latimer, and Elizabeth, of England, were not, in any historical sense, children of previous sects or schisms, but went out incontestably from the communion of the Catholic Church. They could not, therefore, with any consistency or truth set up even the miserable plea of sectarian continuity for their rebellion. Their movements were movements instituted *de novo*; and the only plea that can be made in defence of the Reformation, consistent with either history or logic, rests on the assumption that the Catholic Church, the only then existing religious organization that even claimed to be the Church of Christ, had become an apostasy, and that *they* (the "Reformers") had the right to re-create it from the Bible. This assumption, beyond all question, was the basis on which Luther himself placed his movement from the day he openly threw off the authority of the Catholic Church to that of his death; and back to it all the various creeds of Protestantism are driven by an invincible logical necessity.

The agreement on this point of the vast majority of members of Protestant sects, however opposed to each other in doctrine and practice, is conclusive proof. Whatever their controversialists may say, and however subtly they may endeavor to explain away and qualify the fact, Protestants generally, as a final resort, discard all testimonies of history to the continuity of the Catholic Church from the days of the Apostles as impertinent to the question, and fall back upon the Bible—that is, their own interpretation of the Bible—in defence of the origin of their respective sects.

The movement, miscalled "The Reformation," was, therefore, in its objects and purposes, as regards the then existing Christian Church, not a *reformation* in any sense. It was, essentially and in its fundamental idea, a rebellion against the Church,—an effort to destroy it, and to construct a religion for Christian Europe, *de novo*, from the Bible—that is, from such parts of the Bible as the "Re-

formers" acknowledged to be inspired, and which they claimed to have the right of interpreting and expounding according to their own individual notions. As regards the then existing Christian Church the lines written by Luther with a piece of chalk on a wall of his chamber, during his last sickness, were the keynote of the whole movement:

"Pestis eram vivus, moriens mors tua ero, Papa."
("Living, I was your pest; dying, O Pope, I shall be your death.")

The question, then, fairly confronts us, was the movement (intended avowedly and obviously to destroy the existing Christian Catholic Church), so far as it succeeded in introducing another religious belief and practice, a real reform of religion?

I. Did the so-called Reformation introduce or promote purer doctrine? There are two ways of arriving at a correct answer to this question. One is by examining the fundamental doctrinal ideas of the "Reformers," and developing their logical consequences. The other is by examining the results as shown in history and the light of actually existing facts to-day. We shall employ both methods.

1. The Reformers, rapidly driven on by the irresistible logic of their movement, broadly disclaimed the testimony of the Church Fathers as to what was true doctrine, and the authority alike of Pope and Councils. They appealed, or at least Luther did, at first to the Pope, but almost immediately defied him. They appealed from him to a Council, but never could be gotten to pledge themselves to submit to its decision. Their final resort was invariably an appeal to the Sacred Scriptures as *they* interpreted them and to those parts of them only which *they* acknowledged to be inspired. And this principle of the "Reformers" is interwoven with the warp and woof of all Protestant "Confessions." Tear it out, and the entire fabric of each and all of them falls asunder. It is embodied in the false popular tradition that "Luther unchained the Bible."

But, in thus setting up "the Bible" as "the rule of faith," the Reformers broke loose from all Christian antiquity. If the doctrine of the Reformers on this point is the pure one, the true one, then the Christian religion was impure and Christian doctrine untrue, from its very start. Protestants for a time professed to make great account of the early ages of Christianity, and asserted they could find in them proofs that would vindicate their assumed "rule of faith." Latterly, with more prudence or less recklessness, they say very little about the ages of "primitive Christianity." Yet, going back to whichever of the earlier ages of the Christian Church they choose, they fail to find any such rule of faith. It did not exist in the age of St. Gregory the Great. Nor in that

of St. Leo the Great, Sts. Celestine, Hilary, Chrysostom, Augustine, Jerome, Cyril of Alexandria, Vincent of Lerins. Nor yet in that of Sts. Athanasius, Basil, Ephrem, Damasus, Cyril of Jerusalem, and the Gregories of Nanzianzen and Nyssa, the age of the Council of Nice.

Going back before that Council (which Protestants profess to acknowledge as an Ecumenical Council of the "undivided," "pure" Church), we hear Tertullian appealing, not to the Sacred Scriptures in his treatise on "*Prescription*," but to the tradition of the Church; and insisting that heretics have no right to appeal to the Scriptures; that they are the exclusive property of the Church; that the Church may rightly say to heretics, in reply to any such appeal:

"Who are *you*? Whence do you come? What business have you, strangers, with my property? By what right are you, Marcion, felling *my* trees? By what authority are you, Valentine, turning the course of *my* streams? Under what pretence are you, Apelles, *removing my* landmarks? The estate is *MINE*; why do you, other persons, presume to work it and use it at your pleasure? The estate is *mine*; *I* have the *ancient, prior possession of it*; have the title-deeds from the original owners. *I* am the *heir of the Apostles*; they made their will with all proper solemnities in *my* favor, while they *disinherited* and cast *you* off, as *strangers and enemies*.

Thus wrote Tertullian to those who in his time appealed to the Sacred Scriptures against the Church.

If we consult St. Cyprian we hear him warning the Christians of Carthage who were inclined to follow promulgators of new opinions in the following pregnant words:

"I counsel and warn you, trust not rashly pernicious words, assent not lightly to declarations which are false, take not darkness for light, night for day, famine for food, thirst for drink, poison for medicine, death for salvation."

Then he lays down "*the rule*" by which false doctrine is to be distinguished from true:

"God is one, and Christ is one, and there is one Church, and one Cathedra founded on the Rock by the Lord's voice. No other altar can be set up, there can be no new altar, by reason of the one altar and the one priesthood. He who gathers elsewhere, scatters. Adulterous, impious, sacrilegious is whatsoever human passion may institute, in violation of the Divine arrangement. Keep far away from the contagion of such men, and avoid their word as you would flee from a cancer or a plague, mindful of the Lord's warning: 'They be blind leaders of the blind; and if the blind lead the blind both shall fall into the ditch.'"¹

¹ Epistle 43. It might almost seem as though the above brief quotation and other parts of this letter, written by St. Cyprian upwards of sixteen hundred years ago, had been intended, not only for the immediate instruction of the Christians of Carthage, but, by prophetic inspiration, as a warning to modern Ritualists and other would-be Protestant-Catholics who discard the so-called "right" of private judgment and claim to be Catholic though remaining outside the communion of the Church.

And then, to settle the whole question as to the rule by which error was to be determined from truth, heresy from the orthodox doctrine, schismatic movements from the normal action of Christianity, when Novatian set up pretensions to being Bishop of Rome and sought to secure the support and obedience (due to the Primacy) of the African Bishops, St. Cyprian wrote a number of letters showing that Cornelius (then Pope) was the true Bishop of Rome, and Novatian a pretender and schismatic. In one of these letters he refers to Novatian personally and to his claims to teaching "pure" doctrine.

"Be he who he may, and how much soever he may arrogate to himself, he is profane, he is foreign, he is without. And since after the *first* (Cornelius, then the true Bishop of Rome) there *can be no second*, whoever is made after one who ought to be alone, he (Novatian) is not second now, but none. . . . It is not *necessary to ask* WHAT *he teaches*, since he *teaches without*. Whoever and whatever he may be, he is no Christian who is not in Christ's Church. Boast as he may of his philosophy, or make vain parade of his eloquence, the man who has not kept fraternal charity and ecclesiastical unity has lost even all that he had before. . . . And whereas there is from Christ one Church divided throughout the world into many members, likewise one Episcopate spread abroad by a *concordant* multitude of many Bishops, *he*, after this order has been handed down by God, after this compact full unity of the Catholic Church has been everywhere settled, now undertakes to *create a human* Church, and sends forth his *new* apostles into many cities to plant this *recent* institution."

Then, again, because of this and other schisms and heresies likely to mislead the faithful, St. Cyprian wrote his renowned treatise, *De Unitate Ecclesiæ*, in which he lays down this *rule*:

"A summary *test of truth* is immediately at hand for *faith*. The Lord addresses Peter: I say unto thee that thou art Peter, and on this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. And I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth, it shall be bound also in heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth, it shall also be loosed in heaven. Again He says to the same, after His resurrection: 'Feed my sheep.' On that one He builds His Church and to him commits His sheep to be fed. And although after His resurrection He gives like power to all the Apostles, and says, 'As my Father hath sent Me, even so I send you; receive ye the Holy Ghost, whosoever sins ye remit they are remitted unto them, and whosoever sins ye retain, they are retained,' yet still, to make the unity clear, he provided by His authority that the origin of this same unity should start from one. The other Apostles were also indeed what Peter was, endowed with like partnership both of honor and power, but the beginning proceeds from unity, and the Primacy is given to Peter that there may be shown to be one Church of Christ and one Cathedra; . . . that the Church of Christ may be demonstrated one. . . . Will he who withstands and resists the Church, presume still that he is in the Church, when the blessed Apostle Paul also sets forth the *sacrament of unity* in like style where he says: 'There is one body and one spirit, one hope of your calling, one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God?' . . . Tear a sunbeam from its place; the unity of the light suffers no division. Break off a bough from a tree; it has no further power of growth. Cut off a stream from its fountain; it must soon become dry. So the Church of the Lord. . . . She sends forth her abundant streams abroad, far and wide in every direction; yet is there but one head, one origin, one mother of continually prolific grace. Of her womb we are born; by her milk we are nourished; with her

spirit we are animated. . . . Whoever is out of her is a stranger ; he is profane, he is an enemy. No one can have God for his father, who has not the Church for his mother. If one might escape who was out of Noah's ark, then may he also escape who is out of the Church."

Going back a few years farther, we come to St. Irenæus, born only about twenty years after St. John was called to rest from his labors, and a pupil of St. Polycarp who was a pupil of St. John. St. Irenæus lays down "the rule of faith" for Christians, the rule by which they may distinguish truth from error, as follows :

"It is necessary to hearken to the Presbyters of the Church, who have the succession from the Apostles, and along with the succession of the Episcopate have received the certain gift of truth according to the good pleasure of the Father. . . . The true knowledge is the doctrine of the Apostles, and the ancient constitution of the Church in the whole world, and the character of the body of Christ according to the succession of the Bishops, to whom the Apostles have committed the Church in every place."

Then, showing that the ways of heresy are many and various and that the doctrine of the Church is one and unchanging, he says :

"She (the Church), though spread throughout the world, with the greatest care, and as occupying but one house, preserves the faith that has been handed down, and believes it, having but one soul and one heart; and proclaims it, teaches it, hands it down, with marvellous agreement, as if she had but one mouth. The languages indeed are different, but the matter of the tradition is still one and the same. . . . If the Apostles had left us no writings, ought we not still to follow the rule of that tradition which they handed over to those to whom they committed the churches? To this rule many nations of barbarians do hold in fact, which believe in Christ and have His salvation inscribed by the Holy Ghost, carefully following the tradition. . . . which we have received and hold from our Church, and which the Spirit of God continually renovates, like a precious jewel in a gold casket, imparting to it the quality of His own perpetual youth."

Then, as if to clinch the matter, St. Irenæus shows that this tradition handed down from the Apostles is not left to the Bishops, singly and independently, but united in a general corporation, the several parts of which are held together in unity, the centre of which is the Church at Rome.

"As it would be tedious," he says, "to enumerate the succession of all the churches, we confound all those who in any improper manner gather together . . . by pointing to the tradition of the greatest and most ancient church, known to all, founded and established at Rome by the two most glorious Apostles Peter and Paul, and to her faith announced to men, which comes down to us by the succession of Bishops. For with this church, on account of her more powerful principality it is necessary that every church, that is the faithful who are on all sides, should agree, in which the Apostolic tradition has been always preserved," etc.

This brings us to the very verge of the age of the Apostles, and going back to it we find St. Ignatius, the personal pupil of St. John, and St. Clement, whose name St. Paul declares is "in the book of

life." On his way to Rome to be devoured by wild beasts by the order of Trajan, St. Ignatius wrote seven letters; four from Smyrna and three from Troas. In these letters, full of earnest practical instruction, he dwells constantly on the necessity of concord and unity, and constantly lays down the *rule* by which in the several churches it is to be secured—*obedience to the Bishop*:

"Do nothing without your Bishop." "For where there is division and wrath God dwelleth not." . . . "It is therefore fitting that you should by all means glorify Jesus Christ, who hath glorified you, that by a uniform obedience ye may be perfectly joined together in the same mind and in the same judgment, and may all speak the same things concerning everything, and that being subject to your Bishop and Presbyters, ye may be wholly and thoroughly sanctified."

"Wherefore it will become you to run together, according to the will of your Bishop, as also ye do. . . . Let us take heed, therefore, that we do not set up ourselves against the Bishop, that we may be subject to God."

"Be ye united to your Bishop, and those who pre-side over you, to be your pattern and director in the way to immortality. As, therefore, the Lord did nothing, neither by Himself nor yet by His Apostles, without the Father, so neither do ye anything without your Bishop and Presbyters. . . . Have one common prayer, one supplication, one mind, one hope, in charity and in joy undefiled. There is one Lord Jesus Christ, than whom nothing is better."²

". . . . Use none but Christian nourishment, abstaining from pasture which is of another kind, I mean heresy. For they that are heretics confound together the doctrine of Jesus Christ with their own poison. . . . Wherefore guard yourselves against such persons; and that you will do if you are not puffed up; but continue inseparable from Jesus Christ, our God, and from your Bishop, and from the commands of the Apostles. He that is within the altar is pure; but he that is without, that is, that does anything without the Bishop, and Presbyters, and Deacons, is not pure in his conscience."³

". . . . Flee divisions and false doctrines. . . . Where your Shepherd is there do ye follow after. . . . For as many as are of God, and of Jesus Christ, are with their Bishop. And as many as shall with penitence return into the unity of the Church, even these shall also be the servants of God. Be not deceived, brethren; if any one follows him that makes a schism in the Church, he shall not inherit the kingdom of God; if any one walks after any other opinion he agrees not with the passion of Christ."⁴

Thus we might go on adding quotations from other letters which St. Ignatius wrote to other churches on his way to Rome, but we abstain. Not being able to write to several other churches, he requested St. Polycarp, in the last of his seven letters, to do it for him; and, in his letter to that Saint, writes as follows, indicating what he wished St. Polycarp to write:

"Hearken unto the Bishop, that God also may hearken unto you. My soul be security for them that submit to their Bishop, with their Presbyters and Deacons. And may my portion be together with theirs in God. . . . Let none of you be found a deserter; but let your baptism remain as your arms; your faith as your helmet; your charity as your spear; your patience as your whole armor."

We have reserved for last reference, among the epistles of St. Ignatius, his letter to the church at Rome, the fourth in the order

¹ Epistle to the Ephesians.
² Epistle to the Trallians.

³ Epistle to the Magnesians.
⁴ Epistle to the Philadelphians.

of his letters from Smyrna. In this letter he chiefly entreats the Roman Christians, in their charity and prayers, not to obtain from God that he should be spared by the wild beasts, to which he was to be exposed, and thus be prevented from receiving the crown of martyrdom, which he so ardently desired. "I beseech you," he writes, "to show not an unreasonable good-will towards me. Suffer me to be the food of wild beasts, whereby I may attain unto God." He seems to exhaust his powers of language in heaping upon the Church of Rome epithets of reverential admiration, designating it as

"the Church that has obtained mercy through the magnanimity of the Most High Father, and of Jesus Christ, His only begotten Son; the Church *beloved* and ENLIGHTENED through His will, Who wills all things that are according to the charity of Jesus Christ, our God, which PRESIDES in the place of the Roman region, being worthy of God, most comely, deservedly BLESSED, most *celebrated*, properly**organized*, most chaste and PRESIDING in charity, HAVING THE LAW OF CHRIST, bearing the name of the Father."

We come now immediately to the age of the Apostles. While St. John was still living at Ephesus, dissensions arose among the Christians at Corinth. These dissensions primarily had reference to Priests with whom some of the Corinthians were dissatisfied, and whom they undertook to depose. They involved also disputes respecting doctrine (particularly that of the resurrection of the body), and respecting subjects of practical Christian duty, as is evident from the topics embraced in St. Clement's letter. For authoritative settlement of the whole trouble the Corinthian Christians passed by the Apostle John (still living at Ephesus), St. Ignatius, then Bishop of Smyrna, St. Polycarp, then Bishop of Antioch, and other Bishops to whom they stood in close relation, either by local nearness or by nationality and sameness of language, and invoked the intervention of St. Clement, then Bishop of Rome. He complied with their request by sending to them (along with certain messengers or delegates) a letter of instruction, exhortation, rebuke, and warning, which is still extant.

It is only necessary to glance at this letter to be convinced that both St. Clement, its writer, and those for whose benefit it was intended, moved in an order of thought utterly irreconcilable with that which gathers around the assumption that the Bible is the rule of faith. It dwells on the sin of disturbing the divinely-established unity and order of the Church. It proves with a wealth of arguments and illustrations, drawn from the operations of the natural world, the constitution of civil society, the dealings of God with the Jews through the whole course of their history, and the manner in which the Apostles had not only chosen successors to themselves but had instructed those who should succeed them to keep up the

succession, by appointing others who were to follow them in office, when they themselves fell asleep, that unity, and order, and authority in the Church are based both on natural necessity and on express divine appointment; and that to maintain order, and unity, and authority requires the subordination of the several parts to the whole, and of the inferior to the superior. Speaking of the Jews under the Old Testament dispensation, he says:

"The High Priest has his proper functions; to the Priests their proper place is appointed; to the Levites appertain their proper services; and the Layman is confined within the limits prescribed to Laymen."

Referring to the organization of an army as a further example, he says:

"All are not prefects nor rulers of thousands, nor rulers of fifties, etc. But each man in his own rank executes the orders given by the king and governors."

Like St. Paul he illustrates the doctrine he is enforcing by reference to the human body, pointing out that

"even the smallest limbs of our body are necessary and useful for the whole body, but all the members must conspire¹ and unite *in subjection*, that the whole body may be preserved."

Then, coming still closer to his point, he repeats what he had before referred to, and says:

"The Apostles received the Gospel for us from the Lord Jesus Christ; Jesus Christ was sent forth from God. So then Christ is from God, and the Apostles are from Christ. Both, therefore, came of the will of God in the appointed order. Having, therefore, received a charge . . . they appointed their first fruits, when they had proved them by the Spirit, to be Bishops and Deacons unto them that should believe. . . . And our Apostles knew through our Lord Jesus Christ that there would be strife over the name of the Bishop's office. For this cause, therefore, they provided for a continuance that, if these should fall asleep, other approved men should succeed to their administration. . . . Wherefore, then, are there strifes, and wraths, and factions, and divisions, and wars amongst you? Have we not one God, and one Christ, and one Spirit of grace that was shed upon us? And is there not one calling in Christ?" . . .

Then, evidently referring to his supreme Pontifical authority in the Church, as Bishop of Rome and successor to St. Peter (a fact which, being well known to the Corinthians, it was unnecessary for him explicitly to assert), St. Clement significantly adds:

"Ye, therefore, that laid the foundation of this sedition, submit yourselves unto the Priests, bending the knees of your hearts. Learn to submit yourselves . . . laying aside the arrogant and proud stubbornness of your tongue. . . . But if certain persons should be disobedient to the words spoken by Him [Jesus Christ] through us, they will entangle themselves in no slight transgression and danger."

". . . Yet ye will give us great joy and gladness if ye render obedience to the things written by us through the Holy Spirit, and root out the anger of your unholy jealousy, according to the entreaty which we have made for peace and concord in this letter."

¹ "Conspire;" breathe together; have the same spirit.

Then, St. Clement informs the Corinthians that, along with his letter, he has sent to them persons who in our day would be styled Papal Legates :

"And we have also sent," he writes, "faithful and prudent men that have walked among us from youth unto old age unblameably, *who shall also be witnesses between you and us. And this we have done that ye might know that we have had, and still have, every solicitude that ye might be at peace. . . . Now send ye back speedily unto us our messengers* [naming them] *in peace and with joy that they may the more quickly report to us the peace and concord which is prayed for and earnestly desired by us, that we also may the more speedily rejoice over your good order.*"

The quotations we have given from this ancient and precious relic of Christian antiquity, pointed as they are even in the detached form in which we have had to quote them, are less forcible and significant than when read along with their context in the letter itself. It was written before the last of the Apostles had fallen asleep, by one who had learned his doctrine from their lips, whose name St. Paul, in writing to the Philippians, declares is in the "Book of Life," and who sat in Peter's chair at Rome, the third in the order of succession from that great and glorious Apostle. No wonder it was reverentially read on frequent stated occasions in the Church at Corinth for many years after its reception. Till the settlement by the Church of the canon of the Sacred Scriptures, centuries after, it was bound up in the same volume with one or another of the Gospels or Apostolic Epistles, and was regarded by many Christians as of equal, or almost equal authority with the divinely-inspired Scriptures. Apart from its plain ear-marks of its antiquity, and its allusions to then present circumstances, it might easily be accepted as a Pontifical brief or letter from the present Sovereign Pontiff of the Church, admonishing and encouraging the faithful, and warning and rebuking the seditious and rebellious.

And all the quotations we have given, pointed and direct as many of them are, are even less forcible in the evidence they furnish in separate form than such "rule of faith" as Luther set up was acknowledged by the Christians who learned Christian doctrine directly from the lips of the Apostles, or from those who immediately succeeded the Apostles, than are those quotations in their combined, circumstantial, and overwhelming proof of this fact.

They show that the whole order of thought and belief, up to the time of the Apostles, was different from, and irreconcilable with, that of the so-called "Reformers." If any one proposed to appeal to the Sacred Scriptures in support of a refusal to accept the teaching of the Church, the very proposal was treated as preposterous. "What business have *you* with the Sacred Oracles of God?" was the challenge that at once put an end to his pretensions.

"They are *my* property, given to *me* by Christ, who appointed *me*, to preserve, defend them, expound, teach His Gospel. *You* are intruders, invaders, devastators. What business have *you* on *my* estate? What right have *you* to cut down *my* trees, remove *my* landmarks, divert the course of *my* streams?"¹

¹ Gieseler, a Protestant, furnishes, in his notes and references, countless proofs of it.

Mosheim, the classic Lutheran historian, says: "Cyprian and the rest cannot have known the corollaries which follow from their precepts about the Church. For no one is so dull as not to see that, between a certain unity of the universal Church, terminating in the Roman Pontiff, and such a community as we have described out of Irenæus and Cyprian, there is scarcely so much room as between hall and chamber, or between hand and fingers."

Neander, the classic rationalistic Protestant German church historian, commenting on phrases used by St. Cyprian (the genuineness of which some persons dispute), says that those disputed clauses contain nothing that is not elsewhere affirmed by St. Cyprian.

His Eminence, Cardinal Newman, while still a Protestant, and striving to actualize his "fond dream" of a *Via Media*, by which Anglicanism might be reconciled with Catholicity, wrote:

"Did St. Athanasius or St. Ambrose come suddenly to life it cannot be doubted what communion they would mistake [not *mistake*, but *intelligently take*.—G. D. W.] for their own. All surely will agree that these Fathers, with whatever difference of opinion, whatever protests, if we will, would find themselves more at home with such men as St. Bernard or St. Ignatius Loyola, or with the lonely priest in his lodgings, or the holy Sisterhood of Mercy, or the unlettered crowd before the altar, than with the rulers or the members of any other religious community."

Dr. John Williamson Nevin's learning and intellectual acuteness and vigor are unquestionable. He is frequently quoted as correct in his historical statements, even while striving to find a basis for Protestantism, by Archbishop Kenrick, in his treatise on the Primacy of the Apostolic See. After an exhaustive examination of ancient Christian writings, he was reluctantly forced to the conclusion that all attempts to vindicate Protestantism, or the "Reformers," on the ground that the so-called "Reformation" was a return to "primitive Christianity," or, to use his own favorite expression, "a re-pristination" of it, were worse than useless, involving a direct contradiction of the plain facts of history. He subtly evaded the evident conclusion that the Holy Roman Catholic Apostolic Church is the one true Church of Christ, and that Protestantism is a heresy and a schism, by setting up the theory that Protestantism is an evolution in the onward course of history; and that the *Church of the future*, yet to be evolved, would unite such elements of truth as were to be found in Protestantism with all its manifest contradictions and tergiversations, with those which the Catholic Church has preserved and taught. He says, referring to the assumed agreement of Protestantism with "primitive Christianity," "that Protestantism . . . is still farther away from this older faith than the system by which it is supposed to have been supplanted in the Middle Ages. No defence of Protestantism can well be more insufficient and unsound than that by which it is set forth as a pure *re-pristination* of what Christianity was at the beginning of either the fourth century, or the third, or the second. It will always be found, on examination, to have no such character in fact; and every attempt to force upon the world any imagination of the sort in favor of either Episcopalianism or Presbyterianism, or Independency, in favor of all or of any one of the threescore and ten sects which at this time 'follow the Bible as their sole rule of faith,' must only serve in the end, by its palpable falsehood, to bring suspicion and doubt on the whole cause which is thus badly upheld." (Mercersburg Review, vol. iii., p. 481.)

"We owe it to ourselves here to see and own the full truth. The religion of these Fathers was not of the shape and type now usually known as Evangelical, and paraded commonly as the best style of Protestantism. They knew nothing of the view which

Protestant historians—we mean those who have really examined the still existing remains of ancient Christian literature—admit this, and it is to-day practically accepted as true by the whole Protestant public, who, without regard to sporadic attempts of Protestant ministers, here and there, to escape the monstrous conclusion to which it irresistibly leads, summarily and contemptuously set aside the testimony of Christian antiquity as of no account, and claim the right unqualifiedly of taking “the Bible as their guide,” that is, such parts of the Sacred Scriptures as they acknowledge to be inspired, and, so far as they really acknowledge their inspiration, constructing a “pure Christianity” from their own ideas.

Our point here is not the right or the wrong on the part of the “Reformers” in thus breaking loose from all Christian antiquity, and setting up a new rule of faith. What we are here concerned in is the *fact* that they *did* it.

If the Protestant rule of faith be the right and true one, then the Christian Church at once fell into apostasy and our Blessed Redeemer’s promise to His Apostles when He commissioned them to go forth and teach all nations was falsified the moment the Apostles proceeded upon their mission. For there is not the slightest sign in secular or ecclesiastical history that the Fathers of the Church in the ages even of Saints Ignatius, Polycarp, Irenæus, and Cyprian departed in any way from the instructions given them by the Apostles, and constructed a new and different rule of faith from that of the Apostles. They *could not* have done it without the knowledge of *other* Christians who had received *their* faith and learned *their* doctrine from the Apostles. The faith had been disseminated, and churches had been thickly planted by the immediate hands of the Apostles or of their collaborators, Saints Mark, Barnabas, Timothy, Titus and others, in Syria, Lesser Asia, Greece, Italy, and Egypt, before Saints Peter and Paul had received their crowns of martyrdom. And these churches and the countries in which they existed were in constant communication. Yet we must suppose, to make the hypothesis on which the so-called Reformation can alone be vindicated, that not in one but in all of these countries the faith was suddenly and quietly changed, corrupted; and that, too, not simply as regards particular doctrines but as regards the *rule of faith* itself; as regards the very standard and test by which truth was to be known and separated from error, without any protest or opposition on the part of the members of those churches, without indeed a word or sign that has come down in

makes the Bible and Private Judgment the principle of Christianity, or the only rule of faith. They took Christianity to be a supernatural system, propounded by the Saviour to His Apostles, and handed down from them as a living tradition (including the Bible) by the Church.” (Mercersburg Review, vol. iii., p. 487.)

history that they were aware that any change *had* been made. They went to sleep at night with "the Bible as their rule of faith," and woke up in the morning, finding without astonishment or surprise that that rule of faith had been discarded, and a new one based on "hierarchical pretensions,"—on the divine authority of the Church to teach—had been quietly foisted upon them.

It is incredible; it is false. It would be far easier to suppose that Calvinism in New England has largely given place to Unitarianism, and that, in turn, to the recent forms of Rationalism, without any sign or indication of the changes that have occurred; that there was no controversy, no conflict, no struggle between the outgoing and the incoming systems.

Thus, on every side we are shut up to the conclusion that the order of Christian thought and doctrine (as well as the doctrine itself), and the rule of faith for distinguishing and separating true doctrine from false, were the same in the post-Apostolic age as in that of the Apostles. And what the rule of faith laid down by the Apostles was, is clear to any one who will take up their Epistles and read them with a mind free from the mist and prejudices of Protestant tradition.

The Church is exhibited in those Epistles as a divine constitution, a veritable kingdom of heaven upon earth, in the world yet not of the world, endowed forever with heavenly powers, destined to withstand "the gates of hell," to endure through all time; commissioned and constituted to teach the everlasting Gospel of Christ; to exercise His authority, to dispense His grace; to be the House of God, the Church of the Living God, the Pillar and Ground of the Truth. As such a real, actual divine constitution the Church comes before us in the New Testament, with rules, laws, and officers to enforce them; all the members (officers included) not acting independently but bound together into one body, obedient to one law, submitting to one rule, having one faith, one doctrine; to separate from which body was schism, and to accept or profess another doctrine was heresy, to be guilty of which not only damned the souls of those who wilfully were guilty, but stamped them so unmistakably with the mark of Satan that they were to be avoided and shunned by faithful Christians. To set up a new doctrine on any pretence, or exercise private judgment against the doctrine of the Church, or refuse obedience to its authority, was at once to fall into condemnation. The test of true doctrine was the living tradition of the Church handed down by Christ to His Apostles and by the Apostles to their spiritual children. To *believe* was not merely to accept intellectually a doctrine, but to submit, to obey. "O senseless Galatians," exclaims St. Paul, "who hath bewitched you that you should not *obey* the truth?" To believe or teach any

different doctrine from that which *was* taught and had been "received" (though the teacher were even one of the Apostles or an angel from heaven) was to be "*anathema*" (Gal. 1 : 8, 9).

This is the constitution of the Church and the rule of faith that confront us in the days of the Apostles. And in the very nature of things it must have been so. The Apostolic Church *could* not have stultified herself (appointed as she was to be the pillar and ground of the truth), so far as to make certain records, as understood and expounded by individual judgment, of what it was her divine mission and work to teach, to be her guide and the rule of her faith and that of her members. She *could* not, we say, unless the Church and the Apostles with her had proved false to the COMMISSION received from the lips of our Divine Lord. Immediately connected with which, too, was a declaration of the plenitude of power HE possessed in heaven and on earth, and a declaration of His abiding presence in the Church throughout all time till "the consummation of the world." "Go, TEACH." "He that heareth *you*, heareth ME."

The so-called Reformation, therefore, was a breaking away from the existing order of things (and a rebellion against it), not only in the Church of the Middle Ages, in that of the times of Saints Augustine, Ambrose, Jerome, Chrysostom, the Gregories, Basil, and Athanasius; in the days of the Saints and Fathers before the Nicene Council and up to the Apostolic age; but in the very age of the Apostles. The conclusion, then, is irresistible that whatever else the so-called Reformation was, or was not with respect to other interests of society, as regards the Christian religion and the Church, as they actually existed in the world from the days of the Apostles down through all ages, it was not a reformation or improvement of what went before it, but a reconstruction, *de novo*,—an attempted re-creation of Christianity and of the Church by the so-called "Reformers" on the basis of *their* ideas of the meaning of the Sacred Scriptures, or of those Scriptures which the "Reformers" received. If the "Reformers" were right, then the Church, from their time up to Apostolic times and even in the Apostolic age was apostate; and the teacher, defender, pillar, and ground of error instead of truth. And then the promise and declaration of our Divine Lord failed almost at the moment of His uttering them. From this impious conclusion, according to the "rule" set up by the "Reformers," there is no escape.

How this conclusion, too, stultifies all history and common sense, we need not say. That a Church and a religion, as actually and authoritatively taught in and by that Church, and as enjoined upon its members and practised by them, became at its very outset so hopelessly in error, so corrupt and apostate, as to falsify the true

rule of faith, the test by which truth may be known and may be distinguished from error, should yet have destroyed the delusions, and exposed and refuted the falsehoods of ancient heathendom; should have raised human society immeasurably above all that it had ever been before; should have emancipated woman from her slavery to the lusts and passions of men, and taught to her and taught to men her dignity and her true relation to the family and to society; should have broken the bonds of slaves and freed captives from their cruel thralldom, teaching the universal brotherhood of men as resulting from the universal fatherhood of God, their Creator, and from the redemption purchased for them by the passion and death of His only Begotten Son; should have taught those who believed in this Church and its doctrine to practice honesty, humility, gentleness, purity and chastity; to crucify all selfishness; to habitually cultivate self-denial; and to live, and if necessary die, for others; to esteem charity above all things else; should have carefully and reverentially preserved and perpetuated the Sacred Scriptures (the very writings which Protestantism asserts are a witness against it); and when barbarian invasions, like successive waves of a destroying deluge, buried under the ruins they created all the classic writings of heathen antiquity, should have searched for, discovered, restored them, and lit anew the torch of intellectual knowledge even while the storms of constant wars were striving to extinguish it; should have taught the arts of peace to those rude and barbarous peoples; should have softened their savage cruelty, and eventually led them out of it; should have opposed a gentle, constant, yet firm and determined resistance to the stern tyranny of the feudal system; should have in like manner constantly stood as a mediator and intercessor between arbitrary kings and rulers, and rebellious peoples; teaching them their respective rights and duties, prescribing the proper bounds and limits to their respective claims; should have multiplied schools and established universities and promoted learning, civil order, liberty, and peace throughout all Europe; should have, in short, been a beacon whose rays of light shone through all the darkness of the Middle Ages, and guided all the nations with respect to every interest and concern of society; should have rendered the splendid services to human civilization which Protestant and infidel writers, as well as Catholic historians testify this Church has done;—to imagine that such a Church, so apostate, blinded, corrupt and tyrannical, would or could have done all this passes, we say, the bounds of common sense, and stultifies all history.

But we pursue this point further. We affirm (and the affirmation, to our mind, carries with it its own proof), that the so-called Reformation, in setting up "Private Judgment" as its "rule of

faith," its test of truth and error, the ultimate tribunal by which each was to be tried, acquitted or condemned, has introduced a rule that is essentially revolutionary and destructive; impracticable of application to any human interests, concerns or societies, secular or religious; and if it could be or were applied to them, would inevitably dissolve them into a collection of jarring, warring, independent, repellant atoms, incapable of being brought into even an approximate union. No savage tribe, however faint and weak may be the sense of union, authority, and law that rules it, allows or can allow the so-called right of private judgment. No voluntary association, not even a foot-ball, rowing, or base-ball club, allows the meaning and intention of its rules and by-laws to be interpreted by the "private judgment" of its individual members. Not even a band of robbers permits its rules to be so interpreted. And the higher you advance towards a more perfect society, the less the exercise of this so-called right is allowed with regard to society's authority and laws.

No government or people in the world, we repeat, barbarous, semi-civilized, or civilized, will allow "private judgment" to assert itself, either against its laws or in the interpretation of them. Private judgment, exercised in this illegitimate way and outside of its proper scope and limits, would not be tolerated for a moment. And rightfully so. What would the common law or the enactments of the legislature of any people amount to, if left, as regards the interpretation of their meaning and their application to the varying circumstances of men, to the private judgment of each individual? It is the unwritten, traditionary law, the "*common*" law, of every nation, which forms in greatest part its "*corpus juris*"; and the statute law finds its firmest support in the *common* or unwritten law. Both the statute and the common law, too, are vigorous and practically effective in proportion to their correspondence with, and their truthful expression of, the actual, living, traditional consciousness of the people for whom they are the law. No advocate or lawyer, in any tribunal of justice in any country on earth, civilized or uncivilized, could obtain even a moment's hearing who would undertake to set up his private judgment against the recorded decisions or the unwritten traditions of that tribunal. And the citizen who would attempt it would be regarded as an incorrigible, defiant rebel and outlaw, or else as an idiot or a madman.

It is needless to add, that were it possible to carry out the assumed right of private judgment—on which the "Reformers" planted themselves over against the Church—to its legitimate consequences, it would destroy every existing government, would dissolve human society, and, in fact, make it impossible for society

to exist. Mankind would be sundered into as many units as there are persons, each one entirely independent of all others, and an absolute law to himself.

And, so far as this assumed right of private judgment could be, and was, carried into practical effect, it did produce just such consequences. The "war of the peasants," and the outrageous violations of common decency and morality of various Protestant teachers and leaders, their "free-love" doctrines and practices, etc., were the logical outcome of this assumption. For if Luther and Zwingli, and others, had the right to interpret, and not only interpret but interpolate the Sacred Scriptures, to suit their private judgment, why had not Carlstadt and Munzer and their followers? And the almost constant conflicts of peoples with rulers, and factions with factions, as well as of nations with nations, which convulsed and desolated Europe immediately after the so-called "Reformation" became a power, and for generations afterwards were the legitimate consequences of the same false assumption.

We have been stating only actual self-evident facts with regard to the secular concerns of human society. And if what we have said is true with regard to them, how much more true must it not be with respect to the interests which are embraced in man's redemption from sin, his reconciliation with God, and the attainment of his eternal destiny?

For Christ came not to destroy but to fulfil. He has declared that not one jot or tittle of the divine law shall pass away till all be fulfilled. If, then, human law, so far as it *is* law, be "the perfection of human reason," and the reflection and expression of the divine law in its application of the principles of justice to the temporal affairs of men, it follows, of necessity, that in the constitution which Christ gave to His Church—through his Apostles, whom he personally instructed, and to whose remembrance the Holy Spirit brought all things He had commanded—He could not (nor could his Apostles and their successors in all ages) contradict in His "rule of faith,"—the test for distinguishing truth from error,—a universal principle by which the action of every society on earth is governed.

The so-called Reformation, therefore, in setting up its new "rule of faith," not only broke loose from the authority of the Church, and its perpetually-living traditions, but, in the exaltation of private judgment into the ultimate tribunal before which all questions between truth and error were to be decided, it placed the individual above all law, human and divine, except that which his own judgment would accept and approve.

II. We now turn directly to the question whether the so-called

Reformation produced any real reformation as respects morality by the influence its doctrines exerted.

The doctrine of "justification by faith alone," which precedes, in order of time, the express formulation by the "Reformers" of their assumed right of private judgment, was in reality a corollary of that assumption. As private judgment, if allowed, practically abolishes all law, human and divine, by denying that there is any authority to interpret and apply the law higher than the individual himself, it at once became necessary for Luther and the other "Reformers" (unless they squarely and openly denied all the truths of divine revelation) to find some other way than that which had always been taught by the Church for man's justification with God and his deliverance from Divine vengeance. This they professed to find in their doctrine of "justification by faith alone." According to this idea the sinner, filled with terror, and brought to the brink of despair, grasps at the merits of our Blessed Redeemer through faith which alone justifies him. Even in exercising this faith the individual has and acquires no merit himself. He is entirely passive, and the faith which he exercises is purely and entirely the gift of God. Nor does justification make him actually just "who is justified by faith." It is simply a forensic act of God, declaring him to be justified on account of Christ's merits, though not just in fact. Good works are the *necessary* fruits of faith; and as faith alone produces them, and as that is purely the gift of God, in the reception of which the individual (being totally depraved) exercises no volition and does nothing, good works confer no merits. With regard to sanctification, also, man is wholly passive, and the Holy Ghost entirely active. As the "Reformers" held that man, in consequence of the fall of Adam and Eve, having entirely lost the image of God, in which he was created, and having become totally corrupt and depraved, both in his intellect and his will, man was consequently incapable, till regenerated, of thinking, willing, or doing any good thing. All his actions, therefore, even those which were most strictly accordant with the precepts of the natural and divine law, were "evil and only evil, and that continually." "Conceived in sorrow and corruption, the child sins even in his mother's womb; when, as yet, a mere fœtus, an impure mass of matter, before it becomes a human creature, it commits iniquity and incurs damnation."¹ As he grows the innate element of corruption develops. Man has said to sin, "Thou art

¹ Lutum illud ex quo vasculum hoc fingi cœpit, damnabile est. Fœtus in utero ante quam nascimur et homines incipimus peccatum est. Luther on Psalm, 4.

Ex corrupta hominis nativa, nihil nisi damnabile. Calvin's Institutes, book 2, chapter 3.

my father," and every act he performs is an offence against God; and to the worms, "You are my brothers;" and he crawls like them in mire and corruption. He is a bad tree, and *cannot* produce good fruit; a dung-hill, and can only exhale foul odors. These were favorite figures of Luther.

Thus every action of an unregenerate man, however just, generous or noble, was displeasing to God, as performed by one whose nature was utterly perverse and corrupt. On the other hand, no action that was bad would bring the regenerate man under condemnation, because he was *justified* by faith; nor were his good actions, in even the slightest degree, meritorious, because they were done entirely through grace given him by the Holy Spirit.

It is self-evident that these ideas, held by all the leading Reformers, with unimportant variations, deprived human actions of all moral character and mankind of all moral responsibility. Protestants try to deny this and explain it away, but their denials and evasions are in defiance of all sound logic. Moreover, Luther accepted this conclusion. He several times speaks of having defied the devil and enraged him beyond measure, by sinning boldly when the devil taunted him with having disobeyed the law of God. So, too, Luther concisely expresses the same detestable doctrine in his well-known declaration: "Sin, and sin boldly, only believe more boldly, and you shall be saved."

It is easy to see how naturally, in order to give logical coherence to a system of religion based on the ideas just stated, Luther was led to deny the freedom of the human will. He asserted that it was totally enslaved, and possessed no self-determining power. His favorite illustration was that of a horse compelled to move in whatever direction the rider required. If God be seated in the saddle, he said, man *must* act as God wills; but if the devil be the rider, then man *must* do what the devil wills. Nor did Luther shrink from carrying out this doctrine to its logical consequence of making God the author of sin and unjustly condemning sinners. He declared that God damns some who do not deserve it;¹ that He damns some before they are born;² and that God excites us to sin, and produces sin in us.³

¹ Dass Gott etliche menschen verdammt, die es nicht verdient haben.

² Dass Gott etliche zur verdammnis verordnet habe, ehe sie geboren worden.

³ Dass Gott die menschen zur Sünde antreibe, und Laster in ihnen wercke.

So, too, in a letter to Melancthon from Wartburg Castle, dated August 1st, 1521, Luther writes: "Sin cannot destroy in us the reign of the Lamb, though we were to commit fornication and to kill a thousand times a day."

Again, in commenting on Genesis xix, 26, Luther says, that with regard to all things which pertain to the salvation of the soul, "man is like the statue of salt into which

Calvin's doctrine of Predestination was simply the logical capstone of Luther's impious declarations. According to Calvin, God by an unchangeable decree selected from all eternity certain persons to be saved, and certain persons to be damned. This selection was not based upon the foreseen belief, or any good disposition, or quality, or actions of those who were selected for salvation, nor on the foreseen unbelief, or bad disposition, or actions of those who were selected to be damned, but solely and entirely on the "good pleasure" of God. Those who are selected can never be cast away or lost; all others, whatever be their dispositions or their actions, are left by the eternal unchangeable decree of God in a state of "reprobation," and neither will be nor can be saved, whatever they may desire or do.¹

Luther and Calvin were not the originators of these impious doctrines. They simply revived and reproduced in somewhat new forms ancient Gnostic and Manichean errors. The idea of man being the merely passive subject of a contest between God and the devil is only a variation of the doctrine of Manes. It is the old Persian idea of two eternal principles of good and evil, contending continually for the possession of man. We may add, too, that Luther's doctrine of the "slave-will" (this is the title Luther himself gave it) is substantially that which is now put forth by modern materialists, who contend that the human will is as devoid of self-directing and self-determining power, as is a feather subject to the action of different currents of air.

This brings us to the question: Did the "Reformation" cause a reformation of morals? That the doctrines we have just mentioned are destructive of all moral responsibility, is obvious. That they did not produce in all who accepted them a total open abnegation of all obligations of religion, natural and revealed, is easily accounted for.

However far astray men may go in their intellectual aberrations

the wife of Lot was changed; to the trunk of a tree or a stone, like to a statue, lifeless, and having no use of either eyes, mouth, or other senses, or of a heart."

Melanchthon, like Luther, made God the author of all the evil and good that is done, of the adultery of David, the calling of St. Paul, the apostasy of Judas; and this not *permissively*, but actively and efficaciously.

¹ We are well aware that Luther and Calvin disagreed on many points, and even in their explanations of those we have brought forward. So, also, did others of the Reformers. Subsequently, too, an organized opposition to them was made by the "Remonstrants" or "Arminians." But we are not concerned here with the minor points of doctrine and side issues of the "Reformation." We are following down its main current. Luther and Calvin were the great coryphees of the "Reformation." All the other "Reformers" had subordinate parts. The Augsburg Confession, too, kept Luther's ideas in the background, though Luther signed it. Not, however, without quarrelling with Melanchthon, who drew it up. But the Augsburg Confession was an *Apology*; designedly framed for the purpose of conciliating the secular authorities of Germany by presenting Lutheranism in as inoffensive a form as was possible.

or their moral delinquencies, they still possess reason, conscience, and free-will. These exert a restraining power even over those who defy them and deny their existence. The image of God is so indelibly stamped upon humanity that men cannot, without becoming maniacs or demoniacs, totally abnegate reason and conscience.

Yet still, and notwithstanding this, the influence exerted by the doctrines of the Reformers immediately produced a great and widespread deterioration of morals, both public and private. Of this the writings of Luther's age and of that immediately following furnish incontestable proof. The correspondence, sermons, and other writings of the "Reformers," and those of the Humanists who, like Erasmus, sided decidedly neither with the Reformers nor with the Church, refer to this general deterioration of morals as a notorious fact. So, too, do Hume, Robertson, Macaulay, and Lecky, even while they, each in his own way, endeavor to disparage the Catholic religion.

Immediately on the "Reformation" movement acquiring volume and momentum crimes increased in number and enormity. Men quickly learned the lessons taught them both by the precepts and example of the Reformers. Setting up their own "private judgments" as their rule and guide, they scoffed at and defied authority, secular and spiritual. In the name of religion they perpetrated the foulest crimes.¹ A rigid Pharisaical severity on cer-

¹ In "marrying" Catherine Bora, Luther not only broke the solemn vows he had voluntarily taken, but had a child by her only a few weeks after his "marriage" with her. He was not only intolerably obscene, but in his sermon on marriage he excused and defended fornication and adultery on the ground that they were acts which all persons were irresistibly impelled to perform by an inherent necessity of human nature; and that it was impossible to find in any city youths of twenty years of age who had abstained from those acts.

He wrote to the Knights of the Teutonic Order, in 1532, as follows: "The precept of multiplying is older than that of continence enjoined by the councils; it dates from Adam. It would be better to live in concubinage than chastity. Chastity is an unpardonable sin, whereas concubinage, with God's assistance, would not involve the loss of my salvation."

In his "Table-talk" he says: "While a Catholic he passed his life in vigils, fasts, and prayers, in poverty, chastity and obedience; but that after he was "reformed" he became another man. "I burn," he says, "with a thousand flames in my unsubdued flesh . . . and I, who ought to be fervent in spirit, am fervent only in impurity."

Calvin was branded because of having committed a crime of such shameful character that it cannot be named.

Cranmer was a sycophant, a trimmer; he perjured himself four times as executor of the will of Henry VIII., and a number of other times on other occasions. He excused and defended perjury, provided the oath were taken with a secret mental reservation. He took a "wife" while still professing to be bound by his vow of celibacy.

John Knox was foul-mouthed and of flagitious life. He excused and defended murder and assassination, when necessary to accomplish what he regarded as a good purpose.

Zwingli was guilty of fornication, and says of himself: "I cannot conceal the fire

tain points was united with utter license as regards many of the plainest obligations of religion and morality. The statute-books of the several principalities of which Germany was then composed, of Belgium and the Netherlands, of France and Switzerland, and of England, the severe measures resorted to by the magistrates to repress general lawlessness, of which they complain in their official reports and declare themselves unable to check, furnish indisputable evidence, directly to the point. But it is needless to multiply proofs. We call Luther himself as witness and give his own declaration as to the effects produced upon morality and religion by the new gospel of the "Reformation."

"I would not be astonished," he says, "if God should open the gates and windows of hell, and snow or rain down devils, or rain down on our heads fire and brimstone, or bury us in a fiery abyss as he did Sodom and Gomorrha. Had Sodom and Gomorrha received the gifts that have been granted to us, had they seen our visions and received our instructions, they would yet be standing. They were a thousand times less culpable than Germany, for they had not received the word of God from their preachers. . . . If Germany will act thus, I am ashamed to be one of her children or speak her language; and if I were permitted to impose silence on my own conscience, I would call in the Pope and assist him and his minions to forge new chains for us. Formerly, when we were the slaves of Satan, when we profaned the name of God, . . . money could be procured for endowing churches, for raising seminaries, for maintaining superstition. Now that we know the divine word, that we have learned to honor the blood of our Martyr-God, no one wishes to give anything. The children are neglected, and no one teaches them to serve God."

"Since the downfall of popery, and the cessation of excommunications and spiritual penalties, the people have learned to despise the word of God. They care no longer for the churches; they have ceased to fear and honor God. . . . I would wish if it were possible to leave these men without preacher or pastor, and let them live like swine. There is no longer any fear or love of God among them. After throwing off the yoke of the Pope every one wishes to live as he pleases."

This surely is to the point, and testimonies from almost every writer of eminence who touches upon the state of society as re-

that burns me and drives me on to incontinence, since it is true that its effects have drawn upon me too many infamous reproaches among the churches."

Of Beza, Hesshuss writes: "Who will not be astonished at the incredible impudence of this monster, whose scandalous life is known throughout France."

(Ecolampadius, Luther declared, "the devil, whom Ecolampadius employed, strangled him during the night in his bed."

It is frequently urged in excuse of the virulence and coarseness and obscenity of the Reformers that they simply represented the spirit of the age. But this is untrue. They were shameful exceptions to, rather than representatives in this respect of, what the age was outside of themselves and their followers. It was in many respects an age of refinement rather than of coarseness.

Moreover, were the assertion true, it would form no excuse. Luther, Calvin, Cranmer, Knox, and their co-workers claimed to be "*reformers*," and should have set the example of reformation in themselves.

¹ So notorious was the debauchery of the followers of Luther that it became a common saying when persons proposed to engage in drunkenness and revelry: "We will spend the day like *Lutherans*."

gards religion and morals in every country where Protestantism had a foothold in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries might be adduced in confirmation of it.

But it is not necessary to go back to past ages of the so-called Reformation to decide whether it has produced a real reformation as regards morality. It is only necessary to look upon facts existing all around us to-day. Protestantism has existed now for three hundred years, and has had ample time to show what improvement it can effect or has effected as regards morality. Yet, notwithstanding all the efforts still made, here and there, to perpetuate the old traditional falsehood of the superiority of Protestantism over the Catholic religion in promoting morality, the most thoughtful and candid even of Protestants award the palm to Catholicity; and the general verdict of public opinion is fast confirming this decision. It is not necessary to refer to official statistics of crime and social immorality, which have been published and republished, analyzed, and exhaustively discussed, to prove that Protestant countries are not in advance of those where Catholicity predominates as respects morality.¹

It is acknowledged by almost all who have any real knowledge of the subject that in point of purity of morals Catholic Spain and the really Catholic part of the people of France and Italy are immeasurably above the people of Protestant Germany, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway; and that judged by every test applicable to morality,—female chastity, integrity, and sobriety—Catholic Ireland is far in advance of Protestant Scotland. The inhabitants of Tyrol—during past centuries and to-day the most staunch and exclusive Catholic population in Europe—beyond all denial, stand above the people of Protestant Switzerland with regard to morality. The lazzaroni of Naples, for years the standing gibe and jest of Protestant travellers, are immeasurably less debased as regards morality than persons on the same social plane in England. Coming nearer home—for every act of brigandage, murder, or robbery in Italy and Spain, there might be truthfully recounted ten in the United States.

This brings us still closer to our point. Compare the virtue and integrity here, in our country, and in England, of the persons who are under the respective influences of the Catholic religion and of Protestantism, and the general public voice ascribes superiority to the former. Where is the boasted morality of New England, the cradle and home of American Puritanism? How stand, as regards social morals or honesty, the descendants of the "Pilgrim

¹ We might refer here to Laing, Mayhew, Wolsey, Bayard Taylor, Dr. Bellows, the distinguished Unitarian minister of New York city, and many other non-Catholic writers, but it is needless.

Fathers?" And what are the moral consequences of their principles as they have permeated the public mind outside of persons who believe in and practice the Catholic religion? Witness the countless prosecutions for bigamy, for violation of the obligations of the marriage relation, for adultery and seduction; the applications for divorces, and the scandals, frauds, etc., which crowd the records of our courts and the reportorial columns of our newspapers.

It seems that God, in his justice, had determined summarily and at once to dispel the traditional delusion of the superiority of Protestantism over the Catholic religion in point of morals, and to refute once and forever the false charge, so long and persistently brought against the latter, by compelling people to open their eyes and look at the facts daily staring them in the face.

Thus we answer the question: Was the "Reformation" a reformation of morals?

III. Has the Reformation promoted intellectual progress?

It is commonly asserted that the Roman Catholic Church had held the human mind in thralldom from the time of Constantine on to the sixteenth century, and that the Reformation released it from its bondage, and gave a new impulse to intellectual progress. We deny this *in toto*. God alone is the absolute reason. Human reason, with all its high powers, is limited and dependent. When it attempts to soar beyond its proper sphere and divinely-appointed limits, it is shorn of its powers and falls helpless to the ground. It is no longer reason, but becomes *un-reason*. The Church, in the first ages of its existence, had to contend with those who attempted to exalt reason above faith and subject to the test of human understanding the incomprehensible mysteries of divine revelation. In this the Church simply followed the example of St. Paul, who, though profoundly philosophic in some of his Epistles, discards and denounces the "vain philosophy" which would put human thought and knowledge above faith. This principle the Church has always adhered to in her relation to human science.

But this, far from convicting the Church of tyrannizing over human thought, proves that the Church knows its just limits; that she both understands in what its true freedom consists, and respects and promotes it. Man is not free to believe error. This principle is accepted universally in the exact sciences. The man who would insist that he is at liberty to believe that two and three are seven, would be set down as a fool. Yet, strange to say, when the Church applies this same principle in the sphere of religion she is held up to scorn and detestation as tyrannical, and as striving to keep human reason in bondage. And then, again, with glaring incon-

sistency, the same persons who hurl these reproaches upon the Church, accuse her as having been too active, particularly in the last two centuries of the Middle Ages, in promoting the study of philosophy and of ancient classic literature.

As soon as, and even before, the Church emerged from the Catacombs, whenever the early Christians could obtain a momentary respite from persecution, they established schools for the promotion of secular science as well as of Christian doctrine. And ever onwards, in every age of the Church, the acts and decrees of her Councils, and the letters and briefs of her sovereign Pontiffs, testify to their constant, ardent zeal to diffuse knowledge and promote intellectual training and culture. When successive invasions of barbarians destroyed knowledge, education and civil institutions, it was the Church which, immediately upon the cessation of that flood of ignorance and barbarity, indeed even while it was inundating different regions of Europe, sought for and rescued and reproduced the most precious monuments of ancient learning and cultivation. It is owing to her zeal, using the monks of different orders chiefly, and particularly those of the Order of St. Benedict, that we have to-day any of the works of Virgil, Cicero, and other distinguished writers of heathen Rome. Wherever her priests and bishops could secure a foothold, and wherever her missionaries could penetrate, schools were established, which grew into academies, and many of them into universities. The work of educating the barbarians and diffusing knowledge among them went hand in hand with that of converting them from heathenism to Christianity. The immensity of this work and its difficulty may be judged by the slow progress and small success of the people of the United States in educating the colored people of the South and the Indians within their States and Territories. It was a work of far greater extent and far greater difficulty. Yet the Church succeeded, and throughout all Christianized Europe schools were rapidly multiplied; schools, too, not chiefly for the children of kings and nobles, but specially for the children of the common people,—the poor. The sons and daughters of kings and dukes and counts sat on the same benches and side by side with the children of peasants and serfs.

This educational work of the Church culminated in the fourteenth century, and still more in the fifteenth, in covering Europe with universities, and carrying educational training and literary culture to a height never since surpassed, and it is questionable whether it has even now been reached. The universities of that period were certainly superior as regards extent of mental training to any that now exist. Their number was greater, and the numbers of students attending them have never since been equalled. Going back even to the thirteenth century, we search

in vain among the learned of our own time for scholars of equal encyclopædic knowledge to that of Albertus Magnus, taking into consideration the respective facilities for acquiring knowledge in his age and ours; and for minds as acute and profound as those of St. Thomas Aquinas and the galaxy of brilliant thinkers who surrounded him, or were his immediate predecessors or successors. And never before or since has there been such a multitude of thoroughly-learned and cultivated scholars as those who, particularly in Italy, were the intellectual glory of the age immediately preceding the so-called Reformation.

The "Reformers" themselves owed all the learning and intellectual training they possessed to the educational facilities provided by the Church. Their immediate successors and those who in the course of time succeeded them, were far inferior in extent of knowledge and mental development. The so-called Augustan age of France and England owed whatever literary excellence and culture it possessed to the impulses previously given by the Church.

The promoters of the "Reformation" could plunder universities or destroy them, as they did at the instigation of Luther and other "Reformers," but they could not restore them, or establish new ones. Those which they did not utterly demolish, they maimed and crippled. They tore into pieces and scattered to the winds, or burned, or sold to bakers as fuel for their ovens, their libraries, containing priceless treasures of learning and materials for authentic history, which are irrecoverable. They appropriated to their own use and squandered the revenues of those universities, ejected their professors, and then found themselves unable to find other teachers of competent ability and knowledge to replace them. The students, too, were greatly inferior in numbers, in application to their studies, and in morality, to their Catholic predecessors. The "Reformation" pulled down, destroyed, or plundered the educational institutions of its time, but was unable to rebuild and restore them, and infuse into them their former intellectual vigor and life. The writers of that age and of the one immediately following constantly refer to the decay of learning and of interest in education.

Of England like remarks are true. It is only necessary to turn over the pages of Hume, Macaulay, Hallam, and Disraeli, for more than sufficient proofs of the decay of learning and the ignorance of the Protestant clergy in England, long after the so-called "Reformation." The libraries of the monasteries, containing priceless treasures and invaluable materials for history, were scattered to the winds, or sold for fuel to bakers. The splendid library of Oxford subsequently met with a like fate. The Universities of Oxford and Cambridge were not destroyed. They still survive. Of them,

as of the present universities of Germany, it may be truthfully said that they send forth some respectable scholars, and a few who are erudite, but the majority of their students go to them for any other purpose than to *study*. In those of Germany, drinking, smoking, duelling, profligacy and secret associations are the order of the day. At Oxford and Cambridge, the greater number of their "students" go there simply for the name and prestige which attendance upon those ancient seats of learning confers.

Catholicity and Protestantism have now confronted each other for nearly four hundred years. They have had ample time to show to the world what their respective influence is upon the intellect of those who severally adhere to them. We sum up with the utmost possible brevity the results of a comparison. Take, first, the lowest classes, the common laboring people of Catholic and Protestant countries.

No intelligent and unprejudiced traveller (nor many even of those who are prejudiced against the Catholic religion) will deny that the peasantry of France, of Ireland, and of Spain, are not only the equals, but the superiors, of the same class in Protestant Germany, England, and Denmark, in intellectual brightness, dignity, and respectful manners. And the same remark holds good as to the higher grades of society. In the city of Rome, previous to the Italian Revolution, according to Laing, a Scotch Presbyterian (who travelled over all Europe, investigating the social, moral and intellectual condition of its different countries), and of the late N. P. Willis, a non-Catholic, there were a greater number of schools for the common people, in proportion to population, than in any other city in Europe. And it is a notorious fact that the institutions for higher learning were incomparably superior as regards the extent and thoroughness of their courses of study, to any existing elsewhere throughout the world.

As regards our own country, Protestants, in virtue of their numbers, have had almost exclusive control, and Catholics till recently formed but an insignificant part of the population; mostly poor, and burdened, too, with taxation to support schools, in which the tuition and reigning spirit are directly hostile to their religion. Yet, no one will say that, despite these disadvantages, Catholics are inferior to Protestants in intelligence or in zeal to promote education. And to-day they are not only abreast of Protestants in these respects, but bid fair soon to be in advance of them.

Thus, as judged either by the past or by the present, by its immediate action at the outset or by its subsequent results, the so-called Reformation produced no advance in mental development, training, or education. It retarded them, and society is only now recovering from the effects of retardation.

IV. Did the Reformation advance society as respects civil liberty?

It is claimed that this so-called right of private judgment promoted the progress of civil liberty. It did just the opposite. It promoted a license of opinion and action that was unbearable, because of the excesses, moral and political, which it quickly produced. Consequently, the "Reformers," who first declared that private judgment was an inalienable right, quickly began to limit its exercise to themselves. They allowed it to none others. They denounced with utmost bitterness, and in words which Protestant historians are ashamed to quote, all who presumed to dispute their doctrines. They split into opposing factions, the leader of each faction ruling his followers as with a rod of iron and anathematizing all other Protestants as (along with "papists") children of the devil. Surely, this was a strange though true exhibition of how private judgment promotes true freedom, civil and religious.

No despotism is so arbitrary, so unreasoning, so limitless, as the despotism of anarchy, and to that private judgment, if carried out to its last consequences, inevitably leads. But men are not maniacs, nor yet are they devils (though the Protestant doctrine of total depravity represents them as such, or akin to them). Consequently even the Reformers practically confined the so-called right of private judgment each one to himself and his followers. Soon, too, they virtually surrendered it to the secular princes who protected them. Refusing to submit to the spiritual authority of the Church, they quickly placed their belief at the disposal of the secular authorities whose favor they had secured. *Cujus regio, ejus religio*, became their ruling maxim. Dukedoms and kingdoms became "Lutheran," or "Sacramentarian," or "Calvinistic," or adopted some other phase of Protestantism, according to the dictate of the prince or duke or king who ruled them. This is simply an historical fact. It is also undeniable that, with few exceptions, the almost countless Protestant "confessions" and declarations of belief of the sixteenth century were submitted to the approval of secular rulers and enforced by them. This is the fact as regards the Augsburg Confession, which is the fundamental declaration of belief of the Lutherans; the Heidelberg Catechism, the most generally accepted formula of belief of the "Sacramentarians," or followers of Zwingli and Calvin, or, as they style themselves, the "*Reformed*" churches of France, Switzerland, Germany, and Holland; and it is notoriously true with regard to the "Thirty-nine Articles" of the "Established Church of England."

Where the Reformers dared attempt it, as in Switzerland, they fused the secular and spiritual authority together, and established

a theocracy. Where they dared not attempt this, they placed themselves sycophantly at the feet of secular rulers as in England and Germany.

The lesson of the Reformers was quickly learned by those of the temporal rulers who professedly remained Catholic. They were Catholic in their expressed belief in Catholic doctrines, but anything else than Catholic in their political policy, and their utter lack of that obedience which real faith includes and requires. Francis I. of France, Charles V. of Spain, Germany, and the Netherlands, Philip II., his son and successor in the two last-named countries, were Catholics in belief. In their actions as regards both Church and State they were not Catholics but Protestants. If they protected the Catholic religion to some extent, and sometimes persecuted Protestants (as Philip II. did most cruelly in the Netherlands), they did it professedly in the name of religion, but in reality as a part of their political policy. The Duke of Alva, satrap of Philip II. in the Netherlands, put to death Catholics as well as Protestants who refused to tamely submit to his iron rule. All three of them were ambitious secular rulers, whose hearts were set on self-aggrandizement and the extension of their royal prerogatives.

Following the example of the "Reformers," they set up *their own* private judgments as the supreme tribunal for the determination of all matters, ecclesiastical or political, within their respective domains. The two first-named alternately resisted the Sovereign Pontiffs of the Church or sided with them, as considerations of expediency for the time being seemed to indicate would be politic. Each of them wished the "Reformation" to acquire a certain degree of power (though not to become predominant) as a check upon the exercise of authority by the Sovereign Pontiff of the Church. They subsidized and made alliances with Protestant princes and rulers, and instituted a policy which, as systematized and further carried out by their successors, culminated in the almost entire demolition of the institutions of constitutional government and of the safeguards of civil liberty in all Protestant countries and in most of the Catholic countries of Europe during the seventeenth century, and far on into the eighteenth.

Referring to this, Guizot says: "The *emancipation* (!) of the human mind (by the 'Reformation') and absolute monarchy triumphed simultaneously in Europe." His statement is the simple truth.¹ During the one hundred and fifty years that followed the so-called Reformation, Europe went back as regards civil liberty almost to the absolutism of Cæsar Augustus and his successors.

¹ That is, the *fact* stated is true, reserving the word "emancipation."

The ancient liberties of the people were crushed, and temporal rulers were virtual despots. Passing over England with its tyrannical sovereigns, its alternately sycophantic and rebellious Parliaments, its revolutions and restorations, it is only necessary to cite Protestant Germany, Denmark, and Sweden. Nor does the fact that the statement applies also to France and Spain weaken in the least the force of our argument. Their peoples were Catholic; in Spain exclusively so, in France by a vast majority. Their rulers were professedly Catholic. But, to be truly Catholic, according to the doctrine of the Catholic Church, requires obedience to truth as well as belief in it, both as to faith and good works. The kings of France and Spain were behind no other temporal sovereigns in extending their royal prerogatives and breaking down all the ancient guarantees of constitutional liberty in their respective dominions, despite the remonstrances and protests of successive Sovereign Pontiffs of the Church.

In all this the kings of France and Spain acted not as Catholics but according to their own imperial "private judgment," defying alike the authority of constitutional civil law and that of the Sovereign Pontiff of the Church. The famous *dictum* of Louis XIV. of France, "*I am the State*," was carried out by him to a despotic extent with regard also to ecclesiastical affairs. He might consistently have added, as expressing his own idea: "*I am the Church*." Since the "Reformation" up to to-day, the peoples of France and Spain have never possessed the civil freedom and constitutional rights which they enjoyed before that revolt against authority, human and divine.

A like remark holds good emphatically of Prussia: Albert of Brandenburg, who laid the foundation for the present kingdom of Prussia by sacrilegious plundering and invasions, was called by his contemporaries "the Attila of the Reformation." He was an apostate, treacherous and unprincipled. He appropriated to his own use the vast property of the Knights of the Teutonic Order.¹ He established a despotism, and his despotic rule has descended as a part of his patrimony to his successors on the throne of Prussia. In no country in Europe has despotism been so thoroughly systematized as to Church and State as in Prussia. No more perfect tyrant ever sat on a throne than Frederick "the Great;" the rule both of his predecessors and of his successors has been of like character.

Thus, from the very outset of the Réformation onwards, that movement has not promoted civil liberty, but has retarded its

¹ It was to encourage Albert of Brandenburg and other Teutonic Knights to violate their religious vows, that Luther wrote that by the mercy of God he could expect to be saved if he practiced concubinage, but never if he adhered to his vow of celibacy.

progress. It taught no true principle respecting human rights and civil institutions that was not previously known and taught by the Catholic Church, her doctors and theologians, long ages ago. It introduced principles of disorder and confusion, which inevitably led to anarchy on the one hand and tyranny on the other.

Every guarantee of personal rights, every institution that protects and defends personal freedom, every element that enters into constitutional government, republican government, were known and in full practice long before the sixteenth century,—trial by jury, the election of officers and rulers, the restraint of their powers within just limits, the confederation and union of sovereign States for a common purpose. The Church has always fostered and promoted them, and always will do so. Modern constitutional governments are not built upon any basis of principles and institutions discovered or brought into exercise by the so-called Reformation, but on one which preceded that movement. All through Europe, and particularly in Italy, there had been for centuries free cities and republics, in one or another of which every essential principle of constitutional government was recognized. And it is an historical fact, too, that the peoples of most of these Italian republics lost in great degree their ancient liberties, and fell under the domination of ruling families, only *after* the spirit of revolt against legitimate authority in Church and State, which Luther subsequently formulated, had sapped in Italy, as elsewhere, the true foundation of all government. Centuries before the so-called Reformation, St. Thomas Aquinas wrote as follows :

"The law, strictly speaking, is directed primarily and chiefly to the common good ; and to decree anything for the common benefit *belongs either to the whole body of the people or to some one acting in their place.*"

Then, as to the best form of government, he wrote :

"The choice of rulers in any state or kingdom is best when one *is chosen for his merit* to preside over all, and under him are other rulers *chosen for their merit*, and the government *belongs to all*, because the rulers *may be chosen from any class of society*, and the *choice is made by all.*"

Nor were these statements made by St. Thomas as new ; they were made as explaining and maintaining principles always held and taught by the Church. And, after the Reformation had paved the way for, and actively promoted, ideas destructive of constitutional liberty,—and which, in England, culminated among the Episcopalians in the doctrine of "passive obedience" to kings, and the declaration of James to Parliament that "God had appointed him absolutely master, and that all privileges which co-legislative bodies enjoyed were pure concessions from the bounty of kings"—the

Catholic theologian, Suarez, wrote a treatise, entitled "A Defence of the Catholic and Apostolic Faith against the Errors of the Anglicans." In this treatise Suarez declares that society has received political and civil power immediately from God, and communicates it to certain persons whom it selects. He then says:

"In the second place, it follows from what has been said that the civil power, whenever it is found in a man or a prince, has emanated according to usual and legitimate law from the *people and the community*, either directly or remotely; *otherwise, it cannot be justly possessed.*"

And in this Suarez repeats and defends what Cardinal Belarmine had previously written, declaring—

"Political power emanates from God alone; for, being necessarily annexed to man's nature, it proceeds from Him who has made that nature. *It resides primarily in the body of the people.* The divine will has not given it to any man in particular: The people *transfer it*, to one person or more, *by natural right.* Particular forms of government, accordingly, are by the law of nations, and *not by divine law*, since it depends on the consent of the multitude to place over themselves a king, consuls, or other magistrates, as may seem best; and, for a legitimate reason, they can change royalty into aristocracy or democracy, or *vice versa.*"

St. Alphonsus Liguori, in his *Moral Theology*, in speaking of laws says:

"It is certain that the power of making laws exists among men, but so far as civil laws are concerned, this power belongs naturally to no individual. It belongs to the community, who transfer it to one or more, that by them the community itself may be governed."

Billuart, in his *Moral Theology*, says:

"I maintain in the first place that legislative power belongs to the community or its representative. . . . It is the duty of the community, or its ruler, to watch over the common good. . . . The law has the power of commanding and coercing in such manner that no individual has any authority to command or restrain the multitude. This authority belongs exclusively to the community or its representative; to these, therefore, legislative power belongs. . . . The community may be considered collectively as one moral body, and in this sense it is superior to itself as considered distributively in each of its members. Again, it may be considered as acting in the place of God, from whom emanates all legislative power, as it is said in Proverbs, 'By Me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things.'"

Lastly, Concina, in his *Dogmatic and Moral Theology*, says:

"God does not confer this (civil) power by any *special act distinct from creation*, but it is a *property of right reason*, inasmuch as *right reason dictates that men, united in one moral whole, shall prescribe, by express or tacit consent, in what manner society shall be governed, preserved, and upheld.* . . . It is evident, therefore, that the power existing in the prince, the king, or in many persons, whether nobles or plebeians, *emanates from the community itself*, directly or indirectly."

Compare these luminous and consistent expositions of the true basis of civil power by Catholic theologians, before and after

the Reformation, with the confused, contradictory declarations (sometimes anarchical, and sometimes direct apologies for tyranny and despotism) of the "Reformers" and their followers, and the conclusion is unavoidable that the Reformation did not promote higher or truer ideas of civil liberty than those which the Catholic Church has always taught.

We have thus gone over all the points in respect to which the movement in the sixteenth century is claimed to have been a "reformation." It is obvious, we think, that it reformed nothing; that it was not a "reformation," in any true sense whatever. It was a rebellion, not only against the then existing order of things in Church and in State, but also against all the principles that form the basis of civil government and civil liberty, as well as against the *one* divinely-founded and divinely-constituted and commissioned Church of Christ.

It was a revolt against all legitimate authority, ecclesiastical and civil. It started with an attempt to place the individual above society, as well as above the Church; to make *his* private judgment superior to the collective reason of men in society, as well as to the authoritative teaching of the Church,—the sole infallible interpreter of Divine Revelation. In its successive variations and divergencies it was productive, first, of general confusion, fanaticism, and anarchy, and then, of tyranny and despotism; taking sometimes, according to circumstances, the despotism of fanatics, who imagined that they only were the saints and elect of God, and that they only had the right to rule in Church and State, and, at other times, lodging unlimited power in temporal rulers, princes, and kings.

V. We have said little or nothing respecting abuses in the Church, the reformation of which was the ostensible object of the movement miscalled "The Reformation." It seemed scarcely pertinent to our subject to do so. Whatever abuses did or did not exist in the Church, whether as to its head or its members, the "Reformation" did nothing to abate or cure them. It had nothing in fact to do with them, except to employ them as a plausible pretext and excuse for its revolt against authority.

Whatever reform the "Reformers" undertook or professed to carry out, it obviously was not a reformation of abuses in the Church. They went out from it, broke loose from it, denounced it as "the synagogue of Satan." According to them it was apostate, utterly corrupt, Antichrist, and the only duty they and their followers acknowledged with regard to it, was to fight against it to the death and utterly destroy it.

Thus, the so-called Reformation, as soon as it took shape or shapes, and moved in its various divergent directions, was outside

of the Church, independent of it, and had "no part or lot" in any reformation instituted and carried out by the Church. Yet still it may be proper to say a few words on this subject of abuses.

That grievous abuses, causing great scandals, existed, is acknowledged. It was not only universally acknowledged at the time of Luther's outburst, but had been acknowledged long before. The abuses had been pointed out, lamented over, condemned, denounced, and attempted to be reformed by numerous Popes, Prelates, Saints, and Doctors of the Church. Their efforts were thwarted and rendered ineffective, except in the way of making partial reforms, by the opposition and jealousies of the different temporal rulers of Europe. But to this we shall refer again.

Abuses and scandals have always existed in the Church as regards its members, hierarchy, and, sometimes, as regards its head. They existed in the time of the Apostles, as their Epistles plainly show. They existed immediately after the Apostles were called to rest from their labors, as the writings of the earliest post-Apostolic ages prove. They continued to exist in every subsequent age. They always will exist. Our Saviour plainly warned His Apostles of this. "Scandals," he says, "must needs come," though woe to those by whom they come.

The "need" of scandals coming arises not from the divine will, nor from any lack of divine grace, extended to all who seek it and employ its help. To suppose the contrary would be horrible impiety.

The "need" arises from the constitution of human nature. God has endowed our nature with free-will, a gift inexpressibly precious, yet inexpressibly terrible in view of the awful responsibilities that gift includes. Man, in the exercise of his free-will, may do good or do evil; may engage in the service of God or the service of the devil. Of this gift, which makes man only "a little lower than the angels," God will not deprive man. To do so would be to make him the gift of reason He has bestowed on man only a mockery. It would be to give him reason, yet to deprive him of the power of rightly directing and employing his reason. It would make a mere automaton, destitute of self-volition and self-control, and degrade him to the level of a brute or below it.

Consequently, men have not only the option and choice of entering into the Church,—the true Ark of Salvation,—but, after they have entered, the free option of availing themselves of its spiritual blessings and rightly employing the divine grace which the Church dispenses, or of neglecting it, misemploying, abusing it, and thus incurring deeper guilt than those who remain outside of the Church. This truth holds good as to all who are in the

Church, without regard to station or order, to the laity, the priesthood, the episcopate, and the Pope, the Visible Head of the Church and Primate of its priests and bishops. And the higher and more exalted the office, the greater the responsibility, and the greater the need of care, and vigilance, and prayer, and of correspondence with the special grace attached respectively to the offices of Priest, Bishop, and Sovereign Pontiff of the Church. Hence, Priest, Prelate, and Pope, if they fail rightly and diligently to employ the special grace connected with their sacred offices, may fall, will fall into sin, and create scandals, as readily as—more readily than—even the lowest layman, and will incur immeasurably greater guilt. For, "to whom much is given, from him shall much be required."

God has given immunity from sin—impeccability—to no human being, in the Church or out of the Church, no matter what position, dignity, or office he holds. The sole special safeguard and privilege Christ provides for the perpetuity of His Church, and its indefectibility, is its incapability of believing and teaching error, its constant, unchanging belief in, and teaching of (without corruption), the truth He gave to it and commissioned it to teach. And the sole privilege He granted to Peter and his successors in the Primacy is, that in their *ex cathedra*—official—promulgations and definitions of doctrines respecting faith and morals to the Universal Church, they should be preserved from error.

The fact, therefore, of abuses and scandals in the Church, whether on the part of the laity, the priesthood, the episcopate, or the Primacy, is no proof or argument against the divine institution of the Church, or its divinely-established constitution and mission. Abuses and scandals arise, and will ever arise, from the abuse of that freedom of the will with which God has endowed us. Yet, the Church, in the fulfilment of her divine mission, strives and ever will strive to correct and reform those abuses.

But while this general primal cause of abuses was especially active during the one or two hundred years immediately preceding the "Reformation," owing to the increase of knowledge, the thorough intellectual training, and the intense intellectual activity which the Church promoted, but which learned scholars, in the pride to which the human heart is prone, abused and perverted, there were other causes subordinate to this.

Among these, the chief one, and of long standing, was the constant interference of the secular powers of Europe with the freedom of the Church, and their constant restriction of her legitimately-divine power and liberty. The Church ever strives to promote peace. She recognizes, respects, and upholds the rights and authority of temporal rulers within their proper sphere. She endeavors to work in harmony with them for the welfare of mankind.

Hence, to a certain extent, she is willing to consult their preferences and wishes in the appointment of bishops, and in the administration of the temporal affairs which necessarily belong to the practical carrying out of her divine mission.

But the secular governments of Europe, from the time of Constantine onwards, and particularly during the Middle Ages, and specially those of Germany, France, and England, taking advantage of these concessions by the Church, claimed as *rights* what the Church allowed only for the sake of peace and harmony. Moved by that ambition which is inherent in the human heart, by a desire to extend their prerogatives and power, and by cupidity, they constantly claimed the right of supervising and guarding (as robbers guard their plunder) the revenues of the Church's charitable and religious foundations, and of selecting and nominating, and even investing with the symbols of their sacred offices, the abbots, and bishops, and archbishops, within their respective dominions. The Church resisted this preposterous assumption to the full extent of her power. How many conflicts she engaged in, successfully or unsuccessfully, on this account, history records, but want of space will not permit us even to advert to them. But, opposed and tyrannized over by counts, dukes, kings, and emperors, who, though they professed her faith, were anything but obedient to it, she reluctantly submitted to what she could not successfully oppose for the sake of peace and lest in rooting up the cockle the wheat also should be rooted up. The secular rulers of Europe compelled the Church to acquiesce in the appointment to abbacies, bishoprics, and archbishoprics, of men who were their choice.

In many cases, and yet fewer than might be supposed, these were from the start unfit for, and unworthy of the high offices to which they were appointed. They became mere courtiers and dependents upon the rulers who exercised so potential a voice in their selection. They became worldly-minded, and neglected to employ the grace connected with their exalted offices. They failed to devote themselves to the faithful discharge of their sacred duties. They set a bad example to their clergy, and to the laity under them, permitted discipline to become relaxed, and thus created scandals themselves, or allowed them to be created by others and to grow unchecked.

This was the chief, special cause of the abuses which undoubtedly existed in the Church at the time of the so-called Reformation, and previous to it. Those abuses were protested against, condemned, and denounced repeatedly by the Sovereign Pontiffs of the Church, her Saints, and Doctors. Yet the Church, how unjustly we need not say, was held responsible for them.

Yet, at last, the Council of Trent was convened after almost interminable delays and postponements owing to the jealousies and hostilities of different temporal rulers of European countries, and the intrigues and opposition of the Reformers and their adherents, and a thorough reformation of abuses was achieved. In this real reformation, the supporters of the so-called Reformation did not participate. They opposed it, and endeavored to prevent it by all means in their power. Into the details of the reformation effected by the Council of Trent we cannot enter. Suffice it to say, it swept away a countless number of abuses caused by laxity of discipline, growing directly out of the unrighteous assumptions of authority by the temporal rulers of Europe. It provided for the thorough education and training of the clergy, for the instruction of the laity in Christian doctrine. It set forth more explicitly the functions and duties of bishops. It expounded and defined with greater precision and clearness the doctrines which errorists and heretics had confused, obscured, and perverted. In this work, as we have said, the Reformers and their followers did not participate, and from it they utterly held aloof. They conspired against it, and endeavored to prevent it.

The so-called Reformation was a rebellion against the existing Church, an effort to destroy it, a revolution. Yet as a revolution it failed, signally failed in its immediate, direct object; and in thus failing it has failed also in obtaining that false criterion by which revolutions are now popularly justified—success. The Catholic Church of to-day is the unquestioned continuance of the existing Church of all previous ages. And the Catholic Church of to-day has sustained not only without destruction, but without diminution of her strength, all the assaults that have been made upon her. As soon as, and even before, the various heretical schisms which conglomerated constitute the so-called Reformation, the Church, in the plenitude of her divinely-given authority and powers, renewed her strength, and erected defences against newly disseminated errors, by promulgating additional definitions of her faith and doctrine. She reformed abuses, introduced stricter discipline, infused increased zeal and devotion into her children, and sent her missionaries, glorious examples of heroic self-abnegation, virtue, and purity, and of spiritual power, into all regions of the world. She lost thousands from her communion of those whose faith had been weakened and corrupted; but she more than made up for the loss by the greater number of converts she gained in India, Japan, the islands of the Southern Seas, and in America. And to-day, though her Sovereign Pontiff is a prisoner in the Vatican (a voluntary prisoner, the world sneeringly styles him), because he refuses to become the subject of any temporal power, she stands

visibly more compact in her organization, more uniform and strict in her discipline, more conspicuous in the salutary influences she is exerting upon society, than in any previous age. Her unchanged and unchangeable faith more clearly and fully defined, and universally respected, even by those who fear and hate her. Though Protestants and infidels—with the rise of every little petty schism, like those of Rongeism, thirty years ago, in Germany; and Old Catholicism, ten years back; and with every movement to persecute and plunder her, like those of Bismarck in Germany, and the Garibaldians in Italy—have constantly predicted her downfall, yet their predictions are scarcely made ere the signs of their certain falsification begin to show themselves.

To-day the Czar of Russia longs to make peace with the Holy Roman See, and wavers between his desire to secure its support by freeing the Catholic Church in his dominions from persecution, and his reluctance to surrender the traditionary assumption that is attached to his office as supreme ruler of religion in Russia. The clergy and bishops of the schismatic body styled the Holy Orthodox Church of Russia, of which he is the official head, he despises, as well he may, for they are his sycophantic tools and slaves.

Bismarck, with all his arrogance, has humbled his pride, and tacitly acknowledged that though arbiter of all secular Europe, yet his astute diplomacy and his stubborn persistence, backed by the entire power of the German imperial government, have not been able to destroy the faith of German Catholics, nor tear them from their unity with the Holy Roman See.

In France, the infidels, who have seized the reins of secular power, partly through the remissness of its Catholics, and partly because the Catholic faith strives for peace and quietness, exercises patience when wronged, and fights persecution chiefly with spiritual weapons, have gone on from one wicked step to another. They have suppressed religious orders, driven their members into exile, expelled Sisters of Mercy and Charity from hospitals, closed Christian schools and convents, banished the very name of God from their public schools; and yet to-day the Catholic religion has a stronger hold on France than when the so-called Reformation divided its people into two antagonistic, warring factions. And to-day President Grévy dreads coming to an open breach with the Sovereign Pontiff of the Church more than with any secular European power.

In England, the Crown, or its Cabinet which really exercises the executive and administrative powers of government, pays no regard, or merely a contemptuous show of respect to the bishops and archbishops of the "Established Church." (Why should it? they are but its own creatures.) But it would gladly enter, if it

could, into diplomatic relations with the Holy Roman See, and secure its assistance and co-operation in settling questions with which the English Government feels itself unable to cope.

In Italy the Sovereign Pontiff of the Church has more real power (though despoiled and confined to the Vatican) than the usurpation which forms to-day the secular government of Italy. That government, though it has three hundred thousand soldiers to back it, fears and dreads the Church's Visible Head, even more than Nero or Domitian feared the then Sovereign Pontiff of the Church, hidden in the catacombs.

In the United States, so far as religion is at all really respected it is the Catholic religion. *It* is acknowledged to possess a definite faith which those who profess it really hold. Its power is confessed, and it exerts more real influence upon the general public than all the Protestant sects combined, so far as they can combine. It is felt to be the only bulwark against the progress of ideas which threaten to overturn social and civil order, and to be the only consistent representative of Christian morality.

All over the civilized world and even in the regions dominated by Mohammedanism and heathenism the Catholic Church exercises a power and an influence beyond all comparison greater than any that Protestantism can exert. The number of her faithful children has gone on increasing since the day when Luther's hammer on the Church-door in Wittenberg sounded the signal for rebellion against spiritual and civil authority in Europe, and to-day they far outnumber the collective aggregate of all the adherents of Protestant sects. The Encyclicals of her Sovereign Pontiff are read, and studied, and commented on as documents of supreme importance, securing a consideration which is accorded to no state-papers of secular governments, and (we need scarcely add) to no declarations of Protestant Bishops, Archbishops, Conventions or Synods.

As for Protestantism, its power has waned. Except in America, it is mostly a part merely of the state-machinery of the different countries in which it exists. Its various creeds are obsolete, effete, and not even the members of the sects which are supposed to hold them pay the slightest attention to their declarations; and indeed, in greater part, are profoundly ignorant of what their declarations are. Protestantism, in brief, has gone on disintegrating and dissolving until no one knows or can tell precisely what it is. Only one uniform constant movement can be distinguished amid its constant, whirling eddyings, and the direction of that movement plainly is towards rationalism. The dividing line between Protestantism and outspoken rationalism is invisible. There is none.

Thus, whether regarded as a revolution striving to destroy the

Church, or a reformation aiming to amend and improve it, the movement of the sixteenth century is a failure. It is plainly rapidly reaching its logical conclusion,—individualism. It is equally plain to every thoughtful, discriminating mind that if the religion of Christ be the power by which men are to be brought into subjection to a law higher than that of mere self-will and individual opinion, it is through Christianity, not as Protestantism presents it, but through that of which the Catholic Church has been, according to the testimony of history, both secular and sacred, the witness, the teacher, the guardian and preserver, from the days of the Apostles till now.

THE SPIRITUALITY OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH.

ONE of the most common objections to the Catholic religion is that it tends to formalism; that, in fact, the whole system of worship and morals of the Church is a thoroughly perfunctory system, destitute of the life and power of godliness, and totally inadequate to the great purposes of "vital" religion. Indeed, so firmly has this "first principle of the Protestant tradition," as Cardinal Newman calls it, become fixed in the minds of our separated brethren, that, when they meet with a truly devout and earnest Catholic, they will unhesitatingly tell you that he is what he is in spite of his religion, and that he ought to be a Protestant; and when they discover a superior book of Catholic devotion or of practical religion, they will unblushingly use it as if it belonged by good rights to them, and claim it as a good Protestant book, which has undoubtedly been written by some one who was entirely out of place in the Catholic Church, and ought to be numbered in the ranks of her opponents. Indeed, the coolness with which some Protestant writers and publishers, more especially in England, are of late appropriating the lives of our saints and doctors, and holy men and women, is really refreshing. We admit that it is a cheering indication of the revulsion of religious thought and feeling that is going on in the minds of the non-Catholic community, that almost unexceptionable lives of such Catholics as St. Francis of Assisi, St. Francis of Sales, Bossuet, Fénelon, Henri Perreyve, Père Besson, Père Lacordaire, Charles de Condren and Madame Louise de France, not to mention others of equal merit, should be published and circulated among them quite as a matter

of course. But it cannot but be amusing to Catholics to note how studiously all allusion is avoided to the fact that these admirable saints and heroes and heroines of charity were *Roman* Catholics, thoroughly loyal and devoted to their faith, and that they were what they were as the legitimate result of the teaching and influence of the Church to which they belonged, and in whose service they gloried to live and die.

Again, take the more common and familiar instance of that most beautiful and precious of mere human compositions, *The Imitation of Christ*, by Thomas a Kempis,—that book so full of a divine wisdom and so fraught with comfort, consolation, and encouragement, especially to the weary, heavy-laden toilers in the world's great workshop; that book which George Eliot so beautifully describes in her *Mill on the Floss*, in which she makes her heroine, Maggie Tulliver, accidentally find an old copy of the *Imitation*. "A strange thrill of awe passed through Maggie, while she read as if she had been wakened in the night by a strain of solemn music, telling of beings whose souls had been astir, while hers was in a stupor. . . . Here was a secret of life that would enable her to renounce all other secrets; here was a sublime height to be reached without the help of outward things; here was insight, and strength, and conquest, to be won by means entirely within her own soul, where a Supreme Teacher was waiting to be heard. . . . Maggie was still panting for happiness, and was in ecstasy because she had found the key to it. She knew nothing of doctrines and systems, of mysticism or quietism; but this voice out of the far-off Middle Ages was the direct communication of a human soul's belief and experience, and came to Maggie as an unquestioned message."

Alas! that this "voice from the far-off Middle Ages" should not come with equal force and sweetness as an "unquestioned message" to all the restless seekers after truth—the souls longing for rest and peace—as the loving voice of that Holy Mother, towards whom they have learned, from a false Protestant tradition, to indulge such strange, unfilial, and mistaken sentiments and feelings! Thank God! the book is in almost universal use among the more intelligent and devout portion of the non-Catholic community, not, as formerly, in expurgated editions, to accommodate it to Protestant taste and Protestant sentiment, but entire,—fourth book and all,—and without note or comment or gloss. Yet, it is a curious fact, worthy of notice here, that the apparently learned but narrow author of the *Life of Thomas a Kempis* recently published, Rev. Mr. Kettlewell, a clergyman of the Church of England, who labors through two heavy volumes to prove that Thomas a Kempis wrote the *Imitation*, carries the

idea through the whole of his extensive work that this truly devout and holy man, so thoroughly Catholic in all his teaching, his principles, and his spirit, was a member of a religious Order which, though in the Church, somehow was not of it; that the spirit of this Order was entirely foreign to the Church of which they were members, and that they, in fact, were harbingers of the great Protestant "Reformation," and really belonged to the sixteenth rather than the thirteenth century.

Now, how perfectly ridiculous and absurd, and contrary to fact, all this is will appear when we consider that the Catholic Church alone teaches the science of the Saints, and holds out the highest encouragement to saintliness by a system of instruction and discipline the most thorough and complete, and such as is found nowhere else in the world. In this respect it is a most perfect contrast to Protestantism. Indeed, Protestantism may most justly be characterized as a veritable go-as-you-please race for heaven, in which all ideas of rigid "training" have been abandoned; where every man is his own guide, and follows his own notions of what is right and best, and in which the "every man for himself and the devil take the hindmost" sentiment seems to be predominant. Whereas, the Catholic Church has the most perfect system of ethics—of spiritual training and direction—that the world has ever seen. These principles are embodied in what is called moral theology, and are the result of the reflection and experience of the wisest and best men—the greatest saints—that ever lived. Protestants know little or nothing about the grand science of moral theology which constitutes so important a part of ecclesiastical training in the Catholic Church. On the contrary, they despise it, and ridicule it; and this fact is a good indication of the inner life and spirit of Protestantism. What do they care for cases of conscience? Are they not their own guides? Why should they seek counsel and direction from man in things pertaining to God? They will not be in bondage to any man. The very word casuistry has come to be a term of reproach among them, and designing, bad men, of corrupt mind and heart, take advantage of professional treatises in casuistry to misrepresent and prejudice the minds of the people against the Church, charging it with pandering to the passions of men, and thus tending to corrupt society. What ought to be thought of the man who would deliberately go through the country lecturing, "to gentlemen only," on the more delicate subjects of *Physiology*, and professing to expose the "immoral tendency" of the practice of medicine, by quoting from treatises in which those subjects are discussed, and even exhibiting the illustrating cuts? We may lay it down as a settled, fixed principle, that there can be no true spirituality, no high degree of sanctity,

without spiritual direction. Man is naturally so weak, so partial, so blind to his own faults, so easily seduced to presumption, or tempted to despair, that, without proper guidance, he is sure to err in one or the other direction, and thus come short of the degree of perfection he might otherwise attain. Scruples are sure to arise in the mind of the conscientious Christian out of every relation and circumstance in life. Therefore it is necessary that there should be settled, fixed rules of conduct, so far as possible, for every case that may arise. The absence of spiritual direction is, undoubtedly, one reason why Protestantism has not produced, and never can produce a saint. We do not, of course, deny that there have been some very excellent people among Protestants, as the world goes. Indeed, there were and are excellent people among the pagans. Some of the more favored among them have practised the natural virtues to a very high degree, and it is a well-known fact that there are pagan communities which in point of public morals, are a standing reproach to our boasted Christian civilization. But it should be borne in mind that there is a very great difference between natural virtue and supernatural sanctity. To be convinced of this, one has only to read candidly the life of a Catholic saint. Protestants, as a general thing, have lost faith in the supernatural, and hence, they cannot appreciate the life of a Catholic saint. They not only have no sympathy with such lives, but they are actually scandalized by them. Their detachment from the world, their self-denial and self-abnegation, their severe penances and mortifications seem unnatural and even fanatical, while their heroic acts of charity, especially when they freely offer their lives for others, or suffer martyrdom for the faith with joy, are incomprehensible to them. They admire those heroic acts; they wonder at them, but they cannot rise to a comprehension of the supernatural plane in which alone they are possible. In their view, as man was made for society, the free indulgence of his appetites and passions, at least within reasonable limits, is not only a legitimate privilege, but an essential obligation. The man or woman who voluntarily eschews the pleasures of matrimony, and sacrifices the joys of social and domestic life, deliberately violates the laws of his constitution, and flies in the face of Providence.

As for the miracles and supernatural experiences of the saints,—well, please don't tax their credulity too far. "Legends" they call them, and by that term they mean not things to be read and accepted as true, but mythical stories unworthy of credence. The question, of course, is not whether all the legends of the saints are equally credible, but whether they are, as they claim, all equally mythical. We are not disposed to deny that there are counterfeit miracles, but we believe it is generally admitted that counterfeits

suppose the existence of the genuine. And in objecting to the genuineness of certain more modern miracles, on account of their apparent frivolous character, we must be careful that we do not unwittingly trench upon the ground of Sacred Scripture, and even of common-sense. For who can tell beforehand what God would and what He would not do under certain circumstances? Indeed, is it not expressly said in Holy Writ that God hath chosen the foolish things of the world that He may confound the wise, and weak things of the world that He may confound the mighty? And as for the miracles of the Bible, what could be more apparently frivolous and naturally incredible than that a man should, by a mere word, cause an axe to swim upon the water, that another man should be raised to life by touching the bones of a dead human body, or that multitudes should be healed of diseases by handkerchiefs and aprons carried from one to another, and even that the shadow of a man should be endowed with the supernatural power of healing all upon whom it should fall? Are these not veritable Catholic miracles, such as our friends object to? Cardinal Newman, in his *Apologia*, says, with his usual force, that Protestants, in arguing against modern miracles, "assume as a first principle that what God did once," by the hands of the apostles, "He is *not* likely to do again; while our first principle or presumption is, that what God did once He is likely to do again. They say, 'It cannot be supposed He will work *many* miracles;' we, 'It cannot be supposed He will work *few*.'" And we may add that it would be the most natural thing in the world, indeed the ordinary course of Providence would lead us to expect, that the later miracles would bear the same general characteristics as the elder. But now, if you have any doubt about this whole subject of extraordinary supernatural occurrences in the Church, read, as we said before, the life of some Catholic saint. Take, for instance, that charming *Life of St. Catharine of Siena*, so carefully and conscientiously written by that most interesting writer, Augusta Theodosia Drane. There you will see a feeble woman, by an extraordinary endowment of divine grace, made the most conspicuous figure of her age and country. She counsels Popes, reconciles princes, restores harmony between alienated states and cities. At great personal sacrifice she goes to Avignon, where the Popes had been in exile for more than fifty years, and in spite of the machinations of designing nobles, and the opposition and threats of worldly French ecclesiastics, induces Gregory XI. to return to Rome, the proper seat of St. Peter. She counsels him as if he had been her own son, and he listens to her as an obedient child listens to a revered and beloved mother. And, in fact, says the historian, "her whole life seemed one continued miracle; but

what the servants of God admired most in her was the perpetual, strict union of her soul with God, for, though obliged to converse with different persons on so many different affairs and transact business of the greatest moment, she was always occupied on God and absorbed in Him." She was often in ecstasy, and obtained innumerable extraordinary answers to prayer. And the candid reader will be struck with the manifest perfect authenticity of the original documents from which these facts were derived. They are not lost in a "dim" antiquity. St. Catharine had a numerous following, and the familiar correspondence, as well as the biographical sketches, of the various members of her community, are extant, and these letters, especially her own, amounting to several hundreds, let us into the very secrets of her daily life. Those extraordinary events are alluded to by the various writers in the most familiar, commonplace, matter-of-fact manner. We seem for the time to be living with them, and even to be participating in those deeply interesting and absorbing scenes. Especially do we contemplate with wonder and admiration the grand central figure around whom revolve innumerable satellites, attracted by her extraordinary sanctity, and ready and glad to do her bidding, while she, conscious of her own weakness, always deprecates their praise, and strives, by every means in her power, to avoid notoriety and humble herself as the servant of all. Recognizing fully the hand of God in all the extraordinary events of which she is made such a conspicuous actor, and afraid of the least shadow of an impulse to vainglory, she practices the most extraordinary voluntary humiliations, spends long hours in prayer, and is admitted to the most intimate communion of the beloved of her soul, where, like St. Paul, rapt to the third heaven, she is permitted to see and hear what it is not lawful for man to utter.

It is said, and with perfect truth, that the continued existence and progress of the Church, notwithstanding all the scandals from within, and all the opposition of the world, the flesh and the devil from without, is the greatest of all miracles. So, with equal truth may it be said that the lives of the great saints of the Church, the succession of whom never dies out, are a perpetual miracle, and, therefore, a standing and irrefragable proof of the supernatural character of the Church and of her divine mission. And this, no doubt, is one object and motive of their existence—to teach us by example, by actual, living, practical illustration, that this world is not all, that there is "more beyond," that God has spoken to man, and that He still speaks. He has not withdrawn into infinite space, and left us to work out our destiny in darkness and despair. He continues to communicate with His creatures through His Church. Through her means and instrumentalities He imparts to them

spiritual graces and supernatural strength. He admits them to the secret *penetralia* of His sweet presence and communion; He endows them with extraordinary courage, and, in certain special cases, even with the power of working miracles, in fulfilment of the promise of the Great Head of the Church, "These signs shall follow them that believe. In my name they shall cast out devils, they shall speak with new tongues. They shall take up serpents, and if they shall drink any deadly thing it shall not hurt them; they shall lay their hands on the sick, and they shall recover."

Now, it is a curious fact, that notwithstanding the strong prejudice to which we have alluded in the first part of this article, our Protestant friends, who occasionally stray into our churches, are very much impressed with the solemnity of Catholic worship. It may only be at a Low Mass where there is no preaching, little or no music, and no prayers in the vernacular; only a distant echo of the softly murmuring voice of the officiating Priest, as, with absorbed recollection and in solemn stillness, he offers up the Holy Sacrifice—the Divine Victim—on the Altar; even so, entirely new and strange and unaccustomed as all the services are, and contrary to all their experience and preconceived notions as to what is proper for the worship of Almighty God, and the true service of religion, somehow there is a mysterious awe, an apparent, deeply-felt, all-pervading presence of holiness and devotion manifest in the countenances and deportment of the worshippers, that takes deep hold of their minds and hearts, so that, when they go away, they are ready to exclaim with the patriarch of old, "Surely, God is in this place, and I knew it not." And, notwithstanding the Puritan predilection in favor of what they call the simplicity of devotion, that taste that professes to prefer "the little wooden meeting-house, painted white, with green blinds," and the brief *ex tempore* prayers, though long enough sometimes in all conscience, without form, or ceremony, or external adornment, it is found that when the more candid and thoughtful of our non-Catholic friends enter one of our magnificent churches, especially our grand cathedrals, and participate in the splendid ceremonial accompanying the offering of the Holy Sacrifice, or it may be at Vespers, or only a grand procession, as on *Corpus Christi*, or a festival in honor of some great saint of the Calendar, their faith, or rather their prejudices, become greatly shaken. They cannot help feeling and acknowledging the superior power of accessories, so beautiful, so grand, and so admirably adapted to impress the imagination, to affect the heart, and, in a word, to influence the whole man with the most profound and elevated feelings of devotion. The recent testimony of the distinguished conservative Unitarian minister of Boston, Rev. James Freeman Clarke, D.D., is but the ex-

pression of the feeling of thousands of visitors to our churches, more especially of travellers abroad entering our grand old Cathedrals. "How imposing are these Catholic Churches! What beauty and majesty in their vast proportions and lovely details! One cannot doubt that this atmosphere of worship suits the mood and calms the excitement of great multitudes. As we enter these solemn aisles, a sense of religion enters the soul. We drop our cares, our desires, and for a few moments feel the presence of eternity. Everything looks upward, everything turns to God. . . . While we feel this influence, we forget papal infallibility, the doctrine of transubstantiation, the sacraments, and think of nothing in dispute. The Catholic Church represents the element of worship latent in every soul, and represents and serves it so well that it retains its hold on millions."

As Mr. Clarke is a Unitarian minister, we could not, of course, expect him to entertain, for a moment, the suspicion that perhaps, after all, this old Catholic Church is the true home of the soul, and that her teaching and her discipline, as well as her devotional system, are equally adapted to all. Or, if the suspicion did enter his mind, as, we cannot deny, would be most natural, and as, in fact, we fear it too often does enter the minds of unwilling observers, we could hardly expect him to give any intimation of it. It was certainly no small concession on his part to acknowledge so frankly the profound religious impression and the admirably soothing and elevating influence of the devotional system of the Church; and, we must acknowledge, it was with a still greater stretch of liberality that he declared that "when the deeper and larger religion comes it must retain all that is good in this Church." But we confess it is with profound melancholy that we reflect, not only upon the ignorance of such otherwise intelligent men as Mr. Clarke, as to the depth and largeness of the Catholic Church, but also upon that fatuitous blindness that leads them to resist the entrance of light when it shines upon them like the light of the sun in the heavens. Mr. Clarke prays, with apparent sincerity, that the day of the "deeper and larger religion," of which he dreams, "may dawn soon." We cannot but pray with all our hearts that he, and all who think and feel with him, may, in God's good time, be endowed with that heavenly gift of faith which shall open up to them the vision of the "King's daughter who is all glorious within, whose clothing is of wrought gold," and under the folds of whose garments alone they can find that rest and peace, and that high spiritual communion for which they so ardently seek and sigh.

We cannot close without noticing an objection which is most intimately associated with the prejudice against the Church on

account of its supposed tendency to formalism, which we are endeavoring to combat. We refer to the impression, so common among Protestants, that devotion to the saints, and especially devotion to the Blessed Virgin Mary, has a tendency to deaden true devotion in the hearts of Catholics by drawing them away from the great central source of light and grace, our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. Now it is a remarkable fact that, at the very moment that this objection is made, Protestants almost universally are losing faith in Jesus Christ as the true Son of God and in the efficacy of His atonement, and consequently devotion to Him; while, on the other hand, the Catholic Church is making the most strenuous efforts to revive and increase devotion to Jesus as our only and all-sufficient Saviour, "the chief among ten thousand, the one altogether lovely." We refer particularly to that most striking development of modern times, the spread of the "Confraternity of the Sacred Heart of Jesus," which was established for the express purpose of reviving in the hearts of Catholics a more ardent love and devotion to Jesus. Why devotion to the Sacred *Heart* of Jesus? Because the heart is the seat of the affections, and the originators of the devotion desired to draw out the hearts and affections of the people by an irresistible appeal from the loving Heart of Jesus. It was designed on purpose to impress upon an age when the love of many had waxed cold, what Our Lord Himself so emphatically taught, "Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven, but he that doeth the will of my Father who is in heaven." That will is, that we should love His son Jesus Christ, and hence this devotion is particularly designed to interest the heart and engage the affections. Let any of our non-Catholic friends take up the devotions to the Sacred Heart which so greatly abound in the Church, and read them carefully, and he will be surprised to see how completely they disprove all his preconceived notions about the obscurantism of the Church in reference to her supreme devotion to Jesus the Saviour. He will be surprised at the wealth and variety of the devotions, as if pious ingenuity had been on the stretch to invent the most attractive forms, and those most calculated to appeal to the heart and captivate the affections. And when he is told that there is no more popular devotion in the church at the present time; that it has spread throughout the whole world; that Confraternities have been established in almost every known nation on the face of the earth, he will, perhaps, be prepared to believe that devotion to the saints has not quite extinguished devotion to Jesus in the hearts of the Catholic people.

And why should it? Why should devotion to Mary lessen devotion to Jesus? Why should the love of the mother weaken

our attachment to her divine Son? Devotion to Mary is simply the worship of Jesus in the arms of His blessed mother. We love her, indeed, for her own sake, because we believe her to be the fairest of the daughters of men,—nay, immaculate and transcendently beautiful and lovely beyond the power of conception. But we love and reverence her chiefly because she is the mother of Jesus,—the mother of God. Jesus took His body from her immaculate flesh; He is bone of her bone and flesh of her flesh; and we reverence her as the greatest and the purest and the holiest of human beings. But we love her in Jesus and for Jesus, and we love Him in her. In the mind of the devout Catholic the two are inseparably associated by the most tender and endearing ties, and there is not the slightest danger of mistaking the relative position of each. Instead of repressing devotion to Jesus, the love of Mary adds a thousand charms to that devotion. And hence it has always been true in the history of the Church that the greatest saints have been the most devoted to Mary, and that devotion to Mary may be taken as a very good indication of the spiritual condition—the zeal and fervor of Christians—in any part of the Church. Oh! it is sad to think how much our separated brethren lose by their groundless prejudices against devotion to the blessed mother of God, though it is a cheering sign that in the English Church, at least, they have begun to discover the great mistake that was made by their ancestors in discarding this beautiful, attractive, and edifying devotion. The advanced Ritualists have actually established “Confraternities of the Children of St. Mary,” and they have issued a manual of devotion, taken principally from our own Catholic manuals. They recommend the saying of the Angelus thrice daily, after the Franciscan form; the Rosary; the Litany of Loretto (with indulgences of Popes Sixtus V. and Boniface XIII.!); the *Salve Regina* and the *Sub tuum præsidium*, as well as various other Catholic prayers “in honor of the immaculate heart of Mary.” Of the consistency and even honesty of introducing such a devotion into the Protestant English Establishment we are not called upon now to speak. But it is certainly a very remarkable indication of the progress of religious thought, and the revulsion from the old Protestant tradition, which seems to be going on everywhere and all around us. These Ritualists are no doubt excellent people. They are said to embrace the most earnest and zealous portion of the English Church. They have, of course, discovered that there is absolutely no incompatibility between devotion to Mary and devotion to Jesus. And we cannot but express the hope that the day is not far distant when this grand discovery will be made by all who are so unhappy as to be outside the true fold, and that they will not be satisfied with vain efforts

to establish the devotion in societies which for the last three hundred years have denounced and protested against it, but be led to cast in their lot with those who have always cherished it, as well as all else that is beautiful and lovely and of good report,—that grand old Church, which is the true Israel of God, and to which "belong the adoption, and the glory, and the covenants, and the service of God and the promises, of whom Christ Jesus is the Head,—God over all, blessed forevermore. Amen!"

BOOK NOTICES.

THE REFORMATION. By *George P. Fisher, D.D.*, Professor of Ecclesiastical History in Yale College. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1883.

The Protestant public, for which this book is intended, cares very little what the Reformation was or was not. The "right of Private Judgment"—which Professor Fisher declares was but "another side" of the doctrine of the "Reformers," that "Christ spoke in the Scriptures," and that "the truth He uttered was one of which they (the Reformers) had an immediate spiritual recognition"—has now been so far and so logically carried out by Protestants that, with a few exceptions, they care as little about what the "Reformers" said and wrote as they do about the doctrines of the Church Fathers. They regard the Reformers and worship them simply as the representatives of the principle of "free-thought," and beyond that they have little concern either as to their opinions, their motives, their real character, or their actions. This same indifference, too, exists as to the real causes, objects, and nature of the so-called "Reformation." Non-Catholics commonly accept, without investigation or reflection, the Protestant traditional statement that it was a movement which has resulted in the purification and elevation of society, the promotion of civil liberty and of intellectual progress, the general diffusion of knowledge and the advancement of civilization, etc. Accepting this as an historical fact, they are unwilling or intellectually incompetent to go behind it and investigate whether it is supported by proof or not.

For these reasons we think that Professor Fisher's work, when first issued from the press a few years ago, received but little attention, except from persons who were in search of a convenient text-book for non-Catholic academies and colleges, or a work of reference for Protestant ministers. But now it is likely to secure more general attention from its connection with subjects which have been again brought into discussion through the recent celebration, by Protestants and Rationalists, of the four hundredth anniversary of Luther's birth, followed by a more restricted and less prominent celebration of the same anniversary of the birth of Ulric Zuingli.

In the volume before us Protestants of the "advanced" "Liberal" type and also Rationalists will find just what they want. But Protestants who still cling to the idea that Episcopalianism, or Presbyterianism, or some other particular "ism" is the purer, if not the purest, form of Christianity will be displeased with Professor Fisher's "breadth" of views, and still more with many of the admissions he makes on various pages of his work. His portraits of Calvin and Calvinism particularly, though he has done his utmost to soften down their bigotry, arrogance and narrow exclusiveness, will not be agreeable reading to the admirers of the French-Swiss "Reformer" and the ideas to which he gave systematic form. Yet in fact Professor Fisher has labored to make the strongest apology for the "Reformation" that could be framed; and, in the prosecution of his undertaking, has brought to his task unquestioned ability, learning, and skill. With a prudence which shows that he is fully aware of the difficulty of the task he has set himself to perform, and the countless historical facts which oppose his claim that the "Reformation" conferred upon society the benefits he claims that it has conferred, he endeavors in advance to evade the force of those facts, and to free himself from the charge of *suppressio veri*, by stating in a note that the effects which are ascribed to the "Reformation," "are not credited to the *dogmatic system* of Protestantism exclusively, but to the Protestant religion taken comprehensively"—to the "genius and spirit of Protestantism." In the same note he says: "The Church of the Middle Ages, I do not consider a 'mitigated evil,' but an incalculable benefit to society. What is said of the Papacy should not be understood of the Church—the organized, collective influence of Christianity. But even the Papacy, as is shown, was in the mediæval period, in many respects, a beneficent institution."

These qualifications and concessions along with countless others that will be found in the body of Professor Fisher's work are not made with any intention of raising doubts as to the justifiability of the "Reformation," or of underrating the benefits he believes it conferred, but for the purpose of more effectively defending it and eulogizing it. He looks upon the Church as having no divinely given constitution or authority, but simply as a natural outgrowth of Christian thought and feeling in each age and country, taking to itself such form as Christians at any time or in any place choose to give it; and that all authority in the Church and all its officers have their origin in and owe their existence only to the common will and consent of the individuals who make up its membership.

Hence, along with Macaulay, and Guizot and other Rationalists or "Liberal" Protestants, Professor Fisher can admit in perfect consistency with his idea—what few Protestants of the "orthodox" "evangelical" school are willing to admit—that the Papacy was the chief instrumentality for conquering ancient heathenism, as well as the barbarism which subsequently inundated Europe; for reducing society to order, educating, elevating and purifying it. The Papacy in Professor Fisher's mind is simply a human institution useful for a time, and up to a certain stage of human progress, but which became useless and obsolete as society advanced. Accordingly, Professor Fisher treats the Papacy not (as traditionary Protestantism regards it) as "a corruption of primitive Christianity," foisted upon the Church in the fifth and subsequent centuries, but as the natural outgrowth of the circumstances in which Christians found themselves during the first ages of Christianity. He quotes from St. Irenæus in proof that "even as early as the latter part of the second century, the Church had passed into the condition of a visible

organized commonwealth," with Bishops "extending their jurisdiction over dependent churches," and the officers of the Church "assuming the position of a distinct order, which is placed above the laity, and is the appointed medium of conveying to them grace," and "the conception of a priesthood attaching itself to the Christian ministry."

In proof of the progress which this "process" had made, Professor Fisher refers to St. Irenæus "uttering the famous dictum that where the Church is—meaning the visible body of its clergy and sacraments—there is the Spirit of God, and where the Spirit of God is, there is the Church. To be cut off from the Church is to be separated from Christ. The Church is the door of access to him."

So, too, Professor Fisher refers to "the importance" that then was ("began to be," is his manner of stating the fact) "attached to tradition," and mentions that Saint Irenæus and Tertullian, in defending Christianity "against Gnostical corruptions, naturally fell back on the historical evidence afforded by the presence and testimony of the leading churches which the Apostles themselves had planted," directing the inquirer to "go to Corinth, Ephesus, Rome, to the places where the Apostles had taught, and ascertain whether the novel speculations of the time could justly claim the sanction of the first disciples of Christ, or had been transmitted from them." He also says that "the pre-eminence of Rome as the custodian of traditions" is what St. Irenæus "means to assert in a noted passage in which he exalts that Church;" and that "the unity of the Church, this great visible society of Christians, was realized in the unity of the sacerdotal body."

"It was natural," Professor Fisher goes on to say, "to seek and find a head for the body. And where should it be found except at Rome, the capital of the world, the seat of the principal Church, where, as it was generally and perhaps truly believed, Peter and Paul had perished as martyrs? After Peter came to be considered the chief of the Apostles, and when, near the close of the second century, the idea was suggested and became current that Peter had been bishop of the Roman Church, a strong foundation was laid in the minds of men for the recognition of the primacy of that Church and its chief Pastor."

These statements and admissions by Professor Fisher (qualified and partial as they are) of incontestable facts of history, will not be welcome to those Protestants who still hold on to the Protestant traditional notion that the "Reformation" was a restoration of Christianity to its pristine purity, and that the Papacy and Episcopacy and Priesthood with all the ideas, functions, and offices inseparably connected with them, are simply corruptions of ancient Christianity. Yet it is the only possible ground that can be taken to defend the Reformation without utterly falsifying or ignoring the plain testimony of history as to what the Church actually was in the age of the Council of Nice and in the preceding century. Professor Fisher's theory is an easier one to maintain in view of the facts of history than the common traditional one of Protestants. It has fewer historical difficulties to contend with, inasmuch as it admits the existence of the Papacy, and of the hierarchical system of which it is the head, at a much earlier period than Protestants usually acknowledge it to have existed. His idea, too, that the Papacy was both a natural and a legitimate outgrowth of the circumstances in which the early Christians were placed, has a plausibility about it which the theory that it was a corruption, a cunningly devised system of tyranny, does not possess.

But while thus avoiding some difficulties, by the adoption of this rationalistic idea of the Church, Professor Fisher encounters others which he seems not to have thought of. His idea is that "the enlargement of

the jurisdiction of bishops," and the "extension of it over dependent churches in the neighborhood of the towns," began in the second century, and that from this naturally grew the idea of investing the Bishop of Rome with the authority and powers of the Primacy. So, too, the appeal to "tradition as an authoritative tribunal for settling all questions of doctrine, grew out of the controversies which the early Christians had to carry on with the Gnostics and other ancient heretics."

Here, however, other historical facts confront Professor Fisher. He is acquainted with *what* Tertullian and Saints Cyprian and Irenæus say of Bishops and the Priesthood and the Church of Rome, and quotes them in support of his theory; but yet he fails to mention the fact that *what* they say on these subjects they say not as expressing their own personal ideas or ideas that had grown up in the Church, but as the universal belief and faith of Christians from the days of the Apostles. Strange that Professor Fisher should overlook this telling and significant fact. In like manner Professor Fisher strangely stops short in his search for historical proof to support his theory. That theory, to state it briefly yet substantially, is, that at first the different churches were entirely independent of each other and purely democratic in government; that they each elected their own officers, and invested them with such powers as each "body of disciples" choose; that in these elections "the body of disciples" had a controlling voice, although, "as long as the Apostles lived, their suggestions or appointments would naturally be accepted." But by the force of circumstances, according to Professor Fisher, this system very soon "naturally" *grew* (strange growth) into just an opposite system—that of an ecclesiastical hierarchy with the Bishop of Rome at its head and its centre of unity.

But here some other historical difficulties confront Professor Fisher and his theory. Growth, however rapid, implies stages and a certain amount of time, long or short. Professor Fisher limits the time for this growth of the Apostolic churches into the beginning of an entirely opposite system of thought, belief, and church organization to less than a hundred years; that is to the period between the first century of Christianity (the Apostolic age) and "the latter part of the second century." Yet even this will not do. Why should Professor Fisher, who surely must know of the existence of certain extant writings of Saints Ignatius and Polycarp and Clement of Rome, not have looked into their writings to see what evidences they contained of this theory of rapid but gradual and "natural" growth theory of different churches into one Church, and of all of them into an entirely opposite idea and system from that on which they started? It would be discourteous to Professor Fisher to suggest that he did not examine or refer to the writings mentioned, because they do not support his theory. Yet it certainly seems so. Saints Ignatius and Polycarp unquestionably exercised what Professor Fisher calls "enlarged jurisdiction over dependent churches," and exercised it not as conceded by the "body of disciples" through force of circumstances, but as of divine appointment. They were the immediate disciples of the Apostles, learned the Christian doctrine from their lips, and yet they used strange language, indeed, for Bishops who had recently "enlarged" and "extended" their "jurisdiction" by the consent of "the body of the disciples." "Take heed that ye do not set up yourselves against your Bishop, that ye *may be subject to God*." "Hearken unto the Bishop that *God may hearken unto you*," etc. St. Clement, Bishop of Rome, also learned his doctrine from the lips of the Apostles, and was contemporary during part of his life with Saints Peter and Paul, and during all of it with St. John. He, too, has left at least one authentic epistle—

that sent to the Christians at Corinth in answer to their request for his interposition to settle their disputes. In that letter (written while St. John was still living at Ephesus), St. Clement uses still stronger language than St. Ignatius, and strange for one whose office was dependent on the good pleasure of "the body of the disciples;" language that would be insufferably supercilious and insolent, if addressed to an independent society of Christians at Corinth over which he had no authority. The dispute he was requested to settle arose chiefly out of opposition to some of the Priests at Corinth. He tells those who opposed them that Priests and Bishops were their ecclesiastical superiors appointed by the Apostles who, taught by Christ, provided for a perpetual succession of those officers in the Church. He then adds: "Ye, therefore, that laid the foundation of this sedition, submit yourselves; . . . learn to submit yourselves, laying aside the arrogant and proud stubbornness of your tongue;" with much more to the same purpose.

These still earlier historical evidences of the visible compact unity of the Church and of an organized hierarchy which based its authority not on the consent of local "societies" of Christians over which they exercised jurisdiction, Professor Fisher does not even allude to. It would have embarrassed him had he done so. For they completely upset his theory; leaving no time whatever for scattered, independent, ecclesiastical democracies to *grow* into a compact unity ruled over by an organized hierarchy with the Bishop of Rome at its head.

When we pass on through Professor Fisher's work, we find a like method employed. Inconvenient facts are omitted or thrust into an obscure corner of the background of his pictures, while those which fall in with his ideas are arranged so as best to suit his purpose. His skill, too, in what we may be allowed to style inverted perspective resembles Hogarth's, though, unlike his, it is employed not for a humorous, but for a serious purpose. In its effects it reminds us of the magic spell described in the "Lay of the Last Minstrel:"

"It had much of glamour might
To make a lady seem a knight;
The cobwebs on a dungeon wall
Seem tapestry in lordly hall;
A nutshell seem a gilded barge,
A sheeling seem a palace large,
And youth seem age, and age seem youth;—
All was delusion, nought was truth."

This skill of Professor Fisher shows itself particularly in his descriptions of the lives and characters of the "Reformers," and the fanaticism, lawlessness, and immoralities of their followers. Acknowledging that the "Reformers" were not "without grave faults and infirmities," and bringing to view some of their minor failings, he omits all mention of and thrusts out of view their glaring breaches of morality and of the precepts of Christianity. He paints them, if not as saints, yet as devout strictly conscientious Christian men of heroic mould. In like manner the countless variations and contradictions of their doctrines are skillfully obscured. In the chapters on the relation of Protestantism to "literature," "civilization," "religion," and "culture," whatever good he finds in modern society he attributes to Protestantism; and whatever evil, to causes disconnected with it.

As might be expected from Professor Fisher's "liberal" sentiments as regards religion, his work has little of a polemical character, and makes many concessions, or seeming concessions, in favor of the Cath-

olic Church and the Papacy, which Protestants commonly are unwilling to make.

Persons who desire a skilful defence of the "Reformation," after the method known among lawyers as "confessing and avoiding" facts, will find it in this volume; those who wish to learn the true nature, character, and effects of that movement, will turn its pages to no purpose.

THE WORKS OF ORESTES A. BROWNSON. Collected and Arranged by Henry F. Brownson. Vol. V.: Containing "The Convert," and the first part of the writings in defence of the Church. Detroit: Thorndike Nourse, Publisher. 1884.

The volume before us is in some respects the most important of all the volumes of the series of republished writings of Dr. Orestes A. Brownson that has yet appeared. Unless we are greatly mistaken, it is the one that will be most interesting to the general public. The first third of the volume is occupied with a republication of *The Convert, or, Leaves from My Own Experience*, in which the wanderings, religious convictions, and experience of Dr. Brownson in search of the truth, the manner in which he at last found it and was led to embrace it, are narrated with remarkable clearness and with equally remarkable simplicity and candor.

A narrative of any person's strivings to escape from error, of his mistakes and the manner in which he discovered and escaped from them, and of the way by which at last he arrived at a certain knowledge of the truth, scarcely ever fails to interest, if the writer possesses sufficient powers of analysis and description to make his narrative clear and consistent. And the interest is greatly increased when it is a history of the internal struggles, opinions, and convictions of one who, by his vigor and energy of thought and action, was a leader of men, and occupied a most prominent place in the public mind.

It is this, that apart from its charming style, makes Newman's *Apologia pro vita sua* so attractive a book, and Dr. Brownson's *Convert, or Leaves from My Experience*, reminds us of it, though entirely different in method, style, and immediate object.

Dr. Brownson's religious experience, till he found light and rest in the Communion of the Church, was a very varied and eventful one. From earliest boyhood religion engrossed his thoughts; and this not as a matter of speculation chiefly, but of personal practical interest and concern. Unbaptized, placed at six years of age with an aged couple, plain, upright, strictly moral persons, who had been brought up in New England Congregationalism, but had no particular religion and seldom went to meeting, he "was taught to be honest, to owe no one anything but good-will, to speak the truth, never to tell a lie or take what was not his own, to keep the Sabbath, and never let the sun go down upon his wrath." He was taught the shorter Presbyterian Catechism, the Lord's prayer, and a short evening prayer in rhyme:

"Now I lay me down to sleep,
I pray the Lord my soul to keep;
If I should die before I wake,
I pray the Lord my soul to take."

The Sacred Scriptures formed the chief part of his reading, much of which he had committed to memory before he was fourteen years old. The simple history of the Passion of our Lord as given by the holy Evangelists affected him deeply, and was a constant subject of meditation. Sometimes he seemed to hold familiar conversations with Him. Sometimes, too, he seemed to have "spiritual intercourse with the

Blessed Virgin Mary and the holy Angel Gabriel who announced to her that she was to be the mother of the Redeemer." He preferred to be alone and "feel that he was in the presence of Jesus and Mary and the holy angels;" yet he had received very little instruction, except such as he had obtained from reading the Sacred Scriptures.

They had marked him at this early age as he was, unbaptized as he was, and living in the midst of a mixed population of Congregationalists, Methodists, Baptists, Universalists, and Christians. He seldom attended their meetings, for all he "learned from either of them was that he must be born again or go to hell, get religion or be damned." The more he "listened to them the more he feared hell, and the less he loved God. Love gave place to terror." Yet he "tried to get religion, and almost made up his mind to submit to the Methodists."

From this he was saved by the advice of an elderly woman who was living in great poverty in a hut on one corner of the farm owned by the persons by whom young Brownson was brought up. She was a woman of great intelligence, who had seen better days, had been well educated, and preserved her self-respect, dignity, and refinement, despite her destitution. Brownson made known to her his perplexities, fears, and distress. She made this remarkable reply to him (a boy just twelve years old)—remarkable for a Protestant :

"My poor boy, God has been good to you, and has no doubt gracious purposes towards you. He means to use you for purposes of His own, and you must be faithful to His inspirations. But go not to the Methodists or any of the sects. They are New Lights and not to be trusted. The Christian religion is not new, and Christians have existed from the time of Christ. These New Lights are of yesterday. You yourself know the founder of the Christian sect, and I myself knew personally both George Whitfield and John Wesley, the founders of Methodism. Neither can be right, for they came too late, and have broken off, separated from the body of Christians who subsisted before them. When you join any body calling itself a Christian body, find out and join one that began with Christ and his Apostles, and has continued to subsist the same without any change of doctrine or worship down to our own times. You will find the true religion with that body, and nowhere else. Join it, obey it, and you will find rest and salvation. But beware of sects and New Lights; they will make you fair promises, but in the end will deceive you to your own destruction."

These words made a deep impression on the boy Brownson. The argument was one which only a Catholic can consistently make, yet it was constantly in the mouths of the old Puritans as an unanswerable objection to other sects. The old Puritans retained a conception of the Church of Christ. They held that Christ had himself founded a Church, established its order, given to it its ordinances, and taught that it was necessary to belong to it to be saved. They claimed that *they* were the genuine, true successors of the Apostles. The loose notions of the Church, the humanitarianism, and transcendentalism now rife among their descendants, were unknown to them.

Thus Brownson was preserved, for the time being, from joining a Protestant sect. At the age of fourteen, he was thrown upon the world, "into the midst of new and strange scenes, and exposed to new and corrupting influences." He fell in with all kinds and classes of sectaries and "nothingarians." Yet, he still held fast to his belief in his need of religion, though his "young head became confused" with the contradictory opinions he heard advanced, and with the doubts and denials to which he listened.

"For a time" his "mind was darkened," and he "was half-persuaded that all religion was a delusion—the work of priestcraft or statecraft." He "was in a labyrinth, and there was no Ariadne's clue to guide" him "out to the light of day." He felt that his own reason was insufficient to guide him, and the more he attempted by it alone to arrive at truth, the more uncertain and perplexed he became.

One day, when he was about nineteen years of age, he casually went into a Presbyterian meeting-house. The sermon was a commonplace one, to which he paid little attention, but the singing and some of the other exercises deeply affected him, "even unto tears." After he went out of the meeting-house, he began to commune with himself:

"I have done my best to find the truth, to experience religion, to lead a religious life, yet here I am without faith; I know not what to believe; I know not what to do. . . . Was I not told at the outset that if I followed my own reason, it would lead me astray, that I should lose all belief, and find myself involved in universal doubt and uncertainty? I did not believe what these people said, and yet were they not right? They were. They told me to submit my reason to revelation. I will do so. I am incapable of directing myself. I must have a guide. I will hear the Church. I will surrender, abnegate my own reason, which hitherto has only led me astray, and make myself a member of the Church, and do what she commands me."

Accordingly, he went to see the Presbyterian minister, and told to him and to the Session of his church "his experience," and was baptized and received into the Presbyterian "communion." He did not ask whether the Presbyterian Church was the true Church or not, for the church question had not yet been fairly raised in his mind, and, as the Presbyterian Church claimed to be the true Church, he was satisfied, for the moment. "What it believed," he says, "was of little consequence, since I had resolved to abnegate my own reason, and take the Church for my guide."

His conclusion was logical, but his premises were wrong. In submitting his reason to a fallible guide, he indeed abnegated it, as he soon discovered. Had it been an infallible authority, his act would have been entirely and in the highest degree reasonable. Accordingly, he almost immediately was disappointed. "I had joined the Church," he says, "because I had despaired of myself, and because, despairing of reason, I had wished to submit to authority. If the Presbyterian Church had satisfied me that she had authority, was authorized by Almighty God to teach and direct me, I could have continued to submit; but, while she exercised the most rigid authority over me, she disclaimed all authority over me, and remitted me to the Scriptures and private judgment."

We have thus followed young Brownson with as much particularity as we could, yet as briefly as we could, till he landed in Presbyterianism, and found only disappointment and self-contradiction. Our object in this was to show how early in life and how strongly the conviction of a need of an infallible guide possessed him. *This* was the "Ariadne's clue" that guided him, without his knowing it, in all his meanderings, then and subsequently, through the labyrinth of error, and finally brought him out to the light of day. We would like to recount his description of the despotic tyranny exercised by Presbyterianism over him, while it at the same time disclaimed all legitimate right to direct him, and sent him to the Bible as his guide. He clearly though concisely states it, and the personal experience of the writer of this while a member of another Calvinistic sect fully confirms Brownson's state-

ment. Suffice it to say, that Brownson found no rest in Presbyterianism. He honestly strove to content himself with it. But he *could* not. It was then that the alternative was presented to his mind, which we personally know from personal sources of knowledge continually confronts thousands of Protestants, a few of them, from time to time, accepting the right alternative, more of them choosing the wrong, but the vast multitude refusing to take either and falling into a state of unconscious indifference, and really, though unconsciously, disbelieving in the existence of truth, or at least in the possibility of a personal certain apprehension of it.

It became clear to young Brownson that the Presbyterian Church "was not and could not be the Church of Christ," and that, if Christ had a Church on earth which He had founded, and which had authority to teach in His name, it was evidently the Roman Catholic Church. But this seemed to him, as once it seemed to the writer of this, and as it seems to thousands of Protestants, a *reductio ad absurdum*. "That Church, of course, was out of the question," says Brownson. "It was everything that was vile, base, odious, and demoralizing. It had been condemned by the judgment of mankind, and the thought of becoming a Roman Catholic found and could find no entrance into my mind. There was no alternative. It was the Catholic Church, or no church. All the so-called Protestant Churches were New Lights, were of yesterday, founded by fallible men, without any warrant from God, without any authority but their private interpretation of Scripture. I cannot accept any one of them as having any authority to teach or direct me. . . . They have no authority over my conscience, and no right to hold me amenable to them. Then, since I cannot be a Catholic, I must be a no-church man, and deny all churches, make war upon every sect claiming the slightest authority in matters of faith or conscience."

We cannot farther follow Brownson on his meandering way, as narrated clearly, frankly, and candidly in *The Convert*, through Universalism, Unitarianism, and different forms of Humanitarianism and Rationalism, until at last he found light and rest and peace, and the infallible guide and legitimate divine authority he had so long and painfully sought for, in the communion of the One, Holy, Catholic Church, —a guide and authority which did not tyrannize over his reason and seek to crush it, did not require him to abnegate it, but in requiring him to submit his reason to *faith* opened up the way to a higher exercise of it, and guided him in that way.

Dr. Brownson, it has been alleged, was fanciful, notionate, whimsical. To those who know of his many changes of opinion previous to his reception into the Catholic Church, but know not of their reasons and the logical connection between them, the charge seems true. Yet, in reality, it has no foundation whatever. As well charge a man in an unknown wilderness at night with a starless sky above him, with pursuing an erratic course. To those who wish to read the experience of a mind given honestly, heartily, and undividedly to the search for truth, *The Convert*, which occupies the first part of the volume before us, cannot fail to be intensely interesting. It is instructive, too, in the highest degree, in its keen, critical analysis of the various theories and systems, which Dr. Brownson successively took up with, tried, and discarded.

The remaining two-thirds of the volume are occupied with articles on subjects of primary importance, some of them elicited by attacks upon *The Convert*, and efforts to answer it. As a specimen of incisive, conclusive, and crushing, yet courteous retort, we know not

where a superior, or even an equal, can be found to the article entitled "The Princeton Review and The Convert," unless in Newman's *Apologia*, nor of earnest, kind expostulation than the "Letter to Protestants."

The other articles,—“The Church Against No Church,” “Faith not Possible without the Church,” “Liberalism and Catholicity,” “The Great Question,” and “Extra Ecclesiam Nulla Salus,” are on subjects of fundamental importance, and are treated with masterly ability.

LA VIE DE N. S. JÉSUS CHRIST. Par l'Abbé E. Le Camus, Docteur en Théologie, Directeur du Collège Catholique de Castelnaudary. 2 vols. 8vo. Paris: Poussielgue Frères. 1883.

There have long been many lives of Christ in the French language, but, strange to say, there has not been, until the year 1883, a real history of Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ written originally in that language. Excellent as works of piety and edification, these books have failed to meet the needs of our age of criticism and investigation, and the attacks of infidels against the divinity of Christ, and the real significance to Christians of His mission on earth. Such histories had already appeared in German and English, and some of these had been translated into French. But no great national work came from the press before that of the Abbé Le Camus.

It is no exaggeration to call this a great work. The fruit of twelve years assiduous study, it is in every way as complete and satisfactory a history as need be asked for, satisfying alike both the critical and the devout reader. The Bishop of Carcassonne, of whose Cathedral the author is a Canon, says, in a letter of commendation to him:

“In your preface you make so clear a statement of your plan and method as to enable your readers to perceive at once that it is not merely to the intellect you want to speak, but to the soul, and that you excel in bestowing warmth as well as light. You offer to the public an eloquent demonstration of the divinity of Jesus Christ, and at the same time a striking revelation of His incomparable grandeur of character, and infinite tenderness of heart.

“The man of learning, the unbeliever, the honest seeker after truth, will all derive profit from the study of your critical discussions, enlightened as they are by a thorough knowledge of scriptural interpretation, and whilst the theologian will be entirely satisfied with the soundness of your doctrine, which, moreover, has been humbly submitted by you on all points to the infallible judgment of the Holy See, the faithful will rapturously enjoy the delicious perfume of sweet piety which is exhaled by your book from very many of its pages. All will admire your full and graphic description of the manners of the Jewish people, and of the country in which our Saviour's life on earth was spent, making us almost imagine we are witnesses of the scenes and incidents described.”

From the general character of the book as thus described by the author's ecclesiastical superior, we proceed to give an outline of its plan and arrangement of matter. An introduction of over seventy pages deals in general with the nature of Christ's mission, the records of it that have come down to us, and the manners and customs of the people chosen to be its living witnesses, as well as the topography or general physical character of their country. This is of itself a most valuable addition to the literature of the subject, and a worthy precursor to the great history that follows.

The body of the work is divided into three parts, treating respectively of the nativity and early life of Jesus Christ, His public life, and the close of His mission, namely: His death, resurrection, and glorious ascension. In the first part the author, following the example of the evangelists St. Mark and St. John, enters at once, as Horace advises, *in medias res*. The voice of the Baptist crying in the desert, and the promised appearance of the Messiah in Israel, form the subject of the first book, which is followed in the second by a retrospective history of the Promised One. The third is devoted to the immediate preparation for His mission.

The public life of the Saviour being the most important part of His history, occupies by far the largest space. Like the first and third parts, this also is subdivided into three books, representing three distinct periods, namely, that of general exploration, that of real constructive work in Galilee, and that of combat and struggle against opposition in Judea. This division the author deems preferable to that by years, as being less superficial, and more in harmony with the Gospel narratives, copying, indeed, the order followed by St. John. Were space at our disposal, we would enter into more details concerning this part of the work, in which so many disputed points are most ably treated and many difficulties of interpretation and concordance removed.

To the third part also, we can refer but too briefly. Naturally it should receive the most touching and pathetic treatment, for its subject is the close of a most wonderful existence. "The Divine victim," says Father Le Camus, "having fallen into the hands of His enemies, seems to go to sleep in death, only to wake up again to life, and sit forever in glory."

Each volume is furnished with a well-executed map, the one of Palestine, and the other of the city of Jerusalem.

On the whole, it is a work destined to take a very high rank, most likely a place of honor, among the most remarkable literary productions of this age. Our readers may judge of the spirit animating the author during his labors upon it, from the following paragraph at the close of the preface:

"O Jesus, while writing these lines, more than once did science, penetration, and exactness seem to fail me; but it appears to me that your love has never been wanting to me. Indeed it has made my sense of insufficiency the keener. I offer this work to you after having often prayed you to bless it. Entirely unworthy of you as it is, it appears to me full of good-will, and this is enough for your heart to accept it. May it make you better known, admired, and loved."

THE LIFE OF LADY FALKLAND, 1585-1639. By *Lady Georgiana Fullerton*. London: Burns & Oates. 1883.

The dates given above sufficiently indicate the period in history which this life comprises,—the latter part of the reign of Elizabeth of England, the whole of that of James I., and the first and middle parts of that of Charles I.,—a period of intense religious controversy, during the first part of which, too, the fires of persecution of Catholics were unextinguished, and during all of which the penal laws against Catholics remained unrepealed upon the statute-books of England.

Lady Falkland was the daughter of Sir Lawrence Tanfield, an eminent lawyer, subsequently a judge and Lord Chief Baron, a Protestant, who seems never to have had a doubt of the truth of his religion, but was virtuous and conscientious. His daughter from earliest years exhibited

signs of rare intelligence, and at an age at which most children are engaged in the amusements of the nursery was assiduous in studies which usually are prosecuted only in mature years. The love of study was an absorbing passion with her in childhood, and remained with her during all the vicissitudes of her eventful life. She became acquainted with the French, Spanish, and Italian languages, had a thorough knowledge of the Latin, and read Hebrew with facility. At the age of fifteen she was disposed of in marriage by her parents, and bestowed upon Sir Henry Cary, then Master of the Jewel-House of Queen Elizabeth. He had never seen her, nor she him, but her fortune suited his decayed circumstances. The consummation of her marriage was deferred for one year, during which time, and for some years afterwards, while Sir Henry was in Holland and France, returning to England occasionally, but paying little attention to his young wife, Lady Falkland was under the rule of her imperious and despotic mother-in-law. She continued her studies, though under great difficulties and subject to constant opposition. Yet at the same time she faithfully performed every duty of a wife and mother and mistress of a family. During this time she came to entertain serious doubts of her religion—Anglicanism. The first occasion of these doubts was her study of Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Policy*. To use her own words, "it left her hanging in the air."

We refrain from further following the thread of the story. Suffice it to say that, after several years of struggling, examination, and prayer, amid difficulties and snares, opposition and persecution from every side and in various forms, she found her way into the communion of the Church. Then followed still fiercer trials and persecutions for a large part of her life on the part of her own relatives, and of her husband and mother-in-law. She was confined to a house assigned to her, without the means even of obtaining food. Her children were taken from her and educated under Protestant influences. After a time this persecution was relaxed and her children were restored to her. Yet, under all these circumstances Lady Falkland exhibited a wonderful degree of firmness, combined with gentleness, patience, and endurance. In the end she had the happiness of seeing six of the eleven children God gave to her embrace the true faith. Her four daughters became Religious, some of them eminent for their Christian virtues.

The hardships, Lady Falkland endured, the eminent personages she met with, and some of whom she was intimate with, the different state of society of her age from that of our own, her remarkable gifts and virtues are well described in the volume before us, and constitute a most interesting biography.

In one respect, it is a tale of our own times. The absence of penal laws modifies the trials a convert to the Catholic faith must now endure. But, though their form is changed, their nature remains unchanged. Many a daughter, wife, and mother, who gives up the delusions of the sects and enters the true faith, will find in the history of Lady Falkland many resemblances to their own experience.

GOD THE TEACHER OF MANKIND; or Popular Catholic Theology, Apologetical, Dogmatical, Moral, Liturgical, Pastoral, and Ascetical; the Dignity, Authority, and Duties of Parents; Ecclesiastical and Civil Powers; their Enemy. By *Michael Müller, C.S.S.R.* Benziger Brothers, New York, Cincinnati, and St. Louis. Fr. Pustet & Co., New York and Cincinnati. B. Herder, St. Louis.

The volume before us, treating specially on "the dignity, authority, and duties of parents, ecclesiastical and civil powers," and their enemy, is the fifth of Father Müller's series of publications under the general

title of "God the Teacher of Mankind." The sub-title Father Müller has given his works—"Popular Catholic Theology"—well designates their general intention and character. They are designed for popular use, and as respects subjects discussed and elucidated, the manner of treating them, and the language in which Father Müller expresses himself, they are just what works intended for general reading should be, clear, simple and easy of comprehension, yet replete with weighty matter.

The volume before us treats of subjects of immediate practical importance, particularly in their relation to the prevailing errors and sins of our day. After exhibiting in several chapters the dignity and sacredness of the Family, and the mutual relations, rights and duties of its members, Father Müller shows in what true education consists, and then gives a number of excellent directions as to the education of the body, of the soul, education by Christian instruction, by vigilance over children, by training them to obedience, by punishment, by setting a good example to children, pointing out under each head how parents violate their duties as regards each of these points. With great force and clearness he insists on the duty of Catholics to send their children to Catholic schools, shows why Catholics cannot, without sin, send their children to godless schools, points out the evils of the public schools, and answers the objections of nominal Catholics and "moderate" Catholics. He then speaks of the duty of parents to assist their children in choosing a state of life, giving sound practical advice to those who are about to make the choice, and also advice to those who are about to enter into matrimony. He then speaks of mixed marriages, shows their evils, their unhappy consequences, and that they are opposed to the law of God and of the Church.

After elucidating these and many other kindred subjects, Father Müller takes up the subject of ecclesiastical authority, shows its extent and scope; that the Catholic Church has been invested with it by divine appointment, and what the Catholic Church has done for mankind. He then speaks of civil authority, showing its basis, design, and scope, and the duties of temporal rulers to their subjects, of masters to their servants, and the correlative duties of subjects and of servants.

He then shows what is the great enemy of all authority, divine and human. This he finds in Freemasonry. He shows what its real spirit, its chief object is; that it is in reality "an attempt to introduce heathenism practically into the world, to establish the church of Satan." He then points out the means by which it strives to accomplish this. These are: First, the destruction of secular governments; second, the overthrow of the Catholic Church; third, the spread of immoral and infidel principles through the press; fourth, infidel education.

Special chapters are given to an exhibition of American Freemasonry, and to showing that it is condemned by ex-Masons and by the Church.

LIFE OF THE VENERABLE SERVANT OF GOD, CLEMENT MARIA HOFBAUER, VICAR-GENERAL OF THE CONGREGATION OF THE MOST HOLY REDEEMER. By *Father R. P. Michael Haringer*. Translated into English by Lady Herbert. New York and Cincinnati: F. Pustet & Co., 1883.

"The Liguori of the North," as Father Clement Hofbauer was called, has found an excellent biographer in Father Haringer, the Consultor-General of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer. Father Hofbauer was proclaimed Venerable by Pope Pius IX., on the 14th of May, 1876. This decree acknowledged the heroic nature of F. Hof-

bauer's virtues. It only remains to decide upon the miracles which God has wrought at the intercession of his servant, to prepare the way for his ultimate canonization. We feel confident that this life, so free from exaggeration, so calm and so thoroughly historical and accurate, will tend greatly to the glory of the Venerable Missionary, and, by awakening devotion to him, move God to crown him on earth with the sign of the halo, which he has in heaven,—that of saintship.

Father Clement was chosen by God to transplant and consolidate, north of the Alps, the work begun by St. Alphonsus in the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer. He began his Apostolic ministry in 1785, two years before the death of St. Alphonsus. His career embraced the stormy and anarchical period of the French Revolution. He beheld the fall of the monarchy in France, the fearful excesses of the Reign of Terror, the birth of the Empire and its fall, the ruin of Poland, and the decadence of religion in Germany and elsewhere. Father Clement was indefatigable in preaching the faith, and in combating errors, and he endured the hardest trials in defence of the rights and liberties of the Church. He died in 1820, in his sixty-ninth year, after making a remarkable prediction of the spread of the Redemptorist Congregation. As an illustration of the fulfilment of this prediction, Lady Herbert gives a sketch of the extraordinary success of the Congregation in Great Britain and America, and the blessing which rested upon the labors of Father Frederick de Held, the founder of the English Province.

Incident to the life of Father Hofbauer, is a series of admirable sketches of the state of religion and society in Poland (1786), and in Germany at the end of the eighteenth century. Austria is also well delineated in a few but firmly drawn lines. These historical sketches add great variety and interest to the biography of the saint. We have also his maxims on preaching and the care of souls, his predilections in devotions, particularly to the Blessed Sacrament and to our Lady, and many valuable hints and sayings which are peculiarly precious, as Father Faber declares, because they come from a saint.

There are also short and interesting notices of the remarkable men, whom Father Clement drew to the Congregation. One of these, Father F. W. Werner, a convert from Lutheranism, was a man of great ability, and an orator of extraordinary power. He and Father Clement almost alone converted Vienna to God, the one by his preaching, the other by the example of the highest virtue. An Appendix gives a number of documents, including the decrees of the Prussian government inimical to the Church. They show that the present anti-religious movement had its beginnings in the dawn of the century.

THE ETERNAL PRIESTHOOD. By *Henry Edward, Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster*. New York: Catholic Publication Society, 1883.

Probably the chapter that will attract most attention in this admirable treatise upon the nature and duties of the Priesthood, is the fourth, which has for its thesis the obligation to sanctity in the sacerdotal state. "The notion of obligation," says Cardinal Manning, "has been so identified with laws, canons, vows, and contracts, that, if these cannot be shown to exist, no obligation is supposed to exist. It is true that all laws, canons, vows, and contracts lay obligations upon those who are subject to them. But all obligations are not by laws, nor by canons, nor by vows, nor by contracts." He quotes St. Alphonsus in support of the declaration that interior spiritual perfection is a

prerequisite condition to receiving sacred orders. This is the judgment of all the Fathers and Doctors with one voice. We call the special attention of our ecclesiastical readers to this point, as an impression prevails that only the Regular Clergy and the Episcopate are states of perfection, or, as some theologians express it, are bound *ex vi voti*, or *ex ordine*, to exercise spiritual perfection.

The work bears full evidence of the author's wide and intimate acquaintance with the practical duties of the missionary clergy. This gives the treatise an immense superiority over those manuals of the clergy which are written in the seclusion of monasteries or seminaries, by devout men who know little about the actual dangers and trials of the mission. Cardinal Manning has been in the midst of the battle for years, and his book is exactly adapted to the needs of priests exercising the sacred ministry in the world around them. The chapters on "The Priest's Dangers," "The Priest's Helps," and "The Priest as Preacher," are replete with practical advice and counsel.

Singular as it may seem, a great part of the books designed for the guidance of the clergy, consist of depressing homilies on the almost inevitable damnation, which follows upon the slightest relaxation or unbending of a high-strung rigor, which is set forth as the crowning grace of the priesthood. Men of a scrupulous turn are tortured by the impossible standard held up for their attainment, and, as such books find their way into the hands of the laity, a false impression spreads that a Catholic Priest should be of the same mould as a Puritan preacher of the Cromwellian era.

Cardinal Manning's book (particularly the chapter on "The Pastoral Office, a Source of Confidence," and "The Priest's Liberty") will prove most encouraging to all priests who wish to realize a lofty yet attainable ideal of their sacred office. It is on the ground of its strong common-sense, as well as its devotional fervor, that we recommend the work to the perusal of the laity.

"THE CHILDEN OF THE GOLDEN SHEAF" is the title of Miss Eleanor C. Donnelly's latest volume of poems. There are thirty-nine of them, dedicated to the children of our Catholic schools, "at home and abroad," and they are, in themselves, a sweet and wholesome handful of ripe grains of truth. As usual, the title is well-chosen, graceful, musical, and awakening interest. The opening verses tell its story. At the door of a convent chapel there hangs

"A little box, seal'd evermore,
But, with a tiny cross pierc'd in its lid;"

and into it the children drop a grain of wheat "for every act of faith, of hope, of love," for every conquest of themselves, and every pain "endur'd to please Christ's loving heart above." When the box is filled, the grain is taken to the convent mills, and from its "snowy meal," are made the Hosts given to the children on First Communion Day. The happy little ones are called the "Children of the Golden Sheaf," and Miss Donnelly draws a beautiful picture of their possible future as the outgrowth of such a holy gleanings time. This poem is followed by many a favorite, where all are delicately pure and fervent. "The Legend of the Waxen Ciborium," "Pleading Hands," "The Sparrow in the Rain," "The Bee at the Altar," and "A Vision of St. Joseph," which closes the list, and is inscribed to Father Drumgoole, of St. Joseph's Union, New York, are each a gentle reminder and a persuasive lesson for old and young. Essentially for children are "The

Lay of the Easter Eggs" and "Minnie's Christmas Sermon." Miss Donnelly's easy flow of rhyme and rhythm are as delightful as ever, and the manner in which she still crystallizes into a holy thought each suggestion from the outer life is fitly exemplified by the two stanzas, "Like the Swallows."

" Across the ether's blue expanse,
To southern bowers swiftly hieing,
This autumn eve, with upward glance,
I watch a flock of swallows flying:
Till floating pinions migratory
Melt in the sunset's golden glory.

" E'en thus, my soul (I softly say),
When chill temptations o'er thee hover,
From frost of Fear, from Doubt's decay,
Oh! may'st thou flee to blissful cover:
And, like the swallows migratory,
Be lost to view in God's glad glory."

The poems are approved by the Very Rev. Dr. Walsh, Administrator of the Archdiocese of Philadelphia, who says, in his letter to Miss Donnelly regarding the volume: "I recommend it highly to the readers of sacred poetry and song, and particularly to the children of Catholic schools." It is neatly and daintily gotten up, as it deserves, and is a creditable addition to Catholic literature.

THE LIFE AND TEACHING OF JESUS CHRIST. Gathered from the Four Gospels and Arranged for Meditation for Every Day of the Year. By *Nicholas Avancino*, of the Society of Jesus. In two volumes. London: Burns & Oates. 1883.

Father Avancino was one of the members of the Society of Jesus in the seventeenth century, whose whole life may be said to have been spent in arduous labors and good works for the benefit of souls. He was Professor of rhetoric and philosophy, and afterwards of theology, at Gratz, and subsequently at Vienna. Afterwards he governed several colleges as Rector, and the Austrian Province of the Society of Jesus as Provincial, besides discharging the duties of Visitor of Bohemia. Called to Rome in the latter part of his life to occupy the post of Assistant for the German Provinces of the Society, he died there at the age of seventy-four years.

The list of his various publications is a long one, but none of his other works have retained a popularity equal to that of his *Meditations*, of which the volumes before us are a translation. They were composed when Father Avancino was in the maturity of vigorous life, and have the advantage of being the production of large experience as well as of a mind perfectly trained and exercised in theological studies and also in the holy practice of daily meditation after the method of St. Ignatius. They seem to have been originally composed for the use of the members of the Society of Jesus. They are short and leave much to be done by the person who uses them for purposes of meditation. This is in accordance with the method of St. Ignatius, who, always insisted on brevity in giving meditations for Retreats, so that the mind of the person making the meditation might be encouraged to exert itself, and form considerations, reflections, and resolutions of its own.

Yet as some persons complain of this brevity, as making such works dry, Father Avancino's "Meditations" have been enlarged both in France and Germany by additions derived from the famous works of Father Louis de la Puente and other eminent writers. These additions have been retained in the English translation. Indeed, they are

so interwoven with the original text that it would now be difficult to remove them.

The arrangement of subjects in the work follows the course which the endeavor to comprise the whole of the Gospel history and the succession of Christian seasons and festivals requires. From Advent to the end of the Epiphany season the meditations are occupied with the Incarnation and the Holy Infancy. The consideration of the Holy Passion begins with Septuagesima Sunday. The weeks between Easter and Whit-Sunday are given to the mysteries of the Resurrection, the Forty Days, Ascension, and Pentecost. The weeks immediately after Pentecost are devoted to the Ever-Blessed Trinity and the Blessed Sacrament; the remainder of the year is given to considering the Public Life of our Lord.

SHORT SERMONS FOR THE LOW MASSES OF SUNDAY. Comprising in Four Series a Methodical Exposition of Christian Doctrine. By the *Rev. F. X. Schoeppe, S. J.* Translated from the French, with the Permission of the Author, by the Rev. Edward Th. McGinley. New York, Cincinnati, and St. Louis: Benziger Brothers. 1883.

The necessity for plain and pithy sermons or instructions on points of Christian doctrine and Christian duties is daily becoming greater. Vast numbers of Catholics no longer attend the High Mass and hear the regular sermon preached at that service. They usually attend only the Low Masses, and the only opportunity the Priest has of speaking to them from the Altar is at those Masses. Unless, therefore, some brief plain instruction is given at those times, a large proportion of the laity will know very little about religion or the duties it imposes.

The work before us is intended to assist Clergymen in meeting this exigency. The sermons are very brief, requiring only from five to seven minutes for delivery. Yet they are full of solid matter logically arranged, clearly and pointedly expressed, and pervaded with a fervid holy unction. The four series which the volume comprises form a complete course of moral instruction, and also of dogmatic, so far as the latter is connected with the former. Taken together, they contain clear and full explanations of the Apostle's Creed and its dependent tenets, of the Ten Commandments, the Six Precepts of the Church, the Sacraments, the Feasts and Ceremonies of the Church, and of the Last Four Things.

They are not dry skeletons of sermons, but concise, pithy, fervid discourses. They will be useful to the laity as edifying reading, as well as an assistance of great value to those of the clergy whose other pressing duties allow them no time for the preparation of such discourses,—a work of far greater difficulty than to compose a lengthy sermon.

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MARY QUEEN OF SCOTS, AND HER MARRIAGE WITH BOTHWELL. Seven Letters to "The Tablet." Revised, with a preface and notes and a supplement. By the *Hon. Colin Lindsay.* London: Burns & Oates. Edinburgh: William Paterson. 1883.

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THE PLURALITY OF WORLDS.

WHEN the splendid discoveries in astronomical science had become public, and every one, even the least educated, was aware that the millions of bright points with which the heavens appear to be studded were so many suns, each forming a system apart and a unit in the vast and numberless mass of worlds rolling in space, infidels and rationalists tried to press those discoveries into their own science and make them bring their testimony against Christianity, as they had done in all the other branches of human science. Paine, among the English-speaking infidels, formulated the objection from astronomy. "The system of a plurality of worlds renders the Christian faith at once little and ridiculous, and scatters it in the mind like feathers in the air. The two beliefs cannot be held together in the same mind, and he who thinks he believes in both has thought but little of either." (*Age of Reason*.) By this is meant that if the numberless systems of the universe be made by one and the same God, who has peopled them with rational and moral creatures, it is absurd to suppose that He has had such special regard for us, the inhabitants of this tiny speck called the earth, as Christianity asserts; it is senseless to suppose that He sent His only begotten Son to be made man, to suffer and to die for us, and has absolutely neglected and ignored the myriads of rational beings dwelling in other solar systems, and filling with organized, intelligent life all the points of immeasurable space. We might reply to our over-confident friends, the rational-

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ists, that Christianity is preëminently a *fact*, that its main principles have been realized, as it were, and incorporated in real events, such as the mysteries of the Incarnation, of the Atonement, of the perpetual indwelling of the same Incarnate God in the Church, which is His extension and manifestation in time and space, and which is a living, quickening reality, defying the attacks of all its enemies for the last nineteen centuries. Moreover, Christianity has pervaded, more than the air which fills the atmosphere, the whole social system for the last nineteen centuries, and has created modern civilization in all that it can boast of real living, justifying, ennobling elements,—so much so, that we could easily identify the history of civilization with the history of Christianity. Consequently, we are right in saying that Christianity is a fact, in the best sense of the word.

Now, the statement of the plurality of worlds, teeming with rational inhabitants, is an hypothesis, a supposition, a guess. We may, therefore, say to our opponents: Wait till you have demonstrated your opinion to be a fact, your hypothesis to be a thesis, and then it will be time for us Christians to take up your objection and to put fact against fact and discuss upon their agreement or disagreement. But so long as your opinion remains a guess, you will allow us to hold fast to our Christianity. But it is not necessary to resort to such an argument to silence our opponents, as we can lay down and prove the three following propositions, which will form the subject of this article:

I. We think it highly probable that all the solar systems of the universe are inhabited by intelligent spirits informing material organisms.

II. We *know* that Christianity, either as a whole system or in any of its principles, is not opposed to the opinion of the plurality of worlds.

III. We are convinced that they mutually help each other,—Christianity, by rendering that opinion more and more probable; and the plurality of worlds, by setting the grandeur, the magnificence, the comprehensiveness of Christianity in a bolder and more splendid relief.

But before we enter upon the demonstration of these three propositions, we beg to recall a few preliminary notions of astronomy in order that our readers may more easily follow us in our discussion.

Astronomy teaches: 1st. That the fixed stars are self-luminous suns like ours; that some of them are accompanied by one or more self-luminous satellites and others by obscure ones, but the existence of which is sufficiently proven by the phenomena of their various phases and movements.

2d. These may be called systems of primary order, and, like our own planetary system, are governed by the law of gravitation and all the other laws which Kepler discovered to rule over the planets revolving around our sun. If the secondary suns, which officiate as satellites of the principal ones, are themselves surrounded by dark satellites, we shall have the case similar to that which takes place in some of the principal dark stars of our system.

3d. In many cases these simple systems are substituted by others extremely complex, which form groups or globular masses, the laws of whose movement or equilibrium are as yet unknown to us. These groups are formed by separate masses, that is, stars easily distinguishable by means of our instruments, and which, in the centre only, by their great multitude, exhibit a luminous *indistinctness*, which is also of a starry nature, as is easily evinced by their spectrum.

4th. The Milky Way is a belt formed by an enormous accumulation of complicated masses of stars, each of which may be regarded as composed of innumerable systems of superior order. The form of this enormous mass is unknown to us, but in relation to the size of the earth it does not exhibit an equal depth in all directions, and we can look through in certain places beyond its limits,—in others we cannot.

5th. The stars which seem to us the largest are the nearest, and the distance is the principal, though not the only, cause, which makes the others appear smaller. Probably the largest and nearest to us form one of those superior systems of which our sun is a part, many of which united together form the Milky Way.

6th. Besides the stars, there are numberless other masses of matter shining with native light and not as yet concentered in definite bodies, but in the gaseous state, which are called the *nebulae*, some of which are of enormous size.

7th. The distance of some of the stars is immense. The light of some stars of the first magnitude, having the tenth of a second of parallax, would require ten thousand years to reach us, though light travels, as is well known, at the rate of twelve millions of miles a minute.

8th. But though the space which the stars represent be immense, yet it does not constitute the real limits of the creation, because not only the Herschelian instruments cannot penetrate all the galactic stratum in its depth, but not even our own modern instruments, such as Lord Rosse's telescope, that of Lassels, of Washington, of Melbourne, of Paris. Hence the firmament is absolutely unfathomable to us. However, it cannot be said to be infinite, as mathematicians prove that nothing which is composed of distinct

and separate parts or beings can be infinite, because a thing composed of distinct and separate beings can always be expressed either by even or odd numbers, and in neither supposition could it be infinite. Because, suppose that which is claimed by the supposition to be infinite were expressed by an odd or an even number, by simply deducting a unit, from being infinite the thing would become finite, which is absurd.

Having given a résumé of the last results of astronomy, we repeat that we hold it highly probable that the millions of worlds, rolling majestically in immeasurable space, are inhabited by intellectual substances, informing a material organism in the same manner as our souls inform our bodies, but an organism adapted both to the nature of those intellectual substances and to the peculiar conditions—both atmospherical and meteorological—of those regions which they inhabit. Our readers will certainly not expect from us any astronomical arguments in support of our opinion; this we leave to those who follow that sublime science *ex professo*. For us, the fact that one of the greatest of modern astronomers, Secchi, held such opinion,¹ is sufficient warrant that there are no astronomical objections against this opinion of sufficient value to give us any anxiety. Our argument will be both theological and metaphysical, and especially drawn from the most fundamental principles of St. Thomas, several of whose premises, if evolved to their legitimate consequences, will demand the existence in other worlds of incorporated intellectual substances other than man. And now for the proofs.

1st. It is a fundamental principle of St. Thomas that the number of the various creatures of the universe is to be estimated and reckoned in proportion to their perfection and dignity of being in the scale of creation, God having created the higher and nobler in the scale in much larger number than the lower. This principle presides over and pervades the whole cosmology of St. Thomas, and is very frequently alluded to by him. We will give a few instances: "Cum perfectio universi sit illud quod Deus intendit in creatione rerum, quanto aliqua sunt magis perfecta tanto in majori excessu sunt creata a Deo;" that is, things are created in much greater number in proportion as they are more perfect, the perfection of the universe being the object which God has principally in view in creating. (*Summa Th. P. P.*, qu. 50, Art. 3, corp.)

Again: The order of the universe seems to demand that those beings which are higher and nobler should exceed in quantity or number those which are lower and less noble, because the less noble and the more lowly seem to have been made for the higher and the nobler. Hence it is necessary that the nobler beings,

¹ The Stars. An Essay on Sidereal Astronomy.

existing almost for themselves, should be multiplied as much as possible.

"Ordo universi exigere videtur ut id quod est in rebus nobilior excedat quantitate vel numero ignobiliora; ignobiliora enim videntur esse propter nobiliora; unde oportet quod nobiliora quasi propter se existentia multiplicentur quantum possibile est." (*C. G.*, Lib. 2, ch. 92.)

It is evident from these texts, which are repeated on other occasions, that St. Thomas holds the principle as a fundamental in cosmology, that God, in determining the number of the different creatures, has been guided by the place they hold in the scale of perfection; the greater and the more perfect having been created in much greater number than the lower. And before we draw from it the conclusion relative to our subject, it will be interesting to inquire into the metaphysical reason which led St. Thomas to adopt such a principle as fundamental. This reason is found in the fact that God is the efficient, typical, and final cause of the universe; a reason which goes to show that Creation not only demands a variety of species, but also a greater number of species of those beings which are higher and nobler in the scale of perfection than of those which are lower. 1st. The efficient cause demands a variety of species. Every agent, says St. Thomas, intends to impress his own similitude on the effect which he produces, as far as the nature of the effect will permit. This the agent realizes more or less perfectly in proportion to his perfection as agent. For instance, it is evident that the greater the caloric power in a body, the greater is the heat which is generated from it; the more skilful an artist, the more perfect will be the forms which he will give to his materials. But God is a most perfect agent. Therefore it behooved Him to impress His own similitude upon His creatures as perfectly as created nature was capable of. But a most perfect similitude of God could not be realized by the creation of one species of creatures. Because, when it is a question of a cause of a nature far superior to the effect, those perfections which are found in the cause in a simple manner, as one, can be represented in the effect only as composite and multiple. If we would, therefore, admit a perfect similitude of God in creation, we must admit a multiplicity and variety of species.

"Quum enim omne agens intendit suam similitudinem in effectum inducere secundum quod effectus capere potest, tanto hoc agit perfectius quanto agens perfectius est; patet enim quod quando aliquid est calidus tanto facit magis calidum et quando est aliquis melior artifex tanto formam artis perfectius inducit in materiam. Deus autem est perfectissimum agens. Suam igitur similitudinem in rebus creatis ad eum pertinebat inducere perfectissime, quan-

tum naturæ creatæ convenit. Sed perfectam Dei similitudinem non possunt consequi res creatæ secundum unam solam speciem creaturæ, quia cum causa excedat effectum quod est in causa simpliciter et unite, in effectu invenitur composite et multipliciter. Oportuit igitur esse multiplicitem et varietatem in rebus creatis," etc. (*C. G.*, Lib. 2, ch. 45.)

As to the typical cause: He who acts by means of intelligence represents the form (or the idea) of his own intellect in the effect. Thus the artist expresses something like himself by means of his art. But God created the universe by means of His intellect, and not by necessity of nature, as we have shown (Ch. 23). Wherefore the form (or the idea) of the divine intellect is expressed by the universe made by the same intellect. But the intellect which *intelligences* many things is not sufficiently represented by one thing. Consequently, as the divine intellect intelligences many things, it will represent itself much more perfectly if it creates several species of creatures in the universe, than if it creates a single one.

As to the final cause: A number of finite goods are better than one. But all created goodness is finite, because infinitely short of infinite goodness. Therefore the universe would be more perfect if there were created a number of species than if one only.—St. Thomas, *Ib.*

Again, as to the final cause: The goodness of the species is superior to the goodness of the individual, as the ideal and the formal is inferior to that which is material. Wherefore a multitude of different species adds much more to the perfection of the universe (the object aimed at by God in creating) than a similitude of individuals of the same species. These reasons, which abundantly account for the necessity of creating a multitude of species, explain also why the species of the more perfect ones should be created in much greater number than the lower and the less perfect, because of the aptitude of the former to realize better than the lower species, the requirements of the cause which under the threefold relation of efficient, typical, and final cause, always aims at that which is more perfect and more exalted in the scale of being, and can better exercise its infinite power, better express its infinite ideal, and give better vent to the outpourings of its infinite goodness.

We resume, therefore, the cosmological doctrine of St. Thomas, which is to the effect that the principle which guided the Almighty and Allwise Maker of all things in determining the number of species of creatures to be created, was their place in the scale of beings; those species which stand higher in the scale of perfection having been created in much greater number, and in gradual and ascend-

ing variety. Now, it is upon this principle of St. Thomas that we formulate one of our arguments in favor of the existence of numberless species of intellectual substances united to a material organism, and rising one upon another in the scale of being. Because if such were not the case,—if the common species alone had been created,—if the world, rolling in immeasurable space, so to speak, were void of intellectual life,—then the principle would be reversed; then we should find that in this visible creation those beings which are lower in the scale of perfection, those which are at the foot of the ladder, were created in much greater variety, in much greater number than those which stand higher; therefore we should find that the Almighty and Allwise Creator could draw a greater variety of types and ideals from His infinite and inexhaustible essence for the lowest beings of the visible world; and when he had risen in the gradual variety of beings,—from those enjoying a mere existence, from those living an organic life only, from those living a sensitive life, to the intellectual substance, living in and informing an organism,—he could find only one type, and was forced to be satisfied, and rest there. Let us, for the better development of our argument, cast a glance at the visible creation, and we shall find those beings which are endowed with mere existence, the movements of which are not native internal movements, but are borrowed movements,—such as the mineral world, such as the worlds above us, rolling in space,—and we shall find that their number is incalculable.

We know that the fixed stars,—six thousand as seen by the naked eye, and at least, in number, one hundred millions as seen by the telescope,—may be considered as the suns of other systems whose planets are invisible from their distance.

Now, take a hundred millions of fixed stars as so many suns, each one forming the centre of a system of worlds like our own, and it is highly probable that there are more than ten thousand millions of worlds of matter like those of our solar system, which occupy the space sufficiently near to our sun for the rays of their suns to become interchangeably reciprocated.

These worlds have been claimed by astronomers as belonging to *our cluster* in the heavens. But there is no reason to believe that our solar system constitutes a central point about which are collected these vast clusters of worlds, and that all space beyond our contracted scope of vision is left unoccupied. On the contrary, there is every reason to believe that throughout boundless space, in every direction, are sprinkled similar clusters beyond clusters, like glittering dust, diffused throughout space, unlimited by verge or shore. The imagination, in this bold exploring excursion, finds no resting place for bringing to an end its onward flight,

and, like the dove fluttering over the boundless flood of waters, finally droops its weary wings to return to this minute terrestrial orb, that becomes almost lost to it amid the vastness of the extent of space and of countless myriads of the surrounding worlds of matter.

Moreover, by a metaphysical law that God cannot create two beings absolutely equal in every sense, as one of them would represent no type or idea, but would be a senseless repetition, it follows that at least each system of these myriads of clusters must have some specific quality to distinguish it from all others, and that consequently each system of the cluster may be looked upon as a specific and distinct world from all others, though all harmonizing under the Almighty hand of their maker, and obeying the same laws.

Yet these worlds, so prodigiously great in number, these heavenly armies,—as the royal Poet calls them,—when considered as to their place in the scale of being, are seen to hold the *lowest*—the mineral kingdom. They are as inferior to man in the scale of perfection as they are superior to him in the immense proportions of their masses. And yet, though reason teaches us, with St. Thomas, that God created the species of superior creatures in much larger quantity than the lower and the inferior, we must believe that there is and can be no other species of intellectual incorporated substance except the human species; and that God, Almighty and Allwise, who would produce an immense variety of myriads of worlds out of the lowest type of existence, could effect but a single species out of the idea of the highest in His visible creation.

We must believe this, or else we must people those myriads of clusters of worlds with intellectual substances informing an organism, each species differing from the other indefinitely, to give full scope to the typical idea in God's mind.

That portion of the genus animal which comprises the brute creation is not made up of one species, but of a vast number of species. The last results of science show this with the fullest evidence. Every one even slightly acquainted with the natural sciences has heard of that innumerable world of animal life discovered by the microscope, especially of those little animalcules which have been called infusoria, though the term ought to be abandoned, as many of these creatures do not live in infusions, but, on the contrary, inhabit the sea and the fresh-water. The polar ices, the regions of the atmosphere, and the gloomy depths of the oceans are peopled with living organisms, and everywhere their prodigious concentration astonishes as much as the infinite variety of their forms. If the beautiful discoveries of Eurenberg did not prove the fact, who would believe that those tiny creatures, whose

minuteness evades the eye, possess more vital resistance than the most vigorous animal? Where the rigor of the climate kills the most robust of the vegetable world, where a few scattered animals procure but a scanty and precarious existence, the delicate organism of the *microzoa* suffers no injury from the most terrible cold. More than fifty species of animalcules with silicious carapaces were discovered by Sir James Ross on the rounded masses of ice which float on the Polar seas at the 78th degree of south latitude. In the Gulf of Erebus the plummet brought from a depth of more than 500 yards sixty eight species of silicious microzoa, and they have been discovered at the depth of more than 12,000 feet, where they had to support the enormous pressure of 375 atmospheres, a pressure capable of bursting a cannon.

These living corpuscles, which multiply in the transparent regions of the ocean, abound equally in the muddy waters of our rivers and ponds, and, without being aware of it, we daily swallow myriads of them in the fluids which we drink.

That beautiful phenomenon of phosphorescence, which puzzled the sagacity of the learned, is found to be caused by millions upon millions of tiny microzoa floating on the surface of the sea. The red color which the water of certain rivers sometimes assumes is owing to the prodigious number of the same animalcules. M. Morren, a Belgian *savant*, counted twenty-two species of such as are capable of giving water a blood color.

But water is not the sole domain of microscopic animalcules. They are met with in the earth, in masses the capacity of which exceeds all power of calculation. Certain species, the extreme minuteness of which does not equal the 45,000th part of an inch, form in some damp places living beds beneath the soil, which are often several yards in thickness. The city of Berlin is built on one of these beds.

These tiny animals, ten thousand of which could be ranged on the length of an inch, invade not only air, earth, and water, but are found full of vitality in the interior of animals and plants. And we have not, as yet, alluded to the *monad*, the true atom of the animal kingdom. These are so extremely small that they can only be seen by means of microscopes of the greatest magnifying power. They are met with in all kinds of animal and vegetable steepings, and their number is often so prodigious that they all seem to touch each other in the drop of liquid in which they move. A single drop contains more than a thousand millions; that is, almost as many as all the inhabitants of the globe.¹

We return to our argument. If the principle of St. Thomas be true, that the number of species of created beings is greater in pro-

¹ Pouchet, The Universe.

portion to the dignity of being or perfection, which mark their place in the scale of the Universe; and if it be true, also, that God, as we know by scientific observation, has created a large variety of species of that portion of the animal germs, which is restricted to the brute, why should there not be a much larger number of species of intelligent substances informing an organism in the same manner as our soul informs the body? Why should the principle fail in its best and noblest application, whereas, it is maintained and applied in the lower being? We conclude and resume our first argument thus: The nature of the efficient typical and final cause of creation demands the perfection of the universe. But such perfection is better attained by the creation of a number of different species,—therefore, the perfection of the universe demands the existence of a different species; and as among these species of creators the best and the noblest represent their cause in a more perfect manner than the lowest, the number of the former must exceed by far the number of the latter. And as an intellectual substance informing an organism is the highest and noblest representation of God known to us in the visible world, we conclude that the number of such species of intelligent substances informing an organism must by far exceed the number of all inferior species of animals.

But this variety of species of all created beings which God has made to represent His infinite perfections, must exhibit a certain order otherwise; we could never have that single system called the universe. And this order is attained, in the first place, by means of the law of affinity or proportion, which God has established between the different species of His creatures. This law implies that between one species of created beings and another, the distance which necessarily exists, and must exist between them, and which can never be passed over under pain of changing the species,—as the species or natures of things are like number,—you can add to or subtract a unity from a certain number and you will have more or less, but not the same number; be smoothed down, brought somewhat nearer together by a medium species lying between them partaking of the distinctive property of the inferior species in a somewhat higher degree, and of the destructive property of the next superior species in a superior degree.

“*Inveniet,*” says St. Thomas, “*siquis diligenter consideret gradatim rerum diversitatem compleri; nam supra inanimata corpora inveniet plantas et super has irrationabilia animalia et super has intellectuales substantias; et in singulis horum inveniet diversitatem secundum quod quædam sunt aliis perfectiora in tantum quod ea quæ sunt suprema inferioris generis videntur propinqua superiori*

generi et e converso sicut animalia immobilia sunt similia plantis." (*Cont. E.*, Lib., ch. 97.)

Again St. Thomas: "Ita enim procedit ordo rerum ut similia se invicem subsequantur. Ea vero quæ sunt penitus dissimilia, non subsequuntur se invicem in gradibus rerum nisi per *ali quod medium*, sicut videmus quod animal perfectum et planta sunt dissimilia penitus quantum ad duo. Nam animal perfectum est sensitivum et motum motu processivo, planta autem neutrum horum habet. Natura ergo non procedit immediate ab animalibus perfectis ad plantas, sed producit in medio animalia imperfecta quæ sunt sensibilia cum animalibus et immobilia cum plantis." (*De Causis*, Lect. 30.)

Now, admitting this law of affinity or proportion as governing all created species of the universe, and admitting, on the other hand, the existence of an immense variety of pure intellectual substances in no way united to or dependent upon a material organism,—substances, which Revelation calls angels, but whose existence philosophy can demonstrate,—and we find, as a necessary conclusion of the two admissions, that the human species alone would not satisfy that law, and consequently without a variety of intermediate and gradual species of incorporated intellectual substances the order of the universe would not be so apparent, simply because of the immense distance lying between the highest human genius and the angel; of the vast disproportion between their powers, of the enormous superiority of the one over the other; a distance, a disproportion, a superiority which nothing that is known to us to exist could smooth or level. It may not be displeasing to our readers if, for the sake of a fuller development of this part of our subject, we give an abstract of the doctrine of St. Thomas on the nature and properties and attributes of the angels, a doctrine which gained for him the proud title of Angelic Doctor.

St. Thomas, after demonstrating the existence of a countless number of species of pure intellectual substances from the principles that the perfection of the universe, which was intended by God in the creation of the universe, required the existence of such pure intellectual substances, and of the vast number of species in consequence of the noble place they hold in the scale of creation, he passes to the analysis of their nature, properties and attributes, and then writes the following: 1st. The Angelic substance is absolutely independent of all material organism in its existence and its operation. "Ex propria operatione rei percipitur species ejus. Operatio enim demonstrat virtutem quæ indicat essentiam. Propria autem operatio substantiæ separatæ et animæ est intelligere. Est autem omnino alius modus intelligendi substantiæ separatæ et animæ; nam anima intelligit a phantasmatibus accipiendo

non autem substantia separata quum non habeat organa corporea in quibus oportet esse phantasmata." (*C. G.*, Lib. 3, ch. 94.)

2d. As a necessary consequence of this pure spirituality and absolute independence of the angelic nature of all material aid or instrument for its operation, St. Thomas argues that the intellect of the angel, as regards whatever comes within the range of its natural knowledge, is always in the act of intelligencing, and can never be found in the state of potentiality. Also, that the proper and principal object of such intellect is that which, in its nature and substance, is immaterial and intelligible.¹

3d. That though the angelic intellect cannot intelligence all things by means of his own substance, this belonging exclusively to God, whose essence is both the typical and efficient cause of all things, yet it can intelligence its own substance by itself without any aid whatever, because the two requisites wanted to bring about intellectual cognition are at hand; that is to say, subsisting immateriality of the object to be apprehended, and its inherence in the subject which must apprehend. Now, the angelic substance is immaterial, and subsistent, and inherent in its own intellect. Consequently, the angelic intellect can apprehend his own substance in itself and by itself.²

But in regard to other intellectual substances subsisting in themselves and all other objects, both immaterial and corporal, these, not being united with the angelic intellect, cannot be known by it without a means which may bring them together, and this is effected by God having impressed upon the angelic intellect the forms or ideas of all these objects³ in their specific essences and nature, and in their individual subsistence.⁴

Having spoken of the object of the angelic intellect, St. Thomas passes to inquire into the manner in which the angelic intellect is exercised; and he speaks more at length: 1st. Of the special manner according to which that intellect is always in the act of intelligencing those objects which are within the range of their natural knowledge, all having the forms or ideas of such objects, at once complete and perfect, though with regard to things divinely revealed the angelic intellect may be found in the state of potentiality.⁵

2d. That that sublime intellect is able to apprehend any number of objects which can be represented by one or few ideas, and that by intuition and without ratiocination or judgment.⁶

3d. That the intellect of the angel *per se* is exempt from errors and falsehood as regards those objects which come naturally with-

¹ Summa Th., p. 12, 54, art. 4. (*Ib.* 2, 55, art. 1.)

² *Ib.*, art. 2.

³ *Ib.*, 2, 28, art. 1.

⁴ *Ib.*, 2, 56, art. 2.

⁵ *Ib.*, 2, 57, art. 2.

⁶ *Ib.*, art. 3, 4.

in its range, because error mostly originates in analysing or uniting attributes and subjects, or comparing proportions together. But the intellect of the angel intelligences the essences of things, and has no need of analysis, therefore it is not subject to errors.

From this brief analysis of the essence, faculties and properties of the angels, we conclude the boundless distance which exists between man and the angel,—between the highest genius of mankind and the lowest in the hierarchy of angels,—difference and distance so great as to be altogether incalculable, and which St. Thomas expresses as follows: The angelic intellect is superior to the human intellect by a far higher degree than is the intellect of the greatest philosopher to that of a clown.¹

Now if the law of affinity and proportion is to be found in the system of the universe, surely the gap between the angelic intellect and the human,—be the latter even that of the greatest genius that ever honored the human race,—should be followed up and smoothed over by a numberless species of spiritual substances, informing an organism and dwelling in the various planetary systems of the universe, and affording a chain of links between the human and the angelic nature.

So far we have tried to prove that the existence of myriads of spiritual beings animating an organism, and dwelling in the numberless stars and planets rolling above our heads, is a legitimate consequence of two cosmological laws laid down by the Angelic Doctor.

The first of these laws is concerned about the question, What principle determined the Infinite Creator in the production of the various species of creatures as to their number? And we have answered, That the number of species to be created was determined by the place which each one holds in the scale of being or perfection; those species holding a higher place being created in much larger number than those which occupy a lower grade. From this we have concluded that, as the universe exhibits a large number of species in the mineral, vegetable, and animal kingdom, if we refuse to admit the existence of numberless species of incorporated spiritual substances living in the starry heavens, the first cosmological law, laid down and demonstrated by St. Thomas, would be reversed.

We have touched also upon the law of affinity or proportion, the requirements of which are that the distance and difference, necessarily intervening between one species and another to mark and to distinguish one from another, should be softened down by means of intermediate species, thus smoothing the roughness resulting from the too strong and too marked contrast, and maintaining the

¹ *Summa C. Gentes* L. 1, ch. 3.

harmony of the universe; in the same manner as a painter, who is obliged to represent two contrary colors in the roughness of their nature, will shadow and soften down the extremities which join them together, not to offend the eye with the too bold and too great contrast.

From this we think we have drawn the inference that, as there is an immense distance between the highest intellect of mankind and that of the lowest of the pure spiritual substances,¹ the cosmological law of affinity demands that there should be some intermediate species to soften down the immense contrast, and thus to exhibit and represent a most beautiful, harmonious order in the universe.

We will now develop a few more cosmological laws, which point to the same result,—the existence of a plurality of worlds.

The first of these is that, so-called, of the *minimum means*.

God, in the creation of the Universe, is absolutely free in two different senses. He is free to create, or not to create; because He is essentially and absolutely independent and self-sufficient.

Secondly, He is free as to the amount of perfection or being He may choose to create. True, the end of creation, that which inclines Him to create, the manifestation of His infinite excellence and goodness, would seem to demand the very best possible world or the highest possible amount of perfection. But, as the best possible world, understood in an ontological sense, is a contradiction in terms, as it would mean an *infinite finite*, an *absolute relative*, a *necessary contingent*, it follows that the best possible world, in an ontological sense, cannot be conceived, and much less effected. The supposition of a best possible world being eliminated, it follows that God is free to choose any one of the indefinite series of worlds which may be conceived, one more perfect than the other, none of which being able to exhibit any reason or motive why it should be selected in preference to another. For, should any of the series attempt to allege, as motive of preference, its own amount of perfection above all the rest which precede, it would be silenced by pointing out to it an indefinite possible series, much superior in perfection and amount of being.

But, having determined upon the amount of perfection to be created, God was bound to draw from it the greatest possible amount of glory, which it could possibly render to His infinite perfection. In this He was no longer free, but sweetly, though no less strongly, bound by His infinite wisdom; for it would have been foolishness to create a certain amount of being for the mani-

¹ Intellectus Angeli plus excedit intellectum humanum quam intellectus optimi philosophi intellectum *rudissimi idiote*; quia haec distantia inter species humanæ limites continetur quos intellectus Angelicus excedit.—S. Th., Summa C. G., Lib. 1, ch. 3.

festation of His own infinite attributes, and not to derive from that amount all the manifestation it could render, all the homage it could pay to His infinite grandeur. It would have been an unreasonable, motiveless manner of acting—an utterly useless waste of forces. To render this theory perfectly clear, we will make use of figures. Suppose the universe created includes a thousand millions of forces which, by the best possible development and combination, can represent and exhibit God's infinite perfection in degrees corresponding to three times the full amount of forces created and employed; and suppose, moreover, that God should prefer to select an arrangement and a combination of those forces, the result of which would be a manifestation of His infinite perfection in degrees merely equal to the number of forces employed; thus, by choosing such a combination in preference to the former, throwing away two thousand millions of degrees of glory, it is evident that such manner of acting would be unreasonable and unwise. It would be a reckless waste of forces—a failing to put the amount of forces created to the best possible advantage; a manner of acting absolutely and utterly unworthy of God's wisdom. It is evident, therefore, that God is not free in this respect. He must, if He would follow the requirements of wisdom, draw from the given forces to be created all the possible good in view of the end; in other words, He must take the shortest route to arrive at the goal, use the least possible means to attain an object, and follow the fundamental law of wisdom laid down by St. Thomas.

"Sapiens operator perficit opus suum brevior via qua potest."—S. Th., *S. E. P.*, 39: 4, art. 5.

Resuming in a few propositions the full meaning and extent of the law we have slightly developed, we may express it as follows:

1st. No force of the universe should be allowed to go to waste, but should be put to the best possible advantage.

"Contra rationem sapientiæ est ut sit aliquid frustra in operibus sapientis."—*C. G.*, Lib. 3, art. 69.

2d. All the forces combined should be so drawn out as to realize in the best possible manner the general end of the Universe.

"In his quæ *providentia* debite reguntur non debet esse aliquid frustra."—St. T., *Ib.*, art. 72.

Now, without the plurality of worlds teeming with myriads of intellectual substances informing an organism, the law of wisdom just demonstrated would utterly fail in both its requirements. As to the first, let us cast a glance at the heavens, and with the eye, aided by the telescope, unknown for over fifty centuries, pierce through the horizon to read immeasurable space. Here are myriads upon myriads of millions of solar systems, each with their planets and satellites, immense in their colossal proportion, bound-

less in the distance which separates one from the other, vying with the very thought of man in the swiftness of their movements, yet all subject to certain laws in their rotations around each other and rhythmical revolutions upon their axes. Pray, what is the physical use of such masses, so grand, so vast, so undeterminable in number and in bulk? Can any one tell the office they discharge in the plan of creation, and the service they are expected to render to physical life? No use whatever can be mentioned, if we suppose them deserted and sterile, and devoid of living inhabitants. Whilst the earth, a tiny speck in the immensity of space, is teeming with inhabitants, one serving for the use of the other, and all for man; the remaining undeterminately and prodigiously vast majority of the universe is totally and utterly useless.

We are aware that this argument has been answered by some philosophers who refer us to geology, and allege that something very like that which forms the foundation of our objection with regard to the solar systems has taken place on earth. They formulate their argument thus: "You are scandalized," they say, "that the great number of solar systems seem to be of no use whatever if we suppose them tenantless of living and intellectual beings; but, pray, of what use was the earth during the many millions of years which it existed before any animate being dwelt upon it, and of the many thousands of millions of years before man, its lord and master, came to take possession of his dominion? If the apparent uselessness of the earth for so many thousands of millions of years does not scandalize you, why should the apparent uselessness of the starry heavens seem to do so?"¹ Conceding, for the sake of argument, that the earth existed for so many centuries without living or intelligent inhabitants, we presume that that long period was necessary in order to render the earth a fit abode for living beings, and especially for man. But we can see no necessity for such a vast number of colossal systems of suns and planets existing for so many centuries without any known advantage, and for no probable reason that can be imagined; and hence, we feel obliged to deny the parallel between the two cases, and conclude that, as far as human science can tell, those immense systems were, and are, of no physical use whatever. The earth could very well exist and support its inhabitants if there were no other sun or solar system except the sun around which it revolves, and upon which it waits as an humble attendant. The law of the minimum means, therefore, fails as to its first requirement, because, in the case with which we are dealing, the vast majority of the forces of the universe, in a physical sense, are allowed to go to a frightful waste.

But would those myriads of worlds, devoid of intelligent sub-

¹ Whewell, *Essay on the Plurality of Worlds*.

stances informing an organism, be of any use in a *moral* sense? None whatever; if the starry heavens are desolate of intellectual creatures, they fail utterly, in a moral sense, to be of any profit in the universe. For surely the end of creation is the glory of God, the manifestation of His infinite perfection. And how is this attained? Does the mere objective existence of the beings of the universe effect this manifestation? Assuredly not. "*Invisibilia Dei per ea quæ facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur.*" The end is attained by means of intelligent creatures contemplating the works of God, and arguing from them the grandeur, the excellence, the magnificence, the majesty of the Creator, and thus acting as *mediator* between God and the inferior creation. Now, the prodigiously vast number of worlds, floating in boundless space, being supposed without intelligent inhabitants, man, alone in this visible universe, would be left to officiate as the high priest between God and His inferior creatures. But this man could not do. First, because it was after so many centuries, upon the invention of the telescope, that man began to suspect the grandeur of the heavens, and to partly have the veil lifted which hid such grand creations from his sight; and secondly, because even in the present stage of astronomical science man knows but little about the heavens. How, then, could he act as the mediator, the high-priest, between God and His starry creatures, and sing for them the hymn of praise and thanksgiving?

The myriad of worlds, then, if supposed void of intelligent inhabitants, would fail to represent their Creator, to manifest His grandeur, to proclaim His glory, as much as they should; and all those numberless wonders which they must be supposed to contain would say nothing more, and preach nothing more, than the little which man knows; and thus immense opportunities for God's glorification would have been wasted and thrown away.

It may be said here that the *Word Incarnate* alone is able to fulfil the office of mediator between God and His works, because He alone can know and appreciate both perfectly, and thus praise and glorify the Creator as much as He deserves. The end of the universe, therefore, would be attained if there were no other intelligent inhabitants in the solar systems except man, as the Incarnate Word alone can officiate as the true, perfect Mediator.

True, the Incarnate Word is absolutely sufficient to fulfil the end of the universe, because He alone can comprehend the infinite nature and grandeur of the Creator, and the boundless perfection He has lavished upon His creation, and in the name of the latter offer to God a worthy tribute of praise fully equivalent in worth and dignity to the deserts of the Creator. But this is true in a comprehensive sense, which means that the attainment of the end

of the universe required such elements, such conditions, such qualifications; and, that they are at hand. But God's purpose in the creation of the universe was *not* to attain the end of manifesting His infinite excellence and perfection only, in a *comprehensive* sense, but to extend that manifestation to an immense number of created personalities, and to receive from each in return the meed of praise, and thus to enhance to an incalculable degree the accidental fulfilment of the end of the universe, leaving to the Incarnate Word the double office, first, of *substantially* fulfilling the end of the universe, and secondly, of rendering the accidental realization of the end by each created personality acceptable and pleasing to God by uniting all those personalities to Him, and by acting in them and through them as the Divine Leader in the most magnificent and vast chorus which may be imagined. That such was God's purpose is evident from the fact of His effecting other works besides the Incarnation. If His object had been merely to attain the end of His creation in a comprehensive sense only, the Incarnation and the Word Incarnate alone would have been absolutely sufficient, because the Incarnate Word fulfils in the most perfect manner all the conditions required. But, instead of that, God creates an immense number of individuals of all the species which form the created nature of the Word, an immense number of individuals in the mineral, vegetable, animal, and intellectual species, all of which add nothing at all to the substantial manifestation of God's excellence as exhibited in the Incarnate Word, or to the substantial glory which He receives from them. It is clear, therefore, that besides the substantial fulfilment of the end of the universe, God proposed to Himself an immense accidental realization of the same by the creation of a vast numberless multitude of individuals, swelling, as it were, the chorus headed by the Incarnate Word, and enlarging to greater numerical proportions the harmony of the music and song raised to the honor of the Creator. This intention of God, therefore, necessitates the creation of myriads of intellectual creatures informing an organism and dwelling in the starry heavens, though we know that the Incarnate Word fulfils to the letter the substantial end of the universe. Of course this end of the universe, the attainment of God's greatest glory, which is merely sketched, as it were, in its accidental part whilst we are in the way of probation, is intended to reach its highest perfection only in bliss. And therefore this principle involves the necessity of the greatest possible number of intelligent creatures, attaining their ultimate perfection in bliss. Because, if God was not satisfied with the substantial fulfilment of the end of the universe, his infinite glorification by the Incarnate Word, but required the greatest possible accidental realization of the end by the greatest possible

number of created personalities, and if this is not attained perfectly except in the final beatitude, it follows that the greatest possible number of intelligent creatures must attain their final perfection in bliss.

We resume and conclude the argument we have made, in favor of a plurality of worlds, with the following passage from Father Secchi's work, *The Stars*: "The creation which the astronomer contemplates is not a mere mass of incandescent matter; it is a marvellous organism, wherein life springs up the moment the incandescence ceases. And though the life be not apparent through our telescopes, yet from the analogy of our own globe we may surmise its existence in others. The atmospheric constitution of the other planets, which, in certain points, is so similar to ours, as that of the stars is similar to that of the sun, convinces us that these bodies are in a stage similar to the present one of our system, or are traversing one of those stages which it already has gone over, or is destined to travel. From the immense variety of creatures which have existed, or do exist, on our planet, we may infer the different variety of those which may exist in others. If, on our planet, the air, the water, the earth are peopled by such variety of beings, which were so often changed on the change of the simple circumstances of climate, how much greater variety should we not admit in the colossal systems where the secondary luminaries are oftentimes lightened, not by one, but by more than one sun alternately, and where the climatic phases of heat and cold succeeding each other must be extreme, owing to the eccentricity of their orbits, and the various absolute intensity of their radiations, from which even our own sun is not free.

"Life fills the universe, and with life is associated intelligence, and as beings inferior to us abound in it, so there may be in other conditions other creatures vastly superior to us. Between the feeble light of that divine ray, which illumines our fragile nature, by means of which light we have been enabled to discover such wonders, and the wisdom of the Creator of all things, there lies an infinite distance which may be traveled, without ever realizing its term, by an infinite number of His creatures, for whom the theorems which are respectively to us the fruit of hard and persevering studies may be *simple intuitions*."

We proceed to the second part of our article.

Does the opinion of the worlds above us being inhabited by intelligences united to a body conflict with any principle of our holy faith? We answer most confidently, no, and this upon the highest authority.

St. Augustine and St. Thomas held that the opinion broached

¹ Secchi, *The Stars*, p. 239.

by some of the ancient philosophers to the effect that the stars were inhabited by some heavenly spirit as their vivifying and quickening principle, in the same manner as man's soul quickens and gives life to the body, was an opinion in no way concerning our holy faith, and which might safely be maintained. The following are St. Augustine's words: "Nec illud quidem certum habeo utrum ad eandem Societatem, scilicet Angelorum, pertineant Sol et Luna, et cuncta sidera; quamvis nonnullis, lucida esse corpora, non cum sensu vel intelligentia, videantur."¹

St. Thomas: "Hoc autem quod dictum est de animatione coeli, non diximus quasi asserendo secundum fidei doctrinam *ad quam nihil pertinet sive sic sive aliter dicatur*."—*C. G.*, Lib. 2, ch. 70.

And in the work *De Pot.*, quest. 6, art. 6, treating of the same question more at length, he says: "Whether certain incorporeal substances be united to the celestial bodies as forms (souls)." St. Augustine leaves it in doubt. But St. Jerome seems to assert it in the explanation of the text: "Lustrans universa per circuitum spiritus."—*Eccl.* 1. Origen is of the same opinion (Lib. 1, Patriarch., ch. 7). This seems to be reprobated by many of the modern theologians, on the ground that the number of the blessed, according to the Scripture, being made of angels and men, these spiritual substances, of which we are speaking, could not be ranked either among men or angels. But this St. Augustine also leaves in doubt. Then the holy Doctor quotes the words of St. Augustine which we have already given.

It is almost unnecessary for us to remark that, if St. Thomas and St. Augustine thought it not contravening any principle of faith, to hold the opinion that angels or spiritual substances should be incorporated in the heavenly bodies as their vivifying and moving principle, with much greater reason would they have admitted as in no possible way conflicting with any principle of revelation the opinion of the plurality of worlds in the sense so many times explained by us.

It is also quite superfluous for us to remark that many modern Catholic theologians and philosophers hold this opinion to be quite in unison with all the principles of the Catholic Faith. Among these we may quote Frayssinous, Gaume, Ventura, Bonnet, and a host of others. We leave, therefore, this part of the subject as being perfectly plain and obvious, and pass to the more important question. Suppose the worlds above us to be inhabited by intelligences incorporated in an organism, in what relation would these new personalities, so to speak, stand with regard to the whole system of our holy religion? What place would they hold in it? Where

¹ Enchiridion.

should they be located, and in what relations would they stand with regard to the essence, the purpose and result of Christianity?

These questions must be answered, for upon them depends the whole controversy between infidelity, with rationalism, and Christianity. Though we have no other principle or help to guide us except the analogy of faith, we think we can safely and satisfactorily answer all the problems resulting from our opinion.

And, first, though in the proofs we have alleged in favor of our opinion, we have already *located* those myriads of incorporated intelligences in the system of the cosmos, yet we call the attention of our readers to it again.

We place those myriads of intelligences between man and the pure spirits; we place them between those two, not as to size or space, but ontologically and hierarchically speaking, that is to say, as to their degree of perfection in intelligence. We heard the opinion of St. Thomas, that, between the lowest angel or pure intelligence and the greatest of human genius there is as much distance as there is between that genius and the intellect of the most ignorant clown. Now, that great distance, existing between the highest human genius and the lowest angel, may imply a great number of grades of intelligence, and every one of those grades may form a distinct species of incorporated intelligences, each comprehending under it an incalculable number of individuals, all those species rising one over the other in the scale of perfection, till the last one of them will almost touch the angel, and thus exhibit one perfect and symmetrical order.

Having located those myriads of inhabitants of the starry heavens, we must answer now a more important question—In what relation do they stand to Christ?

We answer briefly: The first object intended by God in His external action was the adorable person of our Blessed Lord as the only possible means which could attain the end of the Creation, the highest possible manifestation of His own infinite perfections, and the highest appreciation and honor of His infinite excellence.

From this it follows: 1st. That all other creations were effected through and for the sake of Christ, and as an extension of Christ, and received their destiny through Him. 2d. That all these creations, though manifesting each one in its peculiar way, in their being and action, the infinite excellence and perfection of God, were to do this in a manner worthy of God, by their dependence upon and union with Christ. 3d. That, among all these creations, non-intelligent creatures could fulfil their destiny of manifesting God's infinite excellence only objectively, that is, by the very fact of their existence and their actions, developing their being; but intelligent creatures were to do

this morally, that is, by being fully conscious of the manifestation of God's grandeur, of the appreciation of God's perfections expected of them, and by voluntarily and freely realizing this manifestation and appreciation in their own individual person, and bringing it to the highest possible perfection, of course, by their dependence upon and union with Christ.

In a few words : God launches out into existence all these creations to manifest and glorify Him perfectly in Christ, and through Christ, the only one who could attain such an object. All these creations, in returning to God, that is, in their development, to reach ultimate perfection, must do this by the same principle, which gave them existence and scope, that in Christ and through Christ non-intelligent beings do this only objectively, intelligent beings morally.

It follows from these principles that all the myriads of millions of inhabitants in boundless space, as they were created as men and angels through Christ and for the sake of Christ, so they must fulfil their destiny and attain their ultimate perfection through Christ and by their union with Christ. As we all received of His fulness, to speak with the Apostle, so must they receive of His fulness to reach their destiny.

Of course, this is not the place to prove the above statements, or vindicate their truth. We must necessarily take them for granted.

It follows, then, that the inhabitants of the other worlds and the other solar systems stand in the same relation to Christ as men and angels. No angel ever reached his ultimate destiny except through his supernatural union with Christ, no man ever will reach his eternal destiny except through his supernatural union with Christ, and no intelligent person, no matter who or where, can reach its destiny except through the same union. None comes to the Father but by Me (St. John).

It may be said here that, if our theory be true, then the words of the Creed, "*Qui propter nos homines et propter nostram salutem descendit de coelis,*" must be false. These words seem to imply that the sole object of the Incarnation was the redemption of mankind ; that man and his salvation were the exclusive aim of the coming of Christ.

But every one can understand that those words must not be understood in an exclusive sense or in a principal sense, as in such a sense they would be false. Because the principal object of the Incarnation was : 1st. The Glory of God. 2d. After the Fall, the reparation of honor due to the outraged majesty of God, the salvation of man being only the secondary object.

The second question allied to the first is, How do those intelligent substances stand to Christ as the Redeemer ? Did they need

any redemption? They did not need any redemption, unless they had committed an original sin of their own. For it is evident that what we call the original sin is confined absolutely within the limits of the human species, affecting only those born of Adam. Other spiritual substances, living and vivifying an organism, but not descended from Adam, have nothing at all to do with his fall. But those species of incorporated intelligences, being finite, may have fallen, and very likely did fall, either as a race, by the fall of the head of each race or species from whom all the individuals of the species came, or personally by their individual transgressions, and in either case the infinite merit of the sacrifice of Calvary was sufficient to redeem them and to give them whatever grace of restoration was needed in their peculiar circumstances.

But, fallen or not, they must be united to Christ to reach their destiny, and must be elevated to the supernatural order, and form part of the Catholic Church. What measures Christ may have used to incorporate them into His Church, we cannot, of course, determine.

Whether after the Ascension He went Himself to manifest to them the whole economy of His Incarnation and Redemption, and the establishment of His Church and of the Sacraments, that is, His sacramental extension in time and space; or, whether He established the same sacramental extension in those boundless realms, varying in their visible expression, but identical in spirit and efficacy, are all questions which cannot be resolved, except on the principle of the necessity of a union with Christ, by whatever means accomplished, and of an incorporation at least in spirit into His Holy Church. As Christ is incorporating into the soul of the Church thousands upon thousands, at every hour of time and upon every point of the earth, of human souls by means unknown to us, so He may unite all the myriads of indwellers of the starry heavens to the soul of the Church, which is His Holy Divine Spirit, who vivifies the Church by means altogether beyond our ken.

How beautifully, then, does this opinion of the plurality of worlds enhance the proportions, as it were, the efficacy, the necessity, the absolute need of the Grand Mediator, who has said, "I am *the way, the truth, and the life!*" What new and magnificent stones, chiseled after the same pattern and by the same artist, are added to the already grand and vast proportions of the sublime structure of the Church, and cemented into the whole by the same vivifying, quickening Spirit, which breathes, sustains, holds together, supports the whole edifice?

And what a glorious, grand, magnificent, sublime concert, in honor of Christ, and in honor of God, who, if He act outside of Himself, wishes to make of the whole universe a grand, sublime

choir of praise to His magnificent grandeur, a choir of myriads upon myriads of millions of intelligent spirits, incorporated in an organism, or pure spirit, led by the great Mediator, Jesus Christ, who, in the quality of a divine person, connects that external praise of God's majesty with the eternal and infinite, which God receives from all eternity in His bosom by means of the eternal generations of the Son, the theoretical acknowledgment of the infinite, and the breathing of the Spirit, the practical recognition of the infinite, theoretical and practical acknowledgment, which terminates the infinite life of the Godhead, and keeps it plunged into infinite bliss! And thus external life and internal life are wedded into one in Christ, and to echo each other for all eternity, shared in according to the different degrees by thousands and tens of thousands of myriads of created spirits.

OF THE NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL.

St. Thomas Aquinas. Sum. Theol. I. Pars.

The Metaphysics of the School. By Rev. Thomas Harper, S.J.

MODERN agnosticism does not content itself with denying the existence of God; it also disowns whatever might lead us to the idea of the Infinite Being. It has, consequently, not only done away with everything outside us not patent to experience, but has banished also our spiritual faculties, reason and free will, to the realm of illusions. Nay, our very soul is deemed by it an unreality, upheld by the prejudices of olden times and the superstition of the unlearned. Solid and sweeping, indeed, is this process. Yet a system of such destructive tendency bears, as it were, an antidote in itself. For, whilst it reduces all to matter or to nothingness, it at once arouses us to reaction and shows us the line of argument to be followed in its refutation. From the very foundation of agnosticism we should learn that, to maintain with convincing proofs the existence of God, we must, above all, evince the spiritual nature of our own soul. Were this latter itself but material, were its powers but sensitive, would not all our conceptions of the immaterial be mere dreams? Could we not reach the superior activity of our mind, how should we form an idea of the divine life? The spirituality, therefore, of the soul is fundamental to the truth of our notions and reasonings, is a mirror on

which we see the eternal and supersensible reflected, is the chief source from which we must draw our knowledge of the higher spheres.

It is, on this account, of paramount importance to throw light on the nature of our mind. In proportion as we strive to spread this kind of enlightenment, shall we succeed in dispelling the dismal night of materialism. As the one sided researches into the forces of the material universe have blunted the human intellect, so, on the other hand, will the science concerning our mental faculties again illumine man and correct his ideas; and as matter, exclusively considered, confines us to the narrowest and lowest sphere of nature, so will the study of the soul widen our views and carry us to the contemplation of immaterial beauty, and thence raise us to the cognizance and admiration of the infinite ocean of all being.

But how shall we know the soul? Does not our cognition begin with the sensible? Is not the intuitive perception of merely spiritual objects far above the capacity of our intellect? Certainly; so we are taught by experience, as well as sound philosophy. But, if this be so, is not the immaterial unknowable to us? and is not all that is said about it sheer conjecture? By no means; though we commence with the sensible, our knowledge does not terminate in it. We reach farther; our intellect penetrates the very nature of things presented to it by the senses, and reduces the natures themselves which it attains, by abstraction and division, to the simplest elements common to all entities. From the universal notions thus acquired we form universal principles, and, by again combining these latter, we draw conclusions. By this way of analysis and inference we become acquainted with truths hitherto unknown to us, as they were either hidden under the sensible qualities in the material substances or were above the visible universe as the causes of it. Moreover, once actuated by the cognizance of things without us, we are enabled to reflect on our own operations, and to proceed from them by reasoning into the deepest recess of our interior. A twofold world is thus exhibited to our view, the one within, the other without us, the one opened to us through our senses, the other through our consciousness, both searched into and enlarged by understanding and reason.

Let us now see whether, pursuing this train of thought, we may not only find the human soul, but also realize its nature. However, before we enter upon discussion, it will not be improper to develop the notion of the soul in general as it is common to all living beings. Furnished by this preliminary inquiry with many definitions and axioms, we shall, later on, with less difficulty treat of the human soul in particular.

I. THE SOUL IN GENERAL.

We may define the soul as the principle of life. This definition was given by Aristotle, adopted by St. Thomas and his school, and will not, we hope, meet with any serious difficulty on the part of modern scientists. To form this idea of the soul, not by imagination, but on the solid ground of reality, it is but necessary to observe the phenomena by which we are daily surrounded. Nothing is more striking in nature than the difference everywhere manifested between the animate and inanimate bodies. These two components of the visible universe widely differ from each other in their size, figure, composition, structure, origin, duration, extinction, and, above all, in their operations. The inanimate realm is fixed and unchangeable; in it there is prevailing uniformity, stern necessity, and inertness. In the animate realm, on the contrary, there is boundless variety and activity. There we see numberless beings and species, all following their own way of acting. Each individual being develops itself, according to an intrinsic law, into a perfect organism, a whole wonderfully composed of divers parts. Each species invariably propagates itself, because the individuals, though all will be extinct after a certain period, are fitted for reproduction; whence it is that death and generation, decay and growth, are ever succeeding each other. Besides, if we direct our attention to the higher classes of living beings, to the animals, we see action no more governed by mere necessity, but proceeding spontaneously from cognition. Hence, activity is among them as various as the objects represented by their senses, and operation arises in them not from motion communicated by extrinsic causes, but from an intrinsic tendency, not from an inborn law, but from a perfection or form which they acquire from outward objects. Man, who ranks highest in this world, is capable of universal knowledge; for he dives into the nature of things, reflects upon himself, and transcending the visible universe, grasps the infinite and eternal. For this reason he is universal also in his activity, unbounded in his ways of acting and in his aims, and fit to direct his own will towards certain ends with freedom.¹

As a great power, therefore, does life show itself in nature; life gives her beauty and variety, quickness and spontaneous production; life endows the higher beings with boundless knowledge, and qualifies them for arts, social connections, progress, and liberty; life brings forth ever-new effects, ever-new motion, ever-new works of genius and supreme perfection. And, not only great and wondrous, but also quite peculiar are the phenomena which it daily

¹ St. Thomas, *S. Theol.*, p. 1, qu. 18^a, art. 3.

displays before our eyes. How widely different are they not from those which the inanimate realm produces around us? It will be proper briefly to point out the characteristic properties of vital actions. Life as exercised consists, according to St. Thomas,¹ in self-motion or self-perfection. The inanimate body cannot act on itself, but only on external objects, and hence perfects not itself, but other beings by the effect which it produces. On this account we state it to be capable of only transient activity. Nor can it, consequently, stir itself to action, that is, pass of itself from rest to motion, and *vice versa*; for, to do so, it would be necessary that it could produce in itself the form or perfection in which its act consists or from which it proceeds. Bodies, therefore, devoid of life, are determined to action solely from without. It is this that constitutes their inertia, a property which all scientists predicate of matter as such. Animate bodies, on the contrary, receive the effect of their own actions, and thus perfect themselves; wherefore we maintain that they have immanent activity. Hence it follows that they are also moved to operation by a power or principle intrinsic to them; for though an exterior object may be concurrent and awaken them, as it were, by its influence, still they act more than they are acted on, since they direct their action to themselves and turn the effect which they produce to a perfection of their own, which is not the mere product of the outward object. We may without difficulty substantiate this property of vital operation in all the different classes of living beings. It is traceable in plants. Whoever carefully examines their process of vegetation will discover that their organs do not act severally, but under the sway and for the benefit of the entire organism. Hence in vegetating they act as a whole and perfect themselves as a whole. Much more apparent is immanent activity in the animals. Do they not quite evidently perfect themselves, when from few material impressions they apprehend the concrete qualities of material bodies, retain them in their fancy and their memory, and by composing and decomposing them produce in themselves the richest variety of images? And are they not self-moving, when, in accordance with their cognition, they seek or flee from an object as it is convenient or inconvenient for them, when they pursue it to seize it or to struggle with it, when they display love and hatred and other passions?

Most striking, however, is man's self-activity. He is able to gather the knowledge of the supersensible from the sensible and to aspire to the highest ends with freedom. Undoubtedly he thus perfects himself and acts infinitely more than he is acted upon by the outward objects, and moves with the fullest self-determination. All

¹ St. Theol., p. 1, qu., art. 1.

living beings, then, move and perfect themselves the more, the higher their vital functions are; whereas, at the same time we call any being that can not stir or act for its preservation, dead or lifeless. From promises as these are, we justly conclude with St. Thomas that vital action consists in self-motion or self-perfection.

Knowing the nature of the phenomena of life, we must further search into their source. Certainly they spring from a proportionate cause. In saying so we do not appeal to imagination, but to the principle of sufficient reason, which all admit on account of its compelling evidence and nobody can deny without self-contradiction. The scientists themselves who reject the existence of the soul acknowledge its truth; for all their theories and reasonings are nothing but a retracing of the natural phenomena to their proper causes. Vital actions, then, must have a source or origin, which, to denote its due proportion to its acts, we call the principle of life; and as, moreover, vital actions essentially differ from the non-vital, which they by far exceed in perfection, we further conclude that the principle of life inherent in the animate bodies is also essentially different from the cause that works in the inanimate. This second inference concerning the distinct nature of the immediate source of the vital activity, is just as certain and necessary as the first concerning its existence. Have we thus not arrived at the very definition of the soul? Above we said it to be the principle of life. Do not the grandest phenomena which we observe in the universe, and our operations of which we are conscious, give us the idea of such a power intrinsic to us and always active in us? True, we cannot see it, just as little as the scientist can perceive with his senses the force of attraction or chemical affinity; but reason tells us that it must exist and is the subject of numberless changes and actions of daily experience. Though not seen directly in its own nature, it manifests itself by its effects. We are, consequently, in admitting the existence of the soul and in defining it as the vital principle, neither imposed on by prejudices nor misled by ignorance; we but assert what evidence forces on us and what objective necessity peremptorily requires.

Yet, convincing as our reasons seem to be, they do not put the materialists to silence. These will perhaps agree that vital actions suppose a sufficient cause, an intrinsic principle in the bodies, but they persistently deny the same to be distinct from matter. In their opinion life is but a higher evolution or more artificial combination of material forces; a difference does not exist or cannot, on solid reasons, be shown to exist between the animate and inanimate bodies; and the vital principle that is thought to produce vital actions is not a reality added to matter, but a power of matter itself, in some corporal beings evolved and apparent, in others yet latent

and undeveloped. To attribute to life a higher perfection or derive it from a source above the material, they tell us, is a fiction, an assumption warranted neither by experience nor by science. We might at present leave this question unanswered, since later on we shall, at full length, prove the immateriality of intellectual life, which concerns us at present. Nevertheless, we shall here advance a general proof for the distinction of all vital principles from matter.

To this end let us once more consider the difference between vital and merely material actions. How did we define the nature of both the one and the other? Vital actions, we said, are essentially immanent, since the agent from which they proceed receives their effect and thus perfects itself. Merely material actions, on the contrary, are transient, because the body does not act by them on itself, but on another bodily subject; and from this we have further deduced that the living being is self-moving and matter is inert. Is it now possible that of two opposites the one arises from the other by evolution or by composition? In the first place, can the inert ever become self-active by developing itself? Development does not change the nature of things, but only unfolds what is latent in them. Yet, to give self-moving power to that which cannot of itself pass from rest to motion and to endow with immanent what of itself has but transient activity, is, indeed, not to educe hidden or implicit faculties from a subject, but to impart to the same a new energy. Were it not so, we should be compelled to admit that the want is the origin of motion, and that transient is the beginning of immanent activity. As to the artificial compositions, to which, in the second place, recourse is had to account for the phenomena of life, we must bear in mind that the whole has no other perfection than that of all the parts combined. Hence, what is in no way precontained in the latter is not at all to be found in the former. But the several molecules of matter, it is agreed, are inert and act transiently; wherefore, also, the whole composed of them must be inert and capable, not of immanent, but of only transient activity. By their union the material elements are joined together, but not reversed in their nature; therefore they have conjointly just as well as singly a tendency to outward action, which, however, will be of greater efficacy, either because they unite their forces directly towards a common object, or because one moves and determines the other in a certain proportion and according to a concerted plan. Thus bodies are formed and aggregated by nature, thus mechanisms are constructed by art. Life, therefore, dormant or dilated in matter is an absurdity, and absurdly are materialists supposing that it has been developed from the bodily substance in its primordial condition, or will be elicited from it by the help of science in future ages. The certainty of this reasoning is not lessened by

the imperfection of the knowledge which we have of the material forces; for we have deduced the impossibility we speak of from the very nature of life and matter, as inferred from the phenomena always and everywhere observed; but nature remains the same under all circumstances.

The principle, then, of any life whatever is undoubtedly distinct from matter, nay, transcends it inasmuch as vital is above physical action, as self-motion ranks higher than inertia, and as vegetation, sensation and intellection exceed in perfection material resistance or attraction, because an operation of a higher quality presupposes a power of a superior order. This being agreed to, we must conclude that the vital principle is planted in the body as in a lower element, which by its union it lifts up to a higher nature, and endows with a new energy.

From the facts thus far stated and the principles laid down, we must now draw several conclusions touching the essence of the soul in general. We infer *first* that the soul is a constituent of the *nature* of living beings. *Nature* is the first intrinsic principle of operations,—that is, such an inward source of activity as is preceded by no other one in the acting subject. In accordance with this definition, the principle of life, distinct as it is from matter, must be considered either as a nature of its own or at least as a component part of a nature. Of animate bodies matter is evidently also a constituent, and hence the vital principle is not their entire nature, but a part of the same. We may likewise call the soul an essential constituent. For nature and essence are one and the self-same thing, considered, however, under different aspects. Nature is the first principle of operation, essence is in a thing the first perfection, in which all others have their root. But it is perfection that enables a thing to action, and consequently these two intrinsic principles, that of operation and that of being, must needs coincide. For this reason, the soul is also a *substantial* constituent. To show this a short explanation will suffice. *Substance* is being in itself; it is, in other terms, the subject that sustains all inherent qualities and modes of being, and itself requires no substratum in which to inhere. It is not the self-existent, for this exists of itself and excludes dependence on an efficient cause, whilst substance exists in itself and excludes but inexistence in another thing. Nevertheless a being may exist in itself completely or incompletely, according as it stands by itself, either in every or only in some regard. The conceptions just exposed are not improperly illustrated by an instance taken from human associations. In a society we may distinguish nature, essence, and substance. Its nature is its tendency to a determinate end common to all its members; its essence is that which constitutes its being an intrinsic organization; its substance is its independence and

self-government, which it has completely or incompletely, according as it is sovereign or subject to the sway of a higher body politic as one of its branches. Has, then, the first principle of life existence in itself? Undoubtedly. An *accident*, which is naturally inherent or in need of a subject of inhesion, may be the proximate, but cannot be the first or ultimate source of perfection and operation; such can be only that reality which is, according to its very conception, unsupported and existing in itself. Accordingly, the soul must be conceived as a substance,—either as a complete one, if it stands by itself and is not a part of a being, or as an incomplete one, if, though in some regard it is in itself, still it belongs as a part to a whole. In the animate bodies, where it is composed with matter, it is of itself incomplete, for complete is but the whole made up of all its components. In some way, however, even there the vital principle must be regarded as existent in itself, inasmuch as it is a constituent part of the whole that subsists in itself, as something of the subject that sustains the accidents, and not an accident that inheres in a subject already constituted.¹ Hence we legitimately conclude the identity of nature, substance, and essence; for as nature cannot be the first principle of action, so essence cannot be the first root of perfection without existing in itself. This holds true and is generally admitted by philosophers with regard to natural, though not with regard to artificial beings, as in the conception of the latter an accidental form may be implied.

We infer *secondly* that the soul is a *substantial form*. *Form* in general is that which as an intrinsic entity determines a thing or stamps on it a peculiar shape; *substantial form* is that which gives specific nature to a substance; it is opposed to the *accidental form*, which comes to a subject already constituted in its substantial being. In composed substances we must distinguish two elements, one that is in itself indifferent and indeterminate, another that is differential and determinant; one that they have in common with other beings, another that is peculiar to them. In this regard nature resembles the works of art. In a statue, too, there is the material, the marble, and the figure; the block of marble is of itself indifferent and may be worked into anything; it is the figure sculptured on it that makes it to be a statue rather than a tombstone, an image of Cæsar rather than of Napoleon. The indeterminate component of a being we call matter; the determinant, form. Matter, therefore, and form, combining their own partial entities, complete each other, in order to constitute one being; matter lends itself to the form as

¹ "That which is the essential constituent of a substance," says Father Harper, S. J., "must itself be a substance, however partial, incomplete, and rudimentary; otherwise, the essence of a substance might be in a part composed of that which is not substance,—a contradiction in terms." *Metaphysics of the School*, vol. ii., Prop. cxlii., n. ii., page 205.

a subject for concrete existence, and the form confers on matter that which makes it an entire nature. Matter and form are thus the natural elements of compound substances. Yet not substance only, but also essence has its material and formal constituents. For if we analyze the things as to their essence, we discover in them something that they have in common, and something that is peculiar to them and constitutive of their properties; and if we attentively reflect on those two components, the common and the particular, the indifferent and the differential, we find them to be distinct from each other, sometimes in nature itself, sometimes only in consequence of our abstraction. In the first case we have the physical essence, the components of which are matter and form in the strict sense; in the second we have the metaphysical essence, the constituents of which are matter and form taken rather in a wider meaning and analogically. With regard to natural compounds it will not be difficult to observe in all particular instances that the components of their physical essence are identical with the constituents of their substance; nor can it be otherwise, since nature and substance coincide, and since we consider in either of them the parts as they are distinguished, not by abstraction, but in themselves outside our mind. But, how shall we explain the constitution of simple beings? If a thing is not composed, its essence is all form, or as some say, a pure form; for as the nature of such a being has its characteristic properties there is certainly a form implied in it, and as it excludes all essential composition, there is no matter in it, but form alone. In this supposition the form is a complete essence or substance, whereas in composites it cannot be conceived but as incomplete.

To apply these definitions to the living beings of this visible universe, the body is that constituent of theirs which they have in common with one another and also with the inanimate, and that not only logically or in our conceptions, but also in reality and independently of our mind; for frequently the very same material elements exist successively in water or air, in the plant, in the animal, and in man. The body, therefore, is indifferent, indeterminate, apt to be a component part of many natures; it is the material constituent. The soul, on the other hand, determines the body to one specific nature, for by its union it effects that the same is no more brute matter, but a living being of a certain species and endowed with a certain activity. The soul, accordingly, concurs in the constitution of animate bodies as the formal element, as their essential or substantial form; for it constitutes the characteristic property of their substance or essence. The soul is, on that account, also itself a substance, yet not a complete one, because it

is not entire of itself, any more than matter is; such they are only if united.

We infer, *thirdly*, that the soul is a *substantial act*. *Act* we take here as opposed to *potentiality*, to passive power. *Potentiality* is receptivity, the capacity in a subject of being perfected. *Act*, on the contrary, is the perfection which fills up the receptivity or capacity of a subject, not by acting upon it, but by uniting itself with it. "As operation or action," writes St. Thomas,¹ "which is the complement of active potentiality, corresponds with active potentiality; so that which corresponds with passive potentiality as its perfection and complement, is called act." Potentiality and act are, therefore, opposed to each other, not only by mutual relation, but also by privation or negation. Still the act does not imply so necessary a relation to potentiality that it cannot exist without it; for a perfection may also subsist in itself and thus be its own act, and not that of a subject distinct from it. If an act of that kind is free from all potentiality, it is called pure; and this pure act must evidently be an infinite perfection, since whatever is finite is yet perfectible and hence potential, and it must be self-existent, since self-existence is included in infinite perfection. Just the contrary is the case with potentiality; it implies a want of perfection, and, therefore, the more potential a being is, the more imperfect is it, so that if at last we conceive a pure potentiality without any act, we may easily understand it to be incapable of existence in nature.

A *substantial act* is that which gives a substance its perfection and completeness, and so likewise we may call an *essential act* that which gives to essence its entireness. Now, is the soul an act? Certainly, by the very fact of its being a form. For every form, as St. Thomas concludes, is an act, because it gives shape to a thing, and if a substantial form, completes matter and determines it to a specific nature, an entire principle of activity. Even if the form be pure and not destined to union with a material element, it still must be conceived as an act, inasmuch as it is its own highest and last perfection. Nay, the soul is a substantial act, for it is an act as far as it is a form, yet it is a substantial form, and, therefore, also a substantial act. The vital principle is, indeed, the main perfection that constitutes a living substance, it gives the same life, and proper action, and peculiar nature. For this reason the Scholastic doctors termed the soul the first act of the living being; for substance and essence are primary perfections in the thing which they

¹ "Sicut potentia activae respondet operatio vel actio, in qua completur potentia activa, ita etiam illud quod respondet potentia passivae, quasi perfectio et complementum, actus dicatur. Et propter hoc omnis forma actus dicitur, etiam ipsae formae separatae; et illud quod est principium perfectionis totius, quod est Deus, vocatur actus purus." I. Dist. xlii., qu. 1 art., 1 m.

constitute, since they are the root and foundation of all the others without resting themselves on any other ground.

We infer, *fourthly*, that the soul is but one in each living being. This follows with compelling evidence from what we have said thus far. We conceive every being endowed with life as one; the tree, the horse, the man we meet, each is in our view, one and not several beings. Why do we all think alike in this? Because unity is a necessary attribute of being, so much so that in the opinion of all philosophers one and being are convertible. The reason thereof is plain. Everything is, by its essence that which it is and nothing else. But being that and nothing else excludes plurality and establishes unity. Everything, therefore, has by its essence both being and unity, or, in other words, is one for the same reason for which it is a being.¹ Now, of what does the essence of a thing consist? Chiefly of its form. For if it is simple, the form is its only constituent; if it is composite, the form is, of the two constituents, the principal, because it is the form that completes and determines its specific nature, by which it is distinguished from all other things. Consequently, where there are many forms, there can possibly result only one being. The soul, therefore, as it is the substantial form, cannot be multiplied without destroying man's unity. In this conclusion, drawn from the very conception of essence and form in general, we are greatly confirmed by reflecting on the vital form in particular. The soul is the source of immanent action. Now, if there were in the same body several such principles, of which each one, proceeding to action from itself, produces an effect within itself, would they not severally possess themselves of the bodily elements in their particular interests, and quite necessarily constitute multiplicity in being as well as in operation? As little, then, as we can destroy the oneness of the living being, are we allowed to admit in it a plurality of souls? Nay, from the principles laid down and made use of as premises, we must infer that several substantial forms, of whatever kind they may be, cannot at once exist in one being.²

So much about the soul in general. Is there in the conclusions we have deduced, by aid of the old school, anything unsound? Do they not rest on undeniable facts and observations? Are the principles from which we drew them false, doubtful or not evident? Did we follow a wrong method? Or were the terms we used improper and meaningless? Does the result we arrived at not con-

¹ St. Thom., S. Theol. p. i., qu. 76, art. 3: "Ab eodem res habet quod sit ens et quod sit una."

² St. Thom., Quodl. I., art. 6, c.: "Impossibile est in uno eodemque esse plures formas substantiales, et hoc ideo quia ab eodem res habet esse et unitatem. Manifestum est autem quod res habet esse per formam; unde et per formam habet unitatem. Et propter hoc, ubicunque est multitudo formarum, non est unum simpliciter."

vey a clear idea of, or give an insight into the nature of the source of life? If that be so, then all inquiries that have ever been made are absurd, all science, all knowledge, even of the material universe ceases. Never have there been researches more exact and careful than those made by the scholastic philosophers into the nature of the soul.

II. THE SIMPLICITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL.

From these general observations let us now pass over to the more particular investigation of the human soul. If the phenomena of life presuppose a vital principle, vital actions of a special kind prerequisite a soul of a special nature; for between the principiant and the principiate, the source and the rivulet that flows from it, there must be a strict proportion. Therefore, where we observe in certain living beings actions not attainable to others, there we must admit a soul of a superior nature. Now, pre-eminent among all beings endowed with life is man; in him we discover an excellence, a kind of activity that makes him the king of all other realms, the gem of the universe. He, consequently, must be quickened also by a soul of pre-eminent perfection. It is into this sanctuary within ourselves, this last and innermost source of man's marvellous operations, that we shall now try to penetrate. Yet how can we reach it? Can we, perhaps, in this inquiry be led by intuition? Can we directly attain what is intrinsic to our mind? By consciousness, undoubtedly, we gain some knowledge of our very substance. For, reflecting on ourselves, we obtain cognizance of our acts as they are in themselves; but they are and must be inherent in a subject, an active principle; hence we perceive our soul as their substratum. We can even distinguish it from its acts. We are fully aware that, while the subject remains in us always the same, the acts are always changing; that acts there are many, but the subject is one; that the acts are accidental, but the subject is essential to and identical with us. However, we thus know only the existence of a permanent active principle within us, yet do not get acquainted with its constitution; we apprehend a substance in ourselves, yet do not attain its nature. Distinction must, therefore, be made between the existence and the essence of the soul; the first is, in fact, the object of immediate cognition of our consciousness, yet the other cannot come to our clear and distinct cognizance but by way of reasoning. So we are taught by the Angelic Doctor¹ and all sound philosophers, and

¹ St. Theol., p. i., qu. 87, art. 1.

so we must judge from our own experience. For had we a direct insight into the nature of the soul, it would be impossible to question its spirituality or to entertain erroneous opinions about it. But whence should we infer the nature of that substance intrinsic to us, yet imperceptible to our direct view? From our actions. From them as from the circumference we must proceed to the soul as to the centre. As from vital operations we have deduced the essential properties of the vital principle in general, so we must from the peculiarity and the excellence of human activity gather the nature and the perfection of the source of human life in particular.

And what operations do we observe in man? He has vegetation and sensation; yet these functions he has in common with the plants and brutes, though in him they are in many regards more perfect. As a peculiar gift he has intellection and free volition; it is by them that he surpasses all other beings of this visible creation. They, consequently, most distinctly exhibit the nature of the human soul. For the highest perfection of a being is, more than any other quality, its proper form, gives a peculiar trait to all other attributes, contains all other endowments as their root, and keeps them subordinate to itself as to their end. Wherefore St. Thomas, with Aristotle, remarks that everybody appears to be what is the best in him.¹ Above all, then, we must inquire into the operations of the human intellect and will. Of course, according to the statement made above, we can at once infer from them that the human soul is the principle of rational life. But this does not content us; we long for a fuller knowledge of the fountain-head of our intellection and volition. And this not in vain. By closer researches we shall bring to light the essential attributes of the soul as considered both in itself and in its relation to the body. The soul considered in itself we shall see to be simple and spiritual.

First, let us speak of its simplicity. To begin our argumentation with an exact definition, simple we call that which is not composite. Now a thing can be composite in many regards, and it can be also composite in one respect and not in another. Accordingly, simplicity, too, which is freedom from composition, may be taken in a manifold sense. In the present question we consider substantial simplicity,—that is, we exclude from the soul any plurality of parts which constitute its substance. This remark is well to be borne in mind, in order not to misunderstand the subject under discussion. There is, indeed, some compositeness in the soul; for there are in it many acts which spring up and pass away, and, according to St. Thomas,² many faculties distinct from it, as

¹ S. Theol., p. i., ii., qu. 3, art. 5.

² S. Theol., p. i., qu. 77, art. 12.

well as from one another. And not only in the human soul is it so, but even in the purest created spirit, for God alone is absolutely and in every regard simple. Yet this compositeness does not concern us, because it is accidental and exists between the substance and its accidents, or between one accident and another; whereas, we speak of substantial composition—that is, of such as is between the components of a substance. Furthermore, the parts of a substantial whole can be of a twofold kind; they either constitute a thing in its essence, and hence are termed essential parts, or they give it but extension, and are called integrant parts. Here, again, a distinction is to be made. The several parts can be of the same or a different nature; if they are of the same, they are termed homogeneous; if of a different, heterogeneous. To illustrate the theory by examples: Essential parts in man are soul and body; integrant, but heterogeneous parts are the bodily members. An instance of a composition of homogeneous parts is a lake or a river, where all the molecules that make up the watery mass have the same nature,—that of water.

Having premised these definitions, we maintain that the soul is free from any kind of substantial composition. We commence with rejecting composition of integrant parts. First, we shall prove it to be impossible in the soul from the notions which we have of simple objects. Undoubtedly we have conceptions of not complex natures and substances. We have some knowledge of God and of pure spirits; we understand very well what is meant by the terms spirituality and simplicity; again, we apprehend acts and forms so abstract as to admit of no division whatever; as those of being, existence, relation, identity, bounty, beauty, perfection. Now all these conceptions cannot be at all in a composed subject, and, consequently, our soul is a simple substance. This we hope to prove with compelling evidence. If the active principle by which these notions are formed, and in which they inhere as accidents, be composed of several integrant parts, then the cognitive act is also composite; nay, the act and the principle must consist of the same number of components. For integrant parts, giving extension to a thing already constituted in its essence, are informed and therefore active; and integrant parts of a cognitive principle must be cognitive themselves, since they would otherwise not extend a cognitive substance as such. It is of no avail to aver that cognition may be an operation of many parts taken collectively, but not singly; as vegetation seems to be a vital act of the organism as a whole. Cognition is an immanent action produced by the substantial agent within itself, and consists in the expression of the knowable object by and within the knowing subject. That principle, therefore, is strictly cognitive, which is able to elicit such an act;

other causes concurrent to perception, as, for instance, the external object acting on our faculties, are not properly called so. All, then, depends on the manner in which the several parts we have considered coöperate towards cognition. If they are not representative by an immanent action, they are not in reality integrant components of a cognitive subject as such, but are only concurrents external to it; if they, by whatever aid, thus act and represent an object immanently, they do, as we maintain, elicit an act of perception. Something similar takes place in vegetation; all parts of the plant or the animal grow and vegetate, though under the influence of the whole organism. But if each integrant part is cognizant, what does it represent whenever we conceive something simple? Of course, it must represent the whole of such an object, it being absolutely impossible to divide what is simple. But, if that be so, there must be as many conceptions of the same thing and as many substantial principles of cognition within us, as there are parts supposed to exist in our mind, a multiplicity which is contrary to both sound philosophy and experience. We are conscious of but one conception and but one substance underlying our acts as their cause and their subject.

We may reason in the like manner from our conception of unity. Whenever we think of an organic body, or a mechanism, or an association, we conceive several parts united to one whole. Can such an idea be formed by a compound of integrant parts? We deny it absolutely. Integrant components of a cognitive principle, as we said above, must also be cognitive, so that the complete cognition of an object is the sum, as it were, of many partial cognitions. This supposed, let us ask what are the several component parts cognizant of? Does each one perceive the whole object or only a part of it? If each part of the cognitive subject perceives the entire object,—that is, the collection of all its parts, then there are in us as many conceptions of the whole and as many cognitive principles as there are integrant components of our mind admitted. But what could be more inconsistent than such a thought? Consciousness testifies to the oneness of our conception and of our intellectual power. Reason tells us that it is most absurd to conceive one intelligent principle formed of many intelligent components, since different principles of immanent action cannot possibly be united to one living substance, they being of necessity divergent in their tendencies. If, on the contrary, each part of the thinking subject conceives only a part of the object, the whole of the latter is not conceived at all, because its parts are not united, but exist separately, in the cognitive faculty. Of this an illustration will convince us. If of five different persons each one reads the fifth part of a book, they all together read all its parts, and yet the

knowledge of the book as a whole, the entire idea developed in it, is not attained by any one at all. To conceive a whole as such, it is required to comprehend all its parts collected and united, and for this again it is necessary that they all concur in a cognitive principle, which, that they may no more be divided, must itself be free from multiplicity.

Another proof of the freedom of the soul from integral composition we draw from the nature of our judgments and reasonings. We judge when, after comparing two ideas, we pronounce them to be objectively identical or different. To perform this mental operation, it is necessary that both terms be understood by one and the self-same subject. For he that, after due comparison, judges two things to agree or to differ, must undoubtedly know both of them; were he cognizant of one alone, and somebody else of the other, a judgment concerning them would be just as impossible as in a civil controversy, if of the contending parties each one should bring his cause to a different court. Now, if it is assumed that our mind, this judge within ourselves, be composite, how can all its components concur in judging? Do all, or does only one, or none of them, know both the subject and the predicate and pronounce sentence on their identity or difference? If none is cognizant of all these three things together, one perceiving but the subject, and another the predicate, no judgment at all is formed. If each integrant part of the mind has notice of the subject and the predicate and their mutual relation, there are as many judgments and judges within us as there are parts thought to exist in our soul, contrarily to our consciousness and the natural oneness of ourselves. If only one part knows the two terms and affirms or denies their identity, there is in us only one intelligent principle fit to judge, and this one principle, admitting of no composition, is our soul. In a similar way we may deduce our thesis from the act of reasoning. The mind that reasons must know not only the conclusions which it infers, but also the premises from which it makes the inference, and the reason for which the one is inferred from the other. Hence ratiocination is an indivisible act, and must, consequently, be in a cognizant subject that does not consist of many partial agents.

Lastly, we argue from the nature of reflection or consciousness. Reflection is the act by which the mind turns back upon itself and its operations. Inasmuch as the mind turns back upon itself, we come to our substance and person, we being the subject at once and the object of our cognition; inasmuch as it turns back upon its operations or perceives itself actuated by them, we know all our intellections and volitions to spring from the same self. Such being the nature of our consciousness, let us put the question: Is

a composite principle capable of being self-conscious? Again, three suppositions are possible. Either each of the several components, or none, or only one, turns back upon itself. If each one, we must perceive within our mind several selves, and refer our actions to several *mes*. Yet we are conscious of but one self, which we consider as the source and subject of all our doings. If none turns back upon itself, but one upon the other, as, for instance, the eye directs itself to the hand and the brain to the eye, no reflection at all takes place and no self is perceived, because there is nothing that makes itself the object of its own cognitive act. If only one part turns back upon itself, this alone is our mind endowed with consciousness. Thus, again, we conclude with full certainty that the self-conscious mind is not composed of parts.

All acts, then, of our intellect, conception, judgment, and reasoning, if duly analyzed, evince the substantial simplicity of the soul. No less do the acts of the will bear witness to the same truth. For does not the will also love and desire simple objects? Does it not also tend to unity among parts? Does it not likewise return to itself, approving or detesting its own acts and desiring the perfection of its own subject? We must, therefore, infer from the simplicity of the object willed the simplicity also of the volitive act and principle, and from the impossibility of dividing volition the impossibility of dividing into parts its subject. And as, according to the testimony of our consciousness, intellect and will are in the same self, and as the will does not desire but what is proposed to it by the intellect, and the intellect again is under the control of the will, there is but one soul in us, both intellective and volitive, composed of no integrant parts.

Two objections, however, might be raised against our conclusion. It might be said that integrant parts of a cognitive subject, because they are united and act conjointly, do not divide the object known, but rather reduce it to unity in the cognitive faculty. As an example the brute is alleged, which is endowed with extended organs of sensation and still shows harmony in all its acts, and knows and desires the whole of the objects presented to it. Certainly, we grant that the integrant parts of an animal act altogether in accordance and with a certain completeness, just on account of their substantial union, being made by it dependent on one another and enabled to combine their partial actions. For that, indeed, they perceive the whole exterior object, but not its unity. The reason is, first, because, notwithstanding their union and mutual influence, the several parts are, though not separated, still distinct from and outside one another in space; secondly, because each of them becomes cognizant by immanent action,—that is, by a form produced by it and inherent in it. To these two facts it is

consequent that the several integrant parts of a cognitive subject attain also several parts of the object, one outside the other, and that the cognition of one part of the organ remains distinct from that of the other. Experience confirms this theory. If, for instance, in the optic nerve a fibre is deadened, we do not see the corresponding point in the object; the same happens in our tongue and our hand. Thus we think it sufficiently explained why extended or compound principles, in spite of the union of their parts, cannot conceive unity or unite one object with another, or deduce a conclusion from premises.

Another objection is occasioned by the distinction between the soul and its faculties generally taught by the Scholastics.¹ This distinction supposed, is it necessary to deny the substantial composition of the soul, or do the reasons thus far brought forward prove anything more than simplicity of our intellect and our will, which are the immediate principles of all our rational acts? Certainly they do, and for many reasons. The faculties cannot be simple if the substance is composite. They are evolved from it as from their root. But from the composite the simple cannot spring, since the principiate cannot be of a higher nature than the principiant. And since integrant parts are already informed and constituted in a complete essence, each one will develop from itself a partial faculty of its own, all which are distinct from one another no less than their several sources. Hence there is as much distinction and composition in the powers of a being as is supposed to be in its substance. The difficulty proposed will yet more clearly be solved, if we consider the relation between the substance and its forces as taught by the Scholastics. The faculty, they maintain, results with necessity from the substance and is used by it as a natural instrument; it is, therefore, not the principal, but only the instrumental cause of action, not the primary, but the secondary agent. This theory they hold particularly with regard to the living substance, on account of the immanency of its actions. Accordingly, if we suppose in the soul several integrant parts, which are to be conceived as active, we must also grant that any one of them will through a faculty evolved from itself perform its own operation, distinct from that of the others, though in connection and harmony with each and all of them. So the Scholastic doctrine, when it distinguishes substance and faculty, is not opposed to the simplicity of the soul, but rather supports and illustrates it by showing what multiplicity of operation must follow from any integral composition.

After this discussion concerning the integrant parts, it will no longer be difficult to exclude from the soul every composition of

¹ St. Thom., *S. Theol.*, p. i., qu. 77, art. 1 and 2.

essential constituents. Of components that make up an essence, only one can be active, all others are of necessity passive,—that is, incomplete and indeterminate. For activity is consequent to the ultimate substantial perfection, to the essential form; and to admit more than one essential form in the same being is inconsistent. Consequently, no nature is composed of several active elements; and whenever such are discovered in a thing, they must be considered as integrant parts. Should, however, anybody not share this view of essential composition in general, he would be compelled to adopt it with regard to the human soul, if conceived to be essentially composite. For all rational acts, conceptions, judgments, ratiocinations, volitions require a simple active principle, and can impossibly be performed by a compound one. Besides, if there be several active principles in the essence of the soul, they must be in it sources of immanent action; for how could they otherwise constitute the vital principle? But this granted, evidently the unity of our life would be destroyed. If, therefore, a composition is admissible in the substance of our soul, it must be formed of an active and a passive element. Yet is there such a composition really conceivable? Decidedly not. The soul is the source of activity, even of the most perfect; it is the form which confers on us substantial completion, gives us a certain specific nature; whilst matter is the indeterminate, potential, and inactive constituent of our nature. Now, on the ground of these definitions, is it not quite inconsistent again to divide the soul into a material and a formal element, for so the passive and the active must be termed; and is it not most absurd to say that, what is merely passive concurs in constitution with that which is essentially active? This reason St. Thomas develops in the following way. "The soul," says he, "is the form either by its entire entity, or by a part of the same. If by its entire entity, matter, if understood to be a merely potential being, cannot be one of its constituents; for the form as such is an act, but mere potentiality cannot be a constituent of an act, since potentiality is repugnant to the act, being its opposite. If the soul is the form by a part only of its entity, we call that part alone soul, and the other, which it first actuates, the first subject animated by it."¹ We abstain from advancing other reasons taken from the specific nature of the human soul, as its

¹ S. Theol. p. i., qu. 75, art. 5: "Respondeo dicendum quod anima non habet materiam; et hoc potest considerari dupliciter. Primo quidem ex ratione animæ in communi. Est enim de ratione animæ quod sit forma alicujus corporis. Aut igitur est forma secundum se totam, aut secundum aliquam partem sui. Si secundum se totam, impossibile est quod pars ejus sit materia, si dicatur materia aliquod ens in potentia tantum; quia forma, in quantum forma, est actus, id autem, quod est in potentia tantum, non potest esse pars actus, cum potentia repugnet actui, utpote contractum divisa. Si autem sit forma secundum aliquam partem sui, illam partem dicamus esse animam, et illam partem cujus primo est actus, dicemus esse primo animatum."

spirituality, to be proved later on, will be a further and final evidence of the same truth.

Essential composition, then, no less than integral is repugnant to the nature of the soul. This, therefore, is a simple substance, formed of no parts whatsoever. Hence it follows that the soul is not a body. In bodies there is always a substantial composition of essential parts, of matter and form, as the Scholastics taught, and of integrant parts, or of molecules, as all scientists admit. Moreover, the bodily substance, whatever may be its ultimate elements, must act as a compound. But the human soul is neither substantially composed nor can it bring its rational faculties into a compound action. St. Thomas¹ and his school have, on this account, demonstrated the simplicity of the soul by proving it not to be a body. The arguments of which they make use are nearly the same as we have set forth; some, however, they have taken from the specific nature of the bodily substance. Of these latter one deserves our special attention, since it may serve as a most efficient weapon in our warfare against materialism.²

According to the Scholastic system, or rather to the principles of sound reason, cognition in general consists in the expression of the similitude, the object by and within the cognitive principles. For whenever we are cognizant of a thing, we bear it, as it were, within ourselves; yet we have not its very reality in our mind or in our senses, at least if it is in the outer world; hence we possess only its likeness or its similitude gathered from it by our own operation. Beings, therefore, are qualified for the cognition of outward objects inasmuch as they are enabled to reproduce in themselves the forms of things distinct from them, and cognitive faculties expand the more, the wider their capacity is of receiving foreign forms. But bodies are unfit to receive the forms of other things. First, they are on the lowest grade of being, and as such they are not proportioned to the reception of the forms proper to higher grades. Secondly, the substantial forms of bodies themselves are contrary to one another and cannot at once exist in the same bodily subject, as can be seen in all substantial changes. By its impenetrability, moreover, one body excludes from itself the individual entity of the other, though of the same species. Thirdly, also among the bodily qualities there is a special opposition in consequence of their inhering in an extended and impenetrable subject. Thus, it is evident that bodies are contracted and confined to their own being so as to be unable to receive the form of whatever is distinct from them. This is, quite consequently, alleged by St. Thomas as the reason why they are destitute of cognition. He goes even farther and lays it down as a

¹ S. Theol., p. i., qu. 75, art. 1. Sum. c. gent. lib. i. c. 49 and 65.

² S. Theol., p. i., qu. 14, art. 1; qu. 84, art. 2.

principle, that elevation above matter is the foundation of cognitive power, and that a being is the better fitted for cognition the more immaterial it is. Hence he explains why animals have, and plants have not perception. Plants, says he, by vegetation take in the material substances of bodies; yet this being impenetrable to them, they only add it to the animated molecules which they already have. Animals, on the contrary, whilst they admit into their sensitive organs not the matter, but the material qualities of bodies, not only receive the accidental forms of outward objects in their very substance, but also give them a higher, a vital manner of existence. Conversely we must also infer that any being endowed with cognition must be elevated above matter, and that the more perfect its perception is, the farther it must recede from materiality. Now, the human soul is the source of the most extended knowledge; for it not only knows by the senses the material, but by the intellect also every kind of object, the supersensible and the spiritual, substance and accidents, essence and properties, causes and effects, the absolute and the relative. Hence the saying of Aristotle that the soul is as it were all,—that is, capable to receive the form of all things. What else, then, must we conclude but that our mind is by its nature itself completely distinct from all bodily substance, entirely opposed to it, and in some way infinitely raised above it?

Most valuable conclusions have we thus arrived at, all tending effectively to combat materialistic tendency. Anti-Christian science asserts that living bodies, even that of man, most carefully searched into, show no marks of a higher principle and manifest no activity that could not be exercised by the force of matter. And behold, if we compare vital with physical action, we at once find them to differ essentially, the one being immanent, the other transient, the one consisting in self-motion, the other implying inertness. We likewise understand it to be impossible that by any combination, however artificial, material power can be converted into vital, because composition does not change the nature of the elements and does not confer on the whole what was in no way pre-contained in the parts. Thus we discover, not by the senses, but by reason, in living beings, a substantial constituent essentially superior to matter. If we in particular examine into rational life and physical activity, we cannot but notice an irreconcilable opposition between them, and consequently conclude a difference between the principles from which they flow. All rational acts, whether of the intellect or of the will, require an essentially simple subject from which they proceed and in which they inhere, whereas material actions are produced by a compound physical agent; rational activity is unextended and free from multiplicity, material operation is extended and consists of many partial acts, one outside

the other, even as to space. Matter cannot be cognitive, the principle of rational life is the source of the widest cognition; the one, therefore, is most restricted in its nature, another most universal, another most exclusive, another most comprehensive. Can there be a greater opposition and a more glaring distinction between two principles? Indeed, not to perceive the existence of the soul and its superiority over matter, is to shut the eyes of the intellect to the most radiant light.

It is with the knowledge of the principle of life as with the science of this visible universe. At first, we notice in nature only the phenomena that strike our senses. Nor will he who has no desire or no ability to inquire into them see anything beyond them. But he who begins to analyze them finds the source from which they spring, and the forces by which they are produced, and the regularity with which they recur. Searching thus into the causes of what is obvious, the scientist penetrates into the intrinsic constitution of things and the innermost recess of their powers, and becomes cognizant of the wonderful might, greatness, and order of nature. Similarly at first sight we perceive in the starry heavens nothing but a multitude of shining points. But let the astronomer apply his instruments, let him compare star with star, follow their course, and resolve into its elements the light which they reflect. He will soon find new worlds and new systems of boundless extension; he will detect that the points which we scarcely perceive with the naked eye are heavenly bodies many times larger than our earth; he will discover on them seas and continents and with certainty infer the very material of which they are made; he will mark a wondrous harmony in their orbits, a mutual attraction and dependence without the least disturbance in universal motion, the greatest variety in an endless space, with perfect order and unity. So likewise by self-consciousness and experience we are directly cognizant of our acts without reaching our interior. Yet if by sound philosophy and without prejudice we examine such operations, we are led to the soul as their last and innermost principle within us, to a substance as their support, to a constituent of our nature as their efficient cause. Then, if we continue to reflect and inquire seriously, a new sphere is disclosed before our eyes and a new kind of perfection; for we understand the soul not to be composite as all things around us, but simple; not to have its being constituted like other parts of the universe by a simplicity of components, but by consummate oneness and simplicity; not to be restricted to its form, as bodies are, by their impenetrability, but to be all-comprising, apt to receive everything and to represent within itself all that is, all entity, all beauty. A nature, indeed, more widely extended than the heavens, transcending in perfection all visible creation.

THE IMPROVEMENT OF PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS.

*Report of the United States Commissioner of Education for 1880 and 1881.**Sadlier's Catholic Almanac. 1884.**The Judges of Faith and Godless Schools.* By Rev. Thomas J. Jenkins.
New York. Thomas D. Egan, No. 33 Barclay Street.*Cyclopedia of Education.* Kiddle & Schem, New York. Steyer, 1877.

I.

"THE Judges of Faith and Godless Schools" is chiefly a compilation of Catholic authorities in opposition to a godless system of education, and shows great zeal and industry on the part of its reverend composer. He gives us the testimony against godless schools of two hundred and fifty judges of the faith, including "seventeen plenary and provincial councils, two or three diocesan synods, two or three Popes, two sacred congregations of some twenty cardinals and pontifical officials, seven separate cardinals, who with thirty-three archbishops make forty primates and metropolitans, about seventy individual bishops and archbishops, deceased or living, in the United States. All the testimonies are from the past half-century." We may quote, as a specimen of them, the words of one whose character for mildness and prudence, as well as force, is second to no other bishop who has ever ruled in our country; we mean Cardinal John McCloskey. In his pastoral proclaiming the Jubilee in 1875 he says: "Let us, moreover, especially give heed to the words of the Holy Father, wherein he exhorts us to use all diligence in coming, by every means in our power, to the rescue of imperiled youth, knowing, as we do, the many dangers to which they are exposed and the dreadful ruin to which they are liable. But youth cannot be effectually guarded against these dangers without careful religious instruction and moral training. Nor can proper religious instruction and moral training be secured for them without the hearty and generous co-operation, not of parents alone, but of the faithful at large, with their pastors, in aiding to multiply and sustain good Catholic schools. It is true that in order to do this sacrifices have to be made, and these too often by the classes least able to afford them. But what are these sacrifices compared with the vital interests that are at stake! Let us, then, have courage and patience, hoping for

better things in the future. The time may come, sooner, perhaps, than we now have any reason to expect, when the conviction will force itself upon the public mind, not only that a purely secular education is necessarily imperfect and insufficient, but that the popular system which upholds this sort of education is gradually but surely loosening the hold of any form of distinct religious profession or of Christian belief upon the minds of the growing generation, and is training up for the not far distant future a race of free-thinkers and unbelievers, which will soon ripen into a race not so much of anti-Catholics as of anti-Christians."

We are astonished that any body of Christians can hesitate to subscribe to the teaching implied in this grave language. Hesitation in this case is certainly not the result of invincible ignorance. The Protestant sects know that the public-school system of the country is eviscerating the Christianity of our people. A system which throws all the creeds and principles of belief into a common cauldron, as Fra Junipero threw all the provisions into the same pot to save the trouble of cooking them separately, will logically result, as his experiment did, in producing a noxious and disgusting mess unpleasant to the eye and unfit for social digestion. The attempt to veneer this system of compromise of principle and of religious conviction, so as to make it appear Christian when it is practically pagan, by enforcing the reading of parts of the Bible before the opening of the classes in the morning, besides being illegal is simply ridiculous. The principal who reads the Scriptures for the assembled children is frequently an infidel who does not believe in its inspiration nor in its historical truth. He knows that many of his listeners are Jews, and that it is unfair for him to be reading the New Testament for their instruction, since they believe that the authors of it are impostors; and he knows also that the Catholics in his audience refuse to accept the version which he is using as authentic. That Unitarians, who believe not in the divinity of the Christian religion, should be satisfied with a homœopathic infusion of Christianity into the minds of their children is not surprising; but that the so-called orthodox sects, the Methodists, Presbyterians, and Episcopalians, should allow it to continue without manly and united protest is inexcusable. These profess to believe in fixed doctrines and in the necessity of training the young in the moral and doctrinal principles of Jesus Christ. Yet they permit a system to continue which logically tends to sap the vitality of Christian conviction, and to substitute for it a limp indifferentism or a broad liberalism without backbone or any other bone to give it force enough to resist skepticism, or the advance of the American religion of the future—Agnosticism.

The Episcopalians, it is true, have some private schools, and occasionally we hear a protest from some staunch sectarian against the general infidelity of our system of public education, but the voice is weak, the cry is timid. The Protestant sects, as a rule, are dumb, and allow the destroying work to go on, apparently not caring enough for Christianity to strive after its preservation in the American Republic. These sects are responsible for the continuance of the irreligious system. They are numerically the majority of voters, and a manly union on their part in behalf of the Christian teaching of the rising generations could not fail of result; for it is the majority with us that controls our legislation and all our public institutions. If, therefore, the American of the future is to be a man without Christianity, we shall have to thank the indifference of the Protestant sects for this misfortune.

The figures given in the reports of the Commissioner of Education show the astonishing indifference of the sects to the religious training of Young America. In the State of New-York, for instance, there are over one million children attending the public or godless schools; while only about one hundred and thirty-nine thousand are pupils of private schools and academies where religious instruction is given. Of this number about one-half are Catholic children in the archdiocese of New York; or, according to Sadlier's *Directory*, 46,262. Computing the attendants at Catholic schools and academies in the other dioceses of the State at about fifty thousand, we have nearly three-fourths of the children of the State who receive a religious education in school, members of the Catholic Church; while only a little over thirty thousand children are being educated specifically as Protestants. Thus, then, in a State in which the Protestants are to the Catholics as five to one, Protestant parents care so little about bringing up their children in religious schools that the great majority of them are being brought up infidels or agnostics.

In Pennsylvania it is worse, for the proportion of those attending the public schools is to that of those going to private schools as 931,749 to about 56,710;¹ and as the great majority of the latter are Catholics, the indifference of the sectarians becomes still more striking. In Massachusetts the proportion is 307,211 in the public schools to 26,289 in the private schools, the majority of which is, as usual, Catholic and a small percentage undenominational. This leaves the strictly Protestant schools in so insignifi-

¹ In Pennsylvania, exclusive of Philadelphia, the number attending private schools is given in the official reports as 26,710. In the Archdiocese of Philadelphia the number attending the Catholic schools and academies is given in the *Directory* as about 24,100.

cant a minority as to show clearly the lack of zeal of the sects for the training of children in the tenets of their parents. Yet bigotry exists both in Massachusetts and in Pennsylvania, in spite of the absence of interest in Protestant education; the odor remains after the carcass has been removed.

The general statistics of the Union illustrate this indifference of the sects still more forcibly. The total school population of the United States is 15,661,213, and of the territories 218,293. Of these about two-thirds, or 9,860,333, are enrolled in the public schools; the very small number of 569,595 is the total of all enrolled in all the private schools in the Union. This leaves a very large balance of children who go to no school at all. Now, when it is considered that the Catholics are the only Christian body who make strenuous efforts for the foundation of parochial schools, and who consequently own most of them, what a bitter commentary on Protestant zeal and love of the doctrinal teaching of Christianity do not the above facts furnish? Whence this carelessness on their part in a matter so vital to the Christian religion? Can it be that their hatred of the Catholic Church is stronger than their belief in Christ, and that they are willing to sacrifice the fundamental principles of Christianity rather than unite with the Mother Church in defending them? For there is no mistaking the position of the Catholic Church on this question. She has taken a firm stand, and she will not, because she cannot, recede. She wants religion to be made a part of the child's training. She wants the soul of the child to be saved. She seeks first the kingdom of God and His justice. She cries out, with Christ, to suffer the little children to come to her; to be taught to believe in Him, to love Him, to pray to Him, to be pure, honest and sober; and she wants this education to hold at the least an equal place in the training of the child with its instruction in secular pursuits. She will not consent to have infidel teachers instilling their pernicious principles into the minds of the young; nor will she allow the faith and morals of her children to be endangered by promiscuous intercourse with unbelievers. She wants the American of the future, like the brave and honest American of the Colonial days, to be first of all a good Christian, in order that he may be at the same time a true patriot and an honest citizen. It is because of her convictions on this subject that Catholics cry out against promiscuous, that is, pagan education, and that in the cause of religious education they make sacrifices in building parochial schools, taxing their poverty rather than consent to give up their convictions. That which Catholics feel bound to do, and what they will do, in spite of every difficulty, for Christian education, is best illus-

trated by what they have done in Belgium to found parochial schools. In 1879 the Belgian Government stripped the then existing primary schools of the kingdom of their religious character. Catholic schools for the higher branches of learning (*enseignement supérieur et moyen*), such as the University of Louvain and numerous episcopal colleges and academies, had already been established years before in opposition to the state institutions of the same kind, and were always, as they still are, crowded with students; but lower free schools, specifically ecclesiastical, were very few; because the State primary schools, through an understanding between the clergy and the civil authorities, were essentially religious, and Catholic for Catholic children. The so-called liberal government (which always means on the Continent of Europe a government liberal to atheism and oppressive to Christianity), in 1879, although obtaining power by the ridiculous majority of only one vote in the Senate, carried the law by which all the state schools were to be dereligionized and withdrawn from clerical supervision. At once gallant Catholic Belgium was in arms. The bishops, supported by the priests and the mass of the laity, organized a system of church free schools throughout the land. Millions of francs were offered for their foundation. Buildings went up, as it were, by magic; teachers, either religious or lay, were engaged, and although "the law of misfortune" had been signed as late as July, 1879, yet by the first of October of the same year every city and town of importance had its half dozen or more, and every country parish its church-school, in full operation. The "liberals" had expected to conquer by the high-handed use of power and money, and they had called by anticipation the Catholic effort a "miserable abortion" (*un pitoyable avortement*); but they were amazed that the failure was on their own side. In the large cities, where the government, on account of its many employees, and where French infidelity had made inroads on the faith of the people, the state schools succeeded in keeping about half of the children; but in the smaller towns and cities and in the country, especially in the Flemish part of Belgium, the defeat of the infidel school law was a perfect Waterloo. The Episcopal schools had everywhere from 75 to 95 per cent. of the school children, and many a state schoolmaster who had no family of his own had not a solitary pupil upon whom to bestow the benefit of his erudition.

The Belgian Catholics would not trust the government, although it tried to delude them by saying that nothing was changed in the inner nature of the schools, and by inserting in the law an article granting permission to the ministers of religion to teach catechism in one of the school-rooms, but after school hours. Finding that this concession did not work, the minister of instruction him-

self conceded more. He ordered the crucifix to be retained in the schools, and he had a sum set apart by the treasury to pay one hundred francs a year to every teacher who would agree to teach the catechism to his pupils. This was done to promote schism and thwart the clergy who had prohibited such teaching and had interdicted the state schools. But the people could not be deceived, and they remained faithful to their pastors. It was feared that the people would become tired of supporting their own schools, having to pay at the same time heavy taxes for supporting idle state schoolmasters and empty school-houses. But every year has been strengthening the Catholic cause, and instead of losing, the schools of the bishops have been gaining ground in every direction. They have now over two-thirds of all the school children of the country.

This magnificent result was brought about by the zeal of the clergy. As soon as the godless school law was passed the parish priests at once appointed committees in their respective parishes; subscriptions were at once taken up, buildings erected and church schools established. Teachers were secured either from among the religious communities or from among the schoolmasters who were not willing to sacrifice their conscience for the loaves and fishes of the government. The bishops on their part appointed a diocesan school board and a national committee, whose duty it was to organize the work, to regulate its operations and see to its preservation and growth. The bishops, besides, appointed each a diocesan inspector and under him a sufficient number of district inspectors, generally professors in colleges or parish priests of the canton. Thus, in the diocese of Ghent there is a canon who supervises the Catholic schools of the whole diocese, and under him there are fourteen inspectors, supervising the Episcopal schools, of which there are about two hundred and thirty directed by religious brothers or sisters, and about as many others directed by laymen. There are now but five very small parishes in the diocese without Catholic schools, but these parishes send their children to neighboring districts for their education.

How the zeal and perseverance of these Belgian Catholics should stimulate American Catholics in the same holy cause of resisting a system which is contrary to Christianity, and in the light of this glorious example how gross appears the indifference of the Protestant sects to the decay of Christian convictions which are melting away through the influence of the public schools! This statement needs no proof. It is self-evident to every one who contrasts the state of religion in our Republic at the beginning of the present century with its actual condition in the Prot-

estant sects. Americans in 1775 were Christians. Are they so now?

It is not, however, our purpose to point out the various defects in the public-school system as it exists in most of our States. This has been often and well done. Nor do we care to show how ridiculous is the fetich embodied in the cry of "unsectarian education,"—the shibboleth of the champions of our public-school system. As if a man could not be a true American because he is a stanch Presbyterian, or Methodist, or Catholic; or as if the less belief he had in the doctrines of his creed the better American he would become; as if George Washington and Charles Carroll would have been better patriots if they had been worse Christians, or if they had been Agnostics! This cry of "non-sectarian education" covers something else, and is loudest in the mouths of the bureaucracy that is making its living by it at the expense of the taxpayers. And perhaps sufficient attention has not been called to this side of the question of our system of public education. It is intrenched in the State treasury and identified with a whole organized system of jobbery. The system is sustained by the vanity of politicians, ycleped commissioners and inspectors, who go around the schools making speeches to win the admiration of female teachers who hold their places through political influence; as well as by the patronage which extends all the way up from the janitor who takes care of the school building to the often illiterate trustee who is aspiring to some more lucrative position, or who is already making something by the appointments which he controls; and to the contractors who supply the coal, or the furniture, or who make the necessary repairs, or furnish the books, slates, etc., to the institution. All these and the whole army of teachers, male and female, with their relations and connections, form a strong political party, all interested in extolling the advantages of "non-sectarian education" which brings grist to their mill and dollars to their pockets. Have the American people reflected on the enormous expense and jobbery of their pet system? Perhaps if they had, those of them who care little about the question of principle might be influenced by the potent argument of appeal to their purse. Can it be that the Protestant ministers hesitate to oppose a system out of which so many deacons and vestrymen are making their living?

We spend annually \$85,111,442 for the support of non-sectarian schools; and it is no exaggeration to say that a very large percentage of this amount is—to put it mildly—"jobbery." Our public-school teachers cost us annually \$55,291,022; whereas, a denominational system would not cost half that amount. And all this we endure in order that the State shall do the very un-American

thing of stepping out of its proper sphere to usurp rights properly belonging to parents. The true American idea is to restrict the State's authority to the smallest circle. Education is none of the State's business. It has enough to do to take care of the material welfare of the people, and not to interfere in education, a matter in which it is so easy to oppress the conscience of minorities, and abridge the natural rights of parents. If the State wishes to promote education among the people, it can do so by other means than usurping parental rights. It can enforce attendance at school. It can impose fines on parents who neglect to send their children to school. It can deny the right to vote to those who are not educated; but it need not play the schoolmaster and add to the already too large amount of public plunder by the creation of a new and usurping bureaucracy.

It costs Colorado \$38.03 per capita of its population to support this usurpation of the State in the matter of education. It costs California \$26.32, and Nevada \$23.97, per capita, for the same purpose. These are heavy taxes for sparsely populated States. Massachusetts pays \$21.54 annually for the education of every pupil of her public schools. If education were left to the churches and to the parents, all these taxes could be saved; the work of education would be better done, for it would have educators whose *hearts* would be in their work, and we would not have the spectacle which now greets us in every State in the Union, of large minorities of the people groaning under double taxation, and suffering in conscience from the exercise of a usurped power, in a land of liberty! Where is the spirit of old Protestant "orthodoxy,"—where are the Episcopalians, that so few voices protest against this infidel, dishonest, oppressive, and un-American system of State education?

II.

But all this is only a preface to our purpose, which is to call attention to some matters in which our parochial system of education might be improved. So well do the Catholic clergy and people understand their plain duty as to the necessity of religious education, that they have everywhere erected parochial schools, unless prevented by a physical or a moral impossibility, the only pleas which can justify conscience for delay in this important matter. Now, considering the poverty of many of our parishes; considering the difficulty of private enterprise coping with public institutions, there is reason for congratulation upon the comparative success of the Church schools.¹

¹ The multiplication of Catholic schools in some localities is almost as astonishing as the growth of the Church itself in the United States. Some of the finest school buildings in New York to-day are Catholic; take St. Peter's, St. James's, St. Ann's,

Our Catholic Irish and our Catholic Germans have been emulating the example of their Belgian brethren. Our schools have been gradually growing in importance, and ridding themselves of defects that were inseparable from their beginnings in poverty and debt. The old parish schoolmaster, the aroma of whose short pipe often filled the class-room; a man not very learned, indeed, but untiring in his labors, overtaxed with the care of a large school of unruly boys, whom, though he rudely punished, he dearly loved, and into whose minds he instilled those principles of faith and manliness which he had inherited from his persecuted forefathers, has been gradually disappearing. The basement of the Church, once the school hall of the parish in which the good priest gave his instructions faithfully, adding the daily sanction of priestly authority to the teaching of the master, has been supplanted by the large separate building with airy rooms and fine playgrounds. And yet we remember those rude days of the rattan and the strap, and the old-fashioned teacher, and the old-fashioned school, and the old-fashioned priest, with love and almost with regret. They sent out a race of manly Catholics, of strong faith and strong arms, and it is to be hoped that the new schools, while improved in all their surroundings, appliances, and comforts, will not fall short of the old ones in the zeal and courage of their graduates. The gradual improvement of our parish schools is only a question of time; with the diminution of the Church debt the means for paying Catholic teachers better, for lessening their labors, and putting them on a material equality with the public schools, will increase. In some of the large cities some of our schools have already outstripped the public ones in the character of the buildings and in the capacity of the teachers. This is certainly true of New York; and when this will have become universally so, the objection of some Catholics to the Church schools will be entirely removed. The Catholic teachers who now form so influential a part of the corps of public educators, will then have opportunity for the exercise of their talents in a more congenial atmosphere, and with equal remuneration for their services. Then will the secular be on a par with the religious training of the young in all our parochial schools.

Yet here it is well to call attention to a common error, which consists in depreciating the parish schools for not imitating a seeming excellence, but what is, in reality, a radical vice, in public school

St. Michael's, St. Jerome's, and the Cathedral Schools, for example. This is true of the neighboring cities, also. The old directories compared with the new ones tell the tale of this wonderful growth and improvement. Thirty years ago there was in Jersey City but one Catholic school, in the rickety basement of old St. Peter's Church. Now the finest school building in the city is a Catholic one; and separate school buildings rise near its half dozen principal churches.

training. We mean the system of cramming. We should be sorry ever to see that "improvement" introduced into Catholic schools. It treats the child's head as the geese are treated in Strasburg, and turns his brain into a *pâté de foie gras*.

We do not mean "cramming" in the sense in which it is used in colleges, where lazy students who had neglected their studies during the year endeavor to make up for lost time by stuffing their memory with a lot of undigested material which may carry them across the ass's bridge of a yearly examination, but which they forget or cast aside as useless luggage when they have passed it. This kind of stuffing is unfortunately more frequent in the parochial than in the public schools. A system of learning rules by rote, either in arithmetic or in grammar, is pernicious in any school, and indicates incompetency in the teacher. The child's intelligence should be trained to understand what he commits to memory, otherwise he is like a parrot repeating meaningless expressions. But by "cramming" we mean the excessive multiplying of studies, so that the child's mind is distracted by too great a variety of matter, and has no leisure for concentration, or for proficiency in any one branch of learning.

The multiplication of studies, some of them merely ornamental, and others entirely unsuited to the tender minds of children, is one of the radical vices of the public-school system. For instance, the study of botany, mineralogy, and of other natural sciences, is useful only when it does not crowd out more important subjects. It becomes injurious when it is taught to the detriment of more elementary matters, and when it takes up the time which could be used to better advantage by children who are chiefly the children of the poor, destined for business or for trades in which a knowledge of reading, writing, and arithmetic is the essential requirement. To puzzle and confuse their minds is not properly to educate them; and especially to teach them physiology is unnecessary; and when it is exemplified with large pictures of the anatomical subject, is even positively demoralizing. The physical health of the child is influenced by its intellectual training; and it is undeniable that too much study, and especially too much of a certain sort, not only injures the mind but the body. The public-school system, by the overcrowding of studies, is turning out a race of smatterers who can talk superficially about many things without knowing even the elementary branches of common education well. They are giving us a race of precocious youths who know, in their teens, more "physiology" than their parents did in the fullness of their manhood.

Nor do we find fault with the parochial schools for giving more holidays than the public schools. Just as it is a mistake to over-

burden the child's mind with a multiplicity of studies, so is it to overtax it with long periods of uninterrupted study. The physical health of the child is a proper object of the teacher's care; and when mind and body are both tender, play, recreation, and the Church holiday are as necessary as the text-book. Parents, therefore, who complain of the number of holidays in the Catholic system have not reflected enough on their necessity for the repose of the child's soul and body. Why overstrain young children's minds or bodies? Nor can it be said that, on the score of purely elementary education, the parochial system is inferior to its well-paid and State-protected rival. Whatever may be said of the higher branches, children learn to spell, read, and write as well in the Catholic as in the public schools.

But, having said this much regarding the superiority of parochial to public schools, on the score of religion, of care of the health of the children, and of purely elementary training, we must stop to consider some points in which many of the parochial schools manifestly need improvement.

Their greatest defect is that in many of them there is no system. Parishes make separate systems unto themselves. Our schools lack uniformity in discipline, in text-books, in the efficiency of teachers, and in the grading of studies. In these particular matters the parish schools have much to learn from the State institution; and yet the lesson is so easily acquired, and so readily put into application, that we fail to see a reason for further delaying it.

It is true that the one thousand Christian Brothers, engaged in teaching in the United States, are doing their best to improve the parochial schools. These teachers, for the most part, pass through the Brothers' "Training School," in which youths, under sixteen years of age, are taught the branches that go to make fair English scholars; and if, after spending two or more years in this school, they are found fit, they enter the Novitiate proper, in which, besides studying the religious life, they are instructed in the method of teaching. After the Novitiate, they enter the "Normal School," where they remain two years, if possible. Thus far, however, it has been difficult to permit the Brothers to receive this thorough training, owing to the urgent demand for them all over the country.

It is a noteworthy fact that the boasted system of grading in use in the public schools is based on that of the Brothers, as Henry Kiddle, in his work on *Pedagogy*, plainly indicates.

The two thousand female teachers, known as "Sisters of Charity," are also daily improving the character of the female parish schools. These ladies are carefully trained during their Novitiate in secular learning. They have a training-school at Mt. St. Vin-

cent, on the Hudson, one of the largest and finest educational establishments in the world.

Wherever the Sisters have full control of the school, and are able to afford a complete corps of teachers, as in the free school near Mt. St. Vincent, for instance, a system of grading is carried out, almost identical with that of the public schools. It is a fact worth recording, that when the two parochial schools in Poughkeepsie passed under the Public School Board, no change was required by the School Trustees in the teaching staff of the Sisters, who were, nevertheless, no way superior to those employed in other schools of the diocese. In 1878, when Hon. Matthew H. Ellis, President of the Board of Education of Yonkers, accompanied by the members of the School Board of Poughkeepsie, visited the schools there, he reported that "the Sisters' schools were the best in Poughkeepsie." Yet the Sisters there were no brighter nor better trained than the average elsewhere. In 1877, Henry Kiddle, Superintendent of Schools in New York City, said that it would be suicidal to give Catholics their share of the school fund, "for they have matured teachers, whereas the public schools had only half-fledged birds, who looked on teaching as only a stepping-stone to something else; for, by the time they knew how to subdue themselves and keep order, they got married, and left the ranks."

When we consider that in every community of Sisters or Brothers continual training is going on, and that the evening, after school hours, is spent in prayer and study as preparations for the following day's work, and contrast this system with the usual employments of the male and female public-school teachers, after their day's work is done,—many of the young ladies preparing for the dissipation of the ball or the party, and the gentlemen for a night at billiards in the saloon or cards in the private residence of a neighbor,—it is not astonishing that so many of the parochial should surpass the public schools in discipline and progress. If it were not for the poverty which oppresses the parochial system, the State-paid institution would be completely distanced here, as it has been in Belgium, by its religious competitor.

The Belgian system of grading is well worth imitating by our Catholic educators. In each primary school in Belgium there are from three to five classes, ranged according to the capacity and progress of the pupils. They learn to read and write Flemish or French, according to the language of their locality. They learn the elements of arithmetic, history, and geography, besides the fundamental truths of the Catholic Religion. If, after passing through the higher class, they wish to continue their studies, they can go to the Episcopal academies and colleges, where they will be fitted

for professional careers, or for the higher studies of the universities. The teachers of these inferior schools, both men and women, have been trained in normal schools, and their methods are those most approved by modern progress. The masters have the confidence of the parents and the religious sympathy of their pupils, and they have no trouble in forming the whole man, mind and heart, soul as well as body. No longer trammled by state supervision and restriction, Catholic instruction in Belgium will undoubtedly produce a new generation of Catholics, much better grounded in their religion and more devoted to the Church than those trained under the semi-Catholic official system of education which held sway from 1842 to 1879.

If our parochial schools were wealthy corporations, able to pay teachers; if the Sisters and the Brothers and the lay-teachers had adequate means of effecting it, no doubt all our schools, in the matter of grading as well as in the equipment of the teachers, would be up to the highest standard. Now, could not a general system for their government be even now organized and extended wherever it is feasible?

Of course the discipline of the parish school in the last analysis must depend on the pastor. He is supervisor and school inspector; and no matter what rules may be made for the general government of the schools, their enforcement will depend finally on him. But is there any pastor who does not desire to see a set of rules laid down by some central authority which will be his guide? And is it not a fact that no such set of rules exists? Where is our "Catholic School Manual," serving as guide to the teachers in their treatment of the children, as the "Public School Manuals" regulate the discipline in them? Is it not urgent to supply this deficiency?

Although even in the well-regulated public-school system there is no absolute uniformity of text-books, yet there is always a great similarity among them. Absolute uniformity in this respect may not be attainable, at least for the present, in our Catholic schools, but a little reflection will show the advantages of it. Take, for instance, the catechism. We know that it is important for children to learn its definitions, which, remaining well-grounded in the memory, will serve in after life as sign-posts when developing reason begins to reflect on the meaning of words. "Keep the form of sound words." But if the child learns one definition in one class and a different one—although the difference may be only nominal—in another, will not this beget confusion? In a country like ours, where the people float about from parish to parish, and from diocese to diocese, what are the children to do if every new parish or new diocese into which they may emigrate has a new

catechism worded differently from the one they had been studying in their former home? Will not this lack of uniformity disturb the child; and this collision of definitions, although only verbally different, break up the certainty of its knowledge and destroy the fruit of its application? And that which is true as a consequence of lack of uniformity in the matter of catechisms, is also true, though in a less important sense, in regard to secular text-books. May we suggest, then, that an authorized *national* catechism might be a legitimate theme for consideration by the competent church authorities? And while the bishops in council, or each prelate in his own diocese was considering the question of uniformity in the catechism, they would be likely to consider also the question of uniformity of text-books and discipline, and to insist on improvement in these important matters. Will any one who has looked at this subject carefully deny that improvement is very desirable in these respects? The slovenly form of the text-book, with its daubs of cheap illustrations—the catchpenny of the publisher who has grown rich on the sale of his ill-composed, badly selected, and cheaply printed publications—often brings discredit on the parochial school. We have certainly some good text-books, and there is so much elegant Catholic literature from which to select in the composition of school readers, that it is a shame to see the rubbish which we find enterprising publishers sometimes palming off on our school children as models of style and of system.

To establish a system of training schools for teachers, to enforce uniformity as to their competency and efficiency, is a more delicate and a more difficult matter. We know that the public schools boast—and legitimately do so—of their corps of skilled teachers who have had to get diplomas before presuming to undertake the important duty of training the young. We know that it is charged that many of our parochial school teachers are not properly equipped for their work. Whether this charge be true or not, it deserves attention. Considering, however, that most of those who are engaged in the holy work of Christian education are men and women bound by vows of obedience, it ought not to be difficult for ecclesiastical authority to enforce reformation, if any be needed in this matter, or to help the teaching communities to carry out their rule. The honor and the success of Catholic schools require that their teachers should be second to none in ability or in training for their work. The “*hedge*” schoolmaster is no longer necessary; certainly not in this free Republic.

But it is in the lack of system in grading the classes that some of our parochial schools need the greatest reformation. We have to deal chiefly with the children of the poor. For them time is peculiarly precious, and school labor should be specially spared.

The child is in a hurry to leave school and go to work. The average child's intelligence is dull. It learns slowly and forgets easily. Anything, therefore, that steals its time or increases its labor without necessity should be eliminated. Now, this defect of system in grading is a great thief of time and a despotic task-master. For instance, the matter studied in the first class in one parochial school is that which forms the grade of the third class in another. In the second class in one school higher arithmetic is taught; while in another it is reserved for the first class. There is neither uniformity of matter nor of quantity; and so, when the child goes from one parish to another, expecting to continue his studies where he left off, he finds a complete change in the new school, and he must either go down and lose his time or go up and overtax his brain. This defect is not in the public schools. When a child passes from one to another of them, he has only to tell the teacher where he left off in the old school to be properly placed with congenial studies, to be followed in logical order, in the new one. Thus time and labor are saved in the public schools because of this universal system of grading. The lack of it in many of our parish schools is a crying want, and yet it is the one most easily supplied.

How? We do not wish to enter into the question of details. That is matter for the proper authorities. We only suggest; and Church authority, which is always intelligent, is ever ready to listen to a suggestion prompted by a good motive and put in a respectful manner. Perhaps it would be asking too much to insist on a national *systematization* of our parish schools. This could be most effectually done by the consent of all our prelates in council assembled. But a diocesan *systematization* is easily accomplished. A diocesan school-board appointed by the bishop, as in Belgium, consisting of skilled Catholic lay teachers, as well as of priests, having authority to impose a uniform system of discipline and grading, with the duty of frequent inspection and reporting to the bishop, would at once solve the problem. This might not interfere at all with the respective systems of the teaching orders. Since the object of such a board would be to elevate the tone of our parish schools, and make them in every respect superior to their rivals, so that all excuse of Catholics for not patronizing their own institutions might be taken away, its work would be unimpeded by any obstruction that could not easily be removed, and its mission would be a fruitful one, as it has been in other countries, in the cause of Catholic education. The teaching orders would become its strongest advocates. It would help them to found normal schools and carry out to the letter their written rules.

Much has recently been said and written about the establishment of a Catholic University. It is, undoubtedly, a desideratum, and would have, as a consequence, the improvement of the higher education of Catholics, a lifting up of the standard of Catholic colleges, and would tend to give Catholics what a distinguished foreign ecclesiastic among us has told us that we needed—"social standing." But while agitating for this noble object, let us not forget to begin at the bottom. We want the poor to remain faithful to our Church. We have neither kings nor aristocrats here for whose influence we need particularly care. But we must be true to God's poor, who are the bone and sinew of our Holy Church. Their schools should be our first care; their elevation, our first love. Let us, then, begin by cleaning out the basement before embellishing the edifice with a French roof, and let us concentrate our forces in the endeavor to improve the tone and character of our parochial schools by a uniform system of grading, by promoting the efficiency of our teachers, and by purging the style of our text-books.

THE WANING INFLUENCE OF THE ENGLISH UNIVERSITIES.

THE English universities no longer take the lead in religious thought. The reason is twofold. First, the constitution of the universities—that is, of Oxford and Cambridge—has been radically changed during the last thirty years; and next, religious thought has reached its ultimate development, so that no more "schools," no more "movements," are even possible. So long as the Anglican religion was in a state of transition, expanding towards Catholicity or towards skepticism, the country turned its eyes towards the two old universities to see how such expansion was received by them. When Ritualism brought development to a dead-stand in the one extreme, and agnosticism brought it to a dead-stand in the other extreme, the universities were in precisely the same plight as was the country, and therefore the universities ceased to lead.

More than this, since the universities have un-churched their constitutions, by the abolition of religious tests and of clerical monopolies, they can no longer be the nurseries for either High

Churchism or Low Churchism, as they had been from the time of the Reformation. Obviously the first requisite of a Church of England university would be that the governing tutors should be Anglican; they should not only be Anglican, they should be clerical (since the universities are nurseries for clergymen); but now that laymen may be governing tutors, and Dissenters may be governing tutors, and even agnostics, so called, may be governing tutors, the atmosphere of the universities is no more primarily Anglican than it is primarily Nonconformist or agnostic. Hence it is needless to try to prove that the old English universities no longer take the lead in religious thought, because, by the very changes in their constitution, it has become simply impossible that they should do so.

A short time ago two elections were made at Oxford which sharply emphasized the spirit of the times. Professor Jowett became Vice-Chancellor of the University, and Mr. Monro became Provost of Oriel. Both these elections "told their tale." In regard to Mr. Monro, perhaps the utmost significance that could be attached to the fact of his election was that other Fellows of more pronounced Anglican orthodoxy were set aside as not being "men of their times." But in regard to Professor Jowett, it is not a little remarkable that a man who, a few years ago, was prohibited from preaching in what is known as the university pulpit, was elected to the supreme leadership of the university; that the chief contributor to the famous *Essays and Reviews* was absolved and was throned as the Vice-Chancellor. To persons "down in the country," as the Oxford undergraduates used at one time to call the world outside Oxford, it may not now seem to be of much public importance who may be elected to this chair or to that. Forty years ago such elections made a stir. The reason of the present coldness of the national interest is so obvious that it needs scarcely to be stated. The difference between the Oxford of to-day and the Oxford of some thirty or forty years ago, is that the Oxford of to-day may *represent* English ideas, but the Oxford of forty years ago helped to *form* them. Indeed, the constitutional changes which have come over Oxford, in all governing and academical senses, are not greater than the changes which have made Oxford little more than one of the first "finishing schools" for young Englishmen. The chief nursery of religious thought, which Oxford was at one time, is now a magnificent public school for young men. With but slight distinction, the same must be said of Cambridge. Whereas, forty years ago it was customary with all Anglicans, when any new religious movement was gaining favor, to ask: "How is it received at the universities?" no one in these days would think of asking such a question, because the universities no

longer lead. Oxford and Cambridge being simply representative, in the same sense as is a German university, may catch the spirit which is sent up to them from the country, but do not in any sense shape it or modify it.

Such being the fact, we must naturally ask the question: Is such change a national loss or a national gain? Unquestionably it is a grave national loss. It proves, to begin with, that the old Anglican intensity, which used to crave for a sort of focusing of religious movement, has given place to the conviction that, Anglican developments being "used up," there can be no interest because there can be no development. "Movement" is inconsistent with finality. Ritualism and agnosticism are the two ends. And since, between them, every conceivable compromise, equally in theory and in experiment, has been exhausted by innumerable parties, there is nothing more to be looked for, no further possibility, which the most ingenious of theorists could devise. Was not this fact the reason why the once Anglican universities threw open their gates wide to non-Anglicans? Was it not that, in despair of being teachers, they acquiesced in doing away with (orthodox) teaching? Half consciously, both the universities and the country, so soon as development became impossible and a sort of cold-blooded agnosticism had taken its place, decided to put an end to the nurseries of religious thought by de-Anglicanizing both the universities.

In a university, above all places in the world, if there be religious movement at all, it must necessarily be associated with great names. More than this, the individuality of the "movers" must impress itself on the minds of the undergraduates. But when the atmosphere which was essentially clerical, which made all rivalries in movement to be clerical, became Germanized, rationalized, or primarily secular, there could not well be that honor felt for great men, who were great even among a crowd of clerical magnates. So that personal homage for the leaders of clerical thought became difficult when clerical thought was not in rivalry. Movements, like movers, lost their charm. It is not too much to say that almost all the religious movements which have perplexed Oxford and perplexed the country in the last fifty years (like the great names which were associated with them) have died out of Oxford, even if they have not died out of the country, and are now but memories of the elderly and the few. Where is the "school" of Bishop Wilberforce, the suave patron of High Churchism, or of his brother, the archdeacon, who used to preach to the undergraduates about the intolerable inconsistencies of Anglicanism? Their names scarcely remain, still less their schools. The names of Whately, of Froude, of Thomas Arnold still linger about the mem-

ories of Oriel College, where also the two Wilberforces, Cardinal Newman, and John Keble passed most of their academical careers. But it is the names chiefly that linger. The schools which they founded or represented have become clouded with new conceits of agnosticism. It is true that John Keble, the gifted author of the *Christian Year*, the one man who supplied the elements of poetry and doctrinal tenderness which were wanting to the dry teaching of the Tractarians, has been immortalized by a college built to his memory; yet the spirit of John Keble is not the spirit of modern Oxford any more than is the spirit of Cardinal Newman. The same must be said of Dr. Pusey. The old-fashioned Puseyism is probably quite as dead at Oxford as is the old-fashioned Simeonism at Cambridge. Dr. Pusey outlived his own influence. But that his name was first given to the new Tractarianism, it is probable that his individuality, great at one time as it was, could never have succeeded in coalescing the incongruous elements which were generated by what was known as *the* Oxford movement. Indeed we may say more: If John Henry Newman had not infused his individuality into all the interests and all the sentiments of Tractarianism, it is probable that *the* Oxford movement would have been almost limited to Oxford; it would not have taken hold upon the nation. The reason why, as Mr. Disraeli once expressed it, "the secession of Dr. Newman dealt a blow to the Establishment from which it still reels," was the same reason which made the Fellow of Oriel, the vicar of the village of Littlemore, the venerated preacher at St. Mary's, to be regarded as the father of modern Oxford, the friend and trusted guide of undergraduates. Individuality, *with* personal intercourse, were the essentials, and without them could be no mover, no movement. But the mover, the guide, being gone into another sphere, there is now no one to rally undergraduates. And the consequence of such a loneliness (to undergraduates) is that a reaction, which was perfectly natural or unavoidable, has come over the spirit of their yearnings. As the *London Standard* recently observed, when speaking of the vexed question whether Catholics might send their sons to the university: "The agnostic influences of Oxford were too penetrating" (thirty years ago) "to justify the faithful in sending their sons into so pernicious an atmosphere." Those influences are more penetrating now than they were then. Disheartening as was the evidence of the Oxford Commission upon the subject of the infidel tendencies of modern Oxford, it is certain that there are more easy thinkers (we will not use the offensive word freethinkers) in each of the Oxford colleges of the present day than there were in all the colleges put together twenty years ago.

Now, there can be no question that the Church of England suffers

corporately from the absence of *any* influential body which can guide it. True, the word "guide" is too strong a word to use critically when speaking of the past influence of the universities; but if for "guide" we say "move," or "profoundly interest," we express the same idea with more accuracy. The Church of England being, as Lord Macaulay expressed it, "a hundred sects battling within one church," naturally looks to learning—since it cannot look to authority—for its apology for the favored theories of the hour. It not only looks to learning, it looks to earnestness; it looks to any body of men who ought to be earnest; it looks to this teacher or to that teacher for the more well-weighed exposition of such ideas as are supposed to be Anglican. Above all, it *used* to look to the universities; because the professors and resident-fellows were assumed to devote their lives to what was called the study of "Divinity;" being free from parochial cares, with no congregations to worry them, and with the intention of being "dons" all their lives. But now that the professors and the fellows may be laymen, and may be of almost any kind of religion that they prefer; and now that the undergraduates are equally unattached, and are not even conscious of the existence of the Thirty-nine Articles; the whole of the old spirit of an Anglican university has given place to a Germanized ideal. Hence, the Church of England neither looks to the universities for the calm, digested learning which they used to foster; nor does it look on the undergraduates as the future pastors and preachers who are being deeply imbued with the learned spirit of theologians.

Obviously, a university must have three kinds of influence besides that of its academical prestige; namely, the social, the political, the theological. This is specially true in regard to a university where the best class of future clergy are being prepared. Socially, the position of the Anglican clergy is really of incomparable importance. It is the more so in these days than in past times, because most gentlemen are as well educated as are the clergy. At one time the mere fact that a man could read had raised a presumption that he was in orders. This was the case in the reign of Henry VIII. But toward the end of the seventeenth century the rural clergy, though not the town clergy, had sunk equally in learning and in social caste. Even in Queen Elizabeth's time so low was their social caste that Her Majesty issued an order that no clergyman should espouse a servant-girl without the consent of the master or the mistress. The lady's waiting-woman was thought too good for the parson. In the comedies of the seventeenth century we always find that the country parson thinks himself well mated with the cook. Even in the time of George II.

Dean Swift has assured us that a lady's maid who married a chaplain "aroused suspicion that her character had been blown upon, and that she had no longer hopes of catching the steward." Yet this proves nothing against the character of the clergy. It was the poverty of the rural clergy which kept them servile, just as it was their want of social position which destroyed their influence. In the great towns, and especially in the capital, the clergy were "gentlemen" and university men; but in the country they were, for the most part, humble persons, who had little learning and little conventional good breeding. In the time of George III. a far higher respectability came to be attached to the position of the rural clergy; and in the time of William IV., and in the early part of the present reign, "to be a clergyman was the mark of being a gentleman." It was only when, some thirty or forty years ago, "literates" were warmly welcomed by the Anglican bishops, who ceased to require degrees from their candidates, that the social caste of the Anglican clergy began to descend rapidly; so much so as to affect their relations to "good society." Most Anglicans like a clergyman to be a university man, and if he be not so, they run away with the idea that he has got into holy orders by some back-door.

Politically, the influence of the universities has been little felt since the time of James II., because the principles of the monarchy and of the Church establishment have never been brought into grave conflict. In the early part of the reign of James the Second Oxford was the stronghold of loyalty; and it was just at that period that both Oxford and Cambridge reached the summit of their power and reputation. No neighboring country could boast of such seats of learning; to which all that was intellectual in England looked up with respect and even pride. The schools of Leyden and Utrecht, of Padua and Bologna, of Leipsic and Louvain, could not be compared with those two grand institutions, at which the most eminent of the clergy, the lawyers, the orators, the physicians, the men of literature, the poets, were educated as much in sentiment as in scholarship. The undergraduates, as a body, might not be superior to the undergraduates of our own day or of the last two hundred years; but in the fact that Oxford and Cambridge were the only two provincial towns in which there could be found large numbers of cultured men; and also in the fact that during all the recent struggles between the Royalist and the Puritan factions both universities had been intensely loyal, there was a dignity, both scholarly and political, which the whole country gladly recognized and applauded. Now just as Oxford and Cambridge had sided with the Sovereign against the Puritans, against the Whig factions, against Monmouth; so did they side

with the Church of England against the Sovereign and against his religion, when he tried to force them to become Catholic against their will. Nor can any Catholic blame them for so doing. James the Second had no more right to force Catholicity on the universities than William of Orange would have had to force them to accept Calvinism. And when James the Second put Catholic deans into Anglican colleges, turned out Anglican clergymen to make room for Catholic priests, and converted Christ Church and University College into Catholic seminaries, he abused his royal prerogative as much as would Queen Victoria if she were to force Anglicanism upon Beaumont College or upon Stonyhurst. When, in the year 1687, the fellows of Magdalen College refused to elect a Catholic for their president, and were cited before the High Commission for such disloyalty, a storm was raised in England which would have taught any monarch but King James the utter folly and fatuity of such tyranny. Oxford and Cambridge were as proudly hostile to the High Commission as they were to the king's abuse of his royal prerogative; and it is not too much to say that to the example of the universities was due a good deal of that courageous resistance which drove James the Second from his throne.

But from that time to this no great political conflict between the royal and the ecclesiastical provinces has engaged the attention of the universities. The fatal example of King James has taught prudence to his successors, who, however, have had no will to pick quarrels. It is in the domain of theology, or what passes for that science, that both the universities have been dominant. And, as was said at the beginning, the constitution of the universities, as well as the whole temper of the English mind, has become so changed during the last thirty or forty years that there is no longer either the same capacity in the universities to teach or the same motive for wishing to listen in the country. We must put a number of causes together if we would apprehend the whole reason why the country does not "look up to" the universities. Socially, they have lost something of their former caste, from the fact that they have been compelled to enlarge their boundaries so as to admit a larger number of poor students, and from the fact that fewer students of distinction seek to accept holy orders as a profession. Politically, the growth of Liberalism affects their influence; and politically, also, the general tendency of the times is in the direction of independence of all societies. Theologically, no one cares a pin for the example of the universities, as to High Churchism, or Low Churchism, or Broad Churchism; because the constitution of the universities is no longer essentially Anglican, if, indeed, it be any longer essentially Christian; and also, be-

cause the country is in full possession of all controversies, which are condensed for it in magazines and even in newspapers. The very spirit of the times being "*not* to be taught," by any society, localized church, or reverend champion, the country is as indifferent to the "views" of Oxford and Cambridge as are the undergraduates to the views of their dons.

Fifty years ago there were two distinct bodies in the two great English universities, the dons, who were a class by themselves, and the undergraduates, who were taught by the dons. There is now no distinct "body" of dons, in the didactic or view-teaching sense; the undergraduates, perhaps, admiring this don or that don, but not ascribing to the class-don a collective weight. It needs to be insisted on, when discussing this question,—why have the universities lost influence?—that the chief reason of their former influence in religious matters was that *all* the dons formed a council of religious thinkers. One school derived force from another school, in the fact that *all* opposing schools had splendid foemen. At the time of the Oxford movement the earnest intellects and earnest characters which resisted the new tendencies towards Catholicity derived proportionate importance from their resistance to leaders who were recognized as the very cream of the university. Froude, or Thomas Arnold, together with other gifted "schoolmen," who used to talk about the Oxford "malignants," attracted more attention, and possibly more respect, from the fact that they were in strife with the great Tractarians. To be in conflict with Newman or with Keble, or to disesteem the courteous compromises of Bishop Wilberforce, was to attract disciples who valued their guides all the more in the proportion of the grandeur of their opponents. But, in these days, there being no Oxford council of all professors, all clerics, all fellows—every don doing that which is right in his own eyes—there is little rivalry, little religious competition, little interest in the isolated disputations. This fact creates regret that the constitution of the universities has ceased to be, primarily, clerico-Anglican. We all know that the vigorous wills of young men demand a recognized superiority in their teachers. When those teachers say, "Pray, do not swear to the Thirty-nine Articles; attach yourselves to any religion or to no religion; *we*, as you see, sit so lightly to all such subjects that we do not require *you* to be churchmen; the university atmosphere is not dogmatic, it is not even didactic in a doctrinal sense; it is latitudinarian, which means that the two extremes are equally comprehended within orthodoxy; therefore, as a body we dons do not teach you, we do not profess even to hold council for your benefit; we only tutor you in this subject or in that subject, and make our final schools more Rationalist than Christian; therefore, we pray you to regard relig-

ion as you regard philosophy or antiquity—in such aspects as we place them before you—rather in an amiable spirit of criticism than with profound obeisance to the truths of Revelation.”

Was it not better to pretend to have unity than to affirm that no unity is requisite? A unity of altitude, of profession, of even tone, used to symbolize the teaching of *a* belief. It was at least a decorous apology for the absence of real authority, with a sort of confession that such authority must be longed for. The answer that “universities are meant for everybody” does not meet the particular loss of which we speak. “To mould into shape and symmetry the intellectual and moral faculties of men” does not appear to be possible in a university where the teachers are all cast in different “moulds.” At least, there can be no unity of design. A Christian Athens, perhaps, Oxford never was; yet it is obvious that it aimed at becoming one in the days, say, of Chichele or Wykeham. What it was between Elizabeth and Victoria was the paralysis of its earlier time. Still, as long as there was the pretension of aggregate authority, there was the dogmatic teaching of the necessity of authority. The sentiment, if not the fact, of authority was kept before the eyes of the students. Without that sentiment where could have been the groundwork of the Oxford movement? (Such a movement would be now almost impossible.) What would have been the use of summoning St. Gregory, or St. Thomas, or Tertullian, or St. Prudentius, or St. Paulinus, as witnesses for the beauty of the Early Church, unless religious sentiment were keenly alive to the appreciation of all that was involved in the *idea*, authority? When, in one of the earlier Tracts for the Times, Tertullian was quoted as saying: “The early Christians in all their travels and movements, in all their comings in and goings out, in putting on their shoes, in the bath, at the table, in lighting the candles, in lying down, in sitting down, whatever occupation engaged them, were wont to mark their foreheads with the sign of the cross,” the reader, almost unconsciously, looked away from the *devotion* to the *authority*, of which he retained only the sentiment. That sentiment used to be supreme in the universities. That it is so no longer is the result of the new system which has eliminated orthodoxy out of religion.

In considering the whole question of university influence, we are met by this difficulty at starting; that it would be futile to compare the “ideal” of a non-Catholic university with the “ideal” of a Catholic university. Yet the “ideal” is the root of the whole matter. A Catholic would argue that since theology is *one* of the sciences, it cannot be excluded from a university; and further, that since theology is the *most* important of the sciences, its chair ought to take precedence of all other chairs. He would argue justly

that, all sciences being in some way connected, or having some degree of relative bearing, the omission of the most important of the sciences must mar the "ideal" of a university. He would argue that, as a matter of fact, theology *must* be privately controverted, even if it be not taught as a system; and that the teachers of other sciences, and therefore also their pupils, will make use of some of its principles for their own inferences. Even in Natural Religion it is impossible to completely separate personal opinions from personal knowledge of some of the sciences; while in Supernatural Religion the whole domain of divine truth must, in large measure, *tone* secular studies. No one would argue that a student of physical science need consult with a theologian as to his processes; that an astronomer, a chemist, or a linguist must, to begin with, know something of theology; but every Catholic is aware that, without the knowledge of the highest truth the knowledge of the lesser truths must be imperfect; not in regard to the particular compass of a particular truth, but in regard to its relative place among all truths. In a Catholic university every student has brought up with him certain "truths" about God's Nature and about Redemption; which truths govern his conduct through his conscience, and fix the attitude of his intellect towards all studies. He does not pursue particular studies with a view to getting hints as to the probable truth or probable fiction of "religious truths;" but he accepts, to begin with, certain broad Catholic verities which are his guide in the precise measurement of relative values. In a non-Catholic university every student is at liberty to think what he will about all verities; nor is it too much to say that there is not one "religious truth" which he may not subject to the scrutiny of his own opinions. Hence this attitude of his intellect towards the highest (or divine) truths is the same as towards the truths of natural sciences. There may be a touch of pious sentiment in the intellectual attitude; but the attitude is rationalistic towards *all* truths. And since the "ideal" of a university is the training of the intellect to measure the relative values of known truths, quite as much as to increase the knowledge of truths, or to sharpen the wits to apprehend them, it seems impossible that, in a non-Catholic university, the intellectual attitude should be balanced. The moral side of the intellect must be immoral. The conceits of theological disputation, the prejudiced misleadings of history, the perverted estimate of ecclesiastical facts, the habit of privately interpreting Scripture, the hazy views as to the authority of traditions, together with the total absence of recognized authority on the first principles of belief or of unbelief, and the total absence of those channels of spiritual fortitude which are at the service of every Catholic student, must demoralize the intellect in its capacity of

justly measuring the relative values of the assured and the speculative. Intellectually, the studies at a non-Catholic university must suffer in efficiency as well as grasp, because the impossibility of beginning with the science of divine truths puts the studies of all other truths into wrong places.

It will be said: "But this has always been the case at Oxford and Cambridge, since the time when they ceased to be Catholic; and therefore their waning influence at the present time is not accounted for on any such grounds." The objection has already been partly met. Let it be added that the system called Natural Theology is only of quite modern introduction; and that so long as Scriptural Religion was the professed orthodoxy of the universities, followed by what was called Primitive or Patristic Religion, and finally developing into Anglican Catholicism (counterpoised, however, by agnosticism), there was always sufficient ground for the claim of the universities to take the lead in national religious opinion. The country may have gained something by the spirit of candor, which now obliges the universities to give up "leading;" just as it has gained something by the plain speaking of *most* Englishmen who no longer make pretence of being orthodox. Religious affectation is wholly dead, equally in the country and in the universities. And this is unquestionably a far more healthy condition than that of secret skepticism with hypocrisy. It is even to be preferred to the state of Catholic universities, in the days of the Cæsar Frederick the Second, when the most subtle and fatal forms of unbelief were cherished in at least three great universities, those of Paris, Tuscany, and Lombardy; when the English King John, of evil memory, meditated the profession of Mahometanism; and when secret societies for the propagation of unbelief were organized in the most Catholic universities, bound by oath to send their missionaries among the people, in the disguise of tramping peddlers or travelling showmen. It is true that out of this great evil came great good; that the conspiracy of traitors inspired the faithful with an earnestness which begat the most splendid Catholic conquests. The great St. Thomas came out of that very university which Frederick the Second had established at Naples expressly to corrupt the faith of Italian students. The plague of secret apostasy was soon uprooted. And though from that time to this it has never infected Catholic universities, save in that mild form which is almost inherent in vast societies, it has shown itself sporadically in every age and in every country, and must necessarily do so till the end of the world.

Is, then, the loss of influence in both the old universities partly counterpoised by the frankness with which both institutions proclaim all that they do think and do not think? Hardly so, since a

university, in its "reason of being," is a sort of high protecting power of the *truth*, because it affects that office towards *knowledge*. The ideal of a university is to fix the boundaries of research, as much as to advance knowledge in each province; to act as a sort of umpire for other societies; to adjust the claims of all studies, historical or metaphysical, and therefore to include theology in its grasp. It is at least advocative, if not judicial, as to the selection of all subjects which are argued by what is supposed to be pure intellect. To cherish the fitting mood or disposition of the mind, in its contemplation of *all* the "subjects of education," is as much its purpose as to teach how to compose Latin verses, or to acquire logical accuracy in reasoning. So that when a university abandons even the pretension to lead the country in a learned estimate of the just claims of religious system, and even goes so far as to affirm: "We are not Anglican; we are anything which you like except orthodox," it seems to abandon the *ideal* (it had long ago abandoned the *fact*) of being a university in the full sense of the word. It is true that this abandonment was no fault of the universities; the revolution was forced on them from without, or rather, the outer world said, "Since you cannot teach theology, leave it alone, and attend to what you understand." We all know that, as a matter of fact, theology, in any real sense of the word, was never taught in the (Protestant) universities. A student who was ambitious of taking orders was required to attend a course of divinity lectures, at the end of his academical career, and to take notes (if he so pleased) of dry lists of dry books, recommended for his perusal by the professor. In the examination in arts, a knowledge of Bible history was all that was demanded of the candidate. Theology was left to private disputation. But though this was the case, there was the *fact* that the governing bodies were primarily clerical and Anglican. True, it was a subject for broad jesting, when the divinity lectures were even mentioned; just as it was usually esteemed troublesome to have to attend a college lecture—before breakfast, and in a somewhat chilly hall—upon the four Gospels, or rather upon their "harmony;" but the obligation of the recognition of religious teaching was in itself the dogmatic teaching of *some* authority. The present principle, if principle it can be called, is to pile up secular studies as a sort of bulwark against orthodoxy; to represent them as being so valuable in themselves that mere theology, mere religion, is accidental; to *use* history, or physics, or even politics,—to use chemistry, anatomy, economics,—to use the visible, the sensible, the immediate, so as to shut out the invisible and the future; or so as to imply that all theology being speculative, it can only be used as we use the affections or emotions. Undoubtedly it would be better to banish theology altogether than to teach what

is false to God and false to man ; but the present " principle " is not to ostracise theology, but to teach its insignificance through higher studies. In the middle ages, with the exception of metaphysics, there was no weapon in the armory of the unbeliever with which he could assail the Christian faith ; in these days physical science has made such huge strides that it can be made to dogmatize in a " religious " world of its own. Superb as are the discoveries of modern scientists, they dazzle all the more for their finiteness ; and because they cannot touch the confines of the unseen, they are assumed to prove the unseen to be doubtful. The Catholic Church profoundly honors all sciences, within the sphere of their legitimate provinces ; but non-Catholics want the sciences to usurp the place of theology, which has no more resemblance to them than have the stars to the electric light. Theology is a divine, not a human science ; it concerns the relations of a man's soul with his Creator ; and to try to extinguish the divine claims of spiritual knowledge by the counter-claims of all other sciences put together, is like trying to eclipse the sun by lighting candles in the daytime, or trying to prove that the existence of brain-waves shows that thought must be material as is the body ; or trying to prove that any fact in the spiritual order must be negatived by the material action in the material order. It is the most irrational usurpation that was ever known—this seizing on a divine province by human provinces ; for it is a wilful, proclaimed usurpation. Let the scientists keep to their own sciences, in which they may be honored for their successes ; but just as Galileo would insist on interpreting Scripture, instead of keeping within the limits of his own province, so modern scientists insist on dogmatizing where the church has not dogmatized, or on trying to disprove spiritual dogmas by physical science. Their example has infected almost all classes, who argue in the loosest possible way. Because mesmerism may reveal secrets, it is assumed that the Gospel mysteries may be explained by some (not yet developed) method. Because Darwin strains some odd physical analogies, it is assumed that man's origin must be doubtful. Because geography does not always tally with the Mosaic record, or because geology presents some difficulties as to the world's age, it is assumed that the revelations from Mount Sinai, or the story of the six periods of creation, were rather poetical than matter-of-fact statements. And so mere speculation usurps the place of authority, *equally* in regard to the revealed and the unrevealed. This temper is now the temper of the universities. And since the country has at its command the same sources of information which are open to any society, or to any academy, the universities acquiesce in the claim of the country to usurp the chair (or rather, the arm-chair) of theology.

The country does so. The country is of opinion that its knowledge of sacred history, as much as its knowledge of secular history, is on a par with the knowledge of the universities. Yet the country—that is, the crowds who compose it—knows as little of the origin of the Scripture canon, of what the Holy See has done for learning and science, or of the origin or true courses of various schisms, as it knows of canon law, of the distinctive objects of religious orders, or of the correlative prerogatives of Popes and kings. The country has only a hazy idea that there *is* a difference between religious science and natural science; but it no more troubles itself to define the difference than it would trouble itself to tell why Aristotle was a master of what is called human philosophy, while Plato got into trouble by mixing up human philosophy with the supernatural relations of man to God. The universities having recognized that such confusedness is unavoidable,—or, at least, that it is not *their* province to clear it up,—the country sits down calmly in the arm-chair of its new theology, and ceases to look to “academies” for enlightenment.

That, as a matter of fact, this new school of Natural Religionists has failed to come to even one definite conclusion,—has been forced to proclaim that religion is *not* a science, and that, therefore skepticism is the only true philosophy; and still further, has confessed, spite of its strong wishes to the contrary, that if there be any “religious system” it must be that of the “old theology,”—of the Catholic Roman Church of the Holy See, are stern truths, which, in the arm-chair of its own professorship, the country can contemplate without dismay. The universities cannot chide the country for “taking it easy.” The universities know the rationale of the position. The universities know that what is called natural theology is in the same case now as it was centuries ago. It is in the same case as when Socrates confuted Aristodemus, or as when (but the other day) Bacon constructed an argument from design. The discoveries of modern science have not thrown one single ray of light on the kingdom of the supernatural or on the future life. The Bible is now precisely where it was; private judgment has no new methods for its interpretation. But, indeed, the old theory of private interpretation has been laughed to scorn by every logician, every man of sense. The modern world finds itself face to face with this certainty. That there must either be an infallible interpreter of Bible doctrines, or those doctrines must remain doctrines which are *not* of faith. Nothing can be of faith that cannot be stated—cannot be “defined” as to the limits of its obligations; for no man can be bound to believe in the Holy Trinity unless it can be stated, “There are Three Persons in one God,” nor can any man be bound to believe in Baptism, unless it can be stated, “In

Baptism is Regeneration." But the very school that sets up a claim to *teach* Natural Religion has proved that it cannot "state" one positive doctrine; that it must flounder about in this or that speculation, but cannot dogmatize on one point of its own creed. It has no creed. Yet it affects to oust Theology from its "philosophy," on the very ground that it *has* a creed, and can *state* it. This seems a usurpation which is feeble. It has more the look of wrong temper than of earnestness. It most certainly has no philosophy but that of egotism. If a man say, "I know this subject better than you do," we must ask him, "Well, what do you know about it?" If he reply, "Nothing at all," we are not impressed by his credentials to usurp the chair of eighteen centuries of theologians. Yet this is exactly the spirit of modern thought. That spirit having forced itself on the universities, the universities are now auxiliary to paganism.

We might go on to notice one more mood of this modern spirit, which, while it is really the very root of English "popular" skepticism, is also common to almost all English "scientists." The mood may be perhaps formulated in this way: That, "as there are certain things which *cannot* be understood, *cannot* be reconciled in theology, therefore it is better to take only the *certain* things in theology (such things as natural principles can justify), and leave the rest as disputation-ground for all thinkers, be they so-called theologians or men of science." At the universities this mood is perhaps dominant; and *therefore* the country, knowing that the universities agree with it, cares nothing for the "leading" of the universities. Briefly, it might be replied, both to the country and to the universities, that, as in the natural sciences there are things certain, things contradictory, yet the natural sciences are not abandoned on that ground, so in theology, which is the most mystery-full of all sciences, this abandonment is without reason, without apology. In the mathematical science there are apparent contrarieties, which no mathematician will ever reconcile; even in regard to time and space there exist insolvable difficulties, which the human reason cannot so much as try to fathom; nor is there any science in which some inconsistencies do not puzzle the theorist as well as the most astute, practical investigator; why, then, should Revelation and Nature be divorced as to their "scientific" harmony, simply because hitches, obscurities, antagonisms, meet the sense of both theologians and naturalists? Why cannot historians, geologists, physiologists, pursue their investigations in their own lines, content with their own confessed difficulties and inconsistencies, instead of arguing that, because theology has its difficulties, therefore it must be abandoned as a true science? The universities *do* take the lead in telling the country that because astronomy, chro-

nology, geology, present some difficulties to the acceptor of Catholic dogma, therefore Catholic dogma is not "scientific;" they *do* take the lead in telling the country that if a Catholic dogma cannot be proved, or cannot be shown *not* to be contradictory, it must be relegated to the sphere of the speculative; they *do* take the lead in muddling historical facts,—such, for example, as the real attitude of the Holy See in regard to the first teaching of the Copernican system; but they do *not* take the lead—which, as universities, they should do—in telling the country how it ought to reason on pure methods of reasoning, how it ought to distinguish between principles and incidents, and to distinguish between the science which is revealed by God and the sciences which are gradually built up by men. If the universities have any duty at all towards the country, it must be to try to teach it to reason purely. They should say to the country: "Either give up altogether your habit of reasoning about Revelation, or learn the first principles on which its compass and interpretation can be logically assured to your intelligence." Instead of which, they say to the country: "All sciences, save one, must be pursued on a pure method; their alphabet must precede their construction, and their difficulties must be met scientifically. Theology alone must have no alphabet, no construction, while its difficulties must prove it to be no science."

To sum up what has been said, we may attribute the waning influence of the universities of Oxford and Cambridge to some such general causes as the following: The present (developed) extremes of Ritualism and Agnosticism, which leave no further room for development; and the abandonment of a purely Anglican orthodoxy, which is the abandonment of a purely Anglican chair; the Germanizing of the constitution of the universities, which has made them to "represent" popular ideas, rather than to "lead" religious opinion; the absence of great men, great "movers"—who can hardly be found in societies where there is no earnestness and no recognized clerical rivalry; the absence (therefore) of "individual" influence on the students, who reasonably wish for some guide; the spread of downright skepticism or infidelity; the (consequent) loss of national respect for the candidates for Anglican holy orders; the growth of Radicalism, both in the universities and in the country, which tends to lessen all respect for all societies; the loss of political power in the universities from the spread of such radical ideas, and also from the fact that the present lethargy in national religion does not admit of much clashing of Church and State; the admission of a large number of poor students to the universities, which, though unquestionably a move in the right direction, tends to lessen the old idea of "prestige;" the absence of the class-don, as a sort of council

of wise men, which used to be assumed to be didactic; the easy attitude of the fellows, tutors, and professors towards the easy-thinking or free-thinking undergraduates; the consequent dormancy of the *principle* of authority as well as the *sentiment* of authority; the getting further and further away from the Catholic ideal of a university, which would be to make theology the dominant spirit (though not the dominant study) of students who were (mostly) "preparing" for holy orders; the worn-outness of the old theories of Scriptural Religion, Primitive Religion, Anglican-Catholic Religion; the very frankness of the profession of Natural Religion, which is in itself the abdication of the claim to lead in whatever appertains to national "orthodoxy;" the (unconfessed) habit of making theology insignificant, by proclaiming the vast importance of other studies; the (at the same time) usurping more than the authority of the Catholic Church by dogmatizing where the Church has not dogmatized, both in theology and in its relation to other sciences; the (at the same time) proclaiming that it is impossible to dogmatize upon what is subjected to dogma by every disputant; the arguing that difficulties or apparent conflicts are fatal to the Divine authority of the Catholic Church, to the building-up of any science of theology, to the certainty of the truths of Revelation,—nay, even to the belief in Divine Providence.

Having, therefore, abdicated the position of leaders,—by having abandoned the essentials of their position,—it is impossible that the universities should recover the position through any movement, either from within or from without. Unless, indeed, the universities were to become Catholic,—which would imply that the country had become so first,—they could never again lead in "religious thought;" that is, lead in the sense of "learned opinions." No Catholic university could possibly influence Catholic faith; but, in regard to the relation of various sciences to revealed truth they could teach with much authority and precision. Truth being the ally of the Catholic Church, no matter in what grooves it be found; reason and knowledge, being ministers to faith, provided they be exercised in the way of truth; it is at once the interest and the mission of the Catholic Church to foster the pursuit of *all* truth. The Holy See cherishes talent, and every kind of acquirement, less for their own sake than with a view to spiritual profit; knowing well that her sons will be better members of professions because better men, better Christians from their knowledge of the relative value of *all* truths. But this is just exactly what Natural Religion can *not* teach. It knows nothing of the relations of natural sciences to that one science which is commonly entitled "the supernatural." It knows nothing of starting with certain definite verities, which imbue and perpetually guide the whole intellect.

It even resents any mention of "infallible" dogmas, while affecting to dogmatize *against* truths; and scorns the science which alone can guide the soul, while affecting to believe that men have souls. Out of such chaos can there come symmetry? "Son of man, shall these dry bones live?" It is totally impossible that the universities should recover influence, unless they should first become Catholic. And there is no human probability of their doing so. Imagine anything so astounding as that the majority of undergraduates should, on a sudden, become converted to Catholicity, or that their dons, inspired with like fervor, should, on a sudden, try their hardest to convert their pupils! But, apart from such unlikely combination, there is no hope even of a minority becoming Catholic. The minority, like the majority, have other things to think about, their heads being full of tough examinations. As to the country, it is normally anti-Catholic. It is not anti-Catholic in the old-fashioned doctrinal sense (doctrines are now relegated to clerical spheres), but in the sense that it is in hostility to any state of mental disturbance, which should prevent its enjoying social and personal ease. The recent sympathy shown in England towards the German Lutheran movement proves that, *if* the national mind be polemical, it is in the direction of stubborn protest against authority. It is most improbable, then, that the country should aid Oxford and Cambridge in seeking to get back to Catholic authority. The country is more likely to aid them in becoming Rationalist. "Christian Rationalism" is now the "fashionable" English tone; that is, Rationalism *plus* a sentiment of Christianity is the sort of tone which pervades all classes of the community. Nine men out of ten *reason* religion like Rationalists, while they profess tender sympathy with Christian sentiment. How can "conversion" come out of such a tone as this? Or, how can Oxford and Cambridge have any influence over a country which has but little interest either in dogma or in tradition? If religious influence exist at all in this country, it is that of private friends or favorite preachers, together with the influence of the *fact* of the Catholic Religion, which is like the sun seen through mist or through fog. The influence of societies is incompatible with the modern spirit of religious and political Radicalism. In the very fact that the universities are societies, and therefore claim a corporate superiority, there is strong ground for jealousy on the part of a community which does not recognize "corporate superiority." "You may profess Latin and Greek, and what you are pleased to call philosophy," is the attitude of the popular mind towards the universities; "but as to the principles of religious belief, or of what you call divine authority, you know no more about such things than we do, and we do not want your opinions, nor

anybody's else." Radicalism has no homage for any "seat of collective wisdom," whether it be a university or a House of Commons. Its homage is all kept for what it has itself helped to create and its contempt for what it has itself helped to pull down. It would like to pull down Monarchy, the House of Lords, the Constitution; it would like to pull down the National Church, the landed gentry, even the City Guilds; it would like to pull down the universities,—should they so much as hint at a pretension to teach anything more patriotic than good grammar. The waning influence of the universities is a result of that Radicalism which, having first dethroned authority from religion, seeks to dethrone it from every sphere of intelligence.

THE MORMON QUESTION AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.

AN eminent writer of our own times, referring to the overthrow of the old Roman civilization by the barbarians of the north, remarks that modern society is rearing within its own cities hordes of fiercer enemies than Goths or Huns could be. The diffusion of knowledge, the development of industry on a gigantic scale, and the discoveries of modern science, have in our times given to civilized nations an overwhelming material superiority over the uncivilized races which still occupy the greater part of the earth. As far back as history reaches, the civilized portion of the human race has been engaged in conflict with the tribes who preferred barbarian freedom to the restraints of settled and organized society. Success has alternately followed each side. If at certain periods the wealth, the knowledge, and the discipline of the more cultured races have driven back the frontiers of barbarism, at others the flood of barbarians has swept away the land-marks of many an old civilization. Rome planted her laws, her literature, and her cities amid the forests of Gaul and Germany, and in the oases of the Sahara, but at a later date new hordes of barbarians drove civilization again from its colonies, and once more restored the dominion of barbarism in many a land. As we have said, there seems little likelihood that modern society should be overthrown by outside barbarians. Everywhere civilized man is advancing as a

conqueror on the domain still occupied by the barbarian tribes. The Indians have all but disappeared as a serious foe from the North American continent, three-fourths of which was their undisputed territory a hundred years back. The great region of upper Asia, the "hive of nations" of the ancient world, has passed in our days under the sway of Russia, and France and England are fast pushing their dominions into the still uncivilized portions of Africa. Nowhere in the world to-day does there appear a barbarous population capable of seriously threatening the safety of the civilized world or renewing the work of Attila or Timur. But observers like Macaulay have already seen the germs of a new and equally formidable barbarism in the very midst of our most civilized populations. The *Sans-culottes* of the first French Revolution, the Communards of 1870, and the Russian Nihilists of to-day are examples of the hostile forces which modern civilization has to reckon with among her own children. Irreconcilable hatred to the existing social system is the spirit which inspires them all, as hatred of the Roman yoke inspired the old barbarians to sweep down on the civilized Empire. Nor is this spirit of hostility only found among the men who mount the barricades or blow up palaces in the frenzy of a life and death struggle. It exists sullenly among millions of more sluggish and more ignorant natures in all the centres of modern life. Among the operatives of England and Germany it exists as really as among the hot-blooded nations of the south, even though its outbreaks are for the time suppressed by a sort of mental *vis inertiae*. There are thousands, it may be millions, in each of those countries who would gladly overthrow the whole social fabric regardless of any material loss they might sustain from its fall. Religion and patriotism, as they are presented to them, they wholly reject; aspirations to a higher culture they have none; they are simply hostile to the civilization in which they live, much as gypsies abhor settled pursuits or town life. Were it possible to separate the masses among whom those feelings have sway from the other parts of their respective nations, they would constitute a force as hostile to existing civilization as were the Vandals or Huns of old to the ancients. Its religions, its legal systems, its social restraints, and its culture would be equally distasteful to them, and whatever organization they might adopt would certainly be of a wholly dissimilar character. In other words a large proportion of the civilized world is ready, if the means be given it, to array itself against civilization as it now exists. The choice being open to it, it would prefer what is usually known as a state of barbarism to one of civilization.

That this is no mere supposition, the existence of the Mormon population in the United States is a visible instance. In the

far West, where forty years ago the Indian held undisputed possession of his hunting grounds, the white population of this country finds itself, its laws, and its whole social organization confronted by a population of kindred race, but as alien in sympathies and habits of life as the red men whose place they have taken. Macaulay's words have been verified on our soil. Civilization has produced a population as hostile to itself as the Goths and Vandals of old. Had the Mormon population of Utah sufficient power, they would deal with the United States as the Turks dealt with the Byzantine Empire, or with even harder measure. Like the Turks, they are honest and thrifty among themselves, like them they hold that they are divinely appointed to supremacy over the unbelieving world. To slay the Gentiles who intruded into their territory, was long recognized by them as a meritorious work; and if the practice has been abandoned of late years, it is for the same reason that makes the Turks admit the equal rights of foreigners within their dominions, namely, want of power to prevent it. In social customs, in form of government, and in general feelings the Mormons of Utah are as far removed from the rest of the population of the United States as are the Turks from the rest of Europe or the Mahometans of India from the English. Christianity, and the Christian idea of family life, are wholly repugnant to them; and if, like the Mahometans, they accept some of the material advantages of modern civilization, and build railroads and telegraph lines, they are equally incapable of making any real advance in true civilization. Their intellects are crippled as completely by Joe Smith and the Book of Mormon as are those of the Mahometan world by the Arabian False Prophet and the Koran.

How to deal with this alien people—alien not in blood, but in the leading elements of what is commonly recognized as civilization—is the Mormon Problem of to-day. Were it only a question of territorial supremacy, did the Mormons dispute our title to theirs by force of arms, the problem would be an easy one. We should have either to abandon all pretensions to the disputed territory, if right of possession lay with the Mormons, and leave them to follow their peculiar ways at their own responsibility, or we should make good our claim to it by the sword and rule it accordingly. The latter alternative might involve difficulties of its own, but it is unnecessary to discuss them here. Although the late Brigham Young once made a show of arming a militia to resist the government of the United States in their claim to jurisdiction over Utah, he never seriously carried out the project. The Mormon leaders accepted, however unwillingly, the supreme authority of the Federal Government, and their aim since 1860 has been chiefly to obtain

the admission of Utah as a sovereign State of the Union. To effect this their people conform outwardly to the ordinary routine of a Territory in political affairs. They hold elections for the various territorial and municipal offices in the same form as in other parts of the Union, but it is only in form. All the important offices of the Territory are filled in accordance with the wishes of the Mormon hierarchy or its head. While Brigham Young lived he was practically the absolute monarch of the Territory as far as his own people were concerned. The elections were simply matters of form, mere ratifications of the Prophet's orders. At present the government of the Mormon Church is divided among more hands, though it is still a close oligarchy. The right of succession to the office of High Priest is regulated on some principles which do not seem to be very exactly defined. One thing is certain, that the popular vote has nothing to do with appointing the supreme head of the Mormon people, and that their government is republican only in name, unless where modified by the Federal laws.

How far such a system of government is compatible with the fundamental principles of the American Constitution, is a difficult question to answer. Is self-government fulfilled by a voluntary abdication of its exercise? We think it is not, however the abdication may be concealed. The theory of our political system rests on self-government of the people, and a community which chooses to be governed by an irresponsible monarch or close corporation, is certainly not self-governed in the common acceptation of the term. Voluntary acquiescence in the orders of a monarch or an aristocracy does not constitute self-government. If it did, the subjects of the Chinese Emperor, or the Mahometan population of Turkey would be as well entitled to be regarded as free citizens as any other nation. They bow to a despotic rule without reluctance, and they would not throw it off were the opportunity given them; but for all that they cannot be regarded as politically free, in the sense attached to the words by our usage. So it is with the Mormons. They have chosen for themselves a fixed ruler. They pay the taxes he imposes on them in the shape of tithes, they obey his edicts as laws, and at need they are ready to bear arms at his decree. If they mechanically imitate at his bidding the political action of a free republican community, that gives them no claim to be regarded as free agents in politics. On this ground a very reasonable doubt may be raised whether such a community could be safely admitted to the same rights as other classes of citizens in this Republic.

It is not, however, in their form of government alone that the Mormons show a total divergence from the principles accepted by the other populations of the Union. It is hard enough to see how

monarchy and republican institutions can exist together in our form of government. But the Mormons have isolated themselves still more from the rest of the community by the system of polygamy than even by their form of government. Modern civilization is elastic enough to embrace various forms of government among nations possessing equal claims to the title of civilized. No one would dream of excluding the subjects of the German Emperor or the King of Sweden from the name of civilized men, because their form of government is monarchical. But there are certain points of social life and laws which are accepted as fundamental by all nations which lay claim to Christian civilization. Among those is monogamy, the restriction of every husband to one wife, and every wife to one husband. Wherever the Aryan race has established itself, this law is recognized by public opinion no less than by law, except among the Mormons. They have adopted polygamy, and by so doing have separated their way of life more widely from that of the body of American citizens than they could do by any purely political change. Their politics could only put them outside the pale of republican institutions; their polygamy puts them outside the pale of European civilization.

In writing thus we have no desire of exciting public feeling against the Mormons themselves. Uncivilized men have the rights of human nature as well as their civilized brothers, and we reprobate wrong-doing or injustice to a savage not less than to a member of the most highly cultured community. But it is of the highest importance, in discussing a subject like the present, to call things by their right names. Polygamy is essentially opposed to the principles of our civilization, and a people that adopts it must therefore be regarded as outside its pale. That they are so, does not deprive them of the natural rights of human beings, but it may make it highly inexpedient to admit them to share in the government of a civilized community.

To form a correct judgment, both on the rights of the Mormons and the policy which justice and public expediency suggest for dealing with them, a knowledge of their history is requisite. It is true they are but of yesterday, comparatively speaking, and the papers have kept their doings a good deal before the public during late years; but nevertheless, the ideas of the average reader respecting the growth of Mormonism are somewhat cloudy. Its beginnings date little more than half a century back. Joseph Smith, the founder of the sect, first set up his claims to divine inspiration about 1827, and published the *Book of Mormon*, the Koran of his followers, about 1830. Personally Smith had little to distinguish him from the numerous other founders of heresies. His imposture was, perhaps, more evident than usual in such cases, though Joanna.

Southcote furnishes a close parallel. Indeed, such are the vagaries of the human intellect, when unguided by a higher power, that gross imposture is often allied with a certain amount of self-deceit, and what is commonly recognized as fanaticism. Such may have been the case with Smith, and certain it is that some of his associates appear to have been inspired with a fanatical belief in his mission. In spite of repeated exposures of his pretensions, he gathered disciples, who accepted him as the prophet of a new revelation. At the beginning of his career as the preacher of a new religion, Smith seems to have closely copied the system of Mahomet, and it is curious to find him fifteen years later adopting the distinctively Mahometan institution of polygamy as an outcome of his creed. At first, however, he did not venture so far. He only pretended to have received visions from angels and a book containing the principles of the religion whose prophet he claimed to be. Like Mahomet, he professed a high respect for our Lord, and claimed that his system was only a full development of Christianity. That such pretensions should find believers in the United States in this nineteenth century, is not a pleasant commentary on the boasted growth of intelligence in our days; but they certainly did find them. Finding his own neighborhood in New York State an uncongenial abode, he transferred his residence successively to Kirkland in Ohio, to Missouri, and finally to Illinois, then—1840—the remote West of the Union. In each State his character suffered exposures of various kinds, but his followers steadily grew in numbers. The establishment of a kind of bank, and certain financial dealings of a dubious character, brought him into contact with the law in Ohio, and finally forced him to quit that State. His followers in Missouri speedily became involved in serious quarrels with the rest of the population. The order of Danites, it was affirmed on oath by some of the leading Mormons, had even then bound themselves by the most solemn covenant to obey any order of their Prophet, and he used the most arrogant threats himself towards those who interfered with his following. The State militia had to be called out to repress the disturbances between the Mormons and the citizens of Missouri, and the former in consequence transferred themselves in a body to Illinois. In that State they obtained a settlement at Nauvoo, where they proceeded to establish a community almost independent of outside interference. The Legislature granted the new colony a charter which made Smith practically autocrat of his town. A Mormon legion was organized and drilled, and the Prophet commenced to assume the airs of a sovereign. He had already completed the organization of his followers, and established a priesthood in two degrees, with a college of twelve, whom he styled apostles, as his own im-

mediate assistants in the work of governing. Brigham Young, his successor, was one of the twelve, and by his advice emissaries were dispatched regularly to Europe to attract immigrants to the new settlement, and proselytes to the new creed. Smith's moral character was bad; and to palliate it among his followers, he finally proclaimed a new revelation by which polygamy was declared lawful. The indignation which this step excited among the people of Illinois, and even among some of Smith's own followers, was very great. Against the latter he proceeded to personal violence in Nauvoo, and was in consequence arrested by the State authorities. A mob broke into the prison in which he was confined and ended his lawless career by lawless violence in 1844.

Neither the death of their Prophet nor the growing hostility of the surrounding population was able to break down the religious-political organization of the Mormon sect. Brigham Young managed to have himself installed as its head, though by a remarkable analogy with the early history of Islam, there was a schism in favor of a relative of Smith's. The seceding Mormons abandoned polygamy, and have had since little to distinguish them from numerous other small sects of Protestantism. The large body which recognized Young adopted plurality of wives as a leading point in their religion. Public feeling against them grew stronger. The charter which had been granted to Nauvoo was revoked by the Illinois Legislature in 1845, and the Mormons prepared to seek new settlements in the then unexplored country west of the Rocky Mountains. Prospecting parties were sent out in various directions. One finally established itself in the south of California near San Bernardino, and others for a time occupied various portions of the present State of Nevada. The neighborhood of the Great Salt Lake in the plateau between the Rocky Mountains and the Sierra Nevada, was, however, the place finally selected for the settlement of the Mormons, and Brigham Young took up his abode there in 1847. In the mean time the Mormons had been driven out of Nauvoo by force, a measure which appears to have been inspired by very mixed motives on the part of the assailants. It inspired a bitter hatred of the United States and its people into the minds of the Mormons, who finally took up their abode on the shores of the Great Salt Lake.

The abode chosen for the new nation, which the Mormon leaders hoped to establish, reflects credit on their sagacity. The site of their city was a thousand miles west of Council Bluffs, which was then almost the furthest outpost of civilization in the West, and it was nearly as far from the Spanish settlements in California. Separated from the latter by the Sierras and the mountain tract of Nevada, it was cut off from the Eastern States by the Rocky Mountains and the bad lands of the present Wyoming and Ne-

braska. Thus, there was little danger of any interference with the peculiar practices of the Mormons from civilized neighbors for many years, even at the rapid rate of progress of Western settlement. The land around the Great Lake, though uninviting enough in its natural appearance, is fertile, and can easily be made capable of supporting a large population. To build up such a population of his followers before the waves of immigration from the Eastern States should encroach on his domain, was the policy of Brigham Young, and his measures to attain that end were skilfully devised. Partly through a spirit of fanatical devotion to their creed and leaders, and partly through a dread of further conflicts with the populations of the Western States, several thousand Mormons from Nauvoo undertook the journey across the wilderness. Many of them made it on foot, trundling their effects in wheelbarrows. Others travelled in caravans with ox-wagons and horses. All braved the attacks from the Indians, of famine, and an almost unknown journey of a thousand miles, and risked the uncertainty of finding a suitable abode at the end, in obedience to their leader. But the latter knew that the numbers that thus followed him from Nauvoo were insufficient to form a community capable of resisting interference from without. Accordingly, an important part of the Mormon policy consisted in attracting immigrants from Europe by means of missionaries specially sent for that purpose. The masses of ignorant and poverty-stricken toilers in the crowded cities of Europe furnished an inviting field for the labors of the Mormon missionaries. The motives for adopting Mormonism, which the latter held out to their converts, were of a tangible kind. They promised them an easier life and more abundant reward for labor in the settlements by the shores of Salt Lake, and they held out these temporal advantages as sufficient proofs of the truth of the religious system which they offered them. To many of the classes which have been referred to at the commencement of this article,—men whose lives were a constant struggle for existence, and from whom all higher thoughts had been crushed out by the heartless pressure of wealth on the poorer classes, so common at the present day,—the teachings of the Mormon emissaries proved highly acceptable. A steady stream of immigrants, mostly of the most ignorant class, has been directed from Europe to the shores of Salt Lake, there to become part of the Mormon population, and blindly subject to the rule of its leaders. The numbers brought over between 1860 and 1870 amounted to twenty-five thousand, and the annual immigration has been since growing larger rather than falling off, in spite of the death of Brigham Young and the measures adopted by the Federal Courts for the suppression of polygamy. England and Wales furnish by far the largest portion of the Mormon converts, nearly three-fourths of the whole. Denmark and Sweden furnish the next largest con-

tingent, and the Protestant portion of Germany comes next in order. The opposition offered by the Prussian Government to the work of the Mormon emissaries must be taken into account in giving due importance to the limited number of German Mormons. Scotland seems to have furnished a smaller proportion of recruits than either England or Wales to the new doctrines. Ireland has sent, we believe, absolutely none across the Atlantic. Twenty-two years ago, a Mormon mission was established in Ireland, but after a couple of years' trial the elders reported it a complete failure. There are, or were, a few Irish Mormons, but they had drifted into Utah from various parts of the Union, not come directly there like the great body of the English and Scandinavian immigrants. Except those born in Utah, few of the present Mormon population are natives of the United States. A large portion of the leaders, however, are Americans, and they utilize the ignorant devotion of their followers in a very practical fashion. The masses are recruited from the decivilized classes, which Macaulay has alluded to as the possible future assailants of our society and civilization. The Mormons certainly have no love for either, as they exist in the world outside their own limits.

It would not be safe, however, by any means, to attribute the rise and progress of Mormonism, wholly or mainly, to the ignorance of its professors. Some who have devoted their attention to the subject seem to imagine that the establishment of schools is all that is needed to overthrow the whole system of Mormonism in Utah. They overlook the fact that fanaticism is one of the most powerful motives of human action, and that while it may exist side by side with ignorance and stolidity, it is a thing of an entirely different kind in the calculations of either philosopher or statesman. No general law can be laid down to explain the periodical outbursts of strong religious excitement among the most widely different races, which go under the general name of fanaticism. Within the Catholic Church religious enthusiasm, though valued—as it deserves, where genuine—as a high and noble gift, is always carefully watched over and disciplined by the Head of the Church and his representatives. Outside the Church, when the religious feelings which form a part of every man's nature, however dormant they may at times be, become excited in a large number of individuals, they easily pass into the passion of fanaticism. No class of men, no nation, is exempt from such outbreaks. Nor does it appear, on investigation, that any class is peculiarly liable to them. They may arise from the most serious or from, apparently, the most trifling and absurd causes; among the most ignorant or the most cultivated populations. They may only last for a brief space, or they may continue for years. The outbreak of the Westphalian peasants under John of Leyden, and that of the Huguenot nobles in France dur-

ing the sixteenth century, were equally examples of the fanatic spirit, as Mahometanism had been in its rise and development nine centuries before. In great human movements where mixed motives are involved, fanaticism is often affected where it has no real existence, except for a moment. When Frederick of Prussia stirred up the feelings of his grenadiers at Rosbach with Lutheran hymns, it was an example of that sham fanaticism. It is of importance in studying the Mormon question to properly estimate how much the population is under the influence of real fanaticism, and what part of their peculiar ways ought to be set down to other motives.

That the bulk of the Mormons are believers in their system of religion, including its practice of polygamy, cannot be doubted. They pay tithes, and punctually obey the orders of the heads of the sect without murmuring, though the burthens are by no means light. They are ready, for the most part, to quit their homes and families, and start as missionaries to Europe, at the word of the hierarchy that rules over them. It is estimated that over a hundred and fifty such emissaries are sent out annually for periods of one, two or five years' mission-work. On moral questions, too, the orders of Brigham Young and his successors are still received as infallible guides. The secret order of the Danites murdered without remorse any persons obnoxious to the Mormon Prophet, and in the massacre of the emigrants at Mountain Meadow in the early days of Utah, the greatest part of the Mormon population was implicated, or at least was fully cognizant of the whole affair, yet the secret was jealously kept. It has been found almost impossible to obtain reliable evidence on oath in the courts from Mormon witnesses in cases where the peculiar doctrines of the sect are involved. Ignorance and stolidity will not account for such facts. They attest clearly the existence of self-believing fanaticism among the mass of the population of Utah.

The question to be solved in regard to the Mormons may be thus summed up. A population as alien in habits and customs as a tribe of Mahometans and as fanatical in their religious ideas has grown up on the soil of the Union. Its practice of polygamy is in direct opposition to the almost universally received ideas of public morals. Nevertheless, it is claimed by the Mormons as an essential part of their religion which they will not part with. This population, as it now exists, has never been admitted into the federation of States which compose the Union. Its territory is American, but it has not been allowed to pass beyond the colonial stage of organization usually carried out in new Territories. While individual Mormons may, if they choose, possess all the rights of American citizens in any State of the Union, the Mormon body, which has connected itself with Utah as its home, and which there

carries out all the practices of its religion, has no share in the government of the Union, and is limited within its own bounds to such an amount of self-government as the rest of the country chooses to bestow. This condition of Territorial existence the Mormons of Utah wish to change for the full self-government of a State. The points involved in the problem are, therefore—

1st. Should polygamy be tolerated at all within the bounds of the United States as a matter of principle?

2d. Is it expedient to tolerate it, and if so, within what limits?

3d. Has the Mormon population of Utah a right to admission as a State?

4th. Would it be wise to admit them, supposing they have no absolute rights in the matter?

With regard to the first point very considerable difference of opinion undoubtedly exists. The Mormons claim that under the Constitution of the United States they are entitled to carry out any practices enjoined by their own religion, however distasteful to the public sentiment of the country. Polygamy they regard as a divine institution, and they urge that to prevent them by force from practicing it would be religious persecution and wholly opposed to the spirit of tolerance of the United States. They also add that for over twenty years after their organization as a Territory the Federal authorities gave a tacit approbation to the practice of polygamy, and that Brigham Young, a known polygamist, received a commission as Governor from President Fillmore. The recent attempts on the part of the Federal courts to enforce the ordinary marriage laws of the Union in Utah, the Mormons claim to be the mere outcome of personal ill-will on the part of some officials. They also claim that the hope of driving them out of the Territory which they have reclaimed, and robbing them of the fruits of their industry, is the real motive at the bottom of the hostility towards their peculiar institutions. On the other side, the opponents of polygamy urge that it is a system contrary to public morals, and as such to be suppressed by the law. Monogamy, they declare, is regarded by our laws not only as a religious, but also as a social obligation, and no part of society can claim exemption from it. On these grounds they urge the passage of still more stringent enactments against polygamy by the United States (for the Territorial Legislature is entirely under Mormon control), and their enforcement by all the means at the disposal of government. Both sides are strong in their respective opinions, and though at the present time no very active measures are going on to bring about a final issue, the whole question is a burning one and liable on slight provocation to burst into a conflagration.

As to the theory that full toleration of all religions is required by the spirit of the American Constitution, it is wholly misleading.

It is well settled in the public mind that most of the bodies of religionists known here can subsist together in our society; but it by no means follows that there are not other bodies of religionists who could not be tolerated among us. We shall no doubt be at once confronted with the formula,—as Carlyle would call it,—that every man has a right to worship God according to the dictates of his conscience. Like the majority of such general statements, the formula in question contains a good deal more error than truth; worship involves external as well as internal acts. To say that the thoughts of every man should be free as far as his neighbors are concerned, is about the same as saying that every living man has a right to breath. Thought, so long as it is held within the thinker's mind, is absolutely independent of human laws. It is not that they have no right to interfere with it, but they have no power nor means of interference. When worship, however, involves external acts, it is an entirely different question. Unless we are prepared to say that any act is lawful if done in the name of religion, we cannot say that every man has a right to worship as he pleases. Some of the earlier followers of George Fox regarded it as part of their worship to pray in public naked the Thugs of India looked on indiscriminate murder as an act of worship; but it would be impossible for any society to tolerate such practices under any name. Personally we are in favor of the amplest legal toleration of religious beliefs and forms of worship that can be granted without danger to society. We do not regard the arm of the law as a suitable agent for spreading religious truth, and we have no admiration for forced conversions even to the truth. Nevertheless, we recognize that it is impossible to allow unrestrained freedom to every practice that may take to itself the name of religion. There is no such thing as a general law of toleration in the United States or elsewhere, nor can there be. The abstract right of the Mormons to practice polygamy on the ground of its being part of their religion has, therefore, no existence.

With regard to the rights acquired by the tacit acquiescence in the practice by the United States, the claim of the Mormons has a better foundation, though it does not give them an absolute right. The power which made the laws has the right to unmake them, though the expediency of so doing must be considerably affected by the question of long toleration. On the other hand, expediency has to be consulted before passing laws, which may be found incapable of enforcement. We know that some years ago it was found almost impossible to obtain evidence, even in Nevada or Idaho, sufficient to convict a Mormon of polygamy, even where the practice was notorious. In Utah itself no Mormon jury would return a verdict against a fellow-Mormon on such a charge. The abolition of trial by jury throughout the Territory, or, at least, the

exclusion from the jury-boxes of three-fourths of the present voters, would be absolutely necessary, if polygamy is to be suppressed throughout Utah by law. The experiment would be a dangerous one for the future. It is easy to introduce a dangerous practice into the administration of the law in moments of excitement, but the consequence may be felt for years, and even whole generations afterwards. Of course, if we regard the suppression of Mormon polygamy as the absolute moral duty of the Government, we should be ready to face any risk in suppressing it. We do not, however, believe that there is any abstract right in the matter on the side of either suppression or toleration. Polygamy is repugnant to the moral feelings of Christian civilization, but it is not an evil, like Thuggism, that must be eradicated by force. We yield to none in our abhorrence of the practice, but many abhorrent things have to be endured in politics and in social life. It must be borne in mind that the practice in question prevails throughout the whole Mahometan and Buddhist world, and yet that Mahometans and Buddhists have long been members of various Christian States, or at least of States as Christian as this country in their public policy. The law of France on marriage is far more Christian than that of any State of the Union. Divorce is absolutely unknown to French law, as amongst Frenchmen; yet French law allows the Mahometans of Algeria to follow out the law of their Prophet in all questions of marriage. Algeria contains a larger Christian population than Utah does, yet we have not heard any protest against the toleration assured to the Mahometans there. In like manner Russia tolerates polygamy among her Tartar subjects, including even those of Kasan and Astrakhan, who have been subject to her laws for three centuries; yet in Russia the marriage bond among Christians is as sacred as it is in this country. When Austria lately annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, the free practice of their religion was guaranteed to all the Mahometan inhabitants, and has since been faithfully carried out. England in India pushes her condescension to the followers of the False Prophet still further. The sanctity of the Tenana is guarded by law, and some years ago a case occurred in which a high European official in India actually professed himself a Mahometan for the purpose of marrying a second wife during the life of his first. It would have been bigamy if he had remained a Christian of any denomination; but being a Mahometan, it was not possible to bring him to justice under the laws of England as they are now administered. Here, too, in the United States we are not aware that it has ever been claimed that the Federal authorities should suppress polygamy among the heathen Indians. It seems to us that the Mormons, in this respect, may be regarded as Indians. Their ways are not our ways; we reprobate their religion and its practices, but we do not believe it is any part of the

Government's duty to suppress either by force within a district where the public sense is not opposed to them. The States can settle appropriate legislation each for itself; and we, certainly, as citizens of any particular State which now makes polygamy a legal offence, would oppose a change in the law. But we cannot regard a Territory like Utah, peopled for the greatest part by Mormons, and in great measure isolated from the rest of the country, as on the same footing with States which have always retained in this respect the traditions of the Christian law of marriage.

While avoiding interference with the "peculiar institution" of the Mormons within certain limits, it seems to us that it would be wholly inexpedient to admit them to the rights of a sovereign State. Their social system is wholly alien to ours. We may tolerate it within certain limits, but we can never conscientiously indorse it. We cannot regard a polygamous people as fitting associates in the government of the Union. The difference between us is too great to admit of an equal partnership without serious deterioration to our whole social system. Mormonism has been frequently described as constituting with slavery "twin relics of barbarism." The expression, like many others made up for immediate use by men who value fluency before fact, is singularly inaccurate, though it contains a certain portion of truth. Polygamy is not a "relic" of anything in our institutions. It is a new development of private judgment in religious matters among us. As to its barbarism, however, there can be no question. It is in direct hostility to the groundwork of our society, and, in the full sense of the word, to our civilization. Accordingly, we would deal with those who practice it, in the name of a religious system, as we would with other barbarians. We would deny them no general right of humanity; we would not drive them from the soil under our jurisdiction, nor would we strain the action of the central Government to deprive them of such personal rights in the administration of the law as are usually accorded to settlers on our soil, regardless of citizenship. More than this, we are not bound by either justice or humanity to concede, while every principle of true political expediency forbids our conceding more. We are not bound to admit any Territory to become an integral part of the Union as a sovereign State, unless we believe its admission will be beneficial to the rest of the Union. The admission of a State in such a condition of barbarism as the prevalence of polygamy in it implies, would be a shock to the moral feelings of the rest of the country, and therefore should be steadily rejected. It rests with each Territory to put itself in accordance with the general public feeling on this point, a feeling which is no passing caprice, but based on the fundamental moral principles of our civilization. So long as Utah, or any other Ter-

ritory, refuses to do this ; so long as its people prefer the usages of barbarism to those of Christian civilization, they should be allowed no part in our Government. We should grant them the rights of men, not the privileges of citizens. Such, it appears to us, is the only fitting solution of the Mormon problem as it exists among us to-day.

THE PROPAGANDA QUESTION AND OUR DUTY.

TO the citizens of the United States—indeed, to any person living within the wide limits of the English-speaking world, breathing the air of religious and civil liberty and familiar with the working of free institutions—it is a strange phenomenon to see ancient Christian countries, like France and Italy, waging so destructive a warfare on Religion, on everything, in fact, which could help to keep alive the belief in a living God and His Providence. One is amazed that a people so enlightened and withal so practical as the French, should destroy or render antagonistic, at a time when they are battling for the rights of a perfect freedom, struggling even for their existence as a great nation in the face of most powerful enemies, the mightiest of all vital forces, Religion,—the Religious Faith of the immense majority. Still, inconsistent as must appear their foreign policy when compared with their legislation and administrative acts at home, they protect abroad as missionaries and educators among the heathen the very men whom they persecute and oppress at home, refusing them even the rights and immunities due to all other classes of citizens.

The Piedmontese statesmen, on the other hand, after having secured for their country a temporary independence and a seeming political unity, appear to be bent on blotting out from her soil every institution which recalls her religious supremacy during the last fifteen hundred years, which made Rome the centre of Catholicity, of Christianity, and caused her religious influence to be so powerfully, so beneficently, so universally felt among uncivilized and pagan nations, as in every portion of Christendom. One would think that Italy, in her very legitimate ambition to assert herself as a first-rate European power, would be ambitious as well to make her moral influence at least strongly felt on every point of both hemispheres, where Christian nations and Christian

civilization are endeavoring to push their way and maintain their preëminence.

The flag of Savoy is but little known and wields but little power beyond the shores of the Mediterranean. But there is a mighty, an incomparable moral force which a confederated Italy could wield for the highest purposes of civilization, for the glorification of her political power even, on every shore bathed by the tides of the Atlantic and the Pacific, among every people known to the traveller, the trader, the ethnologist. This incalculable, this far-reaching, this all-pervading force Italy could wield through the Papacy, without detriment to her political unity, without any weakening of her national strength, and to the immense increase of her prestige among the nations. If the men who at present govern the Peninsula could only open their eyes to see the true interests of their country, and be inspired to take the only sure path toward securing them, how easy it would be, in accord with that Papacy which they persist in calumniating and persecuting, to attain and to popularize all over the world that "moral supremacy" so long the day-dream of her patriots!

They are at this moment travestying justice, and falsifying history to excuse their inconceivably blind attacks on one of the mightiest agencies of civilization devised by the genius of Christian piety,—that far-famed department of Church administration and missionary training known as the PROPAGANDA.

Let us endeavor to make the readers of the REVIEW, the great mass of our people, understand what a wonderful means of influencing, for the best, the divinest ends, a truly Catholic and united Italy might have in that great Institution, by supposing a similar centre of education and apostolic enterprise to be situated in London, and used by England to spread her own fame, as well as to encourage the spread of the Gospel in all pagan countries.

Suppose, then, that Protestant nations and all Protestant sects in both hemispheres should agree to concentrate, in the metropolis of the British Empire, all the resources for missionary enterprise now divided among the numerous organizations on both sides of the Atlantic. Suppose that there they had created a great central school or university, endowed with funds contributed by every religious denomination calling itself Protestant; a school possessing the most famous professors whom money or zeal could tempt to teach there, professors of every science needed by the most accomplished missionaries, of every language most useful in the countries to be evangelized. Give them a library composed of works in every known tongue, living or dead; printing presses, with type and skilled printers, capable of reproducing for the use of professors, missionaries, and the peoples destined to be enlightened

by them, all the works in these same languages best adapted to help in their labors the ministers of the Gospel among the heathen, or to be to their converts the most powerful aids toward instruction. To library and printing presses add a museum filled with all the ethnological treasures collected from every land under the sun, and fitted to illustrate the manners and superstitions of their peoples.

To this Cosmopolitan University, so constituted and so equipped, call selected students from every clime, of every race and color. Form and train them there, and let them go forth thus trained, and carried in the ships of England to their native shores, bringing home with them the fruits of the ripest European culture, the seeds of our civilization and manifold progress, to be cast into the furrows along with the seeds of the Gospel truth and morality.

Follow me still further, and suppose that the name of England were only known on these same shores, and in the interior of these continents, by the peaceful and beneficent results of such an apostleship, and that her flag never covered other expeditions than such as brought to the Barbarian the light of Christian truth, or even a part thereof, with its hundred humanizing influences; considering not so much the religious and moral results thereby achieved as the mere glory and prestige derived by England from the working of this great Missionary Establishment, should we not deem it madness to assail, imperil, weaken, or destroy it in the very height of its success and usefulness?

What would be the consternation of all true Englishmen, the astonishment of all Christendom, to learn that the Supreme Court of Judicature, urged on by the Ministry, had declared all the property of this admired and most admirable institution to be the property of the state; commanding it to be sold to the highest bidder, and the funds thus obtained to be converted into government stock,—utterly ignoring the wishes, the intentions, the rights, of the original benefactors, donors, and founders; utterly defying the intervention, and repelling the remonstrances of the governments and peoples interested in this Cosmopolitan school of Christian civilization?

Would the English people tamely, silently, submit to have this great light extinguished, when its radiance was brightest, when the eyes of all Protestant nations were fixed upon it? Would no foreign government interfere to prevent the consummation of what would be justly considered to be both an international wrong and a national act of madness verging on something like suicide?

We are stating the case in its relation to the incomprehensible blindness of the Depretis Government. The statement may enable even a child to perceive what madness urges men, who call

themselves statesmen, to deprive their country of the most potent moral agencies ever known throughout the whole course of history.

We need not stop to answer the question, Why such a phenomenon in the once-leading countries of Christendom, as to see Catholics, or men either calling themselves so or at least born of Catholic parents, foremost in urging the destruction of all distinctively Catholic institutions, bent, in fact, on subverting the Catholic Church herself?

Signor Depretis and his associates do not even pretend to be Catholics. They were Mazzinians, Garibaldians, conspirators all their life against the order of things established by Christianity. MM. Freycinet, Jules Ferry, and Paul Bert, in France, are far from making a profession of Catholicity. Freycinet, it is well known, is a Protestant, who fancied, perhaps, that, in expelling from his country the religious orders of men and women, he could prepare the way for the speedy triumph there of his own form of Protestantism. Have we not seen, and do we not still see, the men, sent by our own Bible and Missionary Societies, helping on with main and might the anti-Christian work of demolition done by the Secret Societies, by the Radical Revolutionists, by Socialists and Anarchists, even both in France and in Italy? There are plenty of men in our midst who applaud every effort of the Revolution to blot out all Christian ideas from the minds of the European populations, all Christian virtues and sentiments from their hearts, provided that in so doing "the Church of Rome" is destroyed, root and branch. The mighty conspiracy against Revealed Religion, which was so successful in the last century, and which assumed new and more destructive forms in this, was not directed against Protestantism, but against the Catholic Church. She was the common enemy to be slandered, ridiculed, vilified, despoiled, and blotted out of existence.

We are to remember that the conspirators, disguised under a hundred names, or now openly avowing their aims and their principles, were, and are, no Catholics. The Illuminati, the European Masonic Societies, the Carbonari, Young Italy and Young Europe, the International Society of Workingmen, and all those organizations which bear on their banners NO GOD, NO MASTER, have been, from the beginning, one and all, denounced and condemned by the Catholic Church,—the condemnation always proceeding from the Roman See, from him who holds Christ's place on earth.

Hence the united and uncompromising warfare made by all these enemies of the ancient social order established by Christianity against the only living authority professing to speak in the

name of Christ, and challenging the obedience of all Christ's flock to his solemn utterances.

MM. Depretis and Mancini are willing enough that Protestant churches should be founded and flourish in Italy, that within Rome herself Protestant schools should spring up on every side, and that a Protestant press and pulpit should denounce the Roman church within hearing of the Vatican. But Protestant observers, who see beneath the surface of things, and are capable of rising above the narrow prejudices of the meeting-house or the Sunday-school, have openly proclaimed their conviction that the France and Italy of the nineteenth century are not a field in which contradictory Protestant opinions can take root, grow up, and flourish in the place of the grand and vigorous unity of Catholic faith, together with all the sublime and self-sacrificing charities which that Faith inspires.

Italian and French statesmen are convinced of this. Therefore, if they give to Protestant Propagandism full freedom to labor, publish, and build, while systematically weakening and ruining the PROPAGANDA, it is because they believe Protestants are helping them to do the work of demolition.

But it is our firm belief that American Protestants, once they are clearly shown the true nature of the Depretis-Mancini policy, and once they understand the cosmopolitan character of the great institution it seeks to destroy, will not fail to denounce and stigmatize, as it deserves, the conduct of the Italian Government.

The PROPAGANDA, then, as its name implies, was organized for the purpose of propagating the Christian faith in non-Catholic and Pagan countries. The title officially belongs to the Congregation or Board of Cardinals charged with superintending, directing and guarding this most important and complicated work of missionary enterprise over four-fifths of the globe. Then there is the College of the Propaganda, which educates and trains missionaries of all nationalities, to labor in their respective countries, together with the far-famed Propaganda Press, the splendid and choice library, and the rich Ethnological Museum.

The College is, and ever has been since its foundation, a nursery of good men and true; enlightened, large-minded, great-hearted and self-sacrificing. There is scarcely one people, on either hemisphere, who does not bear witness to their learning, zeal and virtues. Our own America, North and South, acknowledges a debt of gratitude it can never pay, for the many illustrious archbishops and bishops who have gloried in being the pupils of the Propaganda, for the numbers of the distinguished priests, whose zeal has so powerfully contributed to the spread of religion, and the

establishment of most prosperous educational and beneficent institutions in the field of their respective labors.

No people better than the American are disposed to acknowledge and praise true merit everywhere, to encourage or cheer on everything which promotes learning, religion, morality, civilization, progress. It is not that they are indifferent to religious forms or creeds which are antagonistic to their own belief and worship, or that they, in general, look favorably upon Catholicity as such; they are, on the contrary, ill disposed toward all that belongs to the Papacy. The old sectarian prejudices, watch-words and cries about Papistry and Papists, still survive among the masses and among those who guide the masses.

But American Protestants have forgotten or unlearned very many things, which still, like barnacles and sea-weed on the hull of an antiquated ship, cling to the Protestant mind in England, Scotland, and Ireland. In spite of the occasional outburst of ignorant fanaticism, or of interested and well-calculated bigotry, which disgrace the American pulpit, and amuse the immense majority of readers,—the Protestant reading public in America are in no dread of the Papal power, in no apprehension of a Papal invasion, or of any Papal utterance which may interfere with our civil institutions.

Intercourse here with enlightened Catholics and their religious guides, and intercourse in Rome with the highest officials of the Roman Church, and with the reigning pontiff himself, have long ago convinced American travelers, statesmen and scholars, that to no class more than Catholics is our free constitution, with all its manifold and precious guarantees, dear and sacred. Our leading men have learned that no living ruler or statesman, even though a Protestant of the Protestants, entertains so great an admiration for our system of government as Leo XIII., or views with so deep and fatherly an interest the progress among us of all the elements of national greatness, or the development of those other elements of license, lawlessness, and irreligiousness which threaten liberty itself.

How often have we not heard of Protestant Americans, even distinguished ministers of Protestant denominations, expressing their satisfaction when a Catholic Cathedral or Parish Church of remarkable beauty arose in city or country town, or when some noble school sprang up beneath the shadow of the Church, or some of these great homes for the orphan, the outcast, the infirm was erected with the alms of our laboring men, of our hard-working girls in the factories, or the exhaustless generosity of our servant-maids. Americans have learned by experience that the Catholic Church, in city or country, is a centre of the most powerful of

moralizing agencies, and that all the great educational and charitable institutions which spring up near it form the minds and hearts of a free Christian people to the knowledge and practice of the sublimest civic virtues.

Americans love freedom, progress, munificence, religion, as they love the light and heat of the sun. And, just as they do not grudge to others the genial radiance and vital warmth of our great central planet, even so do they not grudge other nations the fullest enjoyment of religious truth, intellectual culture, civil liberty, and national greatness. Indeed, we love for others as we do for ourselves the most generous and abundant share of political and religious freedom, the possession of the most liberal institutions, together with that order-loving, reverential, and law-abiding spirit which alone can secure the long enjoyment of liberty, and the progress of a true civilization.

Americans, therefore, take a genuine and a generous pleasure in encouraging and patronizing the great schools in which are trained the men destined to be the religious teachers of the people, the men who, in their day and generation, will be called to use the Church, the School, the Asylum, the Hospital, as the instruments of their apostleship, the scenes of their beneficent labors and influence. In reality, the most ancient and celebrated of our American Universities began by being theological seminaries. The teaching of the elements of profane science came afterward.

Were the Propaganda, with its College, its Library, Printing Presses, and Museum, situated in New York, instead of being in Rome,—the fact of its being the mightiest institution employed by the Catholic Church for the spread of the Faith would make it an object of deep and general interest to the country. Its cosmopolitan character,—the assemblage within its College Halls of students belonging to so many different races, and speaking most of the living languages known to scholars, would increase that interest tenfold. When our people, those among them at least who boast the largest and most liberal culture, were given the opportunity of being present at some of the solemn academical sessions held yearly, and could hear these youths, representing so many different nationalities, delivering each in his own native tongue a composition in prose or poetry,—they could appreciate the fact that the institution was one without its like in the world. They could understand the influence wielded in the past, over all tribes of men, by the Church,—the Great Parent of civilization, the generous foster-mother of Letters, Sciences, and Art. They would feel—because they could see it with their own eyes—that in HER Schools, as in her Sanctuary, men of every race, and color, and language meet, as beneath the roof and around the board of a com-

mon Parent, in that perfect equality which tolerates no castes, no exclusiveness, no narrow prejudices; in the enjoyment of the same advantages, of the same liberal and loving nurture, all cherishing each as a most dear brother, all issuing from that blessed School of Fraternity, armed with the same priestly powers and adorned with the same graces of culture, to bear to their brethren in Africa, Asia, Australia, and Polynesia, as well as to the uncounted tribes of our own native Indians, the knowledge of the Gospel, the sanctifying energy of its morality, the immortal hopes which it inspires.

You would go from the Academic Halls where these young men of every race and color are educated gratuitously, fed, clothed, housed, cared for with a generosity which is at once fatherly and princely,—to the Propaganda Presses, where books in all the known languages are printed for the use of the Missionaries, as well as for the instruction and education of their countrymen. No young Priest goes forth from these Halls to his life-work in his native land without being well provided with this intellectual armor, with these potent means of enlightening, elevating, civilizing.

Protestant Missionary and Bible Societies have come into the field long after the Propaganda, and have only imitated, each in its own sphere, the labors, the results, the generous patronage of science, culture, and evangelical zeal here imperfectly described. Even as patrons of intellectual progress, as brothers helping to bring to their disinherited brothers among the civilized Heathen, and the lowest Barbarians, the regenerating Faith in a common Father and Saviour,—these Protestant Associations justly claim the sympathy and support of their co-religionists. Modern Science, in every one of its departments, has confessed the debt it owes to these Missionary bodies.

Catholics do not doubt the sincerity of the men who go yearly, from the shores of England and America, to bring the Gospel truths within reach of Mohammedan or Pagan, any more than they question the piety which prompts rich Protestants to contribute so bountifully to the support of these Bible Societies and missionary enterprises.

And just here, as an instance of the fair-mindedness we may expect from American publicists the least favorable to the Church, from the most enlightened and influential Protestant laymen as distinguished from their religious teachers, we quote the following editorial of the *New York Times* of March 31, 1884:

“The virtual confiscation of the property of the Roman Propaganda, and the suppression of the institution, will hardly prove to be a judicious measure on the part of the Italian Government. The Propaganda is a sort of combined theological seminary and missionary society. It educates young men and sends them as missionaries to the ends of the earth. Although the Court of Cassation has decided that the Propaganda

is, technically, a religious corporation, and, as such, is liable to suppression under the law passed for the suppression of monasteries and convents, the wide difference between the Propaganda and a community of religious recluses is self-evident.

"Zeal for the destruction of the power of the Roman Catholic Church will induce extreme Protestants to applaud the attack on the Propaganda. What would be said were our Government to suppress the Bible Society or the General Theological Seminary in this city, or to seize the property of both? Yet this would be precisely analogous to the recent act of the Italian Government. It was difficult to class the seizure of the property of the monastic communities as an honest act. But the Italian Government could plead in extenuation that the monasteries were an injury to the property of the country, and that, at the time of the confiscation, the Government was in the utmost need of money. Now, however, there is no such pressing need for money, since the budget shows an annual surplus, and no one pretends that the Propaganda takes able-bodied men and women out of the paths of productive industry to enable them to lead lives of complete indolence."

This will be the common-sense view which the American public will surely take of this matter. Even while rejoicing at the weakening and, as they think, the prospective downfall of the Papacy, they will condemn injustice and hypocrisy in the men who seek its ruin, while pretending to benefit it.

We cannot expect rival non-Catholic societies to be ready to admit that our missionaries succeed where theirs are said to fail, that we reap an abundant harvest on lands where their labors, according to some Protestant writers, are like ploughing and sowing the lands of the Sahara. Still, the most magnificent praise ever given to Catholic missions in every part of the globe has been bestowed by Protestant writers,—historians, scientists, or travellers.

There are men who rise above the prejudices of creed and education, and value educational, literary and scientific institutions according to the intellectual fruits they bear, according to the influence the men who go forth from them have on the welfare of their kind; these enlightened observers and impartial judges would not hesitate to pronounce the Propaganda, considered as a whole and in its recorded results, as the greatest and most successful cosmopolitan institution known to history.

This, therefore, is the proper place to give a brief account of the foundation of this "vital organ of the Papacy," as an American publicist has called it.

The idea of creating in Rome a special department of the Papal Administration for directing and fostering missionary enterprise, was first conceived by one of the most enlightened popes of any age, Ugo Boncompagni (Gregory XIII.), a native of Bologna, whose pontificate lasted from 1572 to 1585. His memory ought to be especially dear to Irishmen, for he took a deep and active interest in their struggles, and sent them in money the funds with which he had purposed to build a college for Irish students in Rome. Gregory XIII. saw that the Reform of Luther had de-

tached from Catholic unity a great portion of Western Europe ; it was necessary to have for them in Rome itself special schools in which should be trained missionaries belonging to the disaffected nationalities. Moreover, the vast regions in India and America opened up to the spread of Gospel truth were not sufficiently provided for by the great Religious Orders. It was needful to establish in Rome itself a central nursery for secular priests, who, under the immediate direction of the Holy See, would fill up the gaps in the great army of missionaries already at work in the New World, as in India, China, and Japan.

What the misfortunes of the time prevented Gregory XIII. from achieving, another Bolognese Pope, Gregory XV., was happy enough to carry out in 1622. Not only did he, through his brother, Cardinal Ludovisi, found and endow the Irish college contemplated by his predecessor ; but he laid the foundations of the Propaganda, which Urban VIII., succeeding, in 1623, to the Papal chair, organized in all its parts. To the Congregation of Cardinals charged with the administration of the department of missions he handed over the present College of the Propaganda (ever since called after him *Collegio Urbano*). It is, in reality, such a school as we have been hitherto describing, where students from every land under the sun are thoroughly educated and trained for missionary work in their respective countries. The polyglot presses, the rich library, the ethnological museum mentioned in the beginning of this article, have been there since the time of the Eighth Urban, successive popes and cardinals, with other generous benefactors, adding continually to the resources of the establishment and its varied intellectual stores. The Propaganda press has rendered to Letters and Science the most splendid services. Its typographical excellence has never been surpassed. No student ever leaves this cherished *Alma Mater* without bearing with him a selection of books printed there. They are in his own native tongue,—a treasury above all price for him amid the labors of his apostleship.

This establishment, created when the Papacy was an independent sovereignty, placed under the safeguard of all Christian nations ; its existence, its resources, its freedom guaranteed by the international law of Christendom,—is, then, cosmopolitan like the Papacy itself, like the Catholic Church of which the Papacy is the organic head and governing power.

Other educational institutions, destined to train missionaries for countries which had cast off, wholly or in part, their allegiance to the Holy See, existed or were created in Rome, and placed under the Congregation *De Propaganda Fide*. We have mentioned the Irish College. There were also the English College, the Scotch,

the German-Hungarian, the Greco-Ruthenian, without naming others. These stood in the relation of Halls to the great Central Schools, to which the students resorted for the public courses in Philosophy, Theology, and the Sciences. All were auxiliary establishments to the Propaganda, sharing in the same generous methods of culture, and supported by the same unstinted system of munificence.

Among the most modern of the colleges thus established in Rome to aid the educational labors of the Propaganda, is the AMERICAN COLLEGE. It was called into existence by Pius IX., who always maintained a predilection for the Church in the United States. The first Provincial Council of New York was held on October 1st, 1854, Archbishop Hughes presiding. The decrees and minutes of the proceedings having been duly submitted to the Holy See, Pius IX., in answer to the Archbishops and Bishops, among other things, proposed the establishment of a College in Rome, in which students from all parts of the Union should be educated under the direction of the Propaganda. "By this means," the Holy Father says to the Prelates, "young men of your choice, and sent hither for the purpose of devoting themselves to the Church, will be reared like choice plants in a conservatory. They will be here imbued with both piety and learning, drawing Christian doctrine from its purest springs, being instructed in rites and ceremonies by that Church which is the Mother and Teacher of all Churches. They will be moulded on the best forms of discipline; and thus trained, they will go back to their native land, to fill with success the functions of pastors, preachers, and guides; to edify by an exemplary life, to instruct the ignorant, recall the erring to the paths of truth and righteousness; and, with the aid of solid learning, to refute the fallacies and baffle the designs of their adversaries."

Archbishop Hughes, if he had not suggested the thought of such a foundation to the Holy Father, at least entered warmly into the design. He threw the whole weight of his great influence into favoring the project, and was heartily seconded by his suffragans. The other archbishops and bishops throughout the country were no less hearty in their coöperation. Acting on this support, the Pope purchased, in 1857, the former Convent of the Umiltà, in the street of that name, at the foot of the Quirinal, and presented it to the American Hierarchy. The 42,000 Roman scudi, equal to the same sum in our dollars, was the Pope's donation to the American Church. Our prelates spent about as much more in repairs, alterations, and in furnishing all that was necessary to make the new college ready for its inmates. These expenses were met by collections made in all the dioceses of the Union.

The property thus handed over to the prelates of the United States was to be managed, and is still held and managed, by a board composed of all our Archbishops. They send to the Holy Father a list with three names, out of which he selects the Rector, who is paid by the Archbishops. Since its foundation, collections have been made annually in each diocese for the current expenses of the College; besides which, and to meet the increasing demands rendered necessary by an increase in the number of students, and by the requirements of a progressive establishment, extraordinary appeals were made in favor of the American College to our clergy and their flocks. In 1877-78, special collections were made for it all through the country, Monseigneur Doane, of Newark, devoting himself in a special manner to the unpleasant work of begging and collecting.

Thanks to all this zeal and generosity, the American College was enabled to purchase a villa or country house at Grotta Ferrata, whither, in the hot and unhealthy summer months, the students can retire from the dangerous atmosphere of Rome.

Such is the American College. Like all similar educational establishments in Rome, it is under the superintendence of the Congregation *De Propaganda Fide*, whose members derive not one dollar from the revenues of the College itself. They are donors and benefactors, rather than receivers and beneficiaries.

The College building and ground, donated by the then Sovereign of the Roman States, increased and improved by the moneys collected in the United States, as well as the villa at Grotta Ferrata, is the legitimate property of the Catholic Church in the United States. It was placed, from the beginning, under the double protection of the existing laws of the country and of the American Government.

No special precautions were taken, after the occupation of Rome, in 1870, by the armies of Piedmont, to secure the American College from occupation or confiscation, and for two good reasons:

The first, because the officers and students of the College, like the Archbishops and Bishops in the United States, who were its foster-parents, like all Americans, in fact, of whatever creed, deemed their home inviolable, because covered by the American Flag. We all felt sure that the same protection, which would, in case of need, be extended by our Government to any American citizen living in Rome, in a house purchased and owned by himself, would never be refused to Catholic Americans for the sole reason that they were Catholics.

Thank God, the College is now saved, and the American Government has nobly and promptly done its duty.

The second is that no one in Rome, or here in America, had,

after the Piedmontese occupation of Rome, any thought of possible danger to the Propaganda, to the property under its care, or to the Colleges directed by it. When the projects of 1866 and 1867, suppressing Religious Orders (or "Religious Associations," as the legislators termed them), became laws, it was expressly and solemnly declared by the King that these laws were not aimed at the Propaganda.

IT IS THE PROPAGANDA ITSELF WHICH WE MUST NOW SAVE!

It is not a "Religious Association," in the sense understood by the two laws of the Italian Parliament. The Congregation, or Board of Cardinals, charged, during more than two centuries and a half, with superintending and directing all the vast missionary enterprise of the Catholic Church, with guarding and promoting the interests of the Missions themselves, and with securing the training of a sufficient and competent number of laborers, is simply a Board or Committee. It would be absurd to liken, in legal phrase or for judicial purposes, the entire body of Cardinals to any one of the Religious Orders or Congregations of the Church, and whose suppression was aimed at by the Italian laws invoked by the Italian Court of Cassation, and on which it rests its sentence. This distinction is clearly stated in the *Times* editorial. The College of Cardinals is the Pope's Supreme Council, composed of men of all nationalities, helping him to govern the Universal Church, and representing in his council the interests of their respective countries. This College can no more be called a Religious Association than the Cabinet of our President, than the Senate and House of Representatives can be called Political Associations. They hold, in the Government of our country, with the Supreme Magistrate, the same place that the Cardinals hold with the Sovereign Pontiff in the government of the Catholic Church, in the administration of the spiritual concerns of 200,000,000 of Christians scattered all over the globe.

The Committees of Congress on "Foreign Affairs," on "Trade and Industry," etc., offer a closer analogy to the *Congregations* of Cardinals, which are only committees or boards, charged, each, with some one department of the vast administration of the Church. It is preposterous, on the face of it, to liken such a board to a Religious or Monastic Order, and to confound, by an unworthy and disingenuous construction of technical terms, the property used for the purposes of such administration with the property of Monastic Associations. Our Treasury Buildings in Washington, our War Office, our General Post Office, our Home Department, our State Department, are all "Federal" property, belonging to the Government,—the property of the entire people of the United States, not that of the State of Maryland, or of the city of Wash-

ington. Would our courts of law ever dream of considering or calling them the property of the respective Ministers with their staffs?

We can reason from this, on a ground of striking, if not perfect, analogy, to the organism we call Papacy, which is the Supreme Government in the Universal Church. Just as you could not confiscate, or alienate, or "convert" into scrip, the Executive Mansion and Department, the State Department, etc., *unless you suppress the Federal Government and Constitution by revolution*, so cannot the property, left to the Pope and to his Cardinals, for the absolute and indispensable necessities of their existence and administration, be confiscated, alienated, "converted," or in any way dealt with as the property of another, save only by the sheer force of revolution subverting the Papacy itself, and declaring its existence in Rome incompatible with the new state of things. But brute force cannot subvert the eternal foundations of right and justice.

The Italian Court of Cassation, in formulating its strange decision, and the Italian Government in justifying and explaining it through Minister Mancini, knew perfectly that they were doing the very thing which would most please their Revolutionary masters; all those, indeed, who, under various names, and for various reasons of their own, desire above all things the obliteration of the Papacy from Italy, and the downfall of the Catholic Church.

That this is the result directly aimed at, no one, who is acquainted with the antecedents of MM. Depretis and Mancini, as well as with those of the Judges of the Supreme Court of Cassation, will be disposed to deny. The professions of utter and irreconcilable hatred towards the Papacy and the great educational establishments it still controls in Rome, made time and again by the Prime Minister, and heartily reëchoed by Signor Mancini, leave no room to doubt that they will not rest satisfied with crippling the Pope and the Church by destroying or neutralizing the efficiency of the Propaganda. The next blow will be to throw aside the Law of Guarantees, and to declare the Vatican itself national property, convertible at any moment into Government scrip. This is what the "Anti-Clerical Circles" of Rome have been so long clamoring for, and what will most assuredly happen, unless the Powers step in and interpose their veto on the consummation of this supreme iniquity.

Fortunately, at this moment Catholics are not left alone to protest against the gratuitous, uncalled-for, and unjustifiable proceedings of the Italian Government. Eloquent voices in the non-Catholic Press of Europe and America denounce and condemn the verdict rendered. We need only quote a few to show clearly how

unprejudiced minds outside of the Church see the wrong done to civilization, as well as the injustice committed against the Propaganda and the great international interests represented by the latter.

"The functions of the Propaganda," says a foremost New York daily paper, "cannot be trammelled or enfeebled, without proportionably crippling the vital powers of the Church. That the Italian Government shrinks from avowedly contemplating such a result is clear, as also that it seeks, by ignoring the international character of the institution assailed, to avert interference on the part of Catholic Powers, and of those Protestant Powers, like Prussia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, which number millions of Catholics among their citizens. As a matter of fact, the international character of the Papacy itself is not more demonstrable than is that of the Propaganda. Besides being an inseparable organ of the Roman Church, and therefore entitled to share its guarantees, the Congregation in question can draw impressive arguments for inviolability from the history of its endowments. Its resources have been created, not by Italian donors for national objects, but by cosmopolitan contributors for ecumenical ends.

"The essentially cosmopolitan origin of the property which the Italian tribunal has declared itself competent to partly confiscate, may be exemplified by the grievous predicament in which the American College at Rome, like all other adjuncts and outgrowths of the Propaganda, is now placed. The building occupied by this seminary, which at present gives instruction to some fifty students, and by which some of the most eminent Catholic ecclesiastics in the United States were educated, was purchased by the Propaganda thirty years ago, and the use of it granted in perpetuity to the American Bishops. The latter, on their part, contributed some \$50,000 for alterations and equipments, and of course these improvements will be disposed of with the building which is ordered to be sold. But would not our Government, which recognizes the duty of protecting Catholics and Protestants alike, be justified in protesting against the arbitrary conversion of property belonging to American citizens? Would it not have been prompt and loud in remonstrance had an American Protestant church or chapel in Rome been similarly menaced with partial confiscation?"

These last words point out the plain and urgent duty, the execution of which the entire Catholic body in the United States must now press upon Congress and the Executive.

"When we examine"—the article goes on to say—"the considerations on which the Court of Cassation bases its decision, and the exculpatory plea of M. Mancini set forth in his letter to the diplomatic representatives of the Italian Government, we see that

the Court gave judgment on the purely technical and disingenuous ground, that the Propaganda Congregation had not been specifically excepted by statute from the operation of the laws of 1866 and 1867, leveled at religious associations. We say 'disingenuous,' because it has been shown by official admission of Italian Ministers, and by the declaration of VICTOR EMMANUEL himself, that the laws named were never meant to strike at the mainstay and paralyze the vital organ of the Papacy, and because for ten years after the occupation of Rome the civil power, respecting the moral guarantee possessed by this institution, refrained from any attempt to harm it by an application of these proscriptive statutes."

From the Capital of the State of New York another influential Protestant journal thus vents its honest indignation.

"The act of the judicial branch of the Italian Government, in partially confiscating the property of the Propaganda at Rome, is robbery under the forms and to the shame of law. The Propaganda is the immense missionary and educational establishment of the Holy See. It is a University of Religion on the largest scale. It has been established and maintained at Rome by the contributions of Catholics in all parts of the earth. It has not been made or carried on by Italian money. It has incurred no obligations to the Italian State. It is as international as Catholicism itself. It does not exist for Italian objects, but for purposes as large and embrasive as the work of the historical order of Christianity around the world.

"If the Italian Government undertook to confiscate the American Protestant chapel, or the doubtful Mr. Van Meter's 'ragged schools' in Rome, both built and maintained by American Protestants, a cry would go up from the Rio Grande to either Portland, *which the American Government would be swift to heed.* Great Britain, France, Spain, Germany, and Australia have far greater interests in the Propaganda than the United States have. Not the magnitude, but the reality of any interest, however, is that which kernels the principle of the thing.

"We have examined the technical excuses put forth by the Italian Government. They are unworthy of serious attention. They are devoid both of honor and honesty. The act is one of sheer spoliation. It is a political looting of the property of citizens of all parts of the earth, located at Rome, and dedicated to the cause of religion and learning. It is one of those malign acts which stamp the Italian Government as a concern inspired by an essentially piratical spirit. Even the most bigoted opponent of Catholicism

¹ New York Sun, March 13th, 1884.

will hardly insist that robbery is rendered honest, or stealing holy, by making Catholic Christians the victims of it."

This is strong language. Surely governments and statesmen, who still cling to the name of Catholic, and who are intrusted with the welfare of peoples an immense majority of whom are Catholics, must be surprised that Protestant publicists, in a free Protestant country, should thus energetically stigmatize acts for which there is, and can be, neither a sufficient motive nor a decent excuse. But the press of Europe has condemned, with a surprising animosity, both the judicial decision obtained by MM. Depretis and Mancini, and the flimsy apology sent forth to cover the judicial iniquity.

"The Court of Cassation of Rome," says the *Germania*, "which has decreed the liquidation of the property of the Propaganda, has not found in the whole European press a serious journal to defend it. The verdict is generally declared unsustainable in a legal point of view." Even the journals devoted to Italy "seek to extenuate the error by the false allegation, that in a financial point of view the conversion is an advantage to the Propaganda. But the question does not merely concern the effect produced by the judicial verdict, although the fate of the institution depends upon it; the question regards the legal value of the decision. That cannot be sustained, and the sentence is, therefore, of itself null and void."

In accordance with this comes to us the opinion of the official organ of the Court of Saxony, the *Dresden Journal*. "The property of the Propaganda belongs to the Universal Church, and as such, it is not only under the safeguard of the Catholic States, but also that of the right of nations. It is beyond doubt that the Catholic Church has an international existence, related to the rights of nations. This existence, as well as the unfailing maintenance of the resources disposed of by the Church, has a general interest for all Christendom."

The leading Italian newspaper, *La Gazzeta d'Italia*, although devoted to the new order of things introduced by the Revolution, has too much sagacity not to perceive that the Court of Cassation is wrong, and the government policy a terrible blunder. It urges on the Ministers the immediate and imperative necessity of having a law passed by the Chambers to exempt from conversion the Propaganda property; and that, for the twofold purpose of preventing serious international complications, and the universal odium sure to fall on both Government and Judiciary, as the result of an unwarranted and unwise act of spoliation. Such is also the advice given by another leading Italian journal, *La Nazione*.

¹ Albany Argus, March 16th, 1884.

We do not insist here on the ruinous effect of the "conversion" on all the property of the Propaganda. It is calculated that it would reduce its nominal value by one-third, besides placing all that great department of the Papal administration entirely at the mercy of the Government. It is the PRINCIPLE itself on which both the Government and the Supreme Court of Appeals proceed, that Catholics cannot admit, and that all true jurists must reject.

The Propaganda is not a religious association, a monastic order. We now come to what is for all American Catholics—indeed, for Catholics in every land—the DUTY OF THE HOUR, sacred, most urgent and imperative. To save both the Propaganda and the Pope's liberty. And, at the outset, let us express our grateful sense of the prompt action taken by President Arthur, the Secretary of State, and Mr. Astor in Rome.

Signor Mancini, in his circular to the representatives abroad of the Italian Government, turns aside from his direct path to the Government of the United States, that it must not interfere in a matter which does not concern it; as if the astute Minister of Foreign Relations had a presentiment that both our Executive and our Congress were sure to extend to American property, and the most sacred interests of American citizens imperilled in Rome, the protection never yet withheld in such cases.

There are around the Italian Ministers and their complaint judges, far-seeing Americans, who must have told them that the Catholic community in the United States, as well as all that is truly liberal and large-minded in the press and the public, would raise such a storm of indignant remonstrance as to compel, if need were, our Government to take, at length, at the eleventh hour, the firm and generous stand which should have been taken before the Piedmontese flag ever appeared under the walls of Rome.

At any rate, M. Mancini's arrogant words, meaning "we make our laws as we please, and you make yours as it suits you,"—remind us of a duty we owe ourselves, and which it is imperative that we do now, and do promptly and thoroughly. Clergy and laity owe it to themselves, to the Holy See outraged in its most vital prerogatives, and threatened, not only in its freedom of action, but in the very essential conditions of its existence in Rome, to take immediate and concerted action. There should be no delay. The Cardinal-Archbishop of New York, on the first intimation of the iniquity consummated, at once issued his eloquent pastoral. His voice has found a no less eloquent echo in the Archbishop of Baltimore and the Bishop of Albany. Doubtless, ere these lines are in print and the April number of the REVIEW is given to the public, all our Archbishops and Bishops will have protested with equal eloquence and solemnity against the baneful

measures of the Piedmontese Government in Rome,—against the wrong inflicted on Catholicity, on the Christian religion itself, on the best interests of civilization, by the virtual confiscation of the Propaganda property.

It is not by any means enough that our prelates should thus lift up their voices. The laity should at once use their own right of assembling and protesting. There should be meetings in every city, in every town, in every parish, and resolutions passed and transmitted to our representatives in both Houses of Congress, explaining the injury done to an institution which is not local, not Roman, not national or Italian, but international, cosmopolitan, Catholic. It belongs to all humanity; for the very aim of its founders and benefactors, the very nature of the education there given, the very character of its teaching, and its pupils, all point to a primary object,—the civilization and Christianization of the heathen, as well as the maintenance of a high intellectual and moral standard among Christian peoples themselves.

As we have seen, Protestants themselves consider that the crippling of the Propaganda means the crippling of the Church herself, the disabling her for the fulfilment of her mission,—to *teach all nations*.

Surely the duty of the hour is a most sacred and a most pressing one.

The best thing, in our judgment, the only telling thing, in fact,—the only one worthy of the emergency, and in any way fitted to meet its requirements, is to prepare for Congress, for our Government, a MEMORIAL signed by our Hierarchy, clergy, and people, diocese by diocese, simultaneously and at once!

We doubt not but the Catholics of British North America will be up and doing. Let us take care that they do not anticipate us. We owe this to the entire body of our non-Catholic fellow-citizens, who expect us to speak up for our dearest religious interests, our most sacred rights violated in Rome, and threatened with still further violation. Let our Holy Father and those who with him in Rome fight the battles of Christianity against unbelief, the battles of Christian society against Socialism and the Revolution, see that here, at least, in free America, we shall give him our utmost moral support, our practical aid as well as our heartfelt sympathy.

And we count with reason on the joint coöperation with us of Congress and the Executive. They will not fail us, unless we lamentably fail ourselves and the expectation of all Christendom.

THE LIFE AND TIMES OF FREDERICK THE SECOND.

THE EMPERORS.

ONE of the first acts of Frederick Barbarossa, as emperor-elect, was to send his ambassador to the Pope to announce his election, but not to seek any Papal confirmation of it. He made his young cousin, Henry the Lion,¹ Duke of Bavaria as well as of Saxony, compensating the thereby deposed Duke of Bavaria, Henry, Margrave of Austria,² by erecting Austria into a separate duchy, hereditary in the female as well as in the male line, and by bestowing it jointly on himself and his Greek wife, Theodora.³ Austria was also enlarged by the addition of the lands between the Inn and the Ens, and the Duke and Duchess made Vienna the capital⁴ of their thus-enlarged duchy.

The Emperor received the homage of Sweyn, King of Denmark, who applied for his recognition as lawful king. He carried the sword of state before his lord, the Emperor, and was confirmed in his kingdom.

In 1154 Barbarossa proceeded to Italy, whither he had received a threefold application for his presence. He had been called by the Pope to support him against Arnold of Brescia⁵ and Roger of Sicily⁶; he had been invited by the Romans themselves, and also by the Lombard cities, then groaning under the overbearing tyranny of Milan.

The Emperor held his first Italian diet at Roncaglia, at which the Marquis of Montferrat⁷ complained of aggression on the part of the towns of Chieri and Asti, while Como, Cremona, Pavia, and Lodi accused Milan of injustice and oppression. At this diet, also, Henry the Lion resigned his ancestral Italian possessions to the Marquis of Este, the representative of the younger line of their common family.⁸

¹ As to him, see *ante*, p. 32. He had been engaged in a dispute with the Archbishop of Bremen, who denied to any new duke the right of investing his suffragans with their temporalities. The dispute was settled by the Emperor, who constituted Duke Henry his representative in such action performed within the ducal domain.

² As to him, see *ante*, p. 32.

³ See *ante*, p. 34.

⁴ Subsequently Henry the Lion, Duke of Bavaria, founded Munich.

⁵ See *ante*, p. 20.

⁶ See *ante*, p. 32.

⁷ He was the husband of an aunt of the Emperor, and also a descendant of Otho III.

⁸ See *ante*, p. 27.

Milan was rash enough to offend the Emperor grievously by not only refusing to furnish him with the nourishment it was legally bound to furnish him with, but also refusing even to sell him food. He therefore destroyed various Milanese castles, and besieged and took Tortona (Milan's confederate city), and subdued Chieri and Asti. At the siege of Tortona, a young man greatly distinguished himself, whose descendants still reign in Europe. This was Otho of Wittelsbach, Palsgrave of Bavaria, and a descendant of the former Dukes of Bavaria, the last of whom, Otho, was deposed by Henry IV., as before mentioned.¹ The city of Pavia was always strongly Imperialist and the great enemy of Milan; and to it Frederick proceeded, and was crowned there after the reduction of Tortona. This done, he proceeded towards Rome in order to meet Pope Hadrian IV.,—the Englishman,—who was harassed by the rebellious Romans and by his conflict with William of Sicily, son of King Roger, whose death took place in 1154. It was these Italian dissensions which rendered fruitless the coming of the aged Patriarch of Jerusalem, who with other prelates came to petition the Pope and others to succor the Holy City, sore-pressed by the encroaching Moslems.

The Pope was forced to leave Rome by its revolutionary inhabitants, who, however, were pretty readily amenable to the influences of religion; for no sooner was their city laid under an interdict than its alarmed citizens gave up Arnold of Brescia. He escaped, but was soon recaptured—falling into the Pope's hands, a convicted heretic and rebel. This compliance on the part of his subjects induced the Sovereign Pontiff to return to Rome, whence he twice visited the Emperor's camp at Sutri. On his first meeting with the Emperor there, he declined to give him the kiss of peace, on account of his neglect of certain formalities; but at his second visit—Frederick having dismounted first and duly held the Papal stirrup while the Holy Father descended from his horse—they became close allies and friends. A pompous and absurd address from the so-called "Roman Republic" having received a proper rebuke from the Emperor, and the Imperial troops having been introduced by night into the Leonine city, Arnold of Brescia was executed, and the next day (June 18th, 1155) Frederick was crowned by the Pope in St. Peter's, and thus for the first time a Hohenstaufen was formally installed with all due circumstances Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire! The Romans themselves, however, exasperated at this coronation performed in their despite, rose tumultuously, and lost one thousand of their number in a revolt. The Pope remained at the Vatican while Frederick Barbarossa advanced upon and destroyed Spoleto, which was rebellious

¹ See *ante*, p. 27.

to him, and then proceeded to Ancona, where envoys from the Emperor of the East waited upon him, seeking to engage him in joint action against William of Sicily. The desire of his German followers to return home forced him, however, to decline such coöperation, and to depart without rendering the Pope any further assistance, and leaving the Papal principality of Beneventum exposed to the action of the last-mentioned William. On his road back to Germany, the Emperor was almost caught in a trap at Verona. It had been planned that a bridge over the Adige should be destroyed as if by accident, when one-half the Imperial force had passed over it, while a Veronese noble, whose castle lay high up in the pass leading to Trent, should obstruct the Emperor's passage. The plan would have been successful but for the gallantry of Otho of Wittelsbach, who, with some adventurous followers, climbed up a summit above the castle so steep that it had been deemed inaccessible, and was left unguarded. Thence descending upon the castle unawares, it was easily captured, and all its garrison put to the sword except its lord and a dozen of his followers, who were hanged after its capture.

One of the matters which hastened the return northwards of Barbarossa was a revolt of the Sclavonians—the last they made to obtain absolute independence. This revolt was suppressed by the Margrave Albert the Bear,¹ assisted by the Archbishop of Magdeburg.

Albert's son-in-law, Vladislas of Poland, supported by his namesake the Duke of Bohemia, craved help from the emperor against Boleslas IV. of Poland. Help was given, though with but an imperfectly successful result; Barbarossa received, however, the homage of Poland, and changed the Duke of Bohemia into its king. Other sovereigns also bowed before the Emperor's throne. Thus Waldemar I. of Denmark, having defeated and slain King Sweyn, sought and obtained an imperial recognition of his royalty. It was he who conquered the island of Rugen—the head-quarters of Northern idolatry.

An appeal also reached the Emperor from Hungary, made by Prince Stephen against King Geisa, who was made to do homage as well as Waldemar of Denmark, and Boleslas of Poland, who thus all became the Emperor's men.²

Various territorial changes were also effected by the Emperor at this time. Thus the Palatinate of the Rhine having become vacant,³ the Emperor added to it the county of Stahleck and certain

¹ As to him, see *ante*, pp. 28 and 32.

² The general recognition in Europe of the supremacy of the Emperor is shown by the letter which King Henry II. of England wrote to him.

³ By the death of the childless Palsgrave Herman, the Palatinate of the Rhine included Franconia west of the Rhine and also this part between the Rhine and the

Franconian fiefs, and then bestowed it on his half-brother Conrad (the son of his father's second marriage with Agnes of Saarbruck), and the Rhine Palsgrave was henceforth first Prince of the Empire and President of the Diet in the Emperor's absence.

Barbarossa also granted to Welf,¹ in consideration of his renouncing all pretence to Bavaria, certain lands belonging to the Great Countess,² who had formerly married his uncle. He was made Prince of Sardinia, Duke of Spoleto, and Marquis of Tuscany. In making this grant the Emperor transgressed the terms previously agreed upon by the Pope and the Emperor Lothar.³ He also was guilty of violation of the Calixtine Concordat,⁴ for he directly interfered in episcopal elections and invested Bishops with their temporalities without waiting for Papal sanction.

The Emperor, at Whitsuntide in 1156, married Beatrice,⁵ Countess of Burgundy,⁶ and was afterwards crowned king at Arles, where he received the homage of his feudatories.

He afterwards held a great diet at Besançon, where he received the homage of the Count of Provence and the Archbishop of Lyons; whither also came two legates from Pope Hadrian to complain of an outrage on the Archbishop of Lund. They, however, gave verbal offence, as in reminding the Emperor of the benefits he had received from the Holy See they spoke of those benefits by the equivocal word *beneficia*, which was also used to denote "fiefs." Certain nobles present understanding the word in this latter sense (as if it had been asserted that the Pope had conferred upon the Emperor his domains as Papal fiefs), dissension arose, when the legate, Cardinal Rolando, made matters worse by asking what but the Papacy was the root of the imperial power? On hearing this, Otho of Wittelsbach attempted to slay the Cardinal, and after quieting the tumult the Emperor sent the legates straight back to Rome.

The German prelates were inclined to range themselves, in this dispute, on the side of the Emperor, but Hadrian sent two more

Neckar. It was separated from the Mosel by a strip belonging to the Archbishopric of Treves.

¹ As to him see *ante*, pp. 27, 28, and 34.

² See *ante*, p. 20.

³ See *ante*, p. 30.

⁴ See *ante*, p. 20.

⁵ She died in 1185, and was buried at Speyer.

⁶ This county of Burgundy was part of the Kingdom. That Kingdom, though re-annexed to the Empire by Conrad II., was not successfully held by Lothar against the claimants—Renault of Chalons and the Duke of Zähringen—to the inheritance of the childless Count William, who had established himself as Lord of Franche Comté, when Conrad II. obtained the Kingdom. Renault had retained possession, and Beatrice was his daughter. To the Duke of Zähringen Frederick granted the greater part of Transjurane Burgundy (the northeastern part of the Kingdom), and the mesne suzerainty over the Bishopric of Geneva and some others, in compensation for his claim. The county of Burgundy nearly coincided with the Franche Comté of to-day.

legates to explain inoffensively the offending word, whereupon peace was restored, and the Emperor at the head of his chivalry again crossed the Alps (in 1158) to subdue the rebellious Italian cities. Verona was no longer one of these, having submitted and promised to give her aid against Milan. Such aid was by no means to be despised, the power of the great city of St. Ambrose being very great. During the Emperor's absence in the north, she had not only rebuilt Tortona, but had waged war with the Emperor's allies—with the Marquis of Montferrat, with various cities, Novara and Cremona being amongst the number,—and had destroyed Lodi.

Two Imperial commissioners preceded Barbarossa. One was the Palsgrave of Bavaria, Otho von Wittelsbach, the other was the Imperial chancellor, Reginald, Bishop of Köln. They visited the now loyal Verona, and also Ravenna, Rimini and Ancona. At the last-named city they found the Greek general Paleologus in the act of raising troops to serve against the King of Sicily, and intriguing to bring about the reannexation of that littoral region once more to the Eastern Empire. He was, however, expelled from the port of Ancona by the two commissioners.

Meanwhile the Emperor himself crossed the Alps, and, after receiving hostages from Brescia, besieged and took Milan, whose inhabitants—coming forth to meet him as suppliants, barefoot and with swords or halts suspended about their necks—were spared by him this time, as well as their city. He then proceeded to Monza (where he was crowned King of Italy with the Iron crown), and afterwards held a diet at Roncaglia.

This diet is very memorable as presenting one of the earliest instances of that advance towards classical Cæsarism and that recession from Teutonic common law, which were amongst the greatest banes of the approaching Renaissance. At Roncaglia certain Bolognese doctors of civil law laid down as authoritative some legal principles of ancient Imperial jurisprudence, but opposed to feudal freedom. Thus these legists asserted that the Emperor alone had the right to nominate the magistrates of cities, tax their revenues and levy tolls, and that, therefore, he ought to take back to himself the various franchises which had been granted from time to time by his predecessors. These principles were sanctioned and adopted by the diet, and thus the legists, who had for some time been trying to advance their own importance and the imperial power at the expense of Christian liberty, obtained for the first time a public approbation of their revived Cæsarism. In return for such support, the Emperor raised the school of Bologna to the rank of a university.

Frederick was now at the height of his power, and even Genoa,

which had begun to resist him, took the oath of allegiance, and sent him aid and tribute. His decline now began through certain unjustifiable, anti-Papal acts which involved him in trouble of all kinds. To a Christian letter from the Pontiff cautioning him against undue self-exaltation, he replied by affirming that the Popes owed their greatness to the emperors, and by disputing the Papal claim to the Matilda inheritance, especially to the islands of Sardinia and Corsica,¹ which the Pope maintained to be fiefs of the Holy See. The Emperor also strongly objected to a peace made by Hadrian with the King of Sicily and to an investiture given to that king of domains to be held by the Holy See. But in this Hadrian only followed the example of his predecessors.² Meanwhile the decrees of the diet of Roncaglia, in forms of ancient pagan law, were preparing fresh troubles in Northern Italy. Milan was boiling with indignation at the prospect of the loss of her ancient liberties, and when the Emperor's commissioners came there to carry out the decrees of the diet and to install new and imperially-appointed magistrates, a revolt broke out and the commissioners had to fly for their lives. This revolt was followed up by the attack and capture of the Imperial castle of Trezzo, the Italians found within it being slaughtered. Frederick advanced to punish the revolted citizens—on his way attacking and taking the city of Crema, which had abandoned the Imperialist Cremona, with which it was before allied, in order to join with Milan. The siege lasted seven months, with terrible cruelties on both sides. Crema yielded in 1160, when it was sacked and burned, its inhabitants, however, being allowed to depart.

A few months before this event Pope Hadrian died. The majority of the cardinals quickly elected in his place Cardinal Rolando Baudinelli, who took the title of Alexander III. A minority of the cardinals, however, subsequently elected Cardinal Ottaviano, who styled himself Victor IV. This gave Barbarossa an excellent opportunity to assume a virtual supremacy over the Church as well as the state, by adjudicating between the rival Pontiffs, re-assuming the position of the imperial Othos.

Pope Alexander, however, strenuously guarded himself against such action, asserting unequivocally that his place was to judge, not to be judged. Frederick, nevertheless, did not fail to make an attempt to seize the opportunity. He called a general council at Pavia to decide the question, which council, however, consisted but of some seventy bishops of Germany and Italy, who could not

¹ In 1092 the Pope had given Corsica to Pisa as a fief of the Holy See. In the eleventh century Sardinia was conquered by Pisa and Genoa. These states disputed, as to its possession, Pisa, however, remaining mistress.

² Leo IX. and Innocent II. See *ante*, pp. 19 and 31.

but have been aware of the Emperor's mind from the very terms of the summons which each received, in which Victor was styled "Bishop" of Rome, and Alexander "Chancellor" only.

A certain hostility to Alexander on the part of the Emperor is after all only what might have been anticipated, seeing that he was the very Cardinal who had given such offence at the Diet of Besançon. As might also have been anticipated, the Antipope Victor was ready to court imperial power. He answered the summons, appeared at Pavia, and proffered obedience to its decision, which was naturally given in his favor. The decision having been pronounced, Barbarossa received him with all due formalities—holding his stirrup, and kissing his slipper. Then Victor sang High Mass, and excommunicated Alexander, by whom he was also excommunicated, and both claimants sent legates to the various European powers.

From the summer of 1161 till early in 1162 the Emperor blockaded Milan. It then surrendered for a second time, its citizens again coming forth with halters and swords about their necks, hoping for mercy. Their lives, indeed, were again spared, but not their city. This, with the exception of certain churches, was now, by the Emperor's order, destroyed, the citizens of Lodi, Como and Novara zealously aiding in the work of destruction. It was this destruction which occasioned the acquisition by Köln of its celebrated relic of the so-called Three Kings. These relics had before reposed in Milan, but now Frederick Barbarossa gave them to his Chancellor, Archbishop Reginald, who removed them to his city on the Rhine, where they still repose. Meantime, the Archbishop of Mainz had been murdered by his citizens, and Conrad Von Witeltsbach (brother of the gallant Otho) had been appointed in his place by the Antipope Victor. Germany also retained the Emperor himself, after granting freedom of election of their own magistrates to the three above-named cities, who had aided him against Milan, and also to ever-faithful Pavia, while feudal rights over Tuscan towns were bestowed on trusty Pavia.

Meanwhile Alexander, driven from Rome by the disorders of its citizens, had retreated by way of Sicily to Genoa, whence (after the fall of Milan and the thereby-increased power of the Emperor) imperial hostility compelled him to return to France. Then a council of French, Burgundian and English bishops assembled at Toulouse, and hailed him as the true Pope.

After some coquetting with the Emperor and his Antipope, the King of France, Louis VII., finally acknowledged Alexander. Thereupon Reginald, Archbishop of Köln, plainly observed the Erastianism of Frederick's supporters by declaring that the Emperor had as exclusive a right to decide a disputed Papal election

as had the King of France in the case of a French bishop, and that the Emperor's appeal to a council was a mere act of courtesy and not the recognition of any right on the part of a council as inferior to his own right.

In the year 1163 Barbarossa proceeded to Mainz, where he punished its Archbishop's murderers, and bestowed on the nephew (son of Prince Vladislav of Poland) the Papal Duchy of Silesia, which then was already beginning to be rather German than Polish, to the great contentment of the Margrave of Brandenburg, who was ever competing with the Polish Sovereign for dominion over Pomerania, and who, therefore, delighted in whatever diminished the power of Poland. Another tract of Slavonian country also now finally became German. This was the country of the Obotrites,¹ which is now Mecklenburg. It was annexed to Saxony by Henry the Lion, after a war undertaken to repress a rebellion² of the heathen Slavonians.

Disputes in Lombardy, excited by the tyranny and profligacy of the Imperial officers, caused the Emperor to return to Italy before the expiration of the year, and there he was detained by the death of his Antipope and by a contention respecting the island of Sardinia.⁴ The Antipope Victor died in April, 1164, but the opportunity for peace thus afforded was lost by the action of two schismatical Cardinals, who elected a fresh Antipope called Pascal III. He was as rashly as perversely acknowledged by the Emperor.

Meanwhile, Germany became full of disorders, amongst which the historical names of *Hapsburg* and *Hohenzollern* make their appearance; and it is interesting to note that they do so in opposition,

¹ See *ante*, p. 32.

² See *ante*, p. 24.

³ Niblot, the Slavonian chief (see *ante*, p. 31, note 3), having died, and his sons Pribislaſ and Werterlaſ having (after fruitless rebellion) become strict vassals of Henry the Lion, they, nevertheless, rebelled again and again, till at last Henry took the latter prisoner to Branwich, and hanged him, and drove Pribislaſ into Pomerania.

⁴ Sardinia and Corsica, after their deliverance from the Saracens, remained under the government of certain native hereditary Counts or "judges." Four such seem to have existed in Sardinia, even prior to the arrival of the Arabs. Corsica coming, in 1045, under the dominion of the Holy See, was granted by it, as a fief, to the Pisans. Sardinia was conquered from the Saracens by the combined efforts of the Genoese; and the Genoese (by agreement) contented themselves with booty; but the Pisans appointed the courts or "judges" of the island, holding it under the Great Countess, Pisa itself being part of the Duchy of Tuscany. To Sardinia, then, the Pope had a twofold claim: (1) as an island recovered from the Infidels, and (2) as part of the Countess Matilda's domains. At the time referred to in the text, the possession of the island was contested by the Genoese and Pisans—the powers repudiating their agreement to be contented with booty only. Now, the Emperor Barbarossa had acceded to the prayer of one of the Sardinian judges, named Barasone, and granted him the island as a tributary-vassal kingdom. The stipulated tribute, however, Barasone could not pay, and when he applied to the Genoese, they took him prisoner, at the same time making use of his name as a justification of their war with Pisa and their repudiation of the old agreement.

thus beginning that contentious rivalry which was (temporarily and permanently) put an end to in our own time on the bloody field of Sadowa.

It is in a dispute between the dukes of Spoleto and Zäringen that we find ranged in opposition the Count of Hapsburg on the one hand, and the Duke and Palsgrave of Swabia, assisted by the Count of Hohenzollern, on the other.

Having succeeded in calming these domestic broils, the Emperor hoped to secure the adherence of England to the cause of his Antipope. This hope was raised by the then raging quarrel between Henry II. and St. Thomas of Canterbury, in which the Holy See was in opposition to the English king. Hence, when Frederick, in 1165, summoned the diet of Würzburg, two English envoys appeared at it. At that diet the strength which Erastianism had obtained, even in this twelfth century, was conspicuously displayed. The Archbishop of Köln then and there demanded that oaths should be taken—and he himself took them—never to acknowledge Pope Alexander or any other Pope elected by his supporters, and never to elect an emperor who would not agree to maintain the same position. From this, however, the Archbishops of Mainz¹ and Salzburg² dissented, for which act they were deposed, and Christian Von Buch installed as Archbishop of the former see.³

But the Erastian spirit of the time, not content with seeking to subdue the Church Militant, aspired even to dominate in the Church Triumphant. Frederick's Antipope, Pascal, now proceeded to enrol the Emperor Charlemagne amongst the saints—a strange promotion, which the Church has never since confirmed.

The Pope and Emperor, as estranged as ever morally, began to approach each other geographically. For Alexander,—after visiting Sicily, where he had obtained the promise of support from King William—returned to Rome; while Frederick returned to Lombardy. He accomplished this, his fourth Italian expedition, at the head of a large army, and passed on to besiege Ancona. That city was a focus of Greek intrigue, the Eastern Emperor having even promised to reunite the Greek Church to the Latin communion, and to assist the Pope with money against the Antipope Pascal, in return for having the whole Holy Roman Empire bestowed upon him.

But it was a less dignified, though better and more efficient, succor which the Pope was destined to receive. The growing

¹ Conrad Van Wittelsbach, the Palsgrave, Otho's brother.

² The brother of Henry, Duke of Austria, and uncle of the Emperor.

³ A Prelate who is said to have enrolled the infamous women who followed his mercenary bands into a regiment of Amazons.

exasperation of the Lombard cities went on increasing until, on the 7th of April, 1167, there began to be formed that anti-imperial union amongst them which is known in history as the "Lombard League," and which was sanctioned by the Holy See. To this league belonged,¹ in the first place, rebuilt and refortified, Milan, with Bologna, Ferrara, Mantua, Parma, Piacenza, Modena, Brescia, Treviso, Vicenza, Verona, Padua and Venice, and also, ultimately, the two cities, hitherto imperial, of Lodi and Cremona. Amongst the names of the commanders appears, for the first time in history, that of Ezzelino de Romano. Meanwhile struggles were taking place between the disorderly and disobedient Romans and the towns of Tivoli, Albano, and Tusculum (now-a-days Frascati), and between the partisans of the Emperor and the Papal supporters, aided by Sicily. Frederick advanced upon the Eternal City, the Pontiff Alexander retreating to Beneventum. Thereupon the Antipope, Pascal, was solemnly installed by Barbarossa, who, with his Empress Beatrice, was crowned by him, the Antipope and Emperor reciprocally swearing fidelity each to the other. The imperial triumph thus seemed complete, but disaster trod fast upon the heels of success. A pestilence so fatally attacked the Emperor's troops that his army melted away like snow before the sun, and the German Sennacherib (as St. Thomas of Canterbury aptly termed him) fled with difficulty northwards to Pavia. Amongst the dead were Reginald, Archbishop of Köln, and the Emperor's two cousins, the Duke of Swabia and the younger Welf, with many bishops, earls and knights. But the Emperor could not maintain himself even at Pavia. Italy was practically lost to him, and in the Spring of 1168 he finally escaped into Germany, a fugitive, with but five followers to represent the magnificent army with which he had entered the Peninsula to master the spiritual sovereignty of the world. Nor would he even have escaped at all but for the devoted fidelity of a German knight, Herman von Sieben-eichen, who placed himself a willing victim in his master's bed at Susa, while that master secretly escaped—a plot to murder him having been formed to avenge certain Italian hostages whom he had hanged during his retreat.

More than six years now elapsed before he ventured again to cross the Alps; but if a practically dethroned Italian potentate, he was as much as ever King of Germany. That title, however, was also bestowed, in 1169, upon his son Henry, aged five years, who was crowned king at Aachen, by the new Archbishop of Köln, Philip von Heinsberg.

¹ The cities which favored the imperial cause were Pavia, Turin, Savona, Albenga, Tortona, Faenza, Ravenna, and Rimini. Cremona, Como, and Pisa were also generally favorable to it, as was sometimes Genoa.

The Emperor also provided for his four other sons,—Frederick, Conrad, Otho and Philip,—as (1st) Duke of Swabia; (2d) Duke of Franconia; (3d) Count of Burgundy,¹ and (4th) lord of certain fiefs, respectively. He maintained, generally, an external peace, though his persistent patronage of the Antipope was the occasion of much internal oppression. This led him to depose various abbots, and the Bishop of Passau; and he succeeded in forcing the Archbishop of Salzburg to renounce his allegiance to the Pope and adopt the schism. This prelate was Prince Adalbert of Bohemia, who had succeeded Archbishop Conrad (the Emperor's uncle), an unswerving partisan of Pope Alexander.

The Emperor successfully maintained his supremacy over the Poles and Bohemians, while the whole of that Slavonian district which is now Mecklenburg was incorporated with Saxony, Slavonian idolatry being rooted out from its last stronghold² by the joint efforts of Duke Henry the Lion and his daughter's father-in-law, Waldemar. Henry himself had now married the English Princess, Matilda, and was at the summit of his power and greatness. Meanwhile a very important event had taken place in Italy. This was the death of the Antipope, Pascal, which took place in September, 1168. His death did not, however, immediately heal the schism, which was destined to drag on almost nine years longer.

A fresh Antipope was elected,—namely, Abbot Giovanni di Strama, who took the title of Calixtus III. He was immediately recognized by the Emperor. This unhappy Antipope, however, never attained even such a measure of success as befel either of his predecessors. The King of England, who was now persistent for Becket's martyrdom, was hostile to him from the first; and the Emperor himself, in spite of the rash oath he had taken at Würzburg, secretly sent messengers to Alexander to propose terms, all of which, however, were refused, that Pontiff demanding absolute submission.

During the Emperor's absence from Italy the Archbishop of Mainz had vigorously upheld the imperial cause, and had perseveringly, though ineffectually, besieged Ancona. In September, 1174, however, the Emperor for a fifth time entered Italy. He

¹ Otho was the Son of Beatrice, Countess of Burgundy. He was also Count Palatine. He died in 1200, leaving a daughter Beatrix, who married a prince of the house of Andechs,—namely, Otho, Duke of Meronia, in the Tyrol and Voiland. He was also Marquis of Istria, and Prince of Dalmatia. He died in 1234, and was succeeded by his son Otho.

² The island of Rugen.

³ This daughter was his eldest—the widowed Duchess of Swabia. The name of her husband (Waldemar's son) was Knut.

came with a German army, yet one which included no Saxons or Bavarians, their great duke having ungratefully refused to join the expedition.

After burning Susa (whence he had so narrowly escaped), he attacked a newly built city, erected as a bulwark against him by the Lombard League, and named *Alexandria*, after their great Papal patron. After blockading it for six months in vain, Frederick had to submit to the humiliation of a truce ; which done, he committed the gross imprudence of disbanding his army. Hostilities recommencing, the Emperor hastily sought reinforcements ; but Henry the Lion still refused his aid, although during an interview at Chiavenna Frederick even knelt to beg for it. It may be hoped that this ungracious refusal was partly, if not largely, due to Henry's fidelity to the Pope, Alexander, which he had generally, and especially of late, favored.

The Archbishops of Germany, however, brought help to their Emperor, but too late. Before they could join him, there took place the eventful battle of Legnano, where he was utterly defeated, and was even supposed to have lost his life. He made his way to his ever faithful Pavia, and then earnestly besought peace. The Pope refused him all terms which should not include his Lombard allies. After many efforts, however, and after the Emperor, having submitted, had been absolved by a nuncio, the Pope and Emperor met at Venice on the 25th of July, 1777. The Emperor knelt and received the kiss of peace, the Pope shedding tears of joy at this happy termination of so long a struggle. Although the Emperor submitted, the Pontiff also made concessions, going even so far as to ratify acts which had been approved by anti-popes. Thus he confirmed the previous imperial appointments to sees, including that of Von Buch to Mainz, the expelled Archbishop, Conrad, being translated to Salzburg. It was also agreed that the Emperor should retain the Matilda domains for fifteen years. The Antipope, Calixtus, afterwards submitted himself. He was most kindly received by Alexander, invited to sit at his table, and was well provided for in the Principality of Beneventum.

The Emperor and Empress then journeyed through Genoa to Arles, where they were crowned as king and queen ; and then returned to Germany, to find Saxony a prey to civil war, through the misconduct of its duke. After having been in vain summoned to three successive diets, Henry the Lion was deprived of his duchies, though upon his submission (after many warlike efforts), he was allowed to retain the Duchy of Brunswick, with Luneburg ; and being banished, sailed in 1152 with his duchess, Matilda, to her native country. The Lion's domains were divided amongst various

recipients. Otto of Wittelsbach¹ was made Duke of Bavaria—the provinces of Carinthia and Styria being separated from that duchy. The Christian Duke of the Obotrites was made Duke of Mecklenburg and an immediate vassal of the Emperor, as was also the Count of Holstein. Lübeck became a free imperial city. The Lion's Westphalian fiefs went to the See of Köln, and others of the fiefs were granted to the Landgrave of Thuringia, the Archbishops of Magdeburg and Bremen, and various bishops. The thus diminished and despoiled Duchy of Saxony was granted to Bernard, who was a son of Albert the Bear, and also brother to Otto, Margrave of Brandenburg.²

At a general council convoked by the Pope, which met in March, 1179, it was enacted that a majority of two-thirds of the electing Cardinals should thenceforth be necessary for a valid Papal election. Complaints were also laid before the assembly of the advance of heresy, both in Northern Italy and in Southern France.

In August, 1181, Alexander died and was succeeded by Lucius III. Nearly two years afterwards (January, 1183) the memorable peace of Constance was made, which insured the practical independence of the Italian cities. It was thereby agreed that these cities were to have self-jurisdiction, on the condition that the chief magistrate, or Podesta, of each city, should receive investiture from the imperial deputy, except when the Bishop had been in the habit of exercising that right. Each city was also bound to provide food for the Emperor when passing through Italy. Every ten years their oath of allegiance was to be renewed, but they were to have the right of raising troops and even of waging wars.

Ezzelino de Romano became at this time the Emperor's man, and henceforth continued a strong Ghibelline. Conrad of Wittelsbach, so recently translated to Salzburg, was now retranslated to Mainz to fill the chair left vacant by the death of Archbishop Christian.

The vast empire being now at peace, the Emperor celebrated the event by holding a great diet at Mainz upon the Whitsuntide of 1184. Upwards of 40,000 Knights are said to have been present at it, where the most gorgeous festivities took place, whereat the Rhine Palsgrave, the Duke of Saxony, the Marquis of Brandenburg, and the King of Bohemia acted as the Imperial server, marshal, chamberlain, and cupbearer respectively, and Casimir, King of Poland, did homage.

¹ The lineal ancestor of the Elector Palatine, husband of Elizabeth of England and ancestor of Queen Victoria. The Wittelsbach thus held the throne of Bavaria.

² Otto had succeeded his father, Albert the Bear, and was arch-chamberlain. The new Duke of Saxony, Bernard, became arch-marshal. In him Saxony returned to the ancient Billung line, his father's mother being the co-heiress, Elike (see *ante*, pp. 27 and 28).

The Emperor now returned to Italy for the sixth and last time, leaving Germany under the care of the young King, Henry. He met Pope Lucius at Verona, to whom, however, he was still inclined to be rebellious. He was warmly welcomed at Milan, whose inhabitants he freed from all feudal restrictions as to field-sports. He sought to obtain Constance, the heiress of the Sicilian crown, as a wife for his son Henry, but to this marriage the Pope, as was natural, was strongly opposed, as the effect of such a marriage would have been to inclose the Papacy within the embrace of one huge power. The Pope recollected how often the southern kingdom had given aid against the northern Kaiser and the northern Kaiser against a Sicilian foe. To have consented to the union of these persons would have been nothing less than suicidal.

Pope Lucius, however, died in November, 1185, and was succeeded by the Archbishop of Milan, who took the name of Urban III. He failed to maintain resistance, and so the Sicilian princess was carried in great state to Milan, and there married to Henry, King of the Romans, in January, 1186. The Pope, however, protested against the marriage, and also against various wrongful acts on the part of Frederick—his invasion of various episcopal and monastic privileges and his retention of the much-disputed Matilda heritage.

The Emperor now returned to Germany, leaving his son in conflict with the Pope, and the young King showed himself a true heir of his Hohenstaufen sires, by his antipapal actions. He blockaded the Pope in Verona, while his father was struggling with Philip, Archbishop of Köln. Urban excommunicated both father and son at Verona, for which act that city was placed under the ban of the Empire. At this moment of intestine disorder in the Latin empire came the startling and appalling news of the fall of Jerusalem. The keys of the Holy City had been given up to Saladin¹ on the 2d of October, 1187. Its fall was largely brought about by the excessive jealousies, divisions, and corruptions of the Christians of Palestine. This is partly shown by the following revolting facts: The Patriarch Heraclius was living in open adultery with a woman nicknamed "Patriarchissa." Prince Bohemond of Antioch was at open war with the Church and so worried the clergy and plundered the churches—in revenge for his excommunication for adultery—that his principality had to be laid under an interdict. The earlier Patriarch, Pulcher (the same who came to Italy in 1154), was violently interrupted while

¹ Guy de Lusignan, second husband of Sibylla, sister of Baldwin IV., had been crowned King the year before on the death of the infant King of Jerusalem, Baldwin V. King Guy was taken prisoner at the fall of the Holy City.

preaching, by the Knights of St. John—one entering the church with a bended bow. A crusading Bishop of Beauvais married Conrad, Marquis of Montferrat, and husband of Theodora, a living Greek Princess, to Isabel, who was another man's wife. For this all the parties were excommunicated by the Archbishop of Canterbury. Another noble, Renauld de Chatillon, had caused the aged Patriarch to be seized, had his bald head smeared with honey and exposed him in a broiling sun till the torment of insects forced him to yield up certain treasures. The Count of Tripoli, to save his domains, applied to Saladin and obtained a Saracen guard to act against his fellow-Christians. Such disorganization and disorder, together with the rapaciousness and insubordination of the Knights Templars, abundantly accounted for the fall of the Christian kingdom.

Efforts had not been wanting to avert the blow on the part of Rome. Alexander III. had vainly tried to unite Henry II. of England and Philip Augustus of France, for one grand crusade. Pope Urban died of the shock which the receipt of the news of the fall of Jerusalem gave him, and the Emperor, in spite of his age, assumed the Cross. He held his last diet at Mainz, where he confided Germany to his son, King Henry; and then in May, 1189, set forth, the German host passing by Regensburg to Belgrade. They were sadly harassed by the Bulgarians, and by the treachery of the Greek Emperor, Isaac, which so enraged the Emperor Frederick that he wrote to his son, King Henry, to get ready the fleets of the Italian States for an attack on Constantinople.

Early in 1190 he crossed the Bosphorus, and in spite of having made a treaty with the Sultan of Iconium had yet to fight his way in Asia Minor before he marched on to Seleucia. On the 10th of June, 1190, he was accidentally drowned in crossing the river Seleph, to the dismay and horror of his army. He was buried at Antioch by his gallant son, the Duke of Swabia. Many of his followers died of starvation, and the remnant joined the Christians at the siege of Acre. In these crusades England, France and Italy had joined, but Knut VI., King of Denmark, refused; that country, like Spain and Portugal, having a permanent crusade of its own.

At the siege of Acre died Frederick, Duke of Swabia, above-mentioned. It is noteworthy that, before his death, he founded in the Holy Land the order of Teutonic Knights. He was much struck by the charity of some owners of vessels from Lübeck and Bremen, who had erected a temporary tent hospital for the sick poor. They made it over to the Duke and his officers, and a hut and wooden chapel were added to the tent hospital.

Amongst the servers of this institution were members of a German hospital of St. Mary, which had existed in Jerusalem before

its fall. The Duke blended the whole into an order of German Knights Hospitallers, and Henry von Walpot was their first Grand Master. Each knight wore a white cloak with a black cross.¹

While this fatal crusade was proceeding, Henry, the young king of the Romans, had to contend with Henry the Lion, who, having revolted, was again put under the ban of the Empire. Being subdued, he had to yield up his son, Lothar, as a hostage and to send his younger son, Henry, to perform feudal service. The king then granted peace to the Lion, who for a time seemed to be really submissive. He was the more ready to grant this peace on account of news from Sicily, which called his wife to the throne of that kingdom, to which he hastily dispatched his chancellor, Diether, and whither he was hastening to follow when he received the news of his father's death.

In the autumn of 1190 Henry, now the Emperor Henry VI., set out for south Italy, having commanded an army to be raised in all speed for Tuscany, under his general Testa. An army was necessary because his wife, Constance, daughter of Roger, king of Sicily, and aunt of King William, just deceased, was denied possession of her rights by Tancred, her illegitimate relative (a bastard son of a son of King Roger), who had been chosen sovereign in her place.²

Testa entered Apulia, and ravaged in his turn a country previously ravaged by the emissaries of Tancred, especially by his brother-in-law, the Count of Acena, who cruelly and traitorously put to death an opponent who came on invitation to a conference, on the temporary retreat northwards of Testa. Tancred, thus successful on both island and mainland, had his son Roger crowned and married to Irene, daughter of Isaac, Emperor of the East. Meanwhile the Emperor Henry was joyfully received at Milan, when he attempted, more or less successfully, to reconcile the quarrelsome and disorderly cities of Lombardy, and obtained promises from both Geneva and Pisa³ of the aid of their fleets against Tancred, in return for which they were to enjoy a monopoly of the foreign trade of Sicily. Early in 1191 he proceeded to Rome, where the citizens were quarrelling with Pope Clement III., on account of his protection of Tusculum against their virulent hostility.

¹ This order must not be confounded with another military order, the knights of which also wore a white mantle. Their mantle, however, was ornamented with two red swords crossed obliquely, with the points downwards. This order was founded in 1209, and existed in Livonia and was called the order of "The Brothers of the Sword." They subsequently joined the Teutonic order.

² The history of Frederick the Second's maternal ancestry and relations will be treated under a separate heading.

³ The Pope had now divided Sardinia between these two cities—the son of "King" Barasone becoming a simple count and vassal of Genoa.

That Pope, dying on Lady Day of that year, was succeeded by Celestine III.

Henry VI. was well educated and accomplished, as well as vigorous and energetic, but he was also harsh, cruel and perfidious. The Hohenstaufens thus seemed to degenerate as they succeeded one another. He conciliated the Pontiff by certain small concessions, and, with his wife Constance, was crowned by him on the 15th of April. This ceremony accomplished, Henry, to please the Romans, withdrew his garrison from Tusculum, surrendering to their brutality its unfortunate inhabitants, who were slain or mutilated, while the town itself was totally destroyed, to be afterwards rebuilt under the name of Frascati.¹ At the end of the month the Emperor, disregarding Papal advice, descended into Apulia, the nobles of which province hastened to do homage to him and Constance. He then advanced and besieged Naples, which was defended by Count Acena, his Empress during the siege taking up her abode at her loyal town of Salerno. There she was seized and carried off to Sicily to Tancred, when sickness had compelled the northward retreat of the Imperial army, the Emperor himself being stricken down and a report of his death being spread about.

He was forced to abandon, for a time, any purpose of rescuing Constance, for a fresh rebellion of Henry the Lion imperatively called him back to Germany. That return was not fruitless, for the Lion not only submitted, but promised to follow the Emperor, and with all his power aid him in the conquest of Sicily—the hand of Agnes, daughter of the Rhine Palgrave,² being granted to his son Henry.³ Meanwhile, Welf, Duke of Spoleto, having died, the Emperor invested his own brother, Conrad,⁴ with his domains and the Duchy of Swabia.

During the Emperor's enforced absence, the efforts and orders of Pope Celestine had caused Tancred to release the Empress; and now Henry prepared to enforce his claims on Sicily, being aided in his task by the ransom-money from King Richard of England, whom he disgracefully held in captivity till February, 1194.

A little before this date died Tancred's son Roger, who left no child by his wife Irene. Tancred himself followed his son to the grave, being succeeded by his second son, William, a mere child, who was crowned on the 20th of February, 1194. Tancred's widow, Sibylla, took up the government as regent for her young son.

In the June following, Henry VI. crossed the Alps with a pow-

¹ Said to have been so called from the boughs, or "frasche," of which the first huts of the new town were constructed.

² Brother of the late Emperor, Frederick Barbarossa.

³ His other son, Lothar, had died.

⁴ His brother, Frederick, having (as will be remembered) died at the siege of Acre.

erful army, and entering Apulia, again received the homage of its nobles. Salerno, however, was stormed, sacked and burned in revenge for its surrender of the Empress. Henry, having conquered the mainland, crossed to Messina, where the Pisans and Genoese had preceded him and fallen into deadly conflict, in spite of the efforts of Henry's esteemed officer, Markwald von Anweiler. He then advanced on Palermo, whence Sibylla with her children and adherents had flown to the fortress of Calatabellata; while the Emperor, as king of Sicily, took possession of the capital. At this time the Empress Constance was away at Jesi in the March of Ancona, expecting her confinement. Sibylla, her rival in Sicily, unable to hold out any longer, surrendered to Henry on receiving a promise that the principality of Tarentum should be granted to her son, and that her partisans should not be deprived of their possessions. Thereupon the Emperor Henry was crowned king of Sicily in the Cathedral of Palermo.

Genoa then put in her claim to grants, which had been expressly promised to her by the Emperor. These he now, however, not only refused, but he also revoked privileges which she had formerly enjoyed. To Pisa, on the other hand, he granted the mesne supremacy over Corsica, Elba and some smaller islands, with the right to establish factories in the two Sicilies. This singular inconsistency should be borne in mind, in order the better to understand the later conduct of these two republics.

The favorable terms promised to the Sicilians were far from being maintained. On Christmas day the Emperor declared that he had received evidence from a monk of a conspiracy against him of all the prominent persons in the state, including the Tancred family. Letters, authentic or not, were placed by the Emperor before certain judges, and the accused were sentenced by Peter, Count of Celano, their judge, to various frightful punishments—hanging, impaling, burning or burying alive, the loss of eyes, or long imprisonment. Sibylla was sentenced to imprisonment for life, and sent to an Alsatian convent, and the bodies of Tancred and of his son Roger were disinterred, and the crowns removed from their heads. The boy-king, William, is said to have been castrated, blinded, and sent to a dungeon in the Alps.

It was upon the very next day after the commencement of these horrors—the 26th of December, 1194—that the subject of this memoir, Frederick Roger, destined to become Frederick II., was born at Jesi, in the presence of many witnesses, including no less than fifteen ecclesiastics.

Thus our list of the Popes and our introductory account of the German Kingdom have been put before our readers. It remains next to notice the other portions of the Empire of Charlemagne,

certain other parts of Europe, and the Eastern Empire and its dependencies up to the same date—that is, up to the end of the year 1194.

The parts of Charlemagne's Empire hitherto briefly noticed by us have been Germany, Burgundy and Lotharingia. We have next yet more briefly to consider the Kingdoms of Italy and Karolingia, in order that we may understand the changes which took place in the Empire of Charlemagne between his days and the period of Frederick II.'s birth.

PRINCE BISMARCK'S CONFLICT WITH THE CATHOLIC CHURCH.

*Juravi quoties rediturum ad limina nunquam.
Cum bene juravi, pes tamen ipse redit.*

(Tibull.)

“**L**'HOMME absurde seul ne change pas,” said Guizot, and the maxim has of late years been a favorite apology with Prince Bismarck when taunted by the Liberals and Progressists in the Reichstag for having betrayed them into participation in a political blunder. The Kultur-Kampf had not only checked and paralyzed their own schemes of progress, but what was immeasurably worse, had left the Catholic party far stronger and more triumphant than it had ever been since the granting of the constitution in 1850. And in reality this conflict had consumed the main activity of the Reichstag and both Houses of the Landtag. Few of the members remained idle. Some took up arms because they hated Rome, and this was a battle threatening to crush her. Some fought because they were hostile to every form of religion, and they felt that after all the Catholic Church was the only one still placing an effectual barrier against what they termed “modern culture.” Many simply followed the Chancellor, trusting blindly in his strength. Had he not hitherto been successful beyond all count of hope in every scheme for the security and aggrandizement of Prussia? Could an intruder, a weak old man in bonds, whom when still free the youth Cavour had set himself to challenge long ago—could a pretentious priest supported by a small proscribed faction in the Imperial Parliament inspire any doubt as

to the loyalty of German citizens, Catholics though they be, and the mighty Chancellor be possibly worsted in the effort to crush him who thus offended in his sight? Impossible. And yet these trusty followers might have remembered the time when Napoleon I., in the midst of his victories, sent his legate to Pius VII. with this instruction: "Treat with His Holiness as if he had at his back 100,000 bayonets;" and how, when the French had seen the end, they said: "Qui mange du pape en meurt."

Some men there were, calm and astute as the Premier himself, who knew that this battle against Rome was a perilous venture. But the Chancellor had never found the enemy as yet who would not yield, and he felt confident. When, however, the ancient Majesty of Rome bent forth from her retreat to prove that in her humiliation, as in her glory, she was impervious to blows from steel; when after seven years the iron Chancellor felt that his arm was wearying in beating the air, then he may have remembered how just 30 years before he had declared¹ himself attached to a certain tendency, then characterized as dark and mediæval. "I am of the opinion," he had said on that occasion, "that the idea of Christian supremacy is as ancient as the 'Ci-devant' Holy Roman Empire—that it is in fact the very soil in which the great family of European States have taken root. If we withdraw this basis from our state, its legislation could no longer recreate itself from the original fountain of eternal truth, but from the vague and mutable ideas of those who occupy the apex."

It would seem as if he had recalled these sentiments when in 1878 he first turned toward Canossa. His journey thither has in truth been slow and with reluctant air, somewhat in the graceful fashion that becomes a prince in modern times, and now and then incognito. Yet his destiny has led him there withal, and in no other sense than that in which he so indignantly repudiated the idea in 1872.

We propose to review this struggle, the end of which is manifestly drawing near. In it there is but little wholly new. It is the unvarying and everlasting repetition of Rome of the Cæsars against Rome of the Catacombs. But like the lessons of nature pointing to eternity, forever seen yet ever impressive, so are the phases of these struggles inexhaustible in what they teach the student of history and us who walk by his lights. Thus whilst the triumphs of our Holy Church give cause for gratitude, they whose duty it is to war with light against darkness, they who strive for freedom of conscience against the absolutism of a bigoted infidelity, find much to learn in her warfare with the powers of Hell.

¹ In the famous Jews Debate, 15th June, 1847. See *Life of Bismarck*, by G. L. Heseckiel, 1870.

The world is indeed very forgetful. And they that lead her movements can in the strength of their manhood or the pride of their knowing hardly realize that they are being led, sometimes at the hands of children or of fools, but always under the guiding providence of God. Success is rarely a measure of real progress, since the day on the Mount when the Kingdom of heaven was promised to the lowly. Yet who of us does not make success the gauge of our winnings, the base on which to rest our giant speculations, so sure to fall because in their construction we ignored the one great law of resistance.

When, therefore, Prince Bismarck, intoxicated with his success, ill advised by the signs of the times, which alone fail when applied to the Eternal Church, began to lay his iron rules upon the conscience of his Catholic subjects, he had no suspicion of what the end would be. There was, indeed, no misunderstanding about the fact that this was a fight against Rome.

About three years ago, when things had come to such a pass that the Chancellor felt he must give to the world some justification of his motives for the legislation of 1873-75, an official collection of the acts relative to the Kultur-Kampf was published¹ under the sanction of the Government. In this publication great stress was laid upon the fact that the Government had been forced into this conflict, and that there had throughout never been any intention to coerce the Catholic Church into a position unworthy of her importance. The *Civiltà Cattolica*, of whose relation to the curia the Prussian Government could have no doubt, had, some months before the beginning of the Vatican Council, announced that, besides the promulgation of the syllabus, the doctrine of Papal infallibility was to be declared as a dogma of faith, binding upon the consciences of Catholics. The ostensibly Catholic Governments of France, Austria, and Bavaria were the first to sound the alarm. The French Minister of State, Count Daru, thought it incumbent upon him to call the attention of the Holy Father to the fact that this declaration of Papal infallibility would prove subversive of all principles of the civil, political, and scientific order of things, and establish an undoubted antagonism between conscience and civil authority. How absurd this assumption was, even in theory, was soon shown, among others, by Cardinal Newman in his reply to Mr. Gladstone's Expostulations. Theology is indeed a subtle science requiring a fixed focus to see by. Looking over the whole range of controversy against Catholicity, we find that the bitterest of its antagonists began by making themselves a manikin of straw, then rightly termed it an untruth, an

¹ The Catholics pointed out at once the insincerities of this publication by publishing a counter-history, supplying all the intentional omissions in the official documents.

enemy to truth, and with Quixotic indignation set about to demolish it—the fools applauding.

Whether Prince Bismarck really feared the infallibility or not, it is difficult to say. The attitude of the so-called Catholic Governments did certainly not remain without its influence upon him. Nevertheless, we know that Count von Arnim, the then ambassador to the Holy See, assured the Chancellor in a dispatch, previous to the opening of the Council, that this declaration of the Papal infallibility was nothing more than a mere idle dispute in theology, without influence upon the allegiance of Catholics to their civil rulers.¹

It is not likely that Prince Bismarck entered into the real merits of the question at all. But he was jealous and suspicious of foreign influence, not only from beyond the Alps, but from conquered France. This fear was soon strengthened, as we see from official communications of that time, by the election of President McMahon to the Government of France. The latter's outspoken leaning in favor of the Holy See was quite sufficient of itself to kindle a hatred against Rome. If the Catholics in Germany could be induced to accept a sort of national church of their own, independent of Rome and under the protectorate of the Emperor, then he might rest in peace about the influence of France or even Austria. But Rome was the connecting link. The blow must then be struck at her.

When, therefore, Dr. Döllinger and the noisy protests of the so-called Old-Catholics justified the assumption that, if encouragement were given to the masses of German Catholics, they might resist the "new doctrine," and thus bring about a separation in sympathy from Rome, Prince Bismarck sounded the battle-cry.

His first step was to deprive the Roman Catholics of all moral support, and to strengthen, by every possible protection and material advantage, the position of the Old-Catholic party. As a preliminary measure, the Catholic Department in the Ministry of Public Worship was abolished; which meant that Roman Catholics should have no redress against the Old-Catholics, who claimed possession of the ecclesiastical property wherever they constituted a quorum, and did not hesitate to appeal to the civil courts in their own behalf.

Practical tests of such nature soon presented themselves as could easily be handled in a way to make Roman Catholics appear as the aggressive party. A priest and religious instructor at the Catholic Gymnasium in Braunsberg refused to accept, and therefore to teach, the dogma of Papal infallibility. His bishop found himself constrained to deprive him of his faculties, and when

¹ See *Geschichte des Kultur-Kampfes in Preussen*, Dispatch, 9th April, 1869.

in spite of this the priest continued to exercise the functions of the *missio canonica*, the ordinary put him under censure of excommunication. It must be remembered here that clerical appointments at that time were made on presentation, on the part of the bishop, by the civil authorities. Catholic institutions of learning stood under state control, and the professors, though priests, or religious, were in a manner looked upon as state officers. As the government authorities ignored the excommunication in the above case, the silenced priest continued in office, with this effect, however, that the Catholic students refused to be present at his instructions. Now came the difficulty. The Minister of Public Instruction thought it his duty to uphold the authority of the civil officer by compelling the students to attend the religious doctrine class, which was an obligatory branch of study for all students matriculated under a certain denomination. Next the bishop was requested to make a public recantation of the censure. He replied that the institution was chartered as a Roman Catholic College, that the Catholic doctrine was expected to be taught there by its priests, and that it was for the ecclesiastical and not the civil authorities to determine what was Catholic doctrine.

Difficulties such as these soon brought a large number of the clergy and bishops under sentence *in contumaciam*. The new school-supervision law was the next paragraph of the coercive legislation. Meanwhile the old Minister of Public Worship had resigned, and Dr. Falk became the idol of the new regime. Whilst unavoidable difficulties were heightened by missteps and suspicions fostered by the anti-Catholic press and by the activity among Catholics, who felt the necessity of equipping themselves for greater struggles, an event occurred which threw the conflict directly into the camp of Rome.

The German Government proposed to appoint as nuncio to the Papal court Cardinal Prince Hohenlohe. The policy was an open secret. The Cardinal, at once a prince of the holy Roman Church and a liege of Germany, was suspected long ere now to be a creature of the state, and, therefore, the proper instrument of the intrigues of Prince Bismarck. Pius IX. simply refused to accept the new nuncio, and as the latter was under his own ecclesiastical jurisdiction, appointed him a domicile. It was on this occasion that Prince Bismarck uttered those memorable words: "To Canossa we shall never go, neither in spirit nor in body."¹

During all this time the action of the Catholics had naturally directed attention to the religious orders, particularly the Jesuits, who, as always on such occasions, were accounted the secret

¹ *Parlamentarische Denkwürdigkeiten*, 14th May, 1872.

springs of all the zeal and prudence in offering a passive resistance which proved far more effective than open opposition could have done. Accordingly, the following month brought the "expulsion law," directed nominally against the Jesuits, but subsequently interpreted as comprising, at the discretion of the Government, any religious community of men within the realm. It sounded like irony when Privy Counsellor Wagener arose to say, in behalf of the Crown, that the latter had no intention of identifying itself with those who, when they cry "Jesuits," mean in reality the Catholic Church.

The following year, 1873, brought the first instalment of what have been called the "May-laws," and to which we shall return presently. Again Prince Bismarck indignantly repudiated the assertion that he was persecuting his Catholic subjects. He was defending them, as he was all Germany, from the personal aggression of the Roman Pontiff.

But the Catholics understood it differently. This was a defence of principles, actual, on their side, and by which they were guarding their liberty of conscience; whilst on the part of the Government it was a case of imaginary injured rights. We have above alluded to the singular activity of the Catholics, who all this time had been preparing to meet the threatening storm. Truly, if ever there was a well-organized body of men that arose in defence of the rights of free citizens and in vindication of the privileges of conscience, it was that body of German Catholics during this time of iron, if not bloody, persecution. And yet can the Government point to a single outrage in all these years; to one disloyal act that denied to Cæsar that which is Cæsar's, whilst it claimed for God the things which are His own?

*Tu quantum ferro, tantum pietate potentes
Stamus.*

Such was their programme from the outset. Our weapons, said Windthorst,¹ when the last of the May-laws had been accepted, are those of passive resistance. We shall never yield to the temptation of violating by any act of ours the laws of social order. For we are convinced that in this alone lies our strength. And when you take from us paragraph after paragraph of the constitution that in former days guaranteed us liberty of conscience, yet one clause of our eternal constitution shall remain untouched: "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it."

When the Catholic Episcopate, on their return from the Vatican Council, addressed their flocks, asking them to be united and to

¹ Parlament. Denkwürdigkeiten, 19th April, 1875.

pray, these with one accord rallied around the common standard. Those that would still pray, they too would be loyal. There was no vague war-cry; no misunderstanding as to the principles involved. The watchmen that held the towers of God's citadel saw that their time was short, that speculation was idle, that waiting for events to point a way might prove disastrous. Besides, the paths of our Holy Church have been marked out these eighteen hundred years. They are the ways of everlasting truth. So they put their hands at once to the plough. They worked and drilled. And how?

The Catholic press, already sufficiently strong to make men on the other side cautious, increased fourfold in number of exponents; increased a hundredfold in strength and efficiency by the tactics it adopted. There were the central organs—commanding voices of the party. These counted each a number of smaller organs in its immediate wake, sometimes published in the same office, and designed to reach separate classes of the Catholic population. Every able pen was pressed into service. The programme was marked out in definite lines for each, at public and private conventions. There were political sheets on a larger scale for the intelligent classes, foremost among them the *Berlin Germania*. From the same office issued the *Schwartze Blatt*, a small political sheet designed to interest the middle classes, to give them the keynote at the elections, to present the intricate movements of the Government in lucid, comprehensive form. In the same house was published the provincial paper meant for the family circle, to instruct the wife and children, and thus to utilize their influence for the common good. In fact, every element of the masses was provided for. They had comic and serio-comic publications with all sorts of captious titles. Then measures were taken for the effectual spread of these papers. In centres of the Catholic population, such as Düsseldorf, we find an organization to promulgate the sale of Catholic newspapers. Every member pledges himself to call for some Catholic paper at the public stands, in hotels, etc., thus creating a demand for the article. Besides this, numberless novels, romances and attractive periodicals dropped into the book-market, no one knew how. But all illustrated one phase or other of the lively struggle impending. Nor was this all. A systematic propaganda took place by means of cheap publications of pamphlets and tracts giving rules of combat, imparting principles of lawful resistance. Thus the serial "compass for the Catholic people," and similar publications in the shape of the *Broschüren-Cyclus*, came into existence. Pocket editions of the May-laws were published, so that every Catholic might be perfectly at home in the matter of his grievances. Add to this the number of pas-

toral instructions which appeared on every occasion from the bishops, even after they had been imprisoned or exiled, and we may form some idea of the services which the Catholic press was made to do in the Kultur-Kampf. The press-bureau became in truth the ticket-office "to Canossa."

Nor could the Government effectually hinder this activity. Opposition had of course been foreseen and was paralyzed ere it might take efficient shape. The Press-laws were very stringent, and the least obnoxious article might give sufficient ground for arrest. But, though the Government had probably increased its censors, there was too much of the offensive matter to cope with. Some things were said so bold that these at once became the norm by which to apply a law, the range of which was practically indefinite. But to the great mass of Catholic journalists these bold sallies were in reality the lightning-rods that kept the storm from hurting them, and thus allowed them to labor in the field unhindered. Moreover, when one publication had been suppressed, ten others would rise in its defence. The Government pursued the policy of gagging the leaders. So the Catholics began to shield these. Majunke, now member of the Reichstag, a priest, and principal editor of the *Germania*, was convicted of offence against the press-laws more than twenty times within three months. Such a man could not be spared to sit idly behind prison walls. So—we are told—the *Germania* Association appointed in his place a modest day-laborer. He had no objection to be responsible for all that might be written in the *Germania* office. He regularly went to prison, and the fines thus saved from the State went to support his poor family, and above all strengthened the courage of the Catholic masses, who admired such honest ingenuity in the interests of liberty of conscience. Thus the Government was defeated in a thousand ways, by the prudence and courage of the Catholic leaders, and by the turn of technicalities in law.

Similar tactics were observed among the Catholic body in Parliament. Not only was it understood that in all matters appertaining to the Church question there could be no division, but each member had, as it were, marked out his special field of defence. There were the members well versed in all questions of antecedents in the ecclesiastical polity of Germany, so as to combat present innovations. There were the experts in canon law, to determine the lines of contact between religious and civil jurisdiction. There were those who at a moment's warning, would cite page and paragraph in the law-code relating to economic and military regulations, where these affected the religious division. Were there any all-too-bold statisticians in the House—these men

at once arose to give them the lie. There was, moreover, a well-understood order in the manner in which each had to strengthen the position of his colleagues. All these men were, in fact, approved combatants, terse speakers, clear heads, and keen to detect in an instant the flaw in the opponent's arguments, men, too, who for the most part had held important posts in the public service where formerly merit had prevailed, and thus they commanded a respectful hearing. The Catholics had quickly learned to send their best men to the House of Representatives. Many a speaker had, during all these years, been listened to with keenest attention, but there was never any time—and this was said by the political enemies of the first leader of the Centre at his grave¹—when all the members kept their breath so completely as when Hermann von Mallinckrodt, who died in the midst of the struggle, would rise, and in his eloquent and altogether superior way, like a prince to the manor bred, leave his adversaries silent and thoughtful for a time. If his was the lofty tone of irresistible truth, swift, on the other hand, like the sword of the Machabee, struck the philippic of Windthorst, the present leader of the party, into the ranks of his opponents. "He is an antagonist," says of him a contemporary by no means friendly to his cause, "before whose wit the boldest deputies tremble, and under whose assaults even the great Chancellor loses his coolness and self-command." Before the annexation of Hanover, Windthorst had been Minister of State, the guiding eye to the blind king of that realm. Since then he has, at times, been accused of aiming at the Imperial portfolio; still, his adversaries hold, undoubtedly sincere and perhaps unconscious of his aim. How a man can aim at a thing without knowing it, must be left for answer to such deep-searching diplomatists as Count Vasili. The old philosophy has it: *nil volitum, etc.*

When, eventually, the May-laws were applied in all their rigor, doubly severe because of the petty intolerance of narrow-minded officials who, in a long military service, had learned to look upon the state as the concretion of all might, and upon its members as parts of a gigantic machinery, Catholics felt constrained to find the full length to which passive resistance, in the ethical sense of the word, might be carried. This made them as intelligently active to evade the force of the unlawful blows as to create in the Government the fear that the whole population, not excluding the religious women, had become Jesuits in disguise. Already the Redemptorist Fathers, the Priests of the Mission, and several other orders had been proscribed under the law of 1872. Now, at least, every Catholic priest had become a disciple of St. Ignatius, to all

¹ See In Memoriam of Mallinckrodt. Collection of comments of the universal press at his death.

intents and purposes of the Government. The gist of the new legislation was that no ecclesiastical jurisdiction could be exercised unless under the previously-obtained sanction of the civil authorities. Heretofore there had, indeed, been a recognized mode of reporting ecclesiastical appointments. But this was understood to be a measure designed merely to insure a right order of things in matters where the religious creed of a citizen came in contact with certain civil obligations. Such were baptisms and marriages, the registering of which before the state determined the rights and duties of school provision, army service, and such privileges as are comprehended under the general term of legal abilities. Catholics had never found difficulties in complying with those requirements. They stood to reason, nay, were in a measure desirable, where Catholics and Protestants lived under a common constitution. But when the state assumed the right to pronounce upon the fitness of a candidate for holy orders by overruling the judgment of an ecclesiastical court; when the Government attempted to force Catholics to accept as pastors men whom they abhorred as heretics and venal creatures of the state, then, indeed, the Catholic hierarchy began to see in state-license a violation of principle.

What was it, after all, that Catholics wanted? The right to pray in their own way, to worship in their own churches, to believe what they were convinced was the divinely-revealed truth; and all this without prejudice to their sworn fealty to the state. No man familiar with life among Catholics can be ignorant of what their faith is to them. With the great world besides, it is, perhaps, a luxury,—at best, a need, to fill some accidental void. But with the Catholic it is the very essence of his life. All else turns thitherward or grows out of it. His joys, his sorrows, nay, his very faults and worldliness receive the impress of that faith. So the last call, as the first, is for the bearer of that faith, his priest. And the latter, conscious of his sacred trust, takes solemn oath on the day when he assumes his holy office, rather to die than fail from earthly fear or love to feed his Master's flocks intrusted to his care. What wonder, then, that priests could not be exiled but by force; that they, whenever there remained an open way, returned to their children to feed them with the bread of life. Many interesting incidents are told in this connection, illustrating at once the individual courage and the thorough unity of the Catholics. In the diocese of Treves a young priest had been appointed to a parish without the consent of the Government. He assumed the charge, said mass, instructed his flock and assisted, as was his duty, the dying. Accordingly, he was successively fined, deprived of his salary, imprisoned, and, as he proved incorrigible, finally exiled. Our good

outlaw, who had forty-eight hours to leave the territory, bade good-bye to his people and went across the border. On the following Sunday the magistrate was startled by the report that the proscribed priest had been in the Church at six o'clock, had before the whole congregation celebrated a *missa cantata*, preached and—was off. The next Sunday the argus-eye of the police was open at five o'clock. Alas, the offender had been there at 2, and all the people had known it except the schoolmaster, who had purposely been kept in ignorance, lest, by being obliged to confess connivance, he might as a public officer be deprived of his salary. But every boy in his school was a sentinel as trusty as the Spartan boy of old. It may seem incredible, and yet the fact is well known, that this priest managed to elude the vigilance of the officials for many a Sunday, worshipping at different hours, now in one place, now in another, of his parish; that the people were always informed, and yet it never reached the ears of the magistrates in such a way as to frustrate these meetings. The priest himself had, of course, a difficult task,—traveling much on foot and at night; now in the guise of a farmer, now in the guise of a Parisian *commis voyageur*. Sometimes the ticket-agent at a distant office would suspect him, and telegraph to the authorities ahead; but our good priest might alight three or four stations before the ticket was due. I believe it was the same priest of whom they tell that on one occasion, when he had already become quite notorious by his frequent incursions, he saw two policemen awaiting him as he neared the station. He had noticed a Catholic gentleman and his lady in the car. So he quickly approached the former, exchanged a few words with him, and then, taking the arm of the lady, politely handed her out of the car, quietly walking away and leaving the eyes of the law to look for the single clerical offender, whom, whatever else they suspected him of, they could not have imagined to be walking in open company with a married lady—such doings were strictly confined to the Old-Catholic party.

All these things heightened the courage of the people and their love for their clergy, who seemed to spare themselves no sacrifice. And when such means as the above failed, when, as was sometimes the case, the aged priest whom the law had still spared, worn unto death with the weary work of traveling from place to place consoling the people, expired at length at the very altar; or when hearing the confessions of thousands that came from far and near at Eastertide, the minions of the law would lay their iron hold upon the hand still feebly lifted in unfinished absolution—then did these Christians gather alone on festive days, as their brethren had done in China and Japan after the martyrdom of Spinola, to sing and pray devoutly that the end might soon draw near—

"Levantes tempore festo
Corpus et ipsum animum spe finis dura ferentem."—*Hor.*

The end was sure to come. Hermann v. Mallinckrodt had in the beginning told his sister, foundress of the prosperous religious community of the Sisters of Christian Charity, that in this conflict they must lose all that was material, and that therefore she would do well to dispose of the property of the community as to the titles, and make likely provisions for her sisters in a foreign land. Yet these men, sure that an overwhelming force would come upon and crush them, never hesitated, looking with steady eye to that further assurance that in the fight for right, above all in the fight for the Catholic faith, the old facts would repeat themselves. That, as Schorlemer-Alst expressed it:¹ The day would surely come when they would lead Prince Bismarck to Canossa, and that with greater courtesy than he had shown to them. "As for us," the valiant officer said, "we are like steel. Strike, and the harder your blows the firmer we shall grow."

But before we come to this period, we should give the reader some brief outline of the legislation that has been characterized as barbarous in the midst of our nineteenth-century civilization.

All that had been done in the matter of legislative innovation previous to May, 1873; may be summed up thus: The Catholic Division in the Ministry had been abolished. A new school-supervision law had been provided. Two clauses had been inserted in the old Constitution, to the effect that the state claimed the right to regulate all matters of education, appointment and dismissal of the clergy, and to determine the limits of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. An imperial decree, moreover, had banished the Jesuits from German territory. As to the two aforesaid clauses, they were, of course, formidable weapons in the hands of a quasi-irresponsible power. Unfortunately, they affected the Protestant church to a far greater extent than had been anticipated or was desirable. Hence it became necessary to enter into details, and to deal separately with the various departments of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Dr. Falk, the new Minister of Public Worship, was intrusted with the preparation of laws able to meet the various emergencies, and to bind effectually the hands of the Catholic hierarchy and priesthood.

Wise according to his generation, he began with the education of the Clergy:

1. Every candidate for holy orders was to submit to a state-examination, including philosophy, history, and German literature. These qualifications had to be obtained in a three years' course at a German University. So far, the law was tolerable enough, but it was further ordained that—

¹ See Parliament. Denkwürdigk. 8th March, 1876.

2. No student attending the University could, at the same time, be a member of an Ecclesiastical Seminary. For the rest—

3. All seminaries, having students who had already completed their university course, were to be, both in matters of discipline and instruction, under the control of state-commissioners.

4. New seminaries could not be erected, nor fresh students received in those already in existence.

On the subject of clerical appointments, the new laws provided that—

1. No appointment could be made to any Ecclesiastical office, unless the candidate be a German citizen. In all cases of appointment, the Government had first to give its formal sanction, and this it might withdraw, even after the appointment had been legally made, within a specified time.

2. New parishes could not be erected without the consent of the state.

The following year brought fresh measures, regulating the confiscation of Church property.

Thus the ranks of the Clergy were soon thinned. Priests could not, as we have seen, refuse the request of dying Catholics for the holy oils or the Viaticum. So they went, and when sick and weary with fatigue and fasts—often unable to find a place where to consecrate the Holy of Holies ere the sun might set; oftener still exhausted by night-travel through unfrequented places—they, at length, pressed the holy unction on the brow of their dying brother-pilgrim, it was only to be seized by the law, to be branded as felons behind heavy bars, or to be sent away from home and kin, to seek in strangers' lands a field whereon to scatter the blessings which, in their own fatherland, men accounted crimes.

An offer was made to the people to elect their clergy. They would not listen to it. "If we have a king, 'by grace of God,' " they said, "surely we cannot make priests to ourselves by grace of man."

As the Jesuits were gone, the bishops were now made responsible for all the present mischief. Their income, and that of the Canonical Clergy, was withheld by what might aptly be called the starvation-law. It failed in its desired effect so far as it increased the zeal of the Catholics, who, whilst they had hitherto looked upon their clergy as heroes, now began to regard them in the light of martyrs, and their charity poured forth in undiminishing flow. The bishops went one after another,—some into exile, some into prison, and some in sorrow to their graves. The remaining Clergy were old, and for the most part infirm, whilst hundreds of parishes were left destitute of pastors. Still, the Catholic Party in Parliament stood as boldly for the ancient prerogatives as they had done on that unforgotten 8th of July, four years

before, when the storm showed its first tokens. Of the religious orders there now only remained those of the Sisters of Charity, under different titles. The last day in May, 1875, brought a new law, ordering the expulsion of these inoffensive women from the German provinces. None were to remain, except such as had actual charge of the sick in hospitals and asylums, and these, too, the law provided, might be dissolved at any moment. Many of these angels of mercy went to distant lands, a loss to their own fatherland. Some, with that swift invention which charity inspires, turned their nurseries and schoolrooms into hospitals, and thus saved their charge from the cruel consequences to which their desertion would have exposed them. And what had these noble women done to become outcasts from their country? They had nursed the wounded soldier on the battlefield of Sadowa, and on the soil of France and Denmark. They had trained the children at home to become thrifty and modest maidens and faithful sons of their country. And now they were sent adrift, without thanks or protection. Verily, the grain has to be crushed ere it can come to resurrection from the earth. But ye, shrewd leaders of the nations, ye who devise with deep-laid policies unending schemes whereby to cast the human heart into the likeness of an iron wheel that turns by fixed, unalterable laws,—ye who take no account of aught in man but the wear and tear of daily friction,—have you never found the need of charity to lay a balm upon some smarting wound in your own hearts? Go, search the laws of our common universe, and learn to rule from Him by whose high grace you call yourselves men's kings and governors. Behold how perfect are the laws to which each plant or shrub yields in its separate realm, and yet how free all action and development! The hardy pine on northern mountain-height, the graceful southern palm—does not the royal sun light both into their full-grown bloom? So does the human heart of high and low, wherever it may beat, warm under charity's glad sun, and grow and ripen into noble powers. Without it, as without religion—its mother, and freedom—its sister, your nations will wither and grow dry, to be consumed at length by the fire that kindles spontaneously within—the flame of anarchy and revolt.

Early in 1878 Pope Pius IX., of blessed memory, died. His successor, our present illustrious Pontiff, Leo XIII., at once opened negotiations with the Emperor. He sincerely desired to secure peace for his Catholic children in Germany, yet the burden of making concessions did not lie with him; he could yield but very little. The Crown Prince replied to the letter of the Holy Father, instead of the Emperor, who was seriously sick. He frankly avowed that, whilst it was not in the power of his Government to solve the ancient difficulty of conflicting principles, the latter was

prepared to adopt all necessary measures in order to come to a peaceful understanding. But where was the basis of this settlement to be found? The Catholic representatives had more than three years before declared that there were but two ways of coming to an agreement. Either by an understanding with the Curia as to the boundary-lines of state jurisdiction, or else by a complete separation of Church and state, on the basis of the United States Constitution. To the former of these means it was objected that it would be going to Canossa; the latter was incompatible with such a system of government as Prussia had.

In the summer of 1879 Minister Falk, the man who had framed and given his name to the obnoxious laws, was removed from office. His successor, Puttkamer, was a man of mild type. In his first address to the deputies he eulogized the historic old Church, a tree of noble growth—still the Government could not compromise itself.

Meanwhile, Prince Bismarck had agreed upon a conference with the Papal nuncio, Masella, at Kissingen, and shortly afterwards with Cardinal Jacobini at Vienna. The result of these meetings was announced by the official organs to have been an agreement of certain concessions of a practical nature on both sides. Rome would recognize the duty of reporting to the Government all clerical appointments, leaving to the latter the right of veto. Germany, on the other hand, would restore her former diplomatic intercourse with Rome.

But the Pope was far too wise to yield so much to a vague promise. He demanded a guarantee of Prussia taking a step in advance of her promises. Prime ministers had proved unscrupulous ere this.

My bashful Huguet—we'll promise it!
And see, the king withholds—Ah, kings are oft
A great convenience to a minister!

Besides, what did the restoration of diplomatic intercourse import? A mere matter of honor; while the duty of reporting allowed the state a certain control in ecclesiastical affairs. Cardinal Jacobini, therefore, replied in a published note, that before Rome could contemplate making any concessions, she would have to insist upon a general revision of the May-laws, upon perfect freedom in the education of the clergy, and the exercise of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The Government asked for a detailed explanation of these demands, and when these were given, suddenly, as if angry at the presumptuous terms, broke off the negotiations.

In 1880 several modifications of the May-laws were introduced purporting to alleviate the grievances of the Catholics. They were not carried into effect, however, partly because Rome did not make any advance by way of grateful acknowledgment, partly

because the Centre absolutely refused to vote in favor of them as involving an admission of former disloyalty on their part. This latter course was characterized by the Government as agitation. Whilst the Centre advocated a radical revision of the Falk laws, they, nevertheless, brought frequent measures into the House, by which specific paragraphs were to be eliminated. This was mainly done to force the Government to action, which, whatever it might be, lay necessarily in the direction of relieving its Catholic subjects. Gradually the correspondence between Germany and the Holy See was resumed. Rome had as yet yielded nothing.

Before the end of 1882 a regularly-accredited ambassador was sent to the Vatican. The same year brought the so-called ultimo law which proved a real alleviation, and was voted for by the Centre.

It did away with the requirement of state-examinations, as the May-laws had prescribed them. It provided with certain restrictions for the recall and maintenance of a number of the bishops and clergy; still it insisted upon the right of controlling ecclesiastical appointments. The action of this law was likewise suspended for a considerable period, since Rome remained still unyielding. Leo XIII. had expressed himself in a letter to the Archbishop of Cologne, that whilst he could not acknowledge the duty to "report in the sense of the May-laws, the Church might, without compromise of principle, permit the appointments of priests to canonical parishes to be registered before the civil authorities. This, it will be noted, would limit the duty of reporting to regular parish priests. The May-laws require the report of every appointment, together with the exercise of veto, and in case of dispute a settlement by the state-tribunal.

Another half year passed, during which the Centre, like the electors in the case of Henry IV., were urging the Chancellor's progress to Canossa.

Early in June, 1883, a new law proposed to limit the duty of reporting to canonical parish priests (6). The right of veto was still there, but difficulties between the ecclesiastical and civil authorities were no longer to be decided by a civil Court of Appeal, but by the Minister of Worship himself. This law provided, moreover, for the maintenance and liberties of a so-called auxiliary clergy. It was the most decided step in advance, yet still insufficient to meet the entire acquiescence of the Catholic Party.

The Holy Father now made his first concession, if so it can be called, in order to relieve the crying miseries of the German Catholics.

It will be remembered that since the beginning of the Kultur-
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Kampf, the newly-ordained clergy were to be subject to the necessity of passing an examination in philosophy, history and German literature. The Government had, in one of the late changes, dispensed with this obligation in the case of the young priests who, during the last nine years, had been forced to study at foreign universities, provided they applied to the Government for a dispensation from said examination. The Holy See now permitted that the young clergy, on their return to Germany, might apply for this dispensation; in this one instance and with the distinct understanding that it did not in any sense imply an acknowledgment of the rights claimed by the May legislation.

At the end of last year, the hearts of the Catholics in the diocese of Limburg were gladdened by the recall from exile of their beloved bishop. It was the first application in this respect of the law of 1882. The world is familiar with the incidents of the visit of the German Crown-Prince to the Holy Father. It requires no comment to illustrate our purpose. It is under God's will a guarantee of what the future will bring to the Catholic Church in Germany.

"Hac ave sunt juncti—parentes
Hac ave sunt facti."—*Ovid.*

The very last day of the old year brought the happy news of the removal of the "starvation law" for the three dioceses of Ermland, Culm and Hildesheim. Of the twelve Prussian dioceses there were now five which had become vacant since the beginning of the Kultur-Kampf. To these the Holy See had made new appointments, and the Government had acknowledged them. The three above-mentioned bishops had been permitted to remain in their Sees, but were deprived of their income, which now was restored to them. A few weeks ago the Bishop of Münster was likewise recalled. There are at present only the two archbishops, Cardinal Ledochowsky, of Posen, and Melchers, of Cologne, who remain still in exile.

Herr Von Gossler, the last Minister of Public Worship, has repeatedly stated that under no condition would the Government recall the two archbishops. It is understood that they are in an especial manner *personæ ingratae*.

In past days the Cardinal had been a most welcome guest to the Royal Court; he had studied with the Emperor at Bonn and enjoyed the highest esteem of His Majesty. Perhaps the Government had relied on the influence of this prelate in the beginning of the conflict. Nothing equals, however, the lofty disdain and princely firmness with which the Cardinal treated the assumptions of the Government. His defiance cost him dear. Within a very short time he was sentenced under various heads to 35,000 marks

fine and nearly seven years' imprisonment. As for the Archbishop of Cologne, who had at one time also been in high favor with the court, it is difficult to understand why he has not been recalled. All the bishops acted with one accord and on precisely the same principles, and should, therefore—as no less a man than Eugene Richter demanded the other day—be all treated alike under the law.

As it is, all the bishops have their hands still tied by numerous clauses in the May-laws, and hence the Centre party are as unyielding as ever in their demands for a thorough organic revision of the legislation since 1871.

Such are the present conditions of the conflict. The Holy See has, as we have seen, changed in no wise its original position. It still asks for a restoration of the *status quo ante*, without leaving aught that might be misconstrued into an acknowledgment of state-control over spiritual jurisdiction. Similar was the issue of the battle between Gregory VII. and Henry IV. Paschall II. not only denied the right of investiture to Henry's successor, but even that of the homagium, a right which, like that of "Report," did not of itself involve a sacrifice of principle on the part of the Church, but could, on account of the attitude of the secular rulers, easily have been construed into and abused as such.

What the issue of this strife in Prussia will be, none familiar with the history of the past can doubt. The present strength of the Catholic section in the Reichstag itself is a guarantee of eventual victory. They are by far the most numerous of any one party in the House, and have more than doubled since the beginning of their difficulties. In matters outside of the religious question they exercise a fairly controlling influence in all Government affairs. Prince Bismarck cannot well do without them now, so they lead him slowly, but no less surely, towards the South. Fifteen years is indeed a long time for so mature a statesman. He had expected to see a new generation grow up, less ultramontane than the one he put in chains. But the sons grew worthy of their sires, and will long remember their tales of courage and victory.

It took two Ministers of Worship to undo the work of one. And lately the cable reports that a cloud hangs over Herr Von Gossler. But even three such useful men shall not save the Premier's consistency, nor ever make the world forget the words of the Iron Chancellor:

"Seien sie ausser Sorge; nach Canossa gehen wir nicht—weder körperlich noch geistig."

THE COMING PLENARY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE.

Concilium Baltimorese Provinciale Primum : habitum Baltimori Anno reparatæ salutis, 1829, Mense Octobri, Baltimori : Ex typis J. D. Toy, 1831. 8vo.

Concilii Plenarii Baltimorensis II., in Ecclesia Metropolitana Baltimorensi, a die vii. ad diem xxi, Octobris. A.D. MDCCCLXVI., habiti. . . . Baltimore, MDCCCLXVIII. 8vo.

Concilios Provinciales, Primer, y Segundo celebrados en la muy noble, y muy leal ciudad de Mexico. . . . En los años de 1555 y. 1565, folio, Mexico, 1769.

Synodo Diocesana que de orden de S.M., celebró el illmo Señor Doctor Don Juan García de Palacios, Obispo de Cuba en Junio de 1684. . . . Habana, 1844. 4to.

Acta et Decreta Sacrorum Conciliorum Recentiorum, Collectio Lacensis, vol. iii. . . . Friburgi Brisgovix, MDCCCLXXV. 4to.

Praxis Synodalis, Manuale Synodi Diocesanae ac Provincialis celebranda. New York, 1883. 12mo.

Notes on the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore. By Rev. S. Smith, D.D. New York, 1872. 12mo.

THE trials, the labors, the hopes and the consolations of the Spouse of Christ are distinctly and authoritatively expressed in the synods and councils which have been held in provinces and countries, or in world-gatherings by the bishops of the Church of God. This has been the case from the first Council of Jerusalem, where the Church, rejoicing in the response of the gentile world to the call of the Apostles, solved the difficulties attending the reception of converts from heathenism into the body of the faithful, at first composed exclusively of children of the house of Israel. The decrees of that council bind, not because they were subsequently recorded under divine inspiration by a disciple of the Apostles, but because they were passed by the body of bishops, whom our Lord had appointed to rule His church, acting in concert and harmony with Peter, who then confirmed his brethren.

As the Church spread, local councils were held, and when the fierce fires of imperial persecution had burnt themselves out in the vain endeavor to crush Catholicity, its agents boasting most loudly of success on the eve of their terrible defeat; then it became possible to hold councils representing not a mere province, nor even the widespread Roman empire, but all the then known habitable

world to which the preaching of the gospel had reached, and which were hence called œcumenical (*οικουμενός*).

The conversion of nations, the rise of religious orders, new devotions, consolations as well as trials, the propagation of erroneous doctrine, contempt of the Church's authority, the hostility of the State, a decline of piety and morality,—all these from time to time called for the action of local or general councils, and the defining of the ever held doctrines of the Church in terms too clear to admit of cavil; or the enactment of disciplinary statutes to maintain the virtue, sacred learning and piety of the clergy, and through them promote the salvation of the flock committed to their care. The dogmatic definition of a council shows not the introduction of a new doctrine, but the condemnation of a new error. Down to the sixteenth century errors of all kinds had been promulgated and condemned, but the personality and attributes of God had not been denied by even the wildest. It is not till the Council of the Vatican, in the nineteenth century, that the Church found it necessary to state authoritatively that there was a God, infinite in all His perfection. No one can pretend that, therefore, the Catholic Church did not believe in God before the nineteenth century; the definition merely proves that after the Council of Trent impiety became bolder than ever, and that errors as to the very existence and attributes of God were put forth, some so insidiously as to seduce, if it were possible, even the elect. So in earlier ages the councils, by their distinct definitions, tell us when errors arose that it was necessary to condemn authoritatively.

The decisions of the general councils, presided over by the Sovereign Pontiff, in person, or represented by his delegates, are irreformable and infallible; the decrees of local councils turn, generally, on discipline, and are of authority when approved by the Holy See. Yet, sometimes, great questions would come before a provincial council, and the decision there made by holy and learned men would be approved by the Sovereign Pontiff and accepted as authoritative by the Church throughout the world, in such a manner that no question in regard to it would arise for centuries. Thus a question as to the canonicity of certain books of Scripture came before a council at Carthage in Africa in 397, and its declaration of what books had always been received as canonical by the Church remained for centuries by tacit consent the official declaration of the Christian Church, eleven centuries confirming and retaining the tradition there expressed. Other particular councils in Africa and Spain, by the importance of their acts, exercised widespread influence. Yet, as a rule, these provincial councils have decided only on discipline, and local concerns of the Church. A Provincial Council is one composed of the bishops of a province,

and presided over by the archbishop; still more important is a Plenary Council, in which the archbishops and bishops of several provinces, and including generally all within the boundaries of a country, meet in session under the presidency of an archbishop or bishop specially commissioned for that purpose by the Pope.

Such councils were frequently held in earlier ages, but on the increase of arbitrary power in the monarchs of Europe, after the revolt of the sixteenth century, they became more and more rare, as the civil power prevented the free action of the Church.

Yet America had provincial councils at an early period. At the commencement of the seventeenth century St. Turibius, Archbishop of Lima, held provincial councils at Lima, the decrees of which were regarded as models even in Italy. In 1625 Peter de Oviedo, Archbishop of St. Domingo, celebrated a synod of this kind, the decrees of which were in force in parts of our present territory of the United States sixty years ago. Still earlier were the provincial councils of Mexico, the first having been celebrated in 1555 by Fr. Alonzo de Montufar, Archbishop of Mexico; the second by the same metropolitan ten years later; a third in 1589 by the Most Rev. Pedro de Moyas y Contreras. The legislation in these synods, duly approved by the Holy See, was in full vigor in Texas, New Mexico and California when those parts were acquired by the United States.

Provincial councils are, therefore, no novelty in the Church or in America, and if we find few celebrated anywhere in the difficult periods of the last century, the young Church of the United States, nursed in earlier days in oppression and penal laws, used the freedom which Providence afforded her to revive these useful and often necessary conventions for the well-being of the whole body. The first Provincial Council of Baltimore, held in 1829, was viewed as the harbinger of a new era, and now the acts of the provincial synods held in the United States and in the British Empire, that is, in lands which in the last century seemed to offer no hope for future extension of Catholicity, when collected, form a solid quarto volume of more than fourteen hundred pages, and are reprinted in Europe for the study and use of bishops in lands where the power and influence of the Church were once paramount. Thus the Church in the United States has led the way in the revival of Provincial and Plenary Councils, and during the last hundred years these assemblies have exerted an influence not discernible in the annals of the two centuries which preceded.

Dr. Carroll, on his elevation to the See of Baltimore, felt the necessity of some definite ecclesiastical regulations for the vast diocese imposed upon his care. It extended from the Atlantic to the Mississippi, from the St. Lawrence and the lakes to the borders

of Florida. In city and country were scattered Catholics, whose numbers no one knew, with only a few priests to meet their wants. The nucleus was the body of Catholics in Maryland and Kentucky, mainly born in the country, who with their ancestors had been for a century governed by the Vicar Apostolic of the London District in England. In that unhappy country there had been no Catholic metropolitan, no sees filled by Catholic bishops from the time of Queen Mary; and of course the enactments of early councils had become obsolete, and no new councils could be held. The Church there, with its branch in America, had been governed under the instructions issued from time to time by the Propaganda. Now that the American portion was separated, much of the temporary code thus formed became inapplicable here, where circumstances were entirely different, and many questions that had distracted the Church in England were unknown.

While the Church in England was homogeneous, made up of men of one race and country, the little Church in America had grown and was growing rapidly by accessions of Catholics from various lands,—from Ireland, from Germany, from France,—the Irish and German immigration coming with few priests, while the French, owing to the revolution which had levelled the throne and the altar, came with a large body of learned, zealous clergy who preferred exile to any compromise with infidelity. Where the Irish formed the bulk of a congregation they began to ask for priests from their own country, but they blended with the Catholics already in the country, and accepted cheerfully and lovingly the ministrations of priests whether Irish, American, English or French. Up to this time the German Catholics in Pennsylvania and elsewhere had mingled with Catholics of other extraction in the churches and missions, special instruction and catechism being given. As demand was made for a distinctly German church in Philadelphia, Bishop Carroll remonstrated in vain, showing the importance of having all Catholics meet in harmony before the same altar and growing up in brotherhood. He yielded reluctantly, and the Church of the Holy Trinity was begun. His forebodings were soon fulfilled. Led by a conventual friar named Reuter, this congregation denied his authority as bishop, claiming that he was bishop only for the English-speaking of the faithful, but had no jurisdiction over Germans. When he visited Philadelphia, in the hope of arresting this dangerous schism, he was arrested and compelled to sit in court and listen to the abuse on everything Catholic poured out by the lawyer of the rebellious church. His authority was ultimately recognized; but Reuter was undaunted and renewed the schismatic effort in Baltimore

itself, where the case came before the courts of Maryland, which upheld Catholic discipline.

But the great Archbishop Carroll looked to the future of Catholicity, and labored for it. His Catholicity was cramped by no narrow nationalism. On the twenty-seventh of October, 1791, twenty priests, English, Irish, American, German, French, met with the bishop in synod. Statutes were then adopted as to baptism under condition; the age for confirmation; the celebration of mass with proper respect and all possible neatness in the place; collections of money and their application; the wearing of the cassock; the catechizing of the young; the sacraments of penance; extreme unction and matrimony, adopting in regard to the last a decree of a Council of Lima; on the Divine Office and holidays of obligation; on the life of the clergy and their support, and on the refusal of Christian burial to all who had neglected to receive communion at Easter.

When the See of Baltimore became archiepiscopal, and the immense diocese was divided, New York, Boston, Philadelphia and Bardstown having been created, one of the earliest desires of the archbishop was to be able to convene his suffragans in a provincial council.

Obstacles arose. No council was held; but in 1810 the venerable Archbishop, with the Bishops of Philadelphia, Boston and Bardstown, and the Coadjutor of Baltimore drew up and signed ten articles of ecclesiastical discipline. These referred to the powers of priests on the borders of dioceses; to the removal of regulars by their superiors from charges having cure of souls, without the knowledge of the bishop; the Douay Bible; Parish Registers; baptism; sponsors; offerings for masses; on the necessity of celebrating masses in the church; theatres, balls, light reading; on the renunciation of freemasonry to be required before a member of a lodge can be admitted to the Sacraments.

As the Church grew, and new dioceses were formed, the desire for a Provincial Council was more and more felt. It engaged the attention of the Archbishop and Bishops here, and of the Sovereign Pontiffs, Pius VII. having issued a brief in regard to one, August 3d, 1823, and Leo XII. another in August, 1828. Archbishop Maréchal drew up the scheme for a council, which his successor, the Most Rev. James Whitfield, submitted to Pope Pius VIII. When this had been approved and authority given, Archbishop Whitfield, in the month of December, 1828, issued letters convoking the bishops of the province to meet in Provincial Council at Baltimore on the first of October, 1829.

The United States, as recognized by the Treaty of 1783, formed the original diocese of Baltimore, and the actual province of that

name; but the republic had subsequently acquired the Spanish colonies of Louisiana and the Floridas. These had formed part of the diocese of Santiago de Cuba, and as such were governed by a Bishop Auxiliary, until in 1793 they were constituted a distinct diocese. As the diocese and province of Baltimore had been guided by the Statutes of the Synod of 1791, so this diocese had its code of local ecclesiastical law in the acts of the Synod of Santiago de Cuba, held in June, 1684, by Dr. Juan Garcia de Palacios, Bishop of Santiago, which were renewed by successive bishops, and are in force to this day in Cuba, their wisdom being universally recognized. A portion of its enactments applies directly to Florida and to the Indian missions on the continent, a restricted list of holidays and fasts of obligation being framed for the Indians.

The original diocese of Louisiana had in time been divided, and there were sees at New Orleans, St. Louis and Mobile, originally suffragans of St. Domingo or of Santiago de Cuba, but subsequently made exempt. At the time of the summoning of the Council the see of New Orleans was vacant, but as it was eminently desirable that the bishops of the whole country should take part in the deliberations of the coming council, the bishops of St. Louis and Mobile were invited. Bishop Portier, of Mobile, was in Europe, but Dr. Rosati, Bishop of St. Louis and administrator of New Orleans, attended, "*salvis cæteroquin suis privilegiis.*" This first council was, therefore, if not in name, yet in fact plenary.

The first Council of Baltimore was composed of Archbishop Whitfield, and of Bishops Flaget, of Bardstown, England, of Charleston, Fenwick, of Cincinnati, Fenwick, of Boston, the Very Rev. William Matthews, Administrator of Philadelphia, and of Bishop Rosati. The sessions were held and the whole proceedings conducted in strict conformity to the rules and usage of provincial councils.

The decrees met difficulties that had arisen. The claim set up in several places by lay trustees that they had a right of patronatus was distinctly and positively condemned, and any priest favoring such usurpation was to be suspended. The duty of a priest to accept any mission assigned him by his bishop, where the income sufficed for a decent support, was inculcated. The power of the bishop to transfer clergymen from one mission to another was distinctly stated. Decrees directed the due administration of sacraments, and strict adhesion to the Roman Ritual was enjoined, as well as the becoming arrangement and care of churches, and altars for the decent offering of the Holy Sacrifice, and performance of the public offices of the Church.

The regulations of 1810, clearly pointed out the danger to be apprehended from secret societies; and condemned all Catholics

who entered lodges of Freemasons. So great, however, was the odium excited in the United States, about this time, against the Masonic body, growing out of the Morgan affair, that no distinct action on the point appeared necessary in 1829.

Decrees were passed for maintaining the use of the Douay Bible, and for prohibiting the using of prayer-books and catechisms except by due episcopal authority, and for the preparation of school books suited to Catholic schools, those then current in the country being to a very great extent so leavened with ignorant and malicious misrepresentations of Catholic doctrine and life as to be a standing insult to the faithful.

Steps were also taken for the establishment of a society for the diffusion of Catholic books. The necessity of Catholic schools for the preservation of the young, especially of the poorer members of the flock, from the insidious proselytism which seems to be the very life-breath of Protestants, is clearly laid down.

The regulations for the life, dress and conduct of the clergy were adapted to the condition of the Church at the time.

Some of the questions brought before the first Council of Baltimore are still in an unsettled state, and although a series of provincial councils was held at Baltimore, with several councils in New York, Cincinnati, New Orleans, St. Louis, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Oregon, will come before a future plenary council for decisive action.

The tenure of ecclesiastical property is one of great difficulty owing to the great number of States, each with a legislature constantly making changes in the statutes, and all subject to be swayed at times by the sudden evolution of anti-Catholic fanaticism. Thus in several States there are laws in force intended avowedly to hamper and cripple the action of the Catholic Church and molest as far as can be done the Catholic citizens in the enjoyment of the property which they have set apart for the worship of Almighty God. No other denomination has ever been made in this way a subject of state persecution.

The old trustee-system was an outcome of this spirit. It sought to force on the Catholic Church a Protestant method without any of the safeguards which Protestant churches enjoyed. With them the congregation does not control absolutely; the real power is in the hands of the church members, a comparatively small number, of persons of both sexes, whose correct life, zeal for religion, fidelity to the ordinances of the sect, assure their zeal and hearty interest in the well-being of the church. In the system forced on Catholics, women were excluded from voting even when owners of pews, while every man who could hire a seat the day of the election, who never attended the services or approached the sacraments,

could vote for trustees; and the trustees chosen by such men claimed the right to nominate the pastor, fix his salary, determine what was necessary for the due celebration of the mass; mortgage or sell the church as they chose. In such men the schismatic Reuter found ready tools, as did Hogan and others in Philadelphia, New York, Norfolk, Charleston, New Orleans.

Some points have been gained. The absurd claim of patronatus is absolutely settled; and the powers of trustees, where the bodies exist under the old form, are confined within due limits; but the tenure of church property itself is still to some extent unsettled. After boards of trustees had in some places plunged churches into bankruptcy, it became the rule in many dioceses to have all church property held in the name of the bishop individually. This was made the pretext for popular outcry, and lists were paraded of the immense property in the hands of Catholic bishops. Ere long acts were passed to prevent a Catholic bishop from being a corporation sole, or to vest in congregations any church property held by a bishop. This led to a course adopted in several States, under which each congregation is incorporated as a distinct body, the board of trustees being composed of the bishop, with some diocesan official, the pastor of the church, and some lay trustees selected for their piety, knowledge, and ability. The system is, perhaps, the best yet devised, yet in actual practice the bishop takes little active part, the lay trustees are treated as mere supernumeraries, and the pastor of the church acts without control; and cases are not wanting where, from lack of financial and business ability, a priest has plunged a congregation into a sea of debt from which it finds no means of emerging, while the one who incurred the debt, on being removed to some other mission, departs without concern, and leaves the victims of his errors to extricate themselves as they can.

When property, diocesan or parochial, is vested in the bishop solely, other questions arise. A State like Pennsylvania may declare that he shall never be deemed a corporation sole, yet where the rights, or supposed rights, of third parties are concerned, courts will, in the very teeth of statute law, hold him to be one, and to be responsible for contracts made with his predecessors. In Ohio, where the late Archbishop Purcell assumed the debts incurred by his brother and Vicar-general, who had taken immense sums of money on deposit, several questions came up as to the legal position of a Catholic bishop, and the property held by him. The court, after a long trial and serious deliberation, decided, with an equity that commands respect, that he must be considered as a trustee for diocesan property, and as a distinct trustee for each parish church of which he held the title, and that these different trusts could not

be confounded. As trustee for a specified church, he was liable to the extent of its property only, for debts incurred for its erection and maintenance, and not for any diocesan debt, or the debt of any other church; and that as trustee for the diocesan property, he was liable for all debts incurred by him as bishop, and that the diocesan property only was liable for such debts.

The long and keen discussion in the civil courts of the position of a Catholic bishop in regard to the property of the Church, evidently calls for decrees in a future plenary council, that will, as far as possible, give the position assigned to him by canon law, and the discipline of the Catholic Church, so clearly as to prevent much litigation that is now inevitable.

In the first Provincial Council of Baltimore, Roger B. Taney, John Scott, and William B. Read, eminent lawyers to whom several questions in regard to Church property had been submitted, were admitted to the council in the ninth public session and gave their opinion, with such explanations as were required. The wisdom of the course, both as a testimony to the people of the country at large, of the desire of the Catholic Church to be in harmony with all sound and just laws, and as a means of preventing many future appeals to the civil courts in such matters, will justify in the future the adoption of a similarly wise course.

Indeed, in view of the increasing litigation regarding the bishops, clergy, and property of the Church, it may not be unwise to arrange for the formation of a body of counsellors, eminent lawyers in different parts of the country, to whom, or some of whom, such cases should in the first instance be confided. It is more easy to have a sound decision in a lower court, affirmed on appeal, than to have an unsound one reversed.

While the First Council of Baltimore declared, once and for all, that trustees had no *jus patronatus*, rules for the execution of their duties in their just sphere were enacted in the Third Council of New York, decree 7; the second Plenary Council of Baltimore, Title 4; Third Council of Cincinnati, decree 4. The subject of the tenure of Church property was regulated by the First Council of Baltimore, decree 5; Third Baltimore, decree 4; Fourth Baltimore, decree 8; and by a decree of the Sacred Congregation *de Propaganda Fide*, Dec. 15, 1840.

The matter of debts incurred which are a charge on such property has been treated only incidentally; the First Council of Cincinnati, decree 11, discountenancing positively and forbidding the taking of money on deposit by any priest in the name of his parish without special sanction; but, as is too well known, it was precisely there where the neglect of this wise precaution led to most disastrous and irreparable evils. It will be for future Coun-

cils to limit by strict and precise rules or prohibit entirely this system of taking deposits of money on interest, by which a church or clergyman becomes to a certain extent a savings bank, without any guarantee of business and financial experience. As no reports of the condition of such quasi banks are made annually to any authority in Church or State, such as real banks are required to make yearly under oath, the affair goes on unchecked till a disastrous result spreads wide ruin and excites general comment.

The same state of affairs exists in regard to churches, and more especially to religious communities, which are under still less episcopal control, but which may be really and absolutely bankrupt, with no power to prevent their plunging deeper and deeper into financial ruin. Questions as to debts incurred or property held by priests arise, which need definite rules. A synod of San Francisco has taken a wise step in drawing the line between a priest's personal and official ownership and responsibility.

The great question of secret societies has, since the meeting of the First Council of Baltimore, taken a new form. Then the Morgan excitement had turned public opinion so strongly against the Freemasons, that many lodges disbanded, public display was abandoned for years, and everything was carried on in the most quiet and unobtrusive manner. Gradually, however, the odium died away, favor was regained, and Freemasonry not only from this country honeycombed all Spanish and Portuguese America, but regained an immense influence in the United States. Success in business, in politics, in army or navy, was to be won mainly by Masonic aid. Other bodies of a similar constitution arose, like the Odd Fellows. The Temperance movement ultimately took the shape of a secret society, The Sons of Temperance. Besides, by the general condemnation in the Fourth Council of Baltimore on account of secrecy, these have been specifically condemned (First New Orleans, decree 10; Second Plenary, Title 12, decree 511-514; First San Francisco, decree 10). And it was also especially provided that no member of a secret society should be allowed to become trustee of any Church (Third Council of New York, decree 7; Third Cincinnati, decree 4; Second Plenary, Title 4). Nor sponsor in baptism (First San Francisco, decree 4). The rivalry excited led the Freemasons to new steps to make their sect more attractive. They assumed more directly the character of a religious sect; they had their forms of baptism, confirmation, marriage and burial, performing the ceremonies they instituted with great pomp, so as to win and impress the weak-minded. But a still more powerful attraction was the establishment in the lodges of a system of coöperative life insurance, by which in case of death assessments were made on all who joined the project, to pay the

amount insured. As the payment thus required was far less than the premiums demanded by ordinary life insurance companies, many became Freemasons in order to be able to insure with them. Other secret associations adopted the same system, and out of this grew mutual insurance coöperative associations which took the form of secret societies, but which, from the low rate at which insurance was given, became very popular.

The question arose whether Catholics could or could not avail themselves of the advantage thus afforded. Some regarded the oath of secrecy as only similar to that taken by directors of banks, etc., a mere pledge not to make known the private affairs of the organization, others as an element which brought the whole system within the condemnation of the Church. (Fourth Council of Baltimore, decree 7.)

The Ancient Order of Hibernians, as represented to the heads of some dioceses, seemed free from what entailed condemnation, while in adjacent dioceses it was deemed clearly unlawful for Catholics, and more or less implicated in deeds of violence. Secret political associations aiming at civil revolution, and employing criminal acts, were clearly condemned, but questions arose as to organizations like the Grand Army of the Republic.

The whole subject has thus, from its manifold ramifications, become one of increasing difficulty to treat with sound and impartial justice. A meeting of the Episcopate of the whole country will tend greatly to bring about some plan, by which in future a uniform decision as to these frequently recurring questions may be attained, such as that of a permanent committee of bishops and theologians, to whom it may be referred from time to time to investigate the facts in regard to each association, and give a decision, to be communicated to all the bishops in the country for their approval and acceptance.

The Constitution of the Church in this country is traced in the councils. The appointment of bishops in the United States is a peculiar one, adopted more from force of circumstances than from any general rule observed at any time in the Church. For the election of the first bishop of Baltimore, the clergy asked and obtained the power to make the selection of the candidate to be proposed to the Sovereign Pontiff. Providence guided their choice and the Rev. John Carroll, whom Pius VI. would have selected himself, felt all the strength imparted by the knowledge that he was the choice of the clergy in the country. When his diocese was divided, a claim that the interests of the Irish were neglected gave the Bishops of Ireland an influence in the nomination of candidates, and through their nomination Drs. Concanen and Connolly were appointed to New York, Conwell to Philadelphia, Kelly to Rich-

mond, and England to Charleston. The last shed lustre on the episcopate and Church in the United States, and exerted an influence which has not yet disappeared. But the other appointments drew on the Bishops themselves trials and crosses, and chilled the very life of the Church they were intended to foster. A decree of the Propaganda, March 18th, 1834, established a plan by which in case of a vacancy the bishops of the province were to nominate three priests to the Pope. This was to be done in a Provincial Council, in case one was to be held within three months after the death of the bishop of the vacant see. Each bishop was, moreover, to leave under seal the names of three priests whom he deemed most worthy to succeed him. This list was to be transmitted to the archbishop of the province after his death. Both lists were to be forwarded to Rome. By the 6th decree of the 1st Plenary Council, renewed in the 6th decree of the 8th Provincial Council of Baltimore, each bishop was urged to appoint ten or twelve councillors, not all to be consulted on every matter, but who all, in case of his death, were to forward to the Archbishop of the Province a list of those whom they deemed most worthy of the mitre. The decree of August 10th, 1850, required the archbishop or senior bishop of the province to notify the other archbishops of the country of every episcopal nomination forwarded to Rome.

In 1859 the Cardinal Prefect of the Propaganda consulted the Archbishops and Bishops of the United States in regard to any change that they might deem advisable in the mode of selecting nominees for vacant sees; and guided by their replies renewed the decrees of June 14th, 1834, and August 10th, 1850, but in addition required every bishop to send to Rome once in three years, the names of priests deemed fit for the episcopate; when a vacancy occurred the bishops of the province were to meet in synod or otherwise, and discuss the qualities of those to be recommended.

The system which obtains in Ireland, where the parish priests as well as the bishops of the province select three candidates, has found likewise advocates here, and is likely to be urged in the future.

The method of securing to bishops a due and equitable salary engaged the attention of fathers from all parts of the Union. In the first Council of Cincinnati a request was made for a uniform system throughout the whole country. In earlier times the bishop depended on the church selected as his cathedral, and was often at the mercy of a board of trustees who could and sometimes did deprive him of a salary. The prevailing system, by which a cathedralicum is paid to the archbishop or bishop of the diocese by each parish, seems to meet general approval.

Since the United States is still regarded as a missionary country,

no parishes have been canonically established, and those established under French or Spanish law, as at St. Augustine, Pensacola, Mobile, New Orleans, St. Louis, Kaskaskia, Detroit, Vincennes, etc., seem to have lapsed in most cases. The clergy in charge of the missions are not, therefore, parish priests; they are ordained *sub titulo missionis*, and take an oath of obedience to the bishop, who appoints or removes them at his discretion. (First Council of Baltimore, decrees 1, 6; Fourth Baltimore, decree 2; Third New York, decree 7; Second Plenary, Title 3, ch. 4.)

The time is coming, as all feel, when regular parishes must be instituted, with parish priests unremovable except for cause and after trial. Yet in this country, where building of churches and schools, as well as their maintenance and the reduction of debts, devolves in a great measure on the pastor, the bishop must have power to remove a priest who is not able to manage affairs for the good of the parish. A priest may have learning and piety and be of unimpeached morality, and still be one who will bring the church to ruin. In a case which came into the civil courts in Pennsylvania, the priest had so mismanaged the finances that the bishop was forced to advance money in order to save the church from being sold; yet the priest contested the right of the bishop to remove him. In Michigan a priest, who had so little skill in managing affairs that he failed to obtain enough to meet his salary, where other priests had done so, sued the bishop. The Second Plenary Council, while reiterating the declaration that the bishop has the right to deprive any priest of his position or remove him to another, exhorts bishops not to exercise this right except for grave reasons and a full consideration of the incumbent's claims. There has been in recent years a great increase in the number of cases where priests, deeming themselves aggrieved, have appealed to Rome, or sought redress in the civil courts of the State, often resulting in long litigation and great expense.

Inferior tribunals and judges with more bias against the church than sound legal principle, have given the wildest decisions. In one case an appointment to a church was held to give a vested life interest in all the receipts from pew rents, collections, etc., of which the bishop could not deprive a priest; in another, a priest, absent for years from a diocese, was held entitled to a salary from a subsequently appointed bishop who had never known him as a priest of his diocese; in another case a priest who was so ill adapted for mission work that people grew indifferent, and the church dwindled away, sued his bishop for his salary, which, through his own incompetence, his parish no longer produced. The frequency of suspensions, of appeals to Rome, the number of priests no longer possessing faculties, but roaming from place to place, has caused

serious and earnest deliberation. An instruction from the Propaganda directed the appointment in each diocese of *Judices Causarum*, a body not exactly judicial, but which was intended to investigate charges against clergymen, and prepare the whole case for the bishop's decision. In practice it proved inadequate, and the interpretation of various clauses has been continually sought by the prelates in this country.¹

At the same time a step toward the real parish priest was made by the creation of the Missionary Rector, as in England.

Whenever cases have arisen, there seems a want of a clear code, defining rights, powers, duties, and obligations, with the distinctness of the Code Napoleon; with classification of the clergy in grades; regulations as to the appointment to each; a distinct statement of offences, and the punishment for each on conviction by a recognized tribunal, in suspension, loss of grade for a longer or shorter period, providing for appointment to inferior positions after a specified period spent in some religious house. If it were possible to lay down all this clearly and distinctly, much of the confusion, delay, and uncertainty which now environ every case that comes before the courts would disappear. At present nothing can be more confused or confusing than the opinions of those summoned as canonists to apply the canons of the Church, as understood in other times and countries, to the affairs of the Church in this country at the present time; canons based on a condition of affairs where churches were already built and endowed, the clergy paid by tithes, and the duties clear and limited, but which can apply here in many cases only by analogy.

Priests, as financial agents of the parishes, have often most reluctantly, against their better judgment, had recourse to fairs, picnics, excursions, and the like, in order to raise money to build churches or schools, or relieve them from debt. The Second Plenary (Tit. vii., ch. 2) shows the desire of the Church for their suppression; yet the steps taken have not hitherto checked the perils of soul and body which attend them.

Organizations for the production and diffusion of good books have from time to time engaged the serious thoughts of the hierarchy, and associations, like the Metropolitan Press, in Baltimore, the Catholic Publication Society, in New York, and a similar project in Cincinnati, were started, but did not meet with the anticipated success, and the concern in each case passed into private hands. Yet the necessity of some great Catholic book concern is deeply felt, as well as means to preserve youth, as far as possible,

¹ The first step towards a formal trial of charges against a priest appears in 1st Council of St. Louis, Dec. 6; this was followed by the action of the 2d Plenary and 10th Baltimore.

from the flood of demoralizing and destructive reading which is made so accessible and so tempting to them. (Second San Francisco, decree 4.)

The support and maintenance of Catholic schools is, of course, one means, but does not fully meet all the requirements of the want. The growth of the parochial schools has been great, and the expense thus assumed by Catholics, at the behest of conscience, is enormous; councils have constantly given this subject their care and encouragement (1st Council of Baltimore; 4th Baltimore; 2d Plenary; 1st New York; 2d Cincinnati). In some dioceses a step has been taken to give these schools uniformity in the method of teaching, the grading of classes, the text-books to be used. In the diocese of Fort Wayne a regular board of directors controls all the schools, producing uniformity in class-books, grades and mode of teaching, and some such system, with a superintendent, seems to be imperatively demanded everywhere, that the resources so nobly supplied by our people may effect the greatest possible good in training the young to be the soundly instructed Catholic population of the land.

The growing facility of divorce by State authority in the United States increases the danger of Catholics being drawn into a more frequent recourse to that shameful system. Hitherto, the cases among Catholics have been very rare. The Second Plenary Council of Baltimore distinctly condemned all who attempted to free themselves in this way from the bond of matrimony, and in case of either party re-marrying, the offender is declared excommunicated. (Fifth Council of Baltimore, decree 3.) The difficulty is increased by the fact that, in some states, a restoration of the matrimonial tie after a divorce is not allowed by law, so that no reconciliation is recognized by the State, and future children will be illegitimate. The repentant Catholic who, after a State divorce, re-marries, cannot, by law, discard the new partner, nor return to the one to whom he or she is still bound by the laws of God. Clearer and more definite instruction seems required to show the careless the manifold dangers which disobedience will entail.

The recruiting of the clergy by means of theological seminaries has been the constant care of the bishops from the day when Bishop Carroll, soon after his appointment, obtained the aid of the Sulpicians (see Second Council of Baltimore, Second Plenary, First Cincinnati); the American College at Rome, created by the Venerable Pope Pius IX., has been fostered (Eighth Baltimore, First New Orleans), and a movement is now made to create a university for still higher training of the clergy. This question is likely to be discussed by the bishops of the whole country.

Whoever looks back at the condition of the Church in the

United States when the first Provincial Council was held fifty-five years ago, can understand how much of the real progress of the Church is due to the decrees of the Councils. The decrees were not always peremptory laws, harsh and unyielding, they were expressions rather of the desire of the Sovereign Pontiff and the bishops to whom Providence had committed this portion of the vineyard of the Lord. Some might slight or overlook the paternal admonitions, but many endeavored in all sincerity to carry out the wise counsels, and every effort was a gain in the right direction. The nucleus of the Church in this country was a little body brought up in the days of penal laws amid a hostile population who viewed them with hereditary distrust and suspicion. Their churches, except in a few instances, were mere extensions of private houses. The services of the church were limited to low masses, even vespers and the benediction of the Blessed Sacrament were rare; without a bishop in the whole land, all the more imposing ceremonials, even the most common episcopal acts were unknown. The first great mass of immigrant Catholics came from Ireland, where, though there was a hierarchy, the weight of the penal laws still prevented much outward manifestation of Catholic life. Opportunities of approaching the sacraments were rare, and the frequentation of them uncommon. Sodalities, and other means of cultivating and maintaining piety, were few, and there was little diffusion of books from which people could understand and appreciate the sublime character of the Catholic liturgy, or the richness of grace of which the Church was the manifold channel. The First Council of Baltimore was held immediately after the schisms in the churches in Philadelphia, which in themselves showed that those who there raised the standard of rebellion were utterly unconcious and ignorant of the supernatural character of the church, and of her ministry, liturgy, and sacraments. Their principles were utterly Protestant, not Catholic; and they were unconsciously Protestants who supposed themselves Catholics. Their ideas never rose above the mere human level; in their unconsciousness of the supernatural, they wished a church conducted like a bank or any other mere human company. The First Council of Baltimore was in itself a vast stride forward, and each succeeding Council, as they followed in Baltimore, New York, Cincinnati, St. Louis, New Orleans, Oregon, and San Francisco, helped to develop Catholic life throughout the country. With the exception of religious processions in the street, the manifestations of the Catholic ritual and of Catholic piety are more free and open here than in most other parts of the world. Confessionals are thronged, the communion rails are filled, and piety is not left to women alone. Catholics feel and understand their religion; make sacrifices for it, labor to save the

weak and shelter those exposed to vices. The religious orders of men increased wonderfully in number, are auxiliaries of the parochial clergy, while those of women in education and works of mercy turn into treasures of heaven the liberal contributions of the Catholic liberality of the moderately well-to-do, who so freely give for Christ's sake. The visitations of the dioceses, now of more moderate size, have, as prompted by the Second Plenary Council, become fully what the law of the Church requires, and the churches for which sixty years ago the merest necessities were deemed sufficient are now filled up with all that the ecclesiastical regulations require, and maintained with a neatness and decency becoming the august character of the worship to which they are dedicated.

The music, formerly subject rather to caprice than rule, has steadily improved, and under the impulse of Councils (3d New York, Decree 3, 4; 1st San Francisco, Decree 7, 8), associations like the Cecilian are doing much to give the true ecclesiastical chanting and music, instead of the lighter and more frivolous.

The Councils hitherto held comprise—ten Provincial Councils of Baltimore, with two Plenary Councils; three Councils held in New York; two at New Orleans; two at St. Louis; four at Cincinnati; two at San Francisco, one at Philadelphia and one in Oregon.

To consolidate the work already done, and to carry out the plan of preparing the United States to pass from the condition of a missionary country, to that of one in full harmony with the general discipline of the Church, will be the great task of the next Plenary Council. It will be a most imposing gathering, with Archbishops and Bishops native to the soil, and others trained indeed in other lands where the old traditions of faith and discipline still prevail, but American by long missionary labors here, attended by theologians, not in name merely but in deep and serious study of every branch of theological science; heads of many religious orders, from the ancient order of St. Benedict to Congregations formed in this country to meet especial wants. The archbishops and bishops with mitred abbots will alone number nearly a hundred, and with their theologians and heads of orders, betoken in themselves, as compared with the first of Baltimore,—which men still living can remember,—what wondrous things God has accomplished in this land, where by His Providence men of all nations are in a few generations moulded into a homogeneous people, which opens a vast field for the conquests of the Church, and itself a token of the union of spirit which should prevail among the faithful.

In all previous Councils much preliminary work was done by

✓ theologians under the guidance of the presiding Archbishop, but for the coming Plenary Council a still more careful preparation has been made. The Sovereign Pontiff invited to Rome the Archbishops of the United States: Archbishop Gibbons of Baltimore, and several others with representatives of those who were incapacitated by ill health, and of metropolitan sees that were vacant by death, proceeded to Rome. There, in a series of long and exhaustive sessions, the wants of the Church in its various relations were fully discussed, and the nature of the legislation to be proposed for general deliberation in the Council was finally settled.

The Council will also in all probability be attended by a special delegate of the Pope, and with the wishes of the Sovereign Pontiff clearly understood on the various points, the deliberations will be greatly facilitated, and the decrees adopted will readily be framed to meet the exigencies of the case, as the wants of the particular dioceses are made known and considered.

Of the great importance of the coming Council no doubt can be entertained; the two former Plenary Councils were but introductory to the third, which will combine the result of long experience, mature deliberation and earnest prayer.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECT OF CHRISTIAN CHARITY.

IT is a well-established and undisputed fact that the Christian code of ethics wrought for all times to come a complete change in the reciprocal relations of human society. The great truths of Christianity, once proclaimed, not only were destined to live on to the end of time, but they were the means of bringing about a social revolution greater than any other of which we possess any historical record. It was a transformation complete, far-reaching, touching the very springs of life, and yet not an external, but internal change of society. The teachings of Christ were not seditious, did not counsel a general uprising against the old order of things; nor did they disturb directly the bonds of society of those times. Their character was peaceful throughout, yet the watchwords of the future were no longer the same. Freedom, equality, fraternity, these words, which in the course of ages have been so grossly misunderstood and tortured into meanings never inherent in them, were announced as the result of the adoption of Christ's teaching. The most concentrated expression of those great truths was probably that made by St. Paul when he wrote to the Corinthians: "And now there remain these three: Faith, Hope and Charity, but the greatest of these is Charity." For it was Christian Faith which taught mankind to perceive in God not only the Creator of all, but likewise the Father of all, and from this common paternity flows human freedom and that fraternal union becoming to children of the same Father. It was Christian Hope, again, which placed all men on an equality by bidding them to look forward beyond the earth's boundaries to that very self-same goal which now was placed within the reach of all alike. And it was Christian Charity, finally, which was given to the human race both as a birthright and as an inheritance, namely, as that central force which should level the inequalities of life, and at the same time as a perennial means of testifying by its practice to sincerity of faith and strength of hope. This being the most general aspect of the influence of Christianity upon society, it is self-evident that charity, inasmuch as it directly concerns not only the individual but others besides the "ego," is a sociological force in a proper sense.

Before going farther it may be well to call the reader's attention to the fact that charity itself is entirely a product of Chris-

tianity, that no vestige of it can be found in antiquity. In the sense in which, as a Christian virtue, this word is understood by people in this nineteenth century, it was altogether unknown in pre-Christian times. It is true, the records of pagan history tell us of many instances of gentleness and tenderness of heart and of commiseration and generosity, and even of self-sacrifice. But they were isolated, individual acts, and did not proceed from any deep, underlying and controlling principle. Cicero, for example, extolled charity in some eloquent passages; but what he eulogized was based rather upon dictates of justice, and hence more a question of right than a question of love. And Cæcilius wrote the winged sentence: "*Homo homini Deus est, si suum officium sciat.*" Yet the claims of the suffering part of humanity met with no practical recognition until the advent of Christianity. It was only after Christian civilization had taken firm root that the alleviation of poverty and of suffering was placed upon a higher plane and surrounded with that indefinable sacred halo which antiquity had been impotent to impart to it. From that time on, however, charity began to spread even beyond the precincts of true Christianity. Being confined neither to form of belief, nor to country, nor to nationality, its seed scattered far and wide; and of all Christian virtues, charity soon became the most Catholic in the true sense of this word. But it is with charity as with many other things. On its passage through space and time, and falling into the hands of many a stranger, the correct and clearly-defined original meaning became mutilated, so that much passes to-day by that name which has no title to it. For this reason it seems all-important that the steady and growing expansion of fellow-feeling, of which evidences abound on every side, should not be allowed, by the present loose way of calling things, to drift aimlessly hither and thither. Philanthropy, humanitarianism, benevolence, and what not, are frequently confounded with charity, as if an apparent similarity of object necessarily constituted identity of principle. Particularly in our own days there is a tendency observable of adopting, or rather returning to, measures for the relief of pauperism which bear a strong resemblance to those in existence under the Roman emperors in the first few centuries.

These provisions for the sustenance of the Roman poor, or, to speak more correctly, the political rabble steeped in idleness, which constituted at times a dangerous element of power, and at all times a potent incentive to corruption on the part of aspirants to power, were principally confined to Rome, the capital of the Empire. The cry, "*Panem et circenses,*" bespeaks loudest that a hungry mob conscious of its political power uttered it. The demand was satisfied, not from any desire of ameliorating their condition, but simply to

gain for the time being their influence and support. Such being the motives, these measures fall, of course, outside the category of charity. Moreover, it is to be borne in mind that in order to supply Rome with the immense quantities of grain required for such purposes, most exorbitant taxes were ruthlessly levied in the provinces, thus plunging whole districts into poverty and distress. The apparent relief of the indigent in the large capital was thus purchased by a much larger misery caused somewhere away from the place of the dispensation of these bounties. Again, the infirm, the aged, orphans and widows were never cared for by the state, and were even by the philosophers of those days not looked upon as worthy of pity. The non-citizens shared the same lot, and the slaves in their turn did not fare better. They were property, living property, to be sure, but if it pleased the whim of their proprietor to feed them to fish as food, they were fed. With these facts before us, it is, of course, impossible to talk of charity in those days.

All this the Christian dogma of life changed. The poor who had been abandoned, the sick and the destitute who had been despised, the helpless and the deformed who had been objects of human disregard, the aged who had been left to perish,—all these became, henceforth, not only objects of the tenderest solicitude, but the claimants of respect and veneration. They were cared for, not in spite of their infirmities, but because of their infirmities. Here, then, we have that phenomenal reconstruction of society upon a new basis to which allusion was made in the beginning. And how was this accomplished? Not by teaching man that he is first and foremost a citizen, but by teaching him that his origin is divine; by teaching him that the common paternity makes him a free-holder and not a slave; by teaching him that through this freedom, he as a social being, stands in fraternal union with all men. And into the man thus taught, addressing him as a human-divine being, was now instilled the principle of charity, that universal law of which a writer of the fourth century, St. Chrysostom, so well said: "Observe how many natural ties God established among us, and how, by giving us different aptitudes, He arranged it so that all should be in need of one another. Just as He has given different countries different kinds of products, that thereby might be established a continuous exchange of good offices, so He has in like manner given to men temporal and spiritual gifts in different measures, that the one might share them with the others." Or, as St. Basil more tersely expresses it: "The first commandment serves as the basis for the second, and by the second we fulfil the first, since God receives our charity in the poor." This, then, is the motive-power, the vivifying agency of true charity. The Creator

of all is likewise the Dispenser of all. He distributes to each what He pleases under certain conditions, and one of these conditions is to use what He has given in assisting those who have been given less. There is no question here of an obligation of human and positive right; it is an obligation purely moral and religious, based upon faith, prescribed by conscience, and yet free and voluntary.

This broad conception of Christian charity it was which rendered it at once constant, efficacious, compassionate, and universal. And it is the echo of this clear-cut, transparent, and luminous virtue which has reverberated from age to age. Nor has its repercussion died away in our days. Far from it. Contrary to all laws of acoustics, it increases in sound, in volume, in strength, in intensity.

In the first few centuries, when persecutions raged wildly and crystallized every virtue into shining typical forms, the practical application of charity solved, indeed, the social problem of how to adjust the unequal distribution of the goods of this world. No Communistic, or Socialistic, or Nihilistic doctrine, subversive of the right of property and the whole existing order of things, confronts us in those days, but only a proper spirit of looking at our possessions as so many privileges by means of which we should attest our faith by practicing the charity which it enjoins. During the reign of Constantine legislative measures were enacted whereby the state assumed, to a certain extent, the responsibility of aiding those in distress; in other words, charity became impressed upon the legislature. What were the effects? It created for the poor a right to be assisted, so that they no longer looked upon their misery as an affliction for the alleviation of which they incurred a debt of gratitude. Being dispensed, moreover, by that abstract and indefinite, though authoritative person, the state, and their lawful right to assistance being conceded, the classes falling under that category at once raised the most absurd pretensions. Assistance became, as it were, a class-privilege, an incentive to idleness and improvidence. On the other hand, it guaranteed a subsistence to the debauchee and the spendthrift. It blunted the finer sensibilities of human nature, and deprived the poor of that delicate shame which Christian charity so carefully preserved. Thus the engrafting of charity upon the state proved then an absolute failure. This remark, however, should not be understood as if it were intended to imply that the state, as such, had no right to mitigate suffering. Inasmuch as all governmental authority is derived from that self-same source from which life and all else flow, in so much the duty of the ruling powers to supplement what individual charity is unable to accomplish, is plain and logical. But if that point is

disputed, as is now so frequently the case, then state charity is apt to degenerate into political institutions, and bereft of that which gives it intrinsic value.

This will appear more clearly if we consider the work of some society representing the genuine principle of Christian charity, and compare it with that of some philanthropic institution outside of the Catholic Church. We will take the St. Vincent de Paul societies, founded by Frederic Ozanam, a highly gifted and enthusiastic young Frenchman, some fifty years ago. They are animated by the same spirit which animated him after whom they are named. St. Vincent de Paul remains forever the most conspicuous example among men of genuine charity.

It was he who founded in the first half of the Seventeenth Century the Sisters of Charity, whose silent figures and gentle manners are now so well known all over the civilized world. It was he who, a few years later, established the first foundling asylum; he also conceived and established the first homes for the aged and infirm, and asylums for the insane. Nor did his charity end there. It drove him to enter prison-gates, and to seek for its objects the criminal and the hardened sinner. More large-hearted sympathy with all forms of suffering, more generous compassion with affliction and misery in any form, than St. Vincent de Paul possessed, it is, indeed, difficult to conceive, save in Him whose life and whose teachings brought the angel of charity down from above, and left it here below as a perennial blessing to all mankind. In his conception, manifestly, charity did not end with the relief of physical suffering, but should, and ought to, address itself likewise to the relief of moral suffering. Now, this is, in a special manner, the object of the societies named after him. There is a vast amount of moral wretchedness in this world, which money is absolutely powerless to remove, and very frequently it goes hand in hand with physical privations. To lend a helping hand in relieving the poor is one thing; to visit the sick, to advise, console, encourage, and seek employment for the idle and despondent, to teach the ignorant and the weak how to help themselves,—this is another thing, the performance of which does not depend upon open purse-strings so much as it does upon labors, personal, responsible, fatiguing, and often thankless. Such work requires not only a large, generous, liberal amount of love for our fellow-beings, but, moreover, an ardent, energetic and patient desire to lighten their burdens and to bring a ray of sunshine into places where bleak despair shrouded existence itself into darkness. Cheerfulness, as is well known, generally departs when misery and affliction crowd upon us, and it is at such times that a few kind words of consolation meet with true appreciation, inspire new hopes, and lift the depressed spirit from the plane of desolation. Warm-felt sympathy

seldom fails to send vivifying emotions through the sufferer, and most efficiently assuages pain and despondency in the victims of misfortune. Men who receive no compensation for their services can only be influenced by unselfish motives in hunting up sorrow in its homes and trying to make it less bitter. The widowed and the orphaned, the outcast and the forsaken, are thus visited in their humble habitations by friends who endeavor by word and deed to mitigate the cares and troubles and afflictions of life. Individual zeal, individual energy, individual compassion, are thus sent forth to individual suffering. Only by trying to impart the strength to suffer can moral wretchedness itself be conquered. Charity, consequently, as practiced by the St. Vincent de Paul societies, is not only subventive, but also preventive in its character. And here lies the radical difference between charity dispensed as a religious virtue and charity dispensed by an abstract person as benevolence of a general character.

It is, indeed, a great thing to relieve the wants for the necessities of life by providing food and shelter, fuel and clothing for those in need of it. But, if, with the notions which now happily prevail so largely, a case of destitution is directly brought before our eyes, it is hardly more than obeying a natural impulse, a social instinct, to give from abundance, and thus evince some little compassion for fellow-man. And many philanthropic institutions and organizations are mainly intended to benefit the indigent by the disbursement of large sums for their wants through the hands of paid hirelings. It seems unnecessary to remark that we have no intention of belittling or reproaching such work, which is, indeed, most praiseworthy. But the fact remains all the same that, while state-charity and charity outside of the Catholic Church have made enormous strides, the full spirit has taken shape and form only in the Church of Rome's adherents. What we wish to emphasize is this, that if that self-same spirit which actuated the Christians of the first few centuries, and which still lives in the Catholic world, had obtained the same currency everywhere, and at all times, the social discontent which offers in so many countries dire threats to society itself, could not have made such headway. We desire merely to point out how true charity is the one sociological factor which, in the solution of many burning problems, should not be overlooked.

In all city-life the world over, the gulf that yawns between the rich and the poor is already too deep and too wide. True Christian charity, we contend, is the only force which can successfully bridge over this gulf by partly absorbing, partly neutralizing, the discontent, the ill humor, the jealousies, which distress is so apt to generate if not delicately cared for. The practice of that command from above, if general, would soon spread a healthy atmosphere of sympathy between man and man, and teach the poor

that they may with confidence rely upon the active help of the rich; that they are not wholly forsaken in their misery, but that others of the great family of men are near them to give them sympathy and comfort. For preserving the peace of society, for fostering love of good order and obedience to law, and for strengthening mutual respect and good-will between class and class, man and man, nothing will prove more efficient than to infuse into the present generation a fresh instalment of those time-honored and twice-blessed notions of charity of which the St. Vincent de Paul societies are the living expressions.

Love for humanity is, indeed, becoming more and more a vitalizing power of modern civilization, and what is it but the remnant of the forgotten meaning of the charity inculcated by Christ? It is the force which propels human nature onward and forward; and from this consideration springs the necessity to turn it into a channel deep as the ocean, boundless as the sea, clear as the spring. Cæcilius's words, lately so well translated into English by a modern essayist in the lines—

"If each to each be all he can,
A very God is man to man,"

should not remain unknown, but enter as a motive of action into each individual life. With a constant multiplication of the means of reaching all classes, with an active and hearty coöperation of all who desire good under whatsoever form, it should not be a hopeless task to revive charity into what it should be.

Nor should it be forgotten in this connection that the replacement of error by truth forms also one of the missions of charity, and falls hence legitimately within its sphere. Yet what do we witness almost every day? Here, a charity-organization society makes well-systematized efforts to prosecute all mendicants in the streets. There, another charitable institution carefully elaborates a plan to prevent its being imposed upon by undeserving applicants. Who can help smiling at so much waste of money and energy, when he contrasts such work with Don Bosco and his marvellous achievements in our days? No wonder Lord Palmerston, after an incognito visit to Valdocco, Don Bosco's headquarters at that time, after inquiring how he managed a thousand boys without any punishments, and seeing with his own eyes the affection they harbored for their benefactor, said on leaving, that he realized for the first time what "love" could do with those untaught, rough natures. On the other hand, what is the effect of surrounding philanthropy with safeguards which make it almost inaccessible? The effect is that those who have any pride or self-respect, and consequently shrink from a public avowal of how and why they got into the pitiable straits they are in, not only refuse to apply,

but actually refuse help as soon as it is conditioned upon a sort of detective investigation of their circumstances. Another effect of this mode of procedure is, that what originally is destined for the relief of suffering is spent in salaries of agents and clerical machinery for the detection of unworthiness. It would seem to be of much less moment if a trifling assistance is given to an undeserving recipient, who in nine cases out of ten is anyhow in very reduced circumstances, than to make one in dire misery wait for help until satisfactory reports can be received, running in the meanwhile the risk that help may come too late.

Charity should, no doubt, be tempered by wisdom. Yet charity is so generous, so noble, that it ignores difference of creed, difference of color, difference of language, and remains always the good Samaritan. It should not be crippled by too much, above all not by any superfluous, red-tape, while it should always practice wise economy and not lavishly bestow upon a few what the many can ill afford to do without. Were more known about the many charity-organizations in the Catholic Church; were their spirit, their principles, their modes of dispensing food, alms, fuel, shelter, etc., better understood, there would soon spring up a wholesome imitation among that large family which also believes in Christ as the Redeemer of all, and in His command: "What you do to the least one of these, you do also to Me." For the genuine ring of charity never fails to awaken a responsive chord in any heart not utterly devoid of gentle sentiments; and particularly in this country, which teems with large-hearted sympathy, a proper realization of what constitutes true charity would put out fresh and vigorous shoots in many directions. The sociological aspect of charity compels us to admit that from it alone can ultimately result not only a lasting and thorough and substantial improvement of the great mass of society, but also a permanent amelioration of the relationships between the different strata of society.

It is from *that* time that Lacordaire speaks, when he says in his inimitable eloquence: "A new age will then commence over which new treasures of riches will be poured out, and this wealth will consist neither of gold, nor silver, nor vessels brought from the uttermost ends of the earth and containing precious and costly things. It will be neither steam, nor railways, nor electricity, nor all that the genius of man shall be able to tear out of the bosom of nature. There is but one thing which we can truly call wealth, and that is love. It alone unites all things and fills all things. It is the beginning, the middle, and the end of all things. One drop of love weighed against the whole universe would tear it away as the tempest whirls away a fragment of straw."

BOOK NOTICES.

CLAVIS RERUM. Norwich: F. A. Robinson & Co., 1883.

The author of this work is unquestionably a person of much more than ordinary intellectual ability and of extensive learning. He has compressed into the small space of one hundred and forty-two pages thoughts lucidly and beautifully expressed, which might easily be expanded into a large volume. His style is a model of pure, pellucid English. In his address "to the reader" he says (and a perusal of his work will incline the reader to accept the statement as true) that the propositions he lays down "are the result of many years of study, observation, and reflection." "Early in life," he continues, he "became convinced that the universe is not a group of independent systems, visible and invisible,¹ but is a perfect and inseparable whole, formed on a single plan, and destined to fulfil a single purpose. To discover this purpose and unfold this plan, so far as human research might accomplish either of those objects, he has since devoted a great portion of his time and labor, and having now arrived at certain definite conclusions, he ventures to submit them to the judgment of his fellow-workers in the same exhaustless field." Taken as a whole the work is one of the most important philosophical treatises on the plan and purpose of the universe which has recently been given to the public. Its every page bears evidence of close thought and profound reflection, so as not only to engage the reader's attention, but also to set his mind to work in developing other thoughts which those of the author suggest. It sparkles with rich gems of truth placed in a fit setting of simple, beautiful, and often really sublime, language. Yet, along with this, are grave errors, which seriously impair, though they do not destroy, the value of the work.

On the first page of his address "to the reader," he specifies four sources from which he has gathered the data upon which his conclusions are based, and then says that he has carefully explored them for clues "whereby he might be led to that central point, from which alone the labyrinth of created nature could at once be seen and understood." The divine purpose and plan can be learned, it is true, from the sources of information indicated by the author, yet only in part and in a general way. Our knowledge is and must be imperfect; for man cannot, at least in this life, place himself at "that central point" from which the whole creation can be seen and understood. This belongs to God alone.

Respecting the creation of animals lower than man, the author says: "This is the unsolved problem of the visible creation. . . . Reason has reached intelligible conclusions in regard to every other division of the universe, but here its keenest scrutiny is baffled, and it has been compelled to either seek for its deliverance in an hypothesis which negatives the immateriality and immortality of man, or to acknowledge that the riddle is beyond its power to solve!"

To this we object. The proofs of man's immortality and of the im-

¹ The universe certainly is "not a group of independent systems," and both the "visible" and the "invisible" are parts of one whole, but the visible is surrounded and penetrated by the invisible.

materiality of his soul are not at all dependent on our solving by reason the problem of the animal creation. Whether or not it is beyond the power of reason to "solve the riddle" of that creation, we are not by any means compelled to adopt the alternative stated by the author.

Again, in his introductory chapter, the author, referring to the individual dispositions of men, says, that "these dispositions must be either natural or acquired." He then argues that "they cannot be natural, for if they were, they must be of the essence of the individual nature, and therefore unchangeable, a supposition which is contrary to experience."

Here we object: (1.) That individual dispositions are both natural and acquired; natural as derived from our parents, acquired inasmuch as they are the product of our own actions.

(2.) It does not at all follow that because they are not natural they are of the "*essence*" of our nature, individual or otherwise. Our nature includes all that belongs to it, accidental as well as essential.

The author then insinuates that "granting that all the differences of individual disposition are acquired (which we not only do not grant, but deny), the period of individual existence is too short for their acquisition," and also that the fact that they manifest themselves from earliest infancy proves that they must have been acquired by the soul of the individual in some previous "state of its existence." What this previous state was, according to the author, may be inferred from his query: "Does no light fall on this question from the fact that every phase of human disposition finds its counterpart in that of some of the species of the animal creation?"

The fact (which observation incontestably proves) that children do inherit certain natural dispositions from their progenitors, accounts for these varieties of individual dispositions manifesting themselves in infancy. Nor is a long individual experience required, because man has the faculty of understanding signs and language, and, consequently, can appropriate the results of the experience of other persons.

Again, in his introductory chapter, the author seems to hold that abstract ideas are the "universal archetypes of things as entities subsisting, not in the individuals of the concrete, but in the infinite life of Him Whose works overshadow His interior being."

But abstract ideas are not archetypes of things, but copies. The concrete things themselves are copies of the archetypes in the mind of God, who knew from all eternity what manner of things He would create. The archetypal idea or plan of things is not by any means abstract; nor should it be confounded with the ideas we possess.

Still following the author in his introductory chapter—address "to the reader"—we controvert his statement that "the four great faiths" of ancient paganism were either "universal" or "primeval." Their origin is disclosed in the *Book of Wisdom* (chapter xiii.). The nature worship of the ancients was not so much a worship of nature in our modern sense of the term, as of various forces and forms of nature which they regarded as so many distinct deities whose names and attributes varied according to locality, so that what was worshiped as a god in one region, was abhorred as a demon in another.

The Incarnation of the Deity, which the author thinks was one of the "four fundamental faiths of ancient paganism," is a doctrine peculiar to Christianity. The avatars of Brahminism (the word '*avatar*' simply means descent) were merely descents or manifestations by which Vishnu appeared in the form of a fish, tortoise, boar, dwarf, etc. He

did not *assume*, in the Christian sense, their natures or permanently occupy their forms.

The author's idea of secondary causes and their relation to God (pages 4 and 5), though expressed in very forcible and beautiful language, seems, when closely examined, to be self-contradictory. Admitting the existence of secondary causes, he yet so closely identifies them with God, the Cause of Causes, as, in effect, to destroy their existence, or at least deprive them of any operative power. He says that "their power or mode of operation" is not "anything distinct from Him;" that "their force is entirely both of and *from* Him;" and that "He works not by them but *in* them." Previously, too, the author says that of God "no secondary cause is predicable."

What does the author mean by this last-quoted declaration? He certainly does admit secondary causes, though with qualifications which to us seem to involve confusion and self-contradiction of ideas. The power of secondary causes though most certainly *from* God, yet is not *of* Him, in the sense of the author. Inasmuch, too, as secondary causes are created, they certainly are truly distinct from Him, their Creator. It is true, He does not need them as "instruments," yet He chooses to use them as such, having first given to them all the power they possess, and He works *by* them as well as *in* them. Whatever power secondary causes have (which the author seems to deny), so far from detracting from Divine Omnipotence, exhibits it all the more fully, since all their force is from Him and has been given by Him. The author quotes approvingly the very important and true dicta of "the ancients," meaning (we suppose) the Scholastics, that "*Createdness is a perpetual dependence upon God*," and that "*Creation and preservation are not two acts, but one act*;" yet in his chapter on "Creation," page 86, he seems to hold an opposite idea, else he would scarcely speak of "creative acts ceasing to operate" while their effects continue to exist.

The author's chapter on "*Elements*" sets forth many sublime truths lucidly and beautifully, yet here, too, there is room for adverse criticism. The author very improperly speaks of God as one of the "six elements," which are "found everywhere combined with one another," and "in which the Universe subsists." The common division of the sum of existence into God and creatures is the true one; it is philosophical and exhaustive. Besides, the word "universe" may very well be reserved in philosophical as well as in every-day language for the sum of created existence; nor should the Creator be placed in the same category with the created. The classification of the latter, also, adopted by the author we regard as very objectionable. "Force," for instance, should not be considered a distinct element; it is an attribute of both matter and spirit; neither can exist without some degree of force. Even inertia is a force.

Again, God is not a "mode of being;" He is Being itself.

It seems scarcely correct to speak of the spirit's "*consciousness*" of God. It would be better to call it knowledge of God, or the faculty of knowing God. Man has the faculty of knowing God, and does know Him both by faith and reason, but this knowledge is not immediate nor intuitive. The existence of God is indeed implied in all our knowledge and in our very existence, but an implicit knowledge of which we are unconscious can scarcely be called knowledge and certainly not "*consciousness*." The existence of innate ideas—assumed by the author—has yet to be proved. The human mind possesses the faculty of forming ideas in accordance with the nature of things and its own essentially ra-

tional nature, which admits of development, not arbitrarily, but only in the manner designed by its Creator.

The author's statement of the doctrine of the Trinity is defective and erroneous. The term "*person*," to which he objects, in this following Whately, far from leading to "extreme confusion of thought," or indeed to any confusion of thought, is necessary to guard against erroneous thought. It may be difficult to define, yet everyone can understand that the term "*person*" designates not a thing, but one to whom the personal pronoun "*He*" can properly and literally be applied.

The Trinity is far more than three "distinct attitudes" or aspects which the Divine Being assumes toward Itself. This would be pure Sabellianism. Were it true, every man would be a trinity.

Again, if the author's theory were correct, it would seem that the Son were the Third Person of the Trinity proceeding from the Father through the Holy Ghost or from the Father and the Holy Ghost; the Holy Ghost would then, too, be the Second Person. Then, too, if we try to form to ourselves a conception of the manner in which the Son and the Holy Ghost proceed from the Father (which, however, is hardly possible), we had better follow St. Thomas's idea, that the Son proceeds from the Father *per intellectum*—being His perfect expression and image in which He eternally sees Himself. From this mutual beholding each other proceeds *per voluntatem*, the Holy Ghost.

"Creation is synonymous with change." Then change is synonymous with creation. If this be so, annihilation also is creation; for certainly annihilation is a change. "Creation is also synonymous with variety!" This rhetorical mode of statement in a philosophical work is entirely out of place and cannot but lead to confused and erroneous thinking.

"Between creation and the incarnation there is with God no relation of priority or subsequence; both are alike eternal." With God the design and purpose of the creation and incarnation are eternal, but not the creation nor the incarnation itself.

Moreover, that after the resurrection there shall be a new heaven and a new earth, and that all things, with the exception of the lost angels and men, shall be more intimately united with God than now, is a truth of revelation. That they shall be "assumed into God" is not only nowhere told us, but no Christian can hold.

The author is a believer in "evolution," but in a different sense, in many respects, from that which is now commonly attached to the word.

The great objection to the work is the author's theory of metempsychosis and his revival of Origen's notion of the pre-existence of spirits, which, after a long course of ages, enter as component parts into the nature of man. The distinction between soul and spirit might perhaps be admitted or, at least, endured. Indeed, if we are to give the name of *soul* to the animating principle of animals, it would be an advantage to have a distinct term for the higher principle which exists in and characterizes man. But to say that the soul, after a long period of transmigration through various animals, is at length united in man with a spirit which existed from the beginning of creation, to form a portion of human nature, is intolerable; yet the whole work, though containing a rich store of important and even of Catholic truth, is constructed with a view to support and recommend this fantastic theory.

As regards the author's general idea of the scope and intention of the Mosaic record of creation, and at the same time as a specimen of the author's transparent, glowing style, we quote the following:

"The first part of this record includes the first verse, and reads as follows: 'In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.'

Here is the simple allegation of the universal Creatorship of God. There are no data given by which the time or the duration of that creative act can be ascertained. There is no hint as to the manner of its operation. . . . By these words He has placed Himself behind and underneath the Universe, as its Origin and Master. He has left the rest to human research, as a problem worthy of its highest thought, and no solution can contradict His Word, unless it denies or depreciates the Creatorship He claims."

"The second part of this record embraces the remainder of the first chapter to the twenty-sixth verse. It describes the earth as without form and void, shrouded in darkness, and brooded over by the Spirit of God. Then follows the creation of light; of the firmament which divided waters from waters; of the sun and moon, as visible sources of light and heat; of fowls and fishes; and finally of reptiles and the beasts of the field. Here, also, apart from the word *Day*, by which the periods of these creative acts are numbered, there is no record of date, or of duration, nor is there a suggestion of the modes by which these vast divisions of the material world were brought into existence. Whether light was created between the evening and the morning of that primeval day; or then, for the first time, penetrated through the darkness in which the earth was buried, we know nothing. Whether the waters were separated from the dry land, by one sweep of the omnipotent hand, or were gathered into their places by the gradual formation of the earth's surface into hills and valleys, through ages of volcanic action, we know nothing. . . . Whether the first-born giants of the field woke into perfect maturity upon the morning of the sixth day, and took possession of the virgin earth; or whether, through the races that preceded them, they drew their ancient origin from God, we know nothing. Upon these questions God has shed no light (in the Mosaic record). His Fatherhood stands out in all its simple glory, to be adored and loved; but He has neither ministered to human curiosity, nor given support or contradiction to a single physical hypothesis. Through the vast body of the earth, and over all the orbits of the stars, He leaves us free to roam; to seek, conjecture, and, if possible, to find the truth; and binds us by but one commandment, that we recognize Him as the Maker of them all."

With reference to the Mosaic account of the creation of man, the author says:

"The third part of this record embraces the remainder of the first chapter and several verses of the second. Here again there is no note of time, or method, or duration. We read the simple statement, that God created man by forming his body out of the dust of the earth, and breathing into it the breath of life, and that man became a living soul. But whether He created him in his material and spiritual parts at the same moment; or whether his material body had been formed in obedience to that law of development, through which successive races of the lower animals received their being, and was now, at last, united with a soul; or whether the soul and body of both had come out of those lower orders, by the same development, and, for the first time, now became the home of a celestial spirit, He has revealed nothing. God has said in His Word that He has made us in His own image and likeness, and thus has told us all that we need know, in order to secure to Him our obedience and love. But He permits us to trace our origin, immediately or intermediately, from Him as best we may, putting no limits on our speculations, or our inquiries; and certain that, if we always act on what we *know*, His right in us, and over us, can never be denied."

The author holds that the incarnation is the end of all creation, and thus expresses his idea:

... "The fullness of creation's hour had come, and nothing now remained except for the Creator to enter and unite the Creature to Himself."

"This is the twofold nature of that Person, Who has thereby become known to the Universe as both the Son of Man and Son of God. He died, in Bethlehem of Juda, now nearly nineteen centuries ago. In that one Person, all Finiteness became endowed with the divine Infinity. His body, seen in its true purity and splendor only upon the Mount of the Transfiguration, and in the hour of His Ascension into heaven, held all the powers of Matter, Force, and Life in ultimate perfection. His intellect and will attained the limit of the possibilities of Soul. His Spirit stood forever face to face with God, to Whom it was eternally united, and saw in Him the boundless fullness of His moral beauty, the glory of His inconceivable simplicity and power."

"This was the End of the creation. It was the true and necessary termination of those vast, successive Epochs, whereby the way had been prepared for this last endless Epoch, in which their wonderful productions might be gathered into Him, Who, having in His own humanity achieved perfection, bestowed upon all other men the means of reaching it themselves, through their own voluntary unity with Him. The method He provided for accomplishing this union with Himself was no less simple than it was efficient. He founded a perpetual society—His Church. To this Church He committed certain truths, by contemplating which the human intellect ascends the loftiest heights of wisdom, possible to man; and in it He established certain practices, whereby the human will is brought into submission to the will of God. To those who by the use of these means become fitted to receive Him, He then gives Himself in that mysterious Eucharist, by which the Body, Soul, and Spirit of the individual man are united to His Body, Soul, and Spirit, and through these, to His eternal and inseparable Godhead, and thus are made partakers of the infinite and uncreated Life of God."

A CATHOLIC DICTIONARY. By *William E. Addis*, Secular Priest, sometime Fellow of the Royal University of Ireland; and *Thomas Arnold, M.A.*, Fellow of the same University. New York: The Catholic Publication Society. 1884.

Rarely have we felt such pleasure in opening a book as we did on receiving this, and it is but the simple truth to say that our pleasure was increased, rather than diminished, by its careful perusal. Its learned authors undertook a task of no ordinary difficulty when they united their labors in producing a Catholic dictionary,—in fact a compendious Catholic encyclopædia. No one who has not had experience in getting up such a work can estimate the amount of toil, often of drudgery, which must be gone through in order to obtain and to put into a condensed form such articles, for instance, as those under the titles of ENGLISH CATHOLICS, EUCHARIST, GALILEO, IRISH CHURCH, JESUITS, LITURGIES, MARRIAGE, MARY, MISSIONS, PENANCE, POPE, and others we need not mention.

We were curious to examine closely such articles as those treating of the Irish Church, English and Scotch Catholics, and were charmed with the large-minded impartiality of the writer, Mr. Arnold,—for to him belong the articles on mediæval and modern history. Mr. Arnold adopts the opinion of Most Rev. Dr. Moran, that St. Patrick was born at Kilpatrick on the Clyde. He says nothing of his being related to

St. Martin, but makes him, and very justly, the disciple of St. Germanus after having studied at Marmontiers and Lerins. "The Irish people received the Gospel with extraordinary readiness. . . . Within a century after St. Patrick, St. Columbanus, the great Irish missionary of the sixth century, said to the Pope, "*The Catholic faith is held unshaken by us, as it was delivered to us by you, the successor of the holy Apostles.*" Again, quoting the testimony of Beda, Mr. Arnold says: "With respect to Beda, although it is true that he does not mention St. Patrick in his Ecclesiastical History, the circumstance—singular as it must be admitted to be—may perhaps be explained on the ground that he chose to confine himself strictly to the religious concerns of the Angles and Saxons. . . . But the fact is that in both his *Martyrologies* Beda does give the name of St. Patrick. In the prose one, under March 17th, he says, '*In Scotia, the birthday of the holy Patricius, bishop and confessor, who first in that country preached the Gospel of Christ.*'"

The articles on English and Scotch Catholics are full of information, all the more precious that they are of the greatest accuracy and condensed into the smallest space compatible with a pleasing and connected narrative.

Most striking is the article on FREEMASONRY, which we recommend all serious-minded readers to peruse carefully. The origin of Freemasonry is traced from the mediæval guild of stonemasons, "who were popularly called by the very name of Freemasons. . . . It was a migratory guild, its members traveling under their masters in organized bodies through all parts of Europe, wherever their services were required in building. . . . The south of France, where a large Jewish and Saracenic element remained, was a hotbed of heresies, and that region was also a favorite one with the guild of Masons. It is asserted, too, that as far back as the twelfth century, the lodges of the guild enjoyed the special protection of the Knights Templars. It is easy in this way to understand how the symbolical allusions to Solomon and his Temple might have passed from the Knights into the Masonic formulary. In this way, too, might be explained how, after the suppression of the order of the Temple, some of the recalcitrant Knights, maintaining their influence over the Freemasons, would be able to pervert what hitherto had been a harmless ceremony into an elaborate ritual that should impart some of the errors of the Templars to the initiated. A document was long ago published which purports to be a charter granted to a lodge of Freemasons in England in the time of Henry VII., and it bears the marks in its religious indifference of a suspicious likeness between Freemasonry then and now."

Then came the radical changes in the spirit of this once praiseworthy organization. In 1535 we see that the Cologne Charter, drawn up by a gathering of Masons at the opening of the Cathedral, "is signed by Melanchthon, Coligny, and other similar ill-omened names." They now became "a sect." Elias Ashmole, in 1646, founded the Rosicrucians (Order of Rose Croix) or Hierarchic Freemasons, which became affiliated to some of the Masonic lodges in Germany, "where from the time of the Reformation there was a constant founding of societies, secret or open, which undertook to formulate a philosophy or a religion of their own."

In 1745, the Jacobite Lord Derwentwater introduced Freemasonry into France; this formed the basis of the Scotch Rite. The new degree of *Cohen* or priest was introduced into the French lodges by a Portuguese Jew. Next came Adam Weishaupt with his Illuminism, degrees of which he engrafted on the order. "The avowed object of the

Illuminati was to bring back mankind—beginning with the Illuminated—to their primitive liberty by destroying religion, for which this newest philosophical invention was to be substituted.” “Freemasonry in Continental Europe has been the hatching-ground of most of the revolutionary societies, many of which were affiliated to the higher Masonic degrees. In France . . . an avowed belief in God was required for initiation, but this requirement, through the efforts of M. Mace, of the University, was finally abolished in the convention of Freemasons, held at Paris, September 14th, 1877. A recent French writer maintains that Freemasonry is—unknown to the craft—managed by five or six Jews, who bend its influence in every possible way to the furtherance of the anti-Christian movement that passes under the name of Liberalism. . . . The war against the Catholic Church in Germany had no more bitter supporter than Freemasonry. . . . In France and Belgium the lodges have officially commanded their members to assist the *Ligue de l'Enseignement*—a league intended to bring about the complete secularization of the primary public schools. . . . English-speaking Freemasons usually disown for their order any aims but those of a mutual benefit and convivial society. . . . But the constant influx into the English-speaking countries of Jews and Continental Freemasons must necessarily impregnate the order with the poison of the Continental sect.”

This admirable article is a fair specimen of the thorough manner in which important subjects are treated. The Inquisition is dealt with in the same spirit and with the same conscientiousness; so are the Liturgies, in which Mr. Addis has accumulated all that is of the greatest interest to churchmen and scholars. Passing over the equally interesting articles, “Mary,” “Mass,” “Marriage,” the reader will find in that on “Mental Reservation,” brief as it is, a synopsis of the soundest doctrine on this much-vexed question. Glancing, however, at that on “Military Orders,” we were rather startled to find this statement: “The *Glorious Virgin Mary*.—founded at Vicenza in 1233, etc.” The Knights of the Glorious Virgin Mary were founded in Bologna, some thirty years later, by Loderingo d'Andalo and Catalano Catalani, as stated in a previous volume of this REVIEW. The entire paragraph, brief as it is, is not only incorrect and misleading, but absolutely unjust to these Knights. It is not true that “in course of time they became rich, and thought more of enjoying themselves than of anything else; whence the people called them in derision the *Frères Joyeux*, ‘Jolly Brethren.’” Count Gozzadini, of Bologna, himself a descendant of Dante, has vindicated the reputation of this Order from the slur cast upon it by his great ancestor. He proved that the name of *Frati Gaudenti* was given to these Knights from the beginning, and when their glorious services caused them to be called to the help of all the cities of Italy. The name probably came from their white raiment and the many privileges and exemptions conferred on them by the State and the Church. The Knights of *Santiago* deserved at least a brief mention.

To the article “Missions” we can accord unmixed praise, as well as to “Pope.” In the latter, as indeed in most of the longer articles, one finds, in a very brief space, such information as cannot be obtained in any similar work in the English language. Hence it is that we welcome this *Dictionary* as a God-send to every Catholic family and every Catholic school, college, and scholar in the country.

The one little blemish we have pointed out, together with the omission of all mention of the pilgrimage to Compostella in speaking of “Pilgrimages,” and a few other oversights, are of very trifling moment

compared with the safe, solid, and satisfactory instruction priest and layman can find in this truly *Catholic Treasury of Knowledge*. As such we recommend it most heartily, promising our readers that they will derive from its pages the same profit and pleasure we have found in them. The Catholic Publication Society Company have conferred on the public a lasting benefit by giving them this *Dictionary*; and the learned authors deserve higher praise than we can bestow, and a more liberal pecuniary reward for their labors than, we fear, they are likely to obtain. What we, in the meanwhile, wish is that this invaluable treasury should be found in every Catholic home in the land.

CREATION; OR, THE BIBLICAL COSMOGONY IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN SCIENCE. By *Arnold Guyot, LL.D.*, Blair Professor of Geology and Physical Geography in the College of New Jersey, etc., etc., etc. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1884.

Writers of works like the one before us encounter at the outset of their undertaking two difficulties that have never yet been overcome, before they can hope that their ideas will obtain general acceptance. One of these difficulties is the fact that what the "Biblical Cosmogony" is, has never as yet been determined. The exact scope and meaning of the references in the first chapters of the Old Testament to the genesis of the universe are still in dispute and likely to long remain so. Apart from the truth that all created things owe their existence to the omnipotent and omniscient *fiat* of God, show forth His infinite perfections, and have their purpose and end in Him, the Church has never spoken authoritatively on the subject. Thus to Catholics as well as to non-Catholics the precise meaning of particular words and phrases in the Mosaic account of creation, is the subject of individual opinion, and not of faith. Many passages of the sacred record continue to be differently interpreted by the most profound scholars, whether Catholics, Protestants, or rationalists. Nor is it probable that the Church soon will—it is almost certain that for a long time to come, if ever, indeed, the Church will not—pronounce authoritatively upon the meaning of those passages as regards their bearing upon merely scientific questions.

The Church, by divine appointment, is the authoritative, infallible teacher of faith and morals. All questions which affect them, in her own good and opportune time, she resolves and infallibly teaches, guided by wisdom divinely promised and given to her. The Church is also the promoter of human science and of every pursuit which tends to increase the knowledge and unfold and develop the intellectual faculties of man. But she is not, nor has she ever claimed, nor will she ever claim to be the authoritative, infallible teacher of human science, or the solver of the riddles which purely scientific subjects propound. Them she leaves the human mind perfectly free to investigate and study.

The second difficulty which writers upon the harmony of the "Biblical Cosmogony" and human science encounter, is the fact that it is extremely difficult to determine what settled convictions or conclusions science has at any time attained, now or in the past. There is a constant tendency of human thought, except as guided and directed by divine authority and wisdom, to move in various and divergent lines, and to entertain different opinions. All the facts and phenomena of physical nature which are necessary to knowing and understanding all that can be known and understood respecting the modes, processes, and periods through which the heavens and the earth, water and land, plants, animals and man were brought into existence have not, by any means, been fully dis-

covered, investigated and understood. Until this shall have been done, human science, instead of reading with certainty and positive connection all that may be learned by the natural reason of man of the natural world by the study of its phenomena, must be regarded as only spelling its way towards such knowledge, with many a blunder meanwhile and misunderstanding both of its words and meaning; and many a dispute, too, and opposition of opinion among the learners, as to whose spelling is correct, and what the true, scientific definition of the word so laboriously spelled really is.

Under these circumstances, to undertake to exhibit "Biblical Cosmogony in the light of modern science" seems to us very much like trying to illustrate a difficult and obscure subject by references to one that is equally obscure. As for "harmonizing" "Biblical Cosmogony" with modern science—which is really the design of the volume before us—it strikes us as very like to attempting to determine the proportionate value to each other of two unknown quantities, the relation of each to all known quantities being as yet unascertained.

We do not mean by these remarks that works like the one before us are valueless or unimportant, but that their value and importance are speculative rather than positive. And this is a fact which at this day, it seems to us, it is specially important to bear in mind. Self-constituted dogmatizers of science, as well as of religion, abound, and by their constant setting up of opinions as if they were final conclusions, and of theories as if they were indisputable verities, they do infinite harm both to science and to religion. Speculative study of what is known only in part is not, by any means, valueless. Properly directed, and confined within its proper limits, it is of immense importance, and effectively promotes the advance of science, physical, metaphysical, and theological. But, as we have just intimated, it must be strictly confined within legitimate limits and never be allowed to become dogmatical, nor assert as positive finalities what, at most, can only be claimed as probable conclusions.

This value the work before us has on some of the points it discusses. And from this point of view it is an important contribution to existing literature on the subject of "Biblical Cosmogony" and of the light which modern science at present throws upon it. To persons fond of such studies it will be interesting. The writer has evidently given to his subject long and careful study, and in his discussions of various unsettled questions evinces extensive learning and research.

Yet in these very discussions he furnishes proofs of the justness and opportuneness of our previous remarks. For, not satisfied with either the Catholic or the Protestant translation of the first chapters of Genesis, he presents his own version of them, and puts his own interpretation upon them, and also gives explanations of what are commonly accepted as ascertained facts of physical science which many scientists will object to.

"*Evolution*," the author declares, is still an open question, yet an open question only within certain strict limitations. It may or may not be that "lifeless matter developed into various forms of lifeless matter; life into various forms of life;" and "mankind into all its varieties." But from one to another of these he holds there is no evidence whatever of even possibility of evolution.

In this Professor Guyot has stated, with unquestionable accuracy and truth, the exact point which science has as yet reached. Whatever conclusions it may or may not hereafter arrive at, and however, in their impatient enthusiasm, certain scientists may endeavor to project thought beyond the limits of what *is* known, and speculate upon what the unknown will teach when, if ever, it *becomes* known, there is as yet no

evidence of even the possibility of evolution of lifeless matter into the various forms of animal life, nor of these into man. On the contrary, the evidence, truly read, is all in the other direction. Theorists who maintain the opposite uniformly substitute *speculations* for *facts* in the chasms they are attempting to bridge over.

With reference to this point he says of the Mosaic record: "Though the narrative is, on the whole, singularly non-committal in regard to any specific scientific doctrine, there are a few points on which it is positive. It teaches that:

"1. The primordial creation of matter, the creation of the system of life, and the creation of man are three distinct creations.

"2. They are not simultaneous, but successive.

"3. God's action in the creation is constant."

As regards evolution in the Darwinian sense, the author's ideas may be inferred from the following statements:

"Besides the primordial creation of matter, that few will deny, the creation of life must be acknowledged, since, as we have seen, science has thus far been unable to derive it from dead matter by any process whatever. Scientific inquiries are far from having demonstrated that all the archetypes of the invertebrates which appear simultaneously in the Silurian are derived from one another. Science fails to discover traces of a direct descent of the vertebrate from invertebrate, whose plan of structure is entirely unlike; of the large fishes of the Devonian from any preceding animal form; of the huge reptiles of the middle ages of life from the fishes of the Devonian. It cannot be proved that the great pachyderms which suddenly come upon the stage in the Tertiary epoch are the offspring of the reptiles of the preceding age. The bond which unites them is of an immaterial nature; the marvellous unity of plan which we observe is in the mind of the Creator."

As regards the theory that man is an evolution from lower animals, he says:

"Man, made by the Creator in His own image . . . could not be confounded with the animals. With his advent a still higher plane is introduced which comprises not only animal but spiritual life, which has its own laws, its own character, and for which the body is but an instrument. . . .

"That spiritual element which constitutes man as a distinct creation can no more be derived from the physiological functions of the animal than life can be evolved from dead matter. There is between the two planes an impassable abyss.

"We often hear of palæontologists looking sedulously for the missing link between man and the animal. They forget that in the sense of which they speak there can be no link wanting. The figure and the structure of the ape is as near as need be to be called a link between man and the animal; the difference between the two beings is in the moral nature. . . .

"The invisible world of ideas is the true domain of man, the scene of his activity. For this reason language has been vouchsafed to him, while it is denied to the animal, whose functions are limited to the procuring of food, to self-defence, and to reproduction."

EXERCITIA SPIRITUALIA S. IGNATII DE LOYOLA: Meditationibus Illustrata ad Usum Clerici tam Regularis quam Sæcularis. *Auctore F. X. Wenninger, S. J., S. S., Theologiæ Doctore. Cum Permissu Superiorum.* Moguntiae: Sumptibus Francisci Kirchheim, MDCCCLXXXIII. Neo-Eboraci et Cincinnati: Fr. Pustet & Co.

The spiritual exercises of St. Ignatius, now so familiar to all Catholic clergymen, are contained within a small volume, and are not simply

meditations or prayers, but, as their name imports, *exercises*, designed to excite and direct the mind and heart to earnest, profound and devout reflection upon the subjects which those exercises comprise. Their spirituality is of such exalted order that Louis de Ponte does not hesitate to declare that St. Ignatius wrote them by special revelation and inspiration of God, as the Holy Spirit interiorly dictated to him, and taught him by these same exercises. They were approved by Pope Paul III., in a bull granted in the year 1548. Pious experience has fully confirmed the wisdom of this approbation by the marvellous effects which God has wrought, and which He daily works in those who seriously meditate upon the truths which St. Ignatius sets forth.

The exercises were designed to extend over four weeks or more. Now they are often condensed into one. At their commencement St. Ignatius has placed these few lines, which he meant to be the foundation and summary of the whole work :

“Man is created to praise, honor and serve God, and thus to save his own soul. All other things are created for the sake of man, and to aid him in the attainment of his destined end ; therefore, he should use them only with this object, and avoid them when they would lead him away from it. We must make ourselves indifferent to all created things, where a choice is left us ; so that we should not desire health more than sickness, riches than poverty, honor than comfort, a long life than a short one, and so of all the rest ; desiring and choosing only what will conduce most surely to the end for which we were made.”

This first thoroughly examined and applied, the mind is solicited to resolve, henceforth, to use all creatures only as the means of salvation. We consider, therefore, the danger of any other course ; we survey our past life with all its errors ; we meditate on the enormity of sin ; the punishment of hell ; the angels eternally condemned ; the offence of Adam ; the long train of his descendents who have been justly sentenced to banishment from God. Then, with some beginning of detachment from the world and our own evil properties, we enter on the second week, and consider the sovereignty that Christ claims in our souls ; the appeal he makes to us, as a king to his subjects, to engage us in his service ; inducements with which he invites us, differing far from and infinitely exalted above those of any temporal monarch. For He promises to treat His servants as Himself, and that He will call upon them to do and to suffer only as He Himself has set them an example.

St. Ignatius then places before us the alternative of heaven or hell, in the admirable meditation entitled, “The Two Standards,” which is said to have peopled so many monasteries. In this Meditation, with allusions to military life he represents Christ as a royal warrior seeking to enlist all men in His service, and Lucifer as His rebellious enemy, craftily striving to attract us to himself. Then when we have seen the emptiness of all the temptations offered us by the devil, we are led to contemplate the mysteries of our Saviour’s life, and thence on to what St. Ignatius calls “the three degrees of humility.” Of these the first is simply such piety as is indispensable to salvation ; the second brings us nearer to God in our intercourse with the world, so that the soul dreads even the smallest and most venial sin ; the third implies an absolute renunciation of all that is not God, and the closest union with Him that may be vouchsafed to man. This meditation, which, according to the scheme of St. Ignatius, extends ever twelve days, leads us to make our deliberate election of the way of life in which we believe ourselves called on to serve God.

The third week, occupied with the Passion of our Lord, confirms and

extends what has gone before. The fourth week, presenting to our minds His glorious resurrection, His ascension, and His unbounded love for man, suggests to us how to attain the highest eminence of charity which has no choice and no affection but in and for God, and which leads us to do all things for His greater honor and glory.

The "Exercises" were originated by St. Ignatius at Manresa, and were perfected by his experience when he began to teach. Whoever diligently uses them will own that only divine inspiration could have shown their holy author so clearly and fully the secrets of the human heart, could have made known to him such effectual remedies for its weakness and propensity to sin, and such stimulants and aids to detachment from all created things, and fixing itself upon God.

The reason which moved Rev. Father Wenninger to the preparation of the volume before us he has stated in his Preface. He states, as the result of his own examination, that very many of the works which are professedly founded on the "Exercises" and designed to be expansions of them, retain but little of their real spirit; that though they may be excellent as pious reading, and as aids for clergymen on the mission, they leave little room for the exercise of mind and heart in real *meditation*. In confirmation of this, he quotes the eminent Very Rev. Father Roothaan, S.J., who, in one of his letters to the members of the Society of Jesus, laments that through the use of such publications persons are led to follow the thoughts of others, instead of exercising themselves in reflection upon the very words of St. Ignatius, thus not only failing to *meditate* in the strict sense of the word, but also failing to drink in the real meaning and spirit of the holy author of the "Exercises." Such persons, he says, really engage in reading and not in meditation.

Impressed with these considerations, Rev. Father Wenninger believed that he would be doing a work which would be fruitful in good results, by publishing the genuine actual text of the "Exercises," according to Very Rev. Father Roothaan's approved version, and expanding and applying the "Exercises" in strict conformity with their very words and with the very spirit of their holy author.

Two great advantages would thus be gained. First, the danger would be avoided of substituting one's own thoughts for those of St. Ignatius, and the very marrow, as it were, of his meditations would be preserved, and in his own words. Secondly, he who uses the work, either for the purpose of spiritual reading or as a preparation and aid to meditation in the strict sense of the word, will not be hindered, but greatly helped and excited in his devout work by dwelling upon the exact words of the holy author.

In the volume before us, Father Wenninger has constantly kept these excellent ideas in mind and has adhered faithfully to them. His work, though primarily intended for members of the Society of Jesus, will be highly profitable, if devoutly used, to others also, who desire to advance towards spiritual perfection.

MARTIN LUTHER: A STUDY OF REFORMATION. By *Edwin D. Mead*. Boston: George H. Ellis, 1884.

The writer of this book is an infidel of the Theodore Parker type, and an intense admirer of Luther. Lutherans, however, and other "Evangelical" Protestants will not thank him for the picture he has drawn of Luther. He not only brings to view Luther's coarseness, vulgarity, and intolerable arrogance, obstinacy and pride, but parades them as virtues and as proofs that he was a veritable prophet, possessed of plenary inspiration, as Rationalists understand those words. He

quotes as preface to his book Luther's own words: "I say . . . that I have taught right and wholesome doctrine. . . . Many accuse me of being too violent and severe in writing against papists and factious spirits . . . I have, indeed, been very violent at times, and have severely attacked my opponents, and yet in such manner that I never regretted it."

With reference to Luther's claims to "inspiration and infallibility," he quotes Luther as saying in his *Table-Talk*: "I merely know that the doctrine I teach is God's Word. I know for certain that what I teach is the only Word of the high majesty of God in heaven, His final conclusion and everlasting and unchangeable truth; and whatsoever concurs and agrees not with this doctrine is altogether false and spun by the devil When a man has this certainty he has overcome the serpent." Thus Luther "bases his inspiration on . . . the ground of the true soul's immediate communion with God."

But the "inspired," the "prophet," Luther had "no doctrine of the infallibility of the Apostles or Prophets which forbade his criticising them in the same frank and free manner in which he criticises Melancthon or Justus Jonas." "The Apostles," Luther says, "did not sufficiently extol or explain Abraham's faith. I marvel much that Moses so slightly remembers him. . . . I will have none of Moses and his law, for he is an enemy of Christ." So with Macchabees and Esther. "The history of Elijah is almost incredible." "The history of the prophet Jonah sounds more strange than any poet's fable." "The Second Book of Esdras I would throw into the Elbe." "The Epistle to the Hebrews was certainly not written by an Apostle." It was "put together out of many pieces." The Apocalypse "I hold to be neither apostolic nor prophetic." St. James' Epistle is "an epistle of straw." It is "directly contrary to St. Paul and to all the rest of the Scripture." "St. John's Gospel and St. Paul's Epistles. . . . and St. Peter's first Epistle teach all which it is needful to know."

Commenting on these and other evidences of Luther's "free," "critical" spirit, the author correctly says: "There was no Bibliolatry or mere mechanical submission to Biblical authority in Luther." "The ground on which he denies the inspiration of a book is always simply his individual opinion as to its doctrine or its style; and certainly no Tübingen professor of our own time ever proceeded with greater boldness or freedom in the matter." "Such words as these serve chiefly to show the deeply *rational* grounds of Luther's faith, as opposed to the grounds of the common churchmen, and how far removed he was from what men call the Protestant principle of authority." It "would be arbitrary and ridiculous to make him appear in the garb of an 'Evangelical' preacher of the present day, which Canon Mozeley so properly makes sport of." "I boldly assert, it does not need great boldness, that coming into the science of our time with the same spirit with which he came into the science of four centuries ago, Martin Luther would have been—Theodore Parker." "Luther stands for *Rationalism*. He stands also for *intellectualism* in religion." "The Lutheran movement differs from the Wesleyan movement, and, in a very great degree, from Christianity." "'If any man will *do* God's will,' said Jesus, 'he shall know of the doctrine.' 'If any man hath the pure doctrine,' said Luther, 'his life will be pure also.' I do not make the antithesis for the sake of condemning Luther."

Luther could not endure Aristotle. The author tells the reason. Aristotle taught that "good works make the habit or principle—that a man becomes just by doing just acts." Luther said: "We must

first be just and then we shall do just actions. . . . It grieves me to the heart that the damned, arrogant, rascally heathen with his false words has seduced and befooled so many Christians."

The author's idea as to what Luther's movement really was, and its chief effects, will appear from the following :

"The very common idea of the Reformation as a universal revival of religion is a very superficial and untrue idea." Then after drawing a picture of Europe as "honeycombed with skepticism, and cynicism, and uncleanness," he says, "into this comes Luther with bolder and more outspoken unbelief in the old church, than the boldest skeptic of them all, but with a new truth (freedom of individual opinion), which they knew not of. To the great multitudes Luther was welcome, because he spoke out their antagonism and unbelief so much better than they could ever do it ; and multitudes caught up his doctrine of private judgment and free thought as the instrument and sanction of abominations. Where the new gospel made one religious man, it simply unsettled ten."

The "abominations" into which the adherents to Luther's new gospel of free thought fell, the author treats as mere accidents of the movement ; the unsettling of religious convictions and the destruction of faith in Christianity he regards as salutary results.

As regards the attitude of the author's book towards the Catholic Church, it is beneath criticism. Like Luther himself, it is unable to refer to the Papacy or the Church without exhibiting a degree of malice and a spirit of falsehood that are simply Satanic. He gathers together all the scandals of the sixteenth century and scandalous tales, actual or mythical, and revels in their filthiness. In this respect he recalls the saying of Carlyle respecting Swynburn, that "he reminded him of a person immersed in the filth of a cesspool, eagerly endeavoring to add to its foulness by his own personal contributions."

THE BAPTISM OF THE KING: Considerations on the Sacred Passion. By *Henry James Coleridge*, of the Society of Jesus. London: Burns & Oates. 1884.

This volume consists of meditations upon the Passion of our Blessed Redeemer. The New Testament Scriptures contain two different series of considerations on this subject. First we have there the narratives of that wonderful history given by the Evangelists. But in addition to these are a number of considerations and contemplations of the Sacred Passion in the Epistles, especially in those of St. Paul. It seems to have been a part of the office of this Apostle to present to the Church the causes, the significance, the divine reasons of the great sacrifice of the Cross, its results in Heaven and on earth, and below the earth, in time and in eternity, the place which it occupies in the counsels of God, rather than the details of the history, though these, too, clearly, constantly occupied his mind. In this, however, St. Paul is not singular among the Apostles. We find the same line of thought in St. Peter and St. John. But their Epistles are comparatively brief, and the great development of the subject was left to the Apostle of the Gentiles, who had been the disciple of Gamaliel and whose mind was stored with all the traditional learning of the Jewish schools, while he was, at the same time, familiar with the philosophy of the ancient world outside the chosen people of God.

The Apostolic commentaries upon the Sacred Passion have furnished Father Coleridge with the chief matter for his work. He says, very modestly: "A Passion, according to St. Paul, would be one of the

most instructive books of theology that could be written. The considerations contained in the following pages cannot claim to be anything of the sort. But they aim at treating the Sacred Passion in the light of general truths, rather than by the way of meditating on the details of the history one after another, and any one who deals with the subject in this manner cannot fail to have large recourse to the doctrine scattered so profusely over the Epistles, as well as to the direct statements of the Gospels."

This manner of treatment of the Sacred Passion is especially useful in the present day, when so many persons look upon that sublime and inexpressible dolorous mystery, yet so fraught with blessings to all who are united to it, chiefly as a pathetic tragedy. Yet our Divine Lord desired to turn the thoughts of those who were lamenting Him and compassionating His suffering rather to considering the interior meaning and purpose of His Passion. On His way to Calvary He bade the daughters of Jerusalem to think of the great chastisements which the crime, then being perpetrated, would bring upon their own nation and city. His words to St. Peter in the Garden, after the wounding of Malchus, pointed to the faithfulness of God in the fulfilment of His predictions and promises. His promise to the good Thief referred to the great work of general deliverance which was to be accomplished by His Passion.

These statements will give the reader a general idea of the design and purpose of Father Coleridge's work. It consists of forty meditations. They are necessarily brief, but it is needless to say to those who are acquainted with other productions of the learned and devout writer, they are replete with profound, suggestive and edifying thoughts, clearly and beautifully expressed, though compressed into the smallest possible space. As regards their general arrangement, they begin with the eternal truths comprehended in the Sacred Passion, go on to the example of our Divine Lord, and conclude with the perfections of God.

In composing his work, Father Coleridge says he has freely used the writings of older authors, particularly of Father Gasper Druzbecki of the Society of Jesus. But, it is easy also to see, that, however much of material Father Coleridge has derived from other distinguished writers, he has transfused it all with his own profoundly devout spirit.

THE NEW PARISH PRIEST'S PRACTICAL MANUAL: A Work Useful also for other Ecclesiastics, especially for Confessors and for Teachers. By *Joseph Frassinetti*, Prior of S. Sabina, Genoa. Translated from the Italian by William Hutch, D.D., President of St. Colman's College, Fermoy; author of "Nano Nagle, her Life, her Labors and their Fruits;" of "Mrs. Ball, a Biography;" translator of Bellecio's "Spiritual Exercises, According to the Method of St. Ignatius," etc. London: Burns & Oates. New York: Catholic Publication Society. 1883.

This work, which has passed through nine editions in Italy, now appears for the first time in English. The following commendation of it in Father Ballerini's edition of Gury's *Moral Theology* is a sufficient guarantee of its merits. In his chapter, "De Obligationibus Parochorum," Father Ballerini says:

"De hoc argumento dignissimum est quod legatur, imo quod diu noctuque manibus teratur opusculum, cui titulus '*Manuale pratico pel Parocco novello*, per Guiseppe Frassinetti, Priore di S. Sabina in Genova: *operetta utile anche agli altri Ecclesiastici, specialmente Confessori e Predicatori*. Quidquid enim ad quælibet Parochi munia pertinere quavis in re potest, in sacramentorum nimirum administratione, in functionibus sacris, in administrandis bonis tum quæ ad parochiale beneficium,

tum-quæ ad fabricam Ecclesiæ spectant, in templi decore, ac domus etiam parochialis decentia servanda, in pauperum, infirmorum, scholarumque cura gerenda, in piis congregationibus instituendis aut fovendis, in divini verbi pabulo tum per prædicationem tum etiam per utilem librorum lectionem plebi suppeditando, in subditis. ubi opus sit, corrigendis, in scandalis, sive contra fidem sive contra bonos mores amovendis, etc., *id omne in egregio hoc opusculo attingitur.*"

Father Ballerini then goes on to still further praise the work, speaking in terms of high praise of the conciseness and clearness of its directions and advice, which he characterizes as "replete with prudence, wisdom, solid learning, and large experience," combined with moderation, gentleness, and charity.

The scope of the work and the subjects it treats upon are given so fully in the above quotation, that it is needless to particularize them. The *Manual* is divided into three parts. In the first part the duties of a parish priest, excepting those which refer to the administration of the Sacraments, are dwelt upon under fifteen different heads. In the second part the duties of a parish priest with reference to the Sacraments are treated with like particularity and detail. The third part treats of the "Practice of the Virtues which are most necessary to a Parish Priest."

A COMPANION TO THE GREEK TESTAMENT AND THE ENGLISH VERSION. By Philip Schaff, D.D., President of the American Committee on Revision. With Facsimile Illustrations of MSS. and Standard Editions of the New Testament. New York: Harper & Bros. 1883.

As a compiler and skilful appropriator of the scholarly labors of others, without being always specially scrupulous to acknowledge his obligations to them, Dr. Schaff is *facile princeps*. The work before us forms no exception to this remark. It is a collection under a number of specified topics of what has been written and published by others in separate and detached form, and in this whatever merit it has consists. It makes at first glance an immense show of bibliographic knowledge, yet, on closer examination, this knowledge is that of a compiler rather than of an original investigator. As for original criticism it is worthless, Dr. Schaff's own criticisms bearing plain marks of superficiality, narrowness and prejudice. So, too, his historical references. With regard to this latter point the following quotations will serve as sufficient proof:

"The Bible was originally intended for all the people who could hear and read, and was multiplied in the early centuries by translations into the Greek, Syriac, Coptic, Latin, Gothic, and other languages, as the demand arose. But, during the Middle Ages, the ruling hierarchy, fearing abuse and loss of power, withheld the book from the people, except the lessons and texts in the public service. Vernacular versions were discouraged or even forbidden. The result was the spread of ignorance and superstition."

"The Reformers of the sixteenth century kindled an incredible enthusiasm for the Word of the living God. They first fully appreciated its universal destination. . . . They went to the fountain-head of truth, and removed obstructions which prevent a direct access of the believer to the Word of God and the grace of Christ. They reconquered the liberty wherewith Christ has made us free, and more martyrs died for the cause of evangelical freedom in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries than for the Christian faith in the first three centuries."

The person who could deliberately pen these lines, it need not be said,

is capable of any falsification which malice, bigotry, or self-interest may impel him to utter.

ΔΙΔΑΧΗ ΤΩΝ ΔΩΔΕΚΑ ΑΠΟΣΤΟΛΩΝ.

TEACHING OF THE TWELVE APOSTLES. Recently Discovered and Published by Philotheos Bryennios, Metropolitan of Nicomedia. Edited with a Translation and Notes by *Boswell D. Hitchcock* and *Francis Brown*, Professors in Union Theological Seminary, New York. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1884.

The manuscript of which this document forms a part, is said to have been discovered in the Library of the Most Holy Sepulchre in Constantinople, by Philotheos Bryennios, then Metropolitan of Serres, and now Metropolitan of Nicomedia, in ancient Mesopotamia. The date of the manuscript is A.D. 1056. It is described as "an octavo volume, written on parchment in cursive characters, and consists of 120 leaves." It contains "first St. Chrysostom's Synopsis of the Books of the Old and New Testaments; then the Epistle of Barnabas; then the two Epistles of St. Clement; then the teaching of the Twelve Apostles; then the Epistle of Mary of Cassobelæ to Ignatius; followed by eight Epistles of Ignatius (the current seven and one to the Virgin Mary)." "The *Teaching of the Twelve Apostles*" occupies leaves 76-80 of the manuscript. This part of the manuscript was published by Philotheos Bryennios at Constantinople in 1883.

That such a document existed in very ancient times there is scarcely room to doubt, but whether, in the lapse of time between the probable time of its composition (the second century), and the date of the only copy yet discovered, many changes, omissions, or additions were or were not made in the process of re-copying, it is not easy to determine. Specialists in this branch of antiquarian study will doubtless closely examine it, and their investigations, it may be expected, will throw additional light upon the question of the faithfulness of the copy of the original manuscript, and its value, if any it has, as a relic of remote Christian antiquity.

KADESH-BARNEA: Its Importance and Probable Site. With a Story of a Hunt for it, including Studies of the Route of the Exodus, and the Southern Boundary of the Holy Land. By *H. Clay Trumbull, D.D.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1884.

From the introduction to this large volume of nearly five hundred 8vo pages, we learn that the occasion for its preparation and publication was the "unexpected discovery" by the author "of the long-lost site of Kadesh-Barnea, which has been a matter of much doubt and discussion among Jewish and Christian scholars." After Dr. Trumbull's return from the East, in 1881, he made a mere announcement of his supposed discovery, and set himself to study the facts connected with it. He found "the linkings" of Kadesh-Barnea more numerous and varied than he anticipated, and the possibility of gain from farther investigation in the fields of ancient and modern scholarship more promising than he had supposed. The results of this investigation, and "the story" of his "hunt," he has embodied in the volume before us. Along with the location of Kadesh-Barnea, he thinks that his work furnishes "the material for determining the route of the Exodus, the main outline of the wanderings of the Israelites in the desert during their forty years sojourn, and also for ascertaining every landmark on the line of the southern boundary of the land of promise."

These are large expectations, and, if realized, would certainly justify

the publication of as large a volume as that before us. We think, however, that the author is over-sanguine. From the examination we have been able to give the work, we incline to regard it as another of the almost countless volumes that have been issued upon antiquarian questions connected with the geography of Egypt, Arabia, and Palestine, which it is doubtful will ever be settled. The author seems to have consulted an immense number of previous publications, and his references and notes to them are valuable, but we are unable to discover that he has settled or determined any question of real importance heretofore disputed.

THE PAROCHIAL HYMN BOOK. Words and Melodies. Containing Prayers and Devotions for all the Faithful. Including Vespers, Compline, and all the Liturgical Hymns for the Year. Both in Latin and English. *Permissu Superiorum.* London: Burns & Oates. 1883.

Beyond all question, this is the most complete and comprehensive work of the kind that has been published in the English language; so comprehensive, indeed, that we fear the size of the work, rendered necessary by its very comprehensiveness, will prevent it from coming into general use. It is a volume of 668 closely printed 8vo. pages, containing the matter common to extensive manuals of devotion, along with 632 hymns and chants, all set to appropriate music, followed by special devotions and prayers, recommended to be used by members respectively of the Arch-Confraternity of the Holy Family, of the Confraternities of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus, of the Most Blessed Sacrament, of the Servants of the Holy Ghost, of the Most Holy Rosary, of the Brown Scapular of our Lady of Mount Carmel, of the Blue Scapular of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary, of the Association of the Holy and Immaculate Heart of Mary, of the Confraternities of St. Joseph and of St. Michael the Archangel, of the Temperance Society of the Cross, and of the Association of Prayer in Honor of the Sacred Thirst and Agony of Jesus, to Repress Intemperance, together with a number of other special devotions and prayers, the forms for reception into the above-mentioned Confraternities and Associations, for investiture with the different Scapulars, etc.

As may be inferred from their very large number, the volume contains all the most approved English hymns and chants, or translations into English from the Latin (together with the original Latin), that are used in Catholic devotions in America, together with many that are not known, or not in common use, in this country. The music, adapted to the hymns and chants, consists of the most popular tunes of the Oratory Hymn Book, of the Holy Family Hymn Book, of Hymns for the Year, together with a large number of very beautiful Italian, French and German melodies.

The general excellence of the contents of the volume is evident from the fact that it is published with the express warm approvals of sixteen of the most eminent bishops and ecclesiastics of England, Ireland and Scotland, among them those of Cardinal Manning and Archbishop Croke.

THE CLOCK OF THE PASSION OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST: With Considerations on the Passion. Translated from the Italian of St. Alphonsus Liguori, by a *Catholic Clergyman*. To which is added the "Stations of the Cross," the "Stations of the Passion as they are performed in Jerusalem," etc., etc. New York: D. & J. Sadlier & Co.

The subject of this little volume as given above, together with the name of the holy author, sufficiently indicates both its scope and the excellence of its contents. No more deeply devout and edifying treatise on the subjects it comprises, could well be placed in the hands of Christians.

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THE BEGINNINGS OF GEOGRAPHY.

THE ten-year-old boy who glibly rolls off the names of the five continents, and the little maid who gravely informs her teacher that the earth is a globe, little dream how much time and toil and thought was required to gain what to them seems elementary knowledge. A glance at the map makes all clear to them; here are the round hemispheres, there lie Europe, Asia, Africa, America, Australia; what can be plainer? Had they to trace them, not on a map, but in nature, they should appreciate very differently the knowledge they now hold so cheap. It was only at the price of disappointments, sufferings, and dangers, that Columbus discovered America; whilst Captain Cook paid for the discovery of Australia with his life. But, compared to the men who laid the foundations of geographical science, Cook and Columbus had easy tasks before them. Centuries of exploration on sea and land, the work of the merchant and the mariner, of the soldier and the missionary, had been digested by the scholar, and the results laid down in books and on maps. Mathematicians, astronomers, and physicists, had invented more and more perfect methods of determining the navigator's position on earth. When Cook and Columbus found new countries, they had little difficulty in recognizing them as new. How different the conditions under which the first geographical observers worked! How great their difficulties! How slow must have been their progress! In our days, when geography, as well as other branches of physical science, advances with giant strides,

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when Nordenskjöld has at last forced the northeast passage, when Burton and Speke and Baker have wrested from Africa the mystery of centuries, we tend to belittle what men have done before us, and we forget that we are only reaping the fruits of seed sown centuries ago. Problems, once solved, are treated as if they had never existed; and self-satisfied superficiality often takes the place of solid knowledge. To master a science it is often useful, not to say necessary, to retrace our steps, and to realize the difficulties surmounted in its infancy.

The earliest beginnings of geography, as of other sciences, are wrapped in darkness. The torch of history that illumines the past had not yet been lit. However, with a slight effort, we may realize the task set before the primitive geographer. To become acquainted with his abode, and with its surroundings and relations to the country but a few miles away, it was indispensable to refer these to some fixed points equally within sight wherever he went. On the earth such points are seldom to be found; a few hours' travel so changes the physiognomy of things around us, even of hills and mountains, as to make them almost unrecognizable. How easy it is to lose one's bearing in a pathless country, he knows full well who has wandered on the prairies or in the forest. And in the days of our primitive geographer roads were scarce and forests plentiful. Luckily, where earth fails, the heavens offer an unerring guide. Go where you will, the sun always rises and sets in the same quarters of the heavens. The glories of dawn and sunset were surely the first of nature's great panoramas that attracted man's eye. They must have early suggested themselves as aids to the traveller, to guide him and determine the direction of his wanderings. If any proof were needed to show this, language supplies it. In every part of the globe, and among peoples of all races, language describes the east and west as the points where the sun rises and sets. The Latin *oriens* and *occidens* speak for themselves. Our own terms, *east* and *west*, hardly differ from these in meaning. *East*, the English form of the German *ost*, is a word closely connected with the Latin participle *ustum*, from *uro*, "to burn." It therefore fitly designates the quarter of the heavens which day by day is ablaze with the splendor of the rising sun. Our term *west* is the same word as the Sanskrit *vasta*, "a house, a home." In the conception of our Teutonic ancestors the *west* was the home of the sun, where he sank to rest every night. The sun, therefore, so to say, taught the primitive geographer two of the four points of the compass. The remaining two were not so easily determined. Homer, who speaks of the east as the direction "towards the dawn and the sun," and of the west as the part lying "towards darkness," has no terms for the true north and south.

He knows the north-northeast wind, the blustering Boreas, and opposite Boreas, Notus, the south-southwest wind. He also knows the seven bright stars that circle around the pole, and to which he gives the same names by which we know them to-day,—“the bear” and “the wagon.” Still it is very uncertain that the Greeks, in the ninth or tenth century before our era, had a precise knowledge of the points that they afterwards described as “towards mid-day,” and “towards the bear.” This is certainly a suggestive fact. Here was a people intellectually gifted as no other, observant and quick-witted, and yet, after travelling for thousands of miles and for hundreds of years over plains and mountains, over land and water, it failed to arrive at a clear and full knowledge of the cardinal points in the heavens; so hard was it to make the first step in geography.

No doubt, even in his infancy, man soon found his way from encampment to encampment, from village to village, nay, from country to country, and from harbor to harbor. Guided by such knowledge of the points of the compass as he had acquired, he gradually formed in his mind a picture of his home, of the hills and the streams in its neighborhood, perhaps even of the more distant points which he reached in his hunting or fishing excursions. He gradually recognized their relations. But it was by no means easy to judge correctly of the direction of the river-courses and mountain-chains, of the outlines of land and sea. About 100 A.D., more than fifty years after the invasion of Britain by Claudius, the great Roman historian, Tacitus thought that the eastern coast of England ran parallel to Germany, and that Wales lay over against Spain. And yet Tacitus was a man of uncommon ability and cultivation, and had unusual means of access to the best sources of knowledge, for his father-in-law was the conqueror of the island, Julius Agricola. Into how much grosser errors must the men have fallen who first explored the Eastern continent! Moreover, mistakes once made were handed down from father to son, whilst years and centuries were needed to extend perceptibly the geographical horizon even of the brightest and most active peoples; for those early days were not the days of the Sir John Franklins and the De Longs. No one loved geography for geography's sake. Men went to distant places, even in their own country, only under the stress of necessity, or the impulse of the nomadic instinct. There were no missionaries that sought the ends of the earth to carry thither Christ's Gospel; no geographical societies that sent forth explorers ready to face death in the cause of science. War and commerce were the chief promoters of geography, and warrior and merchant were geographers only by

accident. Slow, indeed, and painful must have been the progress made under their auspices.

Without the testimony of history we have striven to reason out, as far as possible, a picture of what the infancy and earliest progress of geography must have been. Henceforth history will be our guide in tracing its further fortunes. Except, perhaps, some documents incorporated into the Mosaic writings, no records are as ancient as the Egyptian monuments. Their early chronology, it is true, is far from settled; still, according to the lowest estimates, they carry us back two thousand years beyond Moses, and fifteen hundred beyond Abraham. The most ancient Egyptian annals, so far deciphered, are very scant and unsatisfactory; they say so little of Egypt itself that we must not expect them to say a great deal of other countries. Nor is their silence of much moment; had they come down to us in full they would probably have taught us little about the non-Egyptian world. Even in the days of Sankh-ka-ra, the last king of the eleventh dynasty, whose date is set down by Brugsch at 2500 B.C., and who certainly is not later than Abraham (2000 B.C.), Egypt knew very little of the peoples that dwelt beyond her own boundaries. This Pharaoh's armies advanced southwards into Nubia, whilst trade had made him acquainted with the western and southern coasts of Arabia and the land of Punt; that is to say, the opposite coast of Africa, just below the Gulf of Aden. Perhaps the reader will recognize Punt most easily as the part of the coast of Africa somewhat north of Zanzibar, the starting-point of so many recent expeditions for the exploration of Central Africa. Gradually Egyptian commerce extends northward and eastward, to Edom and Midian. From the latter country, it is interesting to learn, Pharaoh's ships brought the pigment with which Egyptian beauties painted green stripes under their eyes to enhance their good looks. About the same time the monuments of the twelfth dynasty (2466-2266 B.C.) afford clear evidence of Egypt's intercourse with Syria and Phœnicia, thus confirming the history of Abraham's travels and adventures in Egypt, whither, Holy Writ tells us, he went to procure corn. Of course, when the Semitic *shasu*, or shepherds, made themselves masters of Egypt, the connection between the Nile land and the Semitic countries of Western Asia became still more close, and its knowledge of them more complete and comprehensive. But for a long time Asia remained the limit of Egyptian geographical science. Even the greatest of the Pharaohs, Thothmes III. (1600 B.C.), whose obelisk adorns the New York Central Park, and Ramses II. (1300 B.C.), the Sesostris of the Greeks, the king who so grievously oppressed the Israelites, although they penetrated deep into Western Asia, conquered its coast as far as Asia Minor, imposed tribute

on the Assyrian kings of Niniveh, and subjugated Cyprus, seem to have known nothing of Europe. Some three to four hundred years afterwards Homer knows not only the Nile, but hundred-gated Thebes, more than three hundred miles from its mouth. Schliemann's discoveries at Mycenæ also prove that the Greeks at a very early period became acquainted with the products of Egyptian art, and the same tale is told by other Greek antiquities. Still it does not follow of necessity that the subjects of the Pharaoh knew much, or in fact anything, of Greece, much less of the rest of Europe. Indeed, if we may believe Herodotus, they knew very little of Europe even in 666 B.C. At that time Psammetik, Prince of Sais, by the jealousy and superstition of the other petty princes of Lower Egypt, had been dethroned and driven into the marshes of the lower Delta. An oracle had foretold that he would become king of the whole land by the aid of bronze men coming forth from the sea. As he wandered an exile near the sea-coast, news was brought him that a vessel had been stranded, and that bronze men were coming toward the land. They proved to be Greek heavy-armed foot-soldiers. Psammetik at once recognized in them the men of bronze spoken of by the oracle, engaged their services, and, through them, hired other Greek mercenaries, who made him king of all Egypt. The story supposes that the Egyptians, in 666 B.C., knew little, if anything, of the European nation nearest to them. In fact, Greek writers tell us explicitly that from the days of Psammetik dates the closer intercourse between the two countries.

Here, then, we have hastily sketched the growth of geographical knowledge in a country whose contemporaneous monuments, we are told, reach back four thousand years before our Lord. Its inhabitants were an ambitious, enterprising, and intelligent race,—the people, indeed, to which we must trace back the seeds of most of our knowledge, the inventors of the art of writing and of the alphabet, as well as of geometry and the art of surveying. Still the lapse of three thousand three hundred years and the conquests of twenty dynasties had failed to make them acquainted with more than two of the continents of the Old World, though the third lay at a distance of not more than six hundred miles from the mouth of the Nile. Besides, though they knew parts of Asia and Africa, there is no reason to suppose that they knew anything of their geographical character as continents. The Egyptians, in fact, until Alexander's conquest, linked their fate for centuries with that of the Hellenic world; notwithstanding their hoary antiquity and their intelligence, notwithstanding their favorable position and great progress in the arts, they were mere infants in geographical science.

If this be true of the Egyptians, it would be folly to expect more from the second great people of the East, the Assyrians. Egypt, situ-

ated at the southeast corner of the Mediterranean, had in this sea a ready means of reaching the three continents of the Old World. The Assyrians were an inland people; and even if we regard the Babylonians as one nation with them, the only body of water on which they bordered was the Persian Gulf. Unlike the Mediterranean Sea, which is a bond of union between the three continents of the Old World, the Persian Gulf begins and ends in Asia; it is practically an Asiatic inland sea, next to valueless for enabling people dwelling on its shores to extend their geographical knowledge.

The Assyrians and Babylonians, it is true, did not confine themselves to their own country; they were conquerors like the Egyptians. But the course of Pharaonic conquest had been eastward, until they subdued even Niniveh and Babylon; when the star of Assyria rose in the Eastern world, the Ninivite conquerors turned towards the west and south, and swept kings and nations before them until they set their heels on the necks of the haughty Pharaohs, who had been their masters. Notwithstanding all the light, however, that recent researches have thrown on Assyrian history, we fail to find any evidence that the great Assyrian kings, Esarhaddon and Ashurbanipal (681-647 B.C.), or the great monarch of Babylon, Nebuchodonosar, knew any more of Europe than Thothmes III. and Ramses Sesostris.

Geography owes very little to the people whose sacred writings, until quite recently, afforded us the only reliable knowledge of ancient Oriental history—to the Jews. In spite of their nomadic descent,—for Abraham has not inaptly been compared to a Bedouin sheik,—in spite of the roaming tendencies which distinguish them to the present day, they knew little of any land not directly contiguous to their own. Their captivity and consequent wandering widened their knowledge somewhat, for they not only learned to know the nations among which they dwelt, but became acquainted with the geographical learning which these nations possessed. But the science of the Jews never went beyond that of the Assyrians and Egyptians. Nor is this a matter of surprise. The Jews believed that by Divine Providence they were set apart from other nations, and they regarded the Gentiles, if not with contempt, with a religious fear and loathing, that for the most part smothered any interest in foreign lands and foreign peoples. Moreover, wonderfully gifted as they were, they seem not to have taken kindly to the physical sciences in the days of their national existence. Notwithstanding their exclusive tendencies, however, they must be admitted to have shed great light on one department of our science—on ethnological geography. Even we of the nineteenth century must admit our deep obligations to them. In the

tenth chapter of Genesis we find a table of nations descended from Noah's three sons, Sem, Cham, and Japhet. This list, according to the best modern authorities, sets forth both the ethnological relationship and the geographical position of many nations spread over a large area in Asia, Africa, and, perhaps, in Europe. They extend from Ethiopia (Cush) and Egypt (Misraim), northward and westward, to the Ionians at the extremity of Asia Minor (Javan), and eastward to Media, between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf. The table includes all the races which modern science classes as Semitic, the greater part of the Hamitic peoples, and a fair proportion of Indo-Europeans. The modern scientific terms, Semites (from Sem) and Hamites (from Ham or Cham), prove how correctly Holy Writ has handed down to us the affinities of these nations. In fact, writers most hostile to the divine character of the Sacred Books admit the substantial accuracy of this interesting old fragment of ethnological geography. To appreciate duly its importance, we should bear in mind that it occurs in the oldest part of the Bible, in the Book of Genesis, written or compiled by Moses 1500 years before our Lord. In the next place, we should remember that the learned men of Greece and Rome, admirable as were many of their scientific achievements, hardly attempted to classify the relationships of the nations they knew, and that, when they did so, it was on a small scale, and rarely with success. Add that fifty years ago, and perhaps even later, modern science, unenlightened by this passage of Scripture, could not have reached a moderately successful solution of the question of the relationship of the Oriental races. Is it likely, then, that a Jewish savant, a member of an unscientific and systematically self-isolating race, could have solved it by dint of his scientific knowledge? Must we not rather conclude, either that Moses had before him historic documents surpassing in antiquity and correctness all the records of other nations, or that he derived his knowledge directly from a higher source?

The interest connected with this piece of Biblical geography has led us somewhat aside from the main course of our investigation of the question, how long it took to establish the division of the Eastern world into three separate continents. We have seen that neither Egyptians nor Assyrians, nor Hebrews, made the discovery. To the Phœnicians, the Canaanites of Scripture, early geography is more indebted than to any other people of Asia. Unfortunately, we know but little of their history; for their records have perished. What we know of them has come down to us mainly through Greek channels. Thence we learn that long before the Hellenes planted their African and Italian colonies, Tyre and Sidon had sent forth their fleets and founded towns on the coasts of the

Mediterranean. Gades, the modern Cadiz, was settled by the Tyrians, probably more than a thousand years before our era. In the East, Sidonian sailors explored the shores of the Red Sea for the Pharaohs of the eighteenth and nineteenth dynasties (1300 B.C.). Three hundred years later Hiram, King of Tyre, the ally of Solomon, seems to have controlled the trade with Ophir, or India. About the year 600 B.C., Herodotus tells us, a Phœnician squadron, in the service of the Egyptian King Necho, circumnavigated Africa. The voyage lasted three years. To procure the necessary provisions, they landed on the coast at the proper season, sowed corn, waited till it was ripe, and then continued their voyage. One circumstance reported by the hardy mariners so staggered the old Greek historian that he rejected the whole tale. The Phœnicians related that, after they had sailed down the eastern shores of Africa for a certain distance, the sun appeared no longer on their left, but on their right. Strange to say, this incident so marvellous to the father of history, is to us the strongest argument in favor of the truth of the story. Whether the story of Necho's expedition be true or not, it shows that the Phœnicians sailed along the shores of Africa past the Equator. Hanno, a Carthaginian captain, whose records—we might almost call them a log-book, so concise is his account—we possess in a Greek translation, sailed through the Straits of Gibraltar, along the western coast of Africa, past Cape Verd to Sierra Leone. This voyage took place between 500 and 600 B.C. About the same time another Carthaginian, Himilko, explored the western coast of Europe, and reached Albion and Ierne, *i.e.*, Britain and Ireland. From what has been said, it is apparent that the Phœnicians and their colonists were bold and enterprising explorers. No other Asiatic nation was their peer in geographical knowledge. Their voyages extended from India, in the far east, to the Cassiterides, or Tin Islands (some group of islands off the coast of Cornwall), in the west, whilst in the east and south, the mouth of the Indus and Sierra Leone were reached by their mariners, if they did not double the Cape of Good Hope. Thus the Phœnicians knew a great part of the three eastern continents, and were especially well acquainted with their dividing waters. Did they systematize their knowledge? did they recognize the existence of the three divisions of the Eastern Hemisphere? We cannot decide; it seems almost impossible that they should not have done so, and yet we have not the slightest evidence of the fact. At all events, a glance at the map will show that the Mediterranean is the boundary between Europe, on the one hand, and Africa and Asia, on the other. No people was likely to recognize the division of the Old World into three or even into two continents, that had not a fairly full knowledge of that continent-

dividing basin. Such knowledge was first possessed by the Phœnicians and the Greeks, and the Phœnicians, as colonizers and explorers, long preceded the Greeks. We must not confuse, however, what might or should have been, with what was. Whatever the merits of the Phœnicians as geographers, when we question history, whether they discovered the tri-partition of the Eastern Hemisphere, she gives no answer. Guided by her testimony, we must award the credit of this great discovery to the Greeks.

In the present age, when the learned world resounds with the eulogy of the Hellenic intellect, when it falls little short of deifying Greek genius, what need to waste flowers of rhetoric in praising its achievements in the field of geography! The plain facts will speak more eloquently than high-flown rhapsody. Still, we must not forget that as we inherit all the learning of Greece and Rome, so Greece became the heir of all the knowledge of the Egyptians, the Babylonians, and the Phœnicians. Her sages, inspired by the love of knowledge, travelled over land and sea to carry home the wisdom of Thebes and of Babylon, whilst Tyre and Sidon more obligingly brought to Hellas their science with their wares. How early Greece borrowed Phœnician geographical science is clear from the Greek translation of the "Periplus" of Hanno, which we have mentioned above. Of course it was not translated immediately after its composition; there is good reason to believe, however, that it was translated before the time of Herodotus (450 B.C.). At all events, notwithstanding the selfish policy of the Phœnicians, it is certain that the Greeks derived much geographical information from them. But whatever their debt to the Phœnicians, the Greeks themselves were successful explorers. As early as the seventh century before Christ, they founded Cyrene in Africa, and from that time forward colony followed colony in Southern Italy, and as far westward as Marseilles (500 B.C.) in Gaul, and Ampurias in Spain. In the year 509 B.C., by order of Darius Hystaspes, Skylax of Karyanda, in Karia, starting from Kaspatyros or Kas-papyros (thought by some to be Cabul), sailed down the Indus, exploring that river and its mouth, and then the shores of the Persian and Arabian Gulfs, till he reached Egypt. A part of the same ground was covered by Nearchos, the admiral of Alexander the Great, in 326 B.C. His voyage terminated at the mouth of the Euphrates. Many other hardy Greek captains might be added; we shall add the name of only one more, Pytheas, of Marseilles, whom Forbiger places about 334 B.C. This bold navigator, who was also a good mathematician and astronomer, setting out from his native city, sailed along the eastern coast of Spain, passed by the Straits of Gibraltar into the Atlantic, and following the coast-line of Spain and France, reached Britain. He sailed northward

along its eastern shore till he reached the Island of Thule, the northernmost point reached by the ancients. What place is meant by Thule, whether Iceland, or one of the Shetlands, or Norway, our scanty information forbids us to decide. At all events, Pytheas thence sailed southward, and entered the Baltic, being the earliest seafarer who, as far as we know, entered that sea. If, in addition to these naval expeditions, we call to mind Alexander the Great's wonderful campaign, in which he overran all Western Asia, from the Ægean to the Indus, we cannot fail to appreciate the great additions made by the Greeks to man's knowledge of our globe. But the great glory of Greece consists not in merely adding to man's knowledge of places,—they were the first, as far as we know, who systematized that knowledge; in other words, they founded scientific geography. It is to them, also, that history awards the discovery of the division of the Eastern Hemisphere into three great parts or continents; it is to them that Asia and Europe, as continents, owe their names.

And here it is necessary to show how important a part in geography, and, we may add, in history also, names play. Often men's first knowledge of a country is comprised in the name of some small, perhaps some outlying, district; as they penetrate further and further, the name is made to assume a broader meaning, and finally the unity of name often brings home to their consciousness the unity of the land. Take, for example, the name of Greece herself. The Greeks were a small tribe on the coast of Epeiros opposite Southern Italy; they were the first Hellenes, whom the Italians knew in what was afterwards called Greece. Soon they became acquainted with cognate Hellenic tribes, to which they applied the well-known name, until it covered all the Greek tribes. Tacitus tells us that the German name had a similar origin, and the process was repeated after the collapse of the Roman Empire. When the modern European nations were formed, the Franks applied to all the Germans the name of the tribe nearest to them—the Alemanni. In like manner the name of England—land of the Angles—conceals the fact that a large part of the Teutonic conquerors of Britain were Saxons and Frisians.

Trace in the same way the history of the names Asia and Europe (for Africa is a word unknown to the Greeks, who called that continent Libya), and we arrive at the same result. We begin with Homer. His geography, it is well known, covers Western Asia and Southeastern Europe. He has no name for either continent. The lands to the east he describes as the lands "lying towards the dawn and the sun," those to the west, the lands "lying towards the darkness." Still the word "Asia," or rather the adjective "Asian," is found in the Iliad; but it is an epithet given to a dis-

trict on the Kayster in Asia Minor. In Pindar and Æschylus (about 500 B.C.) it retains the same narrow meaning. In fact, even in Roman times Asia was used both in a wider and a narrower sense; for, besides the continent, it also designated a part of Asia Minor, which was organized into a Roman province. Perhaps the latter use was a reminiscence of its early restricted meaning. At all events, as the name of a continent, Asia was not used by the Greeks until about the beginning of the fifth century before Christ. The history of the geographical name Europe is strikingly similar. It occurs first in the Homeric hymn to Apollo, a composition which, in spite of the title, is later than Homer by some two hundred years. There it designates the Grecian mainland as opposed to the peninsula of Peloponnesos. Step by step it extends, until it also becomes the name of a continent.

It would, no doubt, be very interesting and instructive to know the original meaning of the words Asia and Europe. In his *Handbook of Ancient Geography*, Kiepert indorses an attempt to trace them to the Semitic languages. Asia is there derived from the Assyrian word *açu*, "the dawn, or east," and Europe from *ereb* or *irib*, "darkness, or west." The meanings are so strikingly to the point as to put us on our guard. In fact, the etymologies are not without difficulties. The Semitic *ereb* or *irib* is surely much more closely represented by the Greek *ἐρεβος*, "darkness, hell," than by *Europe*; we must not fail to mention, however, that many scholars consider *erebos* an Aryan word, identical with the Sanskrit *rajas*, and the Gothic *requis*. Besides *Europe*, in its vowels, is so distant from *ereb* or *irib*, that it might cast serious doubt on their identity, did we not know how words are mangled in their transit from one language to another. For *açu* the difficulty is of another kind. The word means "east," and, if identical with Asia, was first applied to Asia Minor; we should infer, therefore, that it was first so applied by a people living to the west of it; that is to say, in Europe. Now we know of no Semitic people that dwelt in Europe in those early times. There remains a possibility that the Phœnicians, when sailing up the Ægean, bestowed the name on the country to their right. Unfortunately the word *açu* occurs neither in the few remnants of Phœnician which have come down to us, nor in the *Hebrew*, the language most closely related to the Phœnician. The proposed derivations, appropriate as they appear, must, therefore, be pronounced far from certain.

Whilst Asia and Europe are indebted for their names to the Greeks, Africa owes its name to the Romans. The Afri were a tribe or people which dwelt in modern Tunis; when Rome erected the conquered territory of her great rival Carthage into a province, it was named Africa, after this people. In the course of time,

like Asia and Europe, the name Africa spread far beyond the district originally so called, until at last it embraced the whole continent from the Mediterranean to the Cape of Good Hope.

We have thus given a brief and general sketch of the history of the three names, Asia, Europe, and Africa; we have shown that in each case they were at first the name of a district, which gradually widened its meaning until it designated a continent. But let us not be misunderstood. When the early Greek writers speak of the continents of Asia and Europe, they do not mean what we mean by those terms. With us the dividing line between Europe and Asia runs mainly from north to south, following the direction of the Ural Mountains, and the Black and Ægean Seas; according to Hekataios, of Miletos (500 B.C.), and Herodotus (450 B.C.), this dividing line ran from east to west. Beginning at the Straits of Gibraltar, it followed the line of the Mediterranean, the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora, the Bosphorus, the Black Sea, the river Phasis (now Rioni), and the Caspian; Herodotus carries the boundary still further east along the course of the Araxes, perhaps the Jihon. The reader has, no doubt, remarked that water-courses were considered to be the only true boundaries between the continents. If, now, the Europe of Hekataios and Herodotus be compared with the Europe of modern geography, it will be found to include, besides the modern continent so called, all the northern part of Asia. Hence Herodotus judges Europe to be much larger than Asia and Libya (Africa) together, and sharply criticizes his predecessors for holding the contrary opinion. To make amends to Asia for despoiling her of the great Siberian plains in the north, in the earliest Greek writers, the whole of Libya was added on in the west. Even Hekataios seems still to have held this erroneous view; nay, there were geographers at a much later period who taught that there were only two continents. It seems strange that the historian Sallust, one of Cæsar's generals, who was well acquainted with Africa, where he had held high command, should hesitate to decide the question, whether Africa is a continent or only a part of Asia. But, though later writers are thus found to advocate ancient error, just as, nowadays, we find here and there some erratic savant upholding the heliocentric system; still we must consider the problem of the tripartition of the Eastern Hemisphere finally solved in the time of Herodotus (450 B.C.). True, the father of history does not, by any means, seem convinced of the correctness of this view, and in one passage he speaks of Libya as a projecting headland of Asia; but whatever his doubts,—and some of them were perhaps justified, considering the evidence placed before him,—he was forced to bow to the prevailing opinion, and this opinion remained that of the Greek scien-

tific world. Subsequent geographers partly changed the boundary lines, but indorsed the view in the main.

If we reckon from the beginnings of the Egyptian kingdom, the first civilized power established on the shores of the Mediterranean, it required upwards of 3500 years to prove so elementary a fact in geography as the tripartition of the Old World.

It seems hardly possible that this demonstration was made without the use of maps. To recognize the unity of a large, irregularly shaped continent, to realize that Spain, for instance, is a part of the same whole as Turkey, supposes a clear picture of that whole before the mind's eye. That men succeeded in forming a purely mental picture even of a single continent seems quite unlikely. At all events, we know that at least a hundred years before Herodotus, the Greeks knew how to construct maps; for to Anaximander of Miletos (610-546 B.C.), the disciple of Thales and the reputed inventor of the sun-dial, classical antiquity ascribes the honor of having drawn the first map of the world. It would be rash to infer that maps were not made elsewhere before his time. The division of the Holy Land among the twelve tribes of Israel, as Kiepert justly remarks, could scarcely have been accomplished without the aid of at least a rude map. Moreover, Lepsius has shown conclusively, that the Egyptians, who were great surveyors, and to whom the Greeks were indebted for their first knowledge of geometry, made rudimentary maps. But Anaximander's map was not a mere plan of a city, or of a district; it professed to be a picture of the world, and was certainly an ambitious undertaking. Of the manner of its execution we know nothing. The next map-maker that we know of is Hekataios of Miletos. It seemed not improbable that it was his map which Aristagoras, the contemporary tyrant of that city, took to Sparta. Herodotus tells the story in his usual lively way. The Milesian tyrant, anxious to induce King Cleomenes to invade the Persian empire, procures an interview. "At their interview," says the historian, "Aristagoras, according to the report of the Lacedæmonians, produced a bronze tablet, whereupon the whole circuit of the earth was engraved, with all its seas and rivers." After assuring Cleomenes that it was easy to conquer the Persians, who were an unwarlike people, he dwelt upon their wealth. "All this," he continued, "if you only wish it, you may soon have for your own. The nations border on one another in the order which I will now explain. Next to these Ionians (here he pointed with his finger to the map of the world which was engraved upon the tablet that he had brought with him), these Lydians dwell; their soil is fertile, and few people are so rich in silver. Next to them come these Phrygians," and thus he went on until he came to "Kissia, this province, where you see the river Choaspes marked, and like-

wise the town of Susa upon its banks, where the great king holds his court, and where the treasuries are in which all his wealth is stored. Once master of this city, you may vie with Jove himself in riches. Cleomenes replied: 'Milesian stranger, three days hence I will give thee an answer.' When they met again, Cleomenes asked Aristagoras: 'How many days' journey is it from the sea of the Ionians to the king's residence.' 'Three months,' was the answer. Cleomenes caught at the words, and preventing Aristagoras from finishing what he had begun to say concerning the road, addressed him thus: 'Milesian stranger, quit Sparta before sunset; this is no good proposal that thou makest to the Lacedæmonians to lead them a distance of three months' journey from the sea.' " Aristagoras' map, we are told, was the first ever seen in Sparta.

We have called the drawings of Anaximander and Hekataios maps; in truth they did not deserve the name. What really makes a map are the imaginary lines representing on the one hand the equator and its parallels, on the other the great circles radiating from the poles and cutting the equator at right angles. These lines are based on two hypotheses: 1st, that the earth is round, for if it is not, the meridians should be parallel, not converging; 2d, that the points on its surface correspond to certain points in the celestial sphere. The points in the heaven are always in the same relative position to each other, and though variable as compared to the earth, their motion is entirely regular and constant, so that for certain fixed times they will correspond to certain fixed places on earth. We know that this motion is merely apparent, due to the axial revolution of the earth; but for geographical purposes the old theory, that it is real and caused by the turning of the celestial sphere around the earth, was of equal service. Now as the sphericity of the earth had not been established in Anaximander's and Hekataios' (500 B.C.) time, of course a true map was impossible. Their charts were rather pictorial representations, or topographical plans, and such they must remain until science had proved that the earth is round. Before we pursue further our purpose of showing how difficult and lengthy a task it was to construct a map, even approximately correct, we must briefly glance at the history of the question of the earth's roundness.

To-day every school-boy and school-girl would be astonished that any one should be ignorant of this, to him or her, elementary truth. Still the sphericity of the earth, if one of the first, is one of the most important steps in the progress of astronomical geography. It is one of the first steps in science which admits the principle that "all things are not what they seem," and that the evidences of the senses must be corrected and explained by the superior wis-

dom of reason. To us who have inherited all the wisdom of our forefathers, the matter appears simple enough; not so to the peoples of early antiquity. They had used their senses much, and their reason, it is probable, comparatively little; they had lived by means of the senses, had enjoyed themselves mainly through them,—they had found them always correct. What a shock it must have been to be told that the land which they saw lying before them, plain or undulating, or in gentle slopes or abrupt crags, that the great sea which stretched before them an unbounded level expanse, were the surface of a sphere. The first propounders of this doctrine must have seemed to their contemporaries impostors or visionaries. What views the popular mind entertained on the form of the earth, when they thought of the subject at all, is perhaps learned most readily from mythology. There the earth is conceived as a round disk, resting either on mighty pillars, or on the back of an elephant, or on that of a huge tortoise; or it swims on water that surrounds it on all sides and in its turn supports the heavens. Some fancied the earth of the form of a round shield with a boss projecting from its centre. The historian Tacitus, though he lived one hundred years after the beginning of our era, and long after the Greeks had proved the earth's sphericity, in his description of Northern Britain, still seems to hold to this idea. If now the inquiry be made, how long men groped in the darkness of these errors, we shall find again that the truth was established at a very late day.

Anaximander, according to some Greek writers, or even Thales (about 620 B.C.), according to others, was the first to teach that the earth is a ball. The claims of Thales are wholly unsupported; whilst the advocates of Anaximander are contradicted by statements that he held the earth to be a cylinder. On the whole, it seems probable that the doctrine was first propounded by some philosophers of the Pythagorean school, about 500 B.C. The same view of the earth's form seems to be implied in some passages of Plato (430–348 B.C.). It was Plato's scholar Aristotle, who first systematically established it, using many of the arguments still popularly in vogue. This great thinker was not only one of the foremost intellectual philosophers, a critic and a profound writer on rhetoric, but also the founder of natural history and a distinguished physicist and astronomer.

In Bk. II., ch. 14, of his treatise on "the Heavens," he gives his reasons for asserting the earth's roundness. His first proof is the downward tendency of bodies in all places; then he tells us that in lunar eclipses the earth's shadow thrown on the moon is round, whence we must infer that the earth is a sphere. "Again," he continues, "by the appearances of the stars it is clear, not only

that the earth is spherical, but that its size is not very large. For when we make a small remove to the south or north, the circle of the horizon becomes markedly different; the stars vertically over us undergo a great change, and are not the same as those that travel to the north and to the south. For some stars are seen in Egypt or in Cyprus, but are not seen in the countries to the north of these; and the stars that in the north are visible while they make a complete circuit, there undergo a setting. From this it is clear not only that the form of the earth is round, but also that it is a part of a not very large sphere." Later philosophers added new arguments. Thus Pliny (70 A.D.) adduces the proof that ships, when they go to sea, disappear downwards. He also points out that mountains and other inequalities on the earth's surface are proportionately so small as not to alter the spherical form of the earth appreciably.

Closely connected with the question of the earth's form is that of its size. Nowadays everybody knows that it measures about 25,000 miles in circumference, that its diameter is about 7900 miles, and that the equatorial diameter is about twenty-six miles longer than the polar. We realize with difficulty that there was a time when even the most learned knew nothing of these measurements. Still we see at once that to measure the earth's circumference is in many respects a tougher problem than to establish its sphericity. A direct solution, by going around our globe with the surveyor's chain, is not to be thought of, even at present; much less could it be accomplished in the days of the great Greek geographers: an indirect method, therefore, must be found. The problem was hardly formulated when the Greek mind grappled with its solution. Aristotle, as we have just seen, teaches that, compared with the vast heavenly sphere, our earth is but a small globe. In a subsequent part of the chapter we have quoted, he tells us that mathematicians had set down the earth's circumference at 40,000 geographical miles. We are not informed by what methods they arrived at this result, which is so far from the truth that it seems a guess rather than an attempted solution. Luckily history, has preserved a full and interesting account of the first fairly successful attempt to determine our problem on scientific principles. To Eratosthenes (276-196 B.C.), the librarian of the third Ptolemy at Alexandria, and the founder of scientific geography, belongs the honor of having done this.

It had been noticed that at noon of the summer solstice (June 21st) the sides of a deep well at Syene (now Assouan), in Southern Egypt, cast no shadow, the sun's rays penetrating unhindered to its bottom. The sun, therefore, stood perpendicularly overhead, in other words, Syene lay under the tropics. Eratosthenes next

measured the shadow cast by the pointer of a sun-dial, on the same day and hour, at Alexandria, which was assumed to lie on the same meridian; by means of this he calculated the distance between Alexandria and Syene, and found that the circular distance between the two cities was $\frac{1}{50}$ th of the circumference of the earth. Now the linear distance between the two cities was set down at 5000 stadia, hence the entire circumference of the earth would measure 50 times 5000 stadia, that is to say, 250,000 stadia, about 25,000 geographical or some 30,000 statute miles. In fact, it measures only about 25,000 statute miles, Eratosthenes having gone astray not quite 20 per cent. This error was due not to any mistake in principle, but to several accidental causes. In the first place, the distance between Syene and Alexandria was less than 5000 stadia; lengthy distances were rarely, if ever, determined by the ancients with precision, as they were usually computed by days' journeys. Then the two points assumed were really not on the same meridian. Other slighter errors it is unnecessary to mention. We cannot proceed to other subjects without paying to the learned Alexandrian geographer the tribute of our admiration. Our minds are justly filled with wonder when we learn of the marvels of modern astronomy, the measuring and weighing of the sun and planets, the determination of their chemical constituents, the calculation of the fabulous distances of the fixed stars. But these triumphs of science are, after all, only the necessary sequence of prior achievements. No doubt, what Eratosthenes did was in itself infinitely more simple; but then it was the first great step in the march of applied mathematics. When we bear in mind how small man is, how limited the sphere of his sensations, and how great is the earth and how difficult the correct measurement of even a small part of its circumference, we cannot withhold our admiration from the man who saw in the stars, billions of miles remote, the means of measuring the earth on which he lived, and who read in the heavens the answer to his problem.

We are now prepared to continue our sketch of geographical chart-drawing, which we shall trace to the time when science was able to present men with a fairly accurate map, for until then geography must be accounted in its childhood. Imagine the science of map-making to have perished; suppose that all the great discoveries of geography until the present day were preserved; what would be their value? What could they teach us? They would be a mere farrago of unrelated facts. The map alone enables us to bring order out of chaos, to systematize what was isolated, to create a science of geography on a grand scale. It has already been stated that until the third century before Christ, the so-called world-charts were really only rude representations or topographi-

cal plans of the world. We have used the term "world," the Greek said *οἰκουμένη*, *i. e.*, inhabited world; the rest he did not care for; it was either too hot or too cold to serve as man's home; his *οἰκουμένη* comprised in fact all the world worth the name, and this view is still expressed in our use of the word "œcumenical," *i. e.*, universal. For the Greeks, therefore, a map of the world meant a map of the inhabited land. Of course, with the progress of geographical discovery, the *oikoumene* extended or changed in some of its details, but from the days of Dikaiarchos (310 B.C.) to Ptolemy (150 A.D.), Greek geography retained the same idea of the general form of the inhabited earth; Ptolemy as well as Dikaiarchos conceived it to be an irregular quadrilateral, similar to a Macedonian chlamys or shawl, whose length from east to west bore to its width from north to south the proportion, according to some, of two to one, according to others of five to three. To us, who know the true dimensions, this seems very strange, especially when we include in our view of the world the western hemisphere. Still, geography has preserved traces of the old mistaken conception to this very day. For why do we call the distance from east to west longitude, *i. e.*, length, and that from north to south latitude, *i. e.*, width? Error often strikes its roots so deeply into the soil of human science that, in spite of its being laid bare, it seems almost impossible to eradicate all its shoots.

The first to introduce into his map of the world, as above described, a line to guide the student in his estimate of distance and direction, was Dikaiarchos of Messina (326–286 B.C.), a worthy pupil of the great Aristotle. To him is awarded the credit of making the first attempt to measure mathematically the heights of mountains. He went far astray in his calculations, but he had pointed the way to the successful men who followed him. A similar criticism applies to his improvement of the world-map. He did not succeed in solving the problem of dividing up the plan of the earth's surface, by lines arbitrary and yet fixed; he did little more than suggest that such a problem existed. The lines he introduced on his map, as far as we know, were not intended to bear any reference to the great lines astronomy had established in the heavens, the equator and the tropics. He aimed solely at cutting the inhabited earth (*oikoumene*) into halves by a line running from east to west. This line started from the Sacred Promontory, now Cape St. Vincent, and crossed Sardinia, Sicily, Peloponnesos, Rhodes, Karia, Kilikia, the Taurus range, and the Gulf of Issus, the angle of the Mediterranean made by the coasts of Syria and Asia Minor; thence it was carried further eastward to the Thian Chan on the western border of China; it roughly corresponds to the 36° parallel of north latitude, and was called by

later geographers the earth's diaphragm. Whether Dikaiarchos gave it this name, is not known. It is not a little singular that this line should have unintentionally run so nearly parallel to the equator; indeed, the coincidence is so remarkable as to justify a suspicion that Dikaiarchos really did intend to draw a parallel to the equator. Howsoever we may judge on this question, there is no doubt that the next great cartographer purposed to draw real parallels on his map. We mean of course Eratosthenes, the same great Alexandrian geographer who first measured the earth's circumference. His chief parallel in the main coincided with Dikaiarchos' diaphragm, beginning at Cape St. Vincent and crossing the Sicilian Straits, Peloponnesos, Rhodes, and the Gulf of Issus. Through Rhodes he drew a perpendicular to the line just described, and thus established the first meridian, which passed through Syene, Alexandria, Rhodes, and Constantinople. It is not improbable that in choosing this line he again followed the footsteps of Dikaiarchos. At all events the importance of the points it struck, and the fact that Alexandria was one of them, fully justified the choice. It retained this preëminence until Marinus of Tyre (about 150 A.D.), the immediate predecessor of the great Ptolemy. It is true that both of Eratosthenes' cardinal lines were drawn far from correctly; the Sicilian Straits, for instance, were brought fully two degrees too far south, whilst scarcely two of the principal points of his perpendicular are really on the same meridian. In drawing his other meridians he made equally gross mistakes. The Straits of Messina and Carthage he placed on the meridian of Rome; in reality Carthage lies two degrees to the west, and the Straits of Sicily three degrees to the east of Rome. These errors, however, must not lead us to undervalue the work of the old Alexandrian. His successors in antiquity often did worse, and no further back than two hundred years ago the best geographers might have learnt from Eratosthenes. In 1668, for example, Sanson of Paris published a map in which the Mediterranean extends 60° (about 2900 miles) from east to west; Eratosthenes gives the same distance at about 2650 miles. The true measure is a little more than 2000 miles.

But in pronouncing judgment on the merits of Eratosthenes and the ancients in general, another consideration must not be overlooked. Their means, methods, and instruments for fixing the longitude and latitude of places were very simple, not to say rude. The astronomical observatory at Alexandria had none of the wonderful optical and mechanical instruments that are found to-day at Greenwich and Washington. Eratosthenes' only instrument for determining latitude was the sun-dial, or gnomon. By measuring the length of its shadow and comparing the results

obtained at different places, their latitude might be arrived at. In calculating the latitude of Alexandria by this method, Eratosthenes made an error of only seven minutes. Another method of determining latitude was based on the duration of the longest day in different places. At the equator, of course, day and night are always equal; as we proceed northward the days of the summer solstice increase in length, until at the North Pole there is but a single day six months long. By carefully observing this phenomenon at various places, geographers were enabled to compute their distances from the equator; this method was adopted by the astronomer Hipparchus (150 B.C.) in constructing his series of *climata*, or zones of latitude.

The means of reckoning longitudes were far more defective. With the aid of data furnished by the electric telegraph our schoolboys solve a problem which for centuries almost defied the greatest scientists of antiquity. The telegraph gives us the difference of time between two places; the schoolboy multiplies by fifteen, and reduces hours to degrees of longitude. But Eratosthenes not only had no telegraph; he had not even a satisfactory timekeeper. His only chronometers were sun-dials and water-clocks. Before the invention of the telegraph, a good watch carried from place to place told the difference of time. Sun-dials cannot be carried in the pocket, and, besides, as they point the time by means of the shadow due to the interception of the sun's light, any removal from place to place will cause the shadow, and, therefore, the time to vary. So the geographer had to fall back on the water-clock. This instrument was constructed on the same principle as the well-known hour-glass, water being substituted for sand; but some were so made as to record all the hours of the day. In Eratosthenes' time the water-clock was in its infancy, for it had not been invented until 245 B.C., by the Alexandrian Ktesibios. It was, therefore, in all probability very clumsy and cumbersome, and far from accurate for long periods of time. About a generation after Eratosthenes, Hipparchos, the greatest astronomer of antiquity and a geographer of great merit, suggested that longitude might be determined by comparing the hours at which eclipses occur at different places. No doubt occasionally, but very rarely, this suggestion was carried out. How unreliable were the results is best shown by an example. Eleven days before the great battle of Arbela (331 B.C.), in which Alexander the Great finally crushed and destroyed the empire of the Persian king Darius, an eclipse of the moon was observed as a dreadful portent by the two contending armies. The eclipse took place at the fifth hour, about eleven o'clock in the morning. On the same day, at the second hour (about 8 A.M.), the eclipse was seen at Carthage. The dif-

ference in longitude, accordingly, would amount to 45° ; the real difference is 34° ; that is to say, the observations were an hour astray.

But aside from the errors in longitude due to this cause, Eratosthenes' map was essentially defective in its construction. On our maps the meridians converge and meet at the poles, and the earth is thus represented as a globe. Not so on the chart of the Alexandrine geographer. His first meridian, as we have seen, passed through Alexandria; his other meridians, instead of curving and converging at the pole, were drawn as straight lines and parallel to the first meridian. As a consequence, seas and lands assumed shapes that were utterly false. We shall try to give an idea, though it will be very imperfect, of Eratosthenes' map of the Old World. Imagine a picture of the Eastern Continent from the Straits of Gibraltar to the mouth of the Ganges, and from the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb, at the mouth of the Red Sea, to a line slightly north of the Black Sea, so that it will form an irregular quadrilateral rounded off on the west. To fit it into this outline, Northern Europe is flattened down so that the northern point of Scotland, for instance, is brought within about 9° of the Sea of Azof, whilst Africa, below Cape Guardafui, trends almost directly westward, instead of stretching southward, for 25° more. The map is cut by eight parallels of latitude, not at equal distances from each other, but drawn to suit the convenience of the geographer. The second parallel, for example, which passed just below Cape Guardafui, was at a distance of about 340 geographical miles from the third, drawn through Meroë in Ethiopia, just above Khartoum, whilst the two northernmost parallels were about 1150 geographical miles apart. Perpendicular to these parallels of latitude, and likewise at unequal distances from each other, he drew seven straight lines, as substitutes for our meridians. Besides these lines Eratosthenes adopted the circles which divide the earth into zones,—the equator, the tropics, and the Arctic circle. These had probably been first proposed by the Eleatic philosopher Parmenides, an elder contemporary of Socrates (420 B.C.). To the torrid zone Eratosthenes assigned 48° , to the temperate 30° , to the frigid 36° . It must be added that he did not, as yet, divide the circle into 360° , but followed the system of Eudoxos of Knidos (370 B.C.), who divided it into sixty equal parts.

The division into 360 parts is due to Hipparchos, whom we have already mentioned. This great astronomer, like most Greek philosophers, did not confine his interest and his work to one science, and contributed not a little to the progress of geography and especially of cartography. He was a severe and sometimes an unjust critic of his great predecessor Eratosthenes. He sought to attain

greater accuracy in the location of places, and as has already been stated, suggested the observation of eclipses as a means of determining longitude. He improved Eratosthenes' map by adding two or three parallels of latitude. He seems to have aimed at a more regular distribution of these lines, and in carrying out this aim was guided by the length of the solstitial day. But not even Hipparchos succeeded in carrying out a system that was strictly consistent; for long after him the parallels of latitude were drawn at unequal distances from each other. Some modern authorities, among them Kiepert and Vivien St. Martin, award to Hipparchos the credit of being the first to introduce into his maps of the world converging meridians. Their judgment seems to be based on a passage of Strabo (Bk. II., p. 117), in which that writer expresses the opinion that meridians ought to converge, though, on a plane map, he thinks, it is unimportant to make them do so. Strabo, who lived under the emperor Augustus, is the author of a work on geography which evinces no less industry than ability. It is in the main descriptive; for Strabo, whilst a thorough master of the mathematical geography of his day, wrote for what we nowadays call "the general public," and moreover seems to have preferred the descriptive and historical side of his subject. His views on mathematical geography, which can hardly be said to be an advance on those of Hipparchos and Eratosthenes, are, therefore, in all likelihood borrowed. If, therefore, Strabo holds that the meridians of a map ought to converge, this opinion is, in all likelihood, taken from some earlier geographer. Now, between Hipparchos and Strabo we hear of no geographers of eminence, and at first sight Kiepert and Vivien St. Martin seem justified in making Hipparchos the source of Strabo's views on the correct construction of meridians. On the other hand, Strabo himself tells us that Krates of Mallos, a philosopher who lived about the same time as Hipparchos, constructed a terrestrial globe, about ten feet in diameter, on which the meridians united in two points—the poles. Might not the opinion of Strabo we are now discussing be inferred from what he knew of Krates' globe? Might not some other geographer unknown to us deserve the credit claimed for Hipparchos?

It is hardly safe, therefore, from the above premises, to infer that Hipparchos, as a matter of fact, constructed maps with converging meridians? Hipparchos, it must be borne in mind, was primarily an astronomer and may have expressed his views on astronomical geography, have written a criticism of Eratosthenes, nay, proposed improvement in his maps without going to the trouble of constructing any map of his own. Indeed, in another passage (Bk. II. ch. 38 or p. 98), Strabo finds fault with Hipparchos for merely criticising Eratosthenes, and charges that instead of correcting the

latter's errors, he refers his readers to the maps of the ancients, which, in Strabo's opinion, stood in even greater need of correction. So much is certain, however, that even if Hipparchos made this great improvement, it was not followed up by his successors. Strabo himself, we have seen, considered it unessential to draw his meridians so as to converge at the poles. Marinus of Tyre (150 A.D.), a learned and industrious scholar, who did much to correct and complete the maps of his day, made no effort to perfect them in this respect. To him was due an innovation, which, though based on a false assumption, maintained itself until very recently: the present movement for a common prime meridian shows that it would have been better to retain it. We have seen that the cartographers of Alexandria chose for their prime meridian that of Rhodes, which also passed through Alexandria, Meroë, and Byzantium (Constantinople). Marinus, in the belief that the Canaries were the western limits of the habitable earth, placed his first meridian on the Island of Ferro, and not more than thirty years ago all German maps were drawn with that as the first meridian. France, England, and the United States had already adopted the meridians of Paris, Greenwich, and Washington, the homes of their national observatories, as their prime meridians, and now the Germans, imitating their example, compute longitude from the meridian of Berlin. National vanity, in this as in many other cases, did not benefit the cause of science; the multiplication of prime meridians confuses the student of geography, and plagues the scholar with time-wasting reductions. Hence the cry for a common prime meridian, which found voice in a bill recently passed in Congress. Why not honor the great fathers of Geography by going back to the prime meridian of Rhodes or of Ferro?

The universal adoption and long survival of the prime meridian of Ferro was due to the influence of one great man, Claudius Ptolemaios, popularly known as Ptolemy. He was the worthy successor of Eratosthenes and Hipparchos, and lived at about the same period as Marinus (150 A.D.), though his geographical work was somewhat later and largely based on the labors of his contemporary. For, like Hipparchos, Ptolemy was primarily an astronomer, and to him the Ptolemaic system which places our earth in the centre of the universe, revolving about it, owes its name. Modern science has subverted his astronomical theory, but still gratefully acknowledges her indebtedness to him as a geographer. Indeed, it was fortunate that so great a man should close the long and illustrious succession of ancient scholars that reared and adorned the edifice of geography. For Ptolemy, being the last great geographer of antiquity, remained for centuries the guide of succeeding ages. In mediæval times, as Aristotle was *the philosopher*, so Ptol-

emy was *the geographer* by eminence; his book was the universal text-book, his authority was almost beyond dispute. Now, whatever Hipparchos' merits are in the premises, it was Ptolemy who permanently introduced into the map of the world the converging meridian. Indeed, in his great work on geography he gives directions for making a projection of the globe in two ways, the first by means of straight, the second by means of curved lines. The results of a correct method became at once apparent, for Ptolemy's maps are a vast improvement on those of his predecessors. The direction of the land and sea lines, the boundaries of countries, and the locations of cities are all given with far greater accuracy. Hence his work, though a mere skeleton, consisting of a list of names with their longitudes and latitudes, is still in many respects the most important ancient work on geography. Accompanying this work, or perhaps it would be more correct to say, underlying it, is an atlas of twenty-seven maps, one of the globe and twenty-six of the several countries that compose it. The first map is that of England and Ivernia or Ireland, the last that of Taprobane, or Ceylon. His meridians were drawn at regular distances of five degrees from each other, whereas his predecessors, as we have seen, drew them at random. The parallels of latitude he increased from eight to twenty-one in his geography, whilst in his astronomical work, called by its Arabian title *Almagest*, he raised the number to thirty-eight. They were no longer drawn at will, but fixed according to the duration of the longest day in different parts of the earth. In the *Geography* the first fourteen are drawn so that the longest days under two successive parallels differ from each other by fifteen minutes; for the next five the difference is half an hour, and for the last two, a full hour.

We see, then, Ptolemy improved the construction of maps in every respect; he adopted a correct method of projection, introduced regularity in the position of his meridians and parallels, located positions more correctly, and added to the number of places located. It must be regarded as a great gain for the history of science that fairly authentic copies of his charts have come down to us. Of all the maps drawn by the Greek cartographers, his were the only ones that have had this good fortune. For us, therefore, they possess a double importance: first, as representing the great Ptolemy's own work; secondly, as samples of Greek map-drawing. We know from them that the Greeks gradually learned to construct maps approximately similar to those of the present day; as perfect, in fact, as the science and exploration of their time allowed them to be drawn.

We have now traced the history of the map, until it had become in all its essentials a real map. We cannot forbear adding a few

words on the contributions of Rome to our science; the more so, as in some particulars, they are very peculiar and characteristic. The Roman genius was essentially practical. Whilst the Greek cultivated science for its own sake, the Roman looked only to what was useful to him. Now geography, it will be said, is undoubtedly a very useful branch of human knowledge, that ought to have been especially useful to the Romans, whether we look at them as a military or as a commercial people. And truly the Romans did not fail to recognize this, and they expended both much money and much labor to improve geographical knowledge. But all their toil had an immediately practical aim. They did not care whether the earth was round or flat, whether it measured twenty or thirty thousand miles in circumference. All they looked to was to have a compilation of places and distances to guide their generals and their merchants. They recked not whether they had maps scientifically constructed or not; they were satisfied to know that place A was so many miles to the right or left of B, that there was a road to take them from the one to the other, and a river or mountain to retard their march or voyage. In short, their geography was, in most respects, sheer utilitarianism. Of course a nation that aimed at, and to a great extent achieved, universal empire, a nation especially so systematically skilful in joining together the farthest parts of their empire by a network of roads that justly challenge the admiration of this age of mechanicians and engineers, must have added largely to man's knowledge of the earth. The Romans made their way to many places unknown to the nations which had preceded them in the course of empires; and in the case of localities known before, they substituted precise measurement for clever guesswork; military operations require precise topographical knowledge. No one knew this better than Julius Cæsar, who had led his legions to victory on three continents. Consequently scholars are disposed to accept as authentic the statement of a late, and otherwise by no means weighty, Roman writer on geography, Julius Æthicus, that Cæsar planned and inaugurated the scheme of compiling and constructing a great map of the world. In the very year in which he fell by the daggers of Brutus and Cassius, we are told, he appointed four Greek geometers to survey the Roman world. Nor did his death prevent the execution of the work, for, according to Æthicus, it was completed in thirty-two years. Now Agrippa, the prime minister, general, and admiral of the Emperor Augustus, planned a similar map; but, like Cæsar, he was not destined to see its completion. In one respect, however, he was luckier than his predecessor. When the map was finished and set up in the portico of Polla, it was known as Agrippa's map. Some critics, not unnaturally, have been of the opinion, that this

map of Agrippa, was the very map planned by Cæsar, the direction of which fell into Agrippa's hands after Cæsar's death. As to the manner in which this work was executed, modern scholars are by no means agreed. Some hold that it was painted on the walls of the porch of Polla, and, as a proof, point to a passage in Varro's treatise on farming. At the opening of this book, the old Roman, who, in the judgment of his countrymen, was the most learned of his nation, surpassing even his friend Cicero, meets in the temple of Tellus his father-in-law, C. Fundanius, studying a map of Italy painted on the wall. It will be remarked that this map, like Agrippa's, was exposed in a public building; hence, they infer, Agrippa's map, like that spoken of by Varro, was painted. Others, however, maintain that the map was engraved on marble slabs, which were fitted together and attached by metal nails or clamps to the wall of the building. At first sight this seems an extraordinary manner of drawing and mounting a chart. Still the advocates of this view have in their favor the oldest map of which we possess any fragments. This map was a plan of the city of Rome, of which, by the way, about two years ago, a new fragment was discovered during the excavations in the Roman Forum. According to Jordan, who has written a learned work on the subject, it was set up in a chapel sacred to the Goddess Roma, about 211 A.D., in the joint reign of Severus and Caracalla. The slabs of marble on which it is engraved are three inches thick, and, according to Jordan's computations, covered 300 square metres; that is to say, above 3000 square feet. Of course its width far exceeded its height, for if it had been square, it might have been more than fifty feet high, and would have been utterly useless. As the question stands, we cannot decide whether Agrippa's map was painted or engraved on marble; but we may fairly infer that, like the plan of Rome, its length was out of all proportion to its height. A clearer and more definite conception of it may probably be derived from a curious document which, by so eminent an authority as Kiepert, is regarded as an indirect copy of Agrippa's map. We mean the famous *Tabula Peutingeriana*, or *Peutinger's map*, so called after Conrad Peutinger, of Augsburg, in whose library it was found towards the end of the sixteenth century. Eleven of the twelve parchment charts, of which it consisted originally, are still preserved in the Imperial Library at Vienna. The present copy was made by a monk in the thirteenth century from an original dating back to the reign of the Emperor Alexander Severus (A.D. 222-235). To describe it is by no means easy. As in the case of Agrippa's wall-map, its length is out of all proportion to its width; in other words, the countries are represented on a much larger scale for the direction from east to west, than for the direc-

tion from north to south. For instance, the dimensions of Germany from north to south are to those from east to west as one is to fifteen. Italy, whose general direction is from north to south, is made to run from west to east, being wedged in between France and Dalmatia. As a consequence, the countries of the Eastern Hemisphere appear on the charts stretching in long, narrow ribbons from west to east. The names of countries, tribes, and cities are marked, and the Roman roads, leading from place to place, carefully laid down, with the distances added in figures. In fact, it is very much what a modern railway guide would be, if the stations, instead of being printed under one another, were placed side by side, with lines between, to indicate the roads. We must not, however, forget to add, that the chief features in the physical aspect of the country,—seas, rivers, and mountains,—were also set down. From the above description, imperfect as it is, it will be perceived at once that a Roman map, if map it should be called, differed widely from a Greek one; the latter was the creation of science, the former a soldier's or trader's guide.

Here, then, we close our sketch of early geography. Upwards of four thousand years had rolled by from the establishment of the Egyptian monarchy to the days of Ptolemy. Nations had traded, and warred, and explored, had risen and perished; enthusiastic men of science had braved the perils of the waves and the wilderness, or sacrificed their lives to investigation and study, and still, even in Ptolemy's day, geography had passed but little beyond its infancy. The great Ptolemy, were he to come to life again, must confess his ignorance before a modern school-boy. Yet he would have no reason to blush, for manfully and skilfully had he and his predecessors struggled to extend the domain of science with the slender means at their command. On our part we should thank Providence that, without any effort of our own, we have inherited all the treasures of science, accumulated at immense cost by the generations before us. If we thoroughly realize this, we will neither despise them nor unduly boast of our own merits. On the other hand, we may point with just pride to the great geographers of our own day: to Carl Ritter, who, so to say, re-created the science; to Alexander von Humboldt, who did so much to extend and systematize it; and to Petermann, the prince of cartographers. Nor should we omit from our roll of honor the gallant men who risked or sacrificed their lives for the advancement of geography, the Sir John Franklins and De Longs, that found a cold grave amid the Arctic snows; the Livingstones and Spekes, the Bakers and Camerons and Stanleys, that have revealed the mystery of more than sixty centuries to their contemporaries. And as merit, if coupled with modesty and humility, deserves all the more admiration, let

us not forget the hundreds of missionaries, no less disinterested, no less noble, no less devoted to science, than the heroes whose names fame trumpets forth, missionaries who, whilst bringing Christ's gospel to the heathen, and transforming savages into civilized beings, at the same time have ever had at heart the interests of geographical science.

OF THE NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL.

St. Thomas Aquinas. Sum. Theol. I. Pars.

The Metaphysics of the School. By Rev. Thomas Harper, S. J.

(CONCLUSION.)

BY substantial simplicity the human soul is essentially different from the body; its cognitive power assumes a marvellous comprehensiveness; its perfection by far transcends the realm of bodily substances; its nature presents itself to our mind as a new sphere above this universe, resplendent with unseen beauty, variety and excellence. Yet, by proving the soul not to be composite, we have not fully set forth its essence, nor sufficiently evinced its elevation above the material. Though distinct from matter, may it not be dependent on matter in its very existence, requiring this as its natural subject? So, indeed, many have thought. Just as the materialist does not distinguish the principle of rational life from the material forces, so the sensationist confounds it with the sensitive faculties; whence it comes that the one identifies man with matter, and the other with the brute. Nor are views of that kind heard of only in our days; they were entertained in antiquity, as well as in our times, and brought into systems by the Grecian no less than by our modern philosophers.

These opinions, however, have in no age been universal among the learned. Thinkers of a sounder tendency have always combated them with solid reasons. Prominent among the opponents of sensationism were, before the dawning of the Gospel, Plato and Aristotle, with their respective schools; in the Christian ages, after the Fathers of the Church, St. Thomas, with the Scholastics. The ideas chiefly of the latter it will be most proper somewhat to develop, in order to throw full light on this important question. They distinguish three kinds of substantial forms. There are forms which are such acts of a compound substance that without the composite they

cannot exist at all, since they have their being only with dependence on matter, their fellow-constituent.

There are others which are essential acts of a compound, yet can exist also without it, by themselves, having their existence independently of the material element together with which they constitute a substantial whole. Others, finally, are acts to themselves, because they are complete substances, and hence do not enter into composition, but exist exclusively in themselves. The first mentioned forms are called by the Scholastics material, not because they consist of matter, but because they depend in their existence on it as on their subject. The other forms are termed immaterial, because they are in their existence independent of matter, one kind of them not even being united with it, the other, though joined to it, still not being sustained by it. Again, the material forms are considered as non-subsistent, because they are such constituent parts of a substance that they can exist only in a composite in union with their copartner. The immaterial forms, on the contrary, are called subsistent, since they can exist by themselves and apart from any other substantial entity. There is, however, among them a remarkable difference with regard to their way of subsisting. Those forms which, being acts of themselves and integral natures, exist exclusively by themselves, evidently have a complete subsistence; the others, which are by their nature acts of a compound, yet can exist also apart from it, have an incomplete subsistence. For subsistence is the mode by which the substance exists in its own right and becomes incommunicable to another; but substantial forms which are naturally constituents of a composite are communicable to a whole and by right belong to it; they are, consequently, subsistent only in a limited sense as far as they have their existence independently of a subject which receives or sustains them, and, therefore, can exist also by themselves, though as incomplete substances.

These definitions supposed, the Scholastics generally maintain that the vital principle of brutes is a material or non-subsistent form, but that the soul of man is immaterial and, though incompletely, subsistent in itself.¹ It is in this sense that the scholastic philosophy treats of the immateriality of the soul, or of its spirituality, for the two terms coincide as to their real meaning, since, as we have no immediate insight into the spiritual, we define it negatively by conceiving it as something independent of the material.

Let us now at once put forth arguments for this essential attribute of our soul, by which it is distinguished from that of the

¹ See St. Thos. Sum. Theol., p. i.; qu. 75; art. 2 ad 1.

brute. Of course, immateriality is not directly and in itself perceivable to us; just as little is substantial simplicity, and as, in general, the intrinsic constitution of things is hidden from our immediate view. But we have a medium of demonstration in our own actions; for by action the nature or essence of a thing manifests itself. Hence from the property of the nature the property of the action is legitimately concluded, as from the source we may know the quality of that which flows from it; and *vice versa*, from the property of the action we conclude the property of the nature, as from the mirror we derive the figure of the object shining on it. However, to obtain a thorough knowledge of the essence of a being, we must search into all its actions; for only, when taken all together, do they represent its entire perfection; singly they reflect but particular powers of it. Relying on this undeniable truth, we lay down the following axiom: If in a living being there are no actions but such as spring from an organic faculty, that is, from an animated organ, its soul is a substantial form not subsistent in itself, but dependent on matter in its very being; for, as are the actions taken collectively, so is the nature of the substance. If, on the contrary, there are in a living being operations which cannot be elicited by a bodily organ or exclude the concurrence of the body, its soul must be independent of matter and subsistent in itself; for, as the principiate, so also is the principiant. All our argumentation, then, hinges upon that one question, whether man's rational activity is organic or not, whether exercised by the soul alone, or by the soul conjointly with the body; for all our other vital functions, as sensation and vegetation, are organic, according to general consent. So the Scholastics have looked on this subject. St. Thomas, treating of the immateriality or subsistence of the soul, first proves the intellect to be inorganic and then reasons in the following manner: "The intellective principle, the mind or intellect, performs its operations by itself without the body. But whatever is active of itself is also subsistent in itself; for every being is a principle of operation, inasmuch as it is reduced to act (perfection), and hence operates in the same manner as it is. Whence it follows that the human soul, which we call mind or intellect, is incorporeal and subsistent in itself."

To speak first of cognition, whence may we prove intellection to be inorganic? From the nature of cognition and from the things known to us. Cognition consists in the expression of the similitude

¹ S. Theol. p. i.; qu. 75, art. 2: "Ipsam igitur intellectuale principium quod dicitur mens vel intellectus, habet operationem per se, cui non communicat corpus. Nihil autem potest per se operari, nisi quod per se existit. Non enim est operari nisi entis in actu. Unde eo modo aliquid operatur, quo est; propter quod non dicimus, quod calor calefacit, sed calidum. Relinquitur igitur, animam humanam, quæ dicitur intellectus vel mens, esse aliquid incorporeum et subsistens."

of the object within and by the faculty of the cognitive subject. It is, therefore, necessary that the same form exists in the subject knowing and in the object known; yet it is not requisite that the same form should exist in both of them in the same manner. Nor does this imply any contradiction. The features of a man exist both in himself and in his image; but certainly they exist differently in him and in the marble, or the wax, or the photograph, or the painting which bears his likeness; for in him they are living, and in the things just mentioned they are lifeless. Likewise is the form of the tree which we see not in the same way in nature as in our eye. Since, therefore, it is not impossible that one and the selfsame form should exist differently in two subjects, we must not wonder that this in reality takes place in cognition. We may even infer that it generally must be so. The cognizant subject and the object known are evidently in most cases of a different nature. But it is an axiom that whatever is received in a thing exists there in accordance with the nature of that thing, since there must be a strict proportion between the recipient and the reality received. Consequently, a form also exists differently in the cognitive principle and in the objective. However, though the difference of the manner in which the common form exists does not impede cognition, still it determines the perfection and specific peculiarity thereof. In proportion as the form has in the cognitive faculty a superior or inferior mode of existence, the object is represented more or less perfectly, under a wider or a narrower aspect, from a higher or a lower point of view. Conversely from the different manner in which one and the selfsame object is known by different subjects we conclude the different manner in which the objective form exists in them; for as the form is in all the same, it cannot found in them a diversity of cognition but by the diverse manner of its existence. It is, no doubt, for this reason that the same body is differently perceived by the eye and by imagination.

From these premises we may now with certainty infer, not only what objects an organic faculty is able to represent, but also in what manner it can represent them. Considering, on the other hand, the objects which are known to our mind, and the respect in which they are attained, we shall discover the nature of the intellectual principle. And then comparing organic and inorganic cognition, sense, and reason, we shall be convinced that there is a diametrical opposition between them.

First, the organic faculty cannot at all know spiritual objects, because it cannot receive their forms. For an organ is composed of both body and soul, and is, consequently, a material or bodily subject. But the immaterial cannot possibly exist in the material, the latter not being proportioned to the former. Likewise, if we con-

sider cognition as active, it is evident that the material faculty cannot produce an immaterial form to represent by it a spiritual object; for there would be no proportion between cause and effect. But by the intellect we are cognizant of spiritual objects. Certainly, we have an idea of the spirit, and know to some extent what it is and is not; we have some knowledge of God and divine things, however inadequate it be. The intellect, therefore, we must conclude, is of necessity a spiritual principle, for only, if such, can it be fit to produce and receive spiritual forms. This proof, short and simple as it is, has compelling evidence for all who bear in mind the true nature of cognition. Hence we do not consider it necessary to dwell on it any longer, and address ourselves immediately to the consideration of the manner in which the organic faculty and the intellect represent their objects.

The senses are exclusively cognizant of bodies and do not attain but certain material qualities of them. This is a necessary consequence of the essential properties of any organic power whatever. In the latter, soul and body, the formal and the material elements, concur to action. Now, the body being made of matter, and consequently inert, cannot pass into action, unless acted upon by an exterior cause; and hence does not coöperate towards the cognition of an object by which it is not determined. Nor can we say that the body need not be acted on by the object, but may be moved to operation by the soul; because in such a supposition we should not have one organic, but two distinct faculties, of which the one is immaterial, the other material. Furthermore, on the organic faculty the outward body, which is its proper object, can impress only material qualities as such. For, on the one hand, it can produce no other than material forms, as its effects cannot transcend its own perfection; and, on the other hand, as St. Thomas remarks,¹ the sentient body cannot admit a substantial form of another body without being destroyed. Wherefore the organic faculties can receive but accidental material forms, and much more are they unable, on account of the impenetrability of their subject, to take in complete bodily substances. Thus it is absolutely impossible for the senses to penetrate into the nature of bodies; they cleave to their surface, their material qualities and modifications. Not so is it with the mind. The intellect can perceive all things and attain to their intrinsic constitution. Nay, the very aspect under which it takes cognizance of its objects is their essence. Indeed, we can intellectually know all that is, though we perceive the bodily first, and the spiritual secondarily and analogically; and that which we try to grasp in them by scientific

¹ Sum. c. gent., lib. ii., c. 49: "Nullum corpus potest alterius corporis formam substantialem recipere, nisi per corruptionem suam formam amittet."

inquiries, or apprehend by immediate intuition, is their nature and entity. The formal object itself of the intellect, for so is the aspect called under which it views things, is not material at all, because it is so wide and universal that it comprises the spiritual no less than the corporeal, and extends to a depth and height which no organic power can reach. The mind, therefore, must be an immaterial principle, which, even when it perceives material objects, moulds them so that they have an immaterial mode of existing. Nor do we, in saying so, incur any contradiction. For the superior includes the inferior, and the universal the particular. Consequently the spiritual, which is higher and more comprehensive, implies the material, and the form that exists in a spiritual manner eminently contains that which exists in a bodily manner. On this account, though the material or organic faculty cannot perceive the immaterial, still the immaterial faculty can represent the material object.

From the aspect under which the sense and the intellect take cognizance, we deduce several properties which the objects, as known by both the one and the other, must necessarily have. The sense or organic faculty perceives things as extended. The reason is, because the act or form by which it represents them is extended. For the extended form in the cognizant subject corresponds to an extended form in the object, and the extended act, that is effected by many parts distinct from, and outside one another, represents also the object only as extended.¹ This we have proved above sufficiently, when speaking of simplicity. Nor can, for the same reason, unity be perceived by an organic faculty; for the several parts of an object are severally apprehended by the parts of the organ without being collected in any one of them. True, the soul that animates all our nerves and fibres is simple, but the soul alone is not the sensitive principle, this is the composite of both the formal and the material element; and hence, in the sentient subject the parts of the object known exist extended and not concentrated in one simple point. The human mind, on the other hand, not only perceives things which have no extension, as, simple substances, pure and abstract forms, but also reduces the bodies to unity, and, in general, is able to gather and compare all its notions and judgments.

Again, the senses perceive the bodies, their proper object, as existing and actual. The reason thereof is obvious. The exterior senses are cognizant of the exterior body only when determined by it, and therefore perceive it as acting or making an impression on them. Yet, no doubt, what is apprehended as acting, is known

¹ See St. Thom. Sum. c. gent. lib. ii., c. 49, n. 1.

also as existent and actual. The interior sense has a fourfold function. It either perceives the bodies as acting on it through the exterior senses, wherefore it sees, as it were, colors, and hears sounds; in which case it evidently perceives its object as existent. Or it reproduces the former sensitive impressions as they were first received or formed, and in this case again it perceives its objects, not indeed as acting on it at present, but as they were active in the past, and so also beholds them in their existence and actuality. Or it decomposes the images produced by former sensations and again combines the component parts to new likenesses; and if this happens it is evident that the union thus effected is not real without ourselves, but that all the elements of the whole feigned are real, and have resulted from acting and existing bodies. Or, lastly, it discovers a new quality, that of convenience or inconvenience, in the object which it supposes already perceived by the exterior senses, and hence as existent. The intellect, on the contrary, has knowledge not only of the present and the past, but also of the future, of that which exists and that which will never exist, of the actual and the possible; it conceives the essence of things so that it prescinds from their existence, and, in general, does not perceive its objects as acting on it.

Another peculiarity of the senses is that they perceive only the individual. So it must be, considering the fact that their object is the existent that acts on us. For, indeed, all that exists, and all that acts, is individual. A second reason of this property of sensuous cognition is the extension of its objects. What is extended, its parts excluding one another by resistance, repels from itself also other beings, and is thus portioned off and divided from them even as to space. Now, is a thing so determined and distinguished not individual? The senses, moreover, perceive but the contingent, for the bodies and their qualities can and cannot exist. But the intellect knows the necessary; for it attains the essences of things, which, belonging to the metaphysical order, have absolute necessity. Besides, the senses are forced to perceive the object according as it makes an impression on them, since their cognition is determined by it; hence they can neither make abstraction, but must at once represent all that the outward body imprints on them, nor can they correct the appearance of things, however contrary to truth, but must report them as they seem. Quite differently acts the intellect. It corrects the impression made on the organ; for it conceives the bodily objects to be under certain circumstances otherwise than they exhibit themselves; it judges the sun and the stars to be infinitely larger than they appear, and the earth to move, though it seems to stand; and it accounts for such judgments by compelling reasons. The intellect

is capable also of abstraction. In fact, it separates nature or substance from the accidents, quantity from quality, and one quality from another; it considers all objects, even the simple, under manifold respects, gives them several predicates common to many, or peculiar to individuals, and thus ranges them in certain classes, genera, and species. From all that we see that in the cognition of the material itself there is an essential opposition between the intellect and the organic faculties. The senses are so confined to the bodies which exist in nature that they can neither go beyond them nor represent them in another than a material manner; the intellect views the bodies under a universal, necessary, and immaterial aspect, and gives them attributes attainable to no sentient power.¹

The last difference between the organic and inorganic faculties is that the one can reflect on itself, and the other not. By reflection the cognitive principle returns from an outward thing to itself and makes itself its own object. No faculty, of which matter is a component, can do so. For in a power of that kind the material element is neither determined by the soul, because this alone does not act in sensation, nor by itself, because it is inert, and, consequently, is acted upon by an exterior cause; and this cause, which is a body, is the object of cognition, since what determines a cognitive faculty is the thing known by it. This being so, the senses, and, in general, all organic faculties, cannot turn back upon themselves, but always have an object which is outside them. This impossibility of reflection by an organic power can be inferred likewise from the aspect under which we know ourselves. By consciousness we attain, though indistinctly, our own nature and substance as the source and subject of our acts. So far the senses cannot reach, they can neither know the substance of things nor distinguish the properties from their substratum, nor penetrate from the effect to the cause, nor, dividing united elements from one another, perceive their mutual relations; for all that is far above the material qualities, which are the proper object of sensuous cognition. Since, then, our mind perfectly returns to itself and is cognizant of its own acts and substance, it cannot be organic; it must needs be a cognitive principle free from all materiality, entirely independent of matter in its operation.²

¹ St. Thom. S. theol., pet. qu. 84, art. 1.

² "The exterior sense," says S. Thomas (S. Theol., p. i., qu. 87, art. 3, ad 3), "is perceptive inasmuch as its organ is altered by a sensible object. But a material being is altered, not by itself, which is impossible, but by some other thing. Therefore, the exterior sense, does not perceive itself, but is perceived by the interior sense, which, on its part, it alters and determines. Of course the same reason holds true also of the brain, the interior sense, which consequently cannot turn back upon itself either. Indeed, in other places S. Thomas maintains the impossibility of any

To sum up what we have said of the intellect and the organic faculty, it is evident they are in every regard opposed to one another. The one perceives of its object but material qualities, the other essence and being; the one remains at the surface, the other penetrates to the nature of things; the one is confined to the cognition of the material world, the other is unrestricted in its knowledge and comprehends all without exception; the one is cognizant of the bodies as existent, concrete and individual, the other gathers from them the abstract, the possible, the necessary, and the universal; the one is unfit to reflect upon itself, the other is self-conscious. If we further examine why the organic cognitive principle is so limited in cognition and bound down to the material, we find as the last reason that matter enters into its composition; wherefore, it can produce and support only material forms. If this be so, must not the intellect, so contrary to the sense, be independent of matter? Must it not be immaterial, and must not this immateriality be the cause of its wonderful knowledge, broad conceptions, judgments, and reasonings? Must it not be a spiritual power, in which spiritual forms are received and all things are represented by spiritual likenesses, and, for this very reason, more universally, more comprehensively, more thoroughly?

It is, however, not from the intellect alone that we infer the spirituality of the soul; we arrive at the same conclusion when we reason from the attributes of the will. What is, first, the will's formal object? The good in general, all good, not a certain kind or degree alone of good. For the will is a tendency to happiness, and this consists in the embracing of good without restriction. In this boundless extension of all good also the merely spiritual

kind of sensitive reflection taken in its proper sense. In his commentary on the Third Book of the Sentences (Dist. 23, qu. 1, art. 2, ad 3), he says that no organic faculty can know its own acts, because for this it would be necessary that the material organ, by the concurrence of which reflection is exercised, should intercede between the cognitive faculty and the material organ by which the direct act was elicited; which is undoubtedly the case, inasmuch as the organ and through it the faculty of reflection should be acted on and determined by the organ of the direct perception as by its object. But this is evidently impossible, because the material organ of both acts is the same. In the Theological Summa (p. i., qu. 14, art. 2, ad 1), he asserts that the cognitive powers which are not subsistent in themselves, cannot reflect or be self-conscious, which he says to be evident from the senses. As a reason of his assertion he assigns that non-subsistent forms are not concentrated, but poured out on matter, which certainly means that they cannot act without matter, and, consequently, not become cognizant without being determined by an outward object.

If in other places St. Thomas says that the senses know their act, yet not their essence, he asserts, not reflection in its proper sense, which is a cognitive act distinct from the perception of the outward object, but reflection improperly so-called, or as others say, reflection *in actu exercitato*, inasmuch as every cognitive faculty in the object apprehended, perceives its own act as in its effect. For if we see a mountain, a river, a city, these very objects as *seen* by the direct act imply *our seeing*.

is contained, the divinity, the ideals abstracted from all matter, morality, virtue, justice. Nay, according to the nature of the will, we take the infinite, which is supereminently, and above all else, spiritual, as the last end of all our love and desire, because in it alone we find unlimited goodness; to it we direct all our actions, and to it we subordinate all other objects agreeing with our inclinations; and from it as from the supreme standard we judge what is morally lawful or forbidden. To the attainment of the infinite good we make subservient the use or enjoyment of material things; we even despise sensual gratifications in proportion as we long for full happiness in God, and the more we thus spurn the earthly, the more is the energy of our soul intensified. Our will, therefore, we must conclude, is a power impregnated with the spiritual and perfected by the supersensible.

Of what nature must such a principle of human volition be? The will presupposes a spiritual faculty, because it tends only to the good apprehended by cognition, and no cognitive power but a spiritual can reach the infinite. The will is spiritual itself. For it consists, particularly when put into action, in an inclination or adaptation to a suitable object, which it tends to and finally embraces, in a capacity to be filled out with the things affected. But must there not be proportion between the object and the inclination to it, the capacity and its complement? The one, therefore, being immaterial, the other must of necessity be so too. Besides, appetite tends to such good as conduces to the perfection of the subject in which it is. Yet the spiritual is by no means the perfection of an organic being, as it cannot be received in that being, just as little as the sound enters the eye, or the color the ear. No organic faculty, then, can tend to the spiritual, and much less can it renounce for the same the sensual, being made for the sensual and impelled to it by an inborn tendency.

A still more striking proof of the immateriality of the will is taken from its freedom. That our will is free is a fact testified by our own consciousness and by the consent of all nations and all ages; of it neither the demonstrations of the learned can give us more certainty, nor the objections of the skeptics raise a serious doubt. True, the materialists deny it, saying that it is unaccountable to science and entangled in inextricable difficulties. But, if not materialistic, at least sound philosophy explains it sufficiently, deriving it from the nature of the will and the intellect. And even were it not so, what then? Would, therefore, freedom not be real? If we were to disown the existence of all that we cannot fully account for, how many things as evident as the sunlight should vanish away? Can we unfold the mystery of the growth of plants and animals, the process of cognition in all its details, the

nature of bodies and their forces? Who will answer in the affirmative? Shall we, therefore, say that all those things do not exist? The reality of freedom being set beyond all doubt, we must solve the question, whether it be compatible with materiality or not. Is the free will an organic faculty? By no means. Matter is implied as a necessary element in every organic power, and is in it, neither deprived of a share in operation, nor put into action by the form by which it is quickened, since both these constituents are so dependent on each other as to make up one complete active principle. But matter is inert and follows necessary laws. Hence the organic faculty, in accordance with the nature of such a component, cannot act, unless determined from without, and when acted upon, cannot but react, vitally indeed, but in proportion to the impression received. Just the reverse takes place in the rational will. We can react or not react, when acted upon by an outward agent; we can act in contravention to the impression or can follow the weaker of two and resist the stronger; we can reject what is agreeable to the senses and choose what is repugnant to them. So broad is our freedom of choice. Carefully examined into, it is found to arise from the unlimited expansion of the will. This latter is so constituted that nothing is adequate to it but the infinite, for the reason that it is a tendency to all good without restriction. Being of such a nature, the will is moved or attracted of necessity by the infinite alone, for only the adequate object necessarily sways a power; and is, on the contrary, allured, but not necessitated, by finite things. Allured by them it is, because, being good, they contribute in some way to our happiness; but it is not necessitated, because they are deficient and not necessary to our felicity. Wherefore, that the will is an immaterial faculty, follows quite evidently from its freedom.

Thus both intellect and will, in all their operations, are proved to be spiritual. As such, they manifest themselves by the manner in which they act, and by the object which they regard or pursue. The one, viewing the things under the aspect of being, and hence having the fitness to know all truth; the other, tending to the good in general, to the enjoyment of unlimited goodness, they both bear in their very nature a relation to the infinite, a capacity to embrace God, the boundless ocean of all that is true and good. A tendency of this kind is, undeniably, above and independent of matter; for, whatever implies matter as its constituent is weighed down to the material, and cannot rise above it, neither by cognition nor by appetite. The soul, thus enabled to lift itself up to the Divinity, not only bears no resemblance to earthly things, but is a likeness of the Divine Spirit. For a likeness, as St. Thomas remarks, is that which is formed to the imitation of another being, so as to ex-

press the specific nature of that being, though in an imperfect manner. To God the highest kind of life, the intellectual, is peculiar, and this He has communicated to the soul in its creation, implanting in its nature the fitness and the irresistible tendency to know Him as the Infinite Truth, and to love him as the Infinite Good.¹

What beauty of the human mind is thus disclosed to us, and in what exalted dignity does it appear? Yet, what contrast also between man, as revealed to us by the reasoning of Christian philosophy, and again as shown in the light of materialistic tenets? Here he is lowered to the brute or to matter, endowed with but material forces, and with cognition that is rather fiction than representation of truth; there, he is the likeness of the Deity, his mind being raised above all that is visible, impelled to the infinite and made akin to the increate spirit. Whence is this difference of views and conclusions arrived at? Sound metaphysics and materialism do not take their departure from different points; no, they both start from the human activity, as known by experience. But the Christian philosopher endeavors without prejudice to analyze the facts given to him, and, having obtained a sufficient knowledge of their nature, to trace them back to their true source, and from this to ascend to the first cause and supreme principiant. In this way he not only finds the soul as a substance independent of matter, but also God as its Creator, as its highest object and centre, as its archetype, as the pure and infinite ocean of being, from which life has been poured out on it. But the materialist enters upon the question with the preconceived notion that there cannot be anything but matter, which he can reach with his instruments of observation and measure according to mathematical formulas. The non-existence of the soul is for him a foregone conclusion, and the method adopted by him beforehand involves the impossibility of arriving at the spiritual. Accordingly, he will never meet the soul, any more than the miner will ever reach the heavenly stars; he will look on psychological phenomena as on insolvable riddles, and the highest intellectual endowments of human nature he will either flatly deny, or with hypocritical language and ambiguous terms apparently acknowledge, but in reality bring down to the level of organical forces. A sad degradation of man, indeed, treacherously attempted under the guise of profound learning, and perfidiously covered with false, yet much vaunted, freedom and enlightenment! But, let us turn away from the results of godless science, and return to our spirit as manifested in a brighter and more gladdening light.

¹ Sum. theol. p. I, qu. 92, art., 1, 2, 4, 6, 8.

IV. THE UNION OF THE HUMAN SOUL WITH THE BODY.

We have thus far considered the human soul in itself. We proved it to be a substance not composite, but essentially simple, united with the body, but not dependent on the body in its being; incomplete, because a partial constituent of our nature, but still subsistent in itself, because fit for separate existence. And this simple immaterial substance is the source of wonderful activity; for, able as it is to express in itself all being, it penetrates by intellection all things, yet reposes in nothing but the infinite, and, being qualified to aspire to all good, it can love and desire whatever has any degree of perfection, but rests only in the embracing of the unlimited and essential goodness. The human soul thus essentially differs from any other. Plants and brutes have no vital action that does not flow from an organic faculty, and, therefore, their vital principle is, though distinct from matter, still dependent on it or material. Substantial simplicity, then, immateriality and aptitude for intellection and free volition, unbounded in their sphere, are peculiar to man's principle of life. But, these conclusions being reached, it is now time to consider our soul in its relation to the body. Without having treated of it also in this regard, we would not yet have distinguished it from all other entities, as is required for the scientific explanation of its nature. It is its union with the body that gives it distinction from the substances above us, from the pure spirits, as immateriality and simplicity make it distinct from natures below us.

Here, however, the doctrine expounded seems to entangle us in great difficulties. From the tenets set forth in the beginning of this essay, it follows that the human soul must be regarded as the substantial form of our body. Yet can it be such, if once conceived as spiritual, subsistent, and independent of matter? Many philosophers have answered in the negative. Plato and his school have denied the rational soul to be the essential form of the human composite; in their opinion, it is, after a long pre-existence, thrown into the body as in a prison, in which it dwells as its motor. Some philosophical systems of our times know of no other connection between soul and body than that of mutual influence or mutual presence. Leibnitz construed their union into a harmony, established by Divine intervention between their actions. Others granted the information of the body, but, to account for it, postulated two or even three souls,—a rational, an animal, and a vegetable one.

This opinion has been revised in our days by Günther, who supposes in man two vital principles, the spirit (*πνεῦμα*) as the source of the intellectual, and the soul (*ψυχή*) as that of sensitive life.

To elucidate the scholastic system with regard to this point, we shall first show the oneness of the human soul. Above we have proved from the oneness of the living being the oneness of the vital principle, and we have for this purpose also appealed to the contradiction which is involved in the admission of several substantial forms in the same thing. This, undoubtedly, holds good also of man. Hence, indeed, St. Thomas infers the oneness of the human soul.¹ In following this course, however, do we not rely on an opinion rejected by good authorities, as, for instance, the Scotistic school? And do we not, moreover, beg the question? We are to demonstrate the information of the body by the soul, and now do we not deduce the oneness of the soul from the Scholastic tenet that in the same being only one substantial form is possible? A few remarks will suffice to answer these objections. The several souls admitted in man by the modern systems mentioned above, are as to their nature either complete or incomplete; if complete, they must be considered as pure forms; if incomplete, they belong to an entire essence, not as material, but as formal constituents. So, in fact, Plato, Günther, and others have viewed this point under discussion; they termed the sensitive soul the form of the body; the rational they thought to have the nature of a pure spirit. But, if this be so, the several souls admitted in man are substantial forms. Whether they are considered as informing the body or not, does not matter at all; nay, if information is denied, it is much easier for us to argue. For, in this supposition, what shall unite the several vital principles to one living being? No doubt, the body, their common dwelling-place. But, who will say that several living substances are reduced to oneness by existing in the same house? Yet, the body, it is answered, is more than the simple abode of the soul. Well, suppose it to be whatever you like, it can never produce vital union. For it has of itself no unity, as may be understood from the dissolution to which it falls a prey as soon as the vital principle has departed from it. No, it is not the body that gives unity to the soul; on the contrary, the soul gives unity to the body by quickening it and shaping it into a perfect organism fitted for immanent activity. So, if we admit several souls in man, we have several substantial forms constitutive of several natures, without any union at all. From this it may also be understood that the opinion of the Scotists is not opposed to us in this question. They gainsay the Thomistic proposition in its generality concerning the impossibility of many substantial forms co-existing in the same subject, but they never asserted the possibility of many souls existing in the same living body, being full well aware that, at least in this case, all essential unity would be neces-

¹ S. theol., p. I., qu. 76, art. 3 ab initio; Sum. c. gent., lib. II. c. 58, n. 2.

sarily destroyed, because diverse principles of immanent action cannot but diverge from one another and constitute diverse living and acting beings.

We now proceed to confirm and illustrate the oneness of the human soul, thus far deduced, *à priori*, by two arguments taken from experience and consciousness. If we reflect on ourselves, we do not attribute our vital operations to several subjects, but all to one and the self-same. It is the same *Ego* that we perceive to be intelligent and sentient, to grow and physically develop itself. Now this oneness, forced on our consciousness, cannot be accounted for by saying that several vital principles harmonize in us, or are subordinate to one another, for harmony and insubordination do not make unity in existence, just as little as they effect that the master and the servant, the rider and the horse, are one and the self-same being; they unite actions, but not natures, which stand by themselves, and are intrinsically independent. Nor is any one conscious of such loose union of his constituent parts, or conceives himself to be a spiritual being that keeps a brute subject to itself; everybody rather knows himself to be perfectly and strictly one in life and in existence. Consequently, in one human being there is but one vital principle; for, where life is but one, there the vital source too must needs be one.¹

Another proof is afforded by the dependence which exists between the evolution and the exercise of vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual life in man.² Our cognitive faculties, whether rational or sentient, are not developed and adapted to action before the body is evolved by vegetation, and whenever the bodily organism is hurt or weakened, cognition is impaired or entirely impeded. As far as operation is concerned, vegetation must precede sensation to form its organs, and sensation is prior to intellection, in order to offer the mind its proper object with which to begin thinking. And, conversely, sensation serves vegetation, since the appetite is stirred up and directed by it in the pursuit of the necessities of subsistence, so much so, that with our feeling life itself would soon be extinct. Again, the prevailing operation of the one kind opposes that of the other. If vegetation or sensation are predominant, intellection is lamed; intense mental activity, on the other hand, is detrimental to vegetation and slackens sensation and sensual appetites. Likewise, who does not know that the exertions of the intellect and will modify the body in many respects, and that, *vice versa*, climate, food, health, age, sex have a remarkable influence on the mind? How shall we account for all these phenomena of daily occurrence? By the oneness of the soul. If there

¹ Sum. c. gent., lib. ii., c. 58.

² S. Theol., p. i., qu. 76, art. 3.

were many souls in man, each the principle of a different life, there would be no such mutual dependence among our faculties. The rational soul, being not only independent of the body, but not even really united to it, would be of itself a complete spiritual substance, and, consequently, also an entire principle of spiritual activity. But if such, it cannot be made dependent on a sensitive or vegetative principle in its evolution without a startling contradiction. Neither can that which is material act on the spiritual substance, because no agent can produce an effect above its own sphere; nor can the spirit be prevented from intellection and volition, or be determined to it by the sentient faculties, because as it is raised above them and is complete in itself, so it must act of itself and independently of them. With similar difficulties we meet if we consider the vegetative and sensitive souls. It is an essential property of every principle of immanent action, that, in developing and perfecting itself, it is like a centre from which operations proceed and to which they return. The vegetative soul, therefore, which is only such, evolves but vegetative organs, and cannot at all perform vegetative functions for another body. And the sensitive soul which is only sensitive, cannot terminate in another one's vegetation or feel hunger and thirst for another being. This is an absolute impossibility founded in nature itself. For these reasons the mutual dependence of intellectual, sensitive, and vegetative life peremptorily requires one sole vital principle. From two irrefragable proofs we thus infer the oneness of the soul, from the oneness of our self or substance, and from the mutual dependence of our operations. Our oneness in being could not subsist if there were several souls in us, each one complete in itself; our actions could not be reduced to such unity as is shown by their mutual dependence, if our faculties proceeded from several vital principles, of which each is in its existence independent of the other and by itself a source of action.

After this preliminary statement, it will no more be difficult to prove that in man the rational soul is united to the body as its substantial form. In all living beings of the material universe the body is the material, the soul the formal element; the body is potential, the soul is the act. In man, the highest living substance of this world, there is but a rational soul and none besides; this is, consequently, in him the substantial form of the body. We must, however, demonstrate this important truth not only by inference from general actions, but also by a closer examination of our own being, because, from the latter, as we already suggested, some particular difficulties are raised against the theory of information. To this end, let us first show that soul and body form in man but one complete nature or substance, and one person. One

and the selfsame nature is constituted by soul and body, if from their union results one intrinsic principle of action, for thus we have above defined nature. Now this in reality is the case. There are in man actions which spring only from both of them united. Sensation (and the same is to be said of vegetation and locomotion), is not the action of the soul alone, nor of the body alone, but of the composite of them. In sensuous cognition and apposition the body has its share, for those acts are aroused in us by the determinations which are impressed on it by the outward object; they are strictly commensurate to a bodily organ; they imply in it some physical and chemical changes; they are extended over it, and hence become fit to represent extended things. Still the body alone cannot feel; it is of itself absolutely incapable of vital action; the soul must also concur with it, or rather join it, complete and elevate it to a higher grade of perfection competent with such immanent activity. Sensation in man, therefore, proceeds from the soul as from its main source. Yet from what soul? From the rational, for there is no other one in us. The body, then, and the rational soul make up in us one principle of action, and consequently one nature. As, furthermore, nature is in us identical with substance, it follows that they also constitute one complete substance, but are themselves severally incomplete. For, what is not a full principle of action, what is still in need of another element, is unfinished in itself and but a part of a whole; and what, on the contrary, is an entire nature, having all its powers fully constituted, is a whole of itself and naturally destined to no further union, particularly if a source of immanent activity.

This being proved, it is evident that soul and body form also one person. What do we understand by a person? A rational nature which subsists completely in itself, and is hence incommunicable as a part to a whole. Such is the composite formed of the rational soul and the body. Being singly incomplete in themselves, they constitute one entire rational nature, and consequently one substance completely subsistent in itself and naturally incommunicable to another self. This we perceive also by our consciousness. It is the very same ego, the same subject which we know to be intelligent, sentient, and vegetative, and to which we attribute all our perfections, both of the body and of the soul, however different from one another.

On the ground of these positions, it will be easy directly to show how the rational soul is united to the body as its substantial form. First, by what we said thus far all contrary opinions are already refuted. For they all overturn either the oneness of our vital principle, or the substantial and personal union of soul and body. They all divide man into two subsistent principles, which move or act on

one another, or agree in their actions, but do not unite themselves to one nature and substance, of which, as of the whole or the supposit, all that each of them does or possesses is predicated. Such views are fundamental to Plato's system, that supposes the soul imprisoned in the body as its motor; to Günther's theory, admitting two principles of life, the *πνεῦμα* and the *ψυχή*; and to Leibnitz's pre-established harmony. In a similar dualism any other opinion opposed to information must result. For whenever we suppose two principles, each already determined to a species and qualified for activity, we have two natures and two complete substances. To combine two elements into one nature, it is necessary that the one is yet undetermined, the other determinant; the one passive, that is, in need of its ultimate perfection; the other active, that is, conferring on the former the last complement, by which it becomes a subject fitted for action. This, however, is nothing but the theory of matter and substantial form. In addition to this, all our preceding conclusions are as many positive proofs for substantial information. Man, we said, is one nature, consisting of soul and body. What part has each component in this whole? The body is that component which we have in common with all corporeal beings, and is, as to its elements, even transmitted from them into us. The rational soul is that component which is peculiar to us, distinguishing us from the inanimate, the plant, and the brute, and constituting us in our own species. The body is of itself unfit for any vital actions; the soul is the source of vitality, the principle which by its union shapes the body into the human, the most perfect of all organisms, and endows man with activity proper to him, with vegetation, sensation, and intellection, raising him thus to the highest grade of life. This being so, is not the body the material, the soul the formal element of the human substance? Does not the one coincide with the very definition of matter, and the other with that of form?¹

We reach the same conclusion if we begin with analyzing the notion of form. The substantial form, says St. Thomas,² has two characteristic marks. The first is, that it gives substantial entity to the thing in which it is, not by acting on it, but by communicating itself to it. The second, which follows from the first, is

¹ S. Theol., p. i., qu. 76, Art. 1.

² Sum. c. gent., lib. ii., c. 68, n. 2: "Ad hoc, quod aliquid sit forma substantialis alterius, duo requiruntur. Quorum unum est, ut forma sit principium essendi substantialiter ei, cuius est forma, principium autem dico non effectivum, sed formale quo aliquid est et denominatur ens. Unde sequitur aliud, scilicet quod forma et materia convenient in uno esse, quod non contingit principio effectivo cum eo, cui dat esse; et hoc esse est in quo sub-istit substantia composita, quæ est una secundum esse ex materia et forma constans."

- that, together with the material element to which it is united, it partakes of the same being, inasmuch as it constitutes with matter one entire nature and complete substance, which is identical with and predicable of both combined, but of neither of them separately. The form, inasmuch as it thus concurs to the production of things, is a cause, but one quite different from the efficient. The efficient cause is always extrinsic, the formal cause always intrinsic to the thing constituted; the former is completely distinct from the effect it produces, and outside the same; the latter is within the thing it makes up, as part of it, and partakes of its being. So the architect is distinct from the house which he builds, but the materials and their arrangement are intrinsic to it, nay, both taken together are identical with the building that is made of them. Now the rational soul gives to the body substantial entity, since it determines the same to a specific substance. For the body is, as such, indeterminate and common to all material beings, the soul ranges it in a certain species and makes it human; the body is, of itself, devoid of life, the soul completes it to one living whole, that stands completely by itself, and is an entire principle of intellectual as well as sensitive and vegetative activity. And so the soul does, not in that it acts or imprints new modifications on the body, but in that it joins its own entity to it and enters into composition with it, so as to constitute together with it, as a component part, a new being of superior perfection. Such being the union between soul and body, it is likewise evident that they have the same being in common, for they are constituent parts of the one complete substance or nature of man, who is neither the body alone, nor the soul, but both together united, and is the subject of both bodily and spiritual operation. In every regard, then, does the rational soul possess all the essential attributes of the substantial form, and in all respects does it show itself, not as an agent that moves, modifies, or governs the body, but as a principle which as a formal element concurs to the constitution of the human whole.

Philosophically speaking, therefore, we must maintain information as the only means to explain the composition of our being, the union of soul and body. It stands on a firm ground, and is supported by convincing reasons, taken from experience as well as metaphysical speculation; it excludes the dualism upheld by all other systems, and defends man's essential unity. Nor is it a philosophical tenet alone; it is also a theological doctrine, and an article of our holy faith. The union of the body with the soul, as its substantial form, is implied in several mysteries and dogmas of revealed religion, and has, therefore, repeatedly been taught and defined by the authority of the Church: by Clement V., in the

Council of Vienne, in 1311, against certain Averroists;¹ by Leo X., in the fifth Lateran Council, in 1513, against Pomponatius; by Pius IX., in his condemnation of Günther's and Balzer's systems, in 1857 and 1860. In these ecclesiastical acts it is defined to be of Christian faith that the rational soul is the form of the body, of itself, truly, immediately, and essentially. The soul is the form of the body, truly, if not in a metaphorical or improper sense, that is, not only acting on it; of itself and immediately, if by communicating its own entity, and not by the interposition of some reality, whether substantial or accidental; essentially, if by the exigence and in consequence of its own essence, and hence, for the perfection of this, and for the end of forming a new and complete nature. Moreover, according to the definition quoted, the soul gives to the human body life, which, as all agree, belongs to our being quite essentially and substantially. Is, then, the union between soul and body not substantial, and is, in that union, the soul not the formal constituent of the substance newly composed, and, consequently, the substantial form? Though, therefore, in the documents cited, the term *substantial* does not occur, still, all that is peculiar and essential to a substantial form is predicated of the rational soul.

Although the theory of information is thus philosophically and theologically demonstrated, several explanations may still be desired for a fuller understanding. It might still seem to be hardly conceivable how the rational soul is the ultimate source not only of intellectual but also of sensitive and vegetative activity, and how, from a spiritual substance, another than a spiritual operation can proceed. The difficulty has been foreseen by St. Thomas, and solved in more than one place.² The several substantial forms, he says, differ from one another by their greater or lesser perfection, as there is also a gradation in the things made up of them in nature; for the animate bodies are more perfect than the inanimate, and the animals are above the plants. Wherefore, he continues, Aristotle likens the several species of natural beings to numbers, which differ from one another by the subtraction or addition of the unit, and compares the souls to the several species of geometrical figures. But the superior degree of perfection includes the inferior, the greater the smaller number, the pentagon the tetragon, and so we must conclude that also the higher substantial form implies the virtue and the excellence of the lower. For this reason the ra-

¹ The definition of the Council of Vienne is couched in the following terms: "Quisquis deinceps asserere, defendere, seu tenere pertinaciter præsumperit, quod anima rationalis seu intellectiva non sit forma corporis humani per se et essentialiter, tanquam hæreticus sit censendus." Clement. De Summa Trinitate et Fide Catholica. Tit. 4, cap. unico.

² S. Theol., p. i., qu. 76, art. 3; Quæst. Disp. De Anima, Art. 9.

tional soul, which is among all the substantial forms of this universe the most perfect, virtually contains the perfection of the sensitive and vegetative principle of the brutes and plants, and, consequently, united to matter, it imparts to the bodily composite all powers that are found in any grade of life. Thus it is by the rational soul that man is intelligent, sensitive, and vegetative. From the axiom appealed to St. Thomas draws a further conclusion.¹ The rational soul being supreme, it virtually also contains the body-form, and hence completes in us primordial matter to a body endowed with physical and chemical forces, with quantity and qualities. To one and the selfsame soul, therefore, man owes it that he is an actual, a bodily, a living, a sentient, and a human being. By the rational soul man is an actual being, because he is constituted by it in a complete essence; a bodily being, because he is endued by it with all the properties and powers of a perfect body; a living being, because he is quickened by it and enabled to vegetate; a sentient being, because he is furnished by it with sensitiveness; a human being, because he is gifted by it with reason, his characteristic. This view of the Angelic Doctor's is in full accordance with the above-mentioned tenet of his, that in the same being there can be only one substantial form.

From this it may be understood to what extent the soul informs matter in us. The body owes to the soul, besides the physical forces, its vegetative and sensitive faculties. So far there is between them a natural union, a mutual completion to one active principle. But the rational faculties are not and cannot be communicated to the body; these, with their corresponding acts, the soul reserves for itself. The body, therefore, does not, as it were, imbibe the entire virtue and excellence of the soul, and, conversely, the latter, though it communicates to the body its undivided simple substance, is not in the body completely and in every regard, but rather remains elevated above it, exercising its supreme activity without it by its own power.² And so, it stands to reason; for the soul is of a superior degree of perfection, and the higher cannot be entirely absorbed by the lower.³

Yet, if that be so, another serious difficulty seems to arise. In every substantial union, according to Scholastic principles, each component is of itself incomplete—the one in need of further determination, the other in need of a subject in which it is to be received. Whenever elements, not being of that description, are con-

¹ S. Theol., p. i., qu. 76, art. 4; art. 6, ad. 1.

² Quæst. Disp., De Anima, Art. 1, ad. 18: "Quamvis esse animæ sit quod ammodo corporis, non tamen corpus attingit ad esse animæ participandum secundum totam suam nobilitatem et virtutem, et ideo est aliqua operatio animæ, in qua non communicat corpus."

³ Sum. c. gent., lib. ii., c. 68, sub finem.

sidered as complete in themselves, they enter, not into an essential, but into an accidental composition. So we ourselves have reasoned above, in order to prove information. How, then, is it that the soul, which is a subsistent or spiritual substance, having operations of its own, requires a body? How is it perfected and completed by a material element, and not rather impeded in its spiritual activity, as Plato thought? Again, how is the unity of human operation better accounted for in our theory than in the systems of mutual influence or pre-established harmony? St. Thomas has not failed to answer these objections. In his opinion, the human soul, though spiritual, is of itself, without the senses, no perfect principle of intellection, and has, on this account, a natural aptness to a substantial union with the body. Having, in the *Summa contra Gentiles*, evinced its preëminence over the body, he proceeds to say: "Yet, since our intellection itself requires faculties which operate through certain bodily organs, to wit, the fancy and the senses, the human soul is understood to be naturally united to the body; in order to complete the human species." In like manner he says, in the *Summa Theologica*,² that the soul is adapted to the union with the body on account of its imperfection and potentiality in the intellectual order itself. This might seem to be in contradiction with its spirituality, and with the nature of intellection, which was proved to be an inorganic operation. Yet that this is so, we learn from what he says of the degree of human intelligence.³

The intelligent creatures, as he says, are partakers of God's intellectual nature, the more so the nearer they approach Him on their grade of perfection. Now God, being infinitely perfect, clearly and distinctly knows all truth by His own essence as by one single idea, which, as it comprises all things, may justly be termed most universal. Intellectual natures must, consequently, be capable of universal ideas; yet, as their cognitive power or light diminishes, the more they recede from God, their ideas must, in proportion to the lower degree of their intellect, be less universal or comprehensive; not because they cannot represent many or even all things at once, for this is essential to the intellect, but because they exhibit the particular and individual ever more faintly and indistinctly.⁴ Hence every created intelligence attains a clear and distinct knowledge of particular objects by several

¹ Sum. c. gent., lib. 2, c. 68: "Quia tamen ipsum intelligere animæ humanæ indiget potentiis, quæ per quædam organa corporalia operantur, scilicet imaginatione et sensu, ex hoc ipso declaratur, quod naturaliter unitur corpori ad complendam speciem humanam."

² Sum. Theol., p. i., q. 51, art. 1.

³ Sum. Theol., p. i., qu. 89, art. 1; Quæst. Disp. De Anima, art. 15.

⁴ Sum. Theol., p. i., qu. 55, art. 3.

ideas, by few or many according as its nature is more or less perfect. The human soul is the lowest among all intellectual principles, and hence, in behalf of the clearness of its cognition, its ideas are most multiplied; nay, it is no more fitted to know things in their individuality by universal species, there remaining in it only that universality which comprises many things indistinctly; a deficiency which is, indeed, patent to experience and most striking in those of inferior mental endowments. If, therefore, only universal species were communicated to us, our cognition would be very imperfect, for it would be extremely confused and indistinct. To render it clear and perfect, it is necessary that we have as many ideas as there are knowable objects, or for each particular thing a particular idea. But whence should the soul gather particular species? Of course, not from the spiritual substances; for these are universal, inasmuch as the spiritual, though individual in its existence, includes many perfections on account of its pre-eminent nature. The human intellect must, therefore, get its species from the material world below the spiritual. From there not only the higher grades of being are excluded, but, in consequence of their imperfection and impenetrability, one bodily substance excludes and repels also the other; yet the bodily agents cannot act on the spiritual. Therefore the soul, that it may enter into communication with them, must be united with a body furnished with senses, which, on the one hand, partly inhering in the rational vital principle, and, on the other hand, determined and acted upon by the exterior world, hold up to the mind by their cognition the material objects and bring them near to it. From the sensuous perception, then, the intellect abstracts species after a spiritual manner, which are universal, inasmuch as they represent things from a general point of view, and particular, inasmuch as they afford us knowledge of the bodies in their individual and particular nature. Hence we understand the senses to be necessary to the soul, not as a part of its intellectual faculty, but as a means by which the proportioned object is presented to the mind; and thus it is plain how the soul is of itself an incomplete principle even of intellectual activity and is made an entire and perfect nature by its union with the body.

This solution of the difficulty spoken of throws light on several other important points. Now we see why the intellect, though inorganic, depends nevertheless on the evolution and the regular activity of the organic faculties, extrinsically, however, and not intrinsically. Now the objections of the materialists, taken from the physical and chemical processes that take place in our brain during mental operations, may easily be refuted. Now the influence which the senses, and through them the material things, exercise

on the soul, and which conversely the soul has on the body, is no longer a riddle. If the intellect must receive its proper object from the senses, proximately from those which have their seat in the brain, it is evident that the soul cannot act if the body is not properly disposed, and that, notwithstanding their diversity in nature, there is a proportion between sensuous and mental operations. Again, as the organic and inorganic faculties, the intellect and the senses, the rational and lower appetite all spring ultimately from the same simple substance of the soul, the intense operation of the one necessarily mars that of the other, since it exhausts the strength of the common source, which is but too finite and imperfect; and the energetic tendency of the one carries away the others, since they are intimately connected in the same root. We may also explain how it comes that the intellect, as we daily experience, cannot at all think, during this life, without being assisted by the fancy, however great an abundance of intelligible species be stored up in the memory by former operations. It is the substantial union of the soul with the body that effects such complete harmony between our lower and higher faculties. Every being acts as it is. The soul, and with it the intellect, is linked to the body so as jointly to form one essence; hence it does not act at all but together with the bodily senses.¹ Though elevated above the body, the soul is nevertheless weighed down and closely attached to it by oneness in nature; therefore, it cannot take its flight alone even with its rational faculties, but rises only together with its partner in the same human essence, having become like a bird destined to soar in the air, but which, when fastened to the earth, is able but to walk on the ground. So far it is true that the body fetters and confines the mind; but this loss is amply compensated by other advantages. However, though the soul cannot during this earthly life exercise its activity independently of the body, it does not follow from this that disembodied it becomes unfit to act. For, being on the lowest grade of intelligent substances, it is of itself not incapable of cognition, but only of clear and distinct intellection by universal ideas. Separated from matter, it regains its power of merely spiritual operation, not imperfect as it was at the moment of creation, but enriched with species, which it acquired dependently on the senses, and prepared to receive a higher intellectual light, which it deserved by virtuous actions. Not improperly it is said that the soul is united to the body for the sake of the first evolution, but is disunited from it again, when once developed, in order to exist and act more perfectly, as a tender plant is first brought up in a hot-house, but, when grown up, is placed in the earth.

¹ Sum. Theol., p. i., qu. 84, art. 7.

To recapitulate our prolonged discussion, how has the human soul been presented to our view by all our proofs and positions? With what attributes have we seen it endowed? What nature did we discover in its depth? We may in accordance with our conclusions define it an intellective principiant which is the substantial form of the body. The soul is the principle of life, a substance free from all composition of both integral and essential parts, independent of matter in its existence, and consequently subsistent in itself, a source of the broadest activity, a subject endowed with an intellect capable of knowing all truth, and a will tending to all goodness, the one satisfied only with the knowledge, and the other with the perfect love, of the infinite. To the human soul, therefore, a wonderful excellence is imparted, which raises it not only immensely above the inanimate, but also above all the principles of animal life. For the bodies as such are inert, restricted in their being, and repellant; but man's soul is self-moving, comprehensive, expansive, fit to receive all forms and inclined to all perfection. The bodily world is ever changing even as to its substantial composition, and hence exists limited in time and space; yet our soul, simple in its substance, is absolutely incapable of any essential change, adapted to endless existence, and comprising with its thoughts eternity. All other vital principles of this universe are united to bodies, on which they are essentially dependent, wherefore they cannot exist by themselves, but become extinct together with the destruction of their material substratum; the human soul, on the contrary, is independent of matter and able to exist apart from the body by itself. Again, all cognition and appetition of the sensitive life is restricted to the material, but our vital power lifts itself up by the intellect and will to the objects most pure and spiritual, nay, to the Divinity itself, of which it is a likeness.

But though the human soul is of so noble an origin and nature, it is in its order on the lowest degree of essential perfection, the most imperfect intelligence; on this account it is as a substantial form planted in the body and is made with it one complete substance; to gather by means of the senses less universal, yet clearer, cognition from the world beneath. United to matter, it gives the same completeness in every regard, making it an actual, a living, a sentient being; and, not yet exhausted, it keeps man's characteristic gift, reason and free will, for itself, thus rising above the body, but acting always conjointly with it in consequence of substantial conjunction. This relation to the body distinguishes our soul from the pure spirits, and shows it, particularly during this life, much inferior to them, since they have a direct insight into the immaterial by few, but most comprehensive, ideas, without any

change or interruption. But by this imperfection and destination to union with the body, the soul realizes a grand plan of Divine Providence and plays a wonderful part in the universe. The immense gap between the material and the spiritual is thus shut; two worlds so different, the one so high, the other so low, are amicably joined in one essence, and all creation is harmoniously united. Man himself, in whom this union is effected, becomes a microcosm, a little world resembling the great in all its parts, an epitome, as it were, of all finite being. In him is the material and the immaterial, the latter imperfectly, but the former in its highest perfection, since the bodily forces, vegetation and sensation, are in him more perfect than in anything else.¹

Much and valuable knowledge have we thus gained by the inquiry into the nature of the human soul. We have seen a substance which is a mirror of the whole universe, the summary of all its excellence, the medium of the most astonishing harmony and unity, the source of action more wondrous than all the beauty and the energy of visible nature. We have beheld in it the sublimest kind of cognition, a spark of divine life, a reflection of God's simplicity and infinity, a likeness of the Deity itself. Nowhere are the highest truths, the greatness of God, His wisdom and bounty, revealed to us so clearly as in our own soul.

Into our own selves we have acquired a deeper insight. We have become acquainted with our own weakness and imperfection, but we have also been taught our preëminence over the material, and our exalted dignity; and from thence we may conclude further excellences of the rational part of our being, its incorruptibility and immortality, its destination to contemplate in eternal bliss the beauty, and to embrace with everlasting love the goodness, of the Infinite Being. Our desires, too, are directed to a sublime goal; we feel ourselves carried above these earthly things, low and perishable, to the eternal. Our esteem and love of the moral order is heightened, for the latter now begins to attract us with unwonted power, since it appears to be a light from a superior world, a way to true and everlasting happiness, a harmony between our elevated rank and our conduct, between our actions and our last end in eternity.

Lastly, our courage and confidence is strengthened and mightily supported, because we know ourselves to be the object of God's tenderest affection, since we are His likeness, and rulers of this world set up by Him to dispose of it for His glory. We are assured that, notwithstanding our feebleness, He will not despise us, but with careful providence lead us back to Himself, whence we proceeded. Nor shall we find it inconsistent, but rather highly

¹ Sum. Theol., p. i., qu. 91, art. 1.

credible, that out of His supereminent bounty He has gratuitously lifted us up to the supernatural order revealed in Christian religion. By this new creation He has but extended the profusion of the goodness which He manifested in our first making, and accomplished that conformity and that tendency to Him which He implanted in the nature of our soul.

THE DUTY OF CATHOLICS IN THE FACE OF MODERN UNBELIEF.

IT has been remarked by ecclesiastical historians, that no heresy has ever flourished for more than three hundred years. If one and another among the various forms of error has continued to exist beyond this period, its life has been but a living death. The principle of corruption inherent in it from the first became so manifest to all except those whose eyes were blinded by their personal interest in it, that men passed it by as having outlived its time. It was out of harmony with the spirit of its age. It was not only certainly doomed to die, but the process of decay was visibly proceeding. It was like the man who still lingers on, although mortification has long ago eaten away the diseased limb, and is advancing surely and slowly towards some vital part. After its tercentenary of vigor (if falsehood can ever deserve the name of vigorous), every heresy is doomed to linger on rather than to live, to drag on an inglorious existence without influence, without strength, without any hold on men of cultivated intelligence and ability, save in so far as it panders to pride and passion, and affords a convenient excuse for a life of self-indulgent pleasure-seeking, or sordid money-getting, or selfish ambition. If its term of life has been extended, it is because of the respectable shelter it affords to those who shrink from obedience to a church which enforces upon her children, in practice as well as in theory, the necessity of self-denial and submission to authority. If it still numbers among its members some pious souls, who, in all good faith, accept its teaching, it is because prejudice and education have blinded their eyes, or because they have no opportunity of knowing a better creed. But they are a class existing rather in the past than in the present, or at least they are to be found only in dark nooks and crannies, where the light of God's truth shines but dimly.

To this law of the decay of heresy, Protestantism appeared some thirty or forty years ago to afford a signal exception. It had existed 300 years and more; it had flourished nigh 300 years, if we may date the period of prosperity from the day when the Spanish Armada was wrecked on England's shores, and Elizabeth felt herself secure on a throne which had refused submission to the Holy See. The early storms, half political and half religious, which sent the Pilgrim Fathers to New England's shores, instead of shattering the bark of Protestantism, appeared to establish on either side of the Atlantic a form of religion congenial to the temper of the northern nations, and therefore possessed of a vigorous vitality. The early promise for a long time seemed to be fulfilled. Protestant religion, whether Episcopalian or Presbyterian, was either the established or the dominant religion in England, Scotland and Wales. America, as she grew up to be a powerful and independent nation, followed in the track of the old country. If Ireland clings to her hereditary faith, those who had usurped her soil, and driven her inhabitants from the homes of their ancestors, regarded the crushing out of the Catholic religion as merely a matter of time. If the Irish presumed to be obstinate in their Popery, they could be swept from the country altogether, and could be replaced by Protestant settlers, who would renew the face of the earth, and fill it with an enlightened Protestantism. Everywhere among the English-speaking nations this new form of Christianity rooted and fixed itself, and boldly proclaimed itself the religion of the future, uniting the advantages of Christianity and independence of thought, of piety and freedom, of a willing acceptance of Divine revelation without a submission to any living authority, which could impose inconvenient dogmas.

Even as late as a quarter of a century ago, Protestantism seemed to have fulfilled her early promise. True, there had been internal divisions and defalcations from the religion of the government or of the majority. Episcopalianism has been sorely wounded by children whom she had herself nursed and reared, but if they ceased to be Episcopalians they still remained dogmatic Protestants. Among Episcopalians themselves, a wide separation had arisen between the Evangelical school on the one hand and the Puseyite or Ritualistic on the other hand, but the latter like the former were still essentially dogmatic Protestants, even though they played with the name of Catholic. Firm and strong to all appearance, the Protestant temple still stood; the Protestant Churches were crowded with worshipers; the Protestant religion was regarded as the champion of orthodoxy against the Rationalist, and one Protestant minister's anathema was still regarded with apprehen-

sion, as excluding, if not from the pale of salvation, yet at least from the pale of social and religious respectability.

But how great the change! So great that we who have drifted into it do not appreciate its full significance. The disintegration of Protestantism has been going on with an almost inconceivable rapidity during the last few years, and is proceeding at an ever accelerated ratio. In England it is rapid enough, but the proverbial conservatism of the English character has retarded the process. The political importance of Anglicanism has given to the Episcopalianism of England a factitious strength. The Anglican bishops, members of the House of Peers and Lords spiritual, highly educated and wealthy noblemen, whose well-bred dignity entitled them to a place in the best society, communicated a sort of magnificence to the religious body to which they belonged. The Anglican clergy, drawn from the upper middle class, many of them from the ranks of the landed gentry, were social potentates on a small scale in town and village, and gathered round them all the respectability of its inhabitants. Even now there are many small towns and country districts where absence from the English parish church is considered as almost a slur on any man above the class of laborer or artisan, and the absentee is denounced in the family circle as little better than an infidel. But even in conservative England, these old-fashioned notions are rapidly giving way and are being relegated, like the *paganism* of the early middle ages, to remote districts and hamlets far removed from the busy hum of the crowded city.

In America, however, these influences are scarcely felt. The whole condition of society is completely different. The absence of an hereditary aristocracy, or a state religion, the fact that the influential class consists for the most part of men who have made their own position by their own personal energy and talent, robs Episcopalianism of that exclusive prestige which still clings to it in the educated classes of English society. Every religion in America has to fight its way on its own merits, and if it have weak points, they are sure to be detected and exposed. The quick instinct of public opinion discovers whether any given form of belief has a solid foundation to rest upon, and approves or condemns it accordingly. It is illogical and self-contradictory; the eager and acute intelligence of young America, without any formal process of reasoning, rejects it as an insoluble article. There are none of the time-honored associations clinging around it which in England blind men to its inherent weakness. It has not the traditional hold on the American that it has on the Englishman. The difference between the two countries is of course one of degree, not of kind; but no one who studies the state of feeling on either side of the

Atlantic can deny its existence in a very marked degree. Even in New England, the influence of "blue-blood" and of the form of religion with which the blue-blood for the most part identifies itself, is small as compared with its influence in the old country. In the Western States it scarcely exists at all. In New York and the surrounding cities it is declining day by day, and in a few years will be an element scarcely worth consideration among the forces which will determine the future religion of the country. In England, a Methodist or Wesleyan shopkeeper who makes money and is ambitious to be counted among the "gentry," still finds it desirable to adopt Episcopalianism as one of the factors which constitute respectability and aid the parvenu to a place in good society. But few Americans would think of turning Episcopalians merely for the sake of the social advantages accruing from it.

The result of all this is that dogmatic Protestantism, of which Episcopalianism is the representative creed, has a far worse chance in America than in England. The change which has taken place within the last thirty years is far more obvious in the former than in the latter country. The Episcopal and other Protestant churches find their adherents falling away from them more rapidly. Their congregations become beautifully less, their services are less frequented. The number of worshipers depends far more on the personal ability and attractiveness of the minister. It is far more necessary for him to consult the popular taste, and to serve up meats flavored and seasoned to suit the wishes of his listeners.

The existence and the popularity of men like these is a remarkable indication of the decay of Protestantism in the United States. It is one of many indications that dogmatic Protestantism is moribund, if not practically dead, as a religion. It has been weighed in the balance and found wanting. The hunger after some sort of religion may still attach the "pious female sex" to the formal belief which has been handed down to them; their husbands or brothers may still accompany them to the Episcopal Church of their parish.

In country districts and in fashionable watering-places, the churches may still be frequented for respectability's sake, but Protestantism as a living, energizing power, ready to do battle against all opponents, has lost its former vitality, and thoughtful men are drifting away from it into some form or other of unbelief or agnosticism. They gather in crowds to listen to the open opponent of Christianity, and applaud with insane delight his flippant sarcasms or unveiled attacks on all those doctrines which, to their parents and ancestors, were dear as their very life-blood. Respect for the religious opinions of the majority, which shuts the mouth or veils the unbelief of many an English skeptic, is not recognized in

America as a motive for silence, simply because the majority of Protestants have no religious opinions calling for respect. They no longer cherish the fundamental doctrines of Christianity with a personal and deeply rooted affection. If they still call themselves Christians, their Christianity hangs, for the most part, somewhat loosely about them. They do not feel hurt if it is assailed, or resent the covert sneers of the disciple of Strauss or Renan.

From time to time they wake up to a dim consciousness of the moral and social "ghouls" that are being let loose upon the world by the disciples of "free thought," but the danger is not sufficiently imminent to force them to enter seriously into the consequences of their religious position. They lament the frequency of divorce and the precocious independence of youth, the vices which ravage society and recall the corruptions of the pagan world; but they view the evil from a certain distance and console themselves with a hope that the spread of education or the growth of a healthy civilization will gradually crush out the evils, the existence of which it cannot fail to recognize.

It is not, therefore, to be wondered at, that the encroaching and advancing tide of unbelief makes short work of the barriers by which dogmatic Protestantism seeks to hold it back. As the inrolling sea sweeps away the rampart and citadel of sand which the busy hands of little workmen erect on the sea-shore, so the inrolling sea of skepticism is rapidly washing away the bulwarks and forts of sand which all the various forms of Christianity, save one, oppose to its advance.

All save one—for one there is which the waves and waters of modern thought are powerless to injure. Feebly and fruitlessly they beat upon the solid masonry on which the Church of God is built, and idly they lash themselves into fury and expend their feeble force on the rock upon which she is built. Vainly do they sweep round her if perchance they may find one weak point in her defences, one little cranny in which they may force an entrance and rush in to their work of destruction. But as the ages roll along, instead of loosening her hold or undermining her foundations, they do but add fresh strength to her position and bind together her solid bulwarks into a more perfect unity and exhibit her more clearly to the whole world in the majesty of her eternal might. The Catholic Church rises up proudly among the seething waters, and amid the general ruin stands out in striking contrast to the feeble creeds which are being swallowed up in the abyss. The rain falls and the winds blow and the floods come and beat upon that house, and it falls not, for it is founded on a rock.

Even those who have for centuries attacked and reviled her are beginning, as their own frail tenements are beaten down by the

storm, to turn from time to time their wistful eyes to the indefectible glory of her unshaken faith. She, and she alone, is regarded by the enemies of Christendom as an adversary to be feared, and while they hate her, revile her, misrepresent her, yet all the while in their secret hearts they respect her and recognize her power. The innate faculty which grasps instinctively after Truth can never wholly be eradicated, and even the dogmatic Atheist amid his most audacious blasphemies still cherishes, deep down in the depths of his soul, a consciousness, or half consciousness, that after all the Catholic Church is right and he is wrong. The lurking suspicion may be buried under a heap of vice and pride and intellectual dishonesty; it may be overlaid with a mass of sophisms by which he has long sought to deceive others and has at last succeeded in deceiving only himself. But you may expel nature with the pitchfork of fallacy and plausible argumentation, yet back she will come in spite of all; and the skeptic, while he denounces all religions as mere empty and illogical superstitions worthy of the contempt of intellectual men, has from time to time a misgiving lest in his sweeping denunciation he should be condemning, amid a mass of criminals justly doomed to die, one that is the very Truth itself, and whose only crime is that she demands unqualified and unconditional submission from rebels who will not obey.

But while the Church has nothing to fear from her puny assailants, and looks down calmly from her vantage ground on the battle which rages around, her children, as individuals, do not share in her indefectibility. The waves which beat harmlessly on the rock of the Church may engulf, and do engulf, many of her sons and daughters. The advance of skepticism brings no danger to the Catholic Church, but it is pregnant with danger to Catholics. As the Evil One can avail nothing against God, but can work and does work sad havoc among the children of God, so unbelief, the Devil's first lieutenant, carries captive and entices to their destruction not a few who are the children of Catholic parents and perhaps have themselves been nursed in the Church's bosom. As the Devil consoles himself for the hopelessness of his warfare against God by venting his spite on those who bear the stamp of the Divine likeness, so he consoles himself for the hopelessness of his warfare against the Church by many a successful raid on those who are signed with the sign of the Catholic Church and enrolled in her army. Soldier in deed and in truth the Catholic must be in the present day, and many an assault he must encounter, many a battle he must fight against the countless foes who are arrayed in the livery of modern unbelief. In his daily paper, in his weekly or monthly magazine, among his associates in the school of medicine or of law, in office and counting house, in club and restaurant, on

the railroad, at the hotel, at the private dinner-table, in every social or friendly meeting, he is liable to encounter plausible, ingenious, well-stated objections to Christianity and even to Theism. There is no shirking the contest; the enemy must be met. If we would avoid coming into contact with modern infidelity, we must needs go out of the world. It is in the very air we breathe; it encircles us on every side; we may protect our children from it during childhood and early youth, but the day must come when they will be exposed to its attack. Every day it stalks abroad more fearlessly, emboldened by the overthrow of the dogmatic Protestant. How, then, are we to deal with it? What is the attitude of the Catholic, and especially of the educated Catholic, towards modern Infidelity?

The question is the more important because of the weight which the world outside attaches to the dictum of the Catholic on religious questions. Men seem to expect not only every priest, but every educated layman to be a trained theologian and controversialist. They appear to imagine that the gift of inerrancy attaches to every expression of opinion on the part of each individual Catholic. They expect us, one and all, to be armed *cap-a-pie*, to be ready to meet every objection and to solve every difficulty; or if not this, at least to be able to tell them what the Church teaches on this or that point of doctrine or practice. They are often quite unreasonable in their demands on our information, and on our power of ready argument. All this makes our responsibility the greater. Few Catholics are aware how great a treasure is committed to their charge; how the Protestant and the waverer between belief and unbelief expects of them an acquaintance with all the moot points of controversy, and accepts their statements on the most intricate questions as if they were the voice of the Church herself.

It must be acknowledged that the position of Catholics is a difficult one. As a general rule, our adversaries are better equipped than we are as regards general cultivation, the higher education, and in scientific knowledge. They have the advantage in point of mere secular learning and intellectual development, on both sides of the Atlantic. From a variety of different causes it must be confessed that in respect of dialectic skill, and literary research, and scholar-like training, and breadth of information, Protestants are the superiors of their Catholic neighbors. It would not be difficult, if our space allowed of it, to trace out the causes of this superiority. It will be enough at present to remind our readers that any nation, or section of a nation, which has for long years been driven out of the political and social arena by direct or indirect persecution, sinks thereby in the social and intellectual order, and only recovers, after the lapse of centuries, the advantages of which it has been un-

justly deprived. Add to this that the discouragement by the Catholic Church of mixed education deprives her loyal children of many opportunities of secular learning which they would otherwise have enjoyed. The former of these causes has been at work, ever since the Reformation, both in England and in Ireland. In the latter country it was carried on with a persistent brutality which, until but a short time since, made the higher education impossible, unless at the price of apostasy ; and though in England the persecuting laws fell into abeyance at an earlier period, yet the Catholics, long accustomed to the tradition of injustice, and excluded from the English universities, and from all the public educational endowments, held themselves aloof from the intellectual as well as from the political activity of the nation, and lived for the most part in the quiet retirement of a country life.

The savage cruelty with which Ireland was treated in matters of education did not affect the Catholic population of Ireland alone. Its effects are keenly felt in America at the present day. The forced illiteracy of generations has left the class to which most emigrants belong so unaccustomed to intellectual cultivation that they have almost ceased to feel the want of it. In spite of a bright, quick intelligence, in spite of an eagerness for knowledge, in spite of a natural docility and readiness to learn, they have been so long starved of their mental food by the hateful oppression of misrule, that they do not recover, even in the freedom of American liberty, the appetite for intellectual training which once made Ireland one of the most learned of European nations. Even in America, too, Catholics as such are at a disadvantage. The public schools, with their purely secular education, are no fit place for the training of Catholic children. The normal schools and universities share the same defect ; and though we cannot expect non-Catholics to understand the injustice thus entailed on Catholic consciences, yet as a matter of fact the Catholic population is at a very serious disadvantage as compared with their Protestant neighbors, and is heavily handicapped in the intellectual race.

All this renders the problem to be solved a more difficult one. Fought the battle must be. How are we to train our young soldiers to fight it? What reply are we to advise the Catholic to make when he is brought face to face with the Protestant, the opponent of Christianity, perhaps the open scoffer against the existence of God? Is he to be silent, or to attempt a reply, conscious as he often is of being at a disadvantage in a knowledge of facts, in skill of argument, in the use of the weapons with which he has to shield himself and to strike down his adversary? Is he to endanger his cause by his feeble method of fighting for it? Is he to expose his holy religion to a suspicion of weakness which is really his, not

Hers? If he attempt a reply, ought he simply to stand on the defensive, or is he to carry the war boldly into the enemy's country and attack the position of his adversaries? Is it best for him merely to state the Catholic doctrine without attempting to defend it, or ought he to be able to give a reason for each article of his faith?

The practical solution of questions like these depends not so much on the generation of Catholics now growing up into manhood and womanhood, as on those who have the charge of their intellectual training. It is the parish priest, the presidents of Catholic schools and colleges, the superiors of the training institutions, the Catholic schoolmaster and schoolmistress, be they religious or secular, whose attention we desire to direct to this all-important question. It is they who have to form the rising generation of Catholics. It is to them that we look for the arming of the champions of Faith against the insidious attacks of error. It is they who have the best opportunity of suggesting the weapons to be used, the method of fighting to be adopted; it is they who must put in the hands of the combatant the shield which is to defend him against the piercing darts of skepticism, and the sword and the spear with which he is to attack and put to flight the enemies of the Catholic Church.

The first point to which we would call attention is a point so obvious that it would be absurd to allude to it if it were not so generally overlooked. It is that all dangers to faith from whatever external source they come derive their power to harm from some moral weakness in him who is exposed to them. Mere external attack will never harm the faith of a Catholic, if he have been living up to his religion. The reason of his peril is that there is a traitor in the citadel. In small or great things there has been some unfaithfulness to the grace of God, some wilful, deliberate unfaithfulness, generally some open rebellion and violation of the moral law. The young man whose life is stainless, who has not allowed the siren pleasure to seduce him by her wiles, or the lust for gold to absorb his energies and shut out God, or the longing for fame and honor and a high reputation among men to turn him aside from his desire to please God, will be impervious to every attack on his faith. The objections raised by the skeptic may cause him pain as being an insult to the religion that he loves and cherishes. He may be quite unable to answer the difficulties raised, but they make no impression upon his intellect, and he instinctively rejects them, as a good son rejects any sort of imputation, however apparently plausible, upon the honor of his mother. It is only when there has been some practical disloyalty to God that faith is prone to be weakened and shaken by the attacks of non-Catholics and

infidels. The moral sense must be perverted before the intellect can admit a practical error subversive of its complete and perfect adherence to Truth.

If all Catholics would live good lives, Ingersoll's blasphemies would fall as harmless on their ears as the rattling shower of bullets on the casemate battery. *Beati mundo corde, quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt.* The pure in heart shall see God, and seeing Him they shall see His truth with a clear vision, and seeing it there is no fear lest they desert their virgin mistress Truth for the foul harlot Error, however cunningly Error be painted to deceive the unwary, and however closely she may seek to imitate in garb and gesture her Godlike rival. Hence the man who trains up the young in the love of virtue does more for the defence of truth than he who hurls syllogisms against Error, and plies her with the most trenchant and convincing argument. He is a more efficacious champion of the truth even than one who furnishes youth with a thorough knowledge of their religion, and teaches them solid arguments in defence of every dogma.

It was only the other day that a young man, trained most carefully in a Catholic college, said mournfully to one who was remonstrating with him on his skepticism: "I know well all the arguments for my religion. I know the answers to all the ordinary objections brought against it. I find no difficulty in refuting the objections, *but yet somehow I myself do not believe.*" The gift of faith had been forfeited by habitual sin, and the armory well stocked with weapons was useless to him, who had lost the power to use them. There is no such thing as a purely intellectual difficulty against the Catholic faith. It is when the intellect is blinded by the corrupt will that conjures up the spectre of doubt that it attributes to the phantom a solid reality. It is the intellect debauched by concupiscence which loses that instinctive perception of truth which is an infallible preservative against error and doubt.

But while all this is of primary importance, while nothing without a high morality can ever be a safeguard against the loss of faith, we must not neglect the other side of the question. We must not be satisfied to see our youth grow up pious noodles so long as we are sure that they are pious. Even if it were safe policy as regards Catholics themselves (which it is not), it would bring Catholicity into contempt, and would be a fatal bar to the conversion of those who, though outside the Church, instinctively look to Catholics as the proper champions of truth. Even on matters of natural religion, unconnected with positive dogma, Catholics, and especially Catholic priests, are expected to come to the front, and so be ready with a philosophical defence of first principles. Hence arises the practical point at issue, how far should ordinary

Catholics be trained up to religious argument with the enemies of our religion, or with inquirers who raise conscientious difficulties against this or that dogma, or Catholic practice?

I think that the general experience goes to prove that religious controversy is rarely productive of much good. It may be sometimes necessary, but it is an unfortunate necessity. It rarely convinces; it still more rarely converts. It very commonly strengthens prejudice and embitters opposition to the Church. It has a constant tendency to desert the true question at issue, and to run off into some issue which is not really to the point. It assigns the victory for the most part not to the champion of truth, but to the possessor of the quickest wit and sharpest tongue. It is of more importance to the professional controversialist that his arguments should be plausible than that they should be true. In controversy clever clap-trap often carries the day. An appeal to the sympathies or feelings will enlist the hearer on the side of error in spite of the underlying fallacy. For these and other reasons like them it is, as a general rule, unwise for the ordinary Catholic to enter upon a religious controversy. It is far better for him to fall back upon the weight of authority; and any man of intelligence will understand that this is the most rational and sensible course for him to pursue. If a skeptic asks me (I speak in the character of an average educated Catholic layman) whether I really believe that my God is present in a wafer, when the evidence of every sense testifies to its being an ordinary piece of bread, and challenges me to prove the fact, my most rational answer is to ask him, by way of retort, whether he really believes that the earth moves and the sun stands still, when the evidence of his senses testifies to the contrary, and so challenge him to prove by arguments the scientific fact. He will, probably, reply that it has been proved again and again; and that, though he cannot bring forward the actual proof, yet he knows that they are sufficient to satisfy men of learning who are competent judges of the question. I answer that this is exactly my case with regard to the doctrine of the Blessed Eucharist. I cannot prove it, but I am satisfied to receive it on authority, just as he receives on authority the doctrine of the earth's revolution. The only difference is that he relies on human authority, and therefore makes an act of human faith. I rely only on Divine authority as well as human, and therefore make an act of Divine faith.

But, as a general rule, what is asked and expected of Catholics is not so much the arguments by which they try to prove this or that dogma, as a statement of what the Church actually teaches on this or that point. One of the greatest hindrances to the conversion of non-Catholics is a false idea of Catholic teaching; they

attribute to her some manifest absurdity, and then on the strength of its incredibility reject the Church's teaching as a whole. Granted their premiss, their conclusion is a perfectly logical one. If the Church inculcated upon her children a single dogma which wavered by a single hair's breadth from the rule of truth, the whole system of her teaching would be justly rejected by mankind. It is true that Tertullian says, *Credo quia absurdum*, but we must remember that Tertullian was a Montanist, and, even if he had not fallen away when he wrote those words, yet the tendency to exaggeration was a part of his nature. Besides, the words admit of a perfectly true meaning. *Credo quia absurdum* does not mean, I believe this on the score of its absurdity, but I am obliged to exercise faith on this point because it is at variance with ordinary experience. In this sense the dictum is perfectly true of the mystery of the Blessed Eucharist, of all miracles, of all the strange paradoxes which make the Gospel of Christ a scandal to the Jews, and to the Greeks a folly. But Catholics at the same time cling to that shield which is their safeguard against the skeptic and the world. They must never forget that there is only one religious system in the world which teaches no absurdity in the strict sense of the word, which involves no inherent contradiction, which asks the acceptance of nothing against which an enlightened reason revolts, and that is the Church which is founded on the See of Peter.

To return to our immediate subject, we are asking ourselves, what is the safest attitude for the average educated Catholic, when brought face to face with the infidel objector; and consequently what should be the general drift of the teaching given to our young Catholics, who are likely to have to encounter cultivated skepticism, and what should be the advice of those who educate them as to the position they should take up if called upon to defend their faith? As I have said, they cannot be armed, *cap-a-pie*, against all possible objections, and, even if they could, it certainly is a dangerous thing to enter upon a dispute with an opponent who is well-instructed, quick-witted, and perhaps rather unscrupulous. But men of the world do expect, and have a right to expect, that the Catholics should be able to state, clearly and simply, what it is that the Church teaches on those points where she is most often misrepresented, and where she is most obvious to plausible objection. The mind of man has an instinctive perception of truth, an innate appreciation of the fitness of things. This instinct, though it may be dulled by deliberate sin, and overlaid with ignorance and prejudice, never disappears altogether. Even in those who have learnt to call evil good, and good evil, it never can be wholly extinct; some faint vestiges of it remain even in the degraded intelligence of the dogmatic and proselytizing atheist. In the man

of good-will, who is ready to obey the law of God so far as he can see that it binds him, and to submit to the yoke of the Church as soon as he is convinced of her claims to be the divine teacher, this instinctive power enables him to recognize at once that which has a ring of truth, to discern without an effort the true from the false. Such a man, when he hears the Catholic doctrine stated on any controverted point, is impelled by his natural love of truth to assent to it. To the voice of nature the supernatural voice, speaking within him, as by divine authority, adds its confirming verdict of approval; the process in his mind is one of immediate intuition, rather than of argument; he is drawn towards the truth almost in spite of himself; he takes to it naturally without exactly knowing why, just as the healthy appetite takes to the food suitable to its needs. He falls in love with its divine loveliness without being able to account even to himself for his yearning after it.

We often hear non-Catholics candidly avow, when thus the truth is set before them, that there is something in it irresistibly attractive. They profess their admiration for its dogmas, generally speaking, and only except a few, which some personal consideration or a misunderstanding of them causes them to look askance at and reject. Very often it is sheer ignorance of what those dogmas really are which gives rise to their dislike of them. What they object to is not any doctrine as taught by the Church, but the caricature which passes current for the reality in the world at large. It is true that the difficulty may partly arise from themselves, that the cloud of ignorance may be mingled with the mist of sin, that those prejudices would somehow melt away if they had not in their actions been false to the guidance of the Light which lightens every man who is born into the world. But the moral barrier could often be overleaped were it not for the gulf of ignorance behind it. It is the double chain which cannot be broken, and which hinders the soul from attaining the truth after which it longs.

I do not hesitate to call it a *gulf* of ignorance; and it is a gulf, the depth and breadth of which it is not easy for one who has always been a Catholic to understand and appreciate, unless he has been brought into contact with it professionally as a priest must needs be in a large city, still Catholics cannot be wholly ignorant of its existence. Now and then some well-educated man lets fall a remark which betrays an entire misconception of the most fundamental doctrines and practices of the Church. Sometimes a popular writer lets us into the secret of his aversion to Catholicity by some portentous misstatement as to what Rome teaches. We ourselves remember a Protestant Episcopal clergyman who, after a visit to France, gravely informed his congregation that in that priest-ridden country he had actually seen a list of the various

prices for which different sins could be forgiven. When the good man was questioned it turned out that, in his ignorance of the language, he had thought that the "Prix des Chaises," often hung up at the door of French cathedrals, was a price-list of the sums received for absolution from sins more or less heinous. Some of our readers will recollect, in Hawthorne's *Scarlet Letter*, his extraordinary calculation of the amount of indulgences which could be gained at Rome in a few hours. Under the false impression that an indulgence of one year meant the curtailment by one year of the time to be spent in purgatory, he comes to the conclusion that, by reciting certain prayers and visiting certain holy places, any ordinary individual might in a very short time shorten their time in purgatory by hundreds or thousands of years, and he points out very naturally the demoralizing effect of such a belief. Such a mistake as this creates a very excusable prejudice, but at the same time is a fatal barrier to the conversion of those who entertain it. It is mistakes like this that every educated Catholic should be able to contradict. It is of the greatest importance to Catholics, not for their own sakes alone, but for the sake of others also, that they should be instructed in the Church's doctrine on points where a little perversion will turn what is reasonable and true into what is quite unreasonable and false. If a Catholic has never been taught the difference between absolute and relative worship, how can he meet successfully the Protestant objection to the "adoration of the Cross?" If he has never been instructed in the doctrine of concomitance, how can he reasonably explain the Church's practice of Communion under one species only? If he has never learned what indulgence really means, and the true significance of an indulgence of three hundred days, or seven years, how can he answer, even in his own mind, the countless difficulties that may be raised against them?

The conclusions which follow from what we have been saying may be stated in a few words. 1. For the maintenance and for the advancement of the Catholic religion nothing is so important as the faithful practice of it by individual Catholics. Nothing but this can secure them from defection; nothing has such a power to win over others as this. The point of primary importance, therefore, is to train the young to purity of morals and to the obedience of faith.

2. This is not enough, or rather it is impossible without a further step. Moral and religious training must include the intellect as well as the will. Instruction is necessary, else ignorance is sure to bring with it its twin companion sin. Our young Catholics must be taught not only to state with accuracy the leading tenets of their faith, but to be able to give a reasonable ex-

planation of them, such as would satisfy the educated inquirer upon those points where Protestants most frequently attack us.

3. It is not desirable to encourage in the average lay Catholic an eagerness for the fray in matters of religion. He will often do better to meet the objector by some ready rejoinder, personal or even irrelevant, than by a serious attempt to argue out the difficulty. If a man begin to talk about the "monstrous conception of eternal fire," it may be a better answer to ask him to withhold his judgment until he has been there for a hundred years or so, than to rouse him to fresh blasphemies by discussing the possibility of hell. We must be on our guard against exposing that which is holy to be trampled upon by the sensualist, or torn by the unbeliever. There is a *disciplina arcani* suitable to these days of modern paganism, as well as that which the Christians practised among the pagans of old.

QUID EST HOMO? A QUERY ON THE PLURALITY OF WORLDS.

IN a learned and interesting article, which the April issue of the QUARTERLY contained, there was expounded a theory on the plurality of worlds, by one highly qualified to handle the subject. The theory is one which is patronized by not a few in the learned world; and, in the article to which we refer, it is brought back to solid principles, and is made to rest on a basis so trustworthy as the doctrine of St. Thomas. The readiness and familiarity with which the reverend and learned writer applies the principles of the Angelic Doctor to the theory before him, is one instance of that philosophical revival which is a bright feature of the day; and which shines on the face of the Church, refreshes our Catholic instincts, and follows up the initiative taken by His Holiness, in the cause of true science and learning. Hoping to see a fuller development given to this question, which is felt to bear somehow in a significant manner upon all our revealed doctrine, we have thought to offer a few remarks upon the arguments presented by the learned essayist; and, if the tenor of our observations seem but critical and so far negative, we would beg to supplement them with a more positive view, to which the reverend essayist barely alluded.

To make clear the full weight and significance of his speculation,

as far as it affects infidelity, it seems very evident that what he undertook to prove against free thought is abundantly established. He desired to show that no relevant objection could be made to Revelation, and no slight could be put upon it, by the scientific hypothesis of a plurality of races inhabiting the stellar orbs. Should the present unverified hypothesis be, in any possible event, raised to the dignity of a doctrine, Revelation will remain equally a doctrine, in all its symmetry of form and proportion.

Further, in the reverend author's judgment, the outcome of such a scientific development would be an extension of view, an increased grandeur of conception. We cannot but agree with him; for whatever God has done must result so with us. But he proceeds farther, and is prone to anticipate; and with the good-will which goes half-way towards making a hearty scientist, he forestalls that conclusion, he believes it actual, and thinks God has dealt so with those stellar depths, and has peopled them with rational beings, of our genus, though not of our species.

For this he offers three arguments. More than three we cannot distinguish. Taking them in the order in which we now mean to review them, we may call them the utilitarian argument, the argument for number of species, and the argument for reconciliation.

Utilitarianism in general is the system of thought or action by which things are referred as means to an end. Systematically, things are viewed as measured by the end, and their worth is determined by that. They are compared, assorted, accepted, rejected, on the merits of this one relationship,—how they comport with the end in view. Thus far we are all utilitarians, in theory as well as in practice.

There are two greater orders of utilitarianism, one broad, the other narrow; one viewing things at large, the other regarding them in a special field; the one being that of the commander, the other that of his subaltern. The broad system of utilitarianism excludes the view of no particular end, but by preference keeps its eye on the one more remote, towards which all others converge. Facts and relations which lie outside of the subaltern's field of vision appear, from this commanding point, conspicuous and ordered in keeping with the rest. Facts even which might seem in conflict with other facts become coördinate therewith, by subordination to a higher fact; and notes which sounded in conflicting keys resolve into the intelligent elements of a more comprehensive harmony. In this view of the world, what seems to be neglect in one direction is part of a higher providence in another. "Has God a care for the oxen?" asks the apostle. But if He has not, or has less care for the oxen, it is only because He has more for men, and for

their progress in mercy and charity and hope. In this broad view of the world, even such a thing as evil in the universe is possible; and the universe withal rolls on in its own perfect movement, perfect whether the rhythm of that movement be, absolutely speaking, good, or better, or best.

Thus, then, what within our limited span of life, and to our narrow stretch of vision, seem irreconcilable facts which will never meet in one, like meridians, which at the equator appear perfectly parallel; the same facts pursued beyond the visible horizon, and discerned by a higher intelligence, are found to meet at the pole. And again, as on the smooth surface of the sea it might appear that so level a table, or rather so concave a bosom which the ocean presents, could never, by any freak of fortune, happen to be round and convex, and nod complacently towards itself, till reëntering into itself it came around to whence it started; so, standing as we do, on the infinitesimal arc of some six thousand historical years, we are liable, in our littleness, to settle down in a valley of difficulties, and to feel great thoughts like a great weight upon our little premises; and so it must be until, standing outside of our native narrowness, we come to ply a leverage of thought which is not restricted by the conditions of our birth, and we behold all meridians meeting in a pole, and every surface of the sphere, no matter how varied, blending amicably with every other. This is the broader utilitarian view of things. It is metaphysical and theological.

There is another utilitarianism, that of the subaltern; who, placed to command some nearer attainable end, bends every nerve towards the attainment thereof. In the departments of knowledge, theoretical and practical alike, so various are the adaptations actual and possible, so numerous the combinations, and so diverse the abilities of men for discovering, devising or applying the one or the other, that, in every laboratory of nature and in every hall of speculation, a peerage of wit comes into existence, an aristocracy of genius. The nineteenth century in particular has revised all the merits and titles of nobility, by re-arranging everything upon its own peculiar ground of material culture, or the development of material resources. Men are excellent according as they excel in material specialties. All specialties are partial, limited, but these in particular are limited to matters of sight, touch, hearing; and their highest theory seldom wanders far beyond the demands of practical comfort. Thus hampered, if this utilitarianism applies its principles to wider questions, to metaphysics or theology, it is narrow and warped in the effort. If it essays to control the nobler world of thought, of doctrine, of ethics, of politics, it measures religion by mathematics, piety by poetry, monasticism by the fiscal

returns, eternal justice by material expediency. It has given birth to a liberal brood of scientific knight-errantry, of freebooters and free lances; of steady political legislation, intrrenching in parallel lines of approach upon every stronghold of truth and virtue. It never fails to make a point one way or another; and the least it does is to mask effectively the object of all man's highest cravings, and the final object of true utilitarianism, the knowledge and service of God. For, who ever missed eternal bliss, except on some principle of narrow utility? He had bought a yoke; or he had purchased a house; or he had married a wife; so he left heaven alone. This is materialistic utilitarianism.

Having settled these preliminaries, we may now approach the argument which the reverend essayist bases upon utility. He first lays down the general principle: "God, having determined upon the amount of perfection to be created, was bound to draw from it the greatest possible amount of glory; no force of the universe should be allowed to go to waste; all the forces combined should be so drawn out as to realize in the best possible manner the general end of the universe." Then he proceeds to make the particular application of this general principle: "Now, without the plurality of worlds teeming with myriads of intellectual substances informing an organism, this law of wisdom would utterly fail. Pray, what is the physical use of such masses? Can any one tell? No use whatever can be mentioned; we can see no necessity for such a vast number of colossal systems," etc. Therefore, there exists a plurality of worlds. We beg leave to determine the exact value of these propositions, especially of the second, or minor.

Indeed, as to the general proposition, no philosopher, whose mind is imbued with the essentially broad views of St. Thomas, will ever start with narrow principles, or give in to the short-sighted materialism of the day. But it is quite possible that, with such a broad principle as God's greater glory over-ruling everything, one should connect some other assertion rather too restricted in its nature; as, that the said glory of God cannot be attained except in such and such ways as I designate; particularly if I designate them merely in default of my seeing other ways.

In all matters of God's free choice and determination, and such are the creation and arrangement of things in the universe, God chose freely what number, weight and measure He pleased. He did so on earth; He has done so in the sky. No necessity is imposed on Him as to whether He should make things or not, no necessity arising either from the immutable essences of things, or the immutable attitude of all things towards Himself. And when He chose this world, to make it in time, He made it as its essences demanded that they should be, and He made it essentially depen-

dent on Himself, so that it should ever give glory to Him, as a whole and in all its parts. But how much of it there should be, and how its parts should stand related to one another, in the mingling and blending of their physical proportions, this was entirely the subject matter of His free design, and He designed it all freely. Therefore is it that we know miracles are possible : therefore, likewise, optimism is false.

Is it needful that one physical element more, or one less, should temper the world to make it the very best? Is it needful that two suns, or no sun, should revolve here or there? Is it needful that more grass or less rock should fill up this prospect to satisfy the eye? What is there to make anything necessary, when the whole thing is unnecessary, and every one of its parts arbitrary? If it can be shown by an exclusive minor proposition that such and such a method is the *only* way for effecting the glory of God, then the argument will be quite conclusive that such a method exists. But if the economy of the glory of God is to be demonstrated by fair-seeming hypotheses, which are not exclusive, then there is no inference metaphysically conclusive. At most one can affirm : "I do not know what else can be said." One can ask questions : "Pray, what is the physical use of such an arrangement otherwise?" One can plead that he "sees no necessity for such a vast number of colossal suns and planets, unless this hypothesis be accepted." But all this fails of coming to a certain conclusion, because the conclusion will have started from an uncertain hypothesis.

Sometimes, indeed, it seems possible to argue in these matters absolutely ; as when St. Thomas lays it down broadly that no created effect can exhaust the power of God, yet goes on to say that no dignity can be higher than that of the Mother of God ; which surely seems to be only a created effect,. But when we lay this down, given the present world such as it is, in the number, weight and measure poised as it is by God's free choice, calculated by His wisdom to return just so much glory, not more, not less,—it will be difficult from the general premises, that God's glory must be elicited, and that the world's forces must not be wasted, to conclude that, therefore, such and such exclusively must be the arrangement, and that, as with the moon of Laplace, if God did not arrange it so, there must have been an error in the process. And if Laplace's speculation had been justified, what would it prove? Only this, that in the parts of the world there is no optimism, just as in the whole world we know there is none. For the parts need not be better than the whole, in that wherein they offer themselves indifferent and free to the choice of God's free will. And who will show that the poisoning of a moon, or the locating of a rational

species here or there, is not indifferent and free; that such elements belong either to the intrinsic essence of matter, or to the essential attitude of matter towards God? This can be proved of *one* rational species; but given one such species, or even one individual, there the conclusion stops. Now here we are speaking of *more* than one rational species; we are discussing the question of a plurality of worlds. Therefore, in the argument before us, granting the general principle, we have to decline accepting the minor, which is not and cannot be proved.

We might desist here from weighing the utilitarian argument more fully, but that we observe the argument itself insists and pushes onward. It borrows the aid of another argument to confirm it. And this confirmation is derived from the size, number, weight and other material conditions of the heavenly orbs. Emphasis is laid upon the fact that for over fifty centuries they have rolled unknown through immeasurable space, that myriads upon myriads of millions of solar systems so vast, so colossal, so swift in their movements, have all the while been moving in rhythmic revolutions. Now this would have been a prodigality of outlay, unless the hypothesis before us be accepted. Therefore, we must accept the plurality of worlds.

But it seems to us that these material conditions assume in the argument a degree of importance which sounds unfamiliar to our ears, either in connection with St. Thomas, or with any "theological and metaphysical arguments" of our acquaintance. For it is on this basis that the reasoning is said to be conducted. Now are not these elements purely physical and materialistic? Do they not appeal to mere imagination, which they tend to oppress with vastness, number and weight? And does the oppression of the imagination tend to simplify, and not rather to mystify, the operations of a logical reason? We would beg to suggest that metaphysical and theological reason will find a single grain of sand, or one drop of water, quite as effective in the premises as the burden of the myriad myriads. Nay, taking up the argument in the very sense which now we are criticising, we will state independently, that if a single grain of sand on the far-off shore in a stellar space, if a single drop of rain falling in the midst of the sea on some starry orb, if a single "gem of purest ray serene" in the deep bosom of some solar ocean, can be shown to be thrown away, to be useless in creation, to be *frustra*, then all the epithets lavished upon these vast systems in the same hypothesis, must on all accounts be expended on that grain of sand, that drop of rain, that gem of purest ray serene. Then there would be a reckless "waste of forces,"—a "failure to put the amount of forces cre-

ated to the best possible advantage"—a "manner of acting absolutely and utterly unworthy of God's wisdom,"—and so forth.

And now, having struck a blow in behalf of the theory, we beg leave to turn round and address it thus: Pray, what reason can you assign why the drop of rain in *our* mid-ocean is not utterly wasted? why the grain of sand on *our* shore is not recklessly thrown away? why the protophyte is not prodigally abused in the bottom of *our* sea? What reason can you assign, which will not exactly apply to the uninhabited state of the stellar orbs? Is it that you see the actual use of the odd protophyte, which I now designate with the finger of my fancy amid the million millions? Is it that you weigh the utility of that drop of rain in the middle of the sea? Can you estimate the exact value in creation of that unknown vein of metal in the bowels of this earth? Unknown, I say. If you cannot, why take offence at the unknown stellar orbs? If you can, apply the same reason to them. It will fit exactly.

Allow me to urge the point. "Hast thou entered into the depths of the sea, and walked in the lowest parts of the deep? Hast thou considered the breadth of the earth? Tell me if thou knowest all things?" Can you understand evil in the world? Yet, evil is here, and God's glory is gathered from it, and greater glory than if He had not permitted it. And, if uninhabited stellar orbs are not evil, either morally or physically, what antecedent reasoning, either metaphysical or theological, can put them down as a failure, unless, perforce, they admit of such and such an hypothesis to save them from condemnation?

And, if man did know the reasons for this orb and not for the others, that would give him no premise to work on, except his ignorance. But man's ignorance and man's knowledge alike, in the positive order of physical creation, are no criterion whatever of its why or its wherefore. Rather the very development of man, that he might have something to know, and might come in time to learn it, is reason enough why God should have given the world an amplitude sufficient to supply us with subjects of thought throughout all time, without fear of our resources being ever exhausted. He has handed the universe over to our disputations, and He has given an occupation to the children of men. We are but embryonic, and, if we live, it is but for a day. And, as we might imagine a puzzled embryo philosophizing on its hapless condition,—Why this forming system? Why this developing vertebra? Why this locomotive apparatus for one who has never known motion? and we answer, commiserating: Wait awhile, yet a little while, and the evolution of God's providence will justify itself and you; so is it with this embryonic universe, philoso-

phizing in its centre, man. Or, if you will have it rather that he is no embryo, but developed and living for a few days, short and evil, and that querulously he puts forth a cry from the narrowness of his view and the shortness of his ken; for he cannot understand the things that are about him, and much less the things that are above him; lo! a sweet spirit of the sky may be heard to whisper in the simplicity of his soul: "O man! who art thou that judgest? Behold yon sky; as far as the heavens transcend the earth, so far are God's thoughts above your thoughts, and God's ways above your ways. He is patient, because eternal; *patiens quia æternus*. He has plenty of time, for He lives from everlasting to everlasting. You are impatient; you live but a day, and you live fast; and thirty generations are come and gone before a sea-level is raised. It is meet you should have a resurrection!"

The next argument which we review proceeds to this effect, that the higher we mount in the scale of being, the more manifold must we find the number of species in each higher order, and since, within the compass of this material universe, the rational creature is highest, the number of rational species should be indefinitely multiplied. Now, it is evident that mankind is only one such species. Therefore, there must be others in the stars.

This argument, which is drawn from general principles of St. Thomas, is confirmed by another saying of the Angelic Doctor. He observes that there is a wider distance between the lowest angel and the most intelligent man than between the latter and the lowest savage. But there are countless degrees between these two latter. Therefore there must be countless species between the two former, between man and the angel.

We shall first take up the argument, then its confirmation, and afterwards set matters in that light wherein we conceive them from St. Thomas.

Does not the argument go beyond its object, and overleap itself? and, instead of answering a difficulty, raise it in an aggravated form? With the elevation of species, it is said, there should be an increase in the multiplication thereof; therefore, since on this planet there are many species of the lower orders, and only one rational species, there must be other rational beings in the stars. Granted, for the moment; we continue: and will there not be more species of the lower orders, too, in the same stars? If there are ten myriads of these lower orders to overbalance poor single-handed man on this unprovided orb, will there not be ten myriads of them to overbalance the poor rational being there? The difficulty is raised to an aggravated form. For the same argument, which will establish a rational being there, different in species from the rational being here, will differentiate the lower orders there from their

compeers here. Is there, in fact, a reason drawn from the nature of things, from the power of God, from the conditions of climate, which will vary one kind, and not the other? It cannot be urged that the difficulty requires it so, for that would be to beg the question. We are denying the while that the difficulty does require it so, or rather that there is any difficulty at all to be settled. But of that subsequently.

A confirmation is added, which we do not quite understand, for it seems to create a new difficulty, and that in logic. What meaning there is in it seems to be only this, that a specific difference exists between the angel and man, while no such specific difference exists between the most intelligent man and the lowest savage. A specific difference, as we know, is vastly greater than all the possible grades of intelligence between a learned gentleman and a poor Hottentot. The saying, then, of St. Thomas *might* be utilized in some such way as this: "The intellect of an angel," he says, "surpasses the human intellect more than that of the best philosopher surpasses the lowest clown, for these two latter are within the one species, and the two former are not;" and similarly, the lowest clown surpasses the highest brute more than he is surpassed by the best philosopher. But this establishes our one rational species just half way, and symmetrically, between brute and angel. Therefore, there is no need of imagining any other rational species in the stars.

As to the other principles quoted from St. Thomas, they would prove something as to our rational species, if only they could be applied to it; as every general principle demands a particular minor to make it descend upon a special subject. But the principles are quoted in their generality, and are simply applied to our subject-matter without misgiving. And as to a certain analogy supplied by St. Augustine, when he speaks of the stars as possibly sensitive or intelligent, and St. Thomas subjoins the query, whether perhaps they may not be informed by incorporeal substances, the whole state of the question is very obscure, and the subject-matter is very different from the present, where we speak not of stars being rational, but of rational beings in the stars. St. Thomas, then, may well say, "It makes no difference to divine faith whether it be one way or the other," while our learned author lays stress on the fact that the present question does make much difference, some way or other, as regards the contents of our faith.

Before we proceed to that, we may be allowed to state the misgivings we feel, arising from the whole doctrine of St. Thomas and tending to show that no general principles of the multiplication of species can be made to bear upon species of the rational kind. We shall thus be giving a reply to the appeal of the learned essayist,

when he asks: "Why should the principle fail in its best and noblest application, whereas it is maintained and applied in the lower being?"

In the whole structure of scholastic philosophy, the prospect, which is consistently presented to our view as comprehending the whole of creation, is that there are two extremes therein, and but one mean, the extremes being, on the one hand, the purely spiritual, and, on the other, the purely material; the mean being the juncture between the two.

Now, it is impossible that a juncture be more than one. It is impossible to conceive of a useful rivet, which, before it holds two surfaces together, must be riveted by another rivet, and that by a third, and so on indefinitely. Because, if this were necessary, the first were no rivet at all, but called so by a misnomer. Now, St. Thomas is not misnaming; he is constantly proving the thing, that man is the rivet, the juncture, betwixt intellectual substances above and material substances below. Man adequately joins these two orders together in the indefeasible right of his being a mean between them; for he alone is double, compounded of both, having a spiritual soul and a material body. He cannot then need another juncture to unite himself, already the juncture, with either extreme, and then a third, and then a fourth. Such multiplication of species, which shall be edged in between man and the angel, comes under a head of argument constantly rebutted by scholastic philosophy, as when it proves that we cannot go on indefinitely in reaching a first cause, or that accidents do not need other accidents, whereby they may be joined to their immediate subject; that the modality, for instance, called curvature, does not need another mode to hang upon its subject, as a hook in the wall does not demand another hook whereby itself shall hang, and this latter a third, and then a fourth. Thus, again, no relationship between two terms postulates anything except the two. Given the two extremes, the relationship between at once blossoms forth. And just so, in the infinite wisdom of God, given the two extremes of the purely intellectual angel and the purely material brute, the intermediary between both at once blossoms forth, and that is man. And rising to a higher analogy in the infinite mercy of the Lord, given a fallen race and a commiserating God, the flower of David blossoms forth between them, and the Word made Flesh joins the two in one.

The mention which we have just made of Christ, the Incarnate Word, offers to introduce us into our own positive view, regarding the question before us; but the learned essayist opens up this subject of the Incarnation as a distinct issue with infidelity. We should have thought there was no need for this; all that he had

said before sufficiently guards our flank on this side. We think, too, that nothing is gained in the new issue.

For, first, he states impressively the importance of this new debate. "These questions," he observes, "must be answered, for on them depends the whole controversy between infidelity and Christianity." He states the question, and clears the ground. "In what relation would these new personalities, so to speak, stand with regard to the whole system of our holy religion? What place would they hold in it?" etc. Then he lays down his proposition: That Christ is the centre of all; that all these creations were made through Christ, glorify God dependently on Christ, and do so morally. In short, he sums up thus: As we all received of Christ's fulness, so must they receive of His fulness to reach their destiny.

Now we come to the proof. But the author observes: "Of course, this is not the place to prove the above statements, or vindicate their truth. We must necessarily take them for granted."

But here we are somewhat at a loss. Is the argument undertaken for the sake of Catholics? They could dispense with it; they accept the conclusions beforehand. Is it for the sake of infidels? Then they deny all the premises. The infidel accepts the plurality of worlds, and denies Christianity. A Catholic accepts Christianity, and possibly denies the plurality of worlds. The reconciliation begins with what each admits, and proves no point which either denies. As far, therefore, as this argument goes, the sneer of Tom Paine still curls upon his lip, and he repeats with perfect assurance: "The two beliefs cannot be held together in the same mind, and he who thinks he believes in both, has thought but little of either."

But however little the argument may serve to conciliate the infidel, or to propitiate the believer, it will serve us excellently for a transition, and by this door we may enter into our positive and constructive view of things. If this prove suggestive and consistent, that will be only because there is absolutely nothing new in it; for it is as old as Christianity. If it be found wanting, that will be only because justice is not done to it in our treatment of it, and we beg the philosophical and theological minds to fill up the deficiencies as they will know how.

Let us observe, then, where the speculation has left us. It has left us pondering, at its own invitation, on the only sound explanation of our Lord's attitude towards those imaginary races in the stars. And what is that attitude? Let us take in its full meaning, and note the involuntary admissions which the theory before us makes, when it invites us to ponder on our Lord's Providence in the world.

What is the attitude? It is that of One, who, though Highest by nature, has deliberately chosen a rational species, and assumed a lowly compound nature. And which of the rational species, propounded in the theory, has He selected? Is it the highest? No, but in the theory the lowest. He has not seized upon the higher races. He has not taken his stand upon the largest orbs. He has not selected a central sun; nor even, in this system of ours, which He has honored with His Incarnation, has He chosen a sun at all. Among this little knot of planets His glance has lighted favorably, not upon the largest, almost upon the smallest. Further, on this little earth did He honor the highest point, or a central spot, or the most fertile land, or anything, in short, that was either mathematically or physically symmetrical? Oh, philosophically and theologically, He is the very centre of the universe. He is the Light of all creation, and the Mirror without spot of the eternal majesty. But what have the physics of matter to do with that? or even the politics of human kind? May be, politically viewed, He chose the centre of the human world? Is that so? Was Judea a centre? And in despised Judea did He at least make choice of Jerusalem, and of the Temple therein, and, at a fitting moment, in the splendor of solemnities, amid the august throng of sacred priests and noble princes, walk forth upon this earth in His pride of beauty, and seize in willing captivity the gazing eyes and ravished hearts of senates lost in admiration and multitudes prostrate in adoration? What a sarcasm on such a pretty phantasy is Bethlehem, and Nazareth, and Galilee, and Egypt! What a shock to the æsthetics of science is the company He kept! What a scandal to all mathematics, pure as well as mixed, to all the equipoising of the worlds, political, solar and nebular, is everything He did! We may recall St. Augustine's festive vein: *Accedet homo ad cor altum et exaltabitur Deus*; "Man shall reach to a deep heart, and God shall be deeper still." *Homo, scrutando scrutationes defecisti!* "O man, thou hast missed it in thy searchings so profound!"

This analogy quite illuminates our present topic, for in its light there is much less to wonder at, if we find man, whose head Christ is, made a little less than the angels; and if, in the natural, as well as moral conditions of his being, we behold him situated in exact accord with his prototype; for that prototype was made man *propter homines*, for men's sake; and He is the model and sampler of all their existence. If man, then, is not located in a central sun, nor on the largest planet; if he was not set in mathematical proportion either with the heavens above, or with the earth beneath, or with the waters under the earth; if he is not moulded to match the myriads of lower creatures afar off among the zoophytes, nor

even to hold his own against his nearest neighbors, the elephant, the lion, and the horse, in their strength, size, and agility ; if these things are so, who is it that can take offence ? Is it the world or its physics ? Tell me, was man made for the world and its physics, or were they made for man ? *Propter hominem*. And is it by quantity, by *moles*, that he is better than they ? Perhaps it is St. Augustine that answers somewhere : "*Non mole magna sunt, quæ vere magna sunt.*"

" It is not growing like a tree,
In bulk, doth make man better be,"

observes Ben Jonson ; and it may be that what the dramatist goes on to say will add significance to other parts of our discussion. He continues :

" Or standing long an oak, three hundred year,
To fall a log at last, dry, bald, and sear.
A lily of a day
Is fairer far in May.
Although it fall and die that night,
It was the plant and flower of Light !
In small proportions we just beauties see ;
And in short measure life may perfect be."

Something more remarkable is this, that, as we mount higher in the dispensations of God, we tend more towards unity. In the supernatural order there is only One Man, the Mediator, Christ Jesus ; there is only one such couple as Mary and Joseph. And, as we begin to descend, the comprehension of perfections becoming less, the extension of quantity becomes more. There are twelve Apostles and seventy-two Disciples ; and so on down to the base of the pyramid, the apex being at the top. And in the natural order, in the world of matter and of man, the same law holds. Man is the apex of the orders ; and, as we descend in the scale of beings, they lose, compared with him, in the comprehensiveness of their perfection ; and so they gain in extension, to make up by quantity what they lack in quality ; for man in the material world has been appointed to represent God in the universe. And as in the universe no created word can express God sufficiently, or can articulate half this idea, the Divine Wisdom multiplies His words like an eloquent pleader ; He distributes His phrases like a rhythmic poet, He speaks gently to win us sweetly, He showers His speech to impress us mightily ; and that, without being oppressed, we may receive largely of His resources, He has economized them for our weakness in an unfolding reserve that shall open as we demand, and shall yield its deposit as we desire ; and He has put the key thereof in the keeping of men. *Tradidit mundum disputationi eorum* : " He

has handed the world over to their disputations." Now, in the same station of dignity has He made man to stand with respect to the material world. All the creatures thereof are "groaning and travailing" to express man's perfections, who is the little world, the microcosm, and the big world is trying to take him off; and the efforts thereof, well meant, but ineffectual, are made to multiply in unceasing energy and geometrical procession down to the broad base of the material pyramid, where perfection fades away to the monad and the star of clay, and number stretches out to the myriad and the dust of the milky way. If we are less conscious of all this, it is because we are in a fallen state. Adam, before he fell, could call everything by its name.

With these analogies to strike the proper note of our subject, we venture to approach what may sound a little reactionary, and in the face of an enlightened science we presume to call it Catholic Instinct. The word may sound like a waif of the Middle Ages, straying by some ill-omened presage into the bright centuries of a scientific orient. We would deprecate, however, the use of any term which might lessen its outspoken confidence, or make its countenance fall. If its name, "instinct," is a prejudice to it in the light of science, any other name will do. But, if its name is a prejudice, and must be discarded, then the "moral sense" of ethics must likewise be rejected. Yet many excellent philosophers employ the term "moral sense" when they speak of a ready exercise of reason upon the applications of the moral law; and so we may be excused for thinking that a ready exercise of enlightened faith upon the requirements of Divine truth might well be called Catholic instinct. Neither the "sense" nor the "instinct" is blind; quite the contrary; but what they have characteristic about them is, that they are particularly ready; and, even where unable to explain themselves, can readily be taken up and explained by the scientific faculty; and, inarticulate in their unerring feelings, are speedily formulated into articulate laws. Thus, in the most solemn disputations of theology the doctors appeal to "the sense of the faithful;" and, availing themselves of the prayers in use as the most ready expression of such sense, they take it as an axiom that the law of prayer reveals the law of faith: *Lex credendi ipsa supplicandi lege statuitur*.

We eschew any enthusiasm or glow of feeling in the path of science, unless it first pay due attention to the demands of faith; and that not the mere dogma of faith, for we are not minimizers, but the form, contour, complexion, color of faith; those intangible qualities which a refined instinct catches intuitively, as a mother identifies her child unerringly, without being able precisely to lay her finger on any mark which would convince another. The in-

instinct which we speak of lights upon the things of God by a certain sympathy with their essence, or rather with Him of whom they all are full, and whom in their silence they eloquently reveal to such as are of the same kith and kin ; or, as St. Thomas expresses it, *propter connaturalitatem quandam objecti*. So that sound science alone does not cover it. Or how otherwise could it be that, where all the doctors of the Church have so abounded in the highest theological science, one alone is noticed, St. Gregory Nazianzen, as containing not even an incidental error in the writings which he has bequeathed to the Church? An eminent spiritual author lays it to the account of his wisdom, the first gift of the Holy Ghost, and one which in its eminence characterizes the Doctor, but in its generality is the apanage of all the faithful. In that illustrious Greek Doctor, who so peculiarly carries off the palm for his individual eminence therein, it is interesting to notice the other fact with which this one is connected, that during twelve years he studied nothing but the Holy Scriptures. Howsoever it originates, and on what sustenance soever it feeds and thrives, we beg to give a hearing to this sacred wisdom, which often abounds more where natural science is found wanting, and which, therefore, we have thought right to call Catholic instinct. It says :

"Observe this universe,—high as heaven, deep beyond conception, all but wide enough to escape from under the wings of Omnipotence. Yet I feel not too small to be its centre ; conscious though I be that I fail of being as high as my own roof-tree, or as deep as the well from which I draw, or as wide as the farm which so kindly supports me. After all, is it by length or height that greatness is measured? Is it by extension of bulk, and not by intensity of worth? I fondly imagine that, as I cast my thought, a single fugitive thought, such as I can afford to throw away, like a passing sheen of my mind's activity upon this darksome current of unreflecting creatures, as I glance from below upwards and then down to the depths where microscope never searched nor telescope reached, I fondly fancy that my passing thought, this glancing ray flashing from an intelligent mind on the rolling tide of creation, is worth more in its native value, as it makes the depths pellucid with its fugitive being, than ever a poet's eye has caught in all the clay and metal, and light, and rhythm of solar systems and starry depths. Behold ! so many blades of grass on the sward, so many drops of water in the rills, so many suns in the welkin of creation, all teeming, if so you will have it, with sense, with vegetation, with their resources unexhausted and unopened. Yet I know that my one playful thought is worth more than all ; and if all of them were laboriously brought into being that they might be tipped for one instant with the spiritual glory of being just thought of by my

mind, and of thus being the occasion of one intellectual word which I speak to myself, all creation would have been well devised, would have served a noble purpose, and might be suffered to slip out of existence again perfectly content. So great a being is this single passing glance of intellectual light, and so great a function is the objective glory of stimulating one movement in the intelligent subject!

"Now things pass not out of existence; and we speak the intelligent word of knowledge not once, but often and constantly, and on their account. This is all their history, that they have been elaborated slowly, deliberately, so as to befit the residence intended for their liege lord, one like to themselves in the right of his body, above them in the right of his soul. To use the analogy of revelation, as I see the world of human society evolving for many a thousand years, to receive the mystery of piety in the coming of Christianity, a mystery which appeared in the midst of the ages, and not at the beginning of time; and yet there was no waste, no neglect there, though tremendous results had been cast for time and eternity, all in its absence; so I cannot but ask, is the late discovery of some beds of clay in the sky, and is the tardiness of our personal arrival upon the scene to enjoy the discovery thereof, a matter of such vast consequence that we must remodel all which was ever known before, and must apologize for Christianity, and defend God? Things seem to me just what they ought to be. There is an early rain of God's mercies, and of nature's revelation, and there is a later rain too; and both make one progressive season in the creations and manifestations of His natural providence. I would not have the revelation earlier, nor would I have the formation later. In either case, the precise measure of glory freely determined by God's will, would not be what it is. In no case would there be waste, neglect,—terms which sound strange in our ears when God's action is called in question, and when no metaphysical or theological reason is adduced to establish some intrinsic impossibility.

"Here, far from an impossibility or even an incongruity, I behold everything most congruous and proper; an earth for man's body, a universe for his soul; an earth scarcely yet opened to satisfy corporal needs, a universe just unfolding to develop his spiritual being. Will God, who metes out so much to man in the right of his bodily sustenance, show Himself chary in distributing food for the mind and the heart; lend man no assistance for his heart to be humble, no aid for his mind to be great? But forsooth, as begrudging him a prospect, God must be conceived as turning the landscape to some more practical account, by planting a bigger brother of ours there, who shall tread the prospect down

with his feet, lest the prospect should go to waste! He, whose blessing hath overflowed like a river, is brought down to household economy; and utilitarianism forbids him to allow us the sole use of the stars!

"But, you assert, man does not use them at all. You protest, 'no use whatever can be mentioned, if we suppose them deserted and sterile, and devoid of living inhabitants.' You proclaim against 'such a vast number of colossal systems of suns and planets lasting for so many centuries without any known advantage, and for no probable reason that can be imagined.' Is all that I have now alleged no reason? And is contemplation no use? What do you mean by use? Consumption, burning up, eating up? That is materialistic enough; but even on earth that is not the only use to which things are put. If it were, it would entail this advantage, that half the socialism of the day would never have come into being. But half the socialism and nihilism of the day have come into being from quite another use, to which even the things of this earth are turned,—from the use of contemplation, or, rather, the abuse of contemplation. This is that use of things on earth which does not consume what it enjoys, but enjoys what it does not consume; and when it appropriates these things exorbitantly, and enjoys them exclusively, it is a use so true, and it is so stinging an abuse, that mankind grows rebellious and socialistic and nihilistic:

'The man of wealth and pride
Takes up a space that many poor supplied—
Space for his lake, his park's extended bounds,
Space for his horses, equipage, and hounds.'

There is more use here than materialistic use. There is the use of contemplation in the enjoyment of a prospect. Now in contemplation, to speak of it in general, the soul feeds on truth and beauty, as spirits feed; it witnesses as angels witness; it lives the life which God Himself lives, in the sole adequate witnessing of His own infinite perfections, and, by contemplating the world, man, according to Seneca, gives an adequate testimony to the world, and 'saves works so great from being without a witness.'

"I behold, then, the rays like messengers trooping to me from the far-off stars. I see much. I hear of more. They tell me, as they arrive, that I cannot exhaust the prospect. God is not so poor in wisdom or in power as to stint the measure of the landscape, that I should ever be able to take it in with a single glance, no, nor in a single life, nor, may be, in the lives of all the generations. He who made the gardeners of the earth knows how to lay out a garden for the intellect in the skies. I gather them in,

then, as the rays come to me and tell me of their long journeys, and I

‘Dilate

My spirit to the size of that I contemplate.’

The undulations of light bear in upon my eyes, and the waves of grandeur come rolling over my spirit, and God comes with them, as Job says: ‘As waves swelling over me I feared God, and the weight of Him I could not bear.’ As the deluge of God’s eloquence would overwhelm me, He distributes His words and dispenses the phrases. Hence, He has moderated His messages to the capacity of our fathers, and their sons and our posterity, saluting us ever with a new strain, and by the voices of new messengers. I know them by number that they cannot be numbered by me, and this, the conscious weight of the unknown, feeds my faculty with the magnificent. I know them by name, that they are each a little effort, energizing to express the message which they convey. They are telling—each a little syllable. They are voices, each a tiny sound. And in the sound is the element of a word; in the syllable, the fragment of an idea. I put them together and decipher them, not in the light of torch, nor of sun, nor of firmament, but in a higher light than all this, the light of my spiritual intelligence. Thus illuminated, they yield up their contents clear and striking, what none of the stars and none of the suns, nor all of them together, with the *nebulæ* of the milky way, have ever conceived; for neither any one, nor all of these possess the light of my single thought, which placidly, without effort, reads: The heavens are telling the glory of God!

“All creation travaileth until now, endeavoring to bear this sealed packet unto us. It is laboring to unfold all its treasures unto us. It will show us all, multitude, length, depth, motion, if we will but know; it will develop all its resources, to whet our appetite for learning, and make us develop ours; and, if we do but know, all nature is honored and rests in peace. Eternal life itself has no higher term than this, that we know.

“Is contemplation, then, no use?

“From this service to man, if you discard the skies, you must also dismiss the earth. If the skies are not marshalled to their end by man’s *Benedicite, omnia opera Domini, Domino*, ‘Bless the Lord, all ye works of the Lord,’ then neither is this globe, for all the use he makes of it. Introduce here another and a higher race, or twenty of them, if you find reason to fancy a single one necessary in the sky. First people the unexplored depth of our earth with rational species, to know it and consume it; the unknown

deserts of the sea, to plant them and till them; the altitudes of the mountains, to mine them and work them; the dreary wastes of the clouds—I will make bold to say, ‘the frightful waste’—of atmosphere, water, clay, rock, before you condemn the skies to the political economy of statistics.”

The theory which we have been considering presents us, not with a grand conception of the world, but with a mean conception of man. Let it make man less, or make the world more, before we can find room here for other species than our own. And yet how much less shall it make the one, and how much more shall it make the other? Let God himself give us the measure. He does so. He leads us out, of a starry night, and bids us look up and count the stars if we can. Why so? Is it to beat down our pride, and show us our place on this little orb of clay? Yes, and no! Yes, indeed, for the turgid spirit of man needs humiliation; and therefore He has made us little and set us in a little place, with a thousand little mean things about us, to keep us walking in truth. Yet no! As if all that firmament were but a tent of the night, under which man rests his weary head during this mortal slumber, and which God will roll up like a tent when the shadows disappear in the morning, He does not promise this home as worthy of us, nor even a new heaven and a new earth, though they will be added unto us; but as being above all these, as being dilated in the vastness of our nature, He promises a home which befits us, and which, if we are scarcely worthy of it, at least is fully worthy of us. And this is nothing less than the infinite bosom of God himself: “I will be thy reward, exceeding great.”

THE PROGRESS OF THE CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES,

FROM THE FIRST PROVINCIAL COUNCIL TO THE THIRD PLENARY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE.

JUST as the third decade of the century was closing there were signs in many lands of political and social convulsions, such as in the material order sometimes visit distant points of the globe in simultaneous action by volcano and earthquake, by tornado and deluge.

England had conjured the coming storm by stilling the Catholic agitation and granting the Emancipation, so long denied to those who had remained faithful to the religion of earlier and better days. The Catholic was comparatively free; the descendants of the barons of Runnymede, the bearers of the oldest titles in the English aristocracy, were once more allowed to occupy their seats in the House of Lords; the bar, the army, the navy, were again thrown open to men who believed in the whole Bible, and took the words of Christ literally.

England yielded also to popular demand on another point, admitting the inadequacy of her parliamentary representation, and conceding a measure of legislative reform, by which the Commons were cleansed of some rotten boroughs, and the members made by the election of larger and freer constituencies.

France, though she had just planted her lilies in Algiers, was on the eve of a revolution, which almost without a blow unseated a dynasty and changed the constitution of the monarchy. The Belgian provinces, chafing under a tyrannic rule, and mindful of old liberties, were about to sever their connection with the Netherlands and form an independent kingdom. Greece, aided at the last moment by the great powers of Europe, was about to see her final deliverance from Mohammedan sway, and take her place among the kingdoms. Poland was in revolt against the Muscovite; Italy was seething with Carbonari plots; Spain and Portugal were on the brink of revolution.

But while all Europe was thus agitated, and the friends of civil and religious order and liberty were filled with forebodings, the United States had enjoyed peace and prosperity. A presidential canvass, conducted with unusual violence of language, had ended without the least breach of the public peace, and the chief magistracy had devolved on a man of iron will.

The civil freedom won by the Revolutionary war had entailed the principle of the equality of all religious denominations before the law. Prejudice, deep-seated, fostered for generations by malevolent rulers in state and church, still swayed many minds, and this, whenever it could with impunity, thwarted in regard to Catholics the great and wholesome spirit pervading the institutions founded in this country, where liberty was not identified with irreligion and excess.

Catholics had been free, as it was rare for them to be free; every prerogative of citizenship exercised by their fellow-citizens was, in theory at least, theirs; the offices, the professions, the paths of commerce, art, and science were open to them. They could build churches as noble as their means could afford; if a dozen pious ladies wished to live in the same house, and devote their lives to prayer or charity, the government beheld in this no danger to the public weal. The agitation in the British isles, which achieved Catholic emancipation, had provoked and revived the old spirit of bigotry, and publications abounded denouncing the faith and lives of Catholics. These had not been without their influence in this country, where they reached the more ignorant, less cultivated portion of the people, and where designing men re-echoed their charges with a view of strengthening their own hold on deluded followers kept in the shadow of death.

The diocese of Baltimore at its erection, when confided to the care of the illustrious patriot, the Right Rev. John Carroll, comprised the whole United States, as recognized by the treaty of Paris in 1783, reaching from the Atlantic to the Mississippi, and from the great lakes to Florida; but the republic had, by the cession of Louisiana and Florida, as to which France and Spain yielded their rights, acquired the territory reaching to the Gulf of Mexico and west of the Mississippi to the Pacific. This vast territory, after being for a quarter of a century governed by a resident bishop, auxiliary to the sees of Santiago de Cuba and St. Christopher, was, in 1793, formed into the diocese of Louisiana and the Floridas.

The original diocese of Baltimore constituted in 1829 the actual province of that name, embracing the dioceses of Baltimore, Boston, Philadelphia, Bardstown, Cincinnati, and Charleston; while that of Louisiana and the Floridas had been subdivided into the dioceses of New Orleans, St. Louis, and the Vicariate Apostolic of Alabama and the Floridas, just then created into the diocese of Mobile. The bishops of these three sees were not subject to any metropolitan; and the incumbents of St. Louis and Mobile, that of New Orleans being vacant, were invited to attend the council.

The time of the first council forms a dividing point in our

Church history. Fifty-three years had elapsed since the Declaration of Independence, and fifty-five have passed since it closed its sessions.

From the feeble beginnings at the commencement of our national existence the Church had grown and extended. The Catholic population of the United States at the time of the first Council was estimated at 500,000; that of the whole country being 12,000,000. The diocese of Boston, which included all New England, had a bishop, eight priests, sixteen churches, and about 15,000 Catholics. The baptisms in Boston for 1829 were 536. The diocese had an Ursuline convent, with its academy, and eight or ten Catholic schools. The diocese of New York covered the whole State of that name and half of New Jersey. It could boast of a bishop, twenty priests, about ten churches, and 180,000 souls,—25,000 in New York City. There was an orphan asylum in that city under eight Sisters of Charity, but schools were few and elementary. The diocese of Philadelphia included the States of Pennsylvania and Delaware and half of New Jersey. The bishop no longer exercised authority, an administrator apostolic endeavoring to repair the effects of a terrible schism which, excited by a priest who finally apostatized, had engendered feelings of great bitterness, and sent numbers of families into heresy. This diocese had eighteen priests, about fourteen churches, and 35,000 Catholics. It was almost destitute of institutions and schools, but had Sisters of Charity at Philadelphia and Harrisburg. A spirit of schismatic turbulence in Philadelphia had been a severe trial to Bishop Carroll, and had filled with bitterness the lives of Bishops Egan and Conwell. The diocese of Baltimore embraced the State of Maryland and the District of Columbia, and the Archbishop was administrator of the diocese of Richmond, which was coextensive with the State of Virginia. The diocese of Baltimore had an archbishop, fifty-two priests, about forty churches, five of them in the metropolitan city. In regard to institutions it was far in advance of the dioceses we have already named. It had St. Mary's College and Seminary at Baltimore, under the priests of St. Sulpice; a college and seminary, Mount St. Mary's, at Emmitsburg; a college in Georgetown; it possessed a convent of Carmelite nuns, established by religious who were driven from their cloistered home on the continent of Europe by the storm of revolution; a monastery of Visitation nuns, established in 1808 by Mother Alice Lawlor, under the direction of Archbishop Neale; a community of Sisters of Charity, founded at Emmitsburg by Mother Elizabeth Seton, under the guidance of Rev. Messrs. Dubois and Bruté. This sisterhood already numbered 106 members; sixty-two at the mother house, the rest in Baltimore, Washington, Frederick, New

York, Philadelphia, Harrisburg. It had also a community of Sisters of Providence, colored women, laboring among their own people. The city of Baltimore had an infirmary and an orphan asylum under the Sisters of Charity; a free-school for boys and a boarding-school under the Sisters of Providence. Virginia, where the first altar in our land had been reared by Fathers of the Order of St. Dominic more than three centuries before, was in a far different condition. It had three or four priests, residing at Norfolk and Richmond; but Catholics were few and scattered, and no other church had a resident pastor.

The diocese of Charleston, which included the states of North and South Carolina and Georgia, had about 10,000 Catholics who were known or attended to. The bishop had but ten priests for his extensive diocese; four of these were in Georgia, and he had sent one to St. Augustine at the appeal of the Vicar Apostolic. The trustee system had here shown its unfitness for Catholics; Bishop England had just been compelled to raise money in order to repurchase the Church at Columbia, S. C., which the trustees had so involved that it was sold at auction.

The diocese of Bardstown, still under the venerable Bishop Benedict Joseph Flaget, the only survivor of the suffragans of Archbishop Carroll, had been divided. Kentucky and Tennessee were still under his care, as well as Indiana and Illinois. The more recently erected diocese of Cincinnati had taken from Bardstown Ohio and Michigan, with the Northwest Territory, now known, in part, as Wisconsin. The diocese of Bardstown had a Catholic population mainly sprung from sturdy pioneers from Maryland, who had, disputing the land with hostile Indians, reared their rough homes on the fertile soil. They had been retained in the faith and trained by cultivated and polished priests from France, England and Belgium, and elements, thus apparently inharmonious, had, in the spirit of faith, blended to form the thriving, united, edifying church of Kentucky.

The diocese of Bardstown had its venerable bishop, with his coadjutor, Bishop David, some thirty priests, and, as was estimated, thirty thousand Catholics; Kentucky had twenty-six churches, many of them, indeed, only of logs, and it contained two-thirds of the souls in the diocese. There were about twenty-six priests, a convent of Dominican Friars, a college and seminary at Bardstown, two preparatory seminaries, three primary schools. Besides a convent of Dominican Nuns, there were two communities instituted in the diocese, the Sisters of Loretto, founded by the great missionary, Rev. Charles Nérinckx, which had extended to ten establishments; and Sisters of Charity, founded by Bishop David, which had three houses.

In Tennessee, as in its parent State, North Carolina, the faith

had made little progress; a few score Catholic families were scattered through the State, depending on occasional visitations of priests from Kentucky. When, seven years after the first Council of Baltimore, a bishop was consecrated for the State, there was not a church or a priest within its limits.

In Indiana there were Catholics and a church at the ancient French town of Vincennes. Other Catholics, some of the old French stock, and others of recent emigration, were scattered through the State, and there were Indians who still retained the Catholicity of their ancestors, converts of the early missionaries.

The position of the Church in Illinois was somewhat similar. The Church of the Immaculate Conception at Kaskaskia, owing its name and origin to Father James Marquette, the explorer of the Mississippi; the Church of the Holy Family at Cahokia, where the unfortunate Varlet once officiated; the church at Prairie du Rocher, were all vacant, and the Catholic congregations there were attended only at intervals. Rev. John Bouiller was building a brick church at Mine à Breton, where there were Catholics enough to justify the step. This State, too, had its Indians who had not lost all trace of their Catholic teaching. In these parts of the diocese of Kentucky the labors of the priests were extremely severe. A priest would often ride a hundred miles in his parish, and one declared that he would have to ride a thousand to visit it thoroughly. There were scattered Catholics, some of whom had not seen a priest in twenty years. If this was the case in a diocese where there were so many and so zealous priests, what must have been the case in many of the eastern States?

The diocese of Cincinnati had a bishop, eighteen priests, and 30,000 Catholics. The State of Ohio contained eleven churches and about eleven priests; the State of Michigan, four priests. The Indian missions had been revived, and Arbre Croche became a centre of light.

This comprised all the original diocese of Baltimore, except the State of Mississippi, which had been placed under the care of the Bishop of New Orleans, the few Catholics at Natchez and Biloxi having from French and Spanish days been attended by priests from that city.

There was a general progress in all parts of the country. From notices in the papers of the time we learn that new churches were undertaken or had just been opened in Portland, Eastport and Orono, Maine; Dover, New Hampshire; Charlestown, Mass.; Hartford, Conn.; Newport and Pawtucket, Rhode Island; Buffalo, New York; Fayetteville and Washington, N. Carolina; St. Joseph's, Ohio; Mine à Breton, Illinois.

The emigration from Europe, which began after the fall and

deportation of Napoleon, was daily adding to the Catholic population, and the Catholics coming from the British Isles, roused by the recent agitation for emancipation, were zealous and ready to make sacrifices for their religion. Wherever they planted themselves or secured employment, they sought a priest and were ready to aid him in erecting a church as soon as their numbers made it possible. Accustomed, too, for centuries, to support their own churches and clergy, they gave liberally, and did not expect everything to be provided for them. The priest enjoyed their entire confidence, and they gave readily to him, thus neutralizing the trustee spirit which had grown up in some parts. In older settled parts, notably in Maryland, which received little emigration, and where from the first the clergy had been self-supporting, deriving less aid from the people, there was less apparent progress, there were fewer new churches.

In the old district and diocese of Louisiana and the Floridas the evidences of Catholic progress were very apparent, although the schismatic opposition at New Orleans had hampered the zeal of Bishop Dubourg, and at last filled him with discouragement. The dioceses of New Orleans and St. Louis had at least eighty priests and 100,000 Catholics. Besides the ancient Ursuline Convent and Academy at New Orleans, then a century old, the Ladies of the Sacred Heart, introduced within a few years, had already, in these two dioceses, six convents and academies. Religion had been revived, and the bishop, on his visitation through Louisiana, went from parish to parish, finding in each a church and resident pastor, and in some churches newly erected and ready to dedicate. The Catholic population in Missouri was less compact, and more was to be done; but two religious orders were already there, the Jesuits, the nucleus being a body of young Belgians brought over by the Rev. Mr. Nerinckx, and the Lazarists, of whom the bishop himself was a member, and who were already in their seminary forming new priests for the wants of the diocese. Here wealthy Catholics gave liberally to found and endow institutions. In this way a hospital arose in St. Louis, which was confided to Sisters of Charity from Emmitsburg. The Rev. Messrs. La Croix and Lutz had begun Indian missions, and the Jesuit fathers had established schools for Indian boys.

The progress in the half century had been great, and the growth healthy. At the period of the Revolution the Catholics, perhaps in all forty thousand, had, like those in England, been so long crushed by penal laws that they were despondent, and by no means sanguine for the future. In the thirteen colonies there was not a church, except in Pennsylvania, the chapels in Maryland being required to be under the roofs of the priests' residences, so as not to

offend the Protestant eye by any evidence of the existence of a church. No bishop had ever been seen; confirmation had never been administered; no priest had ever been ordained. The old French settlements in the territory northwest of the Ohio were still there, but the little body of priests had dwindled away to one, and in consequence of the Revolution no pastors could be expected in the future from Quebec. The Catholic population was one to seventy-five of the entire population. It had grown in half a century to be one in twenty-four.

In Louisiana, down to the commencement of the century, the government was Catholic, and clergy were maintained; and for the last quarter of the eighteenth century there had been a resident bishop. Florida, where religion had been planted and a church founded in 1565, just after the close of the Council of Trent, had undergone greater vicissitudes. Its Catholic life had lasted for two centuries, its Indian missions had given a noble series of zealous martyrs; but while in the hands of England, from 1763 to 1783, many of its Catholic inhabitants retired to Cuba; and but for the advent of a colony of Minorcans, religion would almost have disappeared. Spain, on recovering her ancient colony, restored religion; but when it passed into the hands of the United States, our government gave the site of the oldest Catholic church, without the slightest examination, to the Episcopalians, which put forward an absurd claim to it, because the ruins of the house once occupied by the resident bishop were called Casa Episcopal. The site of another church was given to one who had been allowed to occupy it; and to complete the iniquity, the government occupies to this day, as barracks, the old Franciscan convent, the home from which Fathers Corpa, Rodriguez, Auñon, Badajos and Velascola went forth to martyrdom. At the time of the council, Florida had, as we have seen, but one priest, whom Bishop England had sent from Charleston at the request of Bishop Portier.

In reviewing the whole field we see that there had been great progress from the days when Catholicity, east of the Mississippi, had no home beyond the limits of Maryland and Pennsylvania, except in the old French hamlets in the west. The growth of the Church was not uniform; in Maryland, Kentucky, Louisiana and Missouri, there were the greatest signs of vitality; colleges, academies, houses of religious of both sexes, schools; in other States the struggle was mainly to give Catholics opportunity to hear mass and approach the sacraments. In New York and Pennsylvania the bishops, almost from the outset, had found themselves hampered and thwarted in such a way that it was impossible for them to make even remote plans for any diocesan institutions.

To meet the wants of Catholic readers there was at this time

only one publishing house, that of Eugene Cumiskey, of Philadelphia; but he had not the activity or success of his predecessor, Bernard Dornin. The Catholic papers of the country were confined to the *United States Catholic Miscellany* of Charleston, directed by Bishop England himself, and to *The Jesuit*, published in Boston. *The Truth Teller*, issued in New York, was devoted more especially to Irish news, but gave a great deal of Catholic matter, though it was not under Episcopal supervision, and at times showed little respect for the Episcopal character.

There was no edifice of architectural prominence in the country belonging to the Church, except the Cathedrals in Baltimore and New York.

Such was the position of the Church in the United States when the first Provincial Council was summoned. It was the fifth time in the annals of North America that bishops had been convened by the Metropolitan of a Province.

The first, that held in Mexico by Archbishop Alonso de Montufar, in 1555, was attended by three suffragans, and representatives of three others; the second, held in 1565, by the same Metropolitan, was attended by five suffragan bishops; the third, held in 1585, by the Most Reverend Pedro Moya y Contreras, Archbishop of Mexico, consisted of the Metropolitan and six suffragan bishops; another council of six bishops was held in 1771, but its acts were not approved at Rome nor published. It was a strange and sad fact to record, but unfortunately only too true, that in that Catholic country there was not, when the Council of Baltimore met, a single bishop, the last representative of the Mexican hierarchy, Antonio Joaquin Perez, Bishop of Puebla, having died of grief on the 26th of March, 1829, the seizure of a church which was given to the Freemasons, to be profaned by their irreligious rites, having broken his heart. Indeed, at this very time priests came to the United States to obtain the holy oils, and candidates for the priesthood who had studied in Mexico came to this country to receive holy orders; and two were actually ordained at Baltimore at the time of the Council.

The first Council of Baltimore consisted of the Metropolitan, the Most Reverend James Whitfield, Archbishop of Baltimore; of the venerable Benedict Joseph Flaget, Bishop of Bardstown; the Right Reverend John England, Bishop of Charleston; the Right Reverend Edward Fenwick, of the order of Preachers, Bishop of Cincinnati; Right Reverend Joseph Rosati, of the Congregation of the Mission, Bishop of St. Louis and Administrator of New Orleans; Right Reverend Benedict J. Fenwick, Bishop of Boston; and the Very Reverend William Matthews, Vicar Apostolic and Administrator of the diocese of Philadelphia. In the number of prelates it

did not, therefore, compare unfavorably with those held in the olden time in the neighboring country, when the Church was upheld by all the power of Spain. The bishops of Mobile and New York were in Europe, and Bishop David, Coadjutor of Bardstown, whom Bishop Dubois, of New York, had named as his procurator to represent him at the Council, was too ill to undertake the journey to Baltimore in those days of slow and tedious travel. But the Fathers of the Council represented the secular clergy, and the Dominican, Jesuit and Lazarist orders, as well as the Congregation of St. Sulpice; and England, Ireland, France, Italy and America had given birth to the bishops here convened.

Diverse as had been the training, diverse the origin of these venerable prelates, the utmost harmony prevailed. The decrees of the Council do not show all the good effected in the meeting of bishops, separated from each other by such vast distances as to make frequent consultation impossible. Convened at Baltimore together, the difficulties, wants, struggles, trials and hopes of each diocese were made known; the concerted action to be adopted for the great future of the Church was planned.

The influence of the Council was soon apparent. A periodical, the *Metropolitan*, soon appeared in Baltimore, the *Catholic Diary* in New York, *Telegraph* in Cincinnati, *Herald* in Philadelphia, helped to diffuse Catholic intelligence among the faithful, animate their courage and instruct them in points which were daily misrepresented. The papers then teemed with controversy. There soon came an annual, giving the condition of each diocese, with the names of churches, institutions and clergy, facilitating intercourse between Catholics in all parts of the country.

The first Council of Baltimore had proposed an accurate edition of the Catholic Bible. Unfortunately, the subject was not then acted upon; as only one house had issued any that were in print, a standard might have been adopted and an accurate revised text would have saved the country from the flood of incorrect Bibles and Testaments since poured out. The Douay Bible was in general terms adopted, under a belief which Cardinal Cappellari corrected, that it had been approved at Rome; but in fact the Douay has not been printed since 1635. A revision of it, and by no means a happy one, made by Bishop Challoner in 1749-50, very incorrectly and carelessly printed, is really the basis of our present Bibles, which have been modified by unknown hands in England, and under the direction of Archbishops Troy and Murray in Ireland, as well as by several hands in this country. There is no uniform text, scarcely two editions read alike, and yet all are put forward as Douay Bibles, when really not one of them is entitled to the name. An edition of Challoner's New Testament, issued without his sanction in 1752,

and thoroughly Protestantized, has been twice reprinted in this country, and is still sold as Catholic. There seems to be no cure for the evil but to return to the text of the Douay as translated by Dr. Gregory Martin, a careful, accurate version, in the grand old English of the sixteenth century, embodying all the traditional religious language of Catholic England and Ireland.

The increase of Catholic books was as notable as that of periodicals and papers. Lucas, of Baltimore, a convert, soon had a long list of works which he issued, and Catholic bookstores sprang up in many parts.

The progress of the Church in the erection of houses for the worship of Almighty God, and in the maintenance of priests for struggling communities, was due in no slight degree to the aid generously afforded for many years by the Association for the Propagation of the Faith, a society of the faithful which took its origin in France, mainly in the labors of a few devoted women to raise by trifling contributions means to aid Bishop Dubourg, of Louisiana, who had appealed to the charity of France.

The little circle of a few pious women grew into a society of immense size, and Catholic missions in all parts of the world felt its influence as they received its liberal allowances. Protestants generally confound this association, which merely raises money by weekly cent contributions and allots its receipts among missions, with the Congregation of the Propaganda at Rome, which is a department of the Pontifical Government having jurisdiction over the missions and mission countries.

The Catholic Bishops of the United States received great aid from the association, and we owe it a deep debt of gratitude, which we have not repaid with any of the promptness and generosity that our altered circumstances have made a duty, now that its resources have been crippled by the misfortunes of France. It can, without exaggeration, be said that in many dioceses the money allotted by this pious association first enabled bishops to act independently of the trustees of their Cathedral churches, whose course was calculated to paralyze the whole action of the bishop whom it should have been their pride, as it was their duty, to aid, within the limits of their powers, to discharge the duties of his exalted position. Small as the allowance may seem to many of us who scan the volumes of the *Annals*, it was of great moment at that time, when it enabled a bishop to make a visitation of his diocese, to seek neglected Catholics, to pay for the education of a few seminarians, or for the hire of a hall for the celebration of mass, till the little congregation could gather money to build a modest church.¹

¹ The Church in the United States must have received some three millions of dollars from the association. We ought at least to return it the annual interest, to enable

The government of the Church in this country under the Sovereign Pontiffs, from the colonial days, had been all managed through the Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide. To the constant supervision and aid of that department, and the great cardinals who had successively been its Prefects, under Popes Pius VI. and VII., Leo XII. and Pius VIII., the Church owed its progress from the foundation of the See of Baltimore to the condition it had attained at the time of the first Council of Baltimore; and the elevation to the Papal throne of Cardinal Cappellari, who was, as Prefect, so familiar with the wants and development of the American Church, as well as with the Archbishop and his suffragans personally, gave Catholics here an assurance of even greater fostering care under his Pontificate.

This hope was not disappointed. If the progress from 1776 to 1829 had been remarkable, from a small and obscure body just released from the most oppressive penal laws, and barely known in two or three colonies, to a church existing in every state of the Republic, with its hierarchy established, and by its acts taking an honored place in the legislation of that ecclesiastical body that had triumphed over the heathen emperors of Rome, the feudal tyrants of mediæval times, the so-called Reformers, the Gallican and the modern infidel, its progress in the next half century under the Propaganda, guided by the Sovereign Pontiffs Gregory XVI., Pius IX. and Leo XIII., was to present a still more remarkable spectacle.

O unconquerable Church of Rome! Church of all lands and all races, of all centuries and all seasons, with the same unvarying faith, the same priesthood, the same sacrifice, the same sacraments for the king and the peasant, the most learned philosopher and the most unlettered of men, for the Cræsus and the Lazarus, what Church but thou couldst have a mission for this land of ours, where Providence has gathered men of every race and tongue, and shown the very helplessness of schism and error by their utter incapacity to mould men into one homogeneous Christian body, instinct with faith and hope and life that is in charity? This dost thou accomplish, O Catholic Church of America, and it is wonderful in our eyes!

Schism and error may have opinions. Their typical word is: "I think." The Catholic Church speaks like the prophets of old: "Thus saith the Lord." She goes forth with a divine commission, and that gives her messenger or apostle an innate strength or power. A bishop may be sent to a new diocese, like Bishop Miles to Tennessee, and find himself alone in a great state without a church, without a priest, without shelter, and be stricken down

it to aid missions now in need; we are ashamed to say that we do not contribute one per cent. of the amount to that excellent work.

with sickness amid strangers ; or, like Bishop Bruté, set out with only one priest as his whole body of clergy, to scour two states in search of the flock confided to his care. In like manner Bishop Loras set up his mitre and crosier amid the few log huts of the first pioneers of a state, the rude backwoodsmen, before any of them in all Iowa had begun to erect a church of any kind. He does not falter, he has all to create, a clergy, churches, schools, institutions, and yet without any definite knowledge whence he is to obtain the pittance needed for his own maintenance, he sets to work. The struggle is great, the pioneer bishop may sink soon under his labors, but the work goes on ; it may be slow, there may be little for years to encourage, but the triumph must come.

This strikes thinking Americans who stop to study the world around them. Here, they say, is a church that believes in itself, has full faith in itself, in its own mission, its own power, its ultimate triumph. Its people all believe alike, and all join devoutly and earnestly in a worship which, though strange to us, is grand in its conception, grand in its outward form ; and what we cannot understand is that this Church, as we see it, seems a living contradiction of many popular ideas. It has always been accused of hostility to the Bible ; but with a belief in the authenticity, inspiration and accuracy of the Bible dying out among Protestants, this Church upholds all steadily and sturdily, and uses the Scriptures more freely in its worship, and its rites and ceremonies, than any of the sects ; here is a church charged with fostering ignorance, that establishes colleges, academies, and schools in all parts of the country, and if present tendencies continue, is likely in a few years to have the only institutions of learning in which the ancient classics are read and appreciated ; here is a church represented to us as debasing, but presenting to its humblest followers the noblest works of architecture, sculpture, painting and music.

A church which in fifty years has so developed that from half a million of believers it numbers eight millions, is a fact that cannot be overlooked. Increasing more rapidly than other portions of the population by its birth rate, as well as by immigration, its influence is steadily advancing, while polemical attacks, mob violence, hostile legislation, and the trickery of shrewd politicians, seem by successive failures to give it new strength, as it triumphantly points to their exposure.

Let us examine in detail the elements of this semi-century of progress.

In the very year of the first Baltimore Council, a German priest from the United States, the Rev. Frederic Rézé, appealed to the princes and prelates of Catholic Austria for an organized aid to maintain and keep alive the Catholic faith and its practice among

the German immigrants to the United States, whose numbers were steadily increasing. Led by the Cardinal Archduke Rudolph, the sons of Austria formed the Leopoldine Association, which at once began to contribute annually to the support of priests and churches for the German Catholics in the United States. It also aroused a zeal for mission work in this country which brought in priests and led to the establishment of several religious communities.

The next year New Orleans received a bishop, and Philadelphia a coadjutor to its aged prelate in the person of the learned Francis Patrick Kenrick. Both dioceses had long needed a bishop's presence and action, and both soon showed the effects of energetic zeal.

In 1832 the Asiatic cholera swept over the country, and the Catholic priests and the Sisters of various communities devoted themselves heroically to the care of those who were seized with the terrible disease, Bishop Edward Fenwick with several clergymen and religious dying martyrs of charity. The second visitation of this scourge in 1834 elicited similar devotedness.

Meanwhile a new see had been established at Detroit in 1833, and the Rev. Dr. Rézé, the first bishop, induced the Redemptorists in Austria to send some Fathers to revive Catholicity in the hearts of the Indians in his diocese and convert the heathen. They were soon called from this field to meet the more urgent want of the German Catholics, and with few exceptions this has been for many years the special field of their labors in the dioceses of Baltimore, Philadelphia, Erie, New York, Buffalo, Rochester and New Orleans. Besides the care of German congregations, the Sons of St. Alphonsus Liguori have, by missions in English-speaking churches, rendered incalculable service, and Fathers Konings and Müller have contributed to the Catholic literature of the country. This order has already given bishops to the Church in the persons of Bishops Neumann and Gross.

After holding a second provincial Council, and crowning his work by erecting a church in Baltimore at his own expense, Archbishop Whitfield died in 1834. About this time a church was erected at Burlington, the first in Vermont, and New Hampshire had a second one at Dover; while a priest exploring the new town of Milwaukee found twenty Catholics as the nucleus of a congregation. The Fathers of the Society of Jesus, by the general wish of the Bishop, undertook the work of Indian missions begun by their predecessors in the seventeenth century.

But while the Church was thus expanding, and new churches were rising in many parts of the country, the old hostile spirit stimulated by unprincipled men was creating a feeling that needed only a spark to produce a popular outburst. Those who had at

first entered the lists to assail Catholic doctrine and practice by arguments skilfully using Scripture, the fathers, and church history, and observing, to some extent, at least, the decorum of theological discussion, had given way to men who wielded only the arms of misrepresentation, calumny and abuse, who wantonly put forward the grossest frauds and forgeries. The convents and houses of sisters were the especial objects of attack, and all that minds sunk in sensual vice could gather or invent was accumulated in accusations against the pious and devoted Catholic ladies. A wretched woman from Montreal was made the heroine of a book giving pretended accounts of a convent in which she had never been, and in its pages obscenity was hypocritically gilded with pretended zeal for morality.

A Protestant editor of New York went to Montreal with the book in his hand, and visited the convent, examining every portion of it. His published statement proved the vile book a fraud, but his testimony was unheeded. Emulating similar notoriety, a girl who had been taken into the Ursuline Convent at Charlestown, Massachusetts, as a charity pupil, gave notes from which a similar work, under the title of *Six Months in a Convent*, was concocted. It was at once answered, but the public mind had been excited, intemperate ministers harangued the people, and before long a mob unchecked by the public authorities assailed the convent, drove the nuns and pupils from it at night, pillaged and profaned the chapel, tore open the graves of the dead, and gave the building to the flames.

It is a disgrace to American literature that such books were then published; a disgrace not to be removed. Works on our literature now never allude to them, although their circulation was enormous, and their influence beyond precedent. Their vileness is such that historians of American literature shrink from mentioning them.

Still stranger is it that men who could coin and circulate such moral filth should assume to be champions of virtue; or that a mob from the vilest dens and slums should be regarded as of such exalted morality as to find aught to censure in the pure and cultivated ladies of the Ursuline Convent.

A mockery of a trial followed the Charlestown arson and murder; but in the prejudiced state of the public mind, there were no convictions.

The half century has brought a vindication of the Catholic morality. The original New England stock is dying out; divorce and the prevalence of sins against the purity of the marriage state, and the object for which it was instituted, are sapping the strength of the race. Moralists are at last denouncing these sins; and when they come to show by statistics the terrible state of affairs, one and all call attention to the fact that it exists among the Protestant part of the community alone; and they admit that among the Catholics there is a superior morality, and greater faithfulness among the

married to each other and to God's holy designs. The New England of 1884 recognizes the very Catholic morality which half a century ago it assailed and denied.

Yet the Church was spreading. The diocese of Boston could already number 25,000 souls; Chicago had a resident priest; Catholicity had reached western Massachusetts, and a pastor had a flock in Worcester. The third Council of Baltimore, in 1836, solicited the erection of sees at Dubuque, Nashville, and Natchez, and the next year two priests, sent from the St. Lawrence at the request of Bishop Provancher, for the first time said mass in Oregon.

In the short term between 1833 and 1838, the number of suffragan bishops had increased from ten to fifteen, but the number of priests had doubled, rising from 202 to 406; the next nine years showed still greater increase, the number of priests in 1847 being 834, more than double, the number of churches rising from 324 in 1836 to 812 in 1847, while the Catholic population, estimated at 500,000 in 1829, exceeded a million in 1846.

The Catholics had endeavored to keep pace with the wants of their increasing numbers, but where all was to be created the drain for the erection and maintenance of schools was a heavy one. There were in many parts free schools, but the whole system of teaching and the schoolbooks were hostile to the Catholic Religion. About 1840 an effort was made in New York to obtain for schools supported by religious denominations a share in the school-moneys. It was no innovation, as this had been done for many years with good results, and had been abandoned only in consequence of frauds practiced by the Bethel Baptist Church, in order to obtain a greater amount than its school was legitimately entitled to claim. The petition of the Catholics to the Common Council was met by opposing petitions from some religious denominations who employed learned lawyers to advocate their views. The Catholic claim was sustained with admirable ability by Rt. Rev. John Hughes, coadjutor Bishop of New York, who had already established a high reputation in a controversy with Rev. Mr. Breckenridge. The debate attracted attention in all parts of the country, but the Common Council durst not grant the Catholic relief. An application to the legislature found the candidates of both political parties pledged to oppose the Catholic interest, so that the Catholics nominated a ticket of their own. The question of religious services and instruction in schools was thus fairly presented to the public. There were two courses open: one, to allow religious services and instruction to be given in the schools, Catholic for Catholics, Protestant for Protestants, or to exclude entirely from the training of the young all religious services and

instruction of any kind. The former system has been adopted by England and her Colonies; the latter was the basis of a new school system, adopted by the State of New York, and since widely copied in other States. It assumes, really, that religion is injurious to the young, a thing to be proscribed, and that the secular authority has the right and duty to proscribe it. Logically, it must be injurious to adults, and there must exist the same right and duty to close all churches. An increase of crime and dishonesty has been the result. Where the Ten Commandments are no longer taught, where children do not learn the divine precept, "Thou shalt not steal," the result must be theft, dishonesty, speculation and embezzlement. Where they do not learn the precept, "Thou shalt not commit adultery," the standard of moral purity must be low, marital infidelity must prevail, and divorces must be sought and desired. Such a school system, while it checked, to some extent, the anti-Catholic teachings and books in schools, could not satisfy Catholics. It is a recent system, and its fruits, as tested in the United States and Australia, have been "like Dead Sea fruits that tempt the eye, and turn to ashes on the lips." It is un-American, for all the early schools in this country recognized the importance of religion in the training of the young. And when Protestant denominations, in order to thwart Catholics, took ground against religious instruction, they dug their own graves.

When Catholics found that they must choose between a godless education, furnished by the State, and a Christian education at their own cost, they did not hesitate. The discussions had brought the question home to every Catholic fireside, and the faithful were ready for the necessary sacrifices. An impulse was given to the cause of Catholic education, which soon showed grand results. St. Xavier's College, Cincinnati, was opened in 1840, under the Jesuit Fathers, and St. John's, at Fordham, New York. The next year the Augustinians opened Villanova College, near Philadelphia, and, soon after the Jesuit Fathers established the College of the Holy Cross at Worcester, Massachusetts. Academies for young ladies were also multiplied, the Ladies of the Sacred Heart coming to the East to found establishments such as they had already in Missouri and Louisiana. Parochial schools, free schools, sprang up in all parts where the congregations could by any sacrifice establish them. The Brothers of the Christian Schools, Xaverian Brothers, Brothers of Mary and of St. Francis gave teachers for the schools for boys, and those for girls found instructors in the Sisters of Charity, and of Loretto, in Ursuline and Dominican and Benedictine nuns, in Ladies of the Sacred Heart, and subsequently in orders like the School Sisters of Notre-Dame, Sisters of Notre-Dame, of the Holy Cross, of St. Joseph, of St. Dominic, and other similar organizations. So earnestly have Catholics devoted them-

selves to this great task of Christian education, for which all America will, one day, when common-sense returns, bless them most devoutly, that, in 1884, the pupils in the Catholic parochial schools number fully half a million, a number equal to that of the whole Catholic body at the date of the first Provincial Council of Baltimore. With more than 2500 parochial schools in the country, they do not feel that they have done enough, and Catholic journals deem the work in many parts far too inadequate, and show how much yet remains to be done. Yet, our parochial school system is an affair of only about forty years' active life, and has labored under many disadvantages, arising from a want of uniform courses of teaching, study and books. The diocese of Fort Wayne stands as the pioneer in giving the parochial schools a thorough organization with a view to their greatest efficiency. For higher education, we have now 87 colleges, 599 academies. There are, besides, 22 ecclesiastical seminaries, and a number of similar institutions for sacerdotal training in various religious orders, really seminaries, though known under other names. There is a movement which will ultimately succeed, though the time is not certain, for the establishment of a great Catholic University. The influence of the sound Catholic educational system is all the more important, because, though the earlier colleges in the country were under religious control, and sustained mainly by some denomination, the later colleges and universities are not only secularized, but, besides ignoring religion, affect to follow the modern infidel schools of science, and in the study of history, ancient and modern, obey the same guidance. The federal government seeks to control the school systems of the country, now in the hands of the States, and its influence will be of the same character. The Catholic educational system is, and will be, the great, clear, distinctive exponent of Christian truth against its assailants.

The Fifth Council of Baltimore, convened in May, 1843, under his Grace Archbishop Eccleston, was attended by sixteen bishops, including Bishop Odin, who had been appointed Vicar-Apostolic of Texas, originally a Mexican State, but which had, by the action of emigrants from the United States, recently made itself an independent republic. At its request, the Holy See erected several new sees: Little Rock in the State of Arkansas, Chicago in Illinois, Hartford for Connecticut and Rhode Island, Milwaukee for Wisconsin, Pittsburgh for western Pennsylvania. Before the close of the year, Oregon, a growing territory on the Pacific, was made a Vicariate Apostolic. At the opening of the year 1844, the Church in this country, not including Texas, had one archbishop, twenty-five bishops, and 610 priests, nearly double the number reported for 1834. The churches numbered 611, having more than trebled in eleven years.

But a bitter feeling against Catholics prevailed, inflamed not only by unscrupulous men in pulpits, but also by demagogues, who pictured to the workingmen that the influx of foreigners, then mainly Catholic, must inevitably result in reducing them to beggary. A political party, combining these two elements of hatred to Catholics and to foreigners, assumed the name of Native American. By processions, insulting banners, and violent denunciations, the demagogues sought to provoke Catholics to some act of violence. This they desired as a pretext for attacking and destroying Catholic Churches. In May, 1844, this policy led to fearful riots in Philadelphia, which the authorities made no effort to suppress, although two Catholic churches and many residences were burned to the ground, and unoffending citizens slaughtered in cold blood for their religion. The same feeling showed itself in Indiana, where, on the accusation of a shameless woman, a priest was sent to the State prison, although his innocence then, and subsequently, was made so clear that the governor felt that he must save the State from eternal disgrace by opening the prison-doors.

Many business men fled from Philadelphia, and throughout the Catholic body in the United States a feeling of insecurity prevailed. New York narrowly escaped similar scenes. The success of the "Native Americans," many of whom were Irish Protestants, seemed to forebode periodical violence to the disciples of the Church of God. But, if there was a feeling of despondency, it soon passed away. Catholics always remember that they are heirs of the promise: "Blessed are you, when men shall persecute you, and speak evil against you, lying, *and you suffer for my sake.*"

Before the close of the year a native-born American, whose vigorous philosophical mind had been recognized as almost unequalled in the land, after a series of reasonings, which he had, step by step, laid before the public, announced that there was no logical course for a man to pursue except to enter the Catholic Church; and true to his conviction and to God's grace, Orestes A. Brownson became a Catholic, and from the year 1845 gave the cause of truth a vigorous American champion, fully versed in all questions of the day, knowing all the intrigues and schemes of politicians, and advancing Catholic truth with his tremendous logic.

When the year for the next Council came, Bishop Fenwick, who had refused to sell the ruins of the Ursuline Convent, but kept them as a monument of bigotry and injustice, died without obtaining redress. At this time too, a Benedictine monk, Dom Boniface Wimmer, came with a few students and lay-brothers to establish his ancient monastic order in the United States. He began his work in the diocese of Pittsburgh, and Providence so blessed this work that, at this day, he is an Abbot, having more priests under him than any other in the long history of his order, although two other Abbeys

have been formed by members of the congregation he founded. He chose for his especial field the German Catholics of this country, and only in rare cases have the Benedictines assumed charge of other congregations. The order has spread through the dioceses of Pittsburgh, Erie, Newark, Richmond, Savannah, Mobile, Covington, Kansas, Oregon, and has with some success undertaken in Georgia to win the negro race from vice and ignorance to a moral, Christian life. A few years later, in 1850, a colony of Swiss Benedictine Fathers founded a house in Indiana, which has extended its missions as far west as Dakota Territory, where Dom Martin Marty, resigning his abbacy of St. Meinrad's, in Indiana, labored so successfully among the Sioux Indians that he has been made Vicar Apostolic. The Benedictines conduct seminaries and colleges, and do parochial work, as well as maintain missions among the Indians and Negroes.

The sixth council, composed of the Archbishop of Baltimore and twenty-two suffragans, with heads of several religious orders, sought to give the Church a shield against the assaults of the Evil One by placing it in an especial manner under the protection of the "Blessed Virgin Mary, conceived without sin," who was formally chosen Patroness of the United States, and the increased devotion among the faithful after the especial favor of her exemption from original sin had been defined as an article of faith led to the observance of the 8th of December as a holy day of obligation.

After this council new sees were erected at Albany and Buffalo, in the State of New York, and at Cleveland, in Ohio. Oregon was made a metropolitan see, with suffragan bishops, whose sees were finally fixed at Nesqually, in Washington Territory, and in Vancouver's Island. A provincial council was held in Oregon in February, 1848.

The annexation of the Republic of Texas to the United States involved us in a war with Mexico, which resulted in adding to the territory of the United States not only Texas, but the Catholic provinces of New Mexico, Arizona, and California. Texas and California soon lost their Spanish characteristics, but to this day New Mexico has retained her Spanish population with very slight additions from any other races. The United States government has, however, persistently placed over this Catholic people as governors, secretaries, and judges Protestants, some of whom have been selected apparently from their coarse and brutal hostility to every thing Catholic. It has, too, placed the Catholic Indians under Protestant control, and, degrading itself to the work of petty proselytizing, has used every means of coercion and bribery to alienate from the Catholic faith, in which they had been brought up for three hundred years, the simple-minded Pueblo Indians.

There had been a diocese established in California before its acquisition by the United States; and in 1847 a see was established at Monterey, with Upper California as the diocese, the bishop being subject directly to the Holy See. New Mexico was made a vicariate apostolic; in Texas a see had been established at Galveston in 1847.

After the holding of the seventh council of Baltimore, in 1849, which was attended by twenty-five bishops, the Holy See, at the instance of the Propaganda, having already raised St. Louis to the rank of an archbishopric, did the same for New York, Cincinnati, and New Orleans. New sees were erected at Wheeling, Savannah, and St. Paul.

The ancient province of Baltimore, after an existence of forty years, was thus divided: New York and Cincinnati each had a province; Louisiana, as anciently understood, was also divided into three provinces: St. Louis, New Orleans, and Oregon; and the Spanish territory on the Pacific gave the province of San Francisco.

The whole United States in 1850 was estimated to contain 1,523,350 Catholics, governed by three archbishops, twenty-four bishops, 1081 priests, with 1073 churches, and twenty-nine theological seminaries. The work of the Congregation de Propaganda Fide had kept pace with the growth and the wants of the Church in this country.

Up to this time the legislation of the Provincial Council of Baltimore extended to all parts of the republic, each diocese having its own statutes and regulations adopted in the synods held by the Right Rev. Bishops after brief intervals. Henceforward each province would have its own series of decrees, and those of Baltimore would have force only within its greatly restricted province.

A series of councils has been held in the newly created provinces; but their decrees, though approved by the Holy See, and fully as binding as any previously passed, seemed to lack the moral force of those adopted for the whole extent of the United States, and there arose an instinctive tendency for councils that would, as before, pass decrees of national jurisdiction. This led to the first Plenary Council of Baltimore, which opened on the 9th of May, 1852, the Most Rev. Francis Patrick Kenrick, Archbishop of Baltimore, presiding as Apostolic Delegate. Around him gathered five other archbishops, and twenty-three of their suffragan bishops, and titular bishops, acting as administrators or vicars apostolic. The Bishop of Monterey was also present, completing the whole episcopate of the United States. The Abbot of La Trappe, Superiors of the Augustinians, Dominicans, Benedictines, Franciscans, Jesuits,

Redemptorists, Lazarists, and Sulpitians, attested the spread of religious orders and the work their members were accomplishing.

After this council the Propaganda obtained the erection of the metropolitan see of San Francisco, and of the episcopal sees of Portland, Burlington, Brooklyn, Newark, Erie, Covington, Quincy, Santa Fé, and Natchez, and of a vicariate apostolic, embracing the upper peninsula of Michigan.

The increase of the Catholic body in the United States, from the time of the Revolution, was due to the natural increase of those then in the country and the natives of the Catholic provinces subsequently acquired, but in a still greater degree to the Catholic portion of the immense immigration into this country from European countries, and to its increase by births. The Catholic element in the early immigration was mainly in the Irish portion, and at first the emigrants from Ireland were rather Protestant than Catholic. In 1850 the whole number of foreign-born persons in the United States was 2,244,602. Of these about 1,000,000 may be regarded as Catholics, and their children three-quarters of a million more; the more ancient stock constituting another three-quarters of a million; the whole Catholic population of the country being at the time estimated by the soundest thinkers at two and a half millions.

In 1846, for the first time in the history of our immigration, the Germans arriving on our shores exceeded the natives of Ireland, but the more conservative and Catholic part of the Teutonic people were less numerously represented than that which belonged to the more radical and revolutionary classes.¹

This increased immigration had revived the anti-Catholic feeling. St. Louis was the scene of bloody riots in 1854; a mob attacked the Catholic Church in Manchester, N. H.; and Father Bapst was tarred and feathered at Ellsworth, Maine, by a formal act of the town; on the 6th of August in the following year, a day of shame for Louisville and Kentucky, twenty Catholics were murdered, their homes given to the flames, and an attempt made to destroy the Cathedral. Churches suffered almost total destruction in Newark, N. J., and Williamsburg, N. Y.

The storm spent its force, and Catholics, who enjoy the pre-eminence of being the only sufferers for the faith in this republic during the present century, resumed their labors to build up the house of God. Manchester saw its church completed, and this very year has become the See of a Bishop. Provincial councils and diocesan synods were held in Cincinnati, St. Louis, New Or-

¹ In 1854 the Germans arriving were 220,000, while the Irish fell to 101,000; the total for the years 1845 to 1854 being, Irish, 1,512,100; German, 1,226,392.

leans, Baltimore, in the years 1855 to 1858. By 1859, the 1081 priests and 1073 churches of 1850 had more than doubled, having risen to 2108 clergymen ministering in 2334 temples of the living God.

By this time the Benedictines had extended their labors as far west as Kansas; another Trappist monastery had been founded in Iowa; the followers of St. Norbert were establishing a house in Wisconsin; the Franciscans were founding a large institution and community at Allegheny, in the diocese of Buffalo; and other communities had been formed for the German population in the dioceses of Philadelphia, Cincinnati, Alton, and Louisville; the Conventuals in a similar manner had begun their labors at Syracuse; an American province of Capuchins had sprung up in Wisconsin; the Dominicans, Augustinians, Jesuits, Lazarists, and Redemptorists had multiplied their houses and missions; the Passionists, disciples of St. Paul of the Cross, were introduced into the diocese of Pittsburgh in 1852, soon to gain in numbers, and by their austere life and zealous mission work to multiply their houses and their redeeming labors. The Oblates of Mary Immaculate from Canada were establishing churches in Washington Territory at the West, and New York on the East. The great community of the Fathers of the Congregation of the Holy Cross, founded at Notre Dame, Indiana, by V. Rev. Mr. Sorin, in 1842, was building up a future university, and directing churches in several dioceses. The community of Priests of the Most Precious Blood, founded in Ohio in 1844, was extending its churches in the districts of Ohio where the German immigration had taken root; the Priests of Mercy had charge of a French church in New York, and were laboring in the painful missions of Florida. At New York the V. Rev. I. T. Hecker had established a community of missionary priests of St. Paul, mainly for giving missions.

Laboring with these and the secular clergy, especially in the direction of academies and schools, were the Brothers of the Christian Schools, who, introduced into New York in 1846, had already extended to various parts of that State, Missouri, Michigan, and Louisiana; the Brothers of the Society of Mary, another body of excellent teachers, beginning their labors in Ohio, were already spreading to other States; Xaverian Brothers, Brothers of Christian Instruction, and especially Brothers of the Third Order of St. Francis, were directing parochial schools in many dioceses; the Ursuline and Visitation nuns had increased the number of their convents and academies; the Ladies of the Sacred Heart, extending to the East, had institutions also in the dioceses of New York, Albany, Buffalo, Philadelphia, Detroit, Chicago, and Kansas; the Kentucky sisterhoods, the Sisters of Loretto and Nazareth, had multiplied their communities and their schools; the Dominican

nuns had similarly increased. The Sisters of St. Joseph from a feeble beginning were spreading to many parts of the country. The Sisters of Providence had begun their excellent work in Indiana. The School Sisters of Notre Dame had begun their work in Wisconsin in 1847, and, by their thorough system of training their members as teachers, had already made so favorable an impression by their success that they had extended to Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, Pittsburgh, Buffalo, and Detroit, the first example of a community founded for the German Catholics which spread rapidly among English-speaking congregations. The Sisters of the Holy Cross, from their house near Notre Dame, Indiana, had also filiations in many dioceses.

The great community founded by Mother Seton was pursuing its labors, as planned by her, in New York, New Jersey, and Ohio; while the Mother House at Emmittsburg, with the members there, had been transferred to the French sisterhood, and was adopting a new field of labor to conform to the spirit of their new rule. Besides these and some other teaching orders, like the Sisters of the Immaculate Heart of Mary in Michigan, congregations of sisters had been introduced whose field was not education, but the corporal and spiritual works of mercy. Such were the Sisters of Mercy introduced from Ireland into the diocese of Pittsburgh in 1843, and soon laboring in those of Little Rock, Portland, Hartford, New York, Brooklyn, Cincinnati, Baltimore, Chicago, and San Francisco; the Sisters of our Lady of Mercy founded by Bishop England in Charleston; the Sisters of our Lady of Charity of the Good Shepherd, whose mission it is to attempt the reform of fallen women, were pursuing their devoted labors in Louisville, New York, Philadelphia, Cincinnati, St. Louis, and New Orleans, and a similar order in Buffalo; the Franciscan Sisters of the Poor had opened a hospital in Cincinnati.

Thus had colleges, academies, and schools been increased in number, as well as asylums, hospitals, refuges; and the religious orders, with increasing vocations, were enabled to undertake new labors at the appeal of the bishops.

Such was the condition of the Church in the United States on the eve of the great civil war, which cost the lives of so many thousands of our citizens, and brought desolation on so many States. The bishops and clergy of the Catholic Church had done nothing to fan the embers of sectional hatred; no Catholic pulpit rang with appeals to the passions; the influence of the Church was for peace. But when the war began, Catholics in all parts did their duty as subjects of the government which they recognized; and in the camp and on the battlefield, in the hospital and the prison, the Catholic priest and the Catholic sister ministered fearlessly and constantly. They did their holy work in the light

of day, and many who, for the first time, could watch the calm and fearless zeal, were filled with deepest reverence for the ministers of a faith which had ever been presented to them in odious colors.

The war left the South in a state of utter prostration; cities and towns in ruins; her rich lands untilled for want of capital and labor. In the general distress a great part of the Catholic churches and institutions had disappeared, and others sank in the struggle for existence under the harsh rule which ensued. The enfranchised negroes, almost destitute of religious ideas or knowledge, were a field opened to the zeal of the Church, but the bishops of the South were without resources and without priests, and had to rebuild ruined churches and academies. The Church had always labored to mitigate the evils of slavery and to console the bondman. The first priest known to have officiated on our territory, the Dominican Father Antonio de Montesinos, is famous in history as the first to denounce the enslavement of the Indians; and, though the number of saints who have flourished in America is still small, it includes one born in slavery, and one who devoted his whole life to the consolation and relief of the negro slaves.

The priests of St. Joseph, a community founded in England for mission work, and the Benedictine Fathers of St. Vincent's Abbey in Pennsylvania, in time gave their services to the Southern bishops, and the slow and laborious task has been begun of raising the negroes to a moral sense of purity, honesty, and truth, and imbuing their minds with solid principles of religion. This is all the more difficult, as all the religion presented to many was a wild sentimentalism, manifested in excitement, leading to no moral reform, no repentance for sin, no hope of amendment.

Among the recent marks of progress is the increase of reformatories, the house of the Angel Guardian at Boston having been one of the earliest. Near most of the great cities there are now such institutions under the care of religious, where the neglected children of careless and dissolute parents, or those whose waywardness defies control, are kept in discipline tempered by religion and prepared at last to earn their livelihood, and become, as men and women, a blessing and not a curse to society.

Just after the close of the war the second Plenary Council was held at Baltimore, opening on the 7th of October, 1866. Archbishop Spalding presided as Apostolic Delegate, and six archbishops, thirty-seven bishops, three mitred abbots, and thirteen representatives of orders of the regular clergy, attended. For this council the subjects to be discussed had been prepared with wonderful ability by the farseeing Delegate, and they were carefully studied. The decrees that were passed formed a body of doctrine and discipline of the highest order, and as such were regarded in all parts of the Catholic world.

During the war, and for some years subsequently, exact reports of the state of the Church in all parts of the United States were not to be obtained. Yet immigration continued to swell the numbers of Catholics at the North, and in parts acquired by the armies of the Federal government.

When the centennial year 1876 arrived, the Catholic body, so insignificant a hundred years before, without a bishop, with few priests, fewer churches, and no institutions, either of learning or mercy, had become one of six millions of faithful, under eleven archbishops, fifty-six bishops, and five thousand and seventy-four priests. In more than five thousand churches was the holy sacrifice offered in thanksgiving for the blessings which had been vouchsafed them in that period; sixty-three colleges were training young men in sound and solid learning for all the higher walks of life, and hundreds of thousands of children received in the parochial schools knowledge based on morality. To prelude this memorable year, the Sovereign Pontiff had raised Boston, Philadelphia, Milwaukee, and Santa Fé to the rank of metropolitans in 1875, and Chicago was also, in 1880, created an archbishopric.

In this, the year of the third Plenary Council, there are summoned to it a cardinal, the Archbishop of New York; eleven other archbishops besides the Apostolic Delegate, fifty-eight bishops, six mitred abbots, and heads of more religious orders than can now be found in many countries. They will convene as the ecclesiastical superiors of at least seven thousand secular and regular priests charged with the care of more than eight millions of souls.

The progress has been great not only in numbers but in other respects. The episcopate of the United States, which dates back less than a century, has already made an impression on the great gatherings of the bishops of the world, as in that which assembled in Rome at the definition of the Immaculate Conception, in that on the Centenary of St. Peter, and still more in the Œcumenical Council of the Vatican. The ecclesiastical seminaries are better provided, many of them are large institutions with learned faculties, who are enabled to impart a more thorough training than was possible in former years, and aiming to give the country priests as well educated as those nurtured at the American College in Rome, or that at Louvain. The colleges, too, have gained strength, and this is all the more needed as they will soon stand alone in recognizing Christianity, revelation, the scriptures, as well as in the cultivation of the ancient classics, in the study of the literature of Greece and Rome, and in a sound school of philosophy and ethics. The religious orders continue their work, and in those which gather for works of mercy the pious women of Catholicity there

have been new accessions in the Little Sisters of the Poor and the Sisters of Bon Secours, while to the contemplatives have been added the Dominican Nuns of the Perpetual Adoration.

There are still wants to be met. Besides the English-speaking Catholics, whose churches are now keeping pace to some extent with the increase, and the German Catholic body now represented by so large a proportion of archbishops, bishops, abbots, religious and secular clergy, there are other nationalities whose faith in the future is a problem. Thousands of Italians are reaching our shores, thousands of Poles, great numbers from Portugal and its islands, as well as from Spanish America. All are considered Catholics, but it cannot be said that all are seen as component parts of the body of Catholic worshipers or recipients of the sacraments of the Church. The Poles have generally made efforts to establish churches for themselves, but they seem to lack harmony, and by old local jealousies transferred to this soil not infrequently bring their congregations and churches to ruin, or exile their priests. The Portuguese are concentrated in a few localities, and seem to preserve faith and zeal; but the Italians show very little love of the faith, and very little knowledge of it. Far different from the humble Irish who years ago, laboring on the great public works, always welcomed a priest, and helped to erect churches as they moved along, the Italians neither frequent the churches now accessible to them, nor exert themselves to erect others where they can hear the words of truth in their own tongue. The Italian churches are few compared to the Italian body, and they are not maintained exclusively by them. In many cities there are quarters occupied by Italians who seem to have lost all religion, so that when zealous priests speaking their language give missions in order to revive their faith, they find but a score of listeners, the very women having apparently lost all attachment to religion.

Those coming to us from Spanish America are very numerous, but Spanish churches, except in the old Mexican provinces now annexed to this country, are almost unknown; and yet few comparatively of this body are seen in the Catholic churches where the sermons are in English.

These people are all nominally Catholics, and are by some counted as members of the Catholic Church in this country, but it is a grave question what steps can be taken to save them and their children. The Italians, from their poverty, are a favorite field for Protestant proselytizers, who, by presents and other means, endeavor to win their attendance at their schools and mission chapels. Had they the robust faith which characterized the mass of Irish immigrants of three-score years ago, the case would be different; but the task is to instruct them in their faith and enkindle a zeal and love for it.

With this exception the Church in this country stands in a wonderful degree of prosperity, fitted for its work with churches, some of them, like the great cathedrals of New York, Philadelphia, Cincinnati, the churches of the Jesuits in New York and Buffalo, architectural monuments of remarkable beauty, and institutions that impress all by their magnitude and fitness for their work.

The Church in the United States has, by its organization and the high character of its episcopate, made its impression on the whole Catholic world. Since the first Provincial Council of 1829 the bishops of this country have been repeatedly summoned as a body to Rome, under Pope Pius IX. of blessed memory, to take part in the definition of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin, as to which they had all responded that it was the unwavering faith of their flocks; then at the centenary of St. Peter and the solemn canonization which then took place; and finally, to the General Council of the Church, held in the Vatican, which distinctly defined the infallibility of the Vicar of Christ, and condemned so many false theories of this century.

Since then the elevation by the Sovereign Pontiff of His Grace, John McCloskey, Archbishop of New York, to the Cardinalate in 1875, has given the Church in the United States a constant representative voice in the august senate of the Church, the immediate counsellors of the Pope, the College of Cardinals.

The fathers of the coming council will thus meet to seek, under divine inspiration and the guidance of the successor of St. Peter, the best and wisest means to continue the work of the Lord in this country; to save the millions here already in the fold, to present the truth so distinctly that others must yield to grace, and seek salvation by the path which the Son of Man has traced.



THE LIFE AND TIMES OF FREDERICK THE SECOND.

(Continued from p. 322.)

THE KINGDOM OF ITALY.

AFTER Germany, Burgundy, and Lotharingia, the next part of Charlemagne's vast empire which claims our attention is the kingdom of Italy. Its consideration will, however, occupy but little of our space, as so many facts concerning it have been already incidentally mentioned. Nevertheless, certain portions of its history, especially the earlier portion, should be noticed, since they have their bearing on the later age of our hero, Frederick II.

After the division of the Roman Empire into the empires of the East and of the West, it was again for a time reunited under Zeno, emperor of the East. Then Italy was governed by his nominal lieutenant, but really independent king, Odoacer the Goth, from A.D. 476 to 493. It was afterwards (from 493 to 526) governed by Theodoric, king of the East Goths. The seat of his government was Ravenna, which had also been the seat of government during the later Western Empire. This kingdom included much more than Italy, its coast-line extending a little westward of the mouth of the Rhone. The emperor Justinian (527-565), through his general, Belisarius, brought Italy (including Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica) back under his rule, and at the end of his Gothic war (which lasted from 537 to 543) it was ruled by his officers, termed *exarchs*, from Ravenna. The special region which was known by the name of "the Exarchate" corresponded with what is now the province of the "Romagna," its modern name indicating the long continuance of the rule of Eastern Rome, or Constantinople, in that region. The seaboard of what is now Provence, from a little west of the Rhone to the river Var, was, however, ceded to the extensive Teutonic people called the Franks, who then occupied France and a large part of Germany.

In 568 there appeared on the scene the true founders of the "Kingdom of Italy." These were another Teutonic people called the Lombards, who, under Alboin, then advanced into Italy from that region which is now Styria and western Hungary. Northern Italy, already weakened by previous incursions of Franks and Alemans, soon succumbed, and Pavia became the Lombard capital. Alboin's successor, Antharis, much extended the Lombard king-

dom, became a Christian (though he was converted but to Arianism) and founded the duchy of Beneventum—the first duke of which, Zoton, destroyed the abbey of Monte Casino, which remained desolate for one hundred and fifty years. A large part of Italy, however, remained faithful to the Emperor, the Imperial and Lombard domains intersecting one another. Thus Venice¹ remained imperial, as did Liguria, sheltered beneath the Apennines. So also did the islands of Sardinia, Corsica, and Sicily, as well as the territory to the east of the Apennines between the Po and Ancona, in the Exarchate. Besides these the Emperor also retained the allegiance of Rome, of the country between Civita-Vecchia and Terracina, of the duchy of Naples, with the toe and the heel of the Italian boot. Thus the Lombard kingdom consisted of northern Italy, which is still called Lombardy, of the duchy of Spoleto (which is now Umbria, with the territory eastward of it), of Beneventum and the greater part of the kingdom of Naples.

In 590 St. Gregory the Great was elected Pope, and achieved the independence of Rome by allying himself with the duke of Spoleto against the aggressive Lombard king (against whose aggression the impotent exarch did nothing to defend the Eternal City), and by converting the Lombards from their Arianism. The attack on the worship of images by the emperor Leo (the Isaurian) completed the alienation of Italy from the Eastern Roman Empire. The aggression of the Lombards continuing, Pope Gregory II. (A.D. 716) called upon Charles Martel (the valiant leader of the West Franks) for aid against the Lombard king Luitprand, but Charles could not afford him the help he desired. In 753 the Lombards attacked and took Ravenna and the Exarchate—the exarch flying from Italy. Then Pepin (Charles Martel's son), having been acknowledged by Pope Zachary as king of the Franks, crossed the Alps, at the call of Pope Stephen, and compelled the then Lombard king, Astolf, to yield up the Exarchate and the Pentapolis. The Pentapolis was what afterwards became the duchy of Urbino, or the northern half of the modern march of Ancona, *i.e.*, from the Exarchate down to Ancona.

These regions Pepin presented to the Pope, who declared him "Patrician of the Romans." The Lombards again threatening, Pope Hadrian I., in 774, applied to Charlemagne (son of Pepin) for aid against their king Desiderius, who was advancing against

¹ The Venetian islands were first peopled by inhabitants of Aquilea, who fled to them from the Huns in the middle of the fifth century. Aquilea had been founded 183 B.C., and became a Patriarchate in the sixth century. The prelate of the adjacent town of Grado was also styled a patriarch, but in the fifteenth century that title was taken thence to Venice. The Patriarchate of Aquilea took in the region between Como and the Istrian Pola. Its patriarchs grew to be powerful princes at the north-eastern corner of the Adriatic.

Rome. Charlemagne crossed the Alps, defeated and took prisoner Desiderius at Pavia, and himself assumed the crown of Lombardy. He confirmed his father's grant to the Pope, and he, in his time, was declared "Patrician of Rome," and on a visit to Rome, in 800, he was crowned Roman Emperor, as before related.

The emperor's Italian kingdom reached from the Alps to Terracina, and thence across to the east coast. The Principality of Beneventum, however, remained Lombard, as he could only make it tributary to him. The islands, Naples, and the toe and heel of the boot, remained Greek. Other principalities south of Charlemagne's kingdom were Capua and Salerno. Capua included the territory west of Beneventum and north of Naples; Salerno was formed by the lands south of Naples and north of the Grecian territory at the toe of the boot. The emperor gave the county and marquisate of Tuscany to one Bonifacio. After Charlemagne's death the kingdom of Italy went with the Empire under his immediate successors; the local magnates, however, gradually gaining more and more power and independence as emperor succeeded to emperor. At the end of the ninth century the count of Tuscany, the archbishop of Milan, and the duke of Friuli,¹ were almost independent potentates.

Charlemagne was succeeded by his grandson Bernard² (813), after whom came Charlemagne's own son, Louis I., who was crowned emperor in 816. After him came his son Lothair I. (emperor in 823), then his (Lothair's) son, Louis II. (king of Italy, 844; emperor, 850). To him again succeeded Carloman, son of Louis the Germanic, who was both king of the East Franks and grandson of Charlemagne.³ Carloman was king of Italy from 876 to 880, and was the father of Arnulf, the Roman emperor.⁴ After Carloman came his brother, the emperor Charles the Fat.

On the deposition of Charles the Fat (887), an opportunity was very naturally taken to choose an Italian king less thoroughly German than the chosen emperor Arnulf. Accordingly the duke of Friuli, Berengar I., was chosen, who only claimed Carolingian descent through Gisele (the daughter of Louis, son of Charlemagne), who had married Count Eberhard.

Berengar's kingship was, however, contested by Guido of Spoleto, supported by Adalbert, count of Tuscany.⁵ Guido succeeded for a time, and was crowned both king and emperor, and after his death the same was the case with his son Lambert. Nevertheless,

¹ Friuli took in what is now the region of Trent and Northeastern Venetia.

² Son of the emperor's son Charles.

³ Being the son of Charlemagne's son Louis I.

⁴ See No. 33 (January, 1884) of *Amer. Cath. Quarterly Review*, p. 24.

⁵ A descendant of Bonifacio who was made count (or marquis) by Charlemagne.

the Germans returned under Arnulf, and the latter was crowned emperor of Rome, as has been before mentioned. After his death and that of Lambert, Berengar succeeded, and was in turn crowned emperor. He had, however, to contend for some time, first, with Louis of Provence, son of Boso, king of Burgundy,¹ and afterwards with Rudolf of Burgundy, who for a brief space got possession of the crown, being supported by Ermengarde, daughter of Adalbert of Tuscany.

The next king, Hugh, a vile and infamous tyrant, was a close connection both of Ermengarde and of Guido, the then marquis of Tuscany. Hugh (926-945) was count of Arles and grandson of Lothair I. He came from Provence to Pisa, and was welcomed king by Pope John X. He married the infamous Roman woman Marozia, whose son afterwards drove him from Rome, though he continued for a time to reign over the rest of Italy till he was forced to return to Provence, when he left behind him his son Lothair II., who reigned from 946 to 950.

Berengar II., a grandson of Berengar I., and Marquis of Ivrea,² was the next king, who associated his son Adalbert with him in his kingdom. He sought to obtain the hand of the young and fair Adelhei, Lothair's widow, who refused his suit. Thereupon he cruelly ill-used her, thereby bringing Otho I. down upon him and upon Italy, to her rescue. He then, as before related,³ made Berengar become his man, and was himself crowned king and emperor at Milan and Rome in 962. Thenceforth the kingdom of Italy remained inseparably united with the German Empire up to the date of Frederick the Second's birth, December 26, 1194.

Certain other Italian events, however, both before and after the crowning of Otho, yet need to be here referred to.

The coming of the Northmen and of the Saracens will be treated of under the heading, "The Eastern Empire," but we may now be permitted to remark that the latter had harassed Sicily and the islands from the year 827. Local disputants were so ill-advised as to invoke their aid in Beneventum in 840, and thus at the end of another ten years they had established themselves on Monte Gargano (a revered sanctuary of St. Michael), and on the banks of the Garigliano, whence they ravaged the country and destroyed the monastery of Monte Casino a second time. Having pushed as far inland as Narni, they were, in 916, exterminated by the Greeks and Lombards united, King Berengar and Pope John X. taking the field in person. In the north, Italy was ravaged by the pagan Hungarians, who poured into the country in the time of Berengar

¹ See *l. c.*, ante, p. 26, note 2.

² Ivrea was in the northwest of Italy, in the Alpine region north of Turin.

³ See *l. c.*, ante, p. 25.

I.; they were only finally restrained and settled in their own kingdom by Otho I.

Meanwhile the Greeks had regained much of their power in the south, owing to the discords and intestine disputes of their neighbors. Their so-called "Theme¹ of Lombardy" reached up to Salerno, and they had Naples and Amalfi, with Bari on the Adriatic, for their chief cities. Indeed, the Lombard lords of Beneventum and Capua became unstable subjects to the eastern emperor.

Under the Saxon emperors the self-government of the Romans was forcibly pulled down by both the first and the third Othos, and after Otho III. the Pope and the counts of Tusculum ruled the Roman territory. Under the Franconian emperors he went with "the great Countess" Matilda, daughter and heiress of Boniface, Count of Tuscany and the representative of the first Bonifacio who had been installed by Charlemagne.

KAROLINGIA.

We have next briefly to survey that portion of the empires of Charlemagne and Charles the Fat which was situated to the west² of Lotharingia and Burgundy. This was called Karolingia, because it fell to Karl, or Charles (the Bald), youngest son of the second Frankish emperor Louis (who was himself the son of Charlemagne); just as Lotharingia was so-called as belonging to the two Lothairs. These Lothairs were, first, the emperor Louis' son Lothair, and secondly, Lothair's son, the second Lothair.

In Charles the Bald's time Karolingia took in modern France west of the Rhone³ and the Saone, and including, westwards, Rheims and Laon, with part of Belgium (Flanders), and of Spain (the Spanish March down to Barcelona), and the Channel Islands. His supremacy, however, was more nominal than real over the great duchy of Aquitaine (*i.e.*, the country between the Loire and the Garonne), over the duchy of Gascony (between the Garonne and the Pyrenees), over the county of Toulouse (the country east of Gascony), over the Spanish March and over Septimania—*i.e.*, the land bordering the coast between the Spanish March, the county of Toulouse and the kingdom of Burgundy. Brittany was also all but independent. Other domains to be distinctly noted are the county of Flanders and the duchy of Burgundy. But the greatest duchy of all was the duchy of France, the capital of which was Paris. This duchy included the Isle of France, with Maine, Anjou, Normandy, Champagne and Orleans. Its ruler had the title of "Dux Francorum," and its gradually in-

¹ "Theme" was the term used by the Greeks to denote the large provinces of their empire.

² See *l. c.*, *ante*, p. 22.

³ Except a strip west of the Rhone.

creasing territory was "France," which thus gradually grew out of Karolingia.

Charles reigned from 840 to 876, and was succeeded by his son and grandson (Louis II. and Louis III.), after whose short reigns the kingdom fell for a brief space into the great empire of Charles the Fat,¹ who was chosen to the detriment of Louis III.'s brother, Charles the Simple.²

Upon the deposition, in 885, of Charles the Fat, Odo, Count of Paris, was elected first duke and afterwards king of France (887), as the result of his courageous defence of Paris against the inroads of those Scandinavian invaders known as the "Northmen" or "Normans." Nevertheless, in 893 certain nobles, discontented with Odo, elected Charles the Simple king of France also. Thus was initiated a double series of kings, each claiming to be "king of France;" Charles the Simple and his descendants (the Carolingian series), reigning at Laon; while Odo and his successors ruled at Paris. But neither of these sovereigns held much of what is *now* France. Thus all modern France south of the Loire was practically independent (under the dukes of Aquitaine and Gascony, and the counts of Barcelona³ and Toulouse). While Brittany was under its Breton count, the French territory of Normandy, even, was destined soon to be ceded to those very Scandinavian "Northmen" who had been so courageously repulsed by Odo.

The duchy of Burgundy was ruled by an almost independent duke, Richard le Justicier (877-920). This duchy formed no part of the *kingdom* of Burgundy,⁴ but answered roughly to the modern province of Burgundy west of the Saone, with some part of Nivernois and a southern fragment of Champagne. The county of Flanders—which answered to modern Artois, French Flanders, and Belgium to the Scald (Escaut), was under its independent counts, Baldwin I. or "Iron Arm" (862-879), Baldwin II. or "the Bald" (879-917), and Baldwin III. (919-958).

King Odo of Paris then succeeded his brother Robert I. (922-923), and after his death, his sister Emma having married Rudolph, duke of Burgundy,⁵ the latter became king (923-934), struggling with Louis IV. (called "The Stranger"),⁶ who was king from 936 to 953. Rudolph was aided by Hugh, duke of France, and son of Robert, duke and king of France. After the death of Rudolph, Louis IV. remained king till 953, when he was succeeded

¹ Son of Louis the Germanic, son of Louis I., son of Charlemagne.

² Charles the Fat was the grandson of Louis I., who was the great-grandfather of Charles the Simple.

³ The count of Barcelona held, of course, part of what is now Spain.

⁴ See *l. c.*, *ante*, pp. 22 and 26, note 2.

⁵ The successor of Duke Richard le Justicier.

⁶ Son of Charles the Simple and husband of a sister of the emperor Otho I.

by his son Lothair,¹ who reigned till 985, and was again succeeded by his son Louis V., who, dying after a year's reign, left a widow, Adelaide, who married Hugh Capet, duke of France, son of duke Hugh, last before-mentioned, and grandson of King Robert. This Hugh Capet of Paris succeeded (in 987) Louis V. of Laon, who was the last Carolingian king—his uncle Karl being excluded on account of his having accepted the duchy of Lotharingen (Lorraine) as a fief from Otho I.²

Meanwhile Maine, Anjou and Champagne had become practically independent. The great province of Normandy, with the Channel Islands, had also become a Norman duchy under the Northman Rolf, or Rollo, to whom it was granted³ in 911 by the weak king Charles the Simple, who also gave him the hand of his daughter Gisele. Rolf, before marriage, accepted baptism, taking the name of "Robert" as his "Christian" name.

Hugh Capet (the founder of the great French dynasty whose last reigning sovereign was Louis Philippe) was very willingly chosen by his peers as king on account of his wealth, which rendered him well able to maintain himself with consequent less pressure upon them. His own fiefs comprised the territory around Paris, a large portion of Picardy and Champagne, the districts of Chartrain and Perche, with the counties of Blois, Touraine and Maine. He was also the more readily elected on account of his having been a great benefactor of the clergy.

By his elevation to regal rank, Hugh Capet obtained, as *king*, a claim to superiority and suzerainty over all Karolingia; yet, though he was rich and powerful as to the domains he held anterior to (as well as after) his elevation to the throne, he had very little real power beyond these domains.

Karl, the above mentioned duke of Lotharingen, rebelled against Hugh, and obtained possession of both Rheims and Laon, holding them for about two years. He afterwards died in prison on the Loire, and his son Otho made no further attempt to continue the royal line of Laon. Hugh Capet wore the crown but for nine years, being succeeded, in 996, by his son Robert II. (the Wise), who reigned till 1030. Having been compelled by Pope Gregory V., and a creature of Otho III.,⁴ to put away her whom he considered

¹ Who married Emma, daughter of Lothair, king of Italy.

² This Karl was duke from 977 to 991. He was succeeded by his son Otho, who died childless in 1006.

³ The dukes who succeeded him were William Longsword (927-942); Richard I., the Fearless (942-995); Richard II., the Good (995-1025); Richard III. (1025-1027); Robert "the Devil" (1028-1034); and William, known as "the Conqueror" (1034-1086).

⁴ See *l. c.*, ante, p. 25.

his wife (Bertha, a princess of Burgundy), he married Constance, the daughter of the count of Arles.

Hugh Capet's brother, who was duke of Burgundy, having died, King Robert bestowed that duchy on his son Henry, who succeeded him, in 1030, as King Henry I.

Henry's brother Robert rebelled, but was defeated by the king, assisted by Robert the Devil, of Normandy. Nevertheless, on the intercession of Fulques, count of Anjou, his brother Robert was made duke of Burgundy. During the reign of Henry I. France was, perhaps, at her very weakest, while Germany, under Henry III., was at its strongest. The king of France had little more than the greater part of the Isle of France and of the Province of Orleannais; Champagne, Anjou, and Maine having become very much detached.

Though the Seine and the Loire flowed through the king's territory, his domains were quite cut off from the sea by the domains of his great feudatories. Thus the small county of Penthieu shut him out from the sea between Normandy and Flanders, and the county of Poitou (a portion of the great duchy of Aquitaine) extended up to the southern boundary of Brittany.

So it came about that the kings of France, in the beginning of the eleventh century, had quite a shrunken territory compared with that of the *Duces Francorum* of a century previous. Nevertheless, they had become "kings" instead of "dukes," and this title gave them claims which were very fruitful in their consequences; for these claims by degrees had the greatest practical effect, as, little by little, first smaller and then larger vassal domains fell into, and became incorporated with, the king's immediate territory, *i.e.*, with that which had remained to him of his ducal domains as duke as well as king.

This Norman, Robert the Devil, went to the Holy Land,¹ leaving his young bastard William (the Conqueror) as duke, who was protected by his suzerain, King Henry I., against rebellious relations.

In 1060 Henry's son, Philip I., became king, Baldwin, count of Flanders, acting as his faithful guardian till he died,² at which time Philip was but thirteen years of age. Afterwards King Philip encouraged Noel, duke of Brittany, to throw off his allegiance to

¹ Normandy had already begun to send out knights to the south—to Spain and Italy. They founded the kingdom of the Two Sicilies (see *ante*, pp. 19 and 32).

² He left two sons, Robert, count of Friesland, and Baldwin VI., count of Flanders. Robert had killed Florent, count of Friesland, and married his widow, Gertrude of Saxony; and he afterwards killed his own brother, Baldwin. Baldwin's widow, Richilde, with her sons Arnoul and Baldwin, fled to France for aid, but in vain. King Philip married Bertha,—daughter of Florent and Gertrude,—and Robert became count of Flanders as well as of Friesland.

the duke of Normandy, and waged much war with King William (the Conqueror) till the latter's death, and he also engaged in many small wars with his own vassals. He intrigued with one Beltrade, and all his life he was debauched and more or less at enmity with the Church.

Louis VI. (the Fat) succeeded his father, Philip I., in 1108, and found his domains greatly reduced by his father's reign of forty-eight years. When he ascended the throne his domains extended but forty leagues by thirty, and his revenues were almost exclusively derived from Paris, Orleans, Etanges, Meaux, and Compiègne; he soon, however, began to extend and consolidate his power, rallying the townspeople and peasantry to him against his rebellious barons.

Nevertheless, Henry I., king of England, was a most dangerous enemy, for he not only obtained the aid of the count of Anjou, but also that of his son-in-law, the emperor Henry V., the husband of his daughter Matilda.¹ He vainly supported William, son of Robert Courthose, of Normandy, in an attempt on Flanders, but he effected one enormous, though, as it turned up, very transitory, success. This was the obtaining for his son Louis (afterwards King Louis VII.) the hand of Eleanor, the great heiress of the duchy of Aquitaine, who owned domains much larger than those which made up the kingdom of France.

King Louis VII. (called the Young) came to the throne in 1137. He went to the Holy Land, but lost, through divorcing his wife, all the great possessions his father had obtained for him,—Aquitaine, Guyenne, and Poitou,—so that his own provinces came to be bounded by the Loire, the Seine, and the Meuse.

While these kings were succeeding to the throne one after the other in France, the power of the Northmen, after they had once acquired Normandy, greatly increased, and long went on increasing, to France's detriment. In the first place, the conquest of England greatly augmented the Norman power, and this again led to vast acquisitions of French territory. William the Conqueror's eldest son, Robert, having lost Normandy, and Robert's son, William, dying without being able to obtain it, the duchy passed to the Conqueror's third son, Henry I.,² and, after him—through his daughter Matilda, who had married³ Geoffroy, count of Anjou—to his grandson, Henry II.⁴ This Henry not only became king of England and duke of Normandy, and succeeded to his father's county of Anjou, but he also added Poitou to his

¹ See *l. c.*, *ante*, p. 29.

² King of England from 1100 to 1135.

³ She had before married the emperor Henry V. See *ante*, p. 29.

⁴ King of England from 1154 to 1189.

domains, and the immense province of Aquitaine, through his marriage with Eleanor of that province, the divorced wife of Louis VII.

Thus to England there now belonged the Atlantic coast of France from Dieppe to Bayonne,—except the wild promontory of Brittany,¹—all Normandy, with the Channel Islands, Poitou, Auvergne, the Limousin, Guienne, and Gascony, with Anjou, Touraine, Maine, and Penthiou.² Henry II. of England even acquired Nantes, and all the country lying between the Loire and the Vilaine, from Conan IV., duke of Brittany, and he ineffectually tried to acquire the county of Toulouse from its lord, Raymond de St. Gilles.

Thus the English king Henry quite overshadowed the French sovereign, although the latter was the lord and suzerain of the English king as regarded the latter's French possessions.

Louis VII. married, lastly, Adelais, niece of King Stephen of England, and sister to the counts of Blois, Sancerre, and Champagne. By her he had a most noteworthy son, Philip (called Philip Augustus), who succeeded to the throne in 1180, and was king of France when the emperor Frederick the Second was born. Thus, at the birth of our hero Frederick, the most powerful sovereign in Karolingia was by no means the king of France, but the king of England, who owned as much French soil as did the king of France and all his other vassals put together.

We have now passed in review what seems to us the most noteworthy facts with respect to the history of the whole empire of Charlemagne, from his time to the birth of the second emperor Frederick. The next step will be yet more briefly to notice certain facts concerning the history of some regions external to his empire, namely, (1) Scandinavia, (2) what is now Russia and the Polish parts of Germany and Austria, and (3) Spain up to the same date. After that it will only remain to consider the Eastern Empire, wherein a place will be found for a sketch of (1) its Mohammedan invaders; (2) the Holy Land, and (3) the Normans of Italy, the maternal ancestors of Frederick the Second.

SCANDINAVIA.

At the time when Charlemagne was restoring the Western Empire, the Scandinavian section of the Teutonic tribes had settled down into the three great kingdoms of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. Of these, both Norway and Denmark had an extensive

¹ Of which, nevertheless, he had practical possession through its duke, Conan.

² Which William the Conqueror had added to Normandy.

western seaboard, and thus naturally extended westward by piratical incursions, and by conquering and annexing expeditions. Sweden, on the other hand, made up of the two states of Swethiod and Gauthiod, was shut in by the two other kingdoms, and could only expand, as it did expand, over the Baltic lands of Fins and Slavs.

The western Scandinavians, or Northmen, made their incursions into Britain during the eighth century. After contending with Charlemagne, one of their leaders, Ragnar Lodbrog, ascended the Seine, and pillaged Paris in the middle of the ninth century. Subsequent incursions ultimately led, in 911, to the recognition of the duchy of Normandy, under the Northman Rollo, by King Charles the Simple, as before mentioned. Some of the Northmen also ravaged the southern coasts of France and Spain, and others became mercenary soldiers of the Eastern emperor. Finally, Northmen from Normandy, in 1016, settled in Italy, at Aversa, thus forming the germ of what ultimately grew into the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, as before mentioned, and the history of which will be given in some detail at the end of this introductory survey of Europe up to 1194.

DENMARK.

Of the three Scandinavian kingdoms, it was only Denmark which was at any time subject to the Empire. But Denmark, as we have seen,¹ was more or less distinctly so, and the emperor's supremacy fully admitted, at least at intervals and critical moments.

The boundary between Denmark and the actual empire was the river Eider.² The kingdom comprised the peninsula of Jutland and the neighboring islands, with a strip along the adjacent mainland, called Scania, and Halland,—a strip mainly of what is now Sweden,—and these were, in the tenth century, as truly part of Denmark as either Zeeland or Jutland, which now constitute it almost entirely.

At the time of the coronation of Charlemagne, Sigurd Snogoje was king of Denmark, to whom succeeded, in 824, Hardiknut I., who introduced to his domains St. Anschar and Christianity, which his successor, Gorm, persecuted. Gorm, with the help of the Obotrites, invaded Saxony, but was defeated by Henry I. (the Fearless), who thereupon formed the "March of Schleswig." The next king, Harold II. (Bluetooth), was a Christian, but Svend I. (Forked-beard), who followed (985), dethroned his father and re-

¹ See *l. c.*, ante, pp. 25 and 31.

² During part of the tenth and eleventh centuries, the Danish frontier was withdrawn to the "Dannemark," the land between the two boundaries forming the *Danish March* of the Empire. Under Knut the Great the older portion was restored.

turned to paganism, conquering England in 1013. His son, Knut the Great (1016–1035), vastly extended his power, and became practically emperor of an enormous northern empire. From his capital city, Winchester, he ruled not only over England and Denmark, but also over Norway and Sweden and a large part of the Baltic coast. It was in his reign that the Danish state was at its maximum of importance as regards extent. With the death of Knut his empire fell to pieces, the Danish kingdom passing to a succession of sovereigns till we come to Waldemar I. (1157–1182), who, uniting with Henry the Lion against the Svends, received (in 1162) from the Emperor Frederick the First investiture of the countries conquered. In 1168 he conquered the island of Rugen, and subsequently (1173–1177) Stettin and part of Pomerania.

His son, Knut VI., avoided rendering homage to Frederick Barbarossa, and, making war on the lord of Pomerania, forced the latter to own himself his dependent. He also conquered the duchy of Mecklenburg and the lands of the Svends, from the Vistula to the Elbe, assuming the name of "King of the Slavs and Vandals," a title retained by his successors on the Danish throne.

In 1189 messengers came to him at Roskilde with letters from Pope Clement III., inviting him to hasten to the delivery of Jerusalem, but with no great results. Another spiritual lord—Bishop Waldemar, of Schleswig—rebelled against him, claiming the crown, he being a natural son of Knut V. The rebellion, in which he was aided by Adolphus, count of Holstein, Otho, margrave of Brandenburg, the archbishop of Bremen, and others, was with difficulty suppressed. He vanquished them, however, and took possession of Lubeck, where he convoked an assembly of the nobles of Holstein, Stormarn, Dithmarsch, Vagria, Nordalbingia, and Schwerin, and received their homage. Knut VI. died in the first year of the thirteenth century, six years, therefore, after the birth of the emperor Frederick the Second. The Danish archbishopric of Lund was founded in 1151.

NORWAY.

The special country of the Northmen proper—"Norway"—was formed into a kingdom by Harald Harfager, about the middle of the ninth century. It was at its greatest extent in these early times, far larger than at present, reaching even to the White Sea. Hakon I. (936–950) was baptized, and tried to introduce Christianity, which was much furthered by Olaf I. (994), who sent missionaries to Iceland and to Greenland, which had been discovered about eighteen years. He built Drontheim, the seat of the Nor-

wegian archbishopric; to him succeeded Olaf II., a lineal descendant of Harald Harfager. Olaf, in early life, helped the Saxons in England to oppose the Danes, and subsequently harassed the coasts of France and Spain. He was a Christian, and zealous against idolatry, being so severe as to lead many of his subjects to aid the Danish invader Knut the Great, who, for a time, conquered Norway, as already mentioned. Olaf fled with his infant son Magnus to the Russian court, where his brother-in-law, Jarislaf,¹ entertained him hospitably. In 1030 he was slain in attempting to regain his throne, and was afterwards canonized. Soon after the death of Knut, Olaf's son Magnus (the Good) was recalled from his Russian exile and enthroned,² and reigned till 1047. After him came successively Harold IV., Magnus II., Olaf III., Magnus III. (1087-1103), with others, who need not be enumerated, till we come to Magnus V. The last-named sovereign, when only a child, was crowned at Trendheim, one Erling being Regent of the kingdom. But a youth with a singularly romantic history wrested the kingdom from him. This was Sverre, an illegitimate son of a former monarch, Sigurd II. Sverre's mother had taken him away to the Farøe Islands, where he was not only educated, but was ordained a priest. Nevertheless, he claimed the crown, and arrived in the kingdom and secured it. He did this in spite of the opposition of many of the clergy, of Papal excommunication and national interdict. His success was partly due to the help of John of England. He successfully maintained his power, in the teeth of all opposition, till he died in the year 1202, after a reign of twenty-five years. His ecclesiastical character and consequent knowledge, no doubt, helped him to resist the head of the Church, and he went far towards anticipating the subsequent schism of the sixteenth century. It was towards the end of the reign of this most antipapal northern sovereign that the emperor Frederick the Second saw the light.

SWEDEN.

With the end of the tenth century Christianity began in Sweden, and its King, Olaf, was, with his whole family, baptized in 1001. He temporarily conquered Norway, and annexed to his proper domain of Swethiod the lands of Gauthiod (or Gothland), assuming the title of "King of Sweden," instead of merely "King of Opeala," the title of his predecessors. Sweden was at this time of small dimensions. Even with the addition of the southern part of the modern kingdom—Gothland—it did not include any territory

¹ A prince of the house of Ruric.

² The Svend reigned for a short time before he fled at the advent of Magnus.

west of Lake Wener, nor extend more than half up the gulf of Bothnia, Helsingland being still external to the kingdom. In 1056 one Stenkil was raised to the throne, which was held by his descendants for the greater part of a century, till Swerker was elected in 1129. Upon the assassination of the latter, the two contending tribes of Swethiod and Gauthiod agreed that the united crown should be worn alternately by representatives of two dynasties. His first successor was St. Eric, who invaded, subdued, and converted the Finns in 1154. After certain contentions and two reigns, Swerker II., grandson of Swerker I., was raised to the throne, and married a princess of Denmark, thus gaining support against the disaffected portion of his subjects, namely, the men of Gothland. In order to secure himself against his foes, he put to death all the friends and relations of his predecessor, Knut Ericson, except Eric, who escaped into Norway, whence he returned later to avenge his slaughtered relatives. It was Swerker II. who was king of Sweden when the emperor Frederick the Second was born. At that epoch Sweden had extended its borders, having taken in the district to the west of Lake Wener, that is, Wermland (which was now finally annexed), and also the region bordering the gulf of Bothnia, called Helsingland. It had also extended largely in Finland.

We have now reviewed, very briefly, the history of the Western Roman Empire and the Scandinavian kingdom up to the time of the birth of our hero. Before surveying that of the Eastern Roman Empire and its dependencies up to the same date, it will be well yet more briefly to consider the races and regions of the northeastern and southwestern extremities of Europe.

Hitherto we have been almost exclusively occupied with the Teutonic (German and Scandinavian) races. The immense mass of Slavonic tribes and the non-Aryan races have been but briefly referred to in speaking of Bohemia and the Hungarians. We have seen that the eastern and northern borders of the Western Roman Empire fluctuated from time to time, some Slavonic peoples remaining permanently, and others but fitfully, subject to it.

We will, then, first glance at the Turanian and Slavonic populations to the east and north of the Empire, and then note the condition of the Iberian peninsula, to which, as yet, we have hardly referred.

TURANIAN TRIBES.

After the Celtic, Teutonic, and Slavonic races had possessed themselves of the greater part of Europe, there came successively a variety of tribes, which, as being Asiatic in origin, but neither

Aryan nor Semitic, have been conveniently distinguished as *Turanian*. Such were the Huns, Avars, Magyars, Chazars, Patzinales, Bulgarians, and Cumans. These tribes poured westward, in succession, into Europe, through the lands bordering the Euxine on the north.

The invasion of the *Huns*, who penetrated into Gaul, and were then defeated,¹ in the middle of the fifth century, is so remote from our history, that it may suffice to remind our readers that it was their destruction of Aquileia which peopled the Venetian islands with that city's fugitive inhabitants, and so laid the foundation of Venice.

The *Avars* have also little to do with our history. In the last quarter of the sixth century they pressed on the Northern frontier of the Eastern Empire, and subsequently founded a kingdom on the Danube, which was overthrown by Charlemagne. No more than the Huns have they left any recognized representatives in modern Europe.

The next tribe is represented to-day by the powerful and flourishing kingdom of Hungary,—the tribe of *Magyars*. Having settled to the north and east of the Euxine, and occupied much of the territory of the Avars, they were most imprudently called in by the Emperor Arnulf, in 893, to aid him in his struggle with the great Slav state of Moravia. Under his son, the child-king Louis, the Magyars invaded the empire, and ultimately their ravages not only extended widely in Germany and Italy, but even, in 927, to the shores of the Atlantic. They were finally expelled from Germany by the Emperor Otho I. They then settled in and occupied the central part of the modern kingdom of Hungary,—the lands on the Theiss and the middle Danube,—whence they extended north, south, and east, with varying boundaries, especially to the south and east. As we have seen, the German emperors claimed a feudal superiority over the sovereigns of Hungary, and sometimes succeeded in enforcing it. Nevertheless, the Hungarian kingdom, when once formed, always remained a separate kingdom. It was St. Stephen who received from the Pope, with the consent of the emperor Otho III., a royal crown, and his name begins the series of Hungarian kings.² King Coloman, who opposed, sword in hand, the first undisciplined bands of Crusaders, conquered Croatia and Dalmatia. The latter country was captured by the

¹ At the battle of Chalons, A.D. 451.

² Their names and dates were as follows: St. Stephen (1000-1038); Peter the German (1038-1047); Andrew I. (1047-1061); Bela I. (1061-1074); Geisa I. (1075-1077); Ladislav I. (1077-1095); Coloman (1095-1113); Stephen II. (1114-1131); Bela II. (1131-1141); Geisa II. (1141-1160); Stephen III. (1161-1173); Bela III. (1174-1195); Emeric (1195-1203).

Venetians in 1115, but Bela III. re-entered into possession of it, and held it, together with Croatia.

The *Chazars* we find, at the end of the seventh century, in the land between the Caspian and the Euxine, and they were still to be found in the Crimea and its vicinity at the beginning of the eleventh century. Part of them were converted to Christianity about A.D. 858. Having spread considerably northwards, they were repeatedly in conflict with the Russians, who deprived them of much of their territory in the latter half of the ninth century, and still more of it after the middle of the tenth.

The *Patzinales*, of whom, as well as of the Chazars, no known representatives now exist, invaded, about A.D. 834, the territory of the Chazars, and in 888 pressed into the region northeast of the Euxine (which had been inhabited by the Magyars), and in A.D. 1000 intervened between the Euxine and the Russians. In the latter part of the twelfth century the Patzinales were, in their turn, ousted by the Cumans. Before that, however,—*i. e.*, towards the end of the tenth century, and subsequently,—they were defeated by the Russians, and had many conflicts with the Greeks.

The *Bulgarians* made their appearance in Europe about A.D. 679, and settled between the Danube and the Homus. They soon blended with the Slavonic people of the country they invaded, and formed a Slavonic nation (with a Slavonic language) south of the Danube. This state grew greatly in extent between the beginning of the tenth century and the end of the twelfth, but its history belongs rather to that of the Eastern Empire.

Another Bulgarian immigration formed another Bulgarian state, which was distinguished as *Great or White Bulgaria*. It was situated on the Volga and the Kama, and was in full force at the beginning of the eleventh century.

The *Cumans* (known as the Polootzi or *Parthi* in Russian history) were to be found east of the Volga, in the year 1000, and half a century later they invaded Russia. Between A.D. 1114 and 1180 they advanced and took the lands antecedently occupied by the Chazars and Patzinales, and spread from the Ural River to the borders of Servia and the Danubian Bulgaria.

Besides these various tribes which invaded Europe after the Celtic, Teutonic, and Slavonic Aryan races had settled within it, there were, in Northern Europe, certain non-Aryan Finns, who were more ancient inhabitants of Europe, and who had been driven northward by the invading Aryans. The Laplanders and Finns of the land east of the Gulf of Bothnia have already been mentioned in speaking of the Scandinavian nations, but other Finnish tribes remained, inhabiting *Esthland* and *Livland* (the present Russian provinces of Esthonia and Livonia)—that is to say, the coast part

of the latter—with a strip of *Curland*, or the land west of the river Duna.

SLAVONIC PEOPLES.

Of the various members of the great Slav race, some became early and permanently connected with the German Empire, others were more or less occasionally subject thereto, while the rest remained permanently independent. These peoples may be grouped as those of the Baltic lands, Bohemia, Russia, and Poland, and that is the order in which, for various reasons, they may be here most conveniently considered.

THE BALTIC LANDS.

We have just seen that Finland, Esthland and Livland, with a strip of Curland, were the abodes of tribes of Finns. The other Baltic lands were inhabited by different members of the great Slavonic body. The inland part of Livland came, however, to be inhabited by the *Letts*, the most northern portion of the Aryan tribes which immigrated into these lands. Other Aryans dwelt in Curland, south of whom and of the Letts were the *Lithuanians*, properly so called, who, in A.D. 1000, occupied the region extending thence to somewhere south of the 55° of north latitude, but reaching to the coast for a short space north of the Niemen. South of them, again, came their kindred, the *Jaturages* or *Jatorugi*. The Aryan tribe called *Prussians* inhabited the coast between the Niemen and the Vistula, extending inland (in A.D. 1000) to the borders of Poland, and being bounded on the west by Pomerania, which, as we have seen, belonged to the German Empire. It was originally a dependency of Poland, but ended by being divided into two duchies, each ruled (like Mecklenburgh) by native princes under the empire. Nevertheless, from 1168 to 1189 it was under the supremacy of Denmark, nearly to the Gulf of Dantzic.

We have already seen¹ the extension of Teutonic power over the Slavs, between the Elbe and the Oder. In the first half of the twelfth century, however, no German or Scandinavian power had taken any lasting hold of the eastern coast of the Baltic or the Gulf of Bothnia. But in 1155 began the Swedish conquest of Finland, which led to the addition of a great eastern province to that kingdom. Down to the middle of the twelfth century, notwithstanding occasional Polish or Scandinavian occupations, the

¹ In the first part of this history, vol. ix., No. 33, January, 1884.

ancient Finnish and Lettish tribes kept their hold on the whole Baltic, northeastward from the mouth of the Vistula.

In about the year 1160, German mercantile enterprise extended to Finland, and was followed soon after the birth of Frederick II. by German conquests and occupation in Livland and parts adjacent thereto.

About the year 1158 some merchants of Bremen, bound for the island of Gottland, were wrecked at the mouth of the river Duna, which divides Livland from Curland. There they built a chapel, and converted some of the chiefs of that part to Christianity, through the preaching of a monk, named Meinrad, who was then consecrated first Bishop of Livonia by the Archbishop of Bremen. His successor, Bishop Berthold, failing to carry on the work of conversion by fair means, tried force, by which he lost his life. The third bishop, Albert, for purposes of defence at Riga and to aid conversion, founded a new order of military monks, called "*Brothers of the Sword*," ten years after the birth of Frederick II., *i. e.*, in 1204. These clerical knights had for habit a white mantle, with two red swords arranged, points downwards, as a St. Andrew's cross. At a later period, as we shall hereafter see, they united with the order of Teutonic Knights, owing to the union of the Danes with the Livonians in hostility to them.

BOHEMIA.

Although Bohemia was tributary to Charlemagne, and under Henry the Fowler became permanently an Imperial German fief in 928, yet it remained a Slavonic power under native princes.¹

A certain region, which was for the most part a portion of their domains, fluctuated between Bohemian, Hungarian and Polish supremacy. This was Moravia (in the main the same as the Moravia of to-day), which, under its king, Svatopluk (884-894), became "the great Moravian kingdom," stretching southwards to Sirmium and the northern boundary of Danubian Bulgaria, while northward it included Chrobatia (*i. e.*, Western Galicia and Southern Poland). It also took in a great part of the modern kingdom of Hungary.

¹ Before the thirteenth century they were mainly "dukes," but were sometimes kings. They were: Duke Borzivog (890-901); Spitignev I. (901-907); Wratislas I. (907-916); Wenceslas I. (916-936); Boleslas I. (936-967); Boleslas II. (967-998); Boleslas III. (999-1002); Jaromir (1002-1037); Brzetislas I. (1037-1055); Spitignev II. (1055-1061); King Wratislas II. (1061-1092); Duke Conrad I. (1092); Brzetislas II. (1093-1100); Borzivog II. (1100-1107); Svatopluk (1107); Ladislas I. (1109-1125); Sobieslas I. (1125-1140); King Ladislas II. (1140-1174); Duke Sobieslas II. (1174); Frederick I. (1178-1190); Conrad II. (1190); Wenceslas II. (1191); Brzetislas III. (1193-1195).

It was against this great Slav power that the emperor, Arnulf, called in to his aid (as already related) the terrible Hungarians—"Ogres" or Magyars. They came in, and, after their expulsion from Germany, they remained in the southern part of what had been "Great Moravia," forming, as it were, a Turanian wedge between two divisions of a *Croatian* (or *Chrobatian*) Slav population. North of the wedge was Chrobatia, with its capital, Cracow, while south of it were the Slavs inhabiting the banks of the Drave and the Save. Chrobatia, north of the Carpathians, became the province known as *Little Poland*, while the part south of those mountains fell under the dominion of the Magyars.

POLAND.

In the tenth century there arose a considerable Slavonic power, having its centre at Gnesen and its territory roughly bounded by the Oder and the Niemen, extending southward to Silesia and Chrobatia, and cut off from the sea by Pomerania and Prussia. This power was Poland—a power destined to undergo so many and truly great vicissitudes.

Mieczyslas I. (964–992), the first Christian prince of Poland, married Dembroska, the daughter of the duke of Bohemia, Boleslas I., with whose successor, however, he made war, with the aid of the emperor, Otho III., and first assumed the title of king of Poland. The next king, Boleslas I. (992–1025), warred with the emperor, Henry II., annexed Bohemia and Moravia, invaded Russia and took Kieff, made great conquests in Pomerania, and successfully warred with the Prussians. He also annexed Chrobatia north of the Carpathians, which remained Polish—as Little Poland—as long as Poland lasted, and there was situated Cracow, the second capital of the kingdom. His son, Mieczyslas II. (1025–1034), was a most unsatisfactory sovereign, after whose death a period of anarchy and misery ensued, terminated by the accession of his son, Casimir the Pacific (1041–1058), who obtained Silesia, paying Bohemia for it. His son, Boleslas II., called the Hardy (1058–1081), after various contentions in Russia and elsewhere, and after losing Pomerania, was excommunicated by Gregory VII. for murdering St. Stanislas whilst saying mass, being exasperated by the censures pronounced upon him for his vices by that saint. He died in exile in a monastery in Hungary.

King Wratisslas II., of Bohemia, was now recognized by the emperor, Henry IV., as king of Poland also; but the younger brother of the excommunicated sovereign became Prince of Poland, as Ladisslas I. (1079–1102), paying tribute to Bohemia, and

being both a weak and tyrannical prince. His son, Boleslas III. (1102–1138), called “the Crooked-Mouthed,” married a princess of Kieff, and was a very redoubtable warrior, successfully contending with the Pomeranians, Bohemians, and Russians, and even with the emperors, first Henry V., and afterwards Lothair. Boleslas had carried on war with the Pomeranians in conjunction with Denmark, and forced their duke, Wratislas, to submit, and spread Christianity through Pomerania. Lothair attempted to subject the Polish king, and unsuccessfully invaded Poland to enforce homage and tribute.¹ Boleslas, however, consented to do homage at Merseburg (1135) for Pomerania and Rugen. Boleslas III., on his death, most unhappily, divided his kingdom amongst four of his five sons, who were: Ladislas (the eldest), Henry, Boleslas (the Frizzy), Mieczyslas (the Old), and Casimir (the Just). The eldest became Ladislas II. (1138–1146); he had for his portion Pomerania, Silesia, and the Grand-duchy of Cracow, and had married Agnes, the daughter of the emperor of Germany. Henry had assigned him the territory of Little Poland, and Boleslas (the Frizzy) reigned over the territory of Plock. These two latter brothers, being despoiled by Ladislas II.,—who called to his aid Bohemians, Ruthenians from Red Russia, Galicians, Lithuanians, and Hungarians,—took refuge with Mieczyslas the Old, who reigned over Posen and its dependencies. Then Ladislas was defeated, and had to take refuge in Germany, his brother, the Frizzy, reigning in his stead as Boleslas IV. (1147–1173). The emperor, Frederick I., supporting his son-in-law, Ladislas, forced Boleslas to do homage and pay tribute, and (in 1168) to cede Silesia to the son of Ladislas; and the province thenceforth became more and more separated from Poland. After the death of Boleslas, his brother, “the Frizzy,” succeeded, as Mieczyslas III. (1173–1177), but was dethroned by a rebellion, to the advantage of his brother, “the Just,” who became Casimir II., who instituted a senate and a system by which the already insubordinate nobles and prelates became fatally independent. After a short usurpation on the part of Ladislas III. (1177–1203), a son of Casimir, called Leszek the White, succeeded in 1203, and reigned till his assassination in Pomerania, in 1227.

RUSSIA.

The great territory between 50° and 60° N. latitude, and 27° and 43° E. longitude, with certain extensions therefrom, came in the ninth century to be inhabited by a number of Slavonic tribes, cut off from the Baltic by Finns, Letts, and Lithuanians; from the

¹ See *ante*, January, 1884, p. 31, note 4.

Ural Mountains by Tartar hordes and the Finns of White Bulgaria, and separated from the Euxine by Patzinales and Chazars. The struggles of these Slavonic tribes with one another, and especially dissensions which sprang up in their great city and republic of Novgorod, led to the intervention of certain Swedes, under their leader Ruric, who, in the year 862, obtained the government of that republic. It was from the name of these Swedish invaders and "Warangians," that the country then ultimately subdued obtained its name of "Russia." Soon the tribes that dwelt at Kieff, on the Dnieper, besought his protection against the Chazars. He subdued the latter, and at the same time made himself master of Kieff, as well as of Novgorod. He died in 879. His son, Igor I., succeeded in 913, the state being, till then, governed by his guardian, Oleg, who had invaded the Eastern Empire and forced its Emperor, Leo, into a very favorable treaty. Igor was assassinated in 945, after which his widow, Olga, assumed the reigns of government, and professed the Christian religion, after going to Constantinople to be baptized, when she received the Christian name of Helen, the emperor, Constantine Porphyrogenitas, being her sponsor. Her son, however, Sviatoglaf I., was a pagan; he fought with and overcame, but was finally killed by, the Patzinales, in 972. On his death the empire was divided between his three sons, Yaropolk, of Kieff, Vladimir, of Novgorod, and Oleg. By this time the multitudinous Scandinavian immigrants had quite blended with the Slavonian natives, and formed a true Russian nation. After sundry contentions Oleg and Yaropolk lost their lives, and Vladimir became sole ruler of Russia, the territories of which he notably augmented, conquering parts of Poland (in 983) the Jaturoges on the west, and the Bulgarians of the Volga on the east, his arms extending from Livland to the Caspian. He ultimately subdued the Crimea, where he was baptized (in 988), by the archbishop of Cherson—thus becoming the first Christian emperor of Russia—and married to Anne, the sister of the Eastern emperors Basil and Constantine. Becoming old, he portioned out his vast territories amongst his numerous progeny, which when thus weakened suffered from the incursions of the Patzinales. He died in 1015, when endeavoring to subdue some of his own insubordinate offsprings. Of these Sviatopolk I. reigned (1015–1019) at Kieff, and called in the Poles, under their king, Boleslas I., against his brother, Jaroslav I., of Novgorod, who was aided by the Patzinales.

Sviatopolk lost his life in the struggle, and Jaroslav I. became sole sovereign (1019–1054), after a partial sharing of the sovereignty for a time with a brother named Motislav. Jaroslav was a most powerful prince and beneficent legislator. He conquered the

country of the Cossacks, and obtained all the land east of the Dnieper. In 1036 he defeated the Patzinales, and afterwards aided Casimir (the Pacific) of Poland to conquer the *Mazovians*, or tribes immediately south of Prussia. His sister became queen of Poland, and his three daughters-in-law were Greek, German and English princesses, while the queens of Norway, Hungary and France were his daughters. At his death he made his eldest son Isioslaf I. grand prince of Kieff, while to four others he assigned, respectively, Tchernigoff, Potolsk, Vladimir and Smolensk. This resulted in great disorder and weakening of Russia's power. In 1055 the Cumans made their first incursion and conquered in a dozen years a wide territory. Isioslaf had recourse for support to Boleslas II. of Poland, to the Emperor Henry IV. (in 1075), and to Pope Gregory VII.

Under the next grand prince, Vsevolod (1084–1093), there were other invasions of Magyars and Cumans, and the principality of Kieff wavered more and more (from disordered and divided powers) while the power of Novgorod increased. His nephew, Sviatopolk, (1093–1112), succeeded, who underwent further defeats from the Cumans—the daughter of whose chief he married. Vladimir II. (1113–1125), who was the son of Isioslaf, came next; after whose death a period of utter anarchy ensued. At last, about A.D. 1157, a prince named Andrew greatly raised and strengthened the city of Vladimir on the Kliasma, and within a dozen years subdued Novgorod beneath the supremacy of the former city. He was assassinated in 1176. The disordered and distracted territory of Russia then became divided between the two duchies of Kieff and Vladimir, and at the time of the birth of Frederick the Second Vsevolod III. was Grand Duke of Vladimir, and Sviatoslaf III. Grand Duke of Kieff.¹ Vladimir was become the great seat of power, but already another afterwards celebrated city, Moscow, had come into existence.

SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.

On the southwestern outskirts of Charlemagne's Empire was the great Iberian peninsula, which in many respects resembled and in others widely differed from the lands on that Empire's north-eastern borders. For the most part it had as little to do with the later Germano-Roman Empire as had Scandinavia; but in its earlier

¹ Andrew I. of Vladimir was succeeded by Michael II. (1175–1176), and Vsevolod III. (1176–1212). Kostoslaf, Grand Duke of Kieff (1157–1167), was succeeded by Metislaf II. (1168–1172), Roman (1173–1177), Sviatoslaf III. (1177–1195), followed by Rurik II., who died in 1211.

history it was an important part of the first Roman Empire, and its history is singularly varied and divergent from that of any region we have yet passed in review.

It still contains, in its northern provinces, many Basques, who are the remnants of its primitive Iberian people who were largely displaced by invading Celts in prehistoric times. To this early Celtic population was subsequently added a trifle of both Greek and Phœnician blood. The Phœnicians founded Gades (Cadiz), and also (between the first and second Punic wars) New Carthage, or, as it was called, Cartagena. The Greeks colonized its eastern coast. By degrees the country was slowly reduced under the dominion of Rome, the whole becoming Roman in the time of Augustus.

In the fourth and fifth centuries Spain was invaded by the Suevi, the Vandals and the Goths.

The Suevi, at first pagans, but Christians by the year 570, formed a kingdom which embraced (when at its greatest extent) the modern Spanish province of Galicia and also Portugal down to the Tagus. This kingdom, however, came to an end in 585.

The Vandals were Arians. They held for a time the south of Spain, and have left behind a trace of their presence in the name of the province "Andalusia."

The Goths entered by way of Barcelona and subdued the country, but the great West-Gothic kingdom included Aquitaine, and its capitol was Toulouse. They were Arians till 586. In 550 the southern part of Spain (including Cadiz and Cordova), with the Balearic isles, was won back for the Roman Empire under Justinian.

This region, however,—except the Balearic isles—was gradually regained by the Goths in the course of ninety years, and at the end of the seventh century the whole Iberian peninsula, with Roussillon and the adjacent part of Languedoc to the most western mouth of the Rhone, formed one great West-Gothic kingdom.

This kingdom had two very different seaboard. One faced the Atlantic, the other (from Gibraltar eastward) bordered the Mediterranean. It is thus evident *à priori* that the regions of the peninsula at either coast would have different destinies; and in fact this geographical divergence did, as we shall hereafter see, have the very effects which might have been anticipated.

This united Gothic kingdom was invaded and subdued by the Arabs with great rapidity, between A. D. 711 and 714, and they conquered afterwards the Balearic islands from the Roman Empire, to which, at the time of the Arab invasion, they still belonged. The Mahometans carried their arms into France; and Narbonne, Arles and Nîmes were Saracen cities till 755. The Christian

Goths were driven up to the Pyrenees and southern shore of the Bay of Biscay, where they continued to hold a fringe of independent Christian country on the northern border of the great Spanish Mahometan territory which formed a part of the Caliphate of Bagdad.

The Mahometans, however, soon lost the northeastern portion of the country. Charlemagne acquired it as far as the Ebro (including, of course, Barcelona), and made it into "the Spanish March" of his Empire. The Caliphate of Bagdad included Spain up to 755, when Spain became separated from it, under Abderahman I., forming at first the "*Emirate*," and afterwards the Ommiad *Caliphate* of Cordova. The undivided Mahometan power of Spain was at its maximum in the tenth century; thereafter it waned till, in 1025, the Ommiad Caliphate broke up into a number of separate Mahometan kingdoms, such as those of Cordova, Seville, Lisbon, Zaragoza, Toledo, Valencia, Granada, Jaen, and Murcia.

The quarrels between these kingdoms led to the invasion of other Mahometan tribes from Africa. First came the Almoravides (1086 to 1110), who conquered all the Mahometan kingdoms, save that of Zaragoza. To the Almoravides succeeded the Almohades who invaded Spain from Africa in 1145, established themselves, and turned back what had, by that time, become the advancing tide of Christian conquest from the north. The Moorish sovereign of the Almohades, who gained the great battle of Alarcos, was Jacoub Ben Jousouf (1184 to 1198), and that battle was fought in the year which succeeded the birth of the Emperor Frederick the Second.

Meanwhile the Christians in the north of Spain formed a kingdom of Asturias as early as 718, and Gijon, Artoya and Leon were won back by 730. King Alfonso I. (739 to 757) conquered Galicia and Portugal down to the Douro. Navarre also soon gained its independence, and the small kingdoms of Leon, Castile and Aragon also appeared upon the scene.

Between these rising Christian kingdoms were endless disputes, disunions and divisions; they agreed but in their common hostility to the Mahometans.

The Christian advance had been twofold: one advance was due to purely Spanish enterprise, and took place from the coast of the Bay of Biscay. It gave rise to Leon, Castile and Portugal. The other advance was due partly to Frankish invasion, and gave rise to Aragon, which thus by its origin, as well as by its geographical extension, contrasted widely with Castile. Their advance southwards was at very unequal rates—Toledo being won by Castile a generation earlier than Zaragoza was won by Aragon.

Navarre was intermediate between these great eastern and

western Christian states; but it, for a brief moment, overshadowed both. Under King Sancho I. (1000 to 1035) Navarre included Biscay, Guipuzcoa and the original Castile on the west, as well as Aragon on the east. Then Leon and Navarre comprised all northern, or Christian, Spain. In 1035, however, this Navarre broke up into Castile, Navarre and Aragon. Besides these kingdoms, there were the Counties of Portugal and Barcelona; and that of Barcelona extended into France. The County of Portugal of 1094 became a kingdom in 1139.

The extension of Portugal and Castile entirely cut off Navarre from the task of advancing on the Moslem, a task which Portugal, Leon, Castile and Aragon thenceforth shared between them.

Alfonso VI., king of Castile and Leon (1072 to 1109), took Toledo in 1105.

In 1135 Alfonso VII. (1109 to 1157) received the homage of the kings of Aragon and Navarre, and had himself crowned at Leon "Emperor of Spain." He passed the Guadiana and took Calatrava and Badajoz, and almost all the country north of the Sierra Morena.

Alfonso I. (1104 to 1134), king of Navarre and Aragon, took Zaragoza in 1118, also Tarragona.

Alfonso I. of Portugal (1112 to 1185) took Lisbon in 1147 and Silves, in Algarve, was taken for a short time by his successor in 1191.

At the time of the birth of Frederick the Second the king of Castile was Alfonso VIII. (1158 to 1214), while Alfonso IX (1188 to 1230) was king of Leon. The kingdom of Navarre was governed by Sancho (the Wise) VII. (1194 to 1234), and Alfonso II. (1162 to 1196) ruled over both Aragon and Barcelona. Sancho I. (1185 to 1211) was at the same time king of Portugal. All these sovereigns were, more or less, at war with the Almohades, who, in 1195, won the battle of Alarcos, which carried their power again beyond the lower Tagus and to the vicinity of Toledo.

The kingdom of Valencia was still Mahometan; so that at the time of our hero's birth all Spain was Mahometan south of the mouths of the Tagus and the Ebro, and of the Mountains of Toledo.

We have now finished our preliminary historical survey up to the year 1194, with the important exception of the Eastern Empire and its dependencies, that will next occupy our attention; and in treating thereof care will be taken to say occasionally what may be necessary as to the female ancestors of Frederick the Second.

THE IRISH QUESTION, PRESENT AND PROSPECTIVE.

WE are in the midst of a ministerial crisis in London. Before these words appear in America, we may be passing through the throes of a general election on this side, and the Irish people may at last have the opportunity of sending to the British Parliament a body of members who will truly represent the opinions of the overwhelming majority of the nation. This it is necessary to state by way of preliminary observation; not because the probabilities, on the whole, point to the immediate break-up of the Gladstone cabinet, but that the following remarks may be understood as written in the midst of a ministerial crisis not yet terminated.

The increase of the number of the members who will accept the leadership of Mr. Parnell and adopt the principles of the present Irish Parliamentary Party is a foregone conclusion. It is admitted by foes as readily as friends. In the course of the debates on the bill for the reduction of the franchise, the main objection to the extension of the measure to Ireland, from the Conservative side, has been that it would give Mr. Parnell ninety or ninety-five seats; and the ministerial answer is, that this is not a solid objection at all, for Mr. Parnell will have seventy to seventy-five seats whether the franchise be lowered or not. It is equally admitted that the disposal of a vote so large, in the House of Commons, will place in the hands of the Irish party the fate of every English ministry. The *Pall Mall Gazette* described Mr. Parnell's position in this respect by calling him "the master of the situation." A strong proof that the Irish members will be omnipotent in the next Parliament will be found by even a cursory examination of some of the important incidents in the history of the present House of Commons. There have been at least half a dozen occasions in which the ministry narrowly escaped a defeat that would have driven them from office. On the division on the Marriott amendment to the Cloture, which took place on March 3d, 1883, the government won by but a majority of thirty-nine, and they had declared that they would stand or fall by the result of this division. On the division on the second reading of the Affirmation Bill, the government were defeated by a majority of three; and they would have been dismissed from office if they had not beforehand declared that they would not make the division a question of confidence. On the last division on their Egyptian policy the ministry

won by a majority of but twenty-eight votes. Two observations must be made on these three divisions. First. The government, in the two cases in which it had a majority, would have been placed in a minority if all the Irish members returned on Home Rule principles had adopted the policy of the Irish Parliamentary Party and voted against the ministry. The ministry were saved, not by English Liberals, but by false Irish Nationalists. Second. The ministry, which has thus been often placed in a position of extreme risk, came into office with a majority of over a hundred over the Conservatives, and the Irish Parliamentary Party, which has so often almost succeeded in striking this powerful ministry down, averaged on divisions a vote of but thirty-five.

There is another and still more important inference to be drawn from the history of the relations between the Liberal majority and the Irish party in the present Parliament. One of the safeguards against the Irish party of the future, on which some Englishmen rely—one of the dangers which Irishmen fear—is a union of the two English parties against the Irish attack. Such a union is a dream—unless in one case, with which I will deal presently. Party spirit has always played a large part in the parliamentary struggles of the English people; it may be doubted whether it ever played a larger part than it does at the present time. At this moment, for instance, England is involved in a most serious and difficult foreign complication; peace or a terrible war, the safety or the endangering of her Indian empire, are held by both parties to be the stakes that are at issue in this mighty game; and what is the spectacle that the House of Commons exhibits? Fierce passions, a frenzied want of self-control, a complete absence of scruple or fairness,—ignorance, trickiness, personal rancor, political ambition, rule supreme in England's legislature. Of course, it would be easier to unite English parties against the Irish than on the question of distant Egypt; for national hate and the masterful spirit of a strong towards a weak country are passions which can be most potently worked upon. But England at the present moment has to think, not of Egypt only, but of France, dogging her every step and watching her every move with the fierce eagerness of a rival ambition; and yet the risk of a rupture with France, and the prospect thereafter of one of the most terrible of modern conflicts, cannot keep England united, or honest, or cool; and assuredly that is strong proof that no durable union can be reasonably anticipated against Ireland. There is one thing, and one thing only, that can unite all Englishmen against Ireland, and that is the destruction of life in some of these outrages by which London is occasionally shaken. These outrages bring terror to the Irish minority, whose lives and property are at the mercy of the

English majority around them ; and to the Irish representatives appears one of the gravest obstacles to the early success of the national cause. The period which immediately followed the Phoenix Park murder furnishes an instructive precedent as to the effect of a great crime upon the Irish position. Before May 6th, 1882, Mr. Parnell was the most powerful man in this country. All the resources of the British empire—infantry, cavalry, and artillery, thirteen thousand police, and the wholesale right of arrest—had been brought against him, and had failed ; and he came out of prison an acknowledged victor over the best and worst of the ministers who had all the British power at their back. The House of Commons literally crawled before him ; ministers ran a race with open foes or treacherous friends among them, to shake his hand and offer him congratulations ; coercion was a broken weapon, never to be tried again ; the doom of the landlord was sealed ; and home rule was within the measurable distance of three or four years. Then came the 6th of May, and Mr. Parnell was transformed from the omnipotent leader of a great national movement to the omnipotent opponent of the most cruel coercion bill ever proposed for Ireland. Those who passed through that period of bitter trial may well have sinking of heart in these hours of most sanguine hope, lest once again a successful crime should change the eve of overwhelming victory to an hour of disastrous defeat.

Taking another factor in the situation, the Irish people have never been more determined and never more united than at the present moment. The series of unbroken successes which the Irish party have had at recent elections show not merely a change but a revolution and a moral resurrection. To those who can remember the dreary days which immediately followed the treason of Keogh and Sadleir, the names of some of the Irish constituencies recently contested are but too familiar. They were the synonym for everything that was unusually degraded and politically corrupt. A successful shopkeeper in search of a title ; a lawyer on the lookout for an office ; a financier anxious to bait his plans for the promotion of bubble companies, with the *prestige* of parliamentary position,—any political adventurer who had money to spend was sure of being returned for one of those constituencies, though his opponent might be a man of fearless courage and of inflexible political honesty. Even as recently as the election of 1880, some of these same constituencies obstinately adhered to the old and evil ways. Mr. Parnell, going down to Mallow, to support a national candidate, was disastrously beaten by a government lawyer. Athlone returned, instead of Mr. Sheil, who was one of the first and most earnest supporters of Mr. Parnell, in his

days of early and painful struggle, a political nondescript without a particle of faith in national principles; and yet Mallow has since returned Mr. William O'Brien by an overwhelming majority over a ministerial officer; and Mr. Justin Huntley McCarthy has just been returned, even without a contest, for Athlone. All this points not merely to strength of political conviction,—for this has always been present to the minds of the majority of the Irish people,—but that true appreciation of the political situation which it is hard to impress upon the mind even of the most advanced nation. To put it briefly, Ireland is solid for the national policy of the National party.

Finally, the position of holding the scales between the two English parties, according to all fair probabilities, gives the Irish party a weapon for winning all the constitutional rights of their country. The British Parliament is, after all, the heart of the British empire. The man who is able to control the House of Commons is able to control England. The leader, then, of a large Irish party, holding the balance between the two English parties, may be truly said to be in some degree master of the fortunes and destinies of the British empire. With such a position it is for him to declare his terms. It may be that one or even two or three ministers may refuse these terms; but if the Irish leader be able to keep his party together, the final surrender is inevitable.

Such, then, are the present prospects of the Irish cause: The Irish people determined and united; the probabilities pointing to an immense Irish party,—such a party by being able to make or mar ministers,—in a position to win Ireland's rights. But is there no dark side to this fair prospect? It would be political optimism of the worst character to describe the present situation as all sunshine, and all safety. The very loftiness of the nation's hope at the present moment increases the danger of any defeat. As they are so certain and elated now, proportionately will they be depressed, in case they be defeated. It would probably happen that, if the present party were to fail from one cause or the other, as from treason or disunion, or the play of forces over which they have no control, a period of depression and inaction as profound and as prolonged would follow as that which succeeded the break-up of constitutional agitation by Sadleir and Keogh; and the consequences of such a break-up might be even more serious than those in the dreary period between 1855 and 1865. During those years there was, it is true, a terrible exodus of the people; a universal tyranny and a plunder by the landlords were exercised upon the tenants, which recent legislation has made forever impossible; but, on the other hand, there is no reason to doubt that emigration as large would follow the downfall of the national hopes. It must

be remembered that the whole world is daily becoming smaller ; that America is now incalculably nearer to Ireland than it was in 1855 and 1865, not merely by improved modes of communication, but by the more intimate association between the different countries of the globe.

There was a time when, to a certain portion, at least, of the Irish people, America was still a strange land of dark and unknown features ; but now every Irishman is more familiar with the names and situation of Chicago and San Francisco than with those of Newcastle and Greenock. There are now in Ireland no districts that have not dispatched their contingents to the new country, and the families are few among the peasant classes that have not, at some time or other, sent a member to the United States. The land agitation of the last few years has had an important bearing upon this question. The Irish people were dazzled by the spectacle of such large subscriptions—a thousand and two thousand pounds—coming in uninterrupted succession week after week ; and the idea was more than ever increased that America was a country where there was work, food, freedom, wealth for all. It is a great and terrible fact, in making this comparison between the emigration of the present and of the past, that Ireland now has fewer of its people to spare. When the diminution of its population began, that population was nine millions strong ; now it is barely five millions.

Another factor in considering this part of the question is the unfortunate fact that, at this present moment, there is a stronger feeling against Ireland in England than there has been at any previous period. The English nation is being slowly brought face to face with the problem of a change in the relations between the two countries which to many of them seems the beginning of the end of the empire.

Their passions, besides, have been excited ; their anger roused by the fierce collisions which the last four eventful years have brought forth. The evil to Ireland which this change in the temper of the English people has created, is evidenced by the fact already alluded to, that the strongest coercion act ever passed was passed in the eighty-second year after the Union, and by a Liberal ministry pledged to do justice to Ireland.

It is, therefore, highly probable that the break-down of the national party would be followed by a sterner era of coercion than any that has existed in the present century. And what does this involve ? A large part of the emigration in the last few years has been due to the fact that Ireland was made a country absolutely intolerable to any man who had taken an active part in popular movements. The liberty, the property, sometimes even the life, of every prominent man in a district was at the mercy of the policeman or

the informer. It can easily be imagined how fair must have appeared the prospect of America to a man in such a position ; and if they saw at the same time the destruction of an Irish Parliamentary Party, and a sterner coercion in Ireland, no one can calculate how many people would find their country intolerable and fly with hope and eagerness to the land which has already sheltered so many millions of their race. Finally, on this point, the money which has been placed at the disposal of the Irish authorities by the Imperial Parliament for the purpose of emigration, has found eager prayer for its assistance in every part of Ireland in which it has been spent. The English authorities would only be too willing to spend millions of money for the purpose of stimulating emigration from Ireland. Within the last few years they would have spent probably five times as much as they have, were it not that they were confronted by an Irish party that doggedly resisted every emigration proposal ; remove or dissolve that hostile force, and money would be poured into Ireland for the purpose of bribing its people to leave by wholesale.

I think it absolutely necessary to point out these various dangers to the Irish cause, as these dangers are to my mind very real, and as they form one of the material considerations of the hour. If the view be correct, if these perils really exist, they obviously increase to a vast degree the importance of the present struggle. To have a movement which may be temporarily defeated and then go on again, is one thing ; it is a much more serious matter when the movement has no choice between great success and terrible and abysmal failure. The present situation, then, may be summed up, not as Ireland's hour of approaching triumph, but as the hour which will decide whether her immediate future shall be greatly happy or greatly miserable. The present movement has as its possibilities, not merely the making but also the marring, for a considerable time, of the fortunes of Ireland.

It is a serious duty, in face of a problem so momentous, to take note of the dangers that beset the present Irish party. The first and greatest of these is the danger of disunion. The members of the present party feel this so strongly that they have practically come to the conclusion that the pledge to be taken by every candidate must be to sit and act and vote with the Irish Parliamentary Party, to abide by the decisions of the majority, and in case unable to do this, to hand back to the constituency the seat given on the promise of union with the party. This pledge may appear stringent enough ; any man acquainted with Irish history would wish that it could be possible to make it even more stringent. The history of Ireland—the observation is so trite that one ought to apologize for making it—has been a history of national effort beaten by disunion.

In parliamentary parties this sad moral has been pointed out with emphasis by more than one tragic episode. It might appear to the person viewing Ireland from without that there was no chance of any such disunion in the present hour; but to those acquainted with what is going on in Ireland this will appear much too sanguine an estimate. If there be union in Ireland, it is not because the most energetic attempts have not been made to create disunion; if union endure, it is not because there will not be the materials for creating discord. This should not be matter of surprise. The existence of political activity in any country involves the existence of difference of opinion; one party cannot exist without another party, a certain amount of political imbecility is as inevitable as a certain amount of political wisdom; and as there will be a tendency towards unity and discipline, so will there be a tendency towards faction and disunion. While, therefore, one may view the factionists with hatred, the existence of faction may be accepted without surprise.

The factionists in Ireland, at the present moment, belong almost entirely to the class of men who think that nationalization of the land is the only true and fair settlement of the land question. It would be a waste of space to argue with any man of intelligence and education against this theory. The only point of view from which I wish to look at it, in your pages, is as to its effect on the national struggle in which Ireland is engaged. Everybody knows that Ireland is a country of farmers. At least half the population is made up of farmers with their families. It need scarcely be said that this vast proportion of the population would be opposed, to a man, to nationalization. To them it means—not that they shall get rid of the landlord altogether—which was the programme of the Land League and which was promised to them from hundreds of platforms and in thousands of speeches—but that they shall exchange one landlord for another—that the state shall take the place of the individual landlord. Then, instead of rent being abolished, it is to be perpetuated; and the perpetuation of rent means, likewise, the perpetuation of the power to evict. Then, while the Irish peasant is known to have a stronger sense of his rights of property than almost any other peasant in the world, he is asked by the nationalizers to admit that there should be no such thing as private property in land. Finally, this doctrine, that the land should be the property of the state, is preached in no new country with millions of virgin and unoccupied soil; it is preached in an ancient nation, where every acre, every rood, has been in private hands for centuries, and every rod is guarded by a blunderbuss. It is scarcely necessary to say, under these circumstances, that nationalization and nationalizers are tolerated by the farmers as long as they do

not understand what they mean, and as long as there seems no chance of these projects coming to anything. The moment the farmers understand what is intended, they will rise against the theory, and the theorizers will separate themselves from any political party which represents such views. The adoption of the theory of nationalization by the Irish Parliamentary Party would, then, mean the hostility to that party of all the farmers of Ireland—in other words, a party professing to be national would be opposed by half the nation. The case has only to be thus stated to show to any reasonable mind that the adoption of nationalization would mean the immediate break-up of the Parliamentary Party and the downfall of the national cause.

A nationalizer might be disposed to declare that even this terrible price would not be too great to pay for the success of a cause so sacred as the nationalization of the land. But, unfortunately, the probability is that there would not be even that compensation; the national cause would be lost, and nationalization would not be won. Nobody in his senses believes that nationalization of the land is a doctrine which has the least chance of being accepted by the English Parliament within any period that can be foreseen by man; and, therefore, the break-up of the Irish Party would not imply the nationalization of the land by the British Legislature. The only change in the situation would be that the domination of England in Ireland would be perpetuated. If a nationalizer object that it is his hope to have nationalization carried by an Irish and not by an English Parliament, the answer is that the spread of the doctrine of nationalization among the Irish people means the postponement, if not forever, at least to a very remote period, of the advent of an Irish Parliament. This is the plain issue; if the nationalizers succeed, the cause of self-government is lost.

It might be supposed that a pernicious craze of this sort does not deserve such serious treatment as I have given to it. But the American public ought to be warned that the nationalizers in Ireland, though a small and, of course, unintelligent section, are carrying on a propaganda with the zeal and energy that so often characterize the apostles of a mischievous craze. This propaganda takes the form, very often, of covert attack and active intrigue against the Irish Party. There have been numerous manifestations of this spirit during the last two years which cannot have escaped the notice of any careful observer of the signs of the times. It is, too, an unpleasant feature of the nationalizers that—as so often happens—there exist, side by side, the blindness of fanaticism and the unscrupulousness of very wide-awake intrigue. Proposals are made, not in the name of nationalization, but in its interest; projects are denounced because they seem to erect a barrier against nation-

alization, but the reason given for the opposition is very different; and forms of organization are suggested, in the name of democratic principles, with the real purpose of promoting disorganization in the plans of the leaders of the national movement. The condition of mind is certainly curious which permits many of these gentlemen to take an active part in the management of the National League, which has peasant proprietary and national government—and, as I think I have shown, nationalization of the land is as destructive of the second as of the first of these two principles—for its cardinal doctrines, and at the same time to work night and day against the success of the organization and of its central principles.

A difficulty of the situation is that a good many persons may be drawn into support of the nationalizers, not from any faith in that theory itself, but from the restlessness of ungratified ambition. It must always be remembered, as one of the pregnant facts of the situation, that while the Irish party are in opposition to the government in England, they occupy the position of the government to an opposition in Ireland. In England, they are hostile to the men in power; in Ireland, they are the men who enjoy power; or to put it briefly, in England they are the "outs," in Ireland they are the "ins." This implies that there are throughout the country a certain number of men who have to the Irish Party that envy which is natural and human. These men offer material to the apostles of discord, and are ready to follow a flag, even though they do not care for it particularly, from the one feeling that it is the flag of revolt against the men in power.

Another class for whose support the nationalizers are making a great bid, are the laborers. Here again the materials are ready for any man unscrupulous enough to preach a class war between different sections of national Irishmen. The laborers are poor—terribly poor; are full of a sense of wrong; have gained but little from the present agitation, although they did much towards its success; and as they are brought into contact with farmers in the relation of employed to employer, bear the farmer, in many cases, anything but friendly feelings. It is this class that before long is to be emancipated in Ireland—that will soon have a vote and a voice in the political representation of the country. The creation of a new class of voters implies the rise of a class of politicians who will seek to control that class, and will try to obtain that control by appeals to their passions and the advocacy of unreasonable and impossible demands. It is not hard to teach any body of men to make extravagant and unjust claims; and the Irish laborer may well be taught to put forward demands which the farmers would be justified in resisting. And here, again, it is part of the case against the nationalizers that they would, while injuring those they dislike,

not succeed in benefiting those they pretend to serve. In the same way as the success of the nationalizers would, while destroying any chance of national self-government, at the same time not win nationalization, so the success of the nationalizers in setting the laborers against the farmers would, while hurting the farmers, not help the laborers. The two classes are strictly interdependent; an impoverished farmer means an impoverished laborer. Still more are the two classes dependent on one another as soldiers in the same army fighting for national rights. The first essential of real prosperity for both the laborer and the farmer—as for every class of Irishmen—is the restoration of an Irish Parliament to foster and develop the resources of Ireland; and as an internecine struggle between the farmer and the laborer would postpone the creation of a native parliament, such a struggle would tend to prolong the poverty alike of the laborer and of the farmer.

The prospect of a rupture between the farmer and the laborer has not been unnoticed by English statesmen. It furnishes one of the stock arguments to Liberal speakers for the reduction of the franchise. The Marquis of Hartington, who is known as one of the very bitterest enemies of Irish rights, said in a debate on the Franchise bill: "I think it possible that the immediate effect of this measure will be to increase the number of the party which is opposed to the British connection. . . . That may be the result of this measure; but I by no means admit that it will be the certain result of it. Some of us may be inclined to take a more hopeful view of the matter. The Parliamentary constituencies of Ireland are, under existing circumstances, extremely easy of manipulation; and, as has been stated in the course of this debate, in a great number of constituencies the honorable gentleman, the member for the city of Cork (Mr. Parnell) and those with whom he acts, are enabled almost to dictate the choice of members. . . . I am not at all certain that *the constituencies enlarged, as is proposed by this bill, will be quite so easy to manage by one political party as the existing constituencies.*"

Mr. Shaw Lefevre, who, during the "No Rent" struggle, called upon the Irish landlords to evict their tenants in order to save a Liberal ministry trouble, was even more cynically candid. Dealing with the same Conservative objection as the Marquis of Hartington—that the reduction of the franchise would increase the power of Mr. Parnell—Mr. Shaw Lefevre used these significant words: "One of the principal features in the present condition of Ireland is, that the constituencies are made up of one class, namely, the tenant farmers. The effect of this extension of the franchise *would be to add a large class of agricultural laborers; and I cannot but think that after a time questions would arise of differences between these*

two classes of persons. . . . and my belief is that the giving of the franchise to the agricultural laborers of Ireland would have a steady effect upon the tenant farmers themselves, and that *we may see before long* a difference of opinion between the tenant farmers and the laborers of Ireland. That difference is already beginning to show itself; and I may quote the different policies propounded by the honorable member for the city of Cork (Mr. Parnell) and by Mr. Davitt as an illustration of that difference. I cannot but hope, therefore, that differences of this kind may, in the future, *have a very important effect upon the elections in Ireland."*

I will not pause to examine the morality of the doctrines suggested in these words. Suffice it to say that they are the modern application of the very ancient English principle of ruling Ireland. They propose to divide and conquer. It is not, of course, very surprising that English statesmen, remarkable beyond their fellows for their hatred of Ireland, should preach such a gospel; the persons who excite surprise, in spite of these warnings from enemies, as to the expected and inevitable result of their teachings, are those who, while claiming to be Irish nationalists, persist in efforts that would once more lay Irish nationality prostrate and helpless at the feet of English despotism.

Another point in the present situation which gives grave concern is the selection of proper candidates for election. Here again the Parliamentary Party are confronted with the work of the intriguers. Several instances could be given of attempts to force on Mr. Parnell, through a popular meeting, nationalizers or other craze-mongers, the presence of whom in a Parliamentary Party would be a source of the gravest danger. The peril of the next party will come—it must be borne in mind—not from corruption, but from folly. There will be too many men to buy; and besides, the English authorities have found out that the purchase of an Irish traitor is a very bad bargain. It only results in the return, by the betrayed constituency, of a more violent or a more trustworthy type of politician. A cynical member of the present Parliamentary Party remarked that the next party would consist of seventy-five men, and that in these seventy-five there are certain to be ten traitors. This, in my opinion, is a complete misapprehension of the facts. I doubt if there will be one traitor in the whole number; but there may be—if great care be not taken—ten crotcheteers; and ten crotcheteers would be perhaps as fatal as ten traitors. The motives with which a politician acts are of importance, as a rule, to himself only; to the nation whose prospects are destroyed, it is a matter of absolute indifference whether the work of destruction has been done by the wickedness of arrant knaves or the imbecility of sincere fools. It will be necessary, then, to have, not merely a party which numbers

seventy-five men, but a party of seventy-five honest and capable men.

And this naturally leads me to the discussion of the payment of members. This subject has perhaps by this time passed out of the region of controversy, and has been practically decided by the instinct and good-sense of the Irish race at home and abroad. It is well known that the men who will truly represent national feeling in the House of Commons are not taken from the ranks of the wealthy; they must be taken from the ranks of the people. It is also known that the expenses of a member of Parliament are great; and it is notorious that the demands on a member of Parliament are so great as to leave but little time and less energy for the pursuit of a business or a profession. It is evident from these facts that the only way to obtain a sufficient number of representatives will be to have a fund for their remuneration. In connection with this part of the subject, attention should be drawn to the fact that the amount of attendance a member gives to the House of Commons is one of the most serious elements in his usefulness. The present party is known to be numerically small; but the complete significance of that fact can only be gathered by looking at the ordinary attendance of the party. There are frequently weeks when the number of Irish members on each day in the House of Commons does not exceed a dozen; and the average attendance does not exceed twenty. Now this is a very bad state of things. The real fact is, an Irish member should always be in his place in the House of Commons. There is not a day nor an hour of any day on which he may not be able to do something for Ireland—not so much directly as indirectly—not through what he does himself, but what he can prevent others from doing. The House of Commons is so overweighted with work, and is still hampered by rules so antiquated and imbecile, that every minister and every measure is still at the mercy of even a few members. One single Conservative member—Mr. Warton—by constant attendance in the House, and by an unscrupulous use of the power of “blocking,”¹ does more to embarrass the Liberal ministry than any hundred members of his own party; and is, in fact, a more potent dictator of the fate of legislation than the Prime Minister. In short, the House of Commons in nineteen-twentieths of its work is still at the mercy of a single determined and attentive member. As a single member has this enormous power, it will be seen what might be effected by a body of twenty or thirty men who would always be in their places, and would always watch the ministers. Such a body confronting

¹ If a member put a notice of objection to a bill on the Order Book, he is said to “block” it; and a “blocked” bill cannot be taken up after half-past twelve at night. This is fatal to most measures.

ministers, if it only acted with judgment, would wring many concessions from the needs of Government. But this constant attendance can only be obtained by having a fund for the payment of members. The reason why so many members of the present party are irregular in attendance is not want of patriotism or zeal or energy. It is that, being men engaged in business and dependent on business for their livelihood, they are unable to leave Ireland except at distant intervals; and then at serious risk to their interests.

The indirect effects of the raising of such a fund are almost as important as the direct. Nothing succeeds like success. A cause that has the power of rewarding its adherents strengthens its hold on large sections of society both inside and outside Ireland. These sections may be weak and time-serving and mean; they may have all the vices which French *littérateurs* are fond of ascribing to the *bourgeoisie*; that does not alter the fact that they are a very influential portion of the population of Ireland as of every country. Who doubts that while a great part—probably the greater part—of the success in the smaller Irish constituencies of the last few years is due to lofty motives—patriotic purpose and the advance of political education—who doubts that a part of the success was due to the fact that the Irish Party were seen to have behind them the financial resources of the Irish race in America and Australia? And the effect of these vast subscriptions on England and the rest of the world was also enormous. The world will not stop long to listen to the tale of the weak and the oppressed; it has all its ears for the strong and combative. The financial assistance given to the Irish at home by the Irish abroad was one of the chief means in the last few years of convincing not only England, but all other nations, that there is still an Irish question that has to be settled. It shows that the struggle in which England is engaged is not with a small, poor and helpless country, close to her own shores and within reach of her rifles and ironclads; it shows that the struggle is with a great and ubiquitous race—numbering millions of men, free from English control—wealthy, generous, passionately devoted to the cradle-land of their race.

Finally, as political men are but human, it is an advantage to a cause that the material interests of those concerned should not be in antagonism to the honest and fearless discharge of their duties. English ministries are able to agree with each other and to keep their party together, partly by the fact that they have wealth and honor to give away; and an opposition is maintained through years of depression and defeat by the hope of some day gaining the same privileges. In Ireland, too, English rule has been maintained by the fact that England was able to buy most of the talent of the

country. It is something to see the day when the Irish race can say to the men of ability in Ireland that their kinsmen are wealthy and generous enough to offer a career of honor to those who serve Ireland faithfully and well.

I cannot do better than end this article with a remarkable quotation from an English journal. The burden of my remarks has been the dangers of discord—the necessity of union. On that text the following remarks of the *Pall Mall Gazette*, of London preach a sermon that every Irishman may study with profit. These are its words: "We may therefore assume, that at the next general election, whoever loses, Mr. Parnell will improve his position. He will command the support of sixty or eighty Irish members, and if he can avoid one great danger he will, as he declares, be able to make or mar ministries. There never yet has been a compact Irish Parliamentary party of eighty members, and there are many who declare that there never will be. The fissiparous tendency of the English Radical is nothing compared with the passion for independent action that has always been the bane of the Celt. Mr. Parnell may get his eighty members into St. Stephen's, but how long will he be able to hold them together after they arrive at Westminster? . . . If Irishmen had been capable of acting together, if the Celt had shown the cohesion of the Saxon, Ireland would not now have been lamenting her evil destinies. Should Mr. Parnell really unite Irishmen and teach them submission and loyalty to their own leader, he will do more for Ireland than anything he has yet even attempted."

This is the keynote of the situation. Ireland is advancing steadily to the restoration of her Parliament—she is united, she is determined, she is skilfully and honestly led. Division, and division alone, can drive her back again into the horrors from which she is escaping. Can it be that fools and factionists will be permitted by the Irish race to bring back the night of slavery at the very moment when the hills are aglow with the first rays of freedom's dawn?

MARTIN LUTHER AND HIS AMERICAN WORSHIPPERS.

ON the 21st of May last, a statue, erected in honor of Martin Luther, was unveiled in the city of Washington. And this was done amidst the ringing of bells, the pealing of trumpets, and the gay plaudits of a vast multitude—in a word, with all the pomp and pride and circumstance of a public festival. Not only the brazen effigy of the apostate monk, but the very place where it stands—to be known henceforth as the “Luther Place”—is doomed to perpetuate his name and memory to all coming generations. The Lutheran clergy are very much elated at what they consider a great triumph for their cause; and their newspaper organs are not yet tired of boasting how signally their religion has been honored, in the person of its founder, by the statue thus solemnly dedicated in the so-called “national” capital.

To all this we have nothing to say. It has very little significance, and contains no ground for just quarrel. The members of any religious sect, that can afford it, have a legal right to set up a statue of its founder on ground which they have purchased, or come by in other honest way, as we are willing to suppose was the case with the Lutheran corporation in Washington. And besides, when it is question of such a city, *quo cuncta undique atrocia ac pudenda confluunt celebranturque*—as was well said of another great capital no less wonderful for outward splendor and inward rottenness—and where within a few decades of years we are likely to see statues of Voltaire, Tom Paine and other reforming worthies unveiled by their admirers for public veneration—no citizen need feel either morally shocked or legally hurt at beholding amongst the rest a likeness of the Saxon Reformer.

Modern taste unfortunately—and we may thank Luther's teaching for it—is no longer Christian, but pagan. Our heroes, too often nowadays, are made and held up for worship, not on the score of religion, virtue, or love of country, but because they are of the world, worldly, mouthpieces in word, or patterns in deed, of the bad passions and corrupt inclinations that belong to unregenerate man. They have their use, too; for they are put up by a few bad men, and stand on their pedestals mute but eloquent witnesses of the cowardly servility that is an unfailing mark of all degenerate communities and peoples. Thus Greece of old, in her halls, groves, and highways, for one bust of Plato or Leonidas, had full twenty of Aphro-

dite, Eros, Priapus and adulterous¹ Jove. Rome publicly paraded her Flora and Venus, her Antinous and Sejanus by the side of her deified Neros, Domitians and Adrians. And in our day France and Italy, paganized by their rulers, have exchanged their old heroes for Voltaire, Gambetta, Cavour and Garibaldi. Germany erects altars to refined lust, self-love, nihilism, atheism, brute force and other monstrous developments of modern *Kultur*; and in her Goethes, Virchows, Schopenhauers² and Bismarcks finds worthy hierophants of the new worship. Even those Catholic lands that have been infiltrated by the subtle, deadly poison of Free-Masonry and *Kultur*, fare little better. While the Tyrol, true to her Catholic traditions, shows through her mountains and valleys only pictures or statues of Him who redeemed us, or of the Saints who followed in His footsteps, or of her Christian heroes and patriots, Hofer, Haspinger, etc., the Catholic King of Bavaria, a country in great part Catholic, gives a place in the Ruhmeshalle³ of his capital to Franz von Sickingen and Schelling, thereby teaching his people that high-born cutthroats and windy pantheists are worshipful heroes when born on Bavarian soil.

The mistake made by the Lutheran clergy of Washington was that, instead of contenting themselves with using the occasion simply to glorify the father and founder of their name and sect, they attempted to turn it into a half-civil, half-religious American festival, "a national event," as the Washington papers have it, "for the Protestants of the whole country." The Protestant clergy of other denominations do not seem to have looked upon it in this light. For it appears that the reverend gentlemen who figured at the ceremony were all, or nearly all, Lutheran ministers; and of the few laymen in attendance, all, with one noble exception, may be set down as either mere politicians or adherents of the Lutheran creed. The ministers, however, and their lay associates who addressed the crowd before the unveiling took place, did their best to make their hearers believe that there was some mysterious connection between the honor given to Luther's statue and homage done

¹ This was the fitting epithet given him by the early Christian writers when they would ridicule the gods of paganism. Thus Prudentius (Hymn to St. Laurence):

Discede, adulter Jupiter,
Stupro sororis oblite, etc.

² The infidel Max Müller, who once talked so sweetly that we almost took him for a Christian, is out with a proposal to erect a statue to this gloomy Atheist. If Max and his fellow philosophers could only root Christianity out of the world as they wish to do, they would make Schopenhauer's dream become practical truth.

³ There are many non-Catholics in this Hall, but to them we can have no objection. Whatever their religion may have been, they have deserved well of letters and the arts. Such are Hans Sachs, Franz Holbein and others. But we do object to honoring men whose only title to honor is their immorality or their irreligion.

to the cause of American civil and religious liberty. They had no easy task before them; but, succeed or fail, they had to attempt it. Otherwise the ceremony, for all its pomp and show, would have been idle and unmeaning. The key-note had been sounded in the preliminary meeting of the same day by Rev. Mr. Henninghauser, of Baltimore, when he said:¹ "We would hardly as a people rejoice on the 4th of July as the birthday of our civil liberty, if the 31st of October, 1517, had not preceded it as the birthday of our spiritual liberty. It is no exaggeration to refer our political and civil liberty to that source. The existence of this great republic, with its freedom of religion and conscience, its liberty of speech and of the press, would have been impossible without the Reformation, of which Luther was at once the leader and, with the help of God, the inspiring centre and source of its power and success." Before the ceremony, Senator Conger proclaimed that "Christians of a common faith, all who desire the regeneration and exaltation of the human race, who demand complete toleration of religious belief, who trust in the limitless expansion of intellectual vigor, who hope for perpetual growth of freedom and faith in the soul, are assembled here to render their tribute of respect to the memory of the great Reformer, and to dedicate his enduring monument in the court of this Lutheran Memorial Church." And again: "Conspicuous in the capital of a nation whose possibility of existence hinged upon his (Luther's) labors in life, and the adoption of the principles he taught till his death, we this day place this memorial of our veneration." Judge Miller comforted his audience with the assurance that they were soon to behold the likeness "of a man who presented to the world the right of free thought—a lover of the human race, whose name shall stand as the emancipation of humanity—Martin Luther."

The laymen, to their credit, confined themselves to their subject, and avoided giving unnecessary offence. But Rev. Dr. Morris, of Baltimore, who was another of the speakers, seems to have been blinded to all sense of propriety by the conviction that he would be false to his cloth, false to the pattern of his spiritual progenitor, if he did not improve the occasion to pour out his intolerant bile, and stir up the religious feeling of his audience by abuse and misrepresentation of the Catholic Church. Had he done nothing more than gratify himself and his hearers by this pitiful effusion of Lutheran zeal, we should have nothing to say, as these things have become too common for notice. *Usu viluerunt.* But what necessity did Dr. Morris find in the occasion for coining facts that never had an existence outside of his imagination, and further for coining

¹ For this and the following extracts our authority is the Philadelphia *Lutheran Observer* of May 30, 1884.

sinister motives to color still more luridly these unworthy actions? Had he not all history to draw from, history old and new, the romantic D'Aubigné, the veracious chronicler Mathesius, or the edifying records of the Tisch-Reden? No. He was determined to be original, forgetting that originality is not a commendable quality in the history that is taught outside of the sectarian Sunday-school or pulpit. After extolling the "loyalty and obedience" of Lutherans towards the government under whose protection they live, he publishes the following dreadful discovery of Catholic disloyalty: "He claimed that the Church of Rome recognized no authority but that of its temporal head, and refused to obey the proclamations issued by the chief magistrate of this nation because they emanated from a republican government. He claimed that he had himself made an investigation, and had found that on Thanksgiving Day, or on any national holiday, there were no special services in any of the Catholic churches, while in all others such were held in accordance with the proclamations of the President of the United States and the Governor of the State."

There is only one proper word in the language by which to designate the whole of this vile stuff, invented facts, imputed motives and all the rest. He "claimed"—a very suitable word to impose on the public—his right to the discovery of his chimerical religious facts—something like the British commander's discovery of Graham's Island in the Mediterranean, or the finding of imaginary Antarctic continents by American and French commodores in the southern Polar Seas—"he claimed that the Church of Rome recognized no authority but that of its temporal head." Now, Dr. Morris knows as well as we do, and it would be slandering him to suppose otherwise, that the Church of Rome may mean two things. In the first place, it designates only the small body of Catholics, a million or two, confined within the petty area of the Papal States, and who have Rome for the centre of their political government. As their "temporal head" is the Pope, by divine and human law they owe him allegiance, and if they cling to him, though dispossessed by temporary violence, it does them credit in the eyes of all honorable men. Brute force does not annul principles, nor extinguish legitimate rights. This was once a part of the American creed, and if belief in it has been sadly impaired, we have only to thank our politicians, lay and clerical, whose teachings have been for a long time corrupting gradually the American mind.

The "Church of Rome," in the second place, is often used for the great body of Christians, two hundred millions and more, who profess the Catholic faith and live in communion with the successor of St. Peter, the Bishop of Rome. They style him the Head of their Church, but have always believed and declared that the bond

that unites them with him is spiritual, not temporal, and that their allegiance of the latter order belongs exclusively to the land in which they live, whether it be in Europe, Asia, Africa, North or South America. Does Dr. Morris know better than these immense multitudes where their allegiance is owing? Or, is it in his power to steal it away without their consent or knowledge, and assign it where he will? It would be great presumption were he sincere in his statement; but no amount of Christian charity, unless it will risk the imputation of being counted blind and unreasoning, can admit this plea of sincerity. Dr. Morris is a faithful disciple of his master, the great Reformer; and the latter taught (in a private letter which he never expected would come to light) that in the school of Wittenberg all weapons were held good and lawful against Popery, provided souls could be saved thereby from the wicked deceits of Antichrist. (Letter to John Lange, Aug. 18th, 1520.)

He assumes that Catholics will only obey "the temporal head" of their Church, and in proof alleges that "they refuse to obey the proclamations issued by the chief magistrate of this nation, because they emanated from a republican government." Any one who has ever read a Catholic catechism must know that Catholics are taught to obey their temporal rulers, and not only to obey for fear but for conscience's sake, as the Apostle tells us. If Catholics, therefore, do not obey the laws, they do it, not because of their religion, but in spite of its teachings. The silly remark that they disobey the chief magistrate, because he is the executive of a commonwealth, "a republican government," is too contemptible to need an answer. Our religion makes no distinction between the obedience due to him who rules by hereditary right, and that to another who holds his place by the choice of his fellow-citizens. But Dr. Morris claims that he has made an investigation, and has found, as the result of it, that no special services are held in any Catholic church on thanksgiving days or national holidays, whilst Protestant churches hold them in conformity with the proclamations of the President or Governor of the State. His investigation and its results will be news to most of our Catholic readers. We can only speak of our own knowledge, when we affirm that our hard-worked clergy at the South used to fast up to mid-day in order to sing High Mass and preach, not on one Thanksgiving day, but on two and sometimes on three occasions; for very often the Mayor issued his proclamation for thanksgiving in addition to those of the President and Governor—the two latter having been, in the good old times, always separate days. If they now coincide, we are entitled to the opinion, which we entertain in common with others yet living, that change and improvement are not always one and the same thing. And this was done not only in large cities like

Charleston and Savannah, but in the humblest hamlet of the two Carolinas and Georgia that could boast of a church or enjoyed the presence of a priest. And passing to the theatre of the Lutheran pastor's investigation, we remember distinctly the beautiful document by which Archbishop Eccleston, of Baltimore, called the attention of his clergy and people to the Thanksgiving day (December 14th, 1842) recommended by the Governor of Maryland, and enjoining solemn service with mass and chant of the *Te Deum*. We have also under our eye, while writing, a similar circular of the same Prelate in reference to Thanksgiving day, 12th of December, 1844; and if we had copies of the Catholic papers and magazines of the years previous or following, we could, no doubt, quote a great many more of the same kind. Though we have not the documents to allege, it is very unlikely that the good Archbishop's successors, the Kenricks, Spauldings, Bayleys and Gibbonses, yielded to him in patriotic feeling or in discharging their duty of encouraging their people to fulfil St. Paul's desire (I. Tim. ii., 1, 2), and make "supplications, prayers, intercessions and thanksgivings for all men; for kings and for all who are in high station, that we may lead a quiet and peaceful life." (I. Tim. ii., 1, 2.) In Charleston, and generally at the South, we are convinced that the old practice remains substantially unchanged. For though we may not have all to be thankful for that we may desire, all the good may yet say from their heart of hearts, with deep thankfulness, in the words of Jeremy: "*misericordiae Domini, quia non sumus consumpti*."

In Pennsylvania, as far as we can learn, the rule is this: Pastors in country churches are left to their own discretion. They sometimes serve more than one church, and cannot always be at home during the week. Consequently, it will depend on their zeal and prudence when, how and where they are to have Thanksgiving devotions. In the city of Philadelphia, the late Archbishop Wood always gave public notice to his clergy and people that such a day had been recommended by the civil authorities as a day of thanksgiving and prayer. In the principal churches, or some of them at least, special services are held at a later hour than the ordinary service of each day. In the others, where no special service is appointed, it is always understood that the great Eucharistic sacrifice, the very name of which implies *thanksgiving*, is offered up in acknowledgement of God's great mercies during the year that has gone by, and in supplication for a continuance of those mercies for the coming year.

In all this what ground is there for blaming us, or what evidence for the charge that we perversely disjoin ourselves from our fellow-citizens and refuse to thank God, because we are recommended to do so by a republican government? The reverend gentleman

talks of loyalty and obedience to these proclamations, as if they were so many spiritual ukases or disciplinary decisions formulated by a theocratical government, that has a right to bind the soul and body of its subjects. Now, in this Dr. Morris betrays himself a thorough Lutheran, but at the same time he betrays himself utterly unacquainted with what are generally supposed to be the first elements of an American freeman's education. It is a standing maxim of the Lutheran creed, formally enunciated by the princes and theologians of that church assembled at Passau some three hundred and thirty years ago (very soon after Luther's death), that the ruler of a country owns the souls as well as the bodies of his subjects, and has a right to impose his religion on them by force, or as they tersely put it, *cujus est regio, illius est et religio*—in plain English, "Whoever owns a country owns its religion too." If, indeed, a Lutheran monarch owned our country, Dr. Morris might see his Wittenberg ideal realized, might be superintendent of the Lutheran Consistory, and write his prince's religious decrees and proclamations, and we should have to be loyal and *obey* them under penalty of life and limb. But (what Dr. M. has forgotten or studiously ignores), none of us, thank God! whether Catholic or Protestant, are the spiritual subjects of any president or governor. And none know it better than themselves. They never use the formula of dictation or command. They *recommend* these days to public observance, for they can do no more, and all good citizens, Catholic and Protestant, seeing that the recommendation is highly proper, cheerfully comply with it.

To return from this rather long digression into which we have been led, not from choice, but by Dr. Morris's Lutheran rhetoric, let us examine the grounds of this so-called American glorification of Luther. The last-named gentleman epitomized the substance of what his fellow-speakers had said by praising Luther as "the Father of religious liberty," and stating boldly his opinion that "it was becoming that the American admirers of the mighty Reformer should follow the bright example" of other lands, where "numerous statues have been erected to his memory." May we venture to ask, in no captious spirit, but merely as an American citizen who reads the newspapers, and takes an interest in all the events of the day, and prefers as a rule to get to the bottom to what floats upon the surface—is all this mere rhapsody, religious or political clap-trap, designed to tickle the ears of an ignorant crowd, who neither know nor care to know what runs counter to their prejudices? Or is it meant for veritable history? Charity would incline to the former supposition; for at first sight it looks very unkind, and almost cruelly unjust, to imagine the speakers so utterly ignorant of Luther's life and teachings, and of European history for the last

three hundred years and more, as they must appear did they really mean what they said. There is no doubt, however, that they would indignantly reject our charitable view, and maintain, *unguibus et pugnīs*, that all their statements are true to history. Very well! We accept their decision, and if they have, in the end, cause to complain, we can only remind them that the alternative was of their own choosing.

Hence, it becomes worth while to examine their statements by the light of that history to which they appeal, and if her torch can so far dispel the gloom of the last three centuries as to reveal even one particle of solid truth in what was said by the Henninghausers, Morrisses, Congers, Millers and other orators of that festive day, we shall readily give in and cheerfully join in the plaudits elicited by their eloquence, even "wave our umbrella and throw up our hat," as was done (so say the enthusiastic reporters) by the electrified crowds who did homage to the Washington statue of the great Martin of Wittenberg.

Since Luther is invoked by Dr. Morris as "the father of religious liberty," and Senator Conger tells us that his Washington statue was honored by all "who demand complete toleration of religious belief," and Rev. Mr. Henninghauser bids us hail the 31st of October, 1517, as the forerunner of July 4th, 1776—the question we have to discuss is naturally two-fold: First, did Martin Luther know of such a thing as liberty of conscience? And if he knew of it did he believe in it himself, or proclaim it to the world as his doctrine, or that of the new church which owes to him its name and its teaching? Secondly, did this doctrine or principle, supposing it to be his, ever influence the belief of European or American Protestants? Or did his teaching help in any way to bring about the American Revolution, the Declaration of Independence, or the religious liberty that came of these two events?

It may be answered, without a moment's hesitation, that Luther knew nothing of religious liberty, much less believed in it, as we understand the phrase. He certainly believed that he had a right to understand and explain the scriptures as he pleased, and to publish as certain truth his own opinions in defiance of what the Christian world had believed for fifteen centuries. But, whatever merit there may be in this, he shares it in common with every heretic, innovator, or "reformer," who has troubled the church of Christ, from Alexander the Coppersmith or Simon Magus, down to George Rapp and Joe Smith, the only American we can boast of as founder of a "new religion."¹ No doubt, he used his private

¹ We ought, perhaps, to make an exception in favor of the "Christians" or Christians (first vowel with sound of long *i*, as the common American pronunciation will have it, though this horrid cacophony is indignantly rejected by the sect); but, though

judgment freely enough; indeed, with Rationalistic boldness, in deciding not only on the sense of Scripture, but on the authors of the Books and their respective merits, retaining or rejecting what pleased or offended him. And this it is that endears his memory to the Bretschneiders, De Wettes, Stanleys and other enlightened Protestant theologians,¹ who cunningly hold to the name of Christianity the more effectually to bring about its ruin. No doubt, he pushed freedom of thought or assertion, and pride of understanding, to an extreme limit by his revolutionary break with the Christian traditions and established faith of fifteen centuries; and this has made him a hero forever with all infidels, materialists, and unbelievers of every class. Of course, they sneer and laugh at his Solidifian whims and Impanation theories, as heartily as they do at the Catholic mass, the decalogue of Moses, or the morality of the Gospel. But they feel, nevertheless—and they are logically right—that he was their precursor, the first to make possible the overthrow of the Christian superstition and open the way for the triumph of reason and the new era of light that is to succeed Gospel darkness. Hence, it is readily understood why the Virchows,² Michelets and other enemies of God and His Christ, are amongst Luther's most ardent devotees and admirers.

appearing simultaneously in New England and Ohio about the year 1803, they seem to have had no distinct paternity. They boast of having no founder, no Luther or Calvin, no Whitfield or Wesley, as the Presbyterian author, Rev. Dr. Baird, mournfully remarks in his book, "Religion in America" (New York, Harpers, 1856, p. 562). This is the sect, we believe, to which the assassin, Guiteau, belonged both as member and preacher. The Sunday after his crime all the Methodist pulpits at the North resounded with denunciations of the misdeed and its author, whom they designated as one "M. Dohertie, a French or Irish Papist." And the pious conclusion drawn was that all foreign Papists, especially French and Irish, ought to be exterminated. But in a few days it leaked out that the imaginary French or Irish miscreant, "M. Dohertie," was no other than "Mr. Guiteau," an American by birth and ancestry, and not only no Papist, but professor and preacher of a thoroughly native American religion. His victim, Mr. Garfield, may be called almost his co-religionist and fellow-preacher, for he too was a professor and minister of the Campbellite body, the principles of which, if we are to believe Dr. Baird ("Religion in America," p. 501), were originally identical with those of the so-called Christians. Dr. Baird, to his credit be it said, hesitates whether he should count either of those sects amongst "Evangelical Christian" denominations. (*Ibid.*)

¹ De Wette in his "Worte Luther's" has a very instructive chapter headed "Luther als Rationalist." Or (as we have lost our copy of the work), it may perhaps read "als Naturalist," since the correlative chapter is headed "Luther als Supranaturalist." The book was printed in 1817 to commemorate the third century of the Reformation.

Dean Stanley said in his New York sermon (1878), "Martin Luther first loosed the shackles of the old restraint and taught us *what the Bible really was*." The author's meaning is well known; but the veil of ambiguous words was required by the decencies of an evangelical pulpit.

² The first name on the subscription list, to erect a statue to Luther in front of the great church at Berlin, is that of Prof. Virchow. And this homage from an atheist is accepted with thanks and newspaper puffs by all Lutherans, lay and clerical.

But, granting that Luther loudly proclaimed and even exercised to the full extent what he may have counted or called *his* right of private judgment in matters of religion, did he ever dream that it was a right belonging to all Christians? We will be content with less. Did he ever in any way acknowledge that the Protestant crowds, whom he drew out with him from "the bondage of the Roman Antichrist," possessed that right? We will narrow the question still further. Did he ever allow that his followers and fellow-religionists—we will not say in far-off regions like Switzerland, France, Denmark or the Hanse-towns, nor even in Hesse, Suabia, Pomerania, Wurtemberg, Ducal Saxony, etc.,—but his own personal devotees and disciples in Electoral Saxony, in the very precincts of Wittenberg, those whom he had under his immediate spiritual charge and supervision, had the privilege of following their own private judgment in any religious matter whatsoever? History answers *no*. He never did. We defy any of his admirers to produce from his works one passage, one single line, or even an obscure hint, that they had freedom of conscience or that "religious liberty" of which Dr. Morri's calls him "the Father." And even if he had so declared a thousand times in printed books, or by word of mouth from the pulpit or the professor's chair, it would signify nothing, for his practical teaching was everlastingly the reverse. But he never so declared. All men were free to differ with the Pope, to reject his teaching, to curse him to the lowest depths, were even invited and encouraged to slay him like a wolf or robber, and wash their hands in his blood and that of his cardinals and other adherents—but they must not dare differ from Martin Luther. The great Reformer (says Sir William Hamilton) had "an assurance of his *personal inspiration* of which he was, indeed, no less confident than of his ability to perform miracles. He disclaimed the pope, he spurned the Church, but varying in almost all else, he never doubted of *his own infallibility*. He thus piously regarded himself as the authoritative judge, both of the meaning and of the authenticity of scripture" (*Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and University Reform*, second London ed., p. 505). He compelled, with unrelenting rigor, all his friends and disciples to subscribe to his doctrinal views, and even to his capricious changes of opinion. Some, like Melancthon, submitted outwardly, but repined in secret and groaned in confidential intercourse

Michelet wrote a life (or panegyric) of Luther, and an edition of his Table-Talk, with a translation of which, judiciously toned down, Mr. Hazlitt has regaled the refined ears and nostrils of the English and American Protestant public. Michelet passes for a Catholic, or rather is paraded as such for effect by Luther's admirers. He has his baptism, wretched man! which he cannot efface; but his opinion of Christian baptism is plain from the polite words by which he designates it. He calls it "the mark of eighteen centuries of slavery."

over the shameful slavery (Melanchthon's own words) in which their master held them. Some had the courage to rebel, and they became the objects of his relentless hate. Karlstadt, Lemnius, Wickel, Agricola, Schwenkfeld (or Grickel and Stenkfeld, as this evangelical Thersites loved to call them), incurred his enmity by presuming to dissent from his opinions. His persecution of them never ceased until he had them deprived of their charge, imprisoned, or banished from German territory. He stirred up to mutiny and sedition, by his furious revolutionary pamphlets, the peasants of his native land. But when they took up arms to put an end to their grievances, learned from his teaching and formulated almost in his very words, he bade them lay aside their weapons. And because they would not obey him, he urged princes and peoples to exterminate them. There is nothing in history more shocking than the atrocious and revengeful spirit with which he preached the crusade for the destruction of those unhappy victims whom his own teachings had led into their evil courses. He would have them choked like mad dogs. "Let them have their due, scourging and shooting. Let artillery rattle amongst them. Let no mercy be shown them, no pity. To pity them is to deny and blaspheme God. And not only princes and soldiers, but every one else must take a hand against these robbers and murderers. Let all strike, stab and slay to the best of their power, and whoever dies in this good cause can have no happier death."¹

If there was any class of men whom Luther hated, because of their religious belief, it was the "ungrateful rabble" of theologians who had received the new gospel from him as their master, and then rebelled against his authority by denying what he considered a fundamental point, his doctrine of the Real Presence. The Henninghausers, Morrisises and Butlers, who glorified him in Washington at the ceremony of unveiling, were they living in his day, would soon feel, by sad experience, to what extent he deserves the title of "Father of religious freedom." They contemptuously reject his doctrine; and therefore for him would be only Zwinglians,

¹ Sie hören nicht das Wort und sind unsinnig; so müssen sie die Virgam, die Büchsen, hören und geschieht ihnen recht. Bitten sollen wir für sie dass sie gehorchen: wo nicht so gilt hie nicht viel Erbarmens: lasse nur die Büchsen unter sie sausen, sie machens sonst tausendmal ärger. . . . O Herr Gott wo solcher Geist in den Bauren auch ist, wie hohe zeit ists, dass sie erwürgt werden, wie tollen hunde (Letter to John Rühel, May 30, 1525. Apud de Wette, *Luther's Briefe*, Berlin, 1826, vol. ii., pp. 669, 670). And in a letter to Amsdorf of same date "Hos (rusticos) justificare, horum misereri, illis favere est Deum negare, blasphemare et de coelo velle dejicere." Ibid., pp. 671, 672. And in his book against the peasants: "Drumb, lieben Herren, loset hie, rettet hie, helft hie: erbarmet euch der armen Leut, steche, schlahe, würge hie, wer da kann. Bleibst du drüber todt, wohl dir! seliglichern tod kannst du nimmermehr überkommen." Wider die Mörderischen und Ruberischen Rotten der Bauern. Erlangen ed., vol. xxiv., p. 294.

Sacramentarians, Zurichers, or, as he loved to call them, fanatics and factious sectarians (*Schwärmer und Rottengeister*). Whoever held this doctrine was his sworn enemy, a soul-murderer, a damned blasphemer, a lying-mouth with a heart thoroughly possessed by the devil.¹ Either he or they must be damned on the last day. Hence, with such men he could hold no commission, have no speech, nor even interchange of letters.

If Luther was thus intolerant towards his fellow-Protestants, damning to hell's lowest depths even those who now call themselves Lutherans, what must have been his frame of mind towards Catholics. It is little to say he was in favor of persecuting them. They were such outlaws in his sight that judicial murder or private assassination were lawful and commendable in their case. We have his own printed word for it. See his letter to Melanchthon (Dec., 1535 in *De Wette*, vol. iv., p. 655), where he brutally triumphs

¹ Literally "an *insatanized*, *persatanized*, and *supersatanized*, wicked heart and lying mouth." But this Latinized phraseology is too weak to express the vigor of the original. Ein eingeteufelt, durchteufelt, überteuft, lästerlich Herz und Lügenmaul. "Kurzes Bekenntniss," Erlangen ed., vol., xxxii., pp. 404, cf. pp. 397, 403. A fishwoman might envy Luther's vocabulary. This foul-mouthed evangelist has forever on his tongue the words "hell, devil, damn, rascal, thief, fool, ass, villain" with many others that cannot be repeated to ears polite. It is often said by his admirers that this was the fault of his time. It is false. Nothing but sheer ignorance, or the will to defend him at all hazards, even by deliberate trampling on the truth, could invent such an excuse. It was the fulness of his heart that was perpetually bursting through all bonds of conventional decency. The cesspool seems to have been the garden that furnished his choicest flowers of rhetoric. The devil, too, seems to have ever been uppermost in his thoughts, for there is no word that occurs as frequently in his books as hell and the devil. In his dirty little tirade "Against Hans Wurst" (Jack Pudding, so he called Henry, Duke of Brunswick), the Devil's name is mentioned no less than one hundred and forty-six times, though the book be of small compass. In his book "On Councils" in merely four lines the Devil's name is repeated full fifteen times. Perhaps, the same thing may be true of the words "lie, liar," etc. He acknowledges himself that he used the words "Hans Worst" (Wurst) in writing, and *above all in preaching* (sonderlich und allermeist in der Predigt). "Wider Hans Wurst," Erlangen ed. of Luther's Works, vol. xxvi., p. 4). Here is a specimen of his style from the same book (page 6). "You lie, you devil! O Jack Pudding, how you lie! O Harry of Brunswick, what a shameless liar you are! You spew a great deal and say nothing; you revile and prove nothing." Zwingli, in one of his tracts against Luther, has the following happy hit at Luther's coarse style, his filthy, doggish eloquence (*obscœnam et caninam facundiam*, as another famous Swiss Reformer called it. See Hess, "Lebensgeschichte Bullingers," Zurich, 1826, vol. i., p. 404). We give it in the unchanged original, that the reader may have a sample of the rough Swiss dialect of Luther's great rival. The idea is, Luther will not reason from God's word; he can only use bad words and call names. "Es wird hie Gottes Wort oberhand gwünnen, nit Schwärmer, Tüfel, Schalk, Ketzer, Mörder, Uprürer, Glychsner (Gleissner) oder Hühler, Trotz, Potz, Plotz, Blitz, Donner, Po, Pu, Pa, plumb und dergleichen Schelt, Schmutz-und Schenzelwort." We quote from a Lutheran source: Luther's "Leben aus den Quellen erzählt von Moritz Meurer." Leipzig, 1870, p. 420.

Hallam remarks that Luther, "in all his attacks on popes and cardinals, disgraces himself by a stupid and nasty brutality." *Intro. to the Literature of Europe*. New York (Armstrong & Sons), 1880, vol. i., p. 306.

over the execution of Bishop Fisher of Rochester, and expresses the pious wish that there were more Henrys in the world to kill more of his cloth. See again his letter to Spalatin (Nov., 13, 1520, De Wette, vol. i., p. 522), in which he expresses his regret that Ulrich Hutten, his lay friend and fellow apostle (one of those reformers whom Sir William Hamilton calls "syphilitic saints"), had failed to lay hands on the Papal legates for whom he lay in wait with murderous intent. We have already seen how he encouraged the princes and all good Christians to wash their hands in the blood of the Pope and his cardinals (*Lutheri Opera Latina*, ed. Henrico Schmidt. Francofurti, 1865, vol. ii., p. 107). But it is useless to quote any more. Perhaps the Lutheran speakers at the Washington festival do not believe that Catholics have any rights of conscience, and that being idolators they are not entitled to the "religious freedom" which Luther brought into the world.

As was the father and teacher, so were the children and disciples. Luther had, in 1528, with the aid of the Elector John and his visiting commission, banished from all Saxony Calvinism and the Sacramentarian heresy, which, strange as it may sound, is the Lutheran doctrine of to-day. And the theologians who succeeded engaged the princes of their day to hold it under the strong hand of repression. They taught the people to look upon Calvinists as "Turks and Mamelukes," and to call cats and dogs by their names. Their gospel was the gospel of hate; and as Menzel says, this intolerant hatred was as truly a part of their religion as belief in the infallibility of their Church was for Catholics. Their pet maxim (to which we alluded before), *cujus regio illiusest et religio*, was no genuine creed of their heart, but good only inasmuch as it afforded a plausible shield and cover to their bitter intolerance. For, if any Lutheran prince adopted Calvinism, his divines forgot their allegiance and stirred up the people against him. This happened to John Sigismund, Elector of Brandenburg. Though he renounced his *Lutheran* right of forcing his own religion on his people, and wished merely that Calvinism should be tolerated, the angry Lutheran preachers denounced him with ferocious invectives from their pulpits, moving their blind dupes to rioting and violence so as to endanger the life of the princely family. No doubt these preachers talked as glibly as their Washington descendents of the "religious freedom" conferred upon mankind by the great Luther. But what did they mean? The poet has told us:

The factious band agree
To call it freedom, when themselves are free.

Let Catholics and Calvinists wear chains or go live elsewhere;
but we Lutherans must be not only free, but reign and triumph in
the State.

The idle boast that our political liberty has any connection with Martin Luther or his Reformation is sufficiently disproved by the fact that the liberties of Germany were effectually lost after Lutheranism had brought Germany under its influence, and nowhere more thoroughly than in Scandinavian Europe, where it became supreme without a rival. This was noticed nearly two hundred years ago (1692), by an acute observer, Lord Molesworth, British ambassador to the court of Copenhagen, who not only observed the fact, but discovered its reason. "In the Roman Catholic religion," he says, "there is a resisting principle to absolute civil power from the division of authority with the head of the Church at Rome. But in the North, the Lutheran church is entirely subservient to the civil power, and *the whole of the northern people of Protestant countries have lost their liberties* ever since they have changed their religion for a better."¹ Mr. Hallam says: "It is one of the fallacious views of the Reformation, to which we have adverted in a former page, to fancy that it sprang from any notions of political liberty, in such a sense as we attach to the term."

Luther, then, deserves no statue at the hands of the American people, nor in their chief city, for his teachings or any influence they may have exercised on civil and religious liberty. And all the rhetoric expended by the Washington orators at the unveiling of the statue was worse than wasted. It was intended, or at all events its effect must be, to lead the ignorant into error or confirm the delusions of existing prejudice.

But are there no teachings of Luther that might be commemorated by a statue, no parts of our soil where its erection would be appropriate? Luther taught that polygamy was no sin, that it might be permitted to Christians; and he actually gave a dispensation to a profligate prince to have two wives at the same time. This shameful fact, which Luther publicly denied, and in his private letters (while admitting its truth) declared his intention

¹ Quoted by Rev. Dr. Baird in his "Visit to the North of Europe." New York (Taylor & Co.), 1843, vol. i., p. 329. It is quoted also by another Preysbyterian tourist, Mr. Laing, in his "Notes of a Traveller."

² As to his ideas on toleration of the Jews, if any one wishes to know whence Stocker, the present court-preacher of Berlin, and chief promoter of the "Judenhetze" or anti-Semitic crusade, that finds such favor just now in Prussia, let him read Luther's two wicked, as well as coarse and filthy, books; one entitled "Against the Jews and their Lies," the other, "Von Schem-Hamporas." They may be found in the thirty-second volume of the Erlangen edition. In them from beginning to end he storms and rages with pitiless invective and scurrilous abuse against God's former people. The kindest terms he has for them are "ass-heads, devil's brood, devil's damned to hell." He encourages Christians to burn down their houses with pitch and brimstone, and help the flames with hell-fire, if possible. The Jews either do not read Luther, or they have more charity than Christians; for in Germany they are foremost in contributing, with praise and purse, to Luther's honor. Or does the feeling lurk in their minds that he has done his share of the good work—the attempt to overthrow Christ's religion?

ever publicly to deny, was carefully hidden from the light of day for many years. But it has come out at last from the darkness in which it was so cautiously and so long shrouded, to cover the Reformers with everlasting infamy. Let Luther have his due. Let his statue be raised in those northern and western halls, legislative and judicial, where divorce and virtual polygamy are hallowed by the sanction of law and authority. Let his statues grace the temples, courts and dwellings of Salt Lake City, and adorn the highways of Utah, where his theories are carried out to their full extent. Let his bust be carved on the prow of every vessel that daily bears to our shores from their Lutheran homes the proselytes of Mormondom. Like Castor and Pollux of old, let him be the tutelary deity invoked to prosper their course and guide them safely to their polygamic elysium in the west.

Rev. Dr. Butler, a Lutheran minister who joined in the glorious Washington unveiling, tells us in the *Philadelphia Lutheran Observer*, of June 20, 1884, that forty per cent. of these Mormon pilgrims are directly from northern Lutheran Europe. It is not likely that he has understated the percentage. He has not told us how many more have come from Lutheran Germany. Enough, perhaps, to fill up half the number or more. The Mormon seed finds no congenial soil in dark, benighted Italy, France, Spain or Ireland. It is only where Luther prepared his way that the Mormon evangelist finds willing ears to hear his message, willing feet to follow him to the happy Western land, where he will set them down safe from the galling restraints of Gospel morals.

Dr. Butler thinks that the "gospel" ought to be preached to these Lutheran new-comers; that they need it. What! after four centuries of Luther's gospel enjoyed in its fullness, with no "damned" Jew, no Calvinist Gentile, no Catholic idolator, no wicked Jesuit,¹ to darken the splendor of its light, they yet need the gospel! What an admission! Dr. Butler will *not* admit that Luther is not the father of "freedom of conscience," "religious liberty," "American Independence," etc., but *does* and must virtually admit that the gospel of Luther is not the Gospel of Christ.

Is there no other place in our land which might justly claim Luther's bust or name, or some other token of his moral presence? We could scarcely bring ourselves to add these few lines were it not for the disgust we feel in seeing the profound ignorance—disgraceful alike to Catholics and Protestants—which prevails everywhere, as to Luther's moral teaching as regards the sexual relation of man to woman. We touch on a delicate subject, and re-

¹ This, be it remembered, is Luther's favorite epithet.

² The Second Article of the Norwegian Constitution reads: "No Jew nor Jesuit shall ever set foot upon the soil of Norway."

gret that we cannot speak of it as professional men generally do, in one of the learned or dead languages. The virtuous sages of paganism, even the professional votaries of false gods believed that continence was not only possible, but acceptable to the Deity. Martin Luther, however, who had studied more of Plautus, Ovid, Petronius, Martial (we doubt if he knew anything of Aristophanes or his lewd Greek predecessors or successors), and the Priapeia, than of Plato, Plutarch or Epictetus, was a thorough pagan of the vilest school. With the gospel in his hand, he taught his German disciples, male and female, in the world, and in monasteries, and female convents, that no man or woman could be chaste in primitive, much less in fallen nature. Chastity or continence, said he, was physically impossible. The gratification of sexual desire was nature's work (God's work as he cynically calls it), as necessary, aye, much more so than eating, drinking, digesting, sweating, sleeping, etc. (we dare not go through with his filthy catalogue). Hence, said he, to vow or promise to restrain this natural propensity, is the same as to vow or promise that one will have wings and fly and be an angel, and morally worth about as much as if one was to promise God (we are giving the vile man's own words), that he would commit adultery. The way in which he explains all this in his coarse Latin, and still coarser German, is such that it cannot be reproduced before American readers.¹ As a Catholic, we dare not sin against St. Paul's warning by mentioning, even for a good purpose, what no Christian ear should listen to. As a man and a citizen of a southern commonwealth, what else could be our first irresistible impulse than to lift cudgel or other weapon upon the theological Rabelais who teaches, in virtue of his new gospel, that all our women, Catholic or Protestant, outside the few that are married, are necessarily unclean and impure. If Protestants hearing Luther's language can keep cool and restrain their indignation, it only shows how far religious bigotry can control all natural impulses of decency and honor.

Any one who has travelled in the old world must have come upon the disinterred cities of paganism. They reveal treasures of art on which we gaze with interest and admiration; pictures of moral and social life on which we look with horror. By the side of the temple, the patrician's ambitious dwelling, the shop of the trader or

¹ Nothing could induce us to give the original passages, Latin or German, in which the Saxon evangelist propounds his beastly theories—so full are they, to adopt Hallam's mild language, not only of indelicacy, but of gross filthiness. We refer the intelligent reader to Döllinger's summary in his work "*Die Reformation, ihre innere Entwicklung und ihre Wirkungen*," Regensburg, 1848, vol. ii., pp. 426-442. But if any one will cast doubt on our assertion, we hold ourselves ready to give the original documents even more fully than they have been given or quoted by Döllinger.

the artist's studio, revealing every variety of domestic and commercial life, we come across dens of infamy where moral turpitude revelled without a blush or any attempt at concealment. Jove and Danae adorn the inner walls; the entrance bears the hideous emblem of a false god, in order that iniquity might be consecrated by a shadow of false religion. Have we any such abodes of vice or temples of sin amongst us? If we have, what more appropriate ornament could they have for their portico than the bust of a man who taught, on theological grounds, that unchastity was a necessity of nature?

BOOK NOTICES.

PHILOSOPHY IN OUTLINE. By *W. T. Harris*. New York: D. Appleton & Co. (Reprint from "*Journal of Speculative Philosophy*.")

No little wonder has of late been excited by the revelation that, in our days, philosophers have succeeded not only in explaining, but even in strictly demonstrating, what the Church has thus far considered as absolutely unattainable by unaided human reason. Some ardent pursuers of wisdom regarded such a victory as an irrefragable proof of the truth of modern philosophical systems; others are transported with delight, imagining themselves to be lifted up to an intuition into things which heretofore were hidden from the eyes of even the wisest.

We allude to the *Philosophy in Outline*, of Mr. Harris, reprinted from the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*. We are indebted to the author for his effort to oppose agnosticism, and to support religion by reason; and we fully acknowledge the sincerity of his intentions. Yet we cannot avail ourselves of his services in behalf of Christianity, as the Church has never accepted the help offered by systems similar to his. For the attempt made by Mr. Harris to demonstrate from philosophical principles the mysteries of revealed religion is by no means new. In the beginning of this century Schelling and Hegel clothed their idealistic tenets in the terms of Christian theology to such an extent that there is scarcely any religious dogma which did not find its place in their systems. Malicious tongues, however, soon spoke evil of the philosophical piety of the two great modern thinkers, and suggested that the use of this Christian phraseology was due to an insidious design to introduce their doctrine into the schools, having been adopted by them when, after the publication of their first writings, they saw the world at large partly shocked by their pantheistic views, partly disgusted with their utter abstruseness. Of course, malicious tongues should not be heeded, nor would they have gained any hearing had not the very nature of the two philosophical systems confirmed this suspicion. The mysteries of the Blessed Trinity, of the Incarnation and Redemption, of the destiny of man, as explained by idealists, were something alto-

gether different from the dogmatic truths which were the real objects of Christian belief; nay, more, these tenets had been changed into a form of pantheism as impious as it was absurd and unreasonable. Schelling and Hegel used theological terms, but underlaid them with a meaning absolutely anti-Christian; they pretended to make Christianity accessible to reason, but tried, in fact, to convert it into a labyrinth of absurdities and self-contradictions.

We are sorry to be compelled to say that Mr. Harris, in his attempt to bring down the mysteries of the Christian religion to the grasp of unaided reason, has borrowed all his views from Hegel. As a natural consequence, he arrived at the very same results as his teacher and pattern. A brief review of some points of his *Philosophy in Outline* will substantiate our assertion.

At the root of all questions concerning the Divinity lie the conceptions of the infinite and the absolute. What are they in Hegelian philosophy? What in it is the infinite, and how is it opposed to the finite or limited? According to Mr. Harris, a thing is limited by the surroundings that exist outside it, act on it, and, conversely, are acted on by it. The infinite, consequently, must be conceived as something that has no more environments, or is self-environed. The infinite is thus to be thought of as the whole, and the finite as a component part of it; for one part is surrounded by the others with which it is connected, whilst the whole is not subject to environment. This confusion of the "infinite" and the "whole" is an obvious mistake. In metaphysics the notion *limit* is not to be thought of as something positive, but as something negative; not as the surroundings that act on a thing, but as the absence of further perfection, whether real or possible. One hundred dollars are a limited amount of money, not because they are surrounded by other coins, but simply because they are not all the money that is or can be. We may, therefore, well conceive a thing to be whole, since it has all the parts due to it, and still to be finite, because it has not all perfection possible. Leaving aside the infinite which is but relatively such, that is, which possesses all perfection only within a determinate species or order, let us consider the infinite which is absolutely such because it comprises all perfection conceivable within the scope of being, the most universal of all conceptions. Of this it is most certain that it cannot at all consist of component parts. For, parts essentially imply limits, however many components therefor we add; by such addition we necessarily impose other limits, and thus obtain a whole that is limited. Besides, since the whole has no other perfection than that of all the components united, whatever intrinsic or essential deficiency is found in the parts must be predicated also of the whole composed of them. Brutes will never by their addition or union form a rational being, because from each and all of them reason is excluded.

A heap of lead will never be a lump of gold. But components are essentially limited, and range under the species of finite beings. Hence the infinite cannot be made up of parts, but must needs be absolutely simple; it is a being that has all reality, all perfection, without distinction or multiplicity of constituents, not only with unity, but also with absolute simplicity. Any confusion, therefore, of the whole and of the infinite is self-contradictory; but in the confusion of the whole and the infinite, as made by Hegelian philosophers, we meet "confusion worse confounded," for they suppose the component parts to be but phenomenal and unsubstantial, yet maintain the whole, composed of them, to be real and substantial.

No less than the conception of the infinite was that of the absolute falsi-

fied by pantheistic philosophy. Absolute, in general, is that which is unconditioned or independent; the absolute being, as considered in metaphysics, is that which exists of itself, and, consequently, possesses all its perfections by virtue of its own essence, without any dependence on an exterior cause. In this definition all agree. It is likewise generally granted that the infinite and the absolute are the same being viewed under different aspects; for the infinite, which has all conceivable perfections, necessarily has also that of supreme independence, and *vice versa* the absolute involves in its conception no limit, but rather, that it be self-existent, requires the highest degree of reality. This, also, Hegel's school will readily concede. But how do they develop the notion of the absolute so defined? In their opinion the absolute is the independent, self-activity, self-cause, self-effect. The independent is the whole, which of itself, hence by its self-activity, separates itself into parts; for every action, they say, implies a separation of a portion of influence from the cause. By thus producing parts which surround and confine one another, the absolute determines itself and becomes self-determined. Furthermore, it is self-cause, because the acts of self-separation and self-determination proceed from it independently of any exterior cause; and it is self-effect, because the effect wrought by its activity is its own determination. The dependent beings must, consequently, be conceived as portions of the absolute, as phases or phenomena of the self-active and self-determined.

Every word of such speculation is in startling contradiction with the nature of the absolute. The whole is here supposed to be anterior to the parts, to be their very source and origin. Yet what can be more preposterous than this? True, parts may in the order of intention (*i. e.*, in the mind of the maker) be referred to the whole as their end or final cause, but in the order of nature they produce the whole by their very reality as its constituent cause. Does man produce his own components, soul and body, or do soul and body, by their mutual union, constitute man? Self-separation itself, on which Mr. Harris insists so much, presupposes the parts already existent in the whole, since to separate something is nothing else but to disconnect components; but to disconnect elements not yet existing is clearly impossible. The parts, therefore, are, as to existence, prior to the whole; and for this very reason the absolute cannot be composite, but is essentially simple. For if composite, it would not be independent, but depending on something anterior, not first and self-existent, but secondary and owing its existence to the union of its constituents.

Still worse is it that in the pantheistic theory above expounded the absolute, by self-activity, in which it is self-cause and self-effect, undergoes an evolution, a transition either instantaneous or progressive, from potentiality to actuality, from indetermination to determination, from unity to multiplicity, and from multiplicity to perfect unity, by self-consciousness. The absolute, it is granted, is identical with the infinite. But the infinite has no development because it possesses all perfection; no potentiality from which it should start, because potentiality itself essentially implies an imperfection, and the actuality that accrues to it effects in it composition; it has no separation and distinction, because it is perfectly and altogether simple. The absolute also as such, abstracting from its infinity, excludes evolution. The potential, in so much as it is such, cannot actualize itself, nor can the indistinct or indeterminate give itself distinction and determination, nor the manifold reduce itself to unity. The reason is very simple. As nothing can give what it has not, a cause or an agent cannot produce a perfection which

it does not pre-contain. Now the potential as such lacks actuality, the indeterminate and indistinct as such lack determination and distinction, the many as such lack unity. Development is, consequently, possible only in those things which are under the influence of exterior causes, that is, independent beings; but it is impossible in a nature altogether independent. The absolute cannot develop itself; it is actual and perfect by virtue of its own essence; without any potentiality it is a pure act or perfection. The developed and the absolute are as much opposed to each other as are darkness and light.

After these explanations it will not be difficult to understand, on the one hand, how Hegelian philosophers come to speak of the triune nature of God, and, on the other, how repugnant to Christianity their speculations are. Mr. Harris gives us the following conception of the Divine Trinity: By self-activity the absolute distinguishes itself into the determining and the determined, into the active and the passive, into subject and object, and thus becomes living, thinking, and self-knowing. But that it may be pure self-activity and pure self-knowledge, it must also determine itself as self-active and know itself as self-conscious. Furthermore, in the infinite, knowing and willing are identical, and, therefore, its knowing is effective or creative. Hence the primordial self-active one by its self-knowledge begets a second independent, free, and perfect self-activity; and this second again, since it must know itself to be self-active, creates a third equal in all respects to itself. But the second self-active, the Son, since He is begotten from the first, the Father, who is unbegotten, must know Himself not only as He is but also as He is derived. Yet derivation is passivity. In the Son, therefore, there is passivity, such, however, as was reduced to actuality at once and from all eternity. Consequently He produces by his self-knowledge a world of finite beings, extending from the most passive up to the most active; a world in which there is first and at the bottom of everything passivity—space, and in which there is a continuous process of evolution from the lower to the higher. All in it passes away constantly until by degrees man is reached, who, being self-conscious, tends in social institutions, particularly in the visible Church, to even greater union with others. At last the souls of all human beings that ever lived, not only on earth but also on the stars, will be united by the bond of perfect charity in the Invisible Church. This latter is the Third Person, the Holy Spirit, who, as He becomes actual through a progressive and not an instantaneous evolution from the finite to the infinite, exists not by generation but by procession. The intervention of the Second Person in the world, in order that it may not perish in its finiteness, but develop itself from matter into man, and that men may rise by charity to absolute unity in the Invisible Church, is perfect grace, the work of Redemption. This exposition should, it is thought, afford us a wonderful insight into the Divinity heretofore denied to man, presenting us with a strict and philosophical demonstration of the Blessed Trinity as taught by Christian Revelation.

Unhappily, the whole theory is based on the conceptions of the infinite and the absolute which we have just proved to be utterly false and self-contradictory. All that was said by Mr. Harris to demonstrate the Trinity of the Divine Persons, supposes composition, division, potentiality, development in the infinite. This alone suffices to overturn his system completely. Of many other suppositions equally absurd that underly his speculations we shall not speak. We shall but mention the incorrectness of his saying, or supposing, that all action is ultimately based on self-separation, as if by acting we should divide ourselves into

parts ; that creation is the production of a thing by self-activity, and not production from no pre-existing subject ; that passivity is space and space and time exist from all eternity as a necessary condition for the existence of the material world, as if they were anterior to matter, and did not follow from its extension and successions ; that the component parts of space and time act on one another as if the present moment could act on the non-existing past or future moment, and be acted on by it ; that, since thinking and willing are the same in God, He effects or creates whatever He thinks, as if by the conceptions of intellect, will, and creating power we did not view the same absolutely simple and infinite Being under three altogether different aspects. It is evident from this that the entire foundation on which the Hegelian explanation of the mystery of the Blessed Trinity rests, is lacking in truth and reality. Is it possible to build on such a basis any other than a false theory, or to draw from such premises other than unwarranted and groundless conclusions ?

. But this is not all. The natural product of false premises is a fresh harvest of contradictions and absurdities. That this holds true of the system under discussion a few simple questions will show : Does the absolute Being know at present or in general at any given moment all evolutions that take place in the world, or does It know them only when they really happen ? If It knows them from eternity, and if in It knowing is effecting, then there is no progressive evolution, no succession and no time, which is in open contradiction with Mr. Harris's views and our own experience. If the absolute, the Second Person, knows the evolutions in this creation only in time and successively as they happen, then there is progressive evolution, a development of self-consciousness, also in the Son, which is likewise contrary to Mr. Harris's position. Again, if knowledge is creation or production, the question arises, whether or not as to being the First Person is identical with the Second ; and the Second with the Third. If all Persons are identical, we should have to admit that something produces and knows itself before existing : a supposition which Mr. Harris himself considers as absurd. If the three Persons are not identical, but distinct from one another, none of them obtains self-knowledge, because knowing only the other which by cognition He produces, and yet self-knowledge is quite essential to the absolute Being. Moreover, each Divine Person is thought to know Himself by producing His own perfect likeness equal to Himself in every respect. But between the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, as described by Mr. Harris, there is an immense difference. He does not say distinctly whether the Father is developed from potentiality or not, yet his words seem to imply absence of any development in Him. For the potentiality or passivity of the Son consists in His being derived or begotten, whereas the Father is essentially underived and unbegotten. But if the Father is a pure act, free from all potentiality, how is the Son, who is essentially potential and developed, His equal in every regard ? If the Son is from all eternity instantaneously developed from potentiality, how can He see his equal and His perfect likeness in the world, which progressively and in time evolves itself into the Invisible Church ? And if the Father and the Son have self-knowledge only by producing an object, a new person, how is it with the Holy Spirit ? Has He no self-knowledge ? Then He is neither the likeness of the Son, nor is He absolute and pure self-activity. If He has self-knowledge, He must, like the others, produce a fourth Person. The fourth, for the same reason, must create a fifth, and so on, and thus we shall have not three Persons in the Divine Nature, but an endless procession of Persons.

Lastly, what unity exists between the Father, the Son, and the Spirit? Is each of them an all-comprising whole? Is each perfectly and actually infinite? This, indeed, cannot be. We should then have three all-comprising wholes, each being distinct from the other, not in its relativity, but in its absolute being. Who cannot see the absurdity of such a position? We should be compelled to say that the produced is self-existent, absolute, and independent, and that a Divine Being is infinite without self-knowledge. No, none of the different Persons is ultimately determined and absolutely perfect with the others. Only, if taken all together, they, in Mr. Harris's system, constitute one complete and absolutely perfect being. Yet, if that be so, there are not three Persons in God's nature, but only one, consisting of three parts, of which each is in itself absolutely incomplete. And can this one Person really be conceived as Divine? Not in the least. For it is composed of finite parts, and, consequently, is finite itself; potential, because implying evolution; dependent, because existing by the union of pre-existing components. The entire Hegelian theory, therefore, results, not in the Three Persons taught by Christian Revelation, but in a being, that, as it is not absolute and infinite, is not at all divine, is a false, fictitious god that bears no closer resemblance to the true Divine Nature and Trinity than do Saturn, Jupiter, and Vulcan.

There cannot be the least doubt about this last inference. Whoever has but the slightest knowledge of Christianity and of the essence of the Infinite Being, must see at once that the Holy Ghost we believe in is not the supreme evolution of the world, the bond of perfect charity among men; that the Son is not perfect and self-conscious by necessarily creating this universe, or becomes our Redeemer by elevating matter to man's nature, and uniting all men in one Invisible Church; and that the Father is not ultimately completed by the necessary process going on in creation. All such views and teachings are a hundred times worse than the heresies of Arius, Macedonius, Nestorius, and Pelagius, condemned already in the first ages of the Christian era.

Hegelian philosophy, then, in treating of God and the Trinity, starts from false notions and suppositions, draws contradictory conclusions, and ends in a kind of pantheism, by which the human and divine, the finite and infinite, the dependent and the absolute, are absurdly confounded.

Hegel's system, if there was any possibility of understanding it, certainly was best understood and appreciated in Germany, its native place. But even there it was long ago looked upon with contempt on account of its utter abstruseness and inextricable self-contradictions. What shall we, then, say of those who now in our country, the much praised home of practical common sense, take up the absurdities already rejected by the learned world; who admire theories the more the less they can be seen through; who imagine they have penetrated the deeper the more repugnant to the ordinary understanding, the more destitute of meaning, the more intricate, those tenets are which are proposed to their views. They remind us of certain eyes which, not being fitted for the perception of the light of the sun, delight more in the darkness and confusion of the night than in the clearness and beauty of the day.

SIX CENTURIES OF WORK AND WAGES; THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LABOR. By *James E. Thorold Rogers, M.P.* New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1884.

To the literature of English history no more important addition than this large octavo volume has been made in a very long time. Professor Rogers is almost, if not entirely, alone in the field of investigation which

it covers, and that field he has cultivated to the best advantage, as far as he knew how. His book is not simply a history; it is a treatise on political economy, the more valuable because it is based on the practice of centuries instead of the ephemeral theories of speculators that go to make up so great a portion of the text-books on the subject that are in such general use in our schools and colleges.

The one blemish of the work is a fault which it seems next to impossible for a Protestant writer, especially if he be a member of the State Church, to avoid committing; its references to and treatment of the relations of the Church with the State are purely Erastian, assuming that the former should be subservient to the interests and even the selfishness of the latter. There is an apparent divergence from this view in the references to the Lollards and Wickliffites, but for the most part it is only apparent, and due, as far as it really exists at all, to the writer's unconscious, innate hostility to every religious influence coming from Rome. Otherwise, the writer is remarkably, almost phenomenally, impartial. He shows most clearly, without expressing, or even implying, his intention to do so, that with the change of religion effected in England by Henry VIII. and his immediate successors came a ruinous, if not a disastrous, change for the English masses, the peasantry and the artisan class, who, having reached their highest point of prosperity under Henry VII. and in the first half of Henry VIII.'s reign, began to sink gradually and sometimes rapidly after this time until they found themselves in their lowest degradation at the beginning of the present century. Since then, as Protestantism has declined, the condition of the working classes has somewhat, but far too slowly, improved. This is the conclusion which the thoughtful reader will draw, though our author only claims to have traced "the causes which brought about the misery and degradation of labor to acts and persons which are historical," and thinks "that the process of restoration is retarded by privileges and practices which are still dominant,—privileges and practices which, unless they are relinquished and abandoned, will give occasion in England, which has hitherto been quit of it, for an extension of that spirit of communism which finds its origin and its apology in the injuries, some real and some imaginary, which the many suffer at the hands of the few." Previously he had said: "I have attempted to show that the pauperism and the degradation of the English laborer were the result of a series of Acts of Parliament and acts of government, which were designed or adopted with the express purpose of compelling the laborer to work at the lowest rates of wages possible, and which succeeded at last in effecting that purpose. These Acts have become historical, and except in so far as they are responsible for the existence of much that is difficult and regrettable in the condition of the working classes now, they have no existence at the present time."

We have no space to give an outline of this work, even were such desirable. Every person desirous of having a correct knowledge of English history should read it. Professor Rogers has put within easy reach information which he himself collected under the greatest difficulties; for he has almost always had recourse to the archives, the original contemporary documents. On this account, principally, there is not a footnote in the whole book. Incidentally, he also refutes many a pet theory, notion, and impression taught and conveyed by most of the previous writers of "standard" authority, especially many of those concerning the condition of the lower orders under the feudal system with which law students are made familiar by the perusal of the historical portion of Blackstone's "*Commentaries*."

The subject here treated, so generally neglected by other writers, is one to which our author has given many years of diligent study. Nearly twenty years ago he published two volumes of a history of agriculture and prices, and out of this the book, just issued, on work and wages has grown. "I have been frequently urged," says the author, "to extract and exhibit those parts of my researches which illustrate the history of labor and wages. To have done this to any purpose it was necessary that I should have in my possession such a continuous record of wages actually earned as would enable me to traverse the whole of the six centuries which intervene between the time at which the first information begins and that at which our present experience concludes. I have already published the facts which bear on more than half the whole period, *i. e.*, for 324 years, and I have collected evidence, as yet unpublished, for 120 years more, *i. e.*, for the 444 years which begin with the forty-third year of Henry III., 1258-9, and conclude with the first of Anne, 1702-3. Sufficient information for the residue has been supplied from the writings of Arthur Young and Sir Frederic Eden in the eighteenth century, and from numerous writers in the nineteenth, the principal authority in the latter period being Porter."

In explanation of the true significance of the facts and figures which he has collected, and so clearly and interestingly set forth here, he says: "It would have been of little value to have collected evidence as to the wages of labor, unless I had also been in possession of adequate information as to general prices from which to estimate precisely what was the purchasing-power of wages. Now I have published the prices of food from 1259 to 1582, and from 1582 a record of wheat and malt prices has been registered every six months at four important centres, Oxford, Cambridge, Windsor, and Winchester, under the statute 18 Eliz., cap. 6. Besides, for the purposes of my inquiry, I am sufficiently provided with the evidence of such other prices as enables me to translate money-wages actually paid into the necessities of life."

It must not be inferred from these statements that the book is merely a compilation of dry statistics. It no doubt abounds in the information of which statisticians are fond, but its figures are so skilfully, delicately, and intricately interwoven in a most interesting narrative, as to make them seem indispensable to the integrity of the work, whose purely narrative portions would be uninteresting without them.

Having collected all the available information bearing directly or indirectly on his subject, prior to the middle of the thirteenth century, and carefully sifted it, as well as all that has since been preserved; having not merely outlined but detailed the vicissitudes of industrial and agricultural labor in England through the centuries of prosperity and comfort before the change that took place under Henry VIII., and having chronicled the events of its degradation and downfall since the introduction of the so-called Reformation, together with its partial revival in our own century, our author devotes a chapter to the present situation and another to the remedies for the existing evils, the last two chapters in the book. The views and theories which he here propounds will not all be accepted or approved by all his readers. Here after summarizing the statements which he has made, and reviewing the inferences of the best known writers on political economy, to whom, as well as to trades-unions, he devotes considerable space, he speaks lucidly on the distribution of wealth, systems of land tenure, rents, taxation, and again of wages in general and their bearing on the other economic issues that engage the attention of statesmen. His chapter on remedies we should have more space to discuss in detail, so important are the issues with

which it deals. But no student of political economy, which, reduced to practice, is here treated of by Professor Rogers, should fail to study this as well as the other portions of the book. Valuable time can be far less profitably spent on the productions of other publicists, most of whom are only sciolists compared with the author of *Work and Wages*.

GOVERNMENT REVENUE: Especially the American System. An Argument for Industrial Reform, against the Fallacies of Free Trade. By *Ellis H. Roberts*. Boston; Houghton, Mifflin & Company. 1884.

This volume contains the substance of a series of lectures on Political Economy, which were first delivered to the two higher classes of Cornell University, and afterwards to the students of Hamilton College, N. Y. They comprise the results of studies of the author, commenced, he tells us, in early boyhood when Henry Clay was in his sunset splendor, "extended at Yale College when President Woolsey drew out from undergraduates criticisms upon the text-books then in use there on Political Economy, still further prosecuted in connection with "labors on the Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives at Washington," and subsequently enlarged by still more searching investigation of the economic history of different countries, and examination of various writers upon Political Economy.

The work throughout bears evidence of careful and extensive research on the part of its author, and of his familiarity with the different policies, judicious or injudicious, of various nations in ancient as well as modern times, to acquire revenues and promote their own internal prosperity.

In his introductory chapter the author defines the scope of his work as broadly comprising the subject of revenue, or "the getting of money for the public treasury." The cognate topics of spending the public moneys, and of the principles of production and of exchange are touched upon incidentally and only as they relate to the income of States.

He then briefly discusses the origin of governments, showing that the idea that a social compact is the basis of the State is entirely false. He argues that its basis is an inherent necessity of human nature; that the idea of government originating in a social compact involves a patent contradiction. For "when man is possessed of sufficient intelligence to form such a compact, government already exists;" that in its crude forms it is as natural a development as the association of the lower orders of existence. He refutes and summarily dismisses Herbert Spencer's notion that society is simply a stock company for protection, with the remark that "that, again, presupposes the organization which can form the company."

In all this, the author is unquestionably correct, and we are glad to see that he not only recognizes this necessity of human nature, but traces its origin to God. He pertinently and correctly says that "the early peoples all start from a theocracy in some form. To the Hebrews God spake directly, and bore rule over their commonwealth. Gods were the original rulers of the Eastern as well as the Western States." . . . "*Society* is the normal condition of man, and the State, rude it may be, but real, must co-exist with it." Thus "freedom is no outgrowth of convention; it springs from a divine right in as complete a sense as any human condition can claim to rely upon a divine title."

It is as gratifying as it was unexpected to find our author, in a work prepared under the circumstances we have briefly adverted to, thus ex-

pressing himself. The idea that society owes its origin to a social compact seems to us absurd on its very face. It is contradicted, too, by all the facts of history, and by the interior consciousness of mankind. Yet this false and delusive notion seems to have permeated public opinion. Not only demagogues and pettifoggers, and men of high official positions though of narrow education and superficial minds, entertain it, but persons of eminent repute as profound jurists or statesmen.

The writer then gives a rapid exhibit of ancient methods of obtaining revenues for the State. He examines and describes the financial legislation of ancient Egypt, Judea, Assyria, Phœnicia, Greece, Rome, China, the Italian Republics, the German States, France, England, Spain, and the Netherlands; and their respective methods, both in former times and at present, of obtaining money for the public treasury. The conclusion he arrives at, from this comprehensive examination, is that the only countries which now levy imposts for the support of government with a view to favor commerce primarily, are Great Britain and the Netherlands. These are examples of "Free Trade." The revenue systems of the Asiatic countries are protective, and systematically aim at fostering home industries. So, too, are those of all the European countries, excepting the two just mentioned. And though Great Britain maintains a free-trade policy, yet her colonies, without exception, insist for themselves on rigid protection. Thus, while the commercial policy of free-trade is maintained by Great Britain and the Netherlands, with an aggregate population of less than 40,000,000, the system of protecting home industries is enforced by all other Western nations, with a population of not less than 340,000,000. The Eastern nations, too, are solidly on the side of the industrial system. It may be added, also, that recent legislation in Germany, Austria, Russia, France, the several British Colonies, and in Japan, looks to the strengthening of the protective policy, and even Great Britain seems to be wavering in her adherence to free-trade.

In his fourth chapter the author gives a historical resumé of the various methods adopted, changed, abandoned, or re-adopted in our own country for obtaining public revenues. He reviews the policy of Great Britain towards her American colonies, its purposes and its consequences. He refers to the difficulties that existed during the days of the confederation, in raising money to carry on the struggle against Great Britain, and points out the fact that the second statute which Congress enacted and Washington signed after the adoption of the present Federal Constitution, declared that it was "necessary for the support of the government . . . and the encouragement and protection of manufactures, that duties be laid." For three-quarters of a century our statesmen, almost without exception, accepted this doctrine, and our legislation, with little variation, embodied it until the disastrous tariff of 1846, followed by that of 1857, which was conceived and enacted in like spirit. Both of these tariffs were hostile to the protective principle, and produced disastrous effects upon our home industries.

In subsequent chapters the author develops his subject in a wider field, under the respective titles of "The Incidence of Imposts," "Freedom of Production," "Commerce broader than Barter," "Fallacies about Markets," "Duties, Wages, and Prices," "Alternatives of Protection," "The Rivalries of Commerce." In the discussion of these subjects he reviews the ideas of Quesnay, Adam Smith, Locke, Burke, Say, Mill, John Bright, Henry C. Carey, and others; supporting and illustrating his own ideas by frequent recurrence to the financial and

industrial condition and statistics of different countries, American, European and Asiatic, at various periods of their history.

In his final chapter he gathers together the results of his investigations into the general conclusion, that our country owes its unexampled material prosperity and rapid accumulation of wealth to its protective policy, and, citing Mr. Gladstone's prediction of our future commercial supremacy, expresses the conviction that it will be "but the echo of our home industries."

As it is this point—the effect upon commerce of a policy protecting home manufactures—that forms the central issue in the battle of free-trade and protective theories, we summarize the author's chief arguments. He first contrasts the British system of free-trade with the protective policy of the United States.

In Great Britain the policy is to impose all charges upon the land, upon homes, and farms, and plants of industry, and their earnings and savings. Commerce is not content with the favoritism which has enriched it. It strives to cast upon production every charge of government.

In this country just the opposite course has been pursued. The policy has been to favor industry here on our own soil. To that end duties have been levied upon commerce, with the design of drawing from commerce its due share of the revenue. Even if these imposts should eventually come out of the people, it would be quite as easy for the people to pay them as it would be to pay taxes upon land or other property, or on consumption, or occupations. But experience has demonstrated that always a large part of the customs-duties is thrown upon the foreign producer or his agents. In every instance, after a period varying with the character of the commodity, for every industry established in this country lower prices have come to exist than prevailed before the duty was imposed. Foreign commerce must always be a concern of a few; production enlists the many. The British system claims a monopoly of favor for trade by sea; the American system gives foreign trade a rank after domestic industry.

In direct answer to the argument that the protective system interferes with commerce, and that protective duties should be abolished in order that we may find a foreign market for our wares, the author insists that the argument is delusive, and that the removal of duties upon importations will not restore our flag to the ocean. We lost a share of the ocean carrying-trade by the war of 1812, which succeeded in checking for a time our maritime progress. We had made vast gains when our late civil war enabled foreign powers to strike a deadly blow at our merchant navy, and we have not yet recovered the lost ground.

But the promotion of commerce with foreign countries is not the first, nor the most important task which devolves upon American enterprise. Until we have still further extended our home production, we have labors quite as imperative as any foreign rivalry can prompt. Capital and industry are getting better returns in these home enterprises than ocean service can now promise. When these fields are fully tilled, American courage and foresight will tempt the seas once more.

The author then shows that the policy of fostering home-production is the true way to eventually win commercial supremacy, and that to strive to secure it by the course by which Great Britain won it, would be to pay too high a price for it. No nation, he says, has ever yet secured the control of commerce by any change in revenue systems or adjustment of government charges. The story of commerce has been a story of violence, grasping greed, and costly wars. Great Britain has acquired her commercial supremacy, not by her revenue policy, but by

diplomacy and incessant wars, destroying the commerce of rivals, and forcing her wares upon reluctant nations at the mouth of the cannon or the bayonet's point. It was trade rivalry that prompted the war of the English Commonwealth with Holland, and that kept England involved in war, with short intermissions, from then until the fall of Napoleon, on the continent of Europe, in Asia, and on our Western continent.

We do not want commercial supremacy acquired in this way, and at this cost. We refuse to maintain a costly navy to force our commodities on reluctant peoples. We refuse to maintain armies strong enough to penetrate the heart of Asia or the valleys of Africa. We are unwilling to build iron-clads numerous enough and powerful enough to cover all the seas, to bombard Alexandria, to hold the Suez canal, to stand off and observe the movements, now of France, now of Russia, now of England upon China, India, Egypt, Tunis, Eastern and Western Africa, and the islands of the South Seas. Foreign commerce, won by the old methods, presupposes a large navy, and brings with it a costly army. If we seek to force our products on countries which do not seek for them, we must not only reduce the wages and degrade the condition and character of our working men, in order to reduce prices, but must pursue the traditional policy by which alone in the past nations have held control of foreign markets. We must be strong enough to defend our competition in Asia and Africa. We must have ships of war to convoy our merchantmen when hostilities threaten. We must be able to compete with Great Britain in diplomatic force and naval power, in Constantinople, Alexandria, and Peking, in Rio Janeiro and at the mouth of the Congo and the Zambesi.

Even at this price, and in this way, we could not secure foreign commerce. The centuries have advanced in their march, and commercial supremacy cannot now be won by parodying the policy of Great Britain. The trident of the ocean must pass into the hands which production makes powerful to hold it. We must win it in the future, if we win it at all, not by the methods of the past, weak and rusty with age, but by methods of the present and future.

The world comes to us for food because we produce it abundantly. Our agricultural implements, our clocks and watches, are sent to far-off lands, because of their excellence. Our cotton and our leather, our sheetings and our calicoes and cutlery, are bought because no one else can furnish equal quality so cheaply. Multiply your productions and the world will come to you to buy. Share the money which armies and navies cost, and leave it to fructify in the pockets of the people, and you will provide the conditions, the cheapest because the most efficient industry; and you will establish the most attractive markets in which to buy and sell that civilization has ever offered.

Upon our diversified production foreign commerce must be developed. With agriculture so productive, with manufactures so masterful, with mining industries outstripping the world, we must be able to win a share of the carrying trade. On the sea as well as on the land, we will conquer the balance of trade, caused by high wages to working-men which the protection of home industry promotes.

PILGRIMS AND SHRINES. By *Eliza Allen Starr*. 2 vols. Illustrated. Chicago: Union Catholic Publishing Company.

It is a difficult thing now to throw a new light upon the ever charming face of pictured Europe. The natural yearning to know more of the land which is, in reality, the motherland of most of us has been so

thoroughly understood and so fully ministered to by poet, painter, journalist, novelist, and moralist, that every feature appeared to have been presented to the eager public in every possible guise and under every possible reflection. But Miss Starr has certainly offered us a new aspect of *Catholic in Pilgrims and Shrines*. Struck by the fact, during her own travels, that if in classic Rome and classic Italy mediæval romance and early art engrossed the attention and aroused the enthusiasm of even Christian tourists to the exclusion of more hallowed interests, she determined to set about remedying the defect. In her own delightful manner she has described the various churches of Rome, the Catacombs, the Vatican, the churches of Paris, Orvieto, Siena and Pisa, and has told the story of the saints whose shrines they are, the events which make holy the ground too lightly trodden by careless feet.

The sketches are not connected by any thread of romance, or woven into a chain of events. They are each perfect in itself, but are vividly and pleasantly individualized as the visit of certain youthful travellers—not always the same party—to the spot under discussion. The descriptions are minute and beautiful, the amount of information something remarkable, while at the same time there is an absence of all display of learning, such as often mars the beneficial influence of instruction offered in this form. Catholics who have a knowledge of general literature and whose surroundings and circumstances force upon the man acquaintance with the tastes and opinions of "people of culture" outside of the Church realize the value of Miss Starr's writings. Too great care cannot be exercised by Catholic writers of to-day. The country is flooded by such a torrent of evil, yet beautiful—deadly beautiful—literature that the one who attempts to set forth the truth in any guise save an elegant and finished style struggles against bitter odds. Miss Starr has an easy, graceful, yet vigorous pen, and into every line she writes she infuses the earnest truth of her living faith, and offers proof of the intellectual freedom of Catholics. The highest praise is due to her present effort.

With many of the sketches the readers of Catholic periodicals have been familiar in the past and will be glad to possess them in more lasting form. The work is beautifully gotten up—paper, type, and outside dress—while the illustrations—etchings by Miss Starr herself, are new and original in every sense of the words. The sketches were made upon the spot by Miss Starr, and are not the hackneyed outline of the oft-repeated favorite view, but were chosen by herself. There is an account of the stormy and dangerous passage to Europe, during which Miss Starr experienced the lengthened horrors of anticipated shipwreck with good cause, and an account of an interview with the Holy Father, Pope Pius IX., either of which is full of interest, and the only examples of the ordinary tourist recitals of personal adventure. The other pages are an admirable comment upon the indifference Miss Starr deplors, in common with other Catholic thinkers. It is to be hoped the harvest of good intentions sown between these covers may be a full and plenteous one.

HISTORY OF THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR. By *Anton Gindely*, Professor of German History in the University of Prague. Translated by Andrew Ten Brock, formerly Professor of Mental Philosophy in the University of Michigan. With an Introductory and a Concluding Chapter by the Translator. Complete in Two Volumes. With Twenty-eight Illustrations and Two Maps. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1884.

The "Thirty Years' War" forms one of the most intricate and confused chapters of Modern history. Starting in Bohemia, and occasioned, though not caused, by the opposition of Bohemian Protestants to the accession of Ferdinand II. to the throne of that country, it spread

through central Europe, carrying devastation and desolation with it, and involving in indescribable misery and wretchedness the inhabitants of the regions through which it extended, and adding the horrors of famine and pestilence to those of war. But not only central Europe was involved in this war. Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, France, Denmark, and Sweden, all severally took part in it, and were all at different times, and most of them during its whole continuance, actively engaged in it. It also involved Hungary, and the ambitious, false, and treacherous Prince of Transylvania was at different times an active and influential agent in complicating its issues and intensifying its horrors. While the immediate causes of the war, or wars—for it was a series of wars rather than one waged between distinct combatants and with a defined purpose—were simple and easily understood, the questions it involved and the issues they drew with them became so numerous, so far-reaching, intricate, and complex, and the interests of the parties on each side so interwoven with those of parties on the other side, that it seemed that a permanent adjustment could be reached neither by the sword nor by diplomacy. And this indeed was the case. For while the "Peace of Westphalia," in 1648, restored peace for a time to Northern Europe and Germany, it was a treacherous truce, rather than a peace, and France and Spain still continued hostilities against each other. The "Thirty Years' War" is commonly looked upon, at least in its earlier stages, as a religious war. Yet this is an incorrect and very superficial view of it. Religious questions, it is true, entered into it. Yet these, at bottom, were questions of property and of political supremacy rather than of doctrine. Nor is it at all certain that, if Ferdinand II. had succeeded at the commencement of the war in completely subduing his opponents, the rights of Catholics and the prosperity of the Catholic Church would have been promoted. The probability is that he or his successors would have adopted the policy, often adopted by the Hapsburgs, of endeavoring to subjugate the Church to the State, and attempted to make the Sovereign Pontiffs of the Church subservient to their ideas. In all probability they would have undertaken to play the part in Italy which the emperors of Germany so often performed in the mediæval times, and which Bismarck and the Emperor William have undertaken in Germany in our own times.

Then, too, while the forces arrayed against each other were chiefly Catholic or chiefly Protestant, they were not exclusively so. During the latter part of the war the Protestant Prince of Saxony, one of the most powerful principalities of Germany, was an active and prominent supporter of what is called the Catholic side of the conflict, while France, Catholic France, under Richelieu and Mazarin, did its utmost to aid the Protestants. Nor did the Sovereign Pontiffs of the Church exert themselves to aid Ferdinand; and the German Prince Bishops gave Ferdinand but feeble assistance. As for Gustavus Adolphus, commonly called the Saviour of German Protestantism, his object was conquest and the acquisition of territory. Bethlen, the Prince of Transylvania, really cared no more than a Turk for any religions between Catholics and Protestants. His object in entering into the war was to conquer Hungary. Richelieu's, and after him Mazarin's, real object in the war was to destroy or weaken the Hapsburg dynasty. As regards the questions of ecclesiastical rights and property, the motives of the Catholic princes and of Ferdinand were political rather than religious, and as for the Protestant princes, they were to retain the vast revenues and estates which by violent spoliation of the Church they had acquired.

To unravel, therefore, the intricate and complex combinations that

were involved in the constantly changing issues and fortunes of this period of blood and confused conflict, and still more to clearly explain and describe them, is a task of extreme difficulty. Professor Gindely brings to his attempt to perform this task long and careful study of the subject and laborious examination of the official records and diplomatic correspondence during the period of the "Thirty Years' War," of the different German principalities, of Bohemia and Hungary, Sweden, France, Spain, and the Netherlands. He is a non-Catholic and his prejudices are evidently opposed to the Catholic religion. This has unquestionably influenced him, unconsciously to himself, at various points in the course of his work. But he has endeavored to be impartial and just in his statements, and on the whole he has succeeded as well as could be reasonably expected. Exceptions may be taken to his descriptions of the personal characters of different Catholic Prelates, particularly those who were in immediate contact with Ferdinand II. and his successor, Ferdinand III., and also with his allusions to the Sovereign Pontiffs of the Church. He fails, too, to bring out the full truth of the devouring ambition of Gustavus Adolphus, his cold selfishness and cruelty, while he paints in darkest colors the atrocities committed by the forces which were arrayed on the side of the Emperors of Germany. In like manner he fails to do justice to the personal character and distinguished military abilities of Tilly, while he throws into the background the tergiversations, treachery, and deceit of the Protestant German Princes and their grossly immoral lives. In like manner in frequent references to the questions of ecclesiastical property throughout his work and his summing up at its close of the results of the "Peace of Westphalia," he keeps entirely out of view the fact that the estates and revenues which the Protestant princes insisted on retaining were acquired by spoliation and plunder. So, too, he fails to bring out, except it be very obscurely, the fact that the religious rights those Protestant princes contended for were not the rights of conscience, but the right for them, the Protestant princes, to impose whatever religion they chose upon the inhabitants of their principalities.

The translation is simply a butchery of good English and grammar. Frequently there is utter confusion of the tenses of verbs and gross misuse of auxiliary verbs. In other respects, too, the style is poor. The translator in his preface seems to be obscurely aware of this, for he claims as merits what are gross defects, under the plea that, perhaps, in the opinion of some of his readers he has followed too closely the idioms of the German language, but that he did not wish to "conceal the author under the mask of a translation." The truth is, he has neither followed the German idioms nor the English, but mixed and confused both. Whatever his acquirements or ability in other respects may be, he evidently lacks the qualifications of a faithful and successful translator. Then, too, either from laziness or inability—the latter, we are inclined to think—he has failed to translate, but leaves in their original German or Latin, explanations of a number of the rude pictures of cities and battles, we cannot call them "illustrations," which are contained in the work.

CHARACTERISTICS FROM THE WRITINGS OF JOHN HENRY NEWMAN. Being Selections, Personal, Historical, Philosophical, and Religious, from his Various Works. Arranged by *William Samuel Lilly*, of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law. With the author's approval. New York: D. & J. Sadlier & Co., 1884.

It is gratifying, though not at all surprising, that the demand for this work is such that it requires the publication of successive editions to satisfy it. We know of no writer in the English language whose writings

have exerted a deeper influence, and can be read and re-read with greater profit and pleasure than those of John Henry Newman. Acknowledged now to be the most scholarly living Englishman, he combines extensive and accurate erudition with keenest logical acumen, and a profound philosophical insight into the interior meaning and relations of facts and truth. There is, too, a transparent simplicity of intention in all that he writes, an honest sincerity that cannot fail to impress his readers even when they take up his works with hostile preconceptions. His style is the perfection of purity, grace and vigor, united. Language with him is simply an instrument for the expression of thought and feeling, and he employs it with the ease and precision with which an accomplished master-at-arms wields his sword. In his hands it is like a magician's wand, bringing forth at will the images he evokes; or like a mighty organ under the command of a master musician, responsive to his slightest touch and inspiring his hearers with his own sublime ideas. Polished irony, incisive sarcasm, gentle humor, sparkling wit, a prolific yet ever pure imagination, combine in his works with varied but accurate erudition, with keenest logic and profound philosophy. Along with this there is an evident abhorrence of falsehood and deceit, a transparent candor, an instinctive perception of fallacies, and an unvarying gentleness and charity, even in rebuke, and then, perhaps, most conspicuous, which win the hearts even of those who oppose him, and have often converted hostility into admiration and esteem.

But Newman's writings make up almost a library within themselves. A catalogue of his works published many years ago—the only one immediately at hand—mentions thirty-four volumes. Since then a number of others have been given to the public. But latterly increasing age, together with absorption in religious devotions, though leaving his intellectual vigor unimpaired, have lessened the activity of his pen.

On this account a work like the one before us, which gathers into the compass of a single volume carefully selected extracts from his writings on subjects which are of immediate and deep importance, cannot fail to be highly useful as well as interesting.

This usefulness, too, we think, goes far beyond the compiler's immediate object, as he states it in his modest preface. It was "to contribute to the wider and more accurate knowledge of a writer concerning whom an amount of ignorance and misunderstanding still prevails, which is especially surprising, considering the high place he admittedly holds, both as a thinker and a master of style." If by this Mr. Lilly means ignorance and misunderstanding of John Henry Newman, personally, we differ from him. There was a time when he was most grossly, cruelly misunderstood and misrepresented. But that time has passed away. He has conquered his enemies by the power of truth, shining forth in his gentle unaffected humility and consistent life. And, however correct Mr. Lilly's estimate was of public opinion as regards Newman in former years, it is not so now. The misconceptions once entertained of him have passed away, and to-day no living man is more generally respected, admired, and esteemed, and by multitudes loved, honored, and revered, than is John Henry Newman.

The task which the compiler set himself to do he has done admirably well. It was a work of extreme difficulty on account of the immensity of the material from which he had to select, and it is a matter of surprise to us that he has succeeded in comprising within a single volume extracts from Newman's writings which convey so clear and complete an idea, first of his personal history and character, and next of his philosophical, historical, and religious writings.

But the usefulness of the work goes far beyond this. The extracts are not *disjecta membra*. Each forms a whole of itself, conveying a distinct idea, with clearness and force. Nor is there one which we would not regret had it been omitted.

Much of the volume will be of great interest to Protestants as setting forth and exposing with utmost faithfulness and invincible logic, yet with utmost gentleness, also, and charity, the fallacies with which they delude themselves, and resolving and clearing away the difficulties that rise up in their minds to accepting the Catholic faith. Catholics, probably, will be most deeply interested in the first and last parts of the volume; the first dealing with Newman's personal history and character, the last treating of subjects intimately connected with the Catholic religion.

THE RELIGIOUS STATE. A Digest of the Doctrine of Suarez, Contained in his Treatise "De Statu Religionis." By *William Humphrey*, Priest of the Society of Jesus. London: Burns & Oates, New York: Catholic Publication Society Co.

There is scarcely any other subject, if any, connected with our holy religion, respecting which deeper ignorance and more inveterate prejudices exist than the nature, obligations, and ends of the Religious Life. This ignorance, to a great extent, is wilful, and is both an antecedent to and a consequence of prejudice and misconception. The non-Catholic world hates and abhors on principle the very idea of a religious life, and denies the possibility of religious practically actualizing what that life involves. This hatred and abhorrence result from the fact that the example of religious, in their detachment from self and from all worldly interests and their undivided devotion to religion are a constant rebuke to non-Catholics and a testimony that they are in error. The vows which religious take they assert are impossible of fulfilment and beyond the power of weak human nature to keep, even when strengthened by divine grace. But their scepticism on this point is a consequence of their unwillingness, even, to attempt, to practice the self-abnegation and mortification these vows require. And this scepticism leads on the one hand to unwillingness to learn what the religious life really is, and on the other to more inveterate prejudices, and in many cases to satanic hatred of it.

Nor are this ignorance and prejudice confined exclusively to non-Catholics. The number of Catholics is not small who have very imperfect, and, to the extent that they are imperfect, erroneous conceptions of the religious life.

To remove this ignorance and prejudice was the primary motive of the author in preparing this treatise. It is not a translation of Suarez's classic work, but a *digest* of it, carefully made, designed to give the marrow of Suarez's doctrine "separated," to use the author's words, "from the dry bones of controversy." He publishes it, he tells us in his preface, in the hope that "it may be of service, not only to religious, but to seculars, and not only to Catholics, but to others, who, although not Catholics, desire to have information with regard to an essential constituent and salient feature of the Catholic Church."

In the first part of the work the state of perfection and its various modes or species are considered. Its essence, its author or efficient cause, its origin and antiquity, the vows by which it is constituted, and what those vows comprehend, are examined and explained, along with a variety of other kindred questions growing out of those we have mentioned. In the second and concluding part the Society of Jesus, its institution and vows, the manner and conditions of entrance into it, the scholastics of

the Society and their studies, the public schools of the Society for externs, the profession of the four vows, the probation which precedes that profession, the means which the Society employs for the spiritual progress and perfection of its members, the means it employs for the salvation of externs, the government of the Society and the mode of severance from the Society, are all considered in detail and lucidly explained.

THE WORKS OF ORESTES A. BROWNSON. Collected and Arranged by *Henry F. Brownson*. Volumes VII., VIII., IX. Detroit: Thorndike Nourse, Publisher.

Volume VII., forming the third part of Dr. Brownson's writings in defence of the Church, contains a number of papers criticising various erroneous theories of religion and refuting various objections of Protestants and infidels against the Catholic religion. These erroneous theories are chiefly those which in Dr. Brownson's time commenced to obtain vogue in New England and since then have spread and supplanted the previous phases of Protestant belief with the present existing forms of transcendentalism and liberalism. He dissects those theories with masterly skill, subjects them to keen logical analysis, and points out their fundamental fallacies and pernicious consequences.

The papers contained in Volume VIII. treat chiefly, though not exclusively, of subjects positively and directly connected with Catholic doctrine and practice. Among these are profound discussions of the relation of "Faith and Theology," the "Mysteries of Faith," "Worship of Mary," "Moral and Social Influence of Devotion to Mary," "Saint-Worship," "Heresy and the Incarnation," "Reason and Religion," "The Church Accredits Herself," the "Constitution of the Church," "Authority in Matters of Faith." The article on "Our Lady of Lourdes" is a masterpiece of powerful, profound reasoning. In other articles, such as "Steps of Belief," "The Great Commission," "Catholicity and Naturalism," "The Protestant Rule of Faith," "Protestantism Anti-Christian," and the "Evangelical Alliance," he exposes prevailing Protestant and infidel errors of his own time and of the present.

"The Spirit-Rapper" makes up the first part of Volume IX. Under the form of an autobiography Dr. Brownson narrates succinctly the early history of spirit-rapping in this country, and, widening his field, he traces out and exposes its connections with modern philanthropy, visionary reforms, socialism, and revolutionism. The latter two-thirds of the volume contain criticisms and refutations of recent erroneous scientific theories. The pretensions of phrenology, and the fallacies and sophisms of Draper, Spencer, Darwin, Tyndale, and other modern sceptics and materialists, are ably and thoroughly exposed.

SOME OF THE CAUSES OF MODERN RELIGIOUS SCEPTICISM. A Lecture delivered in St. John's Church, St. Louis, on Sunday evening, December 17th, 1882, by Right Reverend *P. J. Ryan, D.D.* Published by D. Herder, 17 South Broadway, St. Louis.

Seldom have we read a lecture which impressed us so strongly with a sense of its opportuneness and adaptation to the prevalent current of thought at the present time. That it is instructive, interesting and eloquent, goes without saying. For that, the distinguished reputation of the author is a sufficient guarantee. But apart from all this was the strong conviction of the great usefulness of the lecture, and the powerful influence it would exert, if widely circulated and read, in correcting pernicious prevalent errors.

The plan of the lecture is direct and simple. The author first distinguishes between scepticism and infidelity, showing that men do not so much reject revelation as they doubt it. He then points out four chief causes of the prevailing scepticism: First, ignorance; "ignorance of religious truth on the part of men who are regarded as leaders of modern thought." This point is proved and felicitously illustrated by numerous instances and examples. The second cause is the rejection of Church authority and the assertion of the assumed right of private interpretation of the Sacred Scriptures. The third cause is the Puritanical training in religion of children. The fourth cause is the war between conscience and the sophistries of passion. In the development of this last point the lecturer briefly and concisely, but very clearly, proves that indulgence of the passions, and particularly of those of impurity and pride, "blind the soul," and "have made more sceptics and infidels than all the arguments of all the Agnostics of the nineteenth century."

He then concisely but forcibly shows the disastrous effects upon society of scepticism, and concludes by pointing sceptics who are honestly desirous of reaching truth to the only way and means. The final appeal to sceptics is a masterpiece of eloquence, embodying a most profound yet most lucid and simple application of Scripture, and one would think irresistible from the unaffected, evident, affectionate earnestness of the Most Reverend speaker's concern for his sceptical hearers.

The usefulness of the lecture goes far beyond its immediate occasion and purpose. It may be read with great profit also (as we are sure it will also be with intense pleasure and delight) by Catholics whose minds are unclouded by doubt.

FOOTPRINTS: OLD AND NEW; OR, A NUN'S MISSION. By L. J. B., Author of "The Queen's Sieges," "Lost or Sold," "Guile and Simplicity," etc. London: Burns & Oates. New York: The Catholic Publication Society Company.

This records the observations and impressions of the writer in the Australian colonies of New Zealand, Sidney, and Victoria, of her voyage from Australia to Italy by way of the Red Sea and Egypt, and her observations and experiences in Rome. In connection with these she interweaves a large amount of information respecting the physical features, climate, scenery, industrial, moral and religious condition of the Australian colonies and the work which the Church is doing there. Two-thirds of the volume are given to Italy, and particularly to Rome. She describes its ruins and monuments, churches and other ecclesiastical buildings, its art-treasures, educational and charitable institutions, often minutely, and with many interesting and important details.

A TRIBUTE OF DEVOTION TO ST. MARY MAGDALEN DE PAZZI. By Rev. Antonio Isolero, Miss. Ap., Rector of St. Mary Magdalen de Pazzi's Italian Church, Philadelphia, and Honorary Advocate of St. Peter. Philadelphia. 1884.

We have here a seasonable offering to the renowned Florentine Saint who was elected by God to be the Second Teresa of the reformed Carmelite Order. Father Isolero's "*Un Tributo di Divozione à S. Maria Maddalena de Pazzi*" appeared last year in the vernacular, and as it was pronounced at that time by one of the most learned of our American bishops, "*a treasure of spiritual reading*," it has been recently translated into English by the reverend compiler. The work is divided into six parts. The first is a compilation of the life of the Saint from the writings of Rev. Alban Butler and Rev. Placido Fabrini. The second

and third parts embrace the sayings and miracles of that wonder-working ecstática. The fourth and fifth are devoted to the indulgences and privileges granted to our local shrine of St. Mary Magdalen de Pazzi by his late Holiness, Pius IX., as well as to the prayers of the Saint, and the devotions and order of Novena in annual use by the members of the Italian congregation. The sixth and last part is truly Father Isoleri's own *Tribute of Devotion* to the illustrious patroness of his parish, inasmuch as it consists of the panegyric of her virtues, an eloquent and glowing eulogy of one of the most remarkable and valiant women ever elevated to the altars of the Church. *Laudate Dominum in sanctis ejus!* says the royal prophet, and the perusal of this instructive book cannot fail to lead the reverent reader to praise the Lord in all His saints, but more especially in that virgin saint who was the flower of Florence and the glory of Catholic Italy.

SIX SEASONS ON OUR PRAIRIES AND SIX WEEKS IN OUR ROCKIES. By *Thomas J. Jenkins*, of the Diocese of Louisville. Published by Charles A. Rogers, 167 West Jefferson Street, Louisville, Ky. 1884.

Under this somewhat eccentric title the reverend author narrates his observations, experiences, and adventures during extensive excursions in Minnesota, Dakota, Iowa, Nebraska, parts of Wyoming, and the mountains of Colorado.

The work is valuable to persons desirous of obtaining the impressions respecting those regions of one who evidently is a close and keen observer, as well as a reliable and trustworthy narrator. His accounts of their climate, agriculture, and industrial advantages, and social and moral and religious condition, may be the more implicitly accepted as correct, from the fact that those accounts are made up from his daily jottings in a carefully kept diary.

Independently of this, however, the work is exceedingly interesting, owing to the easy, off-hand style in which it is written, the descriptions of localities, scenery, climate, and personal adventures and experiences, always graphic and evidently written at the time and on the spot of their occurrence, alternating with sallies of humor and serious reflection. A more readable little volume has seldom fallen into our hands.

ORIGINAL, SHORT, AND PRACTICAL SERMONS IN HONOR OF THE BLESSED SACRAMENT. Thirty-six Sermons in Twelve Divisions: Three in Each. By *F. X. Wenninger*, S. J., Doctor of Theology. Cincinnati. 1884.

These discourses are specially adapted for delivery during the "Forty Hours" devotion. They are prepared and published with a view to aiding Parish Priests whose time is so pre-occupied with their labors on the mission that they cannot command the leisure necessary for the careful composition of sermons suitable to the solemn occasion.

As the title-page of the volume suggests, these sermons are short and practical. They treat of subjects directly connected with the Blessed Sacrament, and will materially assist many of the Clergy in imparting suitable instruction and edifying exhortations to their flocks during the holy period of the "Forty Hours."

ADVANTAGES AND NECESSITY OF FREQUENT COMMUNION, ASSERTED AND PROVED FROM SCRIPTURE AUTHORITY AND TRADITION. By *A. C. L. F. Kitrey*. Detroit, Mich. 1883.

This is a reprint of an old work published in London, England, in the year 1780. It treats in an exhaustive manner of one of the most

practically important points in spiritual life. "The bread which I will give you," says Christ, "is my flesh for the life of the world." Consequently the better the nature of this heavenly food is understood, and the more clearly our Blessed Redeemer's designs regarding it are known, the more certainly will it produce the effects intended by its divine giver.

Those designs are plainly and forcibly placed before the reader in this work. In the first chapter the author exposes the fallacy of those who abstain from frequent communion under the pretence of respect for the Blessed Eucharist. He then in successive chapters gathers the material for the main topic of his treatise—the advantage and necessity of frequent communion—from the words of our Divine Lord, from His actions relating to the Eucharist, from the doctrine and practice of the Apostles and of the early Christians, from the doctrine and practice of the ancient Church Fathers, of the leading scholastic doctors, the examples of eminent Saints, from the decisions of Church Councils and the authoritative utterances of sovereign Pontiffs.

In subsequent chapters he dwells upon various considerations which show the great spiritual advantages of frequently receiving the Bread of Life.

ACADIA. A Lost Chapter in American History. By *Philip H. Smith*. Published by the author at Pawling, N. Y. 1884.

This is a work of deep interest and of great historical value. It is the story of a greatly wronged people about whom there is little knowledge in the popular mind, beyond the impressions made by Longfellow's beautiful poem of *Evangeline*. In the compilation now under notice the whole story of the peace-loving Acadians, and of the cruel wrongs inflicted on them by England, is well told. We here learn of the early explorations of the country, the first attempts at colonization, and the permanent settlement; the transfer from French to English rule, and the terrible and unprovoked outrage which followed. At the close of the volume, which is well and copiously illustrated, several deeply interesting legends are given, and a few corroborative documents in the form of an appendix.

NOTES ON INGERSOLL. By *Rev. L. A. Lambert*, of Waterloo, N. Y. Preface by Rev. Patrick Cronin. Second edition, revised and enlarged. Buffalo, N. Y.: Buffalo Catholic Publication Company. 1883.

Many replies have been attempted by Protestants to Ingersoll's sophisms and blasphemies, yet none of them can be regarded as satisfactory. For reasons growing out of the errors of Protestantism and its false basis, they all are failures in one respect or another. It has been reserved for a Catholic clergyman to demolish Ingersoll, though it is not so much the Catholic religion that his attacks are really aimed at as the false ideas of God and divine revelation which Protestantism has diffused.

Father Lambert meets Ingersoll on the broad grounds of reason and common sense. With cold, passionless logic, he follows him step by step, and successively drives him from each of his positions, exposing his inaccuracies and false statements, refuting his sophistry, and turning the keen edge of sarcasm, in which Ingersoll vaunts himself master, against him by wit and irony sharper than his own.

Father Lambert shows up the falsehoods which Ingersoll unblushingly deals in, his plagiarized objections and perversions, long ago uttered and long ago refuted, but palmed off upon ignorant and unthinking audiences as original. He points out his violations of logic, his ignorance of his-

tory, his fraud, deceit, and constant resort to misrepresentation in his blasphemous utterances.

We heartily wish that more books like the one before us, lucid, concise, logical, were given to the public, and we hope that Father Lambert, as he has proved himself such a master in work of this kind, will not let his pen lie idle.

THE SINNER'S GUIDE. By *Vén. Louis of Granada, O.P.* A new and revised translation by a Father of the same Order. Boston: T. B. Noonan & Co. 1884.

The author of this work holds a high place among the spiritual writers of the Church. He lived in an age of saints, and occupies a distinguished place among those who, during the sixteenth century, were brilliant lights of the Church by their sanctity and learning, particularly in Spain. He was held in high esteem by Pope Gregory XIII. and St. Charles Borromeo, the former of whom, in a letter addressed to Father Louis, warmly commended his sermons and writings. Pope Sixtus V. offered him a Cardinal's hat, which he declined, and also the Archbishopric of Braga, the Primatial See of Portugal.

Among his numerous writings, the *Sinner's Guide* is the most practical and one of the most highly esteemed. It has been translated into almost every European language, and also into the Chinese and Persian. The edition before us is a new translation, revised and rearranged.

Its intrinsic merits claim for it wide circulation, which we sincerely trust it will obtain.

SHORT MEDITATIONS TO AID PIOUS SOULS IN THE RECITATIONS OF THE HOLY ROSARY. Translated from the French by a Member of the Order of St. Dominic. New York and Cincinnati: Fr. Pustet.

A most excellent work of small compass, yet very comprehensive in its scope, comprising suitable methods for meditating on the Holy Rosary on different occasions, and under different circumstances; such as methods of meditating during one's work, to aid in preserving the spirit of recollection while going through the streets, method as used by St. Dominic, meditations on the manifestations of our Divine Lord's natural life, of His Eucharistic life, of his Mystical life, as a preparation and thanksgiving for the Sacrament of Penance, before and during Mass, as a preparation for Holy Communion, to obtain resignation, to obtain peace and welfare for the Holy Church and the Sovereign Pontiff, in times of sickness, as a preparation for death, and for Communion on the fifteen Saturdays preceding the Feast of the Most Holy Rosary. Also meditations on the mysteries of the Rosary as prefigured in the Old Testament.

An appendix to the work contains a catalogue of the principal Indulgences attached to the Most Holy Rosary.

LIFE AND REVELATIONS OF SAINT MARGARET OF CORTONA. Dedicated to her Brothers and Sisters of the Third Order of Saint Francis. Written in Latin by her Confessor, Fr. Giunta Revegna, of the Minor Order. Translated, with Mgr. Luquet's Introduction to his French Version, by F. McDonough Mahony. London: Burns & Oates. 1883.

The publication of this excellent work is very timely. Now that sins against holy purity are so common, and the excellence of chastity seems to be almost lost sight of by the world, the account this volume contains of St. Margaret of Cortona is calculated to do great good by inspiring to penitence and guiding into a better way of life those who

are susceptible to correction and reformation. Now, too, that there is a revival and extension of devotion to St. Francis, a serious perusal of the extraordinary virtues attained by St. Margaret, who was a member of the Third Order of St. Francis, of her meditations on the Cross and of the special revelations made to her, will aid in deepening that devotion.

POPULAR LIFE OF ST. TERESA OF JESUS. Translated from the French of L'Abbé Marie Joseph, of the Order of Carmel. By *Annie Porter*. With a Preface by Right Rev. Monsignor Thomas S. Preston, V.G., LL.D. New York, Cincinnati, and St. Louis: Benziger Brothers. 1884.

Many lives of this wonderful saint have been published. Among all that have fallen under our notice we know of no one which equals the volume before us in its conciseness, and yet in the graphic view it presents of St. Teresa's heroic virtues. The knowledge which it will impart to devout readers cannot fail to lead them to a higher appreciation of the supernatural ways of God among His chosen servants, and thus more clearly reveal to them the grandeur of the Christian life, by showing them what divine grace can effect in souls that are willing subjects of its mighty power.

JOSEPH HAYDN: The Story of his Life. Translated from the German of Franz von Seeberg, by the Rev. J. M. Toohey, C.S.C. J. A. Lyons: Notre Dame, Ind. 1884.

We heartily wish that more such books were written and published. They would furnish entertaining and edifying reading matter to those whose tastes are not already vitiated by sensational literature, and would serve also to divert from such literature many who now resort to it simply for the sake of amusement and relieving ennui.

The chief incidents of Haydn's life are brought out in clear, beautiful, and attractive colors. The narrative style is preserved throughout. It is a "*story*," yet a true story, told in most charming manner.

ALLOCUTIONS, OR SHORT ADDRESSES ON LITURGICAL OBSERVANCES AND RITUAL FUNCTIONS. With Appendices on Christian Doctrine Confraternities, Lending Libraries, the Sodality of the Living Rosary, Ladies' Associations of Charity, Purgatorial Societies, Mutual Benefit Societies, etc. By the author of "Programmes of Sermons and Instructions," etc. Browne & Nolan, Nassau Street, Dublin. 1884.

This volume consists chiefly of short explanatory discourses intended to be used by the clergy, for instructing their parochial flocks on the Festivals of the Church and the Ceremonies used in the administration of the sacraments. They are concise, yet clear and sufficiently comprehensive, and, though didactic, are interesting.

GROWTH IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF OUR LORD. Meditations for every day of the year, exclusive of those for each Festival, Day of Retreat, etc. Adapted from the French original of the Abbé de Brandt by a *Daughter of the Cross*. Vol. V. London: Burns & Oates. 1883.

The volume before us of this excellent series of meditations comprises those parts of the Church-year which extend from the eighteenth to the twenty-fourth week after Pentecost, and from the last week but four to the last week but one before Lent; also, special meditations for a number of the feasts of the Church, for Thursdays, Fridays, and Saturdays of each week, and for Retreats. Appended to it is a copious index of all five volumes, which make up the entire series.

EDUCATION: "Intellectual," "Moral," and "Physical." By *Herbert Spencer*, author of a "System of Synthetic Philosophy." New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1883.

Mr. Spencer gives his views of the subject which forms the title of his work, under four heads. I. "What Knowledge is of Most Worth." II. "Intellectual Education." III. "Moral Education." IV. "Physical Education." Those who are interested in the subject of education will find in this volume many useful practical suggestions. As for the principles laid down by Mr. Spencer, they are those which pervade all his writings, and which no Christian can accept as true.

SERMONS FOR THE SPRING QUARTER. By the late *Very Rev. Charles Meynell, D.D.* Edited by H. I. D. Ryder, of the Oratory. London: Burns & Oates. 1883.

This is a volume of sermons, partly doctrinal, but chiefly practical. They are scholarly; very carefully elaborated both as to thought and expression. Yet there is such simplicity of treatment, such directness of scope, and such clearness of explanation, that, while in style and finish they seem exclusively intended for persons of education, the uneducated may read them understandingly and with benefit.

THE CHILDREN'S BOOK. Songs and Stories. Imitated from the German of Julius Sturm. By *Agnes Sadlier*. With Illustrations from Original Designs, by German artists. New York: D. & J. Sadlier & Co., publishers. 1884.

This is indeed a "Children's Book," and with what delight they will read its songs and stories, and look at its pictures, all spirited illustrations of the text, is more easily imagined than told. It is a beautiful volume, beautiful in binding, beautiful in its letter-press, and this external beauty is a fit setting for its charmingly interesting contents.

THE COURSE OF EMPIRE. Outlines of the Chief Political Changes in the History of the World (arranged by Centuries). With Variorum Illustrations. By *Charles Gardner Wheeler*. Boston: James R. Osgood and Company. 1884.

It is difficult to conceive that this work has been gotten up for any other purpose beyond that of selling it. It is a crude compilation of materials gathered from every quarter, and arranged or rather thrown together at hap-hazard. Such books as this do harm by lessening and restricting the sale of works of real merit.

A THOUGHT OF SAINT TERESA'S FOR EVERY DAY IN THE YEAR. Translated from the French Edition by Miss Ella McMahon. New York, Cincinnati, and St. Louis: Benziger Brothers. 1882.

This little book, as its title indicates, consists of brief extracts from the writings of St. Teresa. These extracts are judiciously selected and form an excellent volume for use in daily meditation. It is published with the *Imprimatur* of his Eminence Cardinal McCloskey.

CATHOLIC FLOWERS FROM PROTESTANT GARDENS. Edited by *James J. Treacy*, Compiler of "Historical and Biographical Stories, Sketches, Anecdotes," etc. New York: P. J. Kennedy. 1882.

This is a volume of extracts from the writings of non-Catholic poets, of different degrees of merit, in praise of certain features of the Catholic religion and Catholic practices.

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ENGLISH AGNOSTIC CONCEITS.

THE latest effort of the skeptics is to evolve a religion in which there shall be no mention of God. An *idea* of God there necessarily must be; but He need not be mentioned, nor believed in. Creation did not require a Creator. Thought and brain were evolved out of themselves. The intelligence which is appreciable in all order and fitness was begotten out of some germ which did *not* hold it. Out of nothing everything comes. Or, at the least, it must be maintained that the infinitely great was a product of the infinitely little. The Idea, God, was the development of an atom. The fact, atom, was an eternal generation. Or, possibly, both an atom and an idea were eternally generated out of energy. Let us leave it alone. The Irrationalists cannot make anything out of it. So we may be excused if we cannot do so. The Irrationalists, however, get well chided. We have many admirable papers in magazines, written by first-class non-Catholic thinkers, in defence of supernatural religion. We have the same kind of advocacy in public speeches. Lord Salisbury went so far a few months ago as to say in a speech upon education that religion ought to be taught in all schools "in the entirety of its supernatural range," and this equally as to dogma and morals. Judge Stephen argued much in the same way in a recent paper in a monthly magazine; and Miss Agnes Lambert, a clever writer, cut to pieces, in the pages of the *Nineteenth Century*, the shameless fallacy of trying to build up a new religion on a basis which was not super-

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natural. All grave non-Catholic disputants see the hopelessness of curbing nature by a religion which is *not* above nature. Judge Stephen thinks there might be a moral system evolved out of the purely natural law, which should suffice to control "public morality,"—and in this opinion he is right in some measure—but he is sure that Christian morality requires the *whole* of Christian dogma, and that Christian dogma is, primarily, supernatural. Where these disputants come to the ground, in arguing against naturalists, is in the fact that without authority there is no dogma; and since they reject the teaching Church, they reject living authority, and cannot therefore possess dogma "in its entirety." Judge Stephen, like Lord Salisbury, could not consider this. The "entirety" of dogma was, to them, a dream. The word "entirety" was most excellent in intention; but, in the mouth of non-Catholics, it had no meaning.

To a Catholic, it would seem waste of time to argue that supernatural faith must be built upon supernatural authority. Indeed, the very idea of the supernatural is Divine governance. Just as "a religion" must be primarily supernatural, so the supernatural means God walking with us. But, to take the first point alone,—that "a religion" must be supernatural—all the subtlest skeptics, even Voltaire included, have confessed to the obvious truism. Apart from Christianity, the supernatural in "a religion" has been assumed as its very first postulate. Talleyrand, with just cynicism, told the French Humanitarians, that if they wanted to get their religion believed in, they must themselves, or their apostles, be crucified and be raised again. For how else should they prove their mission to the world? The common sense in such satire is patent. A man starts a new religion, and assures us it is the correct one, and that he has at last hit upon the very thing mankind wants. So admirable a discovery deserves the gratitude of the whole race; but we first ask him for the credentials of his apostleship. His invention may *seem* excellent, but so have about a thousand others; and as we cannot spare the time to wade through all his volumes, to find out the whole merits of his philosophy, we ask him bluntly, "who are you?" "*quis te misit?*" so as to settle the matter off-hand. If he can only reply that he is a highly gifted being, we do not feel that the credentials are sufficient. But perhaps, like Mr. Herbert Spencer, he can show a rare egoism, by the discovery that God is Unknowable; so Unknowable as to require a capital U. This would certainly raise his claim to be listened to. The new art of endowing negatives with the force of supreme positives, by instructing the printer to use capitals,—thus converting such a trite idea as "humanity" into the dignity of the new religion, Humanity; or such a painfully suggestive mood as "agnosticism" into a new science that is simply crushing with a

big A—is undoubtedly the exceptional gift of great apostles who have to fall back on type for their supremacy. Or again, the scholarly coining of grand words, derived from languages almost as dead as the coiner's faith, must present something of the credentials of apostleship.

"Osmosis," and "protoplasm," and "evolution," and "anthropoid" make us pause to bend the knee to the inventors. Such a compound, too, as "brain-waves" sets our common brains wondering as to the sea-like movements of the instrument with which we think. It is true that Professor Ruskin has made merry over this compound, by asking "what does it matter how consciousness is conveyed? The consciousness itself is not a wave." But Mr. Ruskin has no respect for new conceits. "Cellular vibrations" is another way of expressing this same animated behavior of our brains. But to speak of another word which is really very fine: how many men know the meaning of "chlorophyll"? Here again, Mr. Ruskin makes merry. "When I want to know why a leaf is colored, they tell me it is colored by chlorophyll, which at first sounds very interesting; but if they could say plainly that a leaf is colored by a thing called green-leaf, we should see more plainly how far we have got." As to "protoplasm," a word created by Mr. Huxley, there is nothing new in it, save a sound which is ambitious; for a vast number of physiologists had discerned by the microscope the primitive cradle of what we account the human germ. In the same spirit, learned writers, or writers who would seem learned, have treated us to the new word "ozone." We need not feel bashful if we do not know what it means, for Mr. Ruskin—if we may once more quote this keen critic—says *he* does not know; and neither, he believes, does anybody else. But, next, we have the really frightening word "osmosis," which Mr. Darwin was rather proud of having invented. Some inferior minds have said that osmosis means filtration. Perhaps it does. The physicists are still quarrelling over the point. Mr. Herbert Spencer has a preference for "physiological units;" and he is welcome to such additional syllables. "Osmosis," said a satirist some years ago, "is our new Gospel. God—if there be a God, which there is not; man—only he is only an aggregate of cells; human will—but that is only a succession of cellular vibrations—are all Osmosis." We are getting on with our education in "science." Yet, once more, we may quote Mr. Herbert Spencer, who has added this sentence to English literature: "The being called man" (there is a diffidence in this language which makes us nervous as to our own claim to be "called" something which it is just possible we may not be)—"The being called man is a concurrence of atoms, acted upon by a voltaic pile, and emitting sparks of thought." Pyro-

technic, or, shall we say, electric humanity! We are beginning to think we would rather go back to our copy-books. Besides, Mr. Darwin's assurance that men were once apes, who wore off their tails by sitting upon them, gives to us all such a humble beginning that we do not feel we deserve such fine language. "Education," however, may still improve us. And what is education, "scientifically"? Mr. Huxley has told us—and perhaps he believed in what he wrote—"Education is the instruction of the intellect in the laws of nature." That is all. But the laws of nature, if all these gentlemen are trustworthy, must be the most difficult things in the world to be instructed in. Not only are they, many of them, "unknowable," but they require a language, for their very initial comprehension, which might take one a life-time to master.

Yet our new teachers might feel mortified if we attributed to their word-smothering a veiled pretext for disguising their unbelief. They are sometimes careful to tell us that they are believers; though of what sort it is not easy to gather. Mr. Spencer does not wish to be considered a skeptic, that is, of the common vulgar kind. "I have repeatedly and emphatically asserted," he writes, "that our conceptions of Matter and Motion are but symbols of an Unknowable Reality." Here we have a *credo* of much simplicity. "Our conceptions are but symbols." That is, "My conception and your conception are symbolical of some Reality, which, being unknowable, may be called God." We do not seem to approach to any definite apprehension of what such a writer may intend by "I believe." Mr. Huxley is equally ambiguous. When speaking of religion, or religious worship, he recommends that it be "for the most part of the silent sort, at the altar of the Unknown and the Unknowable." This will hardly be a tender or devout worship. "I adore You *because* You cannot be known, and, therefore, I have not the least idea Whom I am adoring," is an odd state of mind for even a Rationalist, who would seem wiser if he did not adore at all. It is not strange that men who hold these ambiguous creeds think it better to get rid of a future world. "The idea of a future world," said an eminent Rationalist, "is the last enemy whom speculative criticism has to oppose, and, if possible, to overcome." This is certainly what some one has called "antitheism." "You may exist, but, if so, you are my enemy," is the genuflectory attitude of these thinkers. They detest even what they account the Unknowable. One claim, however, which is common to all such thinkers, may be profitably considered for one moment, and this is their claim to be "advanced." All these men and their disciples profess that they are "advanced thinkers," and that they are advancing still further and further. Now, to advance means, as a rule, to go forward. At least, we do not

speak of a lessening of human knowledge as being one of the first essentials of true progress; for, if we did, the "irreducible minimum" would be the utmost conceivable progression. Taking the fact that for eighteen centuries Christians have believed in the Incarnation, with all the verities inseparable from that belief, if, in the year 1884, we are to account God unknowable, how can we be said to have "advanced" in religious knowledge? More than this, the grand old Pagans, such superb thinkers as Plato, and the unquestionably "advanced" reasoner, Aristotle, would have thought the language of Mr. Spencer, or of Mr. Huxley, or of their *confrères*, as strangely retrogressive as it was profane. So that, in aspiration, our modern thinkers are as far behind the old Pagans as in actual knowledge they are far behind all the old Christians. It is true to say of Plato that he made the immortality of the soul the very basis of his aspiring philosophy. He even hoped for a revelation from Heaven. He often invoked the Divine help in his reasonings. For him there was but one longing; it was for God. Aristotle, in like manner, though with a less longing spirit, taught that virtue was the first condition of the highest knowledge, and that virtue involved obedience to authority. Our modern thinkers—philosophers!—have "advanced" beyond such babes to the summit of human knowledge, the Unknowable. It has been suggested that the father of the inductive philosophy is not much trusted by Rationalists or by Protestants, because Catholics have made use of his methods. It would, perhaps, be truer to say that the modernists do not trust anyone who believed in anything which *they* could not have evolved. To be "advanced" is to be in the habit of evolving theories which no grave thinker would have hazarded except in play. To bring men back to a crawling and creeping speculativeness, to a groping and burrowing philosophy, to a contentment with the "highest duty" of not being Christian, is the aspiration of the advanced thinkers of the nineteenth century, in the land of the highest civilization.

This last boast of "civilization," in connection with modern thought, cannot possibly be passed over in this notice. Since our advanced thinkers would take away from us all religion, we have a right to look that their new Paganism shall be enjoyable. Give us this world, if you will not allow to us any other! A writer in a leading journal has said that "it would be impossible to reconcile any form of systematic Christian theology with what we (that is, Englishmen) call civilization and progress." We should agree with him. Our civilization is no more Christian than it is Utopian. Starvation and excessive opulence, cruel labor and pagan luxury, contented ignorance and vain agnosticism, are as little known to any system of theology as to any system of natural

virtue or natural decency. Hugh Miller said, speaking of such civilization, that it was probable that, some day, the Radicals of our great cities, who had been robbed of all religious restraints, would avenge on society and on Protestantism the insolent neglect which had degraded them. They have begun to do this already, and in earnest. Radicalism is now revolutionary, just as it is now anti-religious. Radicalism hates "civilization"—hates it justly, and with sound sense and motive—because civilization has meant selfishness and pride, with most anti-Christian contempt for the poor estate.

Civilization, in its modern sense, or as it is approved by modern thought, has come to mean the selfish art of *enjoying* this world's good things by those who are so fortunate as to *possess* them. The number of civilized persons is, therefore, small. The poor can have no civilization. As a matter of fact, the poorer classes in England, especially the poor in country life, have a good deal more *real* civilization than the majority of the rich and the respectable. They live less for themselves, and are more charitable than are the "comfortable," the "respectable," the "fashionable" classes. All their faults are derived from their "superiors." Their virtues are their own work and merit. But necessarily the base coinage of all the conventional proprieties,—as of a false religion, or, as it is funnily called, agnosticism—must corrupt the moral currency of every class of ideas in *all* classes, the lowest as the highest. So long as Protestantism was mainly Christian sentiment, the humbler orders could be "good Christians" in possession of it; but now that Protestantism has given place to cold skepticism, so that half the literature of England is corrupted by it, religious sentiment has come to be thought quite old-fashioned, and a shallow, vain egoism has taken its place. Civilization, therefore, which once *included* Christian sentiment, is now assumed to get on much better without it: that is, civilization in the trite sense of conventionalism *plus* the luxuries which good fortune may assure to us. Free thought has done this. Poverty, which once was honorable, if not agreeable, is now simply disgraceful and contemptible. All classes have caught the infection of this vulgar estimate. Some "good" Christians honor this poor estate—only in prayer books. Society has fallen down before the golden image with such prostration of mind, heart, and soul, that even in churches the poor are suffered to be present, only on condition that they take the least honorable places. Civilization, in its gradual regress with modern thought, has come to be ashamed of magnanimity and chivalry, until it can even say to the poor Christian: "You have no right in our churches, unless *we* graciously concede to you the back benches."

A candid Rationalist has written that "the *idea* of another world is fatal to our making the best of this world." But the *idea* of some modern Christians, taking their flavor from modern thought-ists, is so to blend opposite "philosophies" as to make sure of the present world, and to level religion down to their own meanness. It is this spirit which has so encouraged professed agnostics that they are not afraid to launch their skepticism on the public. If professing Christians did not seem *more* selfish than they are Christian, professing skeptics would try to veil their effrontery. Society, so to speak, pays the skeptics; it gives the patronage which is essential to their success. Take that modern institution, the free press, which is the grand ventilator of all agnostic conceits, and without which very few of us would hear of them. Editors would not dare to publish the advocacy of heathenism, did they not know that most of their readers would enjoy it. No protest reaches their office against such tactics; still less is the "largest circulation" diminished; so, on they go, pandering to the public taste, and the public taste craves for more and more, and grows on the garbage on which it feeds. Without the newspapers agnosticism would make no way. Not one Englishman in a hundred thousand buys a big book on "philosophy"; but most Englishmen read the leaders in the newspapers, which give the currency to every theory or hypothesis. Newspapers are the winds which blow the feathers of human vanity to every nook and corner of the whole land. More than this, journalists usually side with the *talent* much more than with the *merit* of new conceits. If a philosopher, so-called, publishes a brilliant new book, the critics in the newspapers quote the "remarkable passages," whether their tendency be edifying or destructive. A few months ago, Mr. Herbert Spencer, when speculating, in a magazine, as to the possible religion of a future time, wrote many bitter charges against Christianity; and most of the newspapers republished these charges, without one word in abhorrence of such scandal. The "passages were remarkable"; that was enough. Thus newspapers were responsible for spreading skepticism far and wide, *without* the antidote which simple justice would suggest. Ordinary readers (that is, ninety-nine out of every hundred) are not aware that the "philosophers" differ savagely among themselves, though with the decorum of at least verbal politeness. If ordinary readers knew this, they would be often set laughing where now they rub their eyes in mute wonder.

For example: Mr. Huxley has said of his compeer, Mr. Darwin, that his favorite theory is "only hypothesis"; while of the whole Comptist theory, or, as it is usually called, philosophy, he says: "I find there little or nothing of any scientific value." Professor Owen is equally severe on his co-scientists. Not even *one* philos-

opher is accepted by *all*. Mr. Buckle, as to his theory of moral equations,—like Mr. Tyndall, as to his theory of a dynamic principle,—has been taken to pieces by English scientists and English skeptics, with a relish that belongs only to a brotherhood. Yet the affectation of the scientists gives them a charm with the vulgar; and even, to some degree, fascinates the sagacious. Take away this affectation, with the terminology and the capital letters, and nineteen-twentieths of so-called philosophy would shrivel into platitudes, or into theories which were contradicted by common sense.

It would be unjust, however, to pass over one great distinction between the graver and the vainer school of scientists, and it is this: that the graver school is grateful to the Catholic Church for her patronage, if not her parentage, of true science; while the vainer school talks flippantly of the Church "opposing science," or of being inimical to its independence. Of this last school Mr. Huxley is a chief sinner, affirming that it is "life or death to the Catholic Church to resist the progress of science and civilization." Such heedless slander has been so frequently confuted by other equally distinguished non-Catholics,—by Mr. Lecky, Mr. Froude, Mr. Hallam, Mr. Laing, Lord Macaulay, and, it may be added, Mr. Tyndall,—that it is not necessary for English Catholics to quote Catholics or "foreign" Protestants in favor of the exactly opposite sense and fact. Monsieur Guizot, though a Calvinist, not only declared, but fully demonstrated, that to the Catholic Church alone Europe owed all its learning and all that is best called civilization. If some English scientists offend so deeply in their insincerity, it is at least due to others to say that, as historians, they are more accurate and trustworthy than as philosophers.

It would be an interesting inquiry, though it would be impossible to give an answer: Do the disciples of these new philosophers believe in the new philosophy as much as do the philosophers themselves? The disciples do not *believe* in it, because they do not understand it; but they *like* it, because it is a pretext for sloth. In England, we hear young men, of from seventeen to twenty five, chattering Huxleyism or Darwinism or Spencerism, with all the easy volubility of complacency, but with serene ignorance of the alphabet of common sense. The *moral* side of agnosticism—supposing that there is one—is easily apprehended by the multitude, because it means simply, "take it easy, since we, your foremost thinkers, can assure you that we know nothing about religion." Moreover, the new philosophy feeds vanity so agreeably that it must be welcome to every self-loving nature. A man is bid to turn his thoughts inward upon himself; to behold his own teacher in his own brains; to see in himself the only ultimate authority, and in all others the same weak individualism. Thus vanity, like sloth,

is the offspring of that new religion—not inaptly, if ironically, termed *natural* religion—which, having eliminated the Living God out of His Creation, has set up a host of worshipful *egomets* in His stead.

I have said that, without the newspapers, agnosticism would make no way. English agnostic conceits owe their wide popularity to the gentlemen of the press who reproduce them. But more than this, they owe their way to the confidence and the superficiality of the journalists who “write them up” in good English. The funny thing in journalism is that journalists *will know everything*; and will write on religion—on Positivism or on “Popery”—with the easy confidence of profound thinkers and scientists. A gentleman who has just polished off a leader on vaccination, on the Franchise Bill, or on the Derby day, is ready at a moment’s notice to give us his private estimate of the shocking fallacies contained in an Encyclical. He is quite as at home in the domain of Catholic dogma as he was in that of the Health Exhibition; and can tell us all about the “supernatural” with the same perfect familiarity with which, but yesterday, he discoursed on female toilet. Now, this spasmodical journalism is, I should imagine, the chief incentive to the “take it easy”-ness and complacency of the skeptics. If journalists can know everything, so as to *teach* on all subjects, why should not “the intelligent public” be competent to sit in judgment both on the journalists and on the “philosophies” which they handle? If the professed principles of “agnostic” teachers were adopted by all journalists,—which is, to value what is known, not what is speculative,—the occupation of the journalists would be limited when writing about the vagaries of the unknowable. But this would never do; since to be confident about the unknowable is the first credential of an agnostic apologist, as it is also the first privilege of a “free press.” It has often been remarked, that one of the drollest of modern fallacies is the professing to have confidence in a “free press,” when, in reality, a free press means merely “writing up” or “writing down,” so as to please a certain section of opinionists. The press is free, it is true, and so are its readers; but the journalists use their freedom to catch the greatest number of readers, and the readers use their freedom in choosing advocates. Hence, a man, or a youth, with certain hard prejudices, will never look at, still less purchase, any “organ” which he knows beforehand will not favor his predilections. A young man has a fancy for agnosticism (for two reasons, because it sounds very fine, and because he has heard that it excuses him from religion); and he no more dreams of reading a newspaper which might show up agnostic weakness than of reading a newspaper which would recommend him not to smoke. The journalists, who

know exactly the sort of literary pabulum which satisfies the craving of the majority, give full measure of those conceits which are certain to please the masses, and withhold every antidote that might be distasteful. This is the real meaning of a free press; it is an institution designed to put money into the pockets of enterprising speculators in journalism, by whatsoever tactics may best effect that agreeable object, at all costs of spiritual injury to the masses. Agnosticism, as I have said, owes its favor with the multitude to the fact that journalists know it can be *made to pay*; since the vast majority of men and women will jump at every pretext for preferring the present life before the future.

Two other incentives to English agnostic conceits must be noticed in the way of apology. The first is the encouragement which is given to speculativeness by the untenable position of the clergy, who seek to teach dogma without recognizing its source, and to affect authority without fount of jurisdiction. Add to this that *some* dignitaries *preach* skepticism! One example will suffice. A few years ago Professor Jowett, the well-known master of Balliol, and a writer of the famous *Essays and Reviews*, preached a sermon in Westminster Abbey, of which the sole purpose and effect was to establish the two following propositions: first, that modern science has thrown such doubt upon "Miracles" that it is wiser to regard the miracles as exaggerations—as the perfervid impressions of the too imaginative; secondly, that all dogma is but too earnest opinion, and should be relegated to the sphere of false enthusiasm. The morality of the Gospels was, of course, excellent, said the preacher; in short, Christianity should be morality *minus* doctrines, *minus* miracles, *minus* everything which could possibly offend the scientists; and then even agnostics could kindly give it their approbation, and it would be still possible for Christianity to survive. Freethinkers, in England, naturally say in rejoinder: "If this is what you account Christianity, what is the use of priests, churches, or dispensations? *We* can do better without them."

But a second apology for English skeptics is the fact that, in Catholic countries, there is a good deal of professed atheism, and even "antitheism." The latter seems to *them* to arise out of the repugnance with which born Catholics have been brought to regard their teachers. To *us* the explanation is very different; just as to *us* it is a certainty that the whole frame of that disposition which has led to every phase of modern skepticism is solely the result of those "principles" of the Reformation which threw authority to the winds, and enthroned egoism. Still it is impossible to expect ordinary skeptics to work out such truisms for themselves; their education, their habits of thought, do not admit of it.

When they hear first-class Anglican clergymen, and statesmen, and historians, asserting that Catholicity has bred skepticism, and attributing even "antitheism" to "Popish teaching," it is not to be wondered at that, knowing the fatuity of all Protestantism, they look on "the whole thing" as superstition.

So much by way of apology for English skeptics. And yet, once more, let it be added,—for it is affectation to blind one's eyes to the *real* cause of all this hatred of religion,—skepticism is a moral, not a mental disease, and it comes from the general corruption of society. The pace of wealth, the pace of rivalries in business, the pace of pleasures, both equivocal and unjust, the pace of "news" or of succession of sensations, the pace of travel and of telegraphic dispatch, the pace of *suffering* in unnatural struggle for bread, and the pace of *cruelty* in leaving others to suffer; the world's pace is simply fatal to that serenity which, *because* it is joyous, is believing. How is it possible that half the world should be believing, when the other half simply uses it for its own selfishness? No poor man would be a skeptic on religious grounds, unless he had first become a skeptic on natural grounds. The unnatural sufferings of English poverty, rendered irritating and souring and demoralizing by the cold neglect and vulgar pride of the prosperous, breed that rancorous discontent which perverts the whole nature, and makes poor men fling up *the religion of the prosperous*. As to the prosperous skeptics, they are skeptical from that sheer laziness which is sympathetic with the oblivion of responsibility. They are skeptical because they are too "busy" to be believing. The business of self-indulgence is far more exacting than is the business of the counting-house or the barrack-yard. It is a business which grants no holiday for reality. The man of pleasure, of fashion, of position, of distinction, finds skepticism the most charming butler to the mansion of his conscience, because he denies entrance to every caller who would trouble him.

Thus the conceits of agnosticism are but the pleasantries of a vanity of which the root was enjoyment of this life. It is a mistake to call skepticism a result of modern thought, save in the sense that it is a result of modern morals. I do not use the word morals with reference to the Commandments, but with reference to natural candor or ingenuousness. And, in this sense, I call it the loosest immorality to jumble words and make their meaning quite valueless by purposely confusing their *true* meaning. Thus, the distinguished author of *Natural Religion*,—whom every one must allow to be a talented if a fanciful writer—jumbles the meanings of common words in such inextricable confusion, that he leaves his readers in utter darkness as to his meaning. "Nature," "man," "God," have always conveyed different ideas, and sug-

gested different facts, to all Englishmen ; and yet the author of *Natural Religion* uses the three words in common, while at the same time making each oppose the other. What can be more fantastic than such an argument as the following : " Nature, according to all systems of Christian theology, is God's ordinance. Whether with science you stop short at nature, or with Christianity believe in a God who is the author of nature, in either case nature is divine, for it is God or the work of God." Which is like arguing, as Miss Agnes Lambert has observed : " A clock is either a man or the work of a man ; therefore, a clock is a man." The same confusion reigns throughout all Mr. Seeley's writings, in spite of his vigorous thought and evident earnestness. He predicates of science, that it rejects God and that it is God ; that it is a religion, even a grand revelation, and yet that it takes the place of Revelation, and that it is even a *new* Revelation of Him whom we call the Eternal, while it dispenses with the Eternal God in all its searchings ; and thus he confuses us with a muddle which might drive us to despair did we not know whence the muddle is begotten. In the same way mere words are made to convey grand ideas, which they have not and could not possibly have conveyed ; and then they are used arbitrarily in their new senses, without apology for thus offending our old habits. Take one example out of many. Mr. Seeley had been arguing that patriotism, or nationality, might sometimes rise to the dignity of a religion. He had previously argued that religion is but admiration ; so that admiration, if devout, was religious worship. In illustration of his meaning he quotes a saying of Mazzini,—forgetting that Mazzini was an unbeliever,—" Italy is a religion." Logically, therefore, it would come to this, that if religion is admiration, and Italy is religion, Italy is proved to be admiration. But of course Admiration requires a capital A, for without it we might think only of some lady's bonnet. This modern trick of using capitals is half the battle with the agnostics, as may be shown by simply leaving out the capitals. You cannot talk of admiration as the same thing with divine worship, nor of humanity as the same thing with divine religion, nor could you exalt nationality, or patriotism, or even energy, into the tremendous dignity which they are now made to enjoy, unless you called in the aid of big type. Even " the unknowable "—wordy deity that it is—would shrink into unseemly proportions if you would not permit to him a big U. And as with words, so with sentences ; unless you threw up clouds of dust, we should hardly believe that some grand truth was behind. Mr. Herbert Spencer, when he is eulogizing his new religion of worshiping (scientifically and philosophically) that august being who is supreme in *not* being knowable, has the fol-

lowing cloud of dust instead of reasoning : " The conception which has been enlarging from the beginning must go on enlarging until, by disappearance of limits, it becomes a consciousness which transcends the forms of distinct thought, though it forever remains a consciousness." This would be an interesting " new gospel " to a poor peasant. A conception gets somehow changed into a consciousness, principally by the disappearance of its limits, and this new birth remains forever undeveloped. A weak mind might get into an asylum over such " religion." Mr. Harrison's assertion that Mr. Spencer's ingenious effort to construct a new religion out of the unknowable " is far more extravagant than to make it out of the equator," seems to be well founded, and not playful. Indeed, the playfulness might seem to rest with the new apostles. There was once an Anglican bishop, of extraordinary reasoning powers, who wrote a pamphlet to prove,—as a mere satire upon false reasoning,—that Napoleon the Great never existed. He seemed almost to prove it, he wrote so gravely. Our modern skeptics take much the same liberty with logic, and often suggest to us that they are " laughing in their sleeves " over the magniloquent verbosity which is " unknowable." Perhaps the half-way men, who try to batter down atheism by weak blows of semi-skeptical naturalism, are quite as objectionable as the professed atheists. Thus, Mr. Harrison's Humanity, whose divinity is in the capital letter, is about as airy a deity as is the Unknowable. Mr. Harrison and Mr. Spencer have different deities; and each of them is an atheist to the other's god. What is humanity? No two persons would answer alike. At the utmost the " worship " of it is a sentiment very pretty, and worthy of good stanzas. But what is it? No human being was ever quite without it, as a natural and an innocent instinct; but the " worship " is that of beautiful emotion, and has no more to do with faith than with anger. Mr. Justice Stephen, in a good paper on such " conceits," has used these words in regard to the new religion, Positivism, which Mr. Harrison so very highly esteems : " The vast majority of mankind are reproached by the rest for being but nominal Christians, with a lukewarm affection for their nominal creed, and a practical standard of morals and conduct falling far short of its requirements. What will Positivism do with the vast mass of indifferent and worldly people? It can neither hang them nor damn them. How, then, can it hope to govern them—which, Mr. Harrison tells us, is one of the functions essential to a religion which deserves the name?" Poor Positivism, like Unknowableism, and like their auxiliary capital letters, and their dust-stirring, impenetrable sophisms, is a wordy puzzle which can no more help the soul of man than a dictionary can satisfy him for dinner.

Mr. Justice Stephen's comparison of all such "philosophy" to "a gigantic soap-bubble, never burst, but always thinner and thinner," is not too severe or contemptuous; nor is Sir Andrew Clark's *moral* charge, that such reasoning "is an unpardonable sin, a juggling with words and ideas, throwing dust into people's eyes, so that controversies that cannot be settled may be stifled." But there is another charge which must be brought against such sophists, and it is the audacity with which *facts* are denied. Just as our new agnostics elevate words into religions, so they relegate facts to oblivion. For example, both Mr. Harrison and Mr. Herbert Spencer coolly assume that theology—as a science which is accepted by the thinking world—is dead, and can never be revived, nor even appealed to as contributory to knowledge. Was there ever a more baseless assumption? As a matter of fact, the *only* science, in the present day, which commands both the heads and the hearts of the thinking world, and which actually *produces*, in millions, those very mental and moral fruits which are the boasted aspiration of our new dreamers, is that Catholic theology which, for eighteen hundred years, has captivated the grandest intellects of the world. What shall we think of new dreamers who, denying its existence, talk of "discovering the foundations of a new religion" (they have not even yet found the spot where they are to dig!), while calmly looking on the completed edifice of the Catholic Church, and saying, "it is not there, it is vanished." A man might almost as well argue in this way: "The sun has got a good deal behind clouds, during the last eighteen centuries—perhaps, for longer. There are times, too, when our England, turning its back on the sun, has to endure what vulgar people call night. It is time, therefore, to discover the foundations of a new sun; and though we have not the remotest idea how to set about it, science—or possibly agnosticism—may assist us in the search, and the sun of the future may be 'knowable.'" Our present sun, as we enjoy it, does very well; and our Catholic theology, as we have it,—and shall continue to have it,—answers all the purposes we can care for. The idea of digging for foundations, which are assumed to exist somewhere, on which to rear a religion which must be imaginary, is really too heavy a task in the world's old age, and we must decline to be engaged on the "public work." "Sir, the world is in its dotage," was the favorite remark of a well-known character in one of our popular English novels; but no such dotage can have come upon it, up to the present time, as to dig for unknown foundations of the unknowable. Looking for the North Pole was supposed to be looking for something that *might*, if it did not, exist; but looking for some spot where there may possibly be some foundation for some religion which can

exist only in words, is beyond even the enterprise of a Livingstone. Are not these "conceits" quite unpardonable? Do we do wrong in indulging a feeling of "modest contempt"—to use the expression of a Catholic deputy in the German parliament—towards humorists who, denying plain facts, try to lead us to worship wordy fancies? And, once more, to deny the *fact* of a supernatural religion, on the ground that science is not itself supernatural, is another "conceit," which is only to be accounted for on the ground of a delirious vanity. The new teachers are pleased to lay down the postulate: "Any supernatural basis for religion is unattainable." It must follow therefrom that all religion is unattainable; unless for religion you substitute natural instinct, and this instinct will lead different people to different ends. What is to be done, then, for a new basis for a new religion? Science, reply our new teachers, must evolve it. But science can only deal with the natural order; and can no more fly up to heaven to fetch down divine truth, than a man can cross the ocean on his wings, or make his voice heard by the inhabitants of the moon. Science is one thing, revelation is another; and to talk of evolving revelation out of science, is like talking of evolving salvation out of arithmetic. *Facts* are what we have to deal with in science; and it is a fact that no science can make religion, as it is a fact that religion does exist without science. How much better to "drop" religion altogether, and to say candidly, "we intend to do without it;" than to say, "there is no true religion, and there never has been, but we intend, by the aid of science, to dig for one." "The essence of religion," says a clever writer, "is to supply to human life something which is not in it. The essence of science is to take the world as it is, and give a clear systematic account of it." This is common sense. But our new teachers are quite without common sense. They cannot see that, as a religion which is supernatural ennobles and renders happy natural life, so a religion which is all quibble about words excites equal contempt for its originators and a miserable dissatisfaction with existence.

Thus, briefly, agnosticism and conceit may be regarded as very much the same thing. A sort of mysticism, or mistification, is the fashion of our time, and it leads clever people to talk a great deal of nonsense. We trace this spirit in other grooves besides religion. Mr. Darwin used to argue that "earth-worms have minds, and that they act *nearly* in the same manner as men would act under similar circumstances." (Perhaps they are digging for a new religion!) And Dr. Nägeli's further assumption, that the province of mind should be conceded to inorganic creation, is only one further step in the same direction; so that some day we may be asked to speak of atoms as possessing some ideas upon

emotion, or of flowers and paving-stones (so often neighbored in our great towns) as engaging in some sort of mutual apprehension. These deep reasoners think so much on possibilities, that they get to have a quick contempt for actual certainties. Religion we regard as our king of certainties; and we cannot but commiserate persons who pass their lives in speculation, when the noon-day sun of Catholic truth would balance their minds.

THE ACADIAN CONFESSORS OF THE FAITH.—1755.

Acadia. A Lost Chapter in American History. By Philip H. Smith. Pawling, New York, 1884.

The History of Acadia, from its first discovery to its surrender to England by the treaty of Paris. By James Hannay. London, 1880.

Selections from the Public Documents of the Province of Nova Scotia. Edited by Thomas B. Akins. Halifax, N. S., 1869.

THERE are martyrs in the diptychs and records of the Church who are honored specially; there are, too, martyrs who, falling together in the same dread persecution, are honored by a general title, with some designation of number, such as that of the Fourteen Crowned Martyrs. So, too, there are Confessors, who, suffering together for the sake of God and his Christ, receive a common veneration.

We do not forestall the decision and judgment of our Holy Mother, the Church, or seek to render public honors to the Acadians who suffered loss of all they possessed, loss of home, loss of family, destitution, misery, contempt, on account of their attachment to their Catholic faith; but we wish to present them in a true light to their fellow Catholics in this land.

But, it may be said, this is a new and strange view to take of a well-known fact of history. Some one will say: "The French Neutrals under the Treaty of Utrecht, in 1712, were allowed to remain in the province, and their course was such as to justify rigor, though undoubtedly it was carried to excess"—Halt! Our Lord, in foretelling to his disciples the persecutions which they were to encounter for His sake, distinctly stated that the persecutors would cover up their cruel work with lies, *mentientes*; and

between the *suppressio veri* and the *assertio falsi* moralists do not find a very broad expanse.

Historians, who ought to make the truth known, have concealed it. No little manhood is required to admit that those with whom you sympathize have been guilty of conduct base, and cruel, and illegal; but the real historian should rise above such meaner things, and tell the truth fearlessly.

The Acadians suffered as Catholics. No other crime is brought home to them. When, in 1750, they sought permission to emigrate from a province where they were already subjected to harsh treatment, the Hon. Edward Cornwallis,¹ Governor of Nova Scotia, wrote them: "We frankly confess, however, that your determination to leave gives us pain. We are well aware of your industry and your temperance, and that you are not addicted to any vice or debauchery. This province is your country; you or your fathers have cultivated it; naturally you ought yourselves to enjoy the fruits of your labor. Such was the design of the King, our master. You know that we have followed his orders. You know that we have done everything to secure to you not only the occupation of your lands, but the ownership of them forever. We have given you also every possible assurance of the enjoyment of your religion, and the free and public exercise of the Roman Catholic Religion."

The Acadians were thus, in 1750, admitted to be the original occupants, industrious, temperate, moral subjects; they were assured that, remaining, they should hold their lands and enjoy their religion undisturbed.

This was said to them as British subjects, for such they were. Whatever their ancestry may have been, the young women of marriageable age, the Evangelines of that day (1755), were daughters of mothers who had themselves been born under the English flag; few of those who submitted to the English in 1712 were then alive; the people were as much British subjects as the Canadians were in 1800.

As British subjects, they were entitled to the rights and immunities belonging to that character; to the enjoyment of life, liberty and property, unless for violation of law they were by judgment of a competent court found liable to forfeit them.

What was the cause of their treatment in 1755? They were required to take an oath, which, as Catholics, they felt to be against their consciences. When, at last, their deputies yielded and offered to take it, as they had no one to consult in regard to it, they "were informed that as there was no reason to hope their proposed Compliance proceeded from an honest Mind, and could be esteemed

¹ Cornwallis to the deputies. Akins, Nova Scotia Archives, p. 189.

only the Effect of Compulsion and Force, and is contrary to a clause in an Act of Parliament, 1 Geo. II., c. 13, whereby persons who have once refused to Take the Oaths cannot be afterwards permitted to Take them, but are considered as Popish Recusants; therefore they would not now be indulged with such permission."¹

The Acadians were therefore expressly condemned as Popish Recusants, condemned for their religion, and not on any political ground whatever, still less for any crime against the state, against the peace or against public morals.

This is patent on the documents still extant, which form the only legal proceedings against them, against seven thousand British subjects tried by a Governor and four Councillors, without indictment, present only by delegates summoned.

Anti-Catholic as Mr. Bancroft shows himself in his last edition, he frankly states this: "Guns are no part of your goods," he (Lawrence) continued, "as, by the laws of England, all Roman Catholics are restrained from having arms, and are subject to penalties if arms are found in their houses. It is not the language of British subjects to talk of terms with the crown, or capitulate about their fidelity and allegiance. What excuse can you make for treating this government with such indignity as to expound to them the nature of fidelity? Manifest your obedience by immediately taking the oaths of allegiance in the common form before the Council."

The oath demanded of them was therefore not such an oath of allegiance and fidelity as they had repeatedly taken, but the oath framed in England against Catholics, and which no Catholic could in conscience take, for it was a renunciation of his religion.

The deputies replied that they would do as the generality of the inhabitants should determine; and they merely entreated leave to return home and consult the body of their people. The next day the unhappy men offered to swear allegiance unconditionally; but they were told that by a clause in a British statute, persons who have once refused the oaths cannot be afterward permitted to take them, but are to be considered as Popish Recusants; and as such they were imprisoned.

The chief justice, Belcher, on whose opinion hung the fate of so many hundreds of innocent families, insisted that the French inhabitants were to be looked upon as confirmed "rebels," who had now collectively and without exception become "recusants."

Murdoch, in his *History of Nova Scotia* (ii., p. 282), omits entirely the words "Popish Recusants," and thus misstates the whole position.

¹ Akins, *Nova Scotia Archives*, p. 256. Proceedings of the Council held at the Governor's house, July 4th, 1755.

² Bancroft's *United States*, ed. 1883, vol. ii., p. 430.

Hannay, whose "History of Acadia" is one of the most monstrous and barefaced perversions of history that we have ever seen, suppresses this feature of the action of the Governor and Council utterly; his account of the affair can be best stated in the terms he applies to Garneau: "A more flagrant untruth never was told." He suppresses all reference to the act of George I. in regard to Popish Recusants, and once only uses the word "recusants," once only (p. 396) and in a way that most readers would misapprehend.

An oath of allegiance in these terms: "Je promets et jure sincerement en foi de Chretien que je serai entierement fidele et obeirai vraiment sa Majesté le Roy George le Second que je reconnois pour le Souverain Seigneur de l'Accadie ou Nouvelle Ecosse. Ainsi Dieu me sert en aide,"¹—had been taken throughout the province, as Akins shows, though the people asked not to be forced to bear arms against the French.²

When the oath was taken, from time to time representations were made to these Acadians, on which they relied, but it was no less a fact that it was an erroneous supposition on the part of the English governors, "that no unconditional oath of allegiance had ever been taken by the people of Acadia to the British crown." The Acadians had repeatedly taken the oath of allegiance.

Hannay, to justify the British authorities, not only suppresses the fact that the Acadians were punished under an English penal law against Catholicity, but endeavors to show that they were guilty of rebellious acts. "With equal hypocrisy," he says, "the French of Minas and Annapolis approached the English governor with honeyed words while they were plotting in secret with the enemies of English power" (p. 389). "It was always observed that any news of French success, or any prospect of French assistance, brought out the Acadians in their true colors as the bitter enemies of English power" (p. 390). "They had given no return of loyalty to the crown or respect to his Majesty's government in the Province. They had discovered a constant disposition to assist his Majesty's enemies and distress his subjects. They had not only furnished the enemy with provisions and ammunition, but had refused to supply the inhabitants or Government with provisions" (pp. 391-2). All these are mere exaggerations of Lawrence's charges, but not a particle of proof is cited or can be cited to sustain them.

Smith, who has examined this subject with an evident wish to consider it fairly and impartially, says (p. 197): "It does not appear that the men thus summarily imprisoned were proven guilty of

¹ Akins, Nova Scotia Archives, p. 84.

² *Ib.*, p. 266-7.

'assisting the King's enemies,' or 'refusing to supply the Government with provisions,' nor even that they were individually charged with the offence; neither did the Council make any but a general accusation of a 'constant disposition to distress' the English subjects, and to 'obstruct the intentions of the King' without deigning to support the charge with a single instance circumstantially proven or even asserted." And he adds: "The question might be asked, where is his authority in regard to their consummate hypocrisy," or "that the other inhabitants were plotting in secret with the enemies of English power?"

In fact, Hannay's charges refute themselves. Not only does he fail to adduce a single particle of evidence to prove them, but had cases existed, the English Government in Nova Scotia had the means and the will to arrest and try any offender. That not a single Acadian had been accused before a civil or military tribunal proves that no evidence existed to justify a single arrest.

Had there been any plausible grounds, Governor Lawrence and his Council would not have raked up an English penal law against Catholics to apply to these Acadians, a law of which they must have been in perfect ignorance, and to which no allusion had ever before been made. Smith, in his careful work, overlooks this, misled apparently by Murdoch and Hannay, as he seems anxious to be just and fair.

Supposing, now, that the English laws against Popish Recusants applied to the inhabitants of the British Colonies—a point which is surely not very certain, and though maintained by a New England Winslow in 1755, would have been gravely questioned by a New England Adams in 1775—we come to consider what recusancy was, and what the penalties for recusancy were.

The recusancy had to be established by indictment and trial. A person could be convicted only "upon indictment at the King's suit or a regular action or information on the statute of 23 Eliz. 1, or an action of debt at the King's suit alone, according to the statute of 35 Eliz. 1." Fines were imposed for recusancy, and if these were not paid the crown was empowered, "by process out of the exchequer, to take, seize and enjoy all the goods, and two parts as well of all the lands, tenements and hereditaments, leases and farms of such offender leaving the third part only of the same lands, tenements and hereditaments, leases and farms, to and for the maintenance and relief of the same offender, his wife, children and family."

The severe acts of even Queen Elizabeth went no further. There was no provision by which the wife and children were punished for

¹ Cowley's Laws as concerning Jesuits, Seminary Priests, Recusants, etc., and concerning the oaths of supremacy and allegiance, p. 252.

the offence of the father, nor was he deprived of all his lands. And even on conviction of recusancy, new proceedings were required before the crown could occupy the lands. "But as to lands and tenements," says Cowley, "there must first be an office found for the king; for regularly before the finding of such office, lands or tenements cannot be seized into the king's hands."¹ The recusant was regarded as a tenant for life, even of the two-thirds, which went to the heir in remainder. The laws did not confiscate the lands absolutely; and these laws gave no authority whatever to any officer to seize the recusant and his whole family and carry them off.

There was no warrant whatever in English law for proceeding against Popish Recusants in the manner in which Lawrence and his Council did. And if there were individuals who were guilty of overt acts of treason, they had power to punish them, but no law of England authorized the seizure of the property of a whole community and the removal of their persons.

Ignoring entirely the pretext of Popish Recusancy, making charges against the Acadians for which he does not and cannot adduce a particle of evidence, and which from the very nature of the case must be unfounded or the authorities have been imbecile, Hannay has the effrontery to write: "Perhaps those who examine the whole question impartially, in the light of all the facts, will come to the conclusion that it would have been a real cause for shame had the Acadians been permitted longer to misuse the clemency of the government to plot against British power and to obstruct the settlement of the Province by loyal subjects. One statement has been very industriously circulated by French writers with a view to throw odium on the transaction. They say that the Acadians were expelled 'because the greedy English colonists looked upon their fair farms with covetous eyes,' and that the government was influenced by these persons. A more flagrant untruth never was told" (p. 384).

Thus does this writer, who quotes no authorities, pervert the whole question, suppressing the fact that the Acadians were dispossessed of their lands as Popish Recusants; while the plotting against British power, the obstructing of the settlement of the province exists only in imagination. He gives no proof, and could adduce none.

The Acadians, it must be admitted, suffered as Catholics, and suffered for their faith.

Let us, then, come to the story of what they underwent.

Acadia, from its earliest settlement by De Monts, had for a cen-

¹ Cowley's Laws, p. 104.

tury been repeatedly taken by the English and lost or restored by them. By the treaty of Utrecht, May 22d, 1713, France finally surrendered to Great Britain "all Nova Scotia or Acadia comprehended within its antient boundaries." This vague description left an undefined territory and a disputed frontier. By the capitulation of Port Royal the Acadians were permitted either to sell their lands and remove from the new English territory, or remain as English subjects, Queen Anne, by a letter of June 22d, 1713, confirming the agreement.¹ The French government urged them to remove to Cape Breton, but there were none to purchase their lands, and no means of conveyance for the people and their property. The English commanders, apparently not wishing the country to be utterly abandoned by an agricultural population before other settlers came, encouraged them to stay, and the Acadians in considerable numbers remained, relying on the assurance in Queen Anne's letter to Governor Francis Nicholson, June 23d, 1713: "We have therefore thought fit hereby to signify our will and pleasure to you, that you permit such of them as have any lands or tenements in the places under our government in Accadie and Newfoundland, that have been or are to be yielded to us, by virtue of the late treaty of peace, and are willing to continue our subjects, to retain and enjoy their said lands and tenements without any molestation, as fully and freely as our other subjects do, or may possess their lands or estates, or sell the same, if they shall rather choose to remove elsewhere."² The authorities in England, however, as early as 1720 decided that they ought to be removed, and a proclamation was issued requiring them, within four months, to take an unqualified oath of allegiance or suffer the loss of all their property, and be driven from the colony. They remonstrated and, taking an oath of fidelity, were allowed to remain. They were, however, a constant object of suspicion, and though priests were allowed to officiate for them, these reverend gentlemen found themselves liable to be arrested and deported at any moment. Hannay, with his usual audacity, asserts that the Acadians "were enjoying the fullest and freest exercise of their religion" (pp. 386-7), that they "had been left in full enjoyment of their religion" (p. 393). "They had enjoyed more privileges than English subjects, and had been indulged in the free exercise of their religion" (p. 391). Yet of the twenty priests who were permitted to attend the Catholics at Annapolis, Minas, Chignecto, Pigiguit, from the Treaty of Utrecht to 1755, eight were banished from the province, and four carried off as prisoners at the time of the general seizure of the Acadians.³ The priests could not, under

¹ Akins, *Nova Scotia Documents*, p. 15.

² *Nova Scotia Archives*, p. 15.

³ They can be traced in Murdoch's *Nova Scotia*, i., pp. 409-484, and in Akins.

penalty of banishment, say Mass at any neighboring station; and in 1724 it was ordered "that no more Mass should be said up the river, and that the Mass-house should be demolished."¹ This is their condition as shown, not by the statements of French or Catholic writers, but by the very documents of the colonial authorities and historians who consulted them. If Mr. Hannay, living under a Catholic government under similar circumstances, would regard himself as enjoying the greatest possible liberty, he truly represents the Acadian question; if not, he is no safe historian.²

The charges against the French priests who were on the mission from the Treaty of Utrecht to 1755 are all vague, and in no case were made the basis of any legal proceedings. In fact, the only definite one is that against Desenclaves, that he refused absolution to those who would not pay just debts, and in that way made courts of justice useless.³

After the surrender of Port Royal, the inhabitants near it were permitted to remain two years on taking the oath of allegiance, which they did. By the Treaty of Utrecht the subjects of the King of France were to "have liberty to remove themselves within a year to any other place, with all their movable effects. But those who are willing to remain, and to be subject to the King of Great Britain, are to enjoy the free exercise of their religion according to the usage of the Church of Rome, as far as the laws of Great Britain do allow the same"⁴—a contradiction in terms.

The Acadians generally prepared to remove, but depended on French aid and vessels. "They refused the oath and were prevented from leaving the country only by the failure of vessels expected from Cape Breton to take them away."⁵

"But the Queen's letter of 1713 gave the French inhabitants a new offer. All who were willing to become her subjects in Newfoundland and Nova Scotia were free to enjoy the privilege and hold their estates, while those who preferred to leave the country had liberty to sell their properties and depart." The obligation taken by the French in Acadia to do nothing contrary to the welfare of King George I., and the signatures to the oath of allegiance and the obligation are preserved in London to this day, as well as the oath of allegiance and conditions made by the French Roman

¹ Murdoch, i., p. 409.

² Akins, p. 124, gives an extract from a "Collection of Orders, Rules or Regulations in relation to the Missionary Romish Priests in His Britannick Majesty's Province of Nova Scotia." Had the Government found it dangerous to allow French priests to officiate in the colony, it might very easily have arranged that priests from Switzerland or Belgium would be received, or French-speaking priests from England, who had no sympathy with the French. Compare Murdoch, i., p. 517.

³ Smith, p. 123.

⁴ Murdoch's Nova Scotia, i., p. 341.

⁵ *Ib.*, p. 116.

Catholics on the accession of George II. in 1727.¹ "In Governor Phillips's time, in 1730, the unqualified oath of allegiance was taken by all the people (males) on the Annapolis River from 16 to 60." "It is true that some of the subordinate officers accepted qualified oaths from these people on one or two occasions, for doing which they were reproved by the Government." "Some of the English governors discouraged the inhabitants from leaving the country by forbidding their taking their cattle and effects with them, while, on the other hand, the French governors of Quebec and Louisburg showed little desire to assist them to remove into the French dominions." "The French governors did not wish the Acadians to leave Nova Scotia, as they reckoned on them as a check on the British there, as preventing British colonization, and affording facilities for a reconquest. The English governors equally dreaded their removal, believing that if they went to Louisburg or Quebec they would strengthen the enemy's military power. The situation of these poor people, from the conquest to their expulsion in 1755, was much to be pitied, being the puppets of the intrigues and ambition of others, who acted upon their religious and national feelings, and eventually ruined their interests."²

Such is the language of Murdoch, a judicious historian of Nova Scotia.

In July, 1720, Governor Phillips wrote to the Secretary of State in England that the French inhabitants seemed yet undetermined about remaining, and he assigns as one reason that they have been told that the promise of freedom of religion is a chimera, and that they would be treated like the Irish and denied their priests.

They might well fear, for no Acadian could hold any office, as to do so he was required to take the horrible and blasphemous oath against the Real Presence, and to conform to the Church of England.³ Yet with the usual duplicity the English authorities assured the Indians, who repeatedly demanded a definite answer as to the French inhabitants, that "as long as they shall comport themselves with fidelity towards King George, and shall become his subjects, they shall enjoy their own religion and their possessions."

Yet the only privilege allowed them was to choose deputies to wait from time to time on the Governor and Council.

This state of things continued for years, till most of the original settlers at the time of the conquest had died, and a second and even a third generation grew up, born under the British flag and with no claim whatever to be considered French subjects. The number of births among this virtuous people was such that by 1732 the

¹ Archivist Brymner's Report in Rep. Min. of Agriculture, Canada, 1873, p. 156-7.

² Murdoch's Nova Scotia, pp. 342-344.

³ Murdoch, i., p. 363.

French in Acadia had increased fifty per cent.¹ Protestant settlers from New England, Switzerland and Germany were invited, but they did not come; and the growing strength of the Catholics made them an object of fear and hatred. Thus the Council, in 1738, addressing the Governor, gave as one reason of the slow progress of the colony: "The indulgence to the French inhabitants, who, being Roman Catholics, are unqualified to form a house of representatives."

Whenever war began with France or the Indians these people became doubly odious.

Such was the position in 1755, when it was resolved to carry out the long-projected blow against them. They were British subjects who had repeatedly taken the oath of allegiance, many of them born subjects; they could not be convicted of rebellion, or of giving aid and comfort to the enemy. A pretext was needed; and the authorities accordingly resolved to apply the English penal laws against Catholics to the Catholics in Nova Scotia. What those laws were these Catholics certainly did not know; and it is pretty clear that the English authorities did not know or did not care. The Acadians were Catholics, and as such it was resolved to root them out, law or no law. Their deputies were summoned to Annapolis, and they were required to take the *usual* oath of allegiance, and when they demurred, but at last consented, were told that it was no longer possible for them or those they represented to take the oath, as it was "contrary to a clause in an Act of Parliament, 1 Geo. II., c. 13, whereby persons who have once refused to take the Oaths cannot be afterwards permitted to take them, but are considered as Popish Recusants."

Here it is evident that the oath tendered was really that of royal supremacy, involving an abjuration of the Catholic religion, although it is evident that no such oath was ever before tendered; and the Nova Scotia Catholics could have had no suspicion that any such oath was expected to be taken by them.

Now what does the Act of 1 Geo. II., c. 13, authorize or require? It was distinctly the Act under which Lieutenant-Governor Lawrence and the colonial authorities acted, and they could have no power beyond what it conferred. A search in the English Statutes at Large shows no such Act at all; and so far was the government at the time from increasing the penalties against Recusants, that the Irish Statute Book in the first year of George II. (ch. 2) and the third year (ch. 6) shows that the laws were relaxed and the time extended.

There was an Act, 1 George I., c. 13, which required all officers,

¹ Murdoch, i., p. 480.

civil and military, and all holding any position in the Church of England, to take, under penalty of losing the office, an oath against the doctrine of transubstantiation and the supremacy of any foreign prelate; but it was intended to keep Catholics from office. It did not require the oath to be taken by all Catholics, and imposed no penalty on them for refusing to take it. There was, in fact, no Act on the Statute Book of England that authorized the Lieutenant-Governor and his officers in Nova Scotia to confiscate the real and personal estates of the Catholics in the province, and none which authorized their seizure and removal to other colonies.

The appeal to the pretended Act of 1 George II., c. 13, is a monstrous fraud, in itself a proof of the malignity and utter want of principle manifest in the whole proceeding. It was determined to rob and banish the Catholics, and dreading that they might take alarm and escape, every means was taken to prevent anything that might induce them to quit the province. Complaints were even made that French officers and clergymen were persuading the inhabitants to leave.¹

When all was ready a peremptory order was issued to the Catholic inhabitants to send delegates to Annapolis; a military and naval force was gathered, and vessels to carry off the doomed men. It was clear that, oath or no oath, they were to suffer for their religion. The sentence was already passed; all else was a sham and a mockery. Instructions were sent to take special care to seize the priests.

It was decreed that 7000 of these doomed Catholics were to be seized; 500 of the inhabitants of Minas, Piziquid, Cobequid and Rivière du Canard were to be sent to North Carolina; 1000 to Virginia; 2000 to Maryland; 300 from Annapolis river were to be sent to Philadelphia, 200 to New York, 300 to Connecticut and 200 to Boston. The colonies thus selected were not notified that people were thus to be thrown upon them, and no provision was made for their support there.

The nefarious scheme was carried out with secrecy, and troops were collected at the various points with numbers of schooners and sloops to transport them. The Acadians, September 5th, 1755, were then assembled and disarmed, only five hundred escaping to the woods; their cattle were slaughtered for the troops or divided among the few English settlers; then the houses and churches were set on fire, and the Acadian coast was one vast conflagration. The unfortunate people were marched on board the vessels, no regard being paid to ties of kindred or affection. The priests in Acadia, although French subjects, and in that colony under the

¹ N. Y. Col. Doc., x., p. 216.

treaty, were also carried off, professedly to be sent to France, but they were really conveyed as prisoners to Boston. They were the Messrs. Chauvreulx, Daudin, Miniac and LeMaire.¹

Then the vessels started to land the homeless, destitute Catholics, deprived of home and all earthly possessions, at various points. One party of 236, embarked at Port Royal for Carolina, rose on their captors and, seizing the vessel, ran her into St. John's River, where they escaped.² The rest reached their several destinations. Massachusetts, instead of 1000, received 2000 of these poor Catholics, and vainly appealed to New Hampshire to receive a portion. That colony, as being on the frontier, declined, although appealed to on grounds of humanity.³ The brutal Lawrence, who carried out the nefarious work, wrote to Boston to proselytize the children,—"you will the easier have it in your power to make them, as they grow up, good subjects;" meaning Protestants.⁴

At the far south, Georgia had been planted as a refuge for the unfortunate, but it was expressly provided in her charter that no Roman Catholics should be allowed to settle. When, therefore, Governor Reynolds, summoned from holding an Indian council, found 400 Acadians in his limits, he decided that they could not remain, but as winter had set in he distributed them in small parties through the colony. In the spring, by the permission of the Governor, they built a number of rude boats, and in March most of them set out, buoyed up with the hope of being able to work their way along the coast to their former home. With a courage and perseverance almost unexampled, many made their painful way to New York and Massachusetts, aided and encouraged on the way by kind words and kinder deeds.⁵

The 1500 sent to South Carolina were at first apportioned among the parishes, but the authorities there, feeling for their wrongs, offered them vessels at the public charge to transport themselves elsewhere, and many went to France. A few remained in the colony, others sought Louisiana, but many, like those landed in Georgia, tried to reach Acadia.⁶ In the South they met some human sympathy; they found the North dead to compassion. When, in August, a party of seventy-eight landed from their bateaux on Long Island, though bearing passports from the governors of South Carolina and Georgia, they were seized by order of Sir Charles Hardy, who distributed them in the most remote and secure parts

¹ N. S. Archives, p. 282.

² N. Y. Col. Doc., x., p. 427.

³ New Hamp. Prov. Papers, vi., pp. 445, 452.

⁴ N. E. Gen. Reg., xxx., p. 17; Akins, N. S. Doc., 297.

⁵ Stevens, History of Georgia, i., pp. 413-417.

⁶ *Ib.*, p. 418. Cooper's Statutes, iv., p. 31.

of the colony, ordering the magistrates to put the adults to labor and to bind out the children, in order to make "the young people useful, good subjects," that is, deprive them of their religion.¹ Fifty-nine Catholic boys and 49 girls were thus distributed in Westchester and Orange. The lot of these poor people was bad enough, yet the next year we find orders to the sheriffs to confine them all in jail, and from Richmond northward this was done. One party of these Catholic sufferers was at this time in some houses near Brooklyn ferry, and an ancient view shows their home.²

In July, 1756, seven boats, bearing 90 of these exiles, entered a harbor in the southern part of Massachusetts, and they, too, were seized and scattered, while no terms were deemed harsh enough for the kind-hearted authorities of the Southern States who had befriended them. Conscious guilt exclaimed: "there is no attempt, however cruel and desperate, which might not have been expected from persons exasperated as they must have been by the treatment they had met with."³

Those sent to Virginia had a severer lot, but it resulted, finally, in their obtaining a home in France. The Old Dominion seems to have made such positive remonstrance that the English government transported 336 of them to Liverpool, where they were detained for seven years as prisoners of war. Those who know what Americans suffered in English prisons and prison ships during the Revolution, will have some idea of the sufferings of these poor Catholics. A Scotch minister was sent to them to induce them to apostatize and obtain their freedom; the Duke of York made a similar attempt, but though one of them died in prison, they clung to their faith.⁴ At the peace they were claimed by France, and reaching that country obtained, in time, lands in Poitou and Berry, where their descendants may still be found.⁵

Those who were cast homeless on the shores of the other provinces, in most cases sought only to reach their own old homes, or some French colony. Without money or resources of any kind, it was impossible for those even in New York and New England to reach Canada, or those in the south to reach Louisiana, through the trackless woods beset with Indians. The colonial authorities would not have permitted it; but they undoubtedly aided many to embark on ships going to the West Indies or Newfoundland; from these points some reached Canada, where they founded the parish of Acadie; others, reaching Louisiana, formed a settlement on the

¹ N. Y. Col. Doc., vii., p. 125.

² Calendar of N. Y. Hist. MSS., pp. 658-678.

³ Nova Scotia Archives, pp. 301-304. Board of Trade to Gov. Lawrence.

⁴ Brymner's Report on Canadian Archives, 1883, p. 145.

⁵ Memoire sur les Acadiens, Niort, 1867.

Teche, where the descendants of these noble confessors of the faith preserve the distinctive traits of their ancestors. We trace them sailing from Philadelphia, Halifax, Carolina and Georgia to St. Domingo and the Leeward Islands, many dying on the way of sickness,¹ and at last we see them arriving in Louisiana, even after that province had passed under Spanish sway, more than five hundred who arrived in 1765 obtaining lands to begin new homes.²

The Acadians thrown into New England fared badly at the hands of the bigoted people. They were industrious farmers, and accustomed to sea fisheries, but Massachusetts offered them no lands, no means to become self-supporting. Some, undoubtedly, managed to leave the inhospitable shores, but on January 25th, 1760, a report states that there were then 1017 in Massachusetts and the District of Maine. Williamson, in his *History of Maine*, misled by his miserable bigotry, tells us that "they were still ignorant Catholics," paying unwittingly the highest tribute to the fidelity with which they clung to the faith of their fathers; and certainly the Protestantism which they had encountered, either in Nova Scotia or Massachusetts, had none of the traits of Christianity.³

This little body of Catholics seems to have gradually disappeared, most of them probably reaching Canada or the Madawaska settlement in Maine (which is really an Acadian colony), between 1763 and 1776. When a Catholic priest at last opened a modest chapel in Boston, we find nothing to lead us to suppose that he found any Acadians to demand his care.

In the interval we find in New England newspapers proof of the cruel way in which Lawrence and his coadjutors tore families asunder, sending husband and wife, parent and child to far different points. Advertisements appear from time to time in which women and children, cast on the cold charity of New England, implored tidings of husbands and fathers so brutally torn from them.

If Virginia sternly refused to retain those sent to her, and the Carolinas and Georgia so kindly aided others to reach their friends; if Massachusetts, in her stern Puritanism, steeled her heart against the proscribed Catholics, the Acadians who reached Maryland and Pennsylvania were more blessed.

On the 18th of November, 1755, three vessels ascended the Delaware, bearing 454 of these persecuted Catholics, many of them sickly and feeble,—not a few with the hand of death upon

¹ Akins, N. S. Archives, pp. 347, 349, 350.

² Gayarré's *Histoire de la Louisiane*, ii., pp. 127-128.

³ Hutchinson, *History of Massachusetts Bay*, iii., pp. 39-42; i., p. 121; *Collections Maine Historical Society*, vi., p. 379; Williamson, *History of Maine*, ii., p. 311, 318, 349.

them. At once idle fears were excited, lest they should join the Irish and German Catholics and destroy the colony; but pity soon asserted its rights. Anthony Benezet, the philanthropist, did much for their relief, and Father Harding, whose name was always coupled by Pennsylvanians with that of Benezet as a man of unbounded charity to the poor, gave these exiles not only the relief suggested by his kind heart, but the consolations which he, as a minister of God, could impart. At Philadelphia these poor Acadians could approach the sacraments, could hear mass, and receive the ministry of a Catholic priest in their last moments. But the charity could not save these broken-hearted people. More than half died within a short time after their arrival.¹

Those sent to Maryland seem to have been left in a great measure to do for themselves. Some, doubtless, endeavored to reach Acadia or Canada, or took passage for the West Indies. A number, however, finding themselves in a colony where there were Catholic priests, contentedly set to work to begin the world afresh.

Baltimore, at the time, possessed a half-finished house begun ostentatiously about 1740, by a Mr. Edward Fotterall, from Ireland. It was of brick, with freestone corners, and stood near the present courthouse; its outward appearance is preserved in an ancient view of Baltimore. In this deserted dwelling a number of Acadians established themselves, and ascertaining that there was a priest at Doughoregan manor, fifteen miles from Baltimore, they sent to implore him to extend his ministrations to them. The Rev. Father Ashton responded to their appeal, and mass was for the first time said in Baltimore in a room prepared in Fotterall's building, a temporary altar of the rudest kind being erected each time. The first congregations in the city which, before the close of the century, was to be the seat of a Catholic bishop, and the spiritual capital of the country, were humble enough, numbering only twenty or forty in all, chiefly Acadians, with some few Irish Catholics.

The Acadians who remained, induced by the opportunity of practicing their religion, became chiefly engaged in coasting, and their descendants still remain,² and Mr. Piet, the well-known Catholic publisher, can boast of his descent from these sufferers for religion.

Of the seven thousand thus "scattered like leaves by the ruthless winds of autumn from Massachusetts to Georgia, among those who hated their religion, detested their country, derided their

¹ Thompson Westcott, *History of Philadelphia*, ch. 193. Walsh's Appeal.

² The *Annals of Baltimore* name the Guttro, Blanc, Gould, Dashfield and Berbine families.

manners and mocked their language," few comparatively remained to swell the numbers of the Catholic body. "Landed on these distant shores, those who had once known wealth and plenty were scouted at as vagrants, reduced to beggary, bearing within them broken hearts and lacerated affections, where but few Samaritans were found to bind up their wounded spirits, and pour in the oil and wine of consolation into their aching bosoms."¹

It is strange that a theme which inspired the muse of Longfellow has not found a Catholic historian to treat it fully. The material is ample, and, as we have seen, it was distinctly and positively a persecution of Catholics for the faith; Providence permitting their oppressors in self-stultification to make it clear and definite in the supreme act, where they appeal to a fictitious law when they were acting against all law, New England aiding with men and vessels to maintain, in 1755, the principle that acts of the English parliament were binding in her American colonies, the very point that twenty years later she so readily gave the blood of her sons to contest.

Mr. Philip H. Smith, who cannot always rise above religious prejudice, or always sift the chaff from the wheat, has, in his *Acadia*, given certainly the best account that has yet appeared of this noble people. On his title-page he gives this quotation from the *Memoirs of the Pennsylvania Historical Society*: "Let those who would persecute or proscribe for opinion's sake, and limit by political exclusion the right to worship God in the form by which he who worships chooses; who would, if let alone, join in the hunt or exile of those who, like the Acadians, cherish the faith of their childhood and ancestors; let them read the story of the Acadian exiles, and beware of the sure retribution of History."

In his pages more truly and fairly than it has hitherto been presented may be read in detail the pathetic story of their seizure and sufferings.

¹ Stevens, *History of Georgia*, i., p. 476.

WHAT ARE THE THINGS THAT IT MOST CONCERNS US TO KNOW?

Education, Intellectual, Moral and Physical. By Herbert Spencer. D. Appleton & Co., New York, 1884.

The Refutation of Atheism. Works of Orestes A. Brownson, vol. ii. Thorndike Nourse, Detroit, 1883.

Supernaturalism, Mediæval and Classical. W. S. Lilly, *Nineteenth Century*, July, 1883.

The Rights and Duties of Family and State in Regard to Education. *American Catholic Quarterly Review*, January, 1884.

AN age, replete with intellectual activity like our age, could hardly fail to give birth to a copious literature on the subject of education. Whoever possesses the most rudimentary knowledge of the meaning of the term "education," knows that nearly all burning questions of the day are involved in this problem. The social question, a just source of uneasiness in many States, is linked to it in such manner that its solution entirely depends upon the solution which our age will determine to make for education. And so with other grave issues. The questions of faith, of morality, of religion, and kindred subjects depend upon the fundamental ideas which are being imparted to those who follow after us. Considerable progress, no doubt, has been made in our days towards a more correct apprehension of the absorbing importance of education, and it is due to the more general recognition of this fact that so much has been said and written on this subject, from the ponderous volume down to the unpretentious newspaper article. There appears hardly a number of any contemporaneous serial or periodical publication, monthlies, quarterlies, and the like, which has not an essay or a paper on education. The interest which society displays in acquiring full information on this topic, has stimulated nearly every writer to try his hand at it. This of itself accounts for a considerable diversity of opinion; yet it is quite striking to observe the total absence of uniform and settled notions. Systems, diametrically opposed in principles as well as in application, are urged upon the acceptance of society, and no matter how wild and inconsistent a scheme may be, it is pretty sure of succeeding in securing a respectable following. The tendency of modern writers to replace scholastic precision by a refined indefiniteness, becomes particularly conspicuous in the discussions of the educa-

tional problem. Whether this practice arises from uncertain notions on the part of the authors, and from their limited and superficial acquaintance with the kernel of the whole question, or whether it is due to a desire to avoid the giving of offence, and to a decided disinclination to commit themselves in any way, is quite immaterial. The dry fact remains that the majority of writers eschew clear definite statements, and present, as a rule, their opinions in the dim and uncertain twilight of vague expressions. It is, to be sure, a most convenient mode of disposing of any subject-matter, but the result condemns it. For, the views of society have neither been enlarged nor classified by this practice, but, if any thing, more confused than they were before. Another class of writers, and in this minority are included the ablest intellects, treated, for some reason or other, education under one particular aspect only, and neglected, therefore, to take that broad, comprehensive view which the vast field of education peremptorily demands. Thus, while society has been from all sides deeply impressed with the necessity of realizing the paramount importance of infusing correct ideas and correct knowledge into the rising generation, little progress has been made in revising the compass of what these ideas and what this knowledge should be. And so it has come to pass that our times witness a most unique spectacle. Measures for the instruction of the young have been inaugurated and energetically carried out in various States before those preliminary points were definitely settled on which a universal agreement appears almost indispensable before proceeding from theory and discussion to practice and legislation. Nevertheless, this has been done, as is well known. Nor do we propose to enter upon the ungrateful and entirely unprofitable task of animadverting upon the lack of wisdom and the undue haste which characterize the actions of the various governments, since a lasting amelioration of the present anomalous condition of affairs cannot be expected until correct views are generally adopted and enforced wherever they may take hold. The question arises, therefore, what are the correct views? What is it that education should give to all as the most effective means for the proper discharge of all the duties of life?

The perplexing diversities of opinion as to what the curriculum of education should embrace, and what not, and as to whether it belongs properly to the parent to educate his offspring or to the State, are not removed by the fact that the advocates of all systems are fully agreed upon this, that education should put us in possession of that which it most concerns us to know. The proposition is so self-evident that it is not possible to hold seriously a different view, and forms, of course, the primary element which should be answered first of all. And this is precisely the point on which

the most unsettled and erroneous, because most confused, notions are being entertained. What we propose to do in this paper is to throw a ray of light, no matter how feeble, on this vital problem; and we will endeavor to show that the view which the Church of Rome puts forth in regard to it is the one which is sustained by the ablest exponent of science and of the whole modern school of thought, namely, by Herbert Spencer. Among the materials consulted and used in this paper, his book on education has, therefore, been chosen as a quasi text-book of our remarks, and it may not be amiss to briefly set forth the reasons for this choice. The author is not only acknowledged as a profound thinker, an eminent scholar and a very able reasoner, but he is by far the ablest expounder of modern thought. Neither his integrity of purpose nor the honesty of his search for truth can be called in question, nor, again, his uncommon literary gifts and keenness of observation. Though the volume consists of four different essays, they form, nevertheless, a tolerably complete whole, since they merely treat different divisions of the same subject; besides, they bear no marks of haste, but are evidently written with great care. The book is characterized throughout by clearness of thought, force of reasoning, extent and variety of scholarship, originality of illustration, precision, strength, and beauty of expression. It is, therefore, entirely free from the fault which, as we remarked before, impairs the value of so many modern productions. Herbert Spencer, moreover, is the only one of the whole modern school of thought who has taken time and pains to melt its heterogeneous material into one mass, to think out its principles and to arrange them in their logical connections and systematic relations. His works enable us, therefore, to analyze his system, which is also that of his school, and to reduce it to fundamental propositions which may be clearly apprehended and distinctly stated. Taken all in all, his book forms, in our estimation at least, the most valuable contribution of recent date to the literature of education. For these obvious reasons we are not only not prepared to deal with Herbert Spencer's views in the light and off-hand manner in which a professor of a State Normal school, not very long ago, attempted to dispose of them; but we are, on the contrary, quite willing to assign to them the full weight which the transcendent importance of the subject on the one hand, and the unassailable and established standing of the author on the other, impart to them. It will not do to declare Herbert Spencer's views "utterly impracticable" in a summary way, simply because he condemns the public school system of this country, and holds that it is the duty of the parents to educate their children, and that, hence, the less the State interferes, either by restraint or help, with the citizen in the discharge

of this duty, the better it will be in the end for the citizen and the State. Such a sweeping condemnation, particularly when it comes from one who feels himself in duty bound to uphold a system which furnishes him a living, possesses, of course, no weight at all, and is just as unwarranted as it is absurd. However, we are not in the least concerned with the professor of the State Normal school, nor even with Herbert Spencer, save in so far as the latter is connected with the volume wherein he lays down his educational theories.

When we talk of education, we talk by implication of life. For, education is the means of fitting us for life, or, as Herbert Spencer puts it, for "complete living." Education and life are so much intertwined, that in order to discuss fairly and intelligently education, it is absolutely necessary to take cognizance of all facts of life. To pretend to have exhausted education and to ignore at the same time a whole set of facts of life, is one-sidedness, to say the least. It is apparent, therefore, that, as long as religion and religious feeling constitute irresistible facts of life, religion cannot be left out in discussing education. Intellectual, moral, and physical education does, consequently, not complete the course, unless it be taken for granted that religion is included under the heads "moral" and "intellectual." In one sense, Herbert Spencer takes that, indeed, for granted. We contend, however, that he deals throughout only with manifestations of human nature in its strictest, that is, its physical, sense. It is nature and facts of nature, and even psychological facts, as far as they can be explained by physiological phenomena, but never human nature in its entirety, that he is dealing with, except in portions of the first essay, to which we will refer later on. And when he speaks of religion, he himself furnishes us the means not only to explain his silence on this fact of life, but also to declare his system of education incomplete. Before going farther, it seems proper to remark that, as far as that side of life is concerned with the education on which Herbert Spencer dwells in his book, we do not know of a more correct, more convincing, more forcible argumentation. There are not many, and those only minor, points which we cannot endorse without any modification. When he says that, in spite of the stage of civilization which our age boasts of having reached, we are far from having absolutely correct notions on education, far also from knowing the comparative values of different kinds of knowledge, and far from having agreed upon their relative values, we feel that he states the case very truthfully indeed. And because he seems to realize so well how desirable it is to arrive, at last, at a full understanding, it is all the more surprising to see him pass over in silence a whole set of facts of life which, since they are encountered in life, enter legitimately upon the field of education, and these, moreover, a set of facts which

he is far from denying, nay, for the very existence of which he himself adduces the strongest possible proof. In several instances the force of circumstances compels him to leave the sphere of naturalism pure and simple, because true morality presupposes not only that second set of facts of life, but presupposes also a link connecting the two by means of which they are brought into harmonious accord. Yet such is the weakness of human nature that we often practically deny what we admit in all seriousness in theory. In Herbert Spencer's case, we believe his silence to proceed from an honorable reluctance to discuss what lies beyond his own peculiar sphere. Nevertheless, the difficulty which besets the whole agnostic school of thought, namely, the existence of the supernatural, should not taint his discussion of the educational problem, because he recognizes its existence, as will be seen presently, not only as real, but as necessary. And hence the query, how is it possible to set aside in education what cannot be set aside in life? How can the collective experience of the human race from its very existence be ignored in education by a sociologist who refuses to ignore it in life?

The real issue, then, hinges upon this: do Herbert Spencer and the modern school of thought deny the supernatural in life, or do they not deny it? Is the influence exercised by this element under the form of religion admitted by them, or is it not admitted? If they not only admit, but emphatically assert, its existence as real and necessary, then, of course, the system of education they advocate is at once vitiated by their refusal to give the proper place to this agency. Since this is the cardinal point on which many modern thinkers have suffered hopeless shipwreck, it is well worth while to examine more fully into it. For the formation of a valid and correct opinion on Herbert Spencer's own ideas on this subject, it is sufficient to cast a glance at the prospectus of his system of philosophy. He undertook, as is well known, to cast modern thought into a philosophical system, based upon the theory of evolution. The main subject of his inquiry is divided into four parts, namely, the principles of biology, the principles of psychology, the principles of sociology, and the principles of morality. Most of our readers are, no doubt, familiar with his *Data of Ethics*, and hence conversant with the fact that he deals exclusively with natural morality, by defining as good or right and bad or wrong *that* which produces pleasurable or painful sensations. The ultimate criteria of moral or immoral conduct are, therefore, sensations. We make this parenthetical allusion merely to prove that we, by no means, exaggerate in stating that the structure he erected is not a philosophy in the strict sense of the term, but only and solely a philosophy of the natural. How far this can be done, without

doing violence to science even, appears quite plainly from the consideration that he places before the four grand divisions of his system the one subject upon which all these logically rest, as upon their only possible and real basis, namely, the first principles divided into two parts. In the first, which is devoted to discussing the Unknowable, the doctrine put forward by Hamilton and Mansel is carried a step further, and presented in a slightly modified shape, pointing out the various directions in which science leads to the same conclusions, and showing that in this united belief in an Absolute that transcends not only human knowledge, but human conception, lies the only possible reconciliation of science and religion. The second part contains the laws of the Knowable, that is to say, the ultimate principles discernible throughout all manifestations of the Absolute, those highest generalizations which are now being disclosed by science, and which, being severally true, not only of one class of phenomena, but of all classes, form, on this account, the key to all of them.

Now, it is quite certain that a philosophical system, which starts out with asserting that all science tends to confirm the belief in an Absolute far above and beyond nature, is far from denying the supernatural. On the contrary, it affirms the reality of the supernatural. And, if it is true, as Herbert Spencer himself states, that we can have no rational curriculum of education before we settle which things it most concerns us to know, then it is manifestly our duty to ascertain whether it is not important for us, and a matter of vital concern, to know something about that Absolute over and above nature, with which science brings us face to face. Inquiry may show us that this other kind of knowledge, though avowedly not attainable by science, is of equal, nay, perhaps even of greater value than all scientific training; and, until the import of that knowledge is ascertained, it is irrational to affirm that science alone is the all-sufficient *vade mecum* which it is our duty to provide youth with. The powerlessness of science to enlighten us on this point serves simply as an incentive to turn to philosophy, and this department also failing to respond, we would have to turn to religion, perhaps, to gain the desired information. At all events, we have no right to exclude from education a knowledge, until all sources are dried up, from which light on it may be expected.

To do full justice to Herbert Spencer, we quote now in full what he says on the subjects of religion and of the Absolute, in the first essay of the volume on Education: "Doubtless to the superstitions that pass under the name of religion, science is antagonistic, but not to the essential religion which these superstitions hide. Doubtless, too, in much of the science that is current there is a pervading spirit of irreligion, but not in that true science which has

passed beyond the superficial into the profound." And in order to fortify his position, he quotes from Professor Huxley as follows: "True science and true religion are twin-sisters, and the separation of either from the other is sure to prove the death of both. Science prospers exactly in proportion as it is religious, and religion flourishes in exact proportion to the scientific depth and firmness of its basis. The great deeds of philosophers have been less the fruit of their intellect than of the direction of that intellect by an eminently religious tone of mind. Truth has yielded herself rather to their patience, their love, their singleheartedness and their self-denial, than to their logical acumen." And then Herbert Spencer continues: "So far from science being irreligious, as many think, it is the neglect of science that is irreligious. Take a humble simile. Suppose a writer were daily saluted with praises couched in superlative language. Suppose the wisdom, the grandeur, the beauty of his works were the constant topics of the eulogies addressed to him. Suppose those who unceasingly uttered these eulogies on his works were content with looking at the outside of them and had never opened them, much less tried to understand them. What value should be put upon their praises? What should we think of their sincerity? Yet comparing small things to great, such is the conduct of mankind in general, in reference to the Universe and its Cause. Nay, it is worse. Not only do they pass by without study those things which they daily proclaim to be so wonderful; but very frequently they condemn as mere triflers those who give time to the observation of nature—they actually scorn those who show any active interest in these marvels. We repeat, then, that not science, but the neglect of science is irreligious. Devotion to science is a tacit worship—a tacit recognition of worth in the things studied and by implication in their Cause. It is not a mere lip-homage, but a homage expressed in actions—not a mere professed respect, but a respect proved by the sacrifice of time, thought and labor. Nor is it thus only that true science is essentially religious. It is religious, too, inasmuch as it generates a profound respect for, and an implicit faith in, those uniform laws which underlie all things. By accumulated experiences, the man of science acquires a thorough belief in the unchanging relations of phenomena—in the invariable connection of cause and consequence—in the necessity of good or evil results. Instead of the rewards and punishments of traditional belief which men vaguely hope they may gain, or escape, in spite of their disobedience, he finds that there are rewards and punishments in the ordained constitution of things, and that the evil results of disobedience are inevitable. He sees that the laws to which we must submit are not only inexorable, but beneficent. He sees that in virtue of these laws the process of

things is ever toward a higher perfection and greater happiness. Hence, he is constantly led to insist on these laws, and is indignant when men disregard them. And thus does he, by asserting the eternal principles of things and the necessity of conforming to them, prove himself intrinsically religious.

"To all which add the further religious aspect of science, that it alone can give us the true conceptions of ourselves and our relation to the mysteries of existence. At the same time that it shows us all that can be known, it shows us the limits beyond which we can know nothing. Not by dogmatic assertion does it teach the impossibility of comprehending the ultimate cause of things; but it leads us clearly to recognize this impossibility by bringing us in every direction to boundaries we cannot cross. It realizes to us, in a way in which nothing else can, the littleness of human intelligence in the face of that which transcends human intelligence. While towards the traditions and authorities of men its attitude may be proud, before the impenetrable veil which hides the Absolute its attitude is humble—a true pride and a true humility. Only the sincere man of science (and by this title we do not mean the mere calculator of distances, or analyzer of compounds, or labeller of species, but him who through lower truths seeks higher and eventually the highest)—only the genuine man of science, we say, can truly know how utterly beyond, not only human knowledge, but human conception, is the Universal Power of which Nature and Life and Thought are but manifestations."

This remarkable passage contains several statements which, properly analyzed, yield very valuable information. In the first place, we are told that the limit of what is knowable by observing, studying, classifying and generalizing the facts of nature is drawn by nature itself. And, in the second place, we are assured that the more these incontrovertible facts are investigated, and the more the principles underlying these facts are unearthed, the greater the evidence of the existence of a Universal Power of which nature, life and thought are but manifestations. In other words, Herbert Spencer declares, in his lucid and forcible manner, that no real scientist can deny the existence of the supernatural. Nor does he stop there. He declares, furthermore, that every real scientist is aware of the impossibility of ever learning from the study of nature, that is, from science proper, any truths regarding the character and nature of that Universal Power beyond the mere fact of its existence. We will re-state this point more explicitly still: society is bidden to believe that natural facts, though living and speaking witnesses of their own dependence upon the supernatural, neither can nor do reveal anything concerning that Universal Power far above and beyond nature. They attest, only and solely and in the strongest

manner in which testimony can be given, their own absolute dependence upon that Power of which nature, life and thought are but manifestations. This, as a matter of course, renders the existence of the supernatural, *i.e.*, a power far above and beyond nature, real as well as necessary, for without it these manifestations could not exist. Thus science, according to Herbert Spencer, informs us that the whole creation is ringing out in clear notes and in one accord that the supernatural is not a chimera, nor a superstition, but a fact, a reality, nay more, a necessity. We trust no candid-minded person can draw any other conclusion from the general tenor of the quoted passage than this, that according to the admissions of science there are truths of a higher order than that of nature. Now we ask again in all earnestness, how is it possible to dismiss the knowledge of these truths from education before more is known about them than the little which science can tell us about them?

The whole force of the contents of the passage, given above, appears to better advantage still if the salient points are recast somewhat systematically, and if the situation, as it then presents itself to the mind, is put into the form which the late Dr. Orestes A. Brownson gave to it. Science (the philosophy of the natural proper) has for its object, first, the establishment of the principles of the natural order, so far as they are cognizable by natural reason in their intelligible phase; science is, next, engaged in the elucidation of the relationship of these principles and in the explanation of those facts which these intelligible principles and their relationship govern (for instance, the unity of structure of all sensiferous organs); science, lastly, performs the office of establishing the reality and necessity of a supernatural order, since without it the natural is not only incomplete and absolutely without any purpose and meaning, but altogether not possible. The whole so-called system of philosophy of Herbert Spencer is, as has been observed already, confined to inductions from the observation of the facts of the physical order, and hence limited to the establishment and elucidation of those principles which govern sensible facts, whether of external nature or of the mind itself. The term philosophy is, therefore, strictly speaking, not applicable to his system, except by courtesy, since some of the principles known, or at least knowable by the light of nature, *i.e.*, by natural reason, are, as principles, objects of the intellect and in no case of the senses, and reach, therefore, beyond the sphere of the natural proper into the region of true philosophy. Naturalism excludes thus whatever is not explicable on natural principles, and excludes, consequently, the first as well as the final causes of all things. It stops with secondary causes and sees before and behind only an impenetrable darkness. Valuable as this scientific

knowledge is, and we are very far, indeed, from underrating its inestimable value, nevertheless it does not satisfy human intelligence. For, reason is in man a perpetual aspiration to know the origin and the end, the principles and causes of all things; and since all have their root in the supernatural, it has always proved impossible to prevent thinking, reasoning and reflecting minds from sending longing glances into that darkness and from praying that some ray of celestial light may illumine it. Wherever a race possesses great intellectual vigor, philosophy and speculation are invariable concomitants of this mental activity. This goes to show that the human mind of itself tends to acquire truths of a higher order than the physical.

We proceed now to examine more closely the premises which, according to Herbert Spencer, science establishes beyond dispute. If science forces upon our acceptance—and this an unconditional acceptance—the recognition of the supernatural as real and as necessary by declaring the utter dependency of the natural (nature, life and thought) upon the supernatural (a Universal Power far above and beyond nature), then science certainly teaches the subsistence of a necessary relationship between the two, and this relationship not one of coördination, but of subordination. Again, if science teaches, as it does, that the supernatural, being above and beyond nature, cannot be known, nor comprehended, but merely apprehended by natural reason, then science teaches also that any knowledge of the supernatural beyond the mere fact of its existence can be obtained and is possible only by means of a supernatural help, that is to say, by revelation. Here, then, are two very grave conclusions which flow of necessity from the premises furnished by science; we are taught that, inasmuch as nature, life and thought and all that is, depend upon the supernatural, and inasmuch as the natural is subordinated to the supernatural, the knowledge of the latter precedes in actual and real import that of the former; and we are also taught the necessity of revelation for any knowledge of the supernatural. Nor is this all. From the absolute dependence of the natural upon the supernatural follows also that these two form parts of one homogeneous and indissoluble whole, and have, consequently, not only their points of analogy, but also their points of contact. Real antagonism between the two must, therefore, as Huxley asserts and Herbert Spencer re-asserts, be predicated as impossible, so that the science of the natural can never in any way be out of joint with the science of the supernatural. No collision, indeed, is at all possible.

The services, then, which science renders to humanity on the score of general information consist, according to Herbert Spencer, in this. We know that real science necessitates the assumption,

and certifies with one voice to the existence, of a Great Absolute Cause for all that is, nature, life and thought included. And we know also that without revelation, that is to say, without a supernatural agency, nothing can be learned about this Great Absolute Cause except simply that it is. We know, lastly, that between the two elements, thus furnished by science, a necessary relationship does exist.

Herbert Spencer stops his ratiocination with the affirmation of a Universal Power, which, it is true, he says is far above and beyond nature, and the cause of all nature, life and thought, but which he refuses, nevertheless, to term "God" in the Christian acceptance of that word. As a scientist, he could not go farther. But had he a right to stop there as a philosopher? Did not philosophy lead him on to follow into the furthest recess which natural reason can explore? And if he had continued on, would he have arrived at the personal God of Christianity, as defined by the Church of Rome? These questions are very pertinent.

Philosophy proper (namely, the philosophy of the supernatural circumscribed by the intelligible as far as human reason by its own light can reach, and showing us simply something of the supernatural in the way of first principles and their logical deductions), philosophy, we admit, offers, indeed, matter which it is no child's play to wrestle with, and we feel, for our part, reluctant to express any opinion as to the success which might have attended Herbert Spencer's search in that direction. It seems to us, however, as if, for one so highly gifted as the apostle of the modern school of thought, the road, so successfully travelled over by Dr. Brownson, in our estimate America's greatest philosophical mind, should not prove strewn with insurmountable obstacles for Herbert Spencer. While closely linked to the question of belief and, moreover, to belief in the doctrine of the Catholic Church, this inquiry is still purely philosophical, requires only the keen exercise of human reason and does not enter directly upon the field of religion. For a full proof of the truth that the existence of God is demonstrable by natural reason, we must refer our readers to Dr. Brownson's works, Vol. II. In the refutation of Atheism there is contained that masterly analysis of "thought" by means of which he evolves the formula, first stated by Gioberti, "*ens creat existentias*." It would lead us too far from the object we have in view to give more than a very brief outline of Dr. Brownson's irrefutable argument.

Taking Cousin's analysis of thought, as far as it is just and correct, as a starting point, he discloses in thought three elements, subject, object and their relation, always given simultaneously in one and the same complex fact. Without a thinking subject, thought is, of course, impossible, likewise without an object thought of; and

again, unless a relation between the two exists. This is easily understood. He proceeds then to analyze intuitive thought, and proves that the object presents itself to the subject, thereby obtaining the ontological element. By analyzing the object and disclosing therein three elements again, namely, the ideal, the empirical and their relation, he establishes the objective reality of the ideal. By analyzing this last element and disclosing therein also three elements, the necessary, the contingent and their relation or being, existences and their relation, he is led to the final analysis of the relation between the necessary and the contingent, that is, between being and existences, and obtains the creative act as the only possible relation. This creative act, without which nature, life and thought could have no existence, defines the necessary and real Being as the First and Only Cause from which, *mediante* the creative act, all proceeds. Dr. Brownson further proves how God, as First Cause, establishes the physical laws, and how, as Final Cause, He establishes the moral laws, and how, without the assistance of Revelation, these moral laws cannot be known, so that our ultimate destiny cannot be reached save by supernatural assistance. Dr. Brownson's argument on all these points is irresistible in point of logic, and an altogether faultless masterpiece of reasoning, which carries by its very force conviction. The broad conclusions at which he arrives are foreshadowed, if not entirely corroborated, by what Herbert Spencer leads us to infer from his statements. For, as the ultimate, final result of the search for truth, it will be perceived, that science and philosophy yield almost the identical proposition. The one, Herbert Spencer, the scientist, tells us that there must needs be an Absolute Universal Power far above and beyond nature, of which nature, life and thought are but manifestations; while the other, Dr. Brownson, the philosopher, tells us that necessary and real Being, from which, *mediante* the creative act, all proceed, nature, life and thought included, is God. Now it is, of course, idle to pretend here that the Absolute Universal Power far above and beyond nature is something entirely different from the God asserted by philosophy and believed in by Christianity. It is amusing to observe, however, in what different spirit our age receives one and the same truth, if offered by different parties. The *Syllabus*, which asserts that God's existence is demonstrable by natural reason, was hardly promulgated before it met with adverse criticism, and in some quarters this proposition was with a ready alacrity pronounced untenable, nay, absurd. Philosophy announces precisely the same thing, and no exception at all is taken to it; and when Herbert Spencer formulates the same idea and expresses it in his own way, somewhat less definitely, yet substantially the same, why, the world even applauds. Is not this changeable attitude of

society a forcible illustration of how true the saying is that none are more utterly blind than those who refuse to see?

Now philosophy, by establishing that man, nature, and the whole universe originate in and proceed from the supernatural, *mediante* the creative act of God, compels reason to assert also that the destiny, the end, the completion of the natural, rests likewise in the supernatural. The natural and supernatural are, as Dr. Brownson tersely puts it, two parts of one original plan of creation, and distinguished only as the initial is distinguished from the teleological, for which reason no conflict on philosophical grounds between the two is ever possible.

If true philosophy teaches so much about the supernatural, and if, on the other hand, as sociology admits, life cannot be freed from the supernatural, then education should certainly deeply impress upon our minds the fact, established by philosophy, that our final resting-place is not here below, but that we are destined to return to Him to whose creative act we owe life and thought and existence. It certainly is of very great concern to us to learn that our end lies not in the sphere of the natural, pure and simple, and hence it is evident that a system of education that would fail to give us this important knowledge, obtained through reason by its own light, would fail to give us what it most concerns us to know, and would be, therefore, incomplete. This conclusion as to our final destiny is borne out by abundant evidence of a practical character, if we do not on purpose blind ourselves. It is experienced in the inability of man to be satisfied with any natural, *i.e.*, created good; it is attested by the consciousness of our imperfections, of the limits of human reason, and of our capability to be more than we are by our own unassisted powers. "The aspirations and emotions of soul," as W. S. Lilly so well remarks, "are facts. They may be ignored, but they are still facts. No philosophy can satisfy us which ignores those intuitions, which refers that inner voice of conscience to the action of physical organism, and offers the stone of natural science for the satisfaction of an immortal hunger after living bread." Thus it is quite clear that science, as well as philosophy, contains knowledge with which men must needs be equipped in order to enable them not to grope in the dark, but to perceive in what way they can, and for what end they should strive for complete living.

As it will greatly facilitate the next point which we now proceed to make, if the results of the inquiries made so far are clear and distinct before our mind, we will now summarize the position. Life, since it deals continually with the natural, renders science an indispensable element of education. If correct scientific knowledge can be given to all, by all means let us give it to all. Life deals, moreover, and of necessity also, with the supernatural; and

hence education should embrace correct philosophical knowledge, so that all should know what it behooves them to know in the way of philosophy. These two kinds of knowledge, both the product of unassisted natural reason, are, then, indispensable elements of any rational educational system, and in actual importance the philosophical surpasses the scientific knowledge. Life is still unexhausted, however, and hence the course of what a rational curriculum should embrace is also not yet completed. For, that necessary relationship between the natural and the supernatural which science already asserts, and which philosophy establishes beyond all contradiction, remains still unexamined. Were life circumscribed by nature alone, were science unable to point with certainty to a something beyond the clouds that no science ever will penetrate, were reason, entering upon the highest philosophical search which it can enter upon, unable to define what must be behind the clouds which science cannot pierce, and which, alas, even philosophy is impotent to remove, then, indeed, might education remain confined to the inculcation of science and philosophy. But since science and philosophy, severally and jointly, speak to us of a relationship between the natural and the supernatural, since science and philosophy, severally and jointly, tell us that, save by the interference of the supernatural, we cannot acquire anything beyond the scanty morsels which unassisted human reason, strained to its utmost in both departments, does furnish, we are constrained to ask whether no knowledge has been given to mankind by the supernatural, so as to make that necessary relationship, of the existence of which we know, less vague and uncertain, and to thereby equip us with the means to live up to the fullness of the situation. All we can assert in regard to this third step of knowledge is that, if it exists at all, it is neither the product of science nor the product of philosophy, but due exclusively to revelation. The possibility of a revelation is a point which cannot be gainsaid; for in Herbert Spencer's definition of the supernatural, and likewise in the correct philosophical definition of it, that possibility is fully admitted, nay asserted, as, indeed, the only means for obtaining the third class of knowledge, namely, religious knowledge.

Now, if we consult life to see whether it can give us no clue, no faint outline, as to the contents and character of religious knowledge, we cannot help observing that at all epochs of human history religion in some form or other appears as man's inseparable companion from birth to grave. Again, all religious systems appear, or may at least be looked at, as attempts to satisfy the innate and ineradicable desire of human nature to harmonize the natural and the supernatural, by living up to the requirements of the various religious codes. The citizen of the nineteenth

century, in his culture and refinement, smiles at the cruelty and absurdity of ancient forms of worship and forgets to see below shocking ceremonials a catholicity of the worship of the supernatural, or what was believed, at least, to be supernatural. He also conveniently forgets that he is the fruit of nearly two thousand years of Christian civilization, a religion based entirely upon revelation, direct and indirect. Now, we have seen that a religion, really based upon revelation, is declared by science and by philosophy not an idle dream. And we have also seen that in order to attain to a full knowledge of complete living, and for the completion of the knowledge of the natural (science) and the knowledge of the supernatural as far as obtainable by unassisted human reason (philosophy), revelation is indispensable. This, taken in conjunction with the indisputable evidence of all ages regarding the existence of some religion, serves, if not as a convincing proof, at any rate as a strong presumption in favor of some revelation having been made. We will forego, however, taking this for granted, and examine further as to what religion, from the light we now possess, should be. Religion should fill the void left by science and philosophy. And this void is of a threefold character: first, knowledge in regard to the supernatural, its constitution, nature, character, physiognomy, etc.; secondly, knowledge concerning the necessary relationship between the natural and the supernatural, *i.e.*, our destiny, etc.; lastly, knowledge as to the means for reaching that destiny. This threefold information, given by revelation, must be contained in religion in order to come up to that definition of religion which the premises, furnished by science and philosophy, warrant us to make of it. If such a religion, not of human manufacture, but having for its source only the supernatural proper, *i.e.*, God, does exist, then we are bound to assert that such religious instruction precedes in importance not only scientific training, but also philosophical training. For it is obviously true that, if natural reason, on the part of science and of philosophy, reaches as high as to apprehend the supernatural, and links the natural and supernatural together in an indissoluble union; if experience shows an influence of the supernatural upon life and conduct, so manifest, so potent as to be indisputable; if revealed religion alone can explain what the supernatural is, its laws and its injunctions for complete living, etc.; and if such religion does really exist—it is obviously true, then, we say, that a system of education which not only passes over in silence philosophy, a knowledge that brings us at least a step nearer toward understanding our last end than science, but passes over in silence also religion, the only means of familiarizing us with all the requirements

for complete living does not impart to us what it most concerns us to know, and is consequently radically defective.

We are confident that Herbert Spencer, could he grant that the Absolute Great Power far above and beyond nature had made a revelation, would at once and with great emphasis declare that to know what has been revealed exceeds in importance all other knowledge. From the whole tenor of his writings it is quite evident that his doubts concern only *the fact* of a revelation. The introspection of the forces of nature alone furnishes us scientific truths which corroborate revealed truths; but for this reason they are not in themselves religious truths. That this must be the case, nay, that truths of any kind, in whatever department of knowledge, confirm and must confirm revelation, as has been stated more fully before in this paper, is no ground whatever for mistaking science or philosophy for religion. Herbert Spencer bids, for instance, mankind recognize that the laws of nature to which we must submit are not only inexorable, but beneficial; he preaches, therefore, as far as science alone enables him to preach, that goodness, absolute goodness, forms one characteristic of the absolute which he shrinks from terming God. Again, when he says that the study of nature generates a profound respect and an implicit faith in that which underlies all things, the First Great Cause, he preaches that we should believe in God, and with unmeasured confidence rely upon Him. Here we have two Catholic doctrines corroborated by science; yet what an impassable chasm lies for man between "the inexorable laws of nature are beneficent" and the revealed doctrine, "God is infinitely good, wise, just," etc. When Herbert Spencer emphasizes that not science, but the neglect of science, is irreligious, we fully agree with him; but we add on to it, "and not philosophy, but the neglect of philosophy is irreligious, for our having reason imposes upon us the duty to exercise our reason in the acquisition of *all* that we can know or at least apprehend," and further than that, if there is a revelation, it is irreligious to neglect the acquisition of revealed truths, for all kinds of truths, though of different orders, contain knowledge worth having. Attention to scientific truths alone does not make up for ignorance of philosophical and revealed truths, since science stands below philosophy, and both stand below revealed truths, that is, religion.

For education to be complete three sets of knowledge are thus seen to be necessary: science, philosophy, and religion. Science, namely, the philosophy of the natural, or as we would prefer to call it, the knowledge of the natural; philosophy, namely, the "science" of the supernatural as far as cognizable by natural reason alone; religion, namely, the "science" of the supernatural as far as revealed. What it most concerns us to know is what has been

revealed; next in order come science and philosophy, which can be co-ordinated only under the condition that revelation precedes both, and even then philosophy, in point of rank, stands higher. In all three sets of knowledge it is, of course, the correct knowledge alone which is of value. As the child should be instructed in the true A B C of science, so it is likewise essential that the true and correct fundamental principles of philosophy should be engrafted upon the juvenile mind. And what holds good in this respect of scientific and philosophical knowledge, holds also good in a much higher degree still of religion. It is fatal to the mathematician to let one error, no matter how small, slip into his calculations, because that one little error vitiates the result of his whole magnificent labor. It is fatal to the philosopher to have one single faulty premise in his system, because that faulty premise renders his system and his ultimate conclusions false, and hence worthless. But it is more fatal still for religion to hold alongside of many truths one false doctrine; for this also not only vitiates the result, but misleads the recipient, and eventually by discrediting revelation undermines religion itself. And this brings us to a point which requires some discussion in order to mete out full justice and in unstinted measure to Herbert Spencer, and to the whole modern school of thought. It will explain to us why religion is so often ridiculed, why doubts as to the fact of a revelation having been made are so frequent, and why skepticism is on the increase rather than decrease; it will explain to us also why, in Herbert Spencer's book, religious education is really not even mentioned.

The leaders of the modern school of thought are mostly men of science. These, like Herbert Spencer, while, no doubt, in a general way conversant with the doctrines of Christianity, have not made a specialty of sifting the evidences pro and con as regards the claims of the various so-called Christian denominations to holding the Christian revelation intact and in its fulness. For the most part their views of Christian religion are taken from Protestant theologians, or, perhaps, from isolated portions of the teachings of the Catholic Church. Now Protestantism, in order to make way for grace, demolished nature, and on that account has rendered it difficult for clear-headed reasoners to reconcile the natural and the supernatural. The supernatural, as expounded by most Christian theologians outside of the Catholic Church, appears anomalous, illogical, and arbitrary, if not absurd. Unless the cardinal unity of the two orders and their true relationship is thoroughly understood, theology kills science as well as religion, and doing this, the scientists, of course, no longer admit revelation. Even within the pale of the Catholic Church, theology has mostly been studied in separate questions and articles of detail, rather than as one uniform and indissolu-

ble whole. Seldom, indeed, do we find any one looking below a dogma to the Catholic, that is to say, the universal principle that underlies and governs it, that binds it to every other dogma, and integrates it in the living unity of the divine purpose of creation. Religion has been presented in articles of faith, assorted, dissected, labelled, accurately described and analyzed, but rarely as one grand whole, consisting of several integral and inseparable parts. Scientists often cannot help mocking at theological assertions which stand flatly contradicted by science, and are far from presenting in any way the true Catholic revelation, for they know very well that true religion can never teach what does violence to established natural facts. True religion can and does assert that the One who made the inexorable laws of nature has the power to suspend them at will, which is a proposition to which science cannot take exception. But we cannot be told by religion that the Supreme Lawgiver made two sets of laws, one of which excludes the other.

Is it much to be wondered at that Christianity loses caste among men of culture when almost daily the spectacle can be witnessed of one Protestant minister exposing in the pulpit the untenability and weakness of another Protestant minister's position? Is it not true that outside of the Church of Rome Christianity is disintegrating, and that at a rapid rate? Does it not occur even in the most conservative Protestant denomination, namely, the Episcopal Church, that conventions for the election of bishops are turned, by High Church and Low Church factions, into meetings bearing a strong resemblance to political conventions, with caucuses and all other appendages? It is a state of affairs for which the Church of Rome is in no way to blame, yet the Episcopal Church is confessedly a Christian Church, and for that reason is Christianity held responsible for it. Protestantism is the fruitful source, and must shoulder the paternity of much of the existing unbelief. But, while this is all true, it is only an explanation, but no valid excuse, for discrediting religion, revelation, and Christianity. As long as there is one Church whose doctrines are in full accord with true science and true philosophy,—a Church which, from the first day of its existence down through centuries and centuries, has held and taught the self-same, identical truth,—a Church, moreover, which lays claim to infallibility—a claim that might well be expected where true revelation is deposited—as long as this Church, well known as the Roman Catholic Church, continues on, unaffected by what is and has been going on all around, true religion should be searched for in that Church. There and nowhere else can it be found.

Herbert Spencer's silence on religion, then, originating, as we believe it does, in uncertainty, honest doubt, sincere bewilderment,

can be well accounted for. But it hardly exonerates him from omitting to state more definitely than he has done, what philosophy can disclose; and what these ultimate philosophical truths, in conjunction with what science leads us to infer, and what experience forces us to recognize, teach us in regard to the nature of religious knowledge, and the important part this highest knowledge plays in life, and hence necessarily in education. If unable to say more, the sincere honesty, characteristic of all his works, should have prompted him to say, "Leave not out religious instruction in bringing up children, if true religion, not a fabric of man, but revealed by the supernatural, has an abode here below; I for my part confess that I did not discover it." This attitude Herbert Spencer would, no doubt, have assumed, had he not neglected to touch upon the philosophical side of education. And had he seen more, did he know more of Catholicity, it seems to us as if he would have enjoined what that Church enjoins. As it is, he avoided, in the volume on Education as carefully as in all his other works, to tread upon any save strictly scientific ground. His philosophy, which, as has been shown, is merely a philosophical systematizing of the truths of the natural order as given by science, is, however, pervaded, no less than his educational theory, by a consciousness, felt, rather than expressed, that a higher order of truths should crown and confirm scientific truths; and that not until these have received a ratification are they entirely removed from the sphere of doubt.

The various inquiries which we have made compel us thus to recognize that no educational system is complete which does not furnish three kinds of knowledge—scientific, philosophical, and religious—for these alone exhaust the fulness of life. In regard to the comparative value of these three indispensable elements of equipping us for complete living, the order in which they have been named and investigated must be reversed, and the first and highest place be assigned to religion as the means of reaching our destiny, no matter how unscientific and how unphilosophical our culture otherwise may be.

If we reflect that, of the great mass of human beings which populate our globe, the vast majority always must remain contented with a crude and fragmentary knowledge of science and philosophy, religion is at once brought out in bold relief. No matter how far we may advance, the hedger and the ditcher, and the cart-driver and the bricklayer will always ply their humble vocations. Neither they nor the large class of laborers whom agriculture and commerce and industry press into service, and who toil for their daily bread, ever can or will attain to that height of culture, to that ideal summit of education, where science and philosophy and religion are all found enthroned. Even the student,

the scholar, the scientist, and the theologian generally follow one line only, and acquire prominence, as a rule, in that alone. Nature itself displays an aristocratic tendency in the distribution of intellectual gifts, so much so that it is quite certain that not all men, nor the majority, could climb to the same height of knowledge, even if the circumstances of life could be so altered as to place precisely the same possibilities within the reach of all. This consideration of itself convinces us that an educational system which is not universally applicable, because it aims at an impossibility, is hardly of great practical value. At all times it will remain true that only the small, nay, an altogether insignificant fraction of the world's population, can be converted into scientists, scholars, philosophers, and theologians.

Yet, shall we, because of the impossibility of ever making a common good of scientific and philosophical knowledge, conclude that the vast majority of all ages is forever hopelessly excluded from complete living and from reaching the end of man's existence? No, we are fortunately spared from drawing so cruel a conclusion, because, what science and what philosophy prove powerless to do, all that and much more religion can and does do. Our natural inclinations and desires, our ambitions and our longings will forever fiercely battle against the circumstances which on every side hem these in, be they great or small. Nor does the knowledge of the disastrous consequences attending with absolute certainty on the violation of an immutable law of nature, prove more than a fragile safeguard for those even who rank foremost in culture and refinement. Neither science nor philosophy can ever be turned into effective checks for curbing our appetites, subduing our passions, and resigning ourselves contentedly to the part which it is ours to play. A more efficient means within the reach of all, and required by all, by the learned few and by the unlearned many, is therefore necessary, and is found and exists only in true religion. True religion alone furnishes us the means of rendering us in any and all walks of life capable of complete living, by making and insisting upon our living up to those grand truths which only a God could bring down on earth, and leave here below forever as a perennial blessing for all humanity. So far, then, from being an element that may or can be eliminated from education, true religion is, on the contrary, the one thing needful above all. That instruction can be imparted to all, while all other knowledge, however desirable it is, cannot be imparted to all.

If the whole human race were well grounded in, and lived up to the teachings of Christ's true Church, labor would then lose its sting of hardship, the social troubles be allayed, science and philosophy flourish with new and resplendent vigor, the arts of peace

replace the terrors of war; there would then be rendered to God that worship of thought and word and action which alone lifts the veil of the future, and shows in the distance the blissful enjoyment of eternity as the fruition of a well-lived life.

THE RELIGIOUS STATE.

The Religious State. A digest of the doctrine of Suarez contained in his treatise "De Statu Religionis." By William Humphrey, Priest of the Society of Jesus. London: Burns & Oates. New York: The Catholic Publication Society Co., 1884.

ONE of the distinctive characteristics of the Church of God is her sanctity. In her doctrine, in the lives of many of her children, in her institutions and preaching, this sanctity appears; it is also found in her sacraments and in the means which she takes to curb human passion and to promote divine worship. Holiness is of the essence of the Church, and is not corrupted by the treachery of some of her members, nor by the scandals of others, neither does it fail amid the fury of persecution nor amid the deceptions of heresy. In the midst of dangers of every kind, her strength lies in the consciousness of the sanctity with which she has been divinely endowed. The Church of God, then, as such, needs no reform; in the essential qualities of her life she is always the same, stemming the tide of human passion and bearing in her bosom, for the good of souls, the promises, the graces, and the merits of her Divine Founder. Possessing the seeds of supernatural truth and of holiness, and fertilized as the Lord's vineyard by the dew and breath of heaven, she necessarily manifests her divine life, in some phase or other, and according to some degree or other. Within her boundaries also grow, apart, the germs of certain forms of virtuous living, and these germs again are trained by reverential hands into different shapes and for different purposes, but the life that is in them all is from the same divine source, and the power wherewith they grow is the same.

As a living divinely constituted body the Church exists with the Holy Spirit always abiding in her to lead her into all truth, with her sacred sacramental system as the great channel of divine grace, and with her divinely organized hierarchy as her governing

authority. The inner life of that Church, her soul, is made up, so to say, principally of the divine virtues of faith, hope, and charity ; while the law of their growth is, with God's grace, the observance of the precepts and counsels which Christ has given to men. In his divine wisdom and mercifulness, He has not laid under commandment all human actions, He has not exacted of men all that men can give, but has left to them a large part of the conduct of life which they may dispose of, within the limits of the lawful, according to their generosity.

His commandments from their very nature bind the human conscience, His counsels are left to the free choice of men. The subject matter of the commandments is good, that of the counsels superadded to the former is better. It is laudable to hear Mass on Sundays, but together with that, to hear Mass also on weekdays is much more so. The commandments are for all, the counsels are for the comparatively few. "Of virginity it has been said," writes St. Augustine, "'he that can take, let him take it,' of justice it has not been said, he who can do it, let him do it, but, every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit shall be cut down and shall be cast into the fire." The observance of the commandments brings with it a reward, and the violation of them a punishment, but the non-observance of the counsels by themselves entails no penalty, while the fulfilment of them gains God's special favor. To the divine precepts they are appended, as it were, as motives for the practice of higher virtue, or as tests of the devotedness of generous hearts, though in the eyes of the world they are deceit and foolishness and cruelty. Of the counsels the principal are voluntary poverty, chastity, and obedience, or the evangelical counsels, as they are called.

In Holy Scripture, and we here speak only of the New Testament, the aforesaid counsels are distinctly specified by Christ and by the Apostles. In the nineteenth chapter of the Gospel of St. Matthew our Lord distinctly contrasts the counsels with the commandments, and makes them the conditions of a new calling. The observance of the commandments, He teaches, will lead to eternal life,—“if thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments,”—whereas the observance of the counsels, as conferring perfection, will merit not only eternal life but also “treasures in heaven.” “If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven ; and, come, follow me.” In the one case, a proof of divine charity is given by the fulfilling of the law ; in the other case, a greater proof still of that charity is shown by the doing, from a generous will, of that which is above and beyond the law. In both instances the greater or less perfection of the Christian soul is essentially

derived from the greater or less degree of charity; it is it which unites the soul to God, its last end, which gives supernatural merit to human actions, and which tempers, as it were, all other virtues with its heavenly elevating character. "Charity is the bond of perfection;" "the end of the commandment;" "God is charity," and, "he that abideth in charity abideth in God, and God in him." Even from a natural standpoint, the love of God is, for man, a dictate of nature, springing from gratitude for the benefits which he has received by creation; but in the supernatural order that love elevated by grace and aspiring to the beatific vision is also a special precept. Having in view this disposition of the divine dispensations, St. Thomas teaches that "perfection essentially consists in the observance of the commandments," "but secondarily and instrumentally in the observance of the counsels." He who sins grievously against the commandment forfeits charity, but he who, apart from the obligations of a vow, does not observe a counsel, shows only a want of generosity towards his Maker.

Charity, however, among men, is of different degrees; there is a charity,—the lowest indeed in degree,—whose test is the fulfilment of the commandments, and whose possession is necessary for salvation. He who is not in mortal sin has this charity, and, on the other hand, "he that loveth not, abideth in death." A higher degree of charity is that which consists not only in avoiding mortal sin, but also venial faults and those obstacles which stand in the way of the soul's aiming at greater intimacy with God. In this last grade of divine love, one will be imperfect, of course, when compared with the blessed in heaven, but perfect compared with others whose charity is in a lower degree. The young man spoken of in the Gospel, by keeping the commandments, was within the bounds of God's friendship; he had charity and the perfection which it denotes; but that perfection of which theologians generally speak, which, untrammelled by earthly goods, aims in the spirit of charity at higher virtues,—that perfection he had not. It was it which was offered to him by our Lord, and which he had not the courage to embrace. The substance of perfection, therefore, he possessed, but the instruments for gaining a higher degree of it he refused. In more general terms, on other occasions, Christ recommended perfection to his followers, leaving it to themselves to discriminate between what is of precept and what is of counsel. In this connection it was that He said: "Be ye perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect."

Again, in the same nineteenth chapter of St. Matthew's gospel, Christ also recommended the counsel of chastity. In answer to a wily question put to Him by the Jews, He upheld and enforced the indissolubility of the marriage-tie, affirming that the privilege

of divorce granted by Moses was wrung from him by Jewish perversity. But under the New Law He ruled that not even for adultery may divorce be granted. Afterwards, when questioned by his disciples on the expediency in such circumstances of getting married at all, He does not command an unmarried life, but leaves it to the gracious ways of Providence and to the free choice of individuals. "All men," he adds, "take not this word, . . . he that can take, let him take it." St. Paul, giving an inspired commentary on those words, writes: "Now concerning virgins, I have no commandment of the Lord, but I give counsel;" and in another passage, speaking of widows, he says: "But more blessed shall she be, if she so remain, according to my counsel." Virginity, then, by the teaching of Christ and of his apostles, though more excellent than matrimony, does not fall under any precept; there is no obligation by divine law of embracing a life of celibacy; but for those who feel themselves called thereunto there is a counsel. "I say to the unmarried and to the widows," adds the apostle, "it is good for them if they so continue, even as I."

In the text cited above, our Lord, after having recommended to the young man the renunciation of all his goods in order to gain perfection, immediately subjoined, "and come, follow me." The relation that exists between both members of the phrase clearly suggests that the perfection that is to be gained by voluntary poverty is correlated to the perfection that is to be found in the following of Christ; or that, as the renunciation of all temporal goods is a great instrument for sanctification, so, for the same end, the giving up of one's own will in all things for Christ's sake is a most effectual means. To the same purport is that other divine saying: "If any one will come after me, let him deny himself, take up his cross, and follow me." Whenever or wherever a divine precept is to be complied with, this self-denial is a strict duty; obedience is, then, of obligation. Men, if they be only sincere followers of Christ, must then renounce their own wills to follow His will, whether this be declared by express definite commandments, or be signified by those who have authority from Him. Beyond, however, the sphere of precepts there is a vast field of human activity in which man is not bound by any positive divine commandment. In that field, for his greater abnegation and for the greater love of Christ, he may do what legitimate authority tells him will be acceptable to the Divine Majesty; and then he will obey, not in virtue of a precept, but through the grace of a counsel. Thus, when the human will surrenders itself unreservedly in the spirit of self-denial, to do Christ's will as manifested by particular law or by the orders of superiors; when it depends in

all things on that will as its rule, then the words of Christ are realized to their full extent,—the abnegation of oneself becomes complete in the matter of obedience.

Indeed, so clearly marked in Holy Writ are the laws of the counsel as separate from the words of the commandments that Suarez writes: "The distinction between the counsels and the commandments rests on faith so certain, and is so expressly mentioned in Holy Scripture, and is so taught by the universal Church, that it cannot be denied without manifest heresy."

This being laid down, a further inquiry is, whether the embracing or the confirmation of the evangelical counsels by vows enters into the scope of Christ's teaching.

A vow is a free, deliberate promise made to God of something of superior excellence—*de bono meliore*; it is a law which one, of his own free choice, imposes on himself. If its subject-matter be a counsel, this, under the obligation of a vow, becomes, for him who takes it, a precept whose violation is a sin and whose observance is an act or an exercise of the virtue of religion. Hence, in the very first epochs of the history of God's people, vows received a special Divine sanction. Jacob's vow, given in the twenty-eighth chapter of Genesis, is the first of which a record has come down to us, while the blessings that he afterwards got prove that his vow was received with Divine favor. In the one hundred and thirty-first Psalm, David "vowed a vow" to build a temple to God, and how acceptable such a vow was to the Divine Majesty we learn from the seventh chapter of the second book of Kings. The tenor of many other passages in the Old Testament shows that one of the special ways by which the Jewish people honored and worshipped God was the taking of vows. All along, from the beginning, the taking of vows had received among them, time and again, the Divine sanction; to it they had recourse when pressed by calamity or when demanding particular favors, or, again, when striving to make amends for past obstinacy. They felt, and they knew from revelation, that the sacrifice of the will through the obligation of a solemn promise was most acceptable to the Lord. Of this they had a suggestive proof also in the exactness with which He required the fulfilment of vows. "When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God," it was said in the twenty-third chapter of Deuteronomy, "thou shalt not delay to pay it, because the Lord thy God will require it. And if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee for a sin."

The practice of taking vows to God had come down to men, then, from the tradition of primitive revelations; in its own peculiar nature it bore an analogy to the custom by which men bind themselves by solemn engagements to each other, and was

grounded not only on religion, but also on the principles of the moral law. The Mosaic dispensation confirmed that practice anew, and, when the ceremonial part of that dispensation ceased, men continued to vow as before, since the obligations of the moral law, and these, too, sanctioned by revealed religion, never ceased to bind consciences. Under the Gospel the moral teaching of the past was ratified by Divine authority. Christ, our Lord, threw around the moral code the light of his own revelations, opened up the springs of human conduct, and pointed out distinctly the aim or the end of human life. More than ever before the trials of that life were depicted for men, while a higher standard of virtue was proposed to them; supernatural aids which they formerly had not were now given to them; they had before them, for their Divine model, the life of God incarnate; and the royal way of the holy cross, they were told, was the way that led to victory. Whatever had braced the soul for special combats, as it were, under the old law, was now imperatively required under the new; and all the strength that vows had given to hearts in former times was now particularly called for in the case of those who, following closely their Divine Master, aspired to religious perfection. It is said, indeed, by some of the Fathers of the Church—such as St. Cyril and St. Jerome—that the prophets of old, in speaking of vows, had sometimes chiefly in view the Christian dispensation. To their prophetic vision the Kingdom of God on earth—"the New Jerusalem"—appeared in all its magnificence, governed by an eternal priesthood and sanctified by "a clean offering" "from the rising of the sun even to the going down" thereof. In that "city of God"—the "glorious church not having spot or wrinkle"—to the prophetic eye there also appeared charity, linking souls to God and to each other, and drawing hearts, through Divine grace and the habits of self-denial, to an entire offering of themselves to the Divine goodness.

With the traditions of the synagogue around him and in the light of the revelations of Christ, St. Paul, joining, so to say, in his own person, the Old Testament and the New by the same religious bonds, had taken a vow, as St. Luke informs us. What he might have done by vowing in honor of God as a son of Abraham he felt he could now do, and that with greater fervor, as a disciple of Christ. The transition from one covenant to the other did not, he was aware, change the aspirations of souls for perfection, but rather increased them, since Christ came to cast on earth the fire of Divine love, and His will is that it be enkindled in hearts. Of this love vows were to be an expression, and to denote, under new forms, a spirit of self-sacrifice and a law for the gaining of greater intimacy with God. As appertaining to Divine worship, they were

to fall also under the legislation of the Church and be regulated by it. Looking, therefore, to the fidelity implied by them, St. Paul, in his First Epistle to Timothy, denounces the wantonness of widows, "who, having made void their first faith, married again." "They had taken a vow," says St. Augustine, commenting on this text, "and had not kept it." The violation of the law which they had voluntarily imposed on themselves explains the severity of the Apostle's denunciation.

The doctrine which the Apostle taught, he had learned from his Divine Master. He knew explicitly, from Divine revelation, "the mind of Christ" when it was often hidden in His words. To St. Paul, as well as to the other apostles, were given by our Lord, after His resurrection, lessons which related to "the Kingdom of God," and which were to enter forever into the body of Catholic traditions. But the very words in which Christ promulgated the counsels contained also implicitly a counsel for the vowing of them. He pointed out means for furthering the gaining of perfection, intending surely that these means should be used not only for some years, but during the whole lifetime. One was not to put his hand to the plough and then to look back, but to persevere unto the end in the way on which he had entered. Hence the recommendation of our Lord was meant not merely for the will in its first purpose, but for the will immovably bound to that purpose by a solemn engagement or by vow. To embrace poverty and afterwards, from caprice, to put it aside, would certainly not correspond with Christ's intention in marking out for some of His followers a special way of virtuous living. According to His counsel, to give up the possession of one's goods implies not only the surrendering of the actual right to them, but also the right of reclaiming them at any future time, since one gives up everything fully and completely only when, by promise, he has made it unlawful for him to possess anything as his own in the present and future. In recommending the counsel of poverty Christ undoubtedly did so also in this latter and fullest sense, and it was in this sense that the Apostles said: "Behold! we have left all things and followed Thee." "By which words," says St. Thomas, following the interpretation of the Fathers of the Church, "the Apostles are understood to have vowed whatever belongs to the state of perfection." They, who were to be to the world the heralds of evangelical virtue, professed it certainly in its most complete form.

According to ancient Christian tradition, too, the narrative given by St. Luke of the manner of life of the first Christian converts in Jerusalem, implies that they confirmed by vow their renunciation of all earthly goods. To this conclusion the sin and punishment of Ananias and Saphira clearly point. Had they not taken a vow,

and, by reserving to themselves some of their goods, committed sacrilege by lying to the Holy Ghost, it is hard to understand how their punishment could be proportioned to their guilt; for, though the sin of Ananias was barely a lie and hypocrisy, it was not a sin against justice, nor against charity, nor against the reverence due to God. It must have been, then, only the violation of a vow that gave to the sin its heinous character. In this sense it is that St. Athanasius speaks of the fact in his sermon on the passion and cross of Christ. "As Ananias and Saphira," writes the holy doctor, "after they had made vows to God withdrew from the same vows, deceiving others; but Peter, the minister of truth, thrust them from him, saying: 'You have lied, not to men, but to God.'"

And St. Gregory the Great writes, in a letter to Venantius: "Ananias had vowed money, from which, afterwards overcome by the persuasion of the devil, he took away something; but with what a death he was punished you are aware."

Again, the first beatitude, as given by St. Matthew, counsels, in the opinion of many Fathers of the Church, the vow of voluntary poverty. By the beatitude our Lord also intended, no doubt, to teach the virtue of humility, or poverty of affection, but the woes which St. Luke records as a kind of counterpart to the beatitudes, show that by "the poor in spirit" Christ had perhaps mainly in view the voluntarily poor. He said: "Blessed are ye poor, for yours is the kingdom of heaven." And afterwards, to bring out, as it were, more strikingly the blessedness which He promised, He subjoined: "But woe to you that are rich, for you have your consolation." He promises a kingdom to the poor, a reward which suggests the giving up of all things in this world for Christ's sake. Both in deed and affection He himself had given up all things and thus sanctified poverty, and surely to vow what had been thus sanctified must be most commendable and meritorious in the eyes of God. The vow gives a new value to the counsel, since to vow according to Catholic teaching is to perform an act of Divine worship. It is, moreover, not only to consecrate one's actions to God, but also the faculties from which these actions proceed, or, as St. Anselm remarks, it is to give to God not only the fruit but the tree also.

A line of argument similar to that just given leads to the same conclusion in regard to the vow of chastity. This counsel, as we have seen, was proposed in the nineteenth chapter of the Gospel of St. Matthew, on the occasion of the Apostle's asking an explanation of the law of marriage originally given by God, but in some instances dispensed with for special causes by Moses. After having explained how, by a defect of nature or by the physical action of men, the law of generation is in some cases frustrated,

Christ adds: "And there are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven. He that can take, let him take it." The antithesis between these words and the context evidently indicates a solemn promise or vow as a cause of continency. Those to whom allusion is made have, by a voluntary engagement, made it unlawful for themselves to contract marriage. Not obliged to celibacy by any natural or physical cause, since Christ excludes this; not constrained to it also by any common law of Christian life, it follows that they are bound to it only by a law arising from their own free act or vow. After this manner St. Epiphanius, St. Augustine, St. Jerome and Fulgentius interpret the aforesaid words of Christ.

The same thesis is still more clearly proved from the text before cited of St. Paul to Timothy, in which he writes of some younger widows, "that when they have grown wanton in Christ they will marry. Having damnation because they have made void their first faith." The Apostle had taught elsewhere that death dissolves the marriage bond. It is not, therefore, on account of a second marriage that a widow is in a state of "damnation;" nor can it be even for a sin of incontinency, since she does not thereby violate her first faith; but her sin is that, having taken a vow of chastity or having pledged her faith to Christ, her spiritual spouse, she violated it by marrying again. It is only the violation of a vow that could entail such punishment as the Apostle mentions. For the interpretation of the text just given there is, according to Suarez, a consensus of Greek and Latin Fathers, and the "consensus Patrum" is a certain rule of belief.

This vow of chastity has been especially dear to the Church from the very beginning. The fragrance of virginity was all around her at her very rising, and virgins were the object of her special attention. St. Ignatius of Antioch, the disciple of St. Polycarp, who himself was a disciple of St. John, wrote of virgins, "being consecrated to God, they are to be honored," and that "they are to remember to whom they have consecrated themselves." In the third century Tertullian and St. Cyprian wrote treatises on "the veiling of virgins,—*de velandis virginibus*." The same spirit of love for virginity is traceable through the legislation of the primitive Church. In the third book of the Apostolic Constitutions, ascribed to Pope St. Clement, the disciple of St. Peter, it is prescribed that vows are not to be taken rashly or without due consideration. In the Council of Ancyra, in 310, it was decreed that those who put aside their vow of virginity and married were to be held guilty of bigamy. The General Council of Chalcedon ordained that monks or nuns who, after having taken vows, attempted to marry should be excommunicated. The like teaching runs through

the acts of the Popes Sergius, St. Leo the Great, Gelasius and St. Gregory the Great.

The vow of chastity, then, as a means of gaining perfection and as a sacrifice most agreeable to God, has ever been, from the very dawn of Christianity, before the mind of the Church. It could not forget the example of the glorious and Immaculate Virgin Mother of God, or the solemn promise of virginity with which she had consecrated herself to her Maker, since it is only on the supposition of the virgin's vow that, according to the great doctors of the Church, her words in answer to the message of the archangel can be explained. This is the doctrine which St. Gregory of Nyssa lays down in his sermon on the birth of Christ; and St. Augustine, in his book on virginity, on the words of the Virgin, "How shall this be done, because I know not man?" writes: "She would certainly not have said this had she not formerly vowed her virginity to God." The Virgin's whole soul in the spirit of charity, suggests St. Anselm, was intent only on this, namely, to consecrate her body and soul, by perpetual virginity, to God. And thus it has come to pass that this truth, like a beauteous star, has cast its mild, soft light, in every age, on the Christian world. In the mysteriousness of Divine revelations the Virgin had taken her vow, and, though afterwards betrothed to St. Joseph, she knew from God that that vow would remain inviolate. "A just man," Joseph himself, as ancient Christian tradition teaches, had also vowed chastity to God and become the guardian of the Virgin and of her Divine child—a shield of defence for them against the calumnies and plotting of Jewish enemies.

The counsel of obedience, as we have seen, was proposed by our Lord, in the invitation which he gave to the young man to follow him, as well as in the more general statement that, "If any one will come after me, let him deny himself, take up his cross and follow me." Here, however, we wish to examine whether the vow of obedience was inculcated by the same divine teaching.

A most striking feature of Christ's teaching, in general, was its plain, simple, practical character. There was nothing like mere theory in it; it was not formally based on reasoning from induction or deduction, was not the result of human experience or a summary of the views of former ages. On the contrary, it ran counter to most of the philosophy of the time, brought out prominently virtues that were ignored by Jew and Gentile, and put into the mind of the world ideas for all time and for all peoples. The authoritative manner in which that teaching was given, the luminousness with which it shone in on the soul as on its fitting abode, and the elevation which it gave to human nature, made it to be a new light for the world. Men might know, even from Christ's method of

teaching, that it was God Himself who spoke with them. He began by building up the soul, and then laid down rules for human conduct. Faith, according to His doctrine, was to be the first great element of supernatural life, and the key to the knowledge of supernatural things; while the following of Himself, or the imitation of His life, was to be the practical rule for all those who wish to be saved. This rule men can observe more or less closely; in its essential form, or as it is marked out by the commandments, it has to be observed by all the faithful. Every one who wishes to gain salvation must follow Christ in this manner, he must be ready to die sooner than commit a mortal sin, and to forfeit the whole world sooner than lose his own soul. He who tramples on Christ's law and is thus estranged from Him by grievous sin, does not follow Him, but rather Satan, or the world, or the flesh.

To observe the commandments, then, is the first necessary condition for following Christ, and those who fulfil it are on the way to salvation. But the generosity of divine love will induce many of the faithful not to stop at that, or not to measure their devotion by the bare fulfilment of the precepts. They will wish to observe not only these, but the counsels also, in order to follow Christ more closely, and to imitate Him in that which was the great distinctive feature of His life, obedience; "becoming obedient unto death, even to the death of the cross." In the abnegation which this obedience supposes there are, of course, different degrees. Some will purpose to follow Christ as faithfully and as closely as they can, but will, however, retain the power of limiting the extent of their obedience. They will follow Christ, but still with some reservation. Others will follow Him in all things and at all times, putting no restriction on their obedience save that which sin puts on it, and surrendering their free power of choice by solemn engagement to Christ through the representatives of his authority on earth. They retain no dominion over themselves, but, to gain true liberty within the laws of the just and the holy, give up the natural liberty with which they are endowed, and thus become "free by the freedom with which Christ has made us free." It was to this liberty through the laws of obedience that He called His Apostles. They gave up in the spirit of self-denial all external goods, together with certain gratifications of the body, for God's sake; and not only that, but they vowed their understanding, will and soul in Christ's service. "Behold," said they, "we have left all things and have followed Thee. What, therefore, shall we have?" The reward which they here look for supposes the labor of the entire life as well as its duties solemnly engaged to Christ; they had not, of course, then actually lived out their whole lives, since life is made up of successive moments; but because they had solemnly dedicated those lives to

Christ, they speak of them as if already spent, or as offerings permanently and irrevocably consecrated to Him. They were in a special manner, and according to a special subordination, His disciples; they had received from Him particular precepts and a commission to preach the Gospel, and were "the foundation" of the Church, of which St. John wrote: "And the wall of the city had twelve foundations, and in them the twelve names of the twelve apostles of the Lamb." From the office, therefore, which they received from Christ as well as from their profession of obedience sprang their unchangeableness of resolution, since, as St. Thomas teaches, "this unchangeableness in the following of Christ is rendered firm by vow." By this, as it binds up, as it were, in a moment a lifetime through the force of an obligation, one is enabled to offer, all at once, to God his whole life in abnegation and obedience. Hence, as man's will is that which is dearest to him, his greatest renunciation will lie in surrendering, in what is lawful, his will to him who holds authority from Christ, and who in virtue of his office is, in regard to those subject to him, in the place of Christ. To His disciples, and in their persons undoubtedly to all in His Church having power from Him, our Lord said: "He who hears you hears me, and he who despises you despises me." On this subject St. Basil writes: "The superior of those who have taken a vow of obedience to Him represents in their regard the person of our Lord Jesus Christ, performing the office of mediator between God and men, and offering to God in sacrifice the wills of those who profess to obey Him."

In the ears of the primitive Church the words of Christ, as He invited men to the higher life of the counsels, were continually ringing. Conduct, they knew, was the great proof of love, and the measure of that love was the abnegation practiced for Christ's sake. They heard repeated to them, that the rewards of the perfect are the treasures of heaven, and that every one that "hath left house or brethren or sisters or father or mother or wife or children or lands for my name's sake, shall receive a hundred-fold and shall possess life everlasting." These texts and similar ones were present to the minds of the first generations of Christians. They knew, moreover, from the teaching of the Old Law, that a seal, so to say, of perfection, is a vow, since it implies a special dedication to virtuous living, and they had read it in the book of Numbers: "When a man or woman shall make a vow to be sanctified, and will consecrate themselves to the Lord, . . . all the days of separation he shall be holy to the Lord." And again, "This is the law of the Nazarite, when he hath vowed his obligation to the Lord in the time of his consecration." With this divine teaching before them, and in the fervor of their love for Christ, many of the Christians of

the Apostolic Church, in view of the highest perfection, made by vows an entire offering of themselves to God. In this sense, St. Chrysostom, St. Jerome and St. Augustine understand the fourth chapter of the Acts of the Apostles, and with their opinions before him, St. Thomas pronounces, doctrinally, that "it was from the disciples of Christ that all religious life took its origin." St. Chrysostom styles the religious life "a philosophy introduced by Christ," and Suarez holds that the Apostles themselves took the three vows of poverty, chastity and obedience, as belonging to the state of perfection.

As a corollary, then, from the premises which we have been laying down, it follows that from the profession of the vows of poverty, chastity and obedience there results a state of perfection or the religious state. That is, a state whose principal end is the perfection of charity, and whose means for attaining that end are chiefly the facility and peace and firmness which spring from the obligations of vows.

A state of life, when there is question of persons, implies, according to Suarez, two things (1), "perfection in some condition or mode of existence; (2), rest and stability therein." The latter requires a certain adhesion of the person to the state or an obligation of remaining in it, and this obligation again must come from something like a permanent cause, or from a cause morally permanent. The ever-varying accidents of life, then, do not make a state. A servant, by the mere fact of his obeying his master, is not in a state, since, at his will, he can change his condition; neither is he in a new state who happens to obtain some civil office, which confers a dignity but does not make a state. But persons are said to be in a state of sin, since they are in a state of bondage, arising from the impossibility in which the sinner is of freeing himself from his sinfulness by his own natural power, while the just are said to be in a state of grace, having an obligation of serving God, and possessing His divine help, which, of itself, is a support of their state. And thus they are in a state of bondage to God, but this bondage is true liberty.

A state for acquiring Christian perfection, therefore, or the perfection of charity, implies a fixed condition of life in view of that end; it also imports the removal of what impedes the practice of charity and has coupled with it certain stated exercises which relate to the worship and glory of God. It is the obligations which are contracted that go to make the state. Hence, those who bind themselves by a vow of chastity, as all those who receive holy orders in the Latin Church, are "inchoative," as Suarez writes, or, in a limited sense, in a certain state of perfection. But the state, properly and simply so called for acquiring Christian perfection, is

the religious state. It alone embraces all the means marked out in the Gospel for furthering the soul in the practice of virtue, it removes all these general impediments to charity which spring from our fallen nature, and invites and prepares persons, if they be willing, to gain higher and higher degrees of charity. It supplies instruments for the acquiring of virtue, but, by itself, does not make persons virtuous. The religious state springs essentially from the vows of poverty, chastity and obedience, approved and accepted by the Church; but, as the doctor just quoted remarks, other obligations than those arising from vows the Church may take to constitute a state of perfection.

In religious life, then, the obligations which come from vows give to it stability or a moral firmness on one unchangeable plane, and thus make it a state—a school for the exercising and acquiring of Christian perfection. Outside of that state, most certainly, persons can attain the greatest sanctity by the practice of charity, which is “the bond of perfection;” they may also minister to others with great zeal and merit, but for all that, though, perhaps, individually perfect in a high degree, they are not in a regularly constituted state for acquiring perfection. “For one,” writes St. Thomas, “is properly said to be in a state of perfection, not because he elicits an act of perfect charity, but because he binds himself forever in a certain solemn ceremony to these things which belong to perfection.” In another passage, he explains what these things are and how they help to the forming of the soul to perfection. They are,—the vow of poverty, which cuts off all solicitude and cupidity about earthly possessions; the vow of chastity, which forbids all deliberate sensuality; and the vow of obedience, which excludes a badly regulated will. All the other observances of religious life are in some way directed to these laws of the vows, and form that discipline of life and give that freedom of mind which promote the exercise of charity. To perfection, therefore, it belongs not only to do what is perfect, but also to vow what is perfect. To observe continence is in itself a perfection, but to observe the same under the obligation of a vow is not only to practice the virtue of continence, but also that of religion, or to acquire a double perfection. To be poor for Christ’s sake merits His special graces, but to become professionally poor by vow is to add religious consecration to the virtue of poverty. To practice obedience according to Christ’s law is most commendable, but to subject one’s will by vow to the mighty will of God, and, in Christ’s language, to lose one’s soul for His sake, is more pleasing to God than sacrifices. “Obedience is better than sacrifices.”

But the highest state of perfection on earth is the episcopate; it is “*perfectionis magisterium*,” as St. Thomas calls it. It is not a

state for acquiring perfection as the religious state is, but a state of perfection already acquired, and that especially in behalf of others. Religious are bound only to tend to perfection, bishops are bound to possess it; the obligations of religious spring from their vows, those of bishops from their pastoral charges. In the case of the former, the removal of obstacles to their perfection is required; in that of the latter, as their high office implies, such removal is not deemed necessary. Bishops are considered to have acquired that degree of perfection which needs not those means supplied by vows for the exercise of charity. They are the successors of the Apostles, the Council of Trent teaches; "they are the pillars of the Church," writes St. Athanasius; and "nothing is more sublime than the episcopacy," remarks St. Ambrose. "It behooveth a bishop to be blameless," says St. Paul.

For the reception and exercise of the priesthood, and especially in its plenitude as bishops receive it, great interior perfection or holiness is required. Still the sacramental character which they receive in consecration does not of itself place them, strictly speaking, in a state of perfection. Holy Orders fit one for sacred functions, but do not make a state of perfection. By the fact, St. Thomas teaches, "that one receives Holy Orders, he is not thereby put in a state of perfection, although in him interior perfection is required that he may worthily exercise the sacred ministry." The episcopal state arises especially from the bishop's obligations to his flock; it is these moral obligations which condition it as a state, and give to it its stability; and it is from the same obligations that the perfection of the state results. A bishop, in taking the pastoral office, binds himself irrevocably to his see and to all that belongs to the perfection of his state. Nay, even, if circumstances should require it, he is bound to lay down his life for his flock. "The perfection of the episcopal state," writes the aforementioned great doctor, "consists in this, namely, that the bishop, through a motive of great divine love, binds himself to labor for the salvation of the neighbor, and on that account to retain his pastoral charge as long as he can promote the spiritual welfare of those intrusted to his care." It is not permitted to a bishop, then, to lay down his crosier without the Pope's special dispensation, and without the same it is not allowed to him to join a religious order, or to assume an inferior grade in the ministry, in order to curtail the responsibilities of his office, although both of these changes priests in their own sphere of duties can canonically adopt. The bonds of the bishop can be loosened only by the Bishop of bishops, the successor of St. Peter.

It is of faith that the episcopate is of divine institution; it is also a point of Catholic teaching that the religious state, as to its funda-

mental principles (substantialia), is of divine right (de jure non præcipiente sed consulente, writes Suarez). But the determination of that state to this or that form under the sanction of the Church has come from men guided, no doubt, by the Holy Spirit. Christ Himself, all Christian antiquity teaches, sowed the seeds of religious life and put them together with the grace of His words into the great heart of the Church. His will was that they should grow and produce fruit, and that that fruit should remain. But to suppose that His words of life remained dead for ages, that the seed of those words had fallen altogether by "the way-side" or on "stony ground," or that no hearts were found good enough to thoroughly correspond with it until the time of St. Anthony, would seem like derogating from the efficacy of divine grace. The history of the very first ages of the Church does away with such a supposition.

The inspired record of St. Luke, as we have seen, teaches how the first glow of devotion took the multitude of Christian converts beyond the observance of the commandments to the observance of the counsels. In their fervor they wished to imitate Christ as closely as they could; and, after the manner in which circumstances permitted it, dedicated themselves by a solemn engagement to God's service. Even then, sacred virgins consecrated themselves by special vow to God. Iphigenia, we are told, was received to the profession of virginity by St. Matthew, Thecla by St. Paul, and Petronilla by St. Peter.

What St. Luke writes of the Christians of Jerusalem, that St. Jerome writes of the Christians of Alexandria under St. Mark. In his work on *Ecclesiastical Writers*, he says of the Evangelist: "Having taken with him the Gospel which he had finished, he went into Egypt, and, first announcing Christ at Alexandria, founded a Church noted for such doctrine and continency of life that all the converts to Christianity followed his example. Afterwards Philo, a most eloquent Jew, seeing the first church at Alexandria still observing some legal ceremonies, wrote a book on their way of life, and in praise of his own race, and as St. Luke relates that the faithful in Jerusalem had all things in common, so he (Philo) also has recorded what he saw practiced at Alexandria under the great teacher St. Mark."¹ That Philo speaks of Christians and not of Jews in the work alluded to by St. Jerome has, I think, been satisfactorily proved by Cardinal Baronius and by Natalis Alexander. The Jewish author describes in detail what was the manner of life of these early Christian ascetics; how they loved solitude and practiced mortification and prayer; how they studied Holy Scriptures, and meditated on them, and how they offered praise to God,

¹ The testimony of St. Jerome is confirmed by that of Eusebius of Cesarea.

and listened to the instructions of their teachers. He calls them Therapeutæ, either because they offered pure worship to God, or because they cured their own souls and the souls of others by freeing them from sin.

Many writers have also quoted on this subject the testimony of St. Dionysius the Areopagite, in his book on the *Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*. In it the very rites are prescribed for the initiation of the monk into the life of perfection which he proposes to lead; he is to give himself up, we are told, to the contemplation of the divine mysteries, to perform his actions with great holiness, and to attend to his sanctification under the direction of the bishops. Grave critics, however, deny the genuineness of this work, as well as of the other writings attributed to the convert of St. Paul. They were not written, they maintain, by him, but by an author of the fourth or fifth century under the assumed name of the Areopagite; just as St. Sylvanus, they say, wrote under the name of Timothy, and Vincent of Lerins under that of Peregrinus. But waiving the question of the genuineness of the works of St. Dionysius, the argument derived from the esteem with which they were held in the Church retains still much of its persuasiveness. Reference is made to them in a Lateran council in 649, and again in the sixth general council in 680, and by Pope St. Agatho in a letter to Constantine Pogonatus, confirming the acts of the same council. They are mentioned by the Popes St. Gregory the Great, Adrian I., Nicolas I., by Archbishop Hincmar, by Anastasius the Librarian, by Photius, by St. John Damascene, and by St. Thomas Aquinas, who has commented on them. Now, all through the Christian ages no exception was taken to the Areopagite's teaching on the beginnings of the religious life, and no one objected to it, because, undoubtedly, it was somehow in accordance with the ancient traditions of the Church on the origin of the practice of the evangelical counsels. No innovation was noticed in the passage referred to from the *Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*, because it only determined in a particular way the teaching of St. Luke, or, perhaps, because it assigned a definite date for the original institution of cenobites, who afterwards, under St. Anthony, filled Egypt with their piety.

And, indeed, it is a saying of some of the early Fathers of the Church, that St. John the Baptist was the first monk, as the Apostles were the first priests. They also refer to the apostolic college as a model of a perfect religious community. St. Augustine says of himself, that, following the example of the Apostles, he strove to lead a life of perfection, and Pope Pius IV., in a Bull issued in behalf of the clerks-regular of St. Augustine, speaks of them as having been instituted by the Apostles. The writings of Tertullian and St. Cyprian suggest that down from the apostolic age the

tradition of the religious life was kept up in one way or another. About the year 250 the life of the anchorets becomes known in history through St. Paul the hermit, and shortly after, the cenobitical life is illustrated by the life of St. Anthony. He did not institute monasticism, but perfect it. "He exhorted all," says St. Athanasius, "to prefer nothing in the world to the love of Christ." "He was like a physician given by God to Egypt. For who met him grieving, and did not go away rejoicing? Who came mourning over his dead, and did not forthwith lay aside his grief? Who came wrathful, and was not converted to friendship? What poor man came wearied . . . and did not despise wealth and comfort himself in his poverty?" In him the great animating central principle of religious life was exemplified,—a principle which when fully realized elevates the mind, broadens the heart and ennobles the whole being. It is "the principle of *heroic love* thrown into system by the saints;" *love*—for it is the entire abandonment of self for Christ's sake in order to serve him with all devotedness; *heroic*,—because self, with all that the world can give, and natural affection and self-love suggest, is sacrificed through the soul's energy for God's love by the sword of the Spirit.

But during those first ages of the Church, the sword of the persecutor was almost always unsheathed against the Christians. In town and country their footsteps were dogged by Roman imperial agents, so that amid such difficulties the Christians' greatest safeguard was not to attract notice by any new form or manner of life. Men and women aspiring then to high Christian perfection strove as best they could to carry out their holy purposes privately or under the common conditions of social life; though even then, during, perhaps, the bloodiest of all the persecutions, that of Domitian, we read of a convent of fifty virgins on the borders of the Roman empire, at Nisibis in Mesopotamia. But when peace and liberty were given to the Church by Constantine, the spirit of piety, that had been pent up, burst forth like "a mighty wind," and bore thousands of Christians into the desert, there under rule to lead lives of religious perfection.

The history of the Church bears ample testimony in every age to the devotedness and labors of religious orders. Along the line of centuries, amid the ravages of barbarians and the strifes of peoples and the inroads of heresy, the religious life has been light as well as life for the world. "From monasteries piously instituted and rightly governed," says the Council of Trent, "splendor and utility have come to the Church." In our time, summing up the traditional glories of the religious state, Pope Pius IX. styled religious orders "those chosen phalanxes of the army of Christ which have always been the bulwark and ornament of the Christian

republic as well as of Christian society." Far back in the Christian ages, when the Church was shaken to her foundation by heresy, and when mercenaries, instead of true pastors, were within her sanctuary, it was Athanasius, who had lived in the desert for some years under St. Anthony, that in the first general council, with God's power and grace, victoriously upheld faith in the divinity of Christ. In the fourth and fifth centuries, especially when the offshoots of Arianism were continually appearing, some of the greatest champions of orthodoxy came forth from the cloister. By their writings they opened up the sources of Catholic truth, unfolded divine revelation, by the force of genius linked together Catholic doctrines, and thus became, in the Church of God, for all future ages, "the light of the world." Catholic teaching will always turn for guidance to such doctors as Saints Gregory of Nazianzen and Nyssa, Saints Basil and Chrysostom, Saints Jerome and Augustine and Gregory the Great. In those by-gone times, it not unfrequently happened that when Catholic faith was trampled on by unfaithful guardians, it found a secure asylum among the monks in their monasteries. "His monasteries," says Cardinal Newman, writing of St. Basil, "became, in a short time, schools of that holy teaching which had been almost banished from the sees of Asia; and it is said that he was in the practice of making a circuit of the neighboring towns, from time to time, to preach to them the Nicene doctrine. This, indeed, was a benefit which was not unfrequently rendered to the Church, in that hour of apostasy, by these ascetics, and for which we who now live have reason to be grateful to them."

Another great splendor, arising to the Church from religious orders, has been the preaching of the Gospel. It was they who, in the early mediæval period, gave those men who converted some twenty barbarous tribes and made them the parents of so many Christian nations. Having received a commission from the vicar of Christ, the successor of St. Peter, to preach the Gospel, monks went forth to plant the cross in lands whither the legions of imperial Rome had never gone. Their only arms were their virtues. "In hunger and thirst, in fastings often, in cold and nakedness," they preached Christ crucified, and often sealed their testimony of Him with their life-blood. Their monastic homes, the centres of industrial activity, as well as the centres of enlightenment for the neighboring tribes, they established in the open plains or on the mountain-side or in the depths of the forests. After they had taught barbarians how to live as Christian men, they instructed them, under the guidance of the Church, how to live as members of society. The spirit which swayed the monastic preaching of the mediæval period is that which has animated the preachers of re-

ligious orders in modern times. Their great final aim has been always the same, namely, to gain souls to Christ, to bring them to repent of past sins, to subdue, to pacify and discipline them in accordance with Christian law, and to make them live with hope as heirs of the Kingdom of God. But though their final object has always been the same, the enemies whom the missionaries of latter times have had to contend with are different from those of the former period, and the field of their labors, owing to the discovery and exploration of foreign lands, has grown more vast than that of their predecessors. Heresy had now put on new features, or rather had fitted heresies of the past to the corrupt spirit of the age, and thus separated whole nations from the fold of Christ. Under the direction of the Popes and of the bishops, the members of religious orders went forth to battle with this new enemy. They preached from pulpits and by the way-side, lectured in the schools, explained the true faith before assembled national conventions, grappled with their adversaries in close controversy and compelled heresiarchs to fall back and shift their position or to abdicate their errors. The contest for truth was a long one; in Germany, according to Lord Macaulay, Protestantism was driven back to the German Ocean; in England and Ireland missionaries had a price set upon their heads, and lived under the shadow of the rack and the gibbet in order to preserve the faith of the people.

But their labors among heathen nations and tribes in distant lands are one of the noblest monuments of the zeal of religious orders. Over the whole globe there is not a country that does not bear witness in their behalf, and no others are there to whom may be so justly applied the words of the poet:

"Quæ regio in terris nostri non plena laboris."

India and Japan and China have not lost the inheritance of the faith that had been given and secured to them by the members of religious orders. By them also the cross of Christ was borne into the heart of Africa and into the various islands of the ocean. To-day in those same countries, as well as in all other heathen lands, members of the same religious families are, as of old, actively engaged in their apostolic missions.

In America, too, the first preachers of the Catholic faith were men vowed to God's service in religious life. Amid hardships and dangers of every kind they sought the Indians in their wilds, lived among them, and comforted and civilized them. Along the banks of the Amazon, down the slopes of the Cordilleras to the coast of the Pacific, in the West India islands, the missionaries were the Indians' defenders against the tyranny of cruel masters, and succeeded sometimes in breaking the chains with which slavery had bound their poor neophytes. On the banks of the Paraguay

and the Parana they taught them how to use the implements of industry, how to conform to Catholic social life, and then how, by cultivation, to fertilize the soil until "the wilderness blossomed like the rose." The first to announce the Gospel in the northern part of this great continent were, again, members of the same religious bodies. Their names, it must be admitted by all, are at the very roots of its civilization, their history enters largely into its primitive annals, and the blood also of some among them as martyrs for the faith has entered into American earth on the coast of Florida and by the courses of the Rio Grande, of the Mohawk, of the Penobscot, and of the St. Lawrence. So that on Catholic truth, sealed with that blood, the Church of God rests here to-day in all her grandeur through the length and breadth of this Republic.

Through the influence of the Holy Spirit within the Church, another glory derived to her from the religious state has been the moulding of her doctrines into a scientific form. Every age has produced its own crop of error, has had its own social dangers and its own greater or less rationalistic tendencies. To keep back as much as possible this flood of evil, and to point out to men the way of truth and life, is the office of God's Church on earth,—an office which she has faithfully fulfilled through the course of ages. For centuries she had to defend Christ and his Blessed Mother against the insults of heresy. Later on, she had to meet not only single errors but also error put into system with all the subtlety and force that keen, well-trained intellects could give to it. Jew and Moslem, having mastered in their schools all the resources of dialectics, attacked by their aid the very fundamental principles of the Christian religion. In that crisis in the life of the Church, her great champions were scholars trained to knowledge in the cloister. With reason fully equipped in all the arts of logic, they braced, as it were, by the force of argument Christian truths, and made reason tell for faith, and faith enlighten reason. While the Crusaders were fighting the Saracen at Jerusalem, at Ascalon and Acre, those great Christian scholars were engaged in a still more vital struggle with him in the intellectual arena. They were victorious, and out of the contest came the great body of Christian truth—definite, proportioned, complete.

Again, in the sixteenth century, the life of the Church was fiercely assailed, heresy denied almost all Catholic doctrine, and tore up all the great landmarks of truth set up by Catholic teaching in the past. And again, to meet the objections raised by error, theology was unfolded with new vigor, and strengthened with new argument by the great teachers of religious bodies; so that, in the controversy, as far as argument went, heresy had no ground to

stand upon. Theology then received a new development, and, in the Church, still runs on, qualified, in matters of opinion, by the teaching of the great schools of her religious orders.

In enumerating the glories that have come to the Church from the religious state, those glories are not to be forgotten which she has gathered from her devoted daughters, the spouses of Christ in religion. Ever since the apostolic age these have been for her the sweet odor of Jesus Christ, and this, with a beautiful variety, according to their different callings. Some of them in seclusion, devoted to contemplation and prayer, and to the singing of the praises of the Lord, by their lives of penance make intercession for the sins of men. Others among them zealously devote themselves to the laborious work of education, or to the care of the sick, or to the solace of the aged and the poor, and that with a heroism of virtue which has won the admiration of men of every creed. Among the homes of savages, in the midst of heathen nations, on the battlefields even, through the islands of the seas as well as through the great cities of the world, those heroic spouses of Christ have ministered to Him, and, with their great charity around them, have been a light to the world.

But the greatest of the glories resulting to the Church from religious orders is the recognized sanctity of many of their deceased members. "Marked with the sign of the servants of our God," they stand "before the throne and in the sight of the Lamb, clothed with white robes, and palms in their hands." They are confessors, who "are come out of great tribulation," and with heroic fortitude confessed Christ before men; virgins, "purchased from among men the first-fruits to God," who "follow the Lamb whithersoever he goeth;" martyrs, "who have washed their robes and made them white in the blood of the Lamb," and with their own blood have given to Christ the great testimony of love.

"Like the different forces of the same army," says an eloquent writer, "they (the religious orders) have displayed, even in the diversity of their rules and tendencies, that variety in unity which constitutes the fruitful loveliness and sovereign majesty of Catholicity, and, beyond this, have practiced, as far as consists with human weakness, those evangelical precepts, the accomplishment of which conducts to Christian perfection. Occupied, above all, in opening to themselves the way to heaven, they have given to the world the grandest and most noble of lessons in demonstrating how high a man can attain on the wings of love purified by sacrifice and of enthusiasm regulated by faith."

THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE CHURCH IN REGARD TO EDUCATION.

Acta et Decreta Sacrorum Conciliorum Collectio Lacensis. Herder, Friburgi Brisgoviae.

Der Moderne Staat und die Christliche Schule. By Rev. Florian Riess, S. J. Herder, Friburg. 1868.

Geschichte der Paedagogik. By Dr. Albert Stökl. Kirchheim, Mainz. 1876.

The Judges of the Faith and Godless Schools. By Rev. Thomas J. Jenkins. Egan, New York. 1882.

IN a previous article, taking mainly the natural law for our guide, we endeavored to define the rights and duties of the family and State in matters of education, reserving those of the Church for future treatment. That the Church, according to the intention of her divine founder, should have certain invisible and inalienable rights, must be evident to all true believers in Christianity. Christ has given her a constitution, a social organization, independent of all human power. He has constructed her as a moral edifice upon the unshaken rock of unity, cemented with that divine authority with which He vested her rulers, the apostles and their successors, and chief of all, St. Peter and his followers, her supreme head. He has organized her into a body politic with superiors having power to command, to legislate, to direct, to coërcé; in short, endowed with all those legislative, judiciary and executive means necessary or conducive to her divine purpose, the direction of the faithful to their last end. To those rulers He gave the power of binding and loosing, *i.e.*, of imposing and dispensing with moral obligations, with such efficacy that their decisions should be ratified with divine sanction in heaven. This power has been granted to the Church, not for a time within certain limits, but unto the end of the world, independent of all circumstances, of all social and political changes.

Such a divine social organization as the Church is, must needs by her very constitution possess extensive rights. Chief among them is the right to *teach*, to educate. Jesus Christ, the Son of God, the way, the truth and the life, came into the world as a *master*, a *teacher*, a *prophet*. As such He was expected by the Jews; as such He manifested Himself as *the Prophet*, who taught as one having power, not as the Scribes and Pharisees. Through

Him God has spoken to the world, after having revealed Himself at divers times and in divers ways through the prophets of old.

But Christ's teaching was confined to a limited territory and a small portion of mankind. His mission was with the stray sheep of Israel's fold. The preaching of the gospel and the teaching of the nations He reserved for the Apostles and their followers. For this teaching office He instructed His Apostles with the greatest care during the three years of His public life. After having thus trained and prepared them He conferred upon them that inviolable charter available for all times and places: "All power is given to me in heaven and on earth; *going, therefore, teach ye all nations.*" To guide them unerringly in their teaching, He assured them of His assistance to the end of the world; "And behold I am with you all days even to the consummation of the world." He finally sealed their infallibility by the outpouring of the Holy Ghost on that memorable day of Pentecost, when parted tongues of fire descended upon them, and they began to speak in divers tongues the wonderful works of God. Thus trained, chartered, and armed with supernatural power, they went forth on their universal mission, according to the behests of their Lord, "in Jerusalem, and Judea, and Samaria, and even to the uttermost parts of the earth," and "they taught everywhere, the Lord working withal and confirming the word with the signs that followed." When brought before the authorities of the Synagogue and the State, and called to account for their conduct, they resolutely and unflinchingly answered: *non possumus*. "We cannot but speak the things we have seen and heard." "We ought to obey God rather than men." And this has ever since been the watch-word of the Church as often as her divine rights of education have been infringed upon by the abuse of the civil power, *non possumus*.

Nor were the Apostles satisfied with teaching by word of mouth; whenever necessity or utility suggested, they also had recourse to written instructions. They became all things to all men—Jew to the Jew, Greek to the Greek, barbarian to the barbarian, wise to the wise, and foolish to the foolish—to gain all to Christ. It is but natural, then, to expect that the Church should, in course of time, open schools, as the most effectual means of teaching the nations. Therefore we see already in the second century the first of the great *Catechetical Schools* flourishing in Alexandria, which was then a great centre of learning as well as commerce. This school, founded by the convert philosopher Pantaenus, has received undying fame from the names of St. Clement and Origen. Nor were these schools, as might be inferred from their names, institutions for mere religious instruction or the teaching of the Christian doctrine. All the arts and sciences of the time, especially

philosophy, rhetoric, and literature, were thoroughly and systematically taught in them. St. Gregory Thaumaturgus in a panegyric on Origen gives us a graphic sketch of that great teacher's method. "Before receiving students," he says, "Origen used to examine them by a series of questions to discover their defects and to try to correct them. He then taught them logic to whet their understanding—not, however, the logic common with ordinary philosophers, but the logic of common sense, which is necessary to all, Greeks and barbarians, the learned and the unlearned, in short, for all men, whatever vocation they may choose to follow. To logic he added natural philosophy, which he taught in such a manner as to illustrate and classify every single object, to reduce it by a simple exposition to its first elements, and explain the nature of the whole and its parts, and the various changes to which it was subject. This he did to inspire the pupil with a rational instead of an irrational admiration of nature. Then the student was introduced to the study of geometry, the firm and unshaken basis of all the other sciences, and astronomy, which contemplates the firmament and leads to the sublime and heavenly. After these preparatory studies he was taught moral philosophy, and herein Origen exhibited to all in himself the golden mirror of virtue and piety. He taught the student particularly to enter into his own spirit, to provide for the soul above all other things, and to practice piety. He then read with them the writings of the ancient philosophers and poets, except those who denied the Providence of God; for these were not considered fit to be read, lest by them the soul should be defiled. The student was made familiar with all the philosophical systems; wherein the teacher accompanied him in spirit, as on a journey, and led him, as it were, by the hand, when anything abstruse, doubtful, or deceptive presented itself; or, like an expert swimmer, to whom no feat is unknown or untried, who, being himself secure from all danger, stretches forth his hand to extricate and save others from drowning. The course of studies was concluded with the exposition of the sacred books and the Christian philosophy. . . ."

I have quoted this rather long passage to show how the Church from the very earliest ages was solicitous to teach not only the Christian doctrine, but the whole cyclopædia of the known sciences. Alexandria, however, was not the only Christian seat of learning of this kind in the first centuries of the Church. Similar though less celebrated institutions existed in Jerusalem, Antioch, Edessa, Cæsarea, Nisibis, Neocæsarea, Nicomedia, Smyrna, Nazianzen, Byzantium, Rome, Carthage, Hippo, Lyons, and other places. These schools were principally intended for adults, while the children were commonly instructed and educated in the Christian doc-

trine and Christian life, as well as in the elements of learning, privately by the parents, or, at least, under their immediate supervision, as was the custom among the Jews, Greeks and Romans in pre-Christian times.

There are, however, instances of Christian schools for children at a very early period. We meet with the first Christian elementary school in the second century at Edessa, where a priest, named Protogenes, taught the children to read and write and sing the psalms. Nor ought we to suppose that this school was the only one of the kind existing at this period. St. Basil the Great (379), who composed the rule of the Monks of the East, not only makes the education of youth one of their chief ministries, but also gives them circumstantial hints on the method of teaching and the conduct they are to pursue in this avocation. The bishops, following the example of St. Augustine, commonly supported and instructed at their houses or churches a number of boys, who formed a kind of diocesan seminary, and from whom the various ranks of the clergy were filled. The priests soon imitated their examples in their districts, and gathered a circle of boys around them whom they instructed in the Christian doctrine, ecclesiastical chant, and the rudiments of knowledge. This practice, which had been already inculcated in provincial synods, was universally sanctioned by the sixth ecumenical council at Constantinople (681), which prescribes that schools should be opened in all parishes (*per villas et vicos*). Besides, every monastery had invariably its school attached. Whence we find from the earliest ages, besides the higher institutions which coincide with the more modern *universities*, three classes of schools—the *episcopal*, corresponding to our seminaries, the *parochial*, and the *monastic* schools.

But soon the tide of the barbarians poured down upon civilized Europe, and almost swept away every vestige of Christianity and civilization. The light of faith and learning seemed for a time to be all but extinguished, and dismal darkness to hover over the face of Europe. But God, in His sweet Providence, chose a tiny islet in the western sea, which seemed to be out of the reach of civilization, to enkindle a new flame. This "gem of the ocean," illuminated by the ray of Christianity, was destined in a short time to shed its lustre over the known world. Its schools count by hundreds, and its students by tens of thousands. Such was their fame that they attracted the eager student in quest of learning and sanctity from all parts of Europe, even from the classic shores of Hellas, to drink at their pure and untainted fountains. Such was the efficiency of these institutions that they turned out hundreds of apostles to bear the good tidings of the Gospel and the light of civilization to the Scot, and the Pict, and the Anglo-Saxon, and

the Teuton, and the Swiss, and the Gaul, and even into the very heart of Italy, which was itself, both before and after, the centre of faith and civilization. We need only recall the names of Bangor in Ireland, or of sea-girt Iona on the wild Scottish coast, or of St. Gall in Switzerland, or of Bobbio on the plains of Lombardy, to remind the reader of what the Irish Church has done for the education and civilization of Europe. We need only mention the names of St. Columbkille, St. Columbanus, St. Gall, Sts. Kilian and Emmeran, St. Virgil of Salzburg. Such was the drift of Irish Apostles to the Continent of Europe, such was their influence on civilization, that a German writer of the ninth century (Emmerich von Reichenau) exclaims, with the pointedness and warmth peculiar to his time: "O, how could we ever forget Erin, from which such light and splendor has dawned upon us! For, though born in a land which lies to the East, the Sun of the Faith has arisen upon us, contrary to the course of nature, from the extreme West, whence he has gone forth in his splendor over all nations."

The fearless and enterprising sons of St. Benedict went forth from the Sunny South and met the sons of St. Patrick on their apostolic expeditions. To the Benedictines is mainly due the conversion and civilization of the Anglo-Saxon. Their first care on landing in Britain was to open schools. What manner of pupils they met with, we see in St. Aldhelm, Venerable Bede, Alfred the Great and Alcuin, who were prodigies of learning and burned with the desire of communicating their knowledge to their fellow-men. To these men humanity and education owe more than to generations of our modern noisy philanthropic educators. The Anglo-Saxons, now converted and civilized, took the lead in the work of civilization among European nations. From them went forth St. Winifrid, or Boniface, as he is usually called, who became the Apostle of Germany, with a numerous host of apostolic companions. Alcuin was employed by Charlemagne, not only as his own tutor, but also to found schools in various parts of the Frankish Empire. Many other Anglo Saxon and Irish monks occupied chairs in these institutions.

In these schools and in the episcopal and monastic institutions we find the germs from which the great *Universities* of the Middle Ages have been gradually developed. When we look at the number of these great institutions, when we consider the multitude of students from all parts and of all classes who flocked to them, when we review the extensive course of studies which they pursued, when we behold those great lights who occupied their chairs, we must conclude that, in those ages which modern writers and talkers are pleased to call "dark," though illiteracy may have been more common, yet higher education was more universal and a good deal

more thorough and substantial than in our own enlightened age.¹ Whatever modern educationalists may think or say in disparagement of the mediæval system of education, we cannot induce ourselves to believe that institutions which turned out writers and thinkers like Albertus Magnus, St. Thomas Aquinas, St. Bonaventure, Duns Scotus, Alexander of Hales, Roger Bacon and such polished geniuses as Dante, Petrarch, Chaucer or Sir Thomas More, have been inferior to our modern "cram" and high-pressure universities with all their vaunted progress. Nor can the mediæval schools be despised for their ignorance in the natural sciences any more than Lord Bacon or Sir Isaac Newton can be blamed for not inventing the telephone or the electric light.

While higher education was thus provided for by the Church in the Middle Ages, the popular or primary schools were by no means neglected. About the year 1400, the diocese of Prague alone, which covered a comparatively limited territory, had at least 640 elementary schools. Now, taking this number as a basis for the 63 dioceses into which Germany was then divided and which were in great part more extensive and populous than Prague, we obtain more than 40,000 elementary schools in Germany alone. As the same discipline essentially prevailed with regard to schools throughout the Church, we might make a similar approximate calculation for the other countries. In the year 1378 we find 63 lay teachers occupied in elementary schools in the city of Paris, a very considerable number for the then existing population. Of these, 22 were female teachers, a circumstance which shows that the education of the female sex was then sufficiently provided for. The education of the female sex, however, was then, as it is now in the Church, wherever she is free, mainly in the hands of religious women. Every convent had its school for externs as well as for the members of its own community. Should any one wish further information on the high attainments of the ladies of the Middle Ages, we would refer him to Montalembert's brilliant chapter on the "Anglo-Saxon Nuns," in his interesting history of the *Monks of the West*.

We see, therefore, that the Church has from the beginning looked upon education as her province. She has practically educated the nations for 1800 years, and continues in the exercise of this minis-

¹ Before the so-called Reformation we count 66 European Catholic Universities of note, of which Italy possessed 17, Germany 14, France 12, Spain and Portugal 10, England 2, Scotland 3, Hungary 3, other countries 5. In the 14th century the University of Bologna numbered 13,000 students, while the University of Oxford (including fellows, tutors and students) formed a body of 30,000. The number of years devoted to study exclusive of the preparatory course was generally 7 for arts and 12 for professional branches (Theology, Medicine, Law), making in all at least 19 years of higher studies, or more in case of less than ordinary success.

try wherever she enjoys her liberty. She has received an inviolable charter from her divine Founder. She has founded the first schools in Christendom and gathered the élite of Christian genius to imbibe the pure waters of learning from their limpid sources. She preserved the remnants of ancient civilization from the devouring flames of barbaric invasion and the levelling fury of sectarian fanaticism. She has given birth to those great institutions of learning which will be remembered in history as the cradles of genius and seats of literature and the fine arts when all our modern public schools and universities will have glided into forgetfulness. From her bosom have gone forth the great teaching orders and congregations of both sexes, who, bound by the holy vows of poverty, chastity and obedience, untrammelled by all earthly ties, free from the clogging influences of worldly affections, devote themselves, whole and undivided, to the work of education. To-day, while her rights are violated by the machinations of godless states and still more godless secret sects; while her children are perfidiously enticed or violently driven into godless and irregular state schools, she shows her divine charter, and says, as the Apostles did, "*non possumus* ; we cannot yield, we cannot betray the charge of Christ ; let the little ones come to me."

The fact that the Church has from the very outset claimed and exercised the right of educating the Christian youth is a sufficient proof of the existence of such a right. Her rights may be violated. The youth may be wrested from her arms with brute force and driven into godless institutions. Concessions may be extorted from her, whereby, to prevent greater evils, she may yield a portion of her rights, provided only the principle be maintained. But the rights entrusted to her by her Divine Spouse she can never abandon, because they imply the most serious and binding duties. Let us now enter somewhat more minutely into those rights and duties, and try, as far as space permits, to determine their extent more in detail.

And for the first, we say : *The Church has the divinely constituted and inalienable right to provide for a complete religious education of all her children in all schools, of whatever kind or grade they may be.* By a *religious education* we do not mean the mere instruction in the Christian doctrine. This, though an essential element, does not constitute a religious education. A religious education supposes a knowledge of the Christian doctrine and consists mainly in a religious and moral training by the exercise of virtuous acts and all those practices of religion which, according to the principles of revelation, constitute or insure a Christian and supernatural life. This training the church owes to all her children, and she has an indisputable right, unmolested, to fulfil this duty through

her lawful ministers, under all circumstances and in all institutions—in the high-school and university, as well as in the elementary school.

This is manifest, first, from the duty which the Church has of directing the faithful by efficacious means to their supernatural end. With the exercise of this duty the Church cannot dispense at any instant of man's life, from the moment she has received him into her fold until she delivers him up to the Supreme Pastor, at the hour of his death. But towards no stage of life is this duty so strictly incumbent upon her as towards that of youth and childhood. "As the twig is bent the tree's inclined." She must, therefore, exercise the greatest vigilance, that, while the child and youth is growing, physically and intellectually, his moral and religious development may keep pace with his bodily and mental growth. She must take care that the germ of supernatural life, which is deposited in his soul in the Sacrament of Baptism, be nurtured and watered by instruction and appropriate devotional exercises, in order that it may take deep root and wax strong into supernatural maturity. She must guard that principle against the evil influences of false doctrines and demoralizing associations, lest it may be blasted in the bud. And should the supernatural seedling become extinct by the blighting breath of sin, she must restore it by the regenerating virtue of the sacraments. Such is the divine mission of the Church, such her indispensable duty. If then the Church has received this charge from her divine spouse, she surely has the right to fulfil it without let or hindrance. But it cannot be fulfilled without free access to the schools, without a perfect freedom in teaching the children, in assembling them to daily exercises of devotion and, at stated times, to the sacraments, without the means of assuring herself of the moral and religious tone of the schools, of exercising the necessary supervision, to prevent any thing being taught by word or example which might endanger the faith or morals of the children. Any institution which excludes the Church from those functions of education or obstructs her in their free exercise evidently violates her most sacred rights. That such an institution also infringes upon the natural rights of the individual, of the family, the parents and children, and tramples under foot the inborn claims of conscience, we have shown in our previous article.

Nor need the advocates of non-sectarian education point to the reading of the Scriptures without note or comment, or to the compensation of the Sunday-school. Abstracting from the fact that the reading of a disapproved version of the Scriptures will be against the convictions of a large fraction of the parents and children, no one will look upon such reading of the Scriptures, "without

note or comment," as part or portion of a religious education, unless he indulge in the old-fashioned Protestant theory that the word of God acts immediately and directly on the soul by a quasi-inspiration. Nay, we are convinced that such mechanical reading and hearing of the Bible "without note or comment," in the schools, can only produce skepticism and generate contempt for the word of God in the minds of the children. The experiment has been so unsuccessful here in our own country that the practice is now all but abandoned in our public schools. The Sunday-school experiment, as far as non-Catholics are concerned in this country, has proved equally unsuccessful. This is evident from the complete disintegration of the Protestant sects, the gross ignorance in religious matters and the wide-spread religious indifference outside of the Catholic Church. How many of our go-to-meeting and Sunday-school young Americans know even those articles whose knowledge is absolutely necessary for salvation, to say nothing of the absolutely necessary means of salvation? Such is the drift at present, that, unless our public educational system is changed, we shall, in a few generations, have a nation of educated pagans, who will have retained of Christianity no more than a few conventional phrases. And how can it be otherwise if religion is ostracized from the schools and relegated into the Sunday-school as a branch of knowledge and education that is not worth caring for, that does not deserve a place in the ordinary life of the child or man, but is merely a matter of private interest and taste? Still less effectual will be the work of the Sunday-school, when, as is frequently the case, it is paralyzed during the week by the naturalistic or anti-Christian tone of the school and other demoralizing influences. So much has already been said and written on the influence of secular education on the Catholic youth, especially in our own country, that we prefer to pass it over in silence. The conviction has been brought home to every thinking Catholic, worthy of the name, that only a complete religious education, such as is given in Catholic schools, can preserve our children from the drift of infidelity and the deluge of immorality which a godless system of education has brought upon the country. Should the education be Christian, it is plain to all right-thinking Catholics that the schools must be Christian, that the children must move in a Christian atmosphere, not for one day in the week only, but all the year round. And this can be obtained only by the direct influence of the Church on the schools and their daily workings. If the child has an immortal soul to save, and his eternal weal or woe depends upon the issue of this affair of salvation, surely no less, but much more stress should be laid upon his training to success in this all-important business than to cleverness in the secular pursuits of life. If such

is the case, why should the Church, the divinely appointed organ instituted by God for the salvation of mankind, be excluded from the domain of education? Such an exclusion is a crying iniquity against God and man, manifesting either the grossest ignorance of the most elementary Christian maxims or the most inconceivable and fiendish malice.

But we go still farther and assert that the Church has not only the right to give a complete religious education to her children in all schools, but has also *the right of supervising the secular instruction, both literary and scientific*, at least so far as to assure herself that there is nothing either in the subject-matter taught or in the manner of conveying it which might endanger the faith or morals, or obstruct the moral and religious development, of the youth. This will appear a hard saying to the advocates of secular or unsectarian education. Yet it is only a corollary of the preceding principle. If the right of securing a complete religious education for her children can be claimed by the Church, also the right of employing the necessary means to this end must be conceded to her. A right to the end implies a right to the means. Now, who does not clearly see that all the efforts of the Church to give a Christian education would be frustrated if she had no control over the secular teaching? What will it avail the Church to teach religion to the children and inculcate its practice, if the secular teacher undoes her work by teaching and inculcating the contrary? What will it profit to teach the child that Christianity is a divine institution, if the secular teacher tells him that Christianity is a myth? What will it benefit to teach the child the history of the creation, the fall of man, and the redemption, if the secular teacher happens to be an evolutionist, and teaches that we descend, or, as some please to put it, "ascend" from the ape? What use will it be for the Church to inculcate morality, if the secular teacher denies the existence of a future retribution, or the immortality of the soul, and thus makes the lot of the just equal to that of the criminal, or puts man on the same level with the beast? In vain will the Church try to direct the child to a Christian life and to Christian virtue if, in his tenderest years, the most dangerous literature is thrown in his way, if even the school-books contain objectionable passages. And what if, as is not seldom the case, treatises on physiology are explained and illustrated to boys and girls, in their very childhood, in a way which is highly prejudicial to morality? What if the text-books of history and literature are teeming with calumny and slander against the Church and all her institutions and practices? Can the Church look on with indifference, or is she not bound to raise her voice, in protest, against such outrages done to her children, and seek redress of such grievances? But without exercising

a certain supervision over the secular teaching in the schools, the Church has no means of preventing such calamities or redressing them. Her ministers must, therefore, have free access to the schools. She must be free to examine into the subjects taught, the manner in which they are taught, and the instruments which are employed, especially the text-books. She must have the means of assuring herself of the orthodoxy and the good moral character of the teachers, and have the power of correcting and the possibility of removing them should this be necessary. She must satisfy herself that such discipline is maintained in the schools as to prevent perversion or immoral contagion among the pupils.

All this follows as a logical sequence from the duty and corresponding right which the Church has of providing for her children a full religious Christian education. Whoever believes at all in the divine mission of the Christian Church, be he Catholic or non-Catholic, must grant so much. Whoever denies the Church this right, manifests that the idea of a Church or a divine ministry does not enter into his creed. By the very fact that non-Catholic clergymen do not insist upon this right they but too clearly show that they have a very inferior notion of their ministry, and forcibly imply that, as far as they are concerned, their existence might, without any inconvenience, be dispensed with, and their places filled by the superintendent or the schoolma'am.

This right of supervision we vindicate for the Church in virtue of her divine mission in regard to all schools of every grade, from the kindergarten to the university, though not in the same degree. Preëminently she holds and exercises it towards *primary schools*. These latter have ever up to the present century been looked upon as ecclesiastical institutions (annexum religionis), and were wholly under the control of the Church. As such they have been considered by Protestants as well as Catholics. As such they have been acknowledged by the conventions of the various governments with the Holy See. As such they have been acknowledged in England, as far as the High Church is concerned, to this day, and the same rights, with some restrictions, are now extended to other denominations. Non-sectarian schools have so far been opened by the British Government only in default of the Churches; and though these public schools are growing in favor with some English politicians, yet the denominational schools meet with a fair share of justice on the part of the British Government at home and abroad.

The correctness of this view of the elementary schools is evident from the very nature of the case. The essential function of primary schools is religious education. For, if the child has religious faculties to be trained; if it has a soul to save and must learn the

necessary means to save it, both theoretically and practically; if it must learn to walk in the path of virtue and salvation in its tender years; surely this spiritual training is of more importance than the learning of the three R's and other more ornamental than useful "cram" with which the children in our times are afflicted. The three R's should be taught and all well taught; but (to speak as Christians) these are subordinate to the elements of religion at this early age. At this tender stage of life, the whole surroundings, the atmosphere in which the child moves, should be religious. The eyes should be chastened by the contemplation of pious objects; the ear should be trained to the melody of sacred song; the lips should be taught to lisp the holy names, the tiny hands to fold themselves in prayer, the whole person to compose itself to Christian modesty; the imagination should be stored with pious and chaste representations; the memory should become the treasury of holy recollections. The practice of religion should, at this age, be made sweet and easy by frequent and appropriate exercises of devotion. Oh, that teachers took half as much pains for the religious training of children as the godless kindergarten does for their secular drill! If they only employed even a fraction of those devices which modern pedagogues suggest to awaken the senses and the minds of the children to the observation of the phenomena of nature to fit them for the future pursuit of natural science! Yet, here we will not speak of methods. All we say is, that elementary education, being essentially religious, must consequently be mainly under the control of the Church. We do not deny the State its due share in the conduct of schools. It may put its claims within its own sphere, in regard to the secular results to be obtained; but the Church, being charged with what is essential in the education, must have the decisive vote and superintendence.

The Church must, therefore, claim the right of *erecting* elementary schools for the education of her children, and of *directing* the same, independently of all civil authority, though she is bound to listen and conform to the *just* wishes of the State, and especially of the parents, in things pertaining to the secular training. She must claim the right of *educating the teachers* of elementary schools, and, therefore, of erecting and conducting *normal schools*; for this is a necessary means of obtaining a staff of teachers who are not only qualified for secular instruction, but also fit to give a religious training by word and conduct. She must claim the right of *examining, approving, and inspecting* the teachers, to assure herself of their capacity and standing, at any given time, to ascertain whether she may safely continue her approbation, or be obliged in a given case to withdraw it. She must claim the right of *removing or exacting the removal* of such teachers as from moral or other

causes prove themselves unworthy or unfit for their office. These rights the Church has by divine institution. She cannot, or will not renounce them. They may be and have been violated by brute force; but this circumstance cannot change the fact or detract anything from the just claims of the Church. Against her divine rights there is no prescription possible.

We now pass from the elementary schools to those which are generally termed *middle schools*. Under this appellation we comprise all those educational institutions which lie between the elementary schools and the universities, properly so called. Their object is to prepare students, especially by a *literary* training, for the higher studies of philosophy and the professional branches of learning, theology, medicine, law, etc. This course of preparation, which generally covers a period of six or seven years (in Germany it is now extended to nine and ten years) formerly consisted mainly in the study of the Latin and Greek classics. These still maintain their place as the principal instrument of training in all well-organized institutions, while other branches, especially mathematics, science, history, modern languages, and literature, receive greater attention. The exigencies of our times have also created a separate class of middle schools, known in Europe as *polytechnical* or *real* schools, and in America as *high schools* and *special courses*. But these latter are generally little more than an appendage to the ordinary elementary schools, and must be treated by the Church in the same way, with slight modifications, which we cannot here define.

With regard to those middle schools which are really preparatory for the higher studies, their relations to the Church are not entirely so intimate. Such institutions are not *essentially* religious or ecclesiastical. Any individual or corporation endowed with the necessary qualifications may establish and conduct such a school, provided the laws and demands of the Church be complied with, and the full exercise of her rights be allowed. They are not considered in law as *annexa religionis*, as elementary schools are. Their immediate object is not religious but secular training, with a view to the pursuit of higher studies, whether sacred or profane. But while the mind is being formed with letters and science, the religious side of the character must be harmoniously developed, and that with the more care the greater are the dangers that beset the pursuit of letters, especially at that age when the passions are so strong and character so flexible, at that stage which is generally decisive for after-life. During this time the religious instruction as well as the secular has to be continued. The students must acquire a full and well-digested knowledge of the Christian doctrine. They must be kept up to the practice of their

religion, and guarded against the dangers attendant on youth. The Church must, then, enjoy full freedom to continue the religious education she began in the elementary schools, in the widest sense of the word. She must have a full insight into the interior workings of the schools, possess all the means to avert all dangers of corruption or perversion, whether these may arise from teachers or text-books, or method, or the discipline of the schools. But without the exercise of an efficacious supervision all this is impossible. Hence we conclude that though these institutions are not strictly religious, the Church should exercise nearly the same supervision over them as over the elementary schools. If such schools are founded and supported by the Church, it is plain that she has the exclusive control over them. All the State can justly demand in this case is the necessary qualifications in such of the students as present themselves for public offices. Where they have obtained these qualifications is not the business of civil authority to inquire. Should the institutions conducted by the Church, however, receive their support from the State, it would then have, at most, the right to examine into the results of the secular training by competent inspectors; unless in the case of strictly ecclesiastical schools, such as seminaries, which are exclusively under the control of the Church. But even though the direction is not in the hands of the Church, there remains for her at least the inviolable right of giving the pupils, as an essential part of their training, a complete religious education, and exercising such a supervision over the secular instruction and training as to have a sufficient guarantee for the security of faith and morals, and the necessary safeguard against the perversion of her children.

If we further apply these general principles to the *university*, the necessity of a similar supervision will be manifest. What is a university? Taking it in its general acceptation and as it presents itself to us historically, a university is an educational institution in which *all* the sciences which constitute a liberal and professional education are taught (*studium generale*). Now, if a university be such as to deserve that name, also religion or theology must be one of its faculties, and to teach religion or theology, as every one knows, is the province of the Church, as she alone has received this commission from the Divine Founder of Christianity. The Church must, therefore, be represented in a university and occupy that place which her dignity and the rank of that science which she represents require.

But even though a university, or what goes by that name, should profess only secular sciences and arts, such as medicine, law, philosophy, science, and letters, it cannot, therefore, exclude the influence of the Church. Secular sciences, too, have all their neces-

sary bearing upon religion and theology. Not one of them can dispense with the aid of theology. She must keep them in check within their proper boundary. If we wish to keep on the standpoint of revelation, she must say the last word on every subject. The teaching of reason and revelation, coming from the same divine source, can never be at variance with each other. The truths of revelation must, therefore, form certain landmarks within which reason must confine itself if it would not stray from the path of truth. As soon as it wanders outside these confines, without the guidance of theology, it is sure to err. But who has to define what *is* revealed truth and what *is not*? It is only the Church, to whom the deposit of faith has been consigned. To the Church, therefore, and her science must be subordinate every other science, inasmuch as she can assign them their proper sphere, check their vain curiosity, and bid them go "so far and no farther." The wild aberrations of science and scientists in our days prove to evidence the necessity of this control.

That the abandonment of science to its own resources leads not only to its own ruin but also to the overthrow of religion, is equally patent from daily experience. Where is the science to-day which does not glory in the mouth of the infidel of having dealt a deadly blow at religion? "Just as comparative anatomy, political economy, the philosophy of history, and the science of antiquities, may be and are turned against religion," says Cardinal Newman (*Idea of a University*), "by being taken for themselves [apart from theology], so a like mistake may befall any other. Grammar, for instance, does not at first sight appear to admit of a perversion; yet Horne Tooke made of it the vehicle of his peculiar skepticism. Law would seem to have enough to do with its own clients and their affairs, and yet Mr. Bentham made a treatise on judicial proofs a covert attack on the miracles of revelation. And in like manner physiology may deny moral evil and human responsibility; geology may deny Moses; and logic may deny the Holy Trinity; and other sciences now rising into notice are, or will be, victims of a similar abuse." It is an acknowledged fact that science, divorced from religion, is, and has always been, hostile to religion and productive of infidelity. To prevent this evil by the reconciliation and close alliance of both science and religion, is the duty and has always been the endeavor of the Church. Hence, she has always opposed herself to mere secular training in every department of education and every dominion of science. In no other respect, perhaps, has the Church shown the divine instinct of the Holy Ghost as in her wonderful foresight in this matter. Time has but too truly realized her dire forebodings on the effects of mere secular education. Her claims, therefore, to a place in the

higher institutions of learning, for her own defence and the benefit of science, must be admitted by all those who do not totally ignore the influence of Christianity on the intellectual life of individuals and nations.

Nor can the Church renounce her claims. She has been entrusted with the deposit of faith by Jesus Christ, her Spouse. It is her mission and duty not only to teach the true faith to the nations, but also to defend it and preserve it in the hearts of peoples and individuals. But as the faith is nowhere more endangered than in institutions of learning which have broken off all connection with the Church and cast away the restraint of revelation, the Church must employ all means to obviate such an evil by maintaining and exercising her right of supervision; and as this right is, as we have shown, a divine prerogative, no temporal power can violate it without committing a flagrant outrage against God and His Church. If the Church holds her proper place in a well-organized university representing the sacred science, all extravagances and encroachments on the part of the profane departments and their representatives can be easily prevented. The tone of the whole institution will be Christian, and the salutary influence of Christianity will spontaneously make itself felt in all departments without much direct interference. In any case, however, the least the Church can demand of a Christian university is orthodoxy and a good moral character in directors, teachers, and other officials; Christian discipline and the exclusion of all elements dangerous to faith and morals, and, finally, a perfect freedom in the exercise of her saving ministries within the institution. The Church can never approve of an educational institution which denies her these prerogatives. Nor can she permit her children to frequent them; unless, indeed, in the case in which other institutions are not available, and *then only* when the danger of perversion is remote, and special precautions are taken to counteract the pernicious influence of an exclusively secular training.

We here speak of the "Church" and a "Christian university" in the very widest sense. For all denominations, who profess to be Christian, must make these same demands, provided they believe in Christianity as a divine institution, which is not only a medium of salvation for mankind, but the most powerful agent of civilization and culture. They practically ignore the divine mission and the civilizing influence of Christianity who would in any way subordinate its functions to other than the God-appointed authority. If the gentlemen in the ministry, outside the Catholic Church, were strongly impressed with the belief that they were called to minister to the faithful in the "things that appertain to God," they would very soon see, as we do, that their first duty is

to preserve the Christian faith in the people by making education religious in the various grades of educational institutions.

The attitude of the Catholic Church towards State education has been often clearly and forcibly set forth, as well by the bishops who have been "set by the Holy Ghost to rule the Church of God" as by the Sovereign Pontiff, her Supreme Head. As long as the Church was in the undisturbed possession of her rights, there was little controversy on the subject. She quietly exercised the function of Christian training on every field of education. She insisted in her synods on the multiplication of schools of the various grades, especially popular schools. But as soon as the controversy arose, her bishops all over the world did not fail, singly and in synod assembled, to proclaim aloud those rights which we have just been vindicating, to condemn Godless schools in the strongest terms, to exhort the faithful to keep their children aloof from those seminaries of infidelity and consequent immorality, and, where necessary, to erect and support their own schools. Space is wanting to quote even a selection of their valuable, beautiful, and zeal-inspiring utterances. We can only refer the reader to Father Jenkins's excellent work, or the voluminous and useful *Collectio Lacensis*. Such is the unanimity of the "judges of the faith" in condemnation of the Godless school system that it undoubtedly constitutes a *consensus*, which no Catholic can oppose without incurring shipwreck in the faith.

We may be permitted, however, here to translate a few utterances of the Holy See, even at the risk of repeating what is already known to many of our readers. In a *brief* addressed to Herman von Vicari, Archbishop of Friburg, Baden, July 14th, 1864, Pius IX., after reviewing the dangers of Godless schools in general, expresses himself concerning the common or primary schools as follows: "As common schools have been instituted mainly for the religious education of the people, to cherish Christian piety and morality, they have, therefore, always deservedly and with perfect right claimed the whole care, solicitude and watchfulness of the Church above all other educational institutions. And, therefore, the designs and endeavors of excluding the Church's authority from the common schools proceed from a most hostile disposition to the Church and from the desire of extinguishing the Divine light of holy faith in the nations. Wherefore the Church, which first founded those schools, has always bestowed the greatest care and zeal upon them and considered them as the most important department of her authority and jurisdiction; and any separation of them from the Church cannot but be productive of the greatest loss to the Church and to the schools themselves. All those who would have the Church resign or withdraw her salutary direction

of the popular schools demand nothing less than that the Church should act against the behests of the Divine Founder, and neglect the most important charge committed to her of procuring the salvation of men. Assuredly, in whatever places or countries these most dangerous schemes of excluding the authority of the Church from the schools should be attempted or put into execution, and the youth should be lamentably exposed to the danger of suffering loss in their faith, the Church is *not only* bound to use all her zeal and efforts, and spare no pains at any time that the young should receive the necessary religious education, *but* is also bound to admonish all the faithful and *declare to them that such schools, being hostile to the Catholic Church, cannot in conscience be frequented.*"

The Sacred Congregation of the Inquisition, in the detailed Instruction to the Bishops of the United States concerning the *public schools*, June 30th, 1875, after quoting the last sentence of the above citation, adds the following words: "These words, inasmuch as they are based on the natural and Divine law, enunciate a general principle, which holds universally and refers to all plans where this most destructive system has been unfortunately introduced. It is, therefore, necessary that the illustrious prelates should, by all possible means, keep the flock entrusted to their charge aloof from the corrupting influence of the *public schools*. In the opinion of all, nothing is so necessary for this end as that Catholics should everywhere have their own schools, and these not inferior to the public schools. Every effort must, therefore, be made to erect Catholic schools where such do not exist, or to enlarge them and make them more useful and efficient, that in the course and method of training they may be nowise inferior to the public schools."

The Sacred Congregation grants that there may be circumstances in which Catholic parents may, in conscience, send their children to American *public schools*, viz.: when no Catholic school is at hand, or when that which is at "hand is not fit to give the children an education suited to their station and conformable to their age." It is to be remembered, however, that the frequenting of the public schools can be permitted, even in these cases, according to the declaration of the Sacred Congregation, only when the danger of perversion can be rendered *remote*; and that *the decision is left to the Bishop*, not to the parents or children.

These utterances of the Holy See refer especially to the common or elementary school. The following propositions, condemned in the *Syllabus*, December 8th, 1864, are quite universal, and apply to all schools, of whatever grade:

Proposition 45. "The entire direction of the public schools in which the youth of a Christian State is educated, diocesan seminaries to a certain extent excepted, can and must be apportioned to

the civil authority, and that in such a way that no other authority has the right to interfere in the discipline of the schools, the direction of the studies, the conferring of degrees, or the choice and approbation of the teachers."

Proposition 47. "The most perfect state of civil society requires that the common schools which are open to the children of all classes of the people, and the public institutions in general which are destined for teaching letters and the exact sciences, and educating the youth, should be exempted from the authority, direction and interference of the Church, and be subjected to the absolute power of civil authority, at the direction of the rulers of the State and according to the manner of prevailing public opinion."

Proposition 48. "Catholic men may approve that system of education of youth which is separated from Catholic faith and the power of the Church, and which regards only, or, at least, chiefly, the natural sciences and the field of social life on earth."

From the doctrine condemned in these *theses* it follows:

1. That the State has not absolute power over the schools. In other words, they are not and cannot be mere State institutions, under the sole direction of civil authority.

2. That there can be no legitimate plea for exempting the schools from the authority of the Church, whether they are mere elementary schools or literary and scientific.

3. That no Catholic can connive at a system of education which has divorced itself from the authority of the Church and the Catholic faith, and has for its object, solely or mainly, natural or secular training.¹

Such is the doctrine of the supreme teaching-office of the Church on secular public schools. Whence the reader may conclude in what light those so-called Catholics are to be considered who tell us that the public schools are as good as any else, and that neither they themselves nor their children have ever taken any harm from them.

But some one may say that these utterances of the Holy See are not *ex cathedra*, that they are consequently not infallible, and that we may think what we please of them. Such statements in any case would be highly irreverent to the authority of the Church, to say

¹ We did not deem it necessary to subject the right of educating the *clergy* to any special treatment, as it is sufficiently evident to all Catholics that this right belongs exclusively to the Church. The forty-sixth proposition of the *Syllabus*, which runs thus: "Imo in ipsis clericorum seminariis methodus studiorum adhibenda civili auctoritati subijcitur," excludes all right of interference on the part of the State. See Pius the Ninth's letter to the Archbishop of Munich, March 23d, 1865. The pending transactions between Berlin and the Vatican show how uncompromising the Church is on this point.

the least; but in the case before us we think that they would not be far short of heretical. For, granting that these are not *ex cathedra* pronouncements, they still partake of absolute infallibility from the universal consent of the bishops of the whole Catholic world, who, though dispersed, when *unanimously agreeing* with the Supreme Head of the Church and with one another on any point of doctrine, are *infallible judges of the faith*. Such, in our opinion, is the unanimity of the whole body of the Episcopate on these general principles that they are no less infallible than the decrees of the Vatican.

In no country is this *consensus* more manifest than in our own. There is, we believe, hardly a bishop living to-day in the United States who has not condemned the *existing* system of public schools in the strongest terms, and earnestly exhorted the clergy and the faithful entrusted to his charge to provide for Catholic schools for the education of the Catholic youth. Much has been done already in this direction in a comparatively short time, and much more is justly anticipated in the near future. The bishops shortly to assemble in Plenary Council, with Apostolic zeal and prudence combined, and the additional experience, deliberation and prayer of years, will deal with the question under its more practical aspects. If we have only done something to throw light on the more general principles and to contribute to a more correct and healthy public opinion on the subject, we have amply attained the object of these articles.

THE NECESSITY OF RELIGION FOR SOCIETY.

1. *Religion the Basis of Civil Society.*
2. *The Religious Element in our American Civilization.*
3. *The Dangers that Threaten our American Civilization.*

I.

RELIGION THE BASIS OF CIVIL SOCIETY.

RELIGION is the bond that unites man with his Creator. It is a virtue by which due honor and worship are paid to God. The virtue of religion embraces all those fundamental truths that involve God's sovereignty over us and our entire dependence on Him. I employ the term *religion* here in its broadest and most comprehensive sense, as embodying the existence of God; His infinite power and knowledge; His providence over us; the recognition of a divine law; the moral freedom and responsibility of man; the distinction between good and evil; the duty of rendering our homage to God, and justice and charity to our neighbor; and, finally, the existence of a future state of rewards and punishments.

I hold that religion is the only solid basis of society. If the social edifice rests not on this eternal and immutable foundation, it will soon crumble to pieces. It would be as vain to attempt to establish society without religion as to erect a palace in the air, or on shifting sands, or to hope to reap a crop from seed scattered on the ocean's surface. Religion is to society what cement is to the building; it makes all parts compact and coherent. "He who destroys religion," says Plato, "overthrows the foundations of human society."¹

The social body is composed of individuals who have constant relations with one another; and the very life and preservation of society demand that the members of the community discharge toward one another various and complex duties.

What does society require of your rulers and magistrates? What does it require of you? It demands of your rulers that they dispense justice with an even hand. It demands of you that you be loyal to your country, zealous in her defence, faithful in the observance of her law, conscientious in the payment of imposts and taxes for her maintenance and support. It demands that you be

¹ Lib. x., De Legibus.

scrupulous in observing your oaths and vows, just in the fulfilment of your contracts and obligations, honest in your dealings, and truthful in your promises. It demands that you honor and respect your lawful superiors, that you be courteous toward your equals, condescending to your inferiors, faithful to your friends, magnanimous to your enemies, and merciful to the poor and the oppressed. It demands of the married couple conjugal fidelity, of parents provident vigilance, of children filial love. In a word, it demands that you "render to all men their dues; tribute, to whom tribute is due; custom, to whom custom; fear, to whom fear; honor, to whom honor;"¹ and that you "render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's."²

How can these social virtues be practised without sufficient motives? These motives must be strong and powerful, because you have passions and self-interest to overcome. They must be universal, because they are binding on all members of society. They must be permanent, because they apply to all times and places.

What motives, religion apart, are forcible enough to compel legislators, rulers, and magistrates to be equitable and impartial in their decisions? What guarantee have we that they will not be biassed by prejudice and self-interest? Will a thirst for fame and a desire for public approbation prove a sufficient incentive for them to do right? How often has not this very love of glory and esteem impelled them to trample on the rights and liberties of the many, in order to win the approbation of a few sycophants, just as Roboam oppressed his subjects that he might be admired and praised by his young courtiers, and as Alexander enslaved nations to receive the applause of the fickle Athenians.

Would you vote for a presidential candidate that avowed atheistic principles? I am sure you would not. You would instinctively mistrust him; for an unbelieving president would ignore the eternal laws of justice, and the eternal laws of justice are the basis of civil legislation.

What principles without religion are binding enough to exact of you that obedience which you owe to society and to the laws of your country? Is it the dread of civil punishment? But the civil power takes cognizance only of overt acts. It has no jurisdiction over the heart, which is the seat of rebellion, the secret council-chamber where dark schemes are concocted. The civil power cannot enter the hidden recesses of the soul, and quell the tumults raging there. It cannot invade the domestic circle to expel the intemperance and lewdness that enervate and debauch both mind and body. It cannot suppress those base calumnies, whispered in

¹ Rom. xiii., 7.² Mark xii., 17.

the dark, which poison the social atmosphere with their foul breath, and breed hatred, resentment, and death. You might as well expect to preserve a tree from decay by lopping off a few withered branches whilst allowing the worms to gnaw at the roots, as to preserve the social tree from moral corruption by preventing some external crimes whilst leaving the heart to be worm-eaten by vice.

Besides, if you are so disposed, can you not in many instances escape the meshes of the law by resorting to gifts, bribes, and ingenious frauds ?

If the civil sword, even with the aid of religion, can scarcely restrain public disorders, how futile would be the attempt to do so without the coöperation of moral and religious influence !

Still less do you fear the judgment that posterity may pronounce on your conduct. For if you believe neither in God nor in a life to come, the condemnation of after-ages will not disquiet you, the censures of future generations will not disturb your ashes reposing in the tomb.

Nor can you suppose the emoluments of office an adequate incentive to induce you to be an upright and law-abiding member of society. The emoluments of office are reserved for the privileged few ; the great bulk of society will always be consigned to private life.

Do not imagine, because you happen to be a man of irreproachable private life, integrity of character, and incorruptible justice, that your fellow-citizens will seek you out, as the Romans sought Cincinnatus at the plow, that they will cordially embrace you, force you from your cherished seclusion, and bestow upon you some office of trust and distinction.

"The office should seek the man, not the man the office," is a beautiful, but Utopian maxim,—a maxim so antiquated as to deserve a place in the cabinet of national curiosities. The most successful office-holder usually has been and usually will be the most industrious office-seeker ; and his chances for success are not always improved by a delicate sense of honor and an inflexible adhesion to principle.

The esteem of your fellow-men will not be a sufficient inducement to make you a virtuous citizen ; for the great mass of virtues, even of those virtues that influence the well-being of society, are practised in private, and are hidden from the eyes of men, like the root which gives life and bloom to the tree, or the gentle dew of heaven which silently sheds its blessings on the labors of the husbandman.

Nor should you be surprised if your good actions, instead of winning the applause of your fellow-citizens, will sometimes even

draw upon you their suspicion, their jealousy, their odium, and their calumny. The wisdom and integrity of Aristides were such that the Athenians surnamed him "The Just;" yet they condemned him to exile. On the day on which the people were to vote upon the question of his banishment, an illiterate burgher, who did not know him personally, requested him to write the name of *Aristides* upon his ballot. "Has that man done you any injury?" asked Aristides. "No," answered the other, "nor do I even know him. But I am tired of hearing him everywhere called 'The Just.'"

The case of the Founder of the Christian religion is still more familiar to the reader. Who was so great a benefactor to society as He? He went about doing good to all men. He gave sight to the blind, and hearing to the deaf, and walking to the lame, and strength to the paralyzed limb, and comfort to the afflicted, and even life to the dead. He promulgated the most sublime and beneficent laws that were ever given to man, He invariably inculcated respect for ruling powers and obedience to their authority; and yet He was branded as a seditious man, an enemy of Cæsar, and He was put to death by the very people whom He sought to deliver from spiritual bondage.

But, perhaps, you will say that a natural sense of justice, independently of religion, can exercise sufficient influence in inducing you to practise the duties of an upright citizen. They that discard religion and yet profess to believe in natural justice, are self-contradictory. They are grasping at the shadow, and rejecting the substance. They are unconsciously clothing themselves in the garment of religion, whilst they reject its spirit, "having, indeed, an appearance of godliness, but denying the power thereof."¹ If they had seriously reflected, they would discover that natural justice has no solid foundation unless it rests on religion. Natural justice may sound well in theory, but it is a feeble barrier against the encroachments of vice.

Tell me, what becomes of your natural love of justice, or what influence does it exert on your conduct, when it stands in the way of your personal interests, pleasures, and ambition?

It is swept away like a mud-bank before the torrent, because it has not the strong wall of religion to support it.

Would your love of justice lead you to give a righteous decision against your friend and in favor of a stranger, though you were persuaded that such a decision would convert your friend into a life-long enemy? Would it prompt you to disgorge ill-gotten wealth, and thus to fall in a single day from affluence into poverty? Would your natural sense of duty inspire you with pa-

¹ II. Tim., iii., 5.

tience and resignation, if you were defrauded of your property by the treachery of a friend? Would a mere natural sense of duty or propriety restrain a Joseph or a Susanna from defiling his or her conscience, and violating the sacred laws of marriage? Would a natural love of truth and honor compel a guilty man to avow his secret crime, that he might vindicate the innocent falsely accused? Such acts of justice, patience, and truth are not uncommon in the Christian dispensation; but they would have been deemed prodigies of virtue in Pagan times.

There are many that consider mental culture a panacea for every moral disorder. "Let knowledge," they say, "be diffused over the land. Social order and morality will follow in its track."

The experience of other nations, as well as that of our own, shows it a very great illusion to suppose that intellectual development is sufficient of itself to make us virtuous men, or that the moral status of a people is to be estimated by the widespread diffusion of purely secular knowledge.

When the Roman Empire had reached the highest degree of mental culture, it was sunk in the lowest depths of vice and corruption. The Persian Empire, according to the testimony of Plato, perished on account of the vicious education of its princes. While their minds were filled with knowledge, they were guided by no religious influences. The voice of conscience was drowned amid the more eager and captivating cries of passion, and they grew up monsters of lust, rapine, and oppression, governed by no law save the instincts of their brutal nature.

It does not appear that vice recedes in the United States in proportion as public education advances. Statistics, I fear, would go far to prove the contrary fact. The newspapers published in our large cities, are every day filled with startling accounts of deep-laid schemes of burglary, bank defalcations, premeditated murders, and acts of refined licentiousness. These enormities are perpetrated for the most part, not by unlettered criminals, but by individuals of consummate address and skill; they betray a well-disciplined mind uncontrolled by morality and religion. How true are the words of Kempis: "Sublime words make not a man holy and just, but a virtuous life maketh him dear to God."

If neither the vengeance of the civil power, nor the hope of emoluments, nor the esteem of your fellow-men, nor the natural love of justice, nor the influence of education and culture, nor all these motives combined, can suffice to maintain peace and order in society, where shall we find an adequate incentive to exact of us a loyal obedience to the laws of the country? This incentive is found only in religious principles. Religion, I maintain, is the only sure and solid basis of society. Convince me of the exist-

ence of a Divine Legislator, the Supreme Source of all law, by whom "Kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things;"¹ convince me of the truth of the Apostolic declaration that "there is no power but from God, and *that* those that are are ordained of God, and *that*, therefore, he who resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God;" convince me that there is a Providence, who seeth my thoughts as well as my actions, that there is an incorruptible Judge, who cannot be bought with bribes nor blinded by deceit, who has no respect of persons, who will render to every man according to his works, who will punish transgressions and reward virtue in the life to come; convince me that I am endowed with free-will and the power of observing or of violating the laws of the country,—and then you place before me a Monitor, who impels me to virtue without regard to earthly emoluments or human applause, and who restrains me from vice without regard to civil penalties, you set before my conscience a living Witness, who pursues me in darkness and in light, and in the sanctuary of home, as well as in the arena of public life.

Religion teaches me that we are all children of the same Father, brothers and sisters of the same Redeemer, and, consequently, members of the same family. It teaches me the brotherhood of humanity.

Religion, therefore, is the fostering mother of charity, and charity is the guardian of civility and good-breeding, and good-breeding is one of the essential elements of the well-being of society. Worldly politeness, devoid of religion, is cold, formal, and heartless; it soon degenerates into hollow ceremony. Good-breeding, inspired by religion and charity, inculcates a constant self-denial. It is sincere and unaffected, it has the ring of the genuine coin, it passes current everywhere, and it is easily distinguished from the counterfeit article. A stranger, who would feel oppressed by the rigid mannerism which rules in the salons of Paris, would be charmed by the quiet dignity and genial warmth with which he would be received by the simple and religious people of the Tyrolese mountains.

As the air of heaven ascends the highest mountains and descends into the deepest valleys, vivifying the face of nature, so does the Christian religion permeate every stratum of society, purifying and invigorating the moral atmosphere. It influences the master and the servant, the rich and the poor. It admonishes the master to be kind and humane toward his servant by reminding him that he, also, has a Master in heaven who has no respect to persons. It does not attempt to disturb, still less to dissolve, those relations that exist between master and man; but it renders those relations

¹ Prov., viii., 15.

more harmonious by rebuking a domineering spirit. It admonishes the servant to be docile and obedient to his master; "not serving to the eye as it were pleasing men, but, as the servants of Christ, doing the will of God from the heart."¹

It reminds him that true dignity is compatible with the most menial offices, and is forfeited only by the bondage of sin.

It charges the rich not to be high-minded, nor to trust in uncertain riches, but in the living God, who "giveth us abundantly all things to enjoy."² It counsels the poor to bear their privations with resignation, by setting before them the life of Him who, in the words of the Apostle, "being rich, became poor for your sake, that, through His poverty, you might be rich."³

In a word, religion is anterior to society and more enduring than governments; it is the focus of all social virtues, the basis of public morals, the most powerful instrument in the hands of legislators; it is stronger than self-interest, more awe-inspiring than civil threats, more universal than honor, more active than love of country,—the surest guarantee that rulers can have of the fidelity of their subjects, and that subjects can have of the justice of their rulers; it is the curb of the mighty, the defence of the weak, the consolation of the afflicted, the covenant of God with man; and, in the language of Homer, it is "the golden chain which suspends the earth from the throne of the eternal."

Every philosopher and statesman who has discussed the subject of human governments has acknowledged that there can be no stable society without justice, no justice without morality, no morality without religion, no religion without God. "It is an incontrovertible truth," observes Plato, "that if God presides not over the establishment of a city, and if it has only a human foundation, it cannot escape the greatest calamities. . . . If a State is founded on impiety and governed by men who trample on justice, it has no means of security."⁴

The Royal Prophet, long before Plato, had uttered the same sentiment: "Unless the Lord build the house, they labor in vain that build it. Unless the Lord keep the city, he watcheth in vain that keepeth it."⁵ And Isaiah says: "The nation and the kingdom that will not serve Thee shall perish."⁶

Xenophon declares that "those cities and nations which are the most devoted to divine worship have always been the most durable and the most wisely governed, as the most religious ages have been the most distinguished for genius."⁷

¹ Eph., vi., 6.

² II. Cor., viii., 9.

³ Ps. cxxvi., 1.

⁷ Memor. Socrat.

² I. Tim., vi., 17.

⁴ De Leg., tom. viii.

⁶ Isaiah, lx., 12.

"If you find a people without religion," says Hume, "rest assured that they do not differ much from the brute beasts."¹

"Never," says Rousseau, who had his lucid intervals of strong sense, "never was a state founded that did not have religion for its basis."²

Machiavel, who was not an extremist in piety, avows that good order is inseparable from religion. He brands the enemies of religion as "infamous and detestable men, destroyers of kingdoms and republics, enemies of letters and of all the arts that do honor to the human race and contribute to its prosperity."³

Even Voltaire admits that "it is absolutely necessary for princes and people, that the idea of a Supreme Being, Creator, Governor, Rewarder, and Avenger, should be deeply engraved on the mind."⁴

Legislators and founders of empires have been so profoundly impressed with the necessity of religion as the only enduring basis of social order, that they have always built upon it the framework of their constitution. This truth must be affirmed of Pagan as well as of Jewish and Christian legislators. Solon of Athens, Lycurgus of Lacedæmon, and Numa of ancient Rome, made religion the corner-stone of the social fabric which they raised in their respective countries.

So long as the old Romans adhered to the religious policy of Numa, their commonwealth flourished, the laws were observed, their rulers governed with moderation and justice, and the people were distinguished by a simplicity of manners, a loyalty to their sovereign, a patient industry, a quiet contentment, a spirit of patriotism, courage, and sobriety which have commanded the admiration of posterity. "The vessel of state was held in the storm by two anchors, religion and morality."⁵

It must be observed, however, that these virtues were too often marred by harshness, cruelty, ambition, and other vices, which were grave defects when weighed by the standard of the gospel. But a righteous God, who judges nations by the light that is given them, did not fail to requite the Romans for the civic virtues which they practised, guided solely by the light of reason. The natural virtues they exhibited were rewarded by temporal blessings, and especially by the great endurance of their republic.⁶

Montesquieu traces the downfall of Rome to the doctrines of Epicurianism, which broke down the barrier of religion and gave free scope to the sea of human passions.

¹ Natural History of Religion. (Not having the original at hand, I quote from a French translation.)

² Contrat Social., l. iv., ch. viii.

³ Diction. Philos., art. Athéisme.

⁶ *Cf.* St. Augustine's City of God, bk. v., ch. 15.

⁵ L. i., De' Discorsi.

⁶ Esprit des Lois, l. viii.

Lust of power and of wealth, unbridled licentiousness, and the obscenities of the plays, corrupted the morals of the people. The master had unlimited power over his slaves. The debtor was at the mercy of his creditors. The father had the power of life and death over his children. The female sex was degraded, and the sanctuary of home desecrated by divorce. The poison that infected the individual invaded the family, and soon spread through every artery of the social body.

Toward the close of the last century, an attempt was made by Atheists in France to establish a government on the ruins of religion, and it is well known how signally they failed. The Christian Sabbath and festivals were abolished, and the churches closed. The only tolerated temple of worship was the criminal court, from which justice and mercy were inexorably banished, and where the judge sat only to condemn. The only divinity recognized by the apostles of anarchy was the goddess of reason; their high priests were the executioners; the victims of sacrifice were unoffending citizens; the altar was the scaffold; their hymns were ribald songs; and their worship was lust, rapine, and bloodshed.

The more exalted the rank, the more sacred the profession, the more innocent the accused, the more eagerly did the despots of the hour thirst for their blood. They recognized no liberty but their own license, no law but their own wanton and capricious humor, no conscience but their own insatiate malice, no justice but the guillotine. At last, when the country was soaked with blood, suspicion and terror seized the tyrants themselves, and the executioner of to-day became the victim of to-morrow.

In a few months, as De Lamennais says: "They accumulated more ruin than an army of Tartars could have left after a six years' invasion."¹ They succeeded in a few weeks in demolishing the social fabric which had existed for thirteen centuries.

II.

THE RELIGIOUS ELEMENT IN OUR AMERICAN CIVILIZATION.

The subject treated in the foregoing section would not be adequately discussed unless some application of it be made to our own country. It may be interesting and instructive for us to consider in this place whether the dictum of the Holy Scripture, "Righteousness exalteth a nation,"² is as applicable to the United States as it has been to ancient empires; whether the founders of our government and their successors, down to our time, have been

¹ *Essai sur l'Indifférence*, p. 431.

² Proverbs, xiv., 34.

indebted to religion as an indispensable element for establishing and maintaining the republic on a solid basis; what blessings we owe to our Christian civilization; and what dangers are to be averted that the Commonwealth may be perpetuated.

At first sight it might seem that religious principles were entirely ignored by the Fathers of the Republic in framing the Constitution, as it contains no reference to God, and makes no appeal to religion. It is true, indeed, that the Constitution of the United States does not once mention the name of God. And even the first article of the amendments declares, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." And so strongly have certain religious sects been impressed with this fact, that they have repeatedly tried to get the name of God incorporated into the Constitution.

But the omission of God's holy name affords no just criterion of the religious character of the Founders of the Republic or of the Constitution which they framed. Nor should we have any concern to have the name of God imprinted in the Constitution, so long as the Constitution itself is interpreted by the light of Christian Revelation. I would rather sail under the guidance of a living captain than under that of a figure-head at the prow of a ship. The adorable name of God should not be a mere figure-head adorning the pages of the Constitution. Far better for the nation that His Spirit should animate our laws, that He should be invoked in our courts of justice, that He should be worshipped in our Sabbaths and thanksgivings, and that His guidance should be implored in the opening of our Congressional proceedings.

The Declaration of American Independence is one of the most solemn and memorable professions of political faith that ever emanated from the leading minds of any country. It has exerted as much influence in foreshadowing the spirit and character of our Constitution and public policy as the Magna Charta exercised on the Constitution of Great Britain. A devout recognition of God and of His overruling providence pervades that momentous document from beginning to end. God's holy name greets us in the opening paragraph, and is piously invoked in the last sentence of the Declaration; and thus it is at the same time the corner-stone and the keystone of this great monument to freedom.

The illustrious signers declared that "when, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands that have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature *and of nature's God* entitle them, a decent respect for the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes that impel them to the separation."

They acknowledge one Creator, the source of life, of liberty, and of happiness. They "appeal to the Supreme Judge of the world" for the rectitude of their intentions, and they conclude in this solemn language: "For the support of this declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor."

The laws of the United States are so intimately interwoven with the Christian religion that they cannot be adequately expounded without the light of Revelation. The common law of this country is derived from the common law of Great Britain. "The common law," says Kent, "is the common jurisprudence of the people of the United States, and was brought with them as colonists from England, and established here, *so far* as it was adapted to our institutions and circumstances. It was claimed by the Congress of the United Colonies, in 1774, as a branch of those 'indubitable rights and liberties to which the Colonies are entitled.' . . . Its principles may be compared to the influence of the liberal arts and sciences: 'Adversis perfugium ac solatium præbent; delectant domi; non impediunt foris; pernoctant nobiscum, peregrinantur, rusticantur.' To use the words of Duponceau: 'We live in the midst of the common law; we inhale it at every breath, imbibe it at every pore; we meet with it when we awake and when we lie down to sleep, when we travel and when we stay at home, and it is interwoven with the very idiom that we speak.'"¹

Now, it is an incontrovertible fact that the common law of England is, to a great extent, founded on the principles of Christian ethics; the maxims of the Holy Scripture form the great criterion of right and wrong in the civil courts. Hence blasphemy and perjury are punished as crimes against the commonwealth, *because* they are crimes against religion. The Chancellors of England, who were "the keepers of the king's conscience," have ever been, for succeeding generations, professing Christians, and, until the Reformation, they were even churchmen.

"The best features of the common law," says an American juriconsult, "if not derived from, have at least been improved and strengthened by, the prevailing religion and the teachings of the Sacred Book, especially those that regard the family and social relations." The Church left the impress of the Divine Law so indelibly on the common law that Sir M. Hale was moved to assert that Christianity was a part of the laws of England, and that to reproach the Christian religion "was to speak in subversion of the law," and that it was the judgment of the English people and their

¹ Commentaries, p. 336 *et seq.*

tribunals that "he who reviled, subverted and ridiculed Christianity did an act which struck at the foundation of civil society."

The oath that is taken by the President of the United States before he assumes the duties of his office, and that is administered in our courts of justice, not only to the witnesses, but also to the judge, jury, lawyers, and officers of the court, in accordance with the Constitution, implies a belief in God and forms an act of religious worship. It is a national tribute of homage to the universal sovereignty of our Creator. By the act of taking an oath a man makes a profession of faith in God's unfailing truth, absolute knowledge, and infinite sanctity. He also acknowledges God as Supreme Judge, who, in the life to come, will reward righteousness and punish iniquity.

The Bible, which is placed in the hands of the witness and is reverently kissed, involves a recognition of divine Revelation.

The Christian Sabbath is revered as a day of rest and public prayer throughout the land. The halls of Congress and of our State legislatures are closed on that day. The proceedings of our courts of justice—Federal, State, and municipal—are suspended. The din of commerce is hushed; the looms in our factories are silent; the fires burn low in our foundries; and every city, town, and hamlet resounds with the peal of the joyous bell inviting men to prayer. This is a national homage to the Christian religion.

Again, the Chief Magistrate of the nation and the Governors of the States issue their annual proclamations, inviting the people to offer their thanksgiving to "the Giver of all good gifts" for the blessings He has vouchsafed to the land.

There is another national custom which proclaims God's sovereignty and superintending providence. I refer to the practice prevailing in this country of opening the proceedings of Congress and of State legislatures, of inaugurating other important measures with prayer, and of invoking the blessing of God on the work about to be commenced.

I do not pretend to excuse or palliate the bad taste and irreverent familiarity which characterize some of those prayers. But the holiest practices may be perverted. And I cannot fail to express my admiration for a custom which, in principle, recognizes God's mercy and moral government, and which confides in Him as the Fountain of all light and wisdom.

The original settlers of the American colonies, with very rare individual exceptions, were all professing Christians, who inaugurated and fostered that Christian legislation and those religious customs to which I have referred.

The Puritans who founded New England, the Dutch who settled in New York, the Quakers and Irish who established themselves in

Pennsylvania, the Swedes in Delaware, the English Catholics who colonized Maryland, the English Episcopalians who colonized Virginia, Georgia, and North Carolina, the Irish Presbyterians who also emigrated to the last-named State, the French Huguenots and the English colonists who planted themselves in South Carolina, the French and Spanish who took possession of Louisiana and Florida—all these colonists made an open profession of Christianity in one form or another, and recognized religion as the basis of society.

The same remark applies with equal truth to that stream of population which, from the beginning of the present century, has been constantly flowing into this country from Ireland and Germany and extending itself over the entire land.

In one century we have grown from three millions to fifty-five millions. We have grown up, not as distinct, independent and conflicting communities, but as one corporate body, breathing the same atmosphere of freedom, governed by the same laws, enjoying the same political rights. I see in all this a wonderful manifestation of the humanizing and elevating influence of Christian civilization. We receive from abroad people of various nations, races and tongues, habits and temperament, who speedily become assimilated to the human mass, and who form one homogeneous society. What is the secret of our social stability and order? It results from wise laws, based on Christian principles, and which are the echo of God's eternal law.

What is the cohesive power that makes us one body politic out of so many heterogeneous elements? It is the religion of Christ. We live as brothers because we recognize the brotherhood of humanity—one Father in heaven, one origin, one destiny.

We shall appreciate our Christian civilization all the more by considering the aboriginal tribes of North America, with whom war was the rule and peace the exception; or by casting our eyes on the numerous tribes of Africa, who, though living side by side for ages, enjoy no friendly intercourse, but are habitually at war with one another. And had our country been colonized, developed and ruled by races hostile to religion, we should seek in vain for the social order and civic blessings that we possess to-day.

III.

THE DANGERS THAT THREATEN OUR AMERICAN CIVILIZATION.

But if our government and legislation are permeated and fortified by divine Revelation and Christian traditions, we cannot ignore the fact that they are assailed by unbelief, impiety

and socialism. We have our moral Hell-Gate, which threatens our ship of state, and which it requires more than the genius of a Newton to remove. If we have strong hopes for the future of our country, we are also not without fears. The dangers that threaten our civilization may be traced to the family. The root of the commonwealth is in the homes of the people. The social and civil life springs from the domestic life of mankind. The official life of a nation is ordinarily the reflex of the moral sense of the people. The morality of public administration is to be gauged by the moral standard of the family. The river does not rise above its source.

We are confronted by three great evils—Mormonism and divorce, which strike at the root of the family and society; an imperfect and vicious system of education, which undermines the religion of our youth; and the desecration of the Christian Sabbath, which tends to obliterate in our adult population the salutary fear of God and the homage that we owe Him. Our insatiable greed for gain, the coëxistence of colossal wealth with abject poverty, the extravagance of the rich, the discontent of the poor, our eager and impetuous rushing through life, the gross and systematic election frauds, and every other moral and social delinquency, may be traced to one of the three radical vices enumerated above.

Every man that has the welfare of his country at heart cannot fail to view with alarm the existence and the gradual development of Mormonism, which is a plague-spot on our civilization, a discredit to our government, a degradation of the female sex, and a standing menace to the sanctity of the marriage bond. The feeble and spasmodic attempts that have been made to repress this social evil, and the virtual immunity that it enjoys, have rendered its apostles bold and defiant. Formerly they were content with enlisting recruits from England, Wales, Sweden and other parts of Scandinavia; but now, emboldened by toleration, they send their emissaries throughout the country and obtain disciples from North Carolina, Georgia, and other States of the Union.

The reckless facility with which divorce is procured is an evil scarcely less deplorable than Mormonism; indeed, it is in some respects more dangerous than the latter, for divorce has the sanction of the civil law which Mormonism has not. Is not the law of divorce a virtual toleration of Mormonism in a modified form? Mormonism consists in simultaneous polygamy, while the law of divorce practically leads to successive polygamy.

Each State has in its statutes a list of causes, or rather pretexts, which are recognized as sufficient ground for divorce *a vinculo*. There are in all twenty-two or more causes, most of them of a very

trifling character, and in some States, as in Illinois and Maine, the power of granting a divorce is left to the discretion of the judge.¹

The second evil that bodes mischief to our country and endangers the stability of our government, arises from our mutilated and vicious system of public school education. I am persuaded that the popular errors now existing in reference to education spring from an incorrect notion of that term. *To educate means to bring out*, to develop the intellectual, moral, and religious faculties of the soul. An education, therefore, that improves the mind and the memory, to the neglect of moral and religious training, is at best but an imperfect and defective system. According to Webster's definition, to educate is "to instil into the mind principles of art, science, *morals, religion*, and behavior." "To educate," he says, "in the arts is important; in religion, indispensable."

It is, indeed, eminently useful that the intellect of our youth should be developed, and that they should be made familiar with those branches of knowledge which they are afterward likely to pursue. They can then go forth into the world, gifted with a well-furnished mind and armed with a lever by which they may elevate themselves in the social scale and become valuable members of society. It is also most desirable that they should be made acquainted in the course of their studies with the history of our country, with the origin and principles of its government, and with the eminent men who have served it by their statesmanship and defended it by their valor. This knowledge will instruct them in their civic duties and rights, and contribute to make them enlightened citizens and devoted patriots.

But it is not enough for children to have a secular education; they

¹ Afghanistan has the questionable honor of presenting a new plea for divorce, which, if applied to this country, might fill with dismay many unfortunate husbands uncongenial with their spouses. "A Lahore newspaper states that an Afghan lady recently applied to the Ameer Abdul Rahman for a separation from her husband on the ground that he was becoming bald. The defender and savior of Afghan unity, recognizing the importance of vindicating the sanctity of domestic as well as governmental authority, decided, after due reflection upon the demoralizing tendency of feminine disrespect for intellectual men, to make an example of the presumptuous plaintiff. His first step was to order a vial of sour milk to be poured on the husband's head, whether as an 'invigorator' or 'tonic' the eastern journalist does not say. Then, abandoning curative for punitive measures, the Ameer next commanded the wife to lick the milk off with her tongue, and when that was done, and the husband's head shone like a billiard ball, his highness directed that the unsympathetic woman should be 'placed on the back of a donkey with her face to the tail, and thus be forced to ride through the bazaar.' After that she knew better, it is reported, than to jeer heartlessly at the misfortune of the head of the house. A humane silence, if not respectful commiseration, was the least that a proper respect for the marriage vow dictated. To the ladies of America the Ameer's conduct will perhaps savor of oriental despotism, but it is possible that not a few of their worse halves will envy the position of honor that Eastern law secures to the bald-headed husband."

must receive a religious training. Indeed, religious knowledge is as far above human science as the soul is above the body, as heaven is above earth, as eternity is above time. The little child that is familiar with the Christian catechism, is really more enlightened on truths that should come home to every rational mind, than the most profound philosophers of pagan antiquity, or even than many of the so-called philosophers of our own times. He has mastered the great problem of life. He knows his origin, his sublime destiny, and the means of attaining it, a knowledge that no human science can impart without the light of Revelation.

God has given us a *heart* to be formed to virtue, as well as a *head* to be enlightened. By secular education we improve the mind; by religious training we direct the heart.

It is not sufficient, therefore, to know how to read and write, to understand the rudiments of grammar and arithmetic. It does not suffice to know that two and two make four; we must practically learn also the great distance between time and eternity. The knowledge of bookkeeping is not sufficient, unless we are taught, also, how to balance our accounts daily between our conscience and our God. It will profit us little to understand all about the diurnal and annual motions of the earth, unless we add to this science some heavenly astronomy. We should know and feel that our future home is to be beyond the stars in heaven, and that, if we lead virtuous lives here, we shall "shine as stars for all eternity."¹

We want our children to receive an education that will make them not only learned, but pious men. We want them to be not only polished members of society, but also conscientious Christians. We desire for them a training that will form their heart, as well as expand their mind. We wish them to be not only men of the world, but, above all, men of God.

A knowledge of history is most useful and important for the student. He should be acquainted with the lives of those illustrious heroes that founded empires,—of those men of genius that enlightened the world by their wisdom and learning, and embellished it by their works of art.

But is it not more important to learn something of the King of kings who created all these kingdoms, and by whom kings reign? Is it not more important to study that uncreated wisdom before whom all earthly wisdom is folly, and to admire the works of the Divine Artist who paints the lily and gilds the clouds?

If, indeed, our soul were to die with the body, if we had no existence beyond the grave, if we had no account to render to God

¹ Dan., xii., 3.

for our actions, we might more easily dispense with the catechism in our schools. Though even then Christian morality would be a faithful source of temporal blessings; for, as the Apostle teaches, "Piety is profitable to all things, having promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come."¹

But our youth cherish the hope of becoming one day citizens of heaven, as well as of this land. And as they cannot be good citizens of this country without studying and observing its laws, neither can they become citizens of heaven unless they know and practise the laws of God. Now, it is only by a good religious education that we learn to know and to fulfil our duties toward our Creator.

The religious and secular education of our children cannot be *divorced* from each other without inflicting a fatal wound upon the soul. The usual consequence of such a separation is to paralyze the moral faculties and to foment a spirit of indifference in matters of faith. Education is to the soul what food is to the body. The milk, with which the infant is nourished at its mother's breast, feeds not only its head, but permeates at the same time its heart and the other organs of the body. In like manner, the intellectual and moral growth of our children must go hand in hand; otherwise, their education is shallow and fragmentary, and often proves a curse instead of a blessing.

Piety is not to be put on like a holiday dress, to be worn on state occasions, but it is to be exhibited in our conduct at all times. Our youth must put in practice every day the Commandments of God and the precepts of the Church, as well as the rules of grammar and arithmetic. How can they familiarize themselves with these sacred duties, if they are not daily inculcated?

Guizot, an eminent Protestant writer of France, expresses himself so clearly and forcibly on this point that we cannot forbear quoting his words: "In order," he says, "to make popular education truly good and socially useful, it must be fundamentally religious. . . . It is necessary that national education should be given and received in the midst of a religious atmosphere, and that religious impressions and religious observances should penetrate into all its parts. Religion is not a study or an exercise, to be restricted to a certain place or a certain hour; it is a faith and a law, which ought to be felt everywhere, and which, after this manner alone, can exercise all its beneficial influence upon our mind and our life."

The catechetical instructions given once a week in our Sunday-schools, though productive of very beneficial results, are insuf-

¹ I. Tim., iv., 8.

ficient to supply the religious wants of our children. They should, as far as possible, breathe every day a healthy religious atmosphere in those schools in which not only is their mind enlightened, but the seeds of faith, piety, and sound morality are nourished and invigorated. By what principle of justice can you store their minds with earthly knowledge for several hours each day, while their heart, which requires far more cultivation, must be content with the paltry allowance of a few weekly lessons?

Nor am I unmindful of the blessed influence of a home education, and especially of a mother's tutelage. As she is her child's first instructor, her lessons are the most deep and lasting. The intimate knowledge she has acquired of her child's character by constant intercourse, the tender love subsisting between them, and the unbounded confidence placed in her by her pupil, impart to her instructions a force and conviction which no other teacher can hope to win.

But how many mothers have not the time to devote to the education of their children! How many mothers have not the capacity! How many, alas, have not the inclination!

And granted even that the mother has done her duty, the child's training does not end with the mother, but it will be supplemented by a curriculum in other schools. And, of what avail is a mother's toil, if the seeds of faith that she has planted are choked by the tares of impiety and infidelity, or attain a sickly growth in the cheerless atmosphere of a schoolroom from which the sun of religion is rigidly excluded?

The remedy for all this would be supplied if the denominational system, such as now obtains in Canada, were applied in our public schools.

The desecration of the Christian Sabbath is the third social danger against which it behooves us to set our face, and take timely precautions before it assumes proportions too formidable to be easily eradicated.

The custom of observing religious holidays has prevailed, both in ancient and modern times, among nations practising a false system of worship, as well as among those professing the true religion. They have set apart one day in the week, or at least certain days in the month or year, for the public and solemn worship of their Creator, just as they have instituted national festivals to commemorate some signal civic blessing obtained by their heroes and statesmen.

The Mohammedans devote Friday to public prayer and special almsgiving, because that day is appointed by the Koran.

The Parsees of Persia and India have four holidays each month consecrated to religious worship.

The Hebrew people were commanded by Almighty God to keep holy the Sabbath Day, or Saturday, because on that day God rested from His work.¹ He wished to remind them by this weekly celebration that He was their Creator and Master, and the Founder of the universe. He desired that they should be moved to worship Him by the contemplation of His works, and thus rise from nature to nature's God.

The Sabbath was marked also by a beneficent character, which admirably displays God's tender mercy toward His creatures and appeals with touching pathos to the compassion of the Hebrew master in behalf of his servant and beast of burden. "The seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord, thy God. Thou shalt not do any work therein, thou, nor thy . . . bondman and bondwoman, . . . nor any of thy beasts, nor the stranger that is within thy gates. . . . Remember that thou also wast a slave in the land of Egypt, and the Lord thy God brought thee out from thence with a strong hand and a stretched-out arm."²

The prophet Isaiah attaches abundant blessings to the due observance of the day: "The children of the stranger that adhere to the Lord to worship Him, and to love His name, to be His servants: every one that keepeth the Sabbath from profaning it, and that holdeth fast my covenant; I will bring them into My holy mount, and will make them joyful in My house of prayer; their holocausts and their victims shall please Me upon My altar. For My house shall be called the house of prayer for all nations."³

The prophet Ezekiel declares the profanation of the Sabbath foremost among the national sins of the Jews, and the chief cause of their national calamities. "I lifted up My hand upon them in the wilderness, to disperse them among the nations, and to scatter them through the countries: because they had not done my judgments, and had cast off my statutes, and had violated My Sabbaths."

It is the opinion of Grotius and of other learned commentators that the Sabbath was held sacred for generations prior to the time of Moses, and its observance, according to Lightfoot and other writers, dates even from the creation, or, at least, from the Fall of Adam. Hence they maintain that the Jewish lawgiver, in prescribing the Sabbath, was not enacting a new commandment, but enforcing an old one.

This inference is drawn from the words of Genesis: "And He blessed the seventh day and sanctified it,"⁴ which plainly means that He then instituted it as a day of rest and prayer for Adam and all his posterity. It is manifest also from the significant fact that

¹ Exod., xx., 8.

² Isaiah, lvi., 6, 7.

³ Deut., v., 14, 15.

⁴ Gen., ii., 3.

the Hebrew people, for some time before they received the Law on Mount Sinai, were enjoined in the desert to abstain on the Sabbath Day from gathering manna, and to rest from all servile work.¹ The same conclusion is obvious from the very words of the precept: *Remember* to keep holy the Sabbath Day, by which God recalls to their mind an already-existing ordinance which had grown well-nigh obsolete during their bondage in Egypt. This inference is, moreover, warranted by the fact that the Sabbath was kept sacred by the Egyptians, as Herodotus testifies. We cannot suppose that a people, so tenacious of their traditions, would adopt from their own slaves a religious custom that was rarely, if ever, practised by the slaves themselves, owing to their wretched condition. We are, therefore, justified in asserting that it was derived from the primitive law given to Adam.

With what profound reverence, then, should we view an ordinance instituted to draw man closer to his Maker, and to inculcate on him humanity toward his fellow-beings and compassion for even the beast of burden; an ordinance, whose observance was requited by temporal blessings, and whose violation was avenged by grievous calamities; an ordinance, which was first proclaimed at the dawn of human life, re-echoed on Mount Sinai, and engraved by the finger of God on the Decalogue; an ordinance, which applies to all times and places, and which is demanded by the very exigencies of our nature!

Sunday, or the Lord's Day, is consecrated by the Christian world to public worship and to rest from servile work, in order to commemorate the Resurrection of our Saviour from the grave, by which He consummated the work of our Redemption, and to foreshadow the glorious resurrection of the elect and the eternal rest that will be theirs in the life to come. "We who have believed," says the Apostle, "shall enter into rest." "There remaineth, therefore, a day of rest for the people of God." Yea, an everlasting day of rest and supreme felicity prefigured by the repose of the ancient Sabbath. Most appropriately, indeed, has Sunday been chosen. If it was proper to solemnize the day on which God created the world, how much more meet to celebrate the day on which He redeemed it.

As the worship of our Creator is nourished and perpetuated by religious festivals, so does it languish when they are unobserved, and so does it become paralyzed when they are suppressed. Whenever the enemies of God seek to destroy the religion of a people, they find no means so effectual for carrying out their impious design as the suppression of the Sabbath. Thus, when Antiochus deter-

Exod., xvi., 23.¹ Heb., iv., 9-11.

mined to abolish the sacred laws of the Hebrew people and to compel them to conform to the practice of idolatry, he defiled the Temples of Jerusalem and Garizim, he put an end to the Jewish sacrifices, and, above all, he forbade, under pain of death, the *observance of the Sabbath and the other religious solemnities*, substituting in their stead his own birthday and the Feast of Bacchus as days of sacrifice and licentious indulgence.¹

The leaders of the French Revolution of 1793 adopted similar methods for the extirpation of the Lord's Day in France. The churches were profaned and dedicated to the *Goddess of Reason*; the priests were exiled or put to death. The very name of Sunday, or Lord's Day, was abolished from the calendar, that every hallowed tradition associated with that day might be obliterated from the minds of the people.

And it is a well-known fact that, in our own times, the enemies of religion are the avowed opponents of the Christian Sabbath. I have seen Sunday violated in Paris, in Brussels, and in other capitals of Europe. And even in Rome I have seen government workmen engaged on the Lord's Day in excavating and in building, a profanation which grieved the Holy Father, as he himself acknowledged to me. Who are they that profane the Sunday in those cities of Europe? They are men lost to all sense of religion, who glory in their impiety and who aim at the utter extirpation of Christianity.

A close observer cannot fail to note the dangerous inroads that have been made on the Lord's Day in our country within the last quarter of a century. If these encroachments are not checked in time, the day may come when the religious quiet, now happily reigning in Baltimore and other well-ordered cities, will be changed into noise and turbulence, when the sound of the church-bell will be drowned by the echo of the hammer and the dray, when the Bible and the prayer book will be supplanted by the newspaper and the magazine, when the votaries of the theatre and the drinking saloon will outnumber the religious worshippers, and salutary thoughts of God, of eternity, and of the soul will be choked by the cares of business and by the pleasures and dissipation of the world.

We cannot but admire the wisdom of God and His ultimate knowledge of the human heart in designating one day in the week on which public homage should be paid Him. So engrossing are the cares and occupations of life, so absorbing its pleasures, that it is difficult, if not impossible, to direct the thoughts of mankind to the higher pursuits of virtue and religious worship unless a special

¹ II. Mac., vi.

time is set apart for these spiritual exercises. We have certain hours assigned to the various functions of daily life. We have stated hours for retiring to rest at night and for rising from sleep, for partaking of our meals, and for attending to our regular avocations of life. If we attended to these ordinary functions only when the spirit would move us, only when inclination would prompt, our health would be impaired and our temporal interests would suffer. And so, too, would our spiritual nature grow torpid if there were no fixed day for renovating it by the exercise of divine praise and adoration. We might for a time worship God at irregular intervals, but very probably we would end by neglecting to commune with Him altogether.

The Christian Sabbath is a living witness of Revelation, an abiding guardian of Christianity. The religious services held in our churches each successive Sunday are the most effective means for keeping fresh in the minds and hearts of our people the sublime and salutary teachings of the Gospel. Our churches exercise on the truths of Revelation an influence analogous to that exerted by our courts of justice on the civil law. The silence and solemnity of the court, the presence of the presiding judge, the power with which he is clothed, the weight of his decisions, give an authority to our civil and criminal jurisprudence and invest it with a sanction which it could not have if our courts were closed.

In like manner, the religious decorum observed in our temples of worship, the holiness of the place, the sacred character of the officiating ministers, above all, the reading and exposition of the Sacred Scriptures, inspire men with a reverence for the Divine Law and cause it to exert a potent influence in the moral guidance of the community. The summary closing of our civil tribunals would not entail a more disastrous injury on the laws of the land than the closing of our churches would inflict on the Christian religion.

How many social blessings are obtained by the due observance of the Lord's Day ! The institution of the Christian Sabbath has contributed more to the peace and good order of nations than could be accomplished by standing armies and the best organized police force. The officers of the law are a terror, indeed, to evil doers, whom they arrest for overt acts ; while the ministers of religion, by the lessons they inculcate, prevent crime by appealing to the conscience, and promote peace in the kingdom of the soul.

The cause of charity and mutual benevolence is greatly fostered by the sanctification of the Sunday. When we assemble in church on the Lord's Day, we are admonished by that very act that we are all members of the same social body, and that we should have for one another the same lively sympathy and spirit of cōoperation

which the members of the human body entertain toward one another. We are reminded that we are all enlivened and sanctified by the same Spirit. "There are diversities of graces," says the Apostle, "but the same Spirit; and there are diversities of ministers, but the same Lord. And there are diversities of operations, but the same God who worketh all in all."¹ We all have divers pursuits and avocations; we occupy different grades of society, but in the house of God all these distinctions are levelled. The same Spirit that enters the heart of the most exalted citizens, does not disdain to descend also into the soul of the humblest peasant. We all profess our faith in the same Creator, and we are all regenerated by the waters of baptism. We hope for the same heaven. We meet as brothers and sisters of the same Lord whose blood was shed on the Cross not only to cleanse our soul from sin, but to cement our hearts in love. We are, in a word, taught the comforting lesson that we all have one God and Father in heaven. "One body," says the Apostle, "one Spirit, as you are called in one hope of your vocation. One Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all, who is above all, and through all, and in us all."²

And how can we hesitate to render to our Creator this reasonable service? We give six days to our temporal affairs; let us devote one day to our eternal interests. Six days we spend in the society of our fellow-men; let us consecrate one day to conversing with our Maker. Six days we lay up treasures on earth; on the seventh we should lay up treasures in heaven.

If, indeed, the observance of the Sunday were irksome and difficult, there would be some excuse for neglecting this ordinance. But it is a duty which, so far from involving labor and self-denial, contributes to health of body and contentment of mind. The Christian Sunday is not to be confounded with the Jewish or even the Puritan Sabbath. It prescribes the golden mean between rigid sabbatarianism on the one hand, and lax indulgence on the other. There is little doubt that the revulsion in public sentiment from a rigorous to a loose observance of the Lord's Day, can be ascribed to the sincere but misguided zeal of the Puritans, who confounded the Christian Sunday with the Jewish Sabbath, and imposed restraints on the people which were repulsive to Christian freedom, and which were not warranted by the Gospel dispensation. The Lord's Day to the Catholic heart is always a day of joy. The Church desires us on that day to be cheerful without dissipation, grave and religious without sadness and melancholy. She forbids, indeed, all unnecessary servile work on that day; but as "the Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath," she allows

¹ I. Cor., xii., 4-6.

² Ephes., iv., 4-6.

such work whenever charity or necessity may demand it. And as it is a day not only of religion, but also of relaxation of mind and body, she permits us to spend a portion of it in innocent recreation. In a word, the true conception of the Lord's Day is expressed in the words of the Psalmist: "This is the day which the Lord hath made, let us be glad and rejoice therein."

AN ITALIAN CHAMPION OF CATHOLIC RIGHTS.

WHEN to Carlalberto, fugitive and broken-hearted on the far-off shore of Portugal, Victor Emmanuel II. had succeeded, and Piedmontese ambition, leagued with Garibaldi and Mazzini, and guided by the genius of Cavour, was preparing all Italy for another and a more successful war against Austria, Cesare Cantù was pursuing his own intellectual labors, directing all of them towards the realization of his cherished dream of an Italy independent, united, and Catholic.

Then appeared the work which he had conceived the plan of in his Austrian prison, his *Storia degli Italiani*, in six volumes, the work which had been the cherished subject of his studies all through the preceding years, and while giving to the public so many precious fruits of his genius. He had put into its composition his whole heart and soul, both as an Italian and as a Catholic. Any serious-minded lover of Italy, who reads these six pregnant volumes through, must be convinced, long before he finishes their perusal, that the coming generation of Italians will find in these glowing and patriotic pages the most eloquent exhortation to be true to the religion and the ideal of their mediæval ancestors.

The Neo-Guelph's aspirations are apparent throughout. These, of course, were equally distasteful to the courts of Vienna and Turin, the former of which considered the Lombardo-Venetian provinces as the southernmost portion of the former German Empire, while the latter aimed at nothing less than blotting out in the Peninsula every sovereignty but its own. Indeed, the Piedmontese king and statesmen were far more bitterly opposed to Cantù's teaching than his own Austrian rulers; the very idea of an Italian Confederation, especially of one in which the Pope should be the presiding authority, was an abomination to Victor Emmanuel and

Cavour. How much more distasteful it was to Mazzini and Garibaldi, the reader needs not to be told.

The work was published in Turin. The last two volumes were not allowed to pass the frontiers of Lombardy. No sooner had the first volume appeared than the *liberal* press of Piedmont denounced once more the author and his religious views. This denunciation increased in violence when the last volumes appeared, describing recent events, and painting contemporary personages, with the generous freedom of one to whom the love of truth and native country was the sole and supreme guide.

In 1855 the Concordat, concluded between Pius IX. and the Emperor Francis Joseph, stipulated the abrogation of the hateful laws enacted in the last century against the Church by Joseph II. This was a result that Cantù had labored for all his life. It drew from him warm expressions of approval. But this measure of religious liberty, bestowed so tardily on all Catholics in the Austrian Empire, was looked upon as a step backward by the Piedmontese Government, whose every act now tended toward doing away with all the time-honored institutions and liberties of the Church within its own dominions.

So Cantù was held up to public scorn as a mediæval bigot.

Then came the Archduke Maximilian with his enthusiastic wife, both bent on transforming Lombardy and Venice into the happiest of happy lands. It was a noble dream, which the jealousy of the Viennese Cabinet and the intrigues of Piedmont would not permit to be realized, even though Maximilian had united superior statesmanship with unquestioned sincerity of purpose. The two royal dreamers experienced a rude awakening, and were sent to their lovely castle of Miramar to indulge in other bright visions of peoples regenerated and empires founded, all of which were to end in the pitiful tragedy we know of.

The great historian, whose name and person Maximilian had loved from his boyhood, was eagerly sought for by him on his arrival in Milan. The new viceroy intended to replace the oppressive centralized administration of the provinces intrusted to him by institutions inaugurating a system of local self-government. And, doubtless, he would have carried out his purpose, had his powers been greater, and had he been sustained by the imperial authorities. He soon found out, however, that he could only count on their support in his conservative and repressive measures. Every attempt to found a more liberal *régime* was promptly and finally disavowed by the Viennese ministers.

Cantù, who aimed at bringing together the leading men of Lombardy and Venetia, in some legal deliberative body, which might be the forerunner of better things, urged the Prince to call together

the noblest men and most illustrious scholars of his government in a council of public instruction.

The proposal, however, only drew on Maximilian an open rebuke, and on Cantù an increase of "watchfulness" from the Austrian police. Worse than that, another calumny was devised against the latter by the unscrupulous police officials, and zealously circulated in Piedmont and throughout all Italy by the Sardinian statesmen and the agents of secret societies. It was to the effect that Cantù had drawn up a petition, for which he was soliciting signatures everywhere, to erect Lombardy and Venice into an Italian kingdom, with Maximilian as its sovereign.

Vainly did Cantù deny the whole thing as a malicious fabrication, demanding the appointment of "a jury of honor," even were it composed of his adversaries, to investigate and pronounce on the matter. The purpose of the calumniator is to have his slander believed and circulated, not to have the truth or falsehood of his statements examined. No tribunal was established. The judgment of all honorable men, even in Piedmont, was well expressed by the celebrated Brofferio, then the most eloquent of the advanced Radicals: "Between all the scribblers who here in Turin defile with their ink such quantities of paper, and only produce such miserable squibs, and Cesare Cantù, whom the Austrian guillotine does not frighten from writing so nobly and so outspokenly the truth about Italy, my choice is soon made."

While slander was thus systematically at work, undermining the reputation, ruining the influence, and poisoning the life of the courageous historian, the cannon of Magenta and Solferino was drowning every other sound in Italy, and the scheme of a confederated Italy, under the presidency of the Pope, proclaimed by Napoleon III., with the seeming consent of Victor Emmanuel, made Cantù himself forget all personal griefs in the prospect of the near regeneration of his country.

Was the great hope of his life about to be fulfilled? Was Providence about to reward the sufferings and labors of himself and the other Neo-Guelphs by this wonderful result of a war undertaken with such questionable motives and directed by passions less creditable still? At any rate, so widely known was the part taken by the author of *Algisio* in advocating a confederated Italy, that immediately after the Battle of Solferino Napoleon sent for him.

"As I was better known outside than inside of Italy," Cantù says in his *Cronistoria*, "a mutual friend induced the emperor to send for me. So, at his invitation, I went to his headquarters. He said he knew what I had endured, and how little sympathy I had for the first Napoleon, and undertook to justify him, saying

that nothing but a fitting opportunity prevented him from creating Italian nationality. Naturally, thereupon, I urged him to carry out the *Napoleonic idea*. He related to me at length all that he had done, and all that he proposed doing. His cousin (Prince Napoleon Jerome), who had just arrived, was to besiege Mantua, the King of Sardinia was to invest Peschiera, he—Napoleon—was to attack Verona immediately. 'A pretty hard bone to gnaw,' he said. Forty thousand men were to land at Venice. That same day, he had seen the Hungarian Kossuth, whom Napoleon had called to ascertain if they could count on a rising in Hungary. Like all these exiles, Kossuth made great promises. But the emperor seemed to be on his guard with him, or perhaps he was satisfied with worming some secrets out of him, and said: *If Austria should continue the war, your co-operation would be needed. Hold yourself in readiness.* Subsequently, from Napoleon and from Picri, the Imperial Prefect of Police, just arrived from Paris, I learned that there were disturbances in France, and that the presence of the emperor might become necessary at home. I mentioned this to his majesty, who at once protested, saying: *I shall not leave Italy till the whole thing is done and over.*

"Then, again, speaking of the future of Italy, he said: *It shall be a confederation, with the Pope at its head*, and so on, as the matter is laid down in La Guéronnière's pamphlet. I mentioned, as opposed to this plan, the risings which were encouraged elsewhere, and he said distinctly: *This is what annoys me.* And, as I spoke of the companions of Ulysses letting loose the winds while he was asleep, he said in quite a loud voice, and smiling: 'Well, I shall say the *Quos ego*.'

"This is not the place," continues Cantù, "to give at length the details of our conversation, which sufficed to give umbrage to those who considered me to be more Italian than Piedmontese. As to Napoleon's sincerity, we shall see the proofs of it."¹

Whatever hopes of a confederated Italy the Neo-Guelphs may have conceived, on learning the purport of this conversation, or on reading the proclamation of Napoleon after the armistice concluded at Villafranca, were soon dispelled by Napoleon's allies. He—shallow adventurer that he was—had let loose the winds, and among them the whirlwind of Prussian ambition, which was fated to sweep his throne and himself from the face of the continent. He had let loose the mad torrent of revolutionary and anti-Christian passions, thinking that he could, at any moment, raise a dam across their path, and force them back to their former obscure channels.

¹ Dell' *Indipendenza Italiana*; *Cronistoria*, vol. iii., p. 265, note.

The revolution, though apparently checked for the time being, was gathering strength. It had at its service Cavour and the organized forces of Piedmont, and it had as auxiliaries the bands of the secret societies in every Italian city. All these elements were directed by one will, that of Cavour,—a will which no scruple of conscience or sentiment of honor restrained. Of course, they prevailed over the divided counsels and timid resistance of the majority of Italians. And so the *Kingdom of Italy* arose out of the union of Lombardy with Piedmont and the disruption of the states of Central Italy.

Thus came to an end the day-dream of the Neo-Guelphs. In the first *Italian Parliament*, which met in Turin, Cantù appeared as the champion of the cause to which his life had been devoted,—that of Italy, free and Catholic. He had never conspired in secret even to compass the most noble of patriotic aims, the liberation of his country from a foreign yoke. He had fought the enemies of Italy in the open light of day by his indefatigable pen, by his eloquent speeches, by his undisguised, loyal, and invincible hostility. And this battle of a lifetime was avowedly for the religion as well as the independence of Italy.

He took his place in the Chamber of Deputies as the representative and spokesman of all those who yearned to see the faith of their forefathers become the very soul of the national life in the new era upon which Italians were entering.

His indomitable courage, his open avowal of Catholicity in the presence of an assembly in which the immense majority were haters of all religion, and intolerant of any opinion favorable to their own baptismal creed, were admired even by his bitterest adversaries. His learning and eloquence, as well as his pluck, always secured him a respectful, if not a sympathetic hearing. In May, 1864, there was a motion to prevent the collecting or sending of "Peter's pence" to the Pope. Cantù rose to speak against it.

"The House," he said, "by permitting me to address it, gives proof that toleration is one of the best guarantees of liberty. Every one here present knows that I rise to advocate a cause that finds no sympathy among the greatest number. I must remind you that the justice of no cause is to be measured by majorities or by success. The gods of old may have favored Cæsar victorious, but posterity did not judge that Cato vanquished was in the wrong. . . .

"You are unwilling that donations should be made to the Pope, because he is a sovereign, and because our bishops have endowments. But when you will have taken away from the Pope his principality, and from the bishops their property, how are they to

live? Of the free offerings made by the charitable. Do I understand you to say that kings should be their almsgivers? This would scarcely be democratic: free men may be unwilling to see the guiders of so many consciences proposed by a minster to the king as deserving of a salary, and nominated by the king as persons capable of filling a salaried office. I may speak to you freely about the Pope, since I have nothing to hope from him, nothing but that he shall send me his blessing at my last hour.

"The men who subscribe their names to the 'Peter's Pence' fund give us all a salutary example of moral courage. . . .

"Let us confess it: what is most needed in our day is such courage among citizens, that of holding an opinion, a conscientious conviction; the courage to profess it openly, not only in presence of two or three persons, but before the multitude, in newspapers, in assemblies, in this House of Parliament.

"If you deplore the lack of this social courage; if you regret the lowering of the moral standard of character, the sudden and total changes of religious profession, the unnecessary public retractions we see, and the cowardly indifference men show toward truth and error;—well, then, do not let us increase this avowed evil. To-day those who send their alms to the Pope, do so in open day; the names and the lists are printed and published: do you want these things to be done henceforth in the dark? Do not, I beseech you, make people feel that one must be either disloyal or intrepid when one says: I am a Christian—a Roman Catholic!"

The Italian Parliament was on a very steep incline, hurried downward to one subversive measure after another, because it was impelled by the fiery and blind revolutionary spirit, like a locomotive without the controlling hand of the engineer.

In February, 1865, the ministers—as a preliminary step toward transferring the seat of government from Turin to Florence—demanded the immediate adoption by the Chamber, without any discussion whatever, of the draught of an entire code of laws for all Italy, and several important separate bills, among them one doing away with ecclesiastical marriage, and thereby opening a wide door to divorce.

It was parliamentary despotism thinly veiled under the form of political, or, rather, of revolutionary necessity.

Cantù was not the man to submit to such dictation, especially when the dearest interests of religion and the family were about to be sacrificed.

"We all know," he said, in rising, "that in the life of a nation, as in that of an individual man, there happen *fatal necessities* which inexorably decide on their own whole future. Such is the neces-

sity, it would appear, which Italy now experiences of unifying its legislation.

"I ask that we have engraved over the portal of this Chamber the word *Ἀνάγκη*. . . . For this is the word which has been unceasingly ringing in our ears for some time past."

After this exordium, he examined at length the several grounds on which the proposed changes could be claimed to be necessary, dwelling with peculiar force on the alleged political reasons.

"You will ask me what I, on my side, would propose. Indeed, I am well aware that there can be no serious opposition made to such a measure as this without having a well-defined programme to substitute for the obnoxious law, and without the courage to support that programme.

"I am a conservative of the old-English school, which admits of no change not founded on reasons of serious inconvenience, demonstrated in free and open discussion. With Walpole I shall say to you: *Nolite quiescere*. With one much older than Walpole I shall say, that nothing but extreme necessity can authorize a change in the laws. Let whatever is well, and doing well enough, alone. Such has been our law (on marriage) during the last three hundred years. Allow the form given to it by the Council of Trent to remain in full force: it makes of both marriage-contract and the sacrament one and the same thing, and thereby shuts the door against clandestine marriages. As to the inconveniences, to meet them I should propose, as a liberal member, my usual remedy—freedom."

He then moved "that all marriages celebrated according to the ritual of the contracting parties should be held to be valid in law. To obtain the civil effect attached thereto, they must be immediately registered by the proper civil officer."

Brave words, these, and most wise counsels. They were not listened to.

In 1864-65 began the parliamentary campaign against the monastic orders. Cantù, who knew better than any living man how little the French *people* had profited by the confiscation of church property, the suppression of monasteries, and the sequestration of their landed possessions during the great revolution, was also well informed of the baneful results of similar measures in Spain and Portugal,—in Spain, especially, where the most glorious edifices of the Middle Ages were ruthlessly destroyed or allowed to fall into ruin, and the property of the suppressed orders became the prey of the ministers in power, or of their numerous and greedy retainers. The most enlightened French statesmen, even when professing to be the irreconcilable enemies of the monks, did not hesitate to say that the indiscriminating cruelty shown toward

them was a national wrong, and the confiscation of their homes and lands a blunder in political economy. When, nearly half a century afterwards, the Spanish ministry, in a time of peace and without the pretext of a revolution, repeated this iniquitous process of sequestration and wholesale suppression, the Liberals of France as well as of both Peninsulas denounced their conduct as a blunder, if not an injustice.

What did Cavour and Victor Emmanuel care for such public opinion? They were backed by English statesmen and churchmen, encouraged by the American press, and powerfully aided by the money and men contributed by the Bible and missionary societies in England and the United States. Provided the Papacy were overturned, and the monastic orders, the most efficient auxiliaries of the Papacy, were annihilated, they cared not what iniquities were committed. Cantù, hopeless as were his efforts in opposing government, parliament, secret societies, and the Evangelical Alliance, did not hesitate to raise his voice, and record his condemnation of the wrong in the face of all Europe. There are very few examples in all history of a more courageous resistance, or of an eloquence more admirable, both in its literary forms and its lofty spirit of religious conviction.

"The patrimony (of the monastic orders) which you threaten to sweep away," he said on April 12, 1865, "became the property of the Church in three ways: by free gift, by purchase, by reclaiming the soil from the wilderness. This last title to its possession is the most extensive. As to the donations of land, they were executed in conformity with the laws, and with the express sanction of the public magistrate.

"How can you lay your hands on the soil which the Church has acquired by the sweat of her brow? You will tell me that these lands belong to corporations, to moral entities created by the State and which the State can do away with. I reply that there are other like entities, associations formed for a moral, industrial, or even political purpose, which are not threatened in their capacity or their liberties. Why not destroy them also? You feel you cannot do this without violating the right of free association. As to the right of the State to interfere, I am free to admit that the State is the guardian of all such associations; but is it, then, the right of a guardian to rob his wards? Montesquieu has said: *Make sacred and inviolable the ancient and necessary patrimony of the clergy; let it be sacred for all eternity like the clergy themselves.*

"I see that in dealing with our Protestant and Jewish brethren you are more liberal than in dealing with Catholics; the Government does not concern itself with the right of circumcision or the

Kypurim. . . . You do not even interfere in the question about the property of the Jewish universities, unless by declaring in the law of July 4, 1857, that the Israelite universities are incorporated, are constituted lawful owners of their property for the exercise of their religious worship and the bestowing of religious instruction.

" The Catholic Church, therefore, shall enjoy the privilege of being persecuted, of being robbed, and insulted. What do you not dare to say against her ?

" Let me conclude. You say that the Church shall be free, but that she shall have none of the rights of a free man. She shall be a property owner, but only after the fashion we like. Others shall administer her property, she must not be allowed over it the superintendence granted to our senators, to our deputies, to our lay societies.

" In God's name, if she is free, then the State is not her guardian. The State may indeed enact just laws, but not prescribe to her what is for her good ; still less may it strip her of her possessions, under the pretext that this is for her advantage.

" One of our ministers has been heard to say in the Upper Chamber, that in our days the Church has been made to keep her proper place ; that the State moves forward in its own sphere without the Church, just as the Church does without the State.

" What an absurdity ! You might as well say that the body moves forward on its legs without its head, or that the blood can circulate without the action of the heart, or that man can breathe without his lungs. To show you how you contradict yourselves, I need only remind you that not a week passes without your publishing laws, decrees, and ministerial propositions concerning the most intimate details of ecclesiastical life ; you suppress the grants hitherto bestowed on our public charities ; you draught into the army and navy the students in our theological seminaries. You not only allow the fullest liberty to all who assail Catholic teaching ; but, besides thereby authorizing such an abuse of free speech, you encourage and rear the men who profit by it, you pay professors and journalists to assail our doctrines and make of your universities the succursals of the Evangelical meeting-houses. You make it a crime for priests to do what we consider to be the common right of all ; you make punishable the very fulfilment of what is to them a sacred duty, obedience to their superiors. You strip our cemeteries of their consecrated character, making them the burial-places of Catholics and non-Catholics alike ; you deprive the marriage ceremony of the priest's benediction.

"The Romans, as we see in Justinian's *Pandecta* and in the *Instituta* of Gaius, permitted all citizens to associate as they pleased, binding themselves by rules of their own choosing, on the sole condition that such rules did not endanger public order; to associate for every imaginable purpose, even to secure themselves public burial. The societies thus formed may acquire property, and this property, should the society itself be dissolved, must be devoted to the purpose for which it was originally acquired.

"Under this legislation the Christian religion fulfilled its social mission and reached the Middle Ages. A minister (the Honorable Signor Ugdulella) complains that I wish to make men go back to this dark period. I must remind him that I was, perhaps, the first in Italy to proclaim the need we had of studying the Middle Ages. Instead of calumniating this period, I have judged it to be a great progress as compared with pagan antiquity, as a battle-field between the forces of the dying past and those of a future which was fast shaping its own institutions. But no man who cannot cast off the narrow and sectarian spirit of our times, can enter into the spirit of universal humanity.

"I repeat it, we have much to learn from the Middle Ages, much which we might profitably borrow from them. How can we help wishing that society in our times were founded on religious faith, on reverence for authority? that a pontiff without armies might once more summon an emperor from the furthest limits of Germany to answer before him for violating the constitution he had sworn to respect? that we might once more behold upon earth men of strong, proud, and saintly character? that all social conditions should still preserve those habits of self-government which made of the community a republic under a king? Are not these things, one and all, quite foreign to the manner of our age, when the State absorbs everything, or a monarchy means despotism?

"Another minister (Pianelli) accuses me of making the modern world return to mediævalism, because I would wish public men to have a conscience, and infractions of the law to be accounted sinful.

"The minister and I have studied the Middle Ages from very different standpoints, probably; but we must have studied it, nevertheless, with such care as not to be confounded with the vulgar crowd, who are carried away by figures of rhetoric or frightened by airy phantoms which disappear with the first beams of light. I can see as clearly as he can the immeasurable distance which separates the period when Christianity was the generic term for civilization as well as morality, when the world had saved from shipwreck the common patrimony of all peoples not barbarians—

God, faith, laws, the rights of the Church, and the Latin tongue,—from those other times, when the bonds of unity are severed, and when we are struck with the opposite directions followed by human thought and social order. It was Sieyès, one of the standard-bearers of the French Revolution, who dared to say: ‘The (French) Nation, in its quality of lawmaker, cannot rightfully deprive me of my property or my private opinion. Security for the property-holder is essential to the work of every legislator. How could he create it, since he only exists in order to protect it? Church property, like all other property, belongs to the persons to whom the original donors willed it to belong. These were free to make of it any other lawful disposition they chose; but, in fact, they bestowed it, in due legal form, on the Church, and not on the nation.’

“It is true that some people say: ‘The priests can live on the almsgiven to them by the faithful;’ and, they add, with a sweet look of piety: ‘In the beginning the Church was poor, and it is only a zeal for her purity that impels us to limit her possessions to Peter’s fishing-bark and his nets.’

“I shall also ask why the King of Italy does not become once more the Count of Maurienne? Why do not the daughters of our sovereigns go, like Nausicaa, to wash the household linen at the public fountains? Why do not our admirable ministers do as did the magistrates of our mediæval republics, come before us with a bundle of papers under their arm,—that old-fashioned *bulgetta*, which gave its name to our BUDGET—a word which fills our people with affright?

“An age, like ours, which laughs at the *stigmata* of St. Francis, which consults somnambulists and rapping spirits, may well be unable to appreciate these great-hearted men, who were also the greatest minds in the most glorious period of Italian story. Those, however, who severely guard their mental vision against the illusions of the surrounding fog, are ready to look with veneration on those great teachers to whom Dante devoted his sublimest strains: and they were monks.

“The Middle Ages were a period of unlimited freedom for all corporations, for robust individual manhood, and, consequently, for the Church also. When degeneracy set in, when Florence substituted for Farinata degli Uberti King Robert of Anjou, when to Boniface VIII. succeeded Gianni Carracciolo, then it was that the writer who gave us Fiammetta the obscene instead of the heavenly Beatrice, befouled with his buffooneries the poor monks, and left us that heap of mud to which all the scribblers of our day go to find the dirt they throw.

“The democratic and republican spirit was extinguished by the

petty despotisms which sprang up. Artists, poets, philosophers, the Pagans of the Renaissance, labored to make a monarchy of Europe, and then it was that men began to decry and to destroy the monastic institutions for which Paolo Sarpi had so superb a contempt, because, indeed, 'they smelled of the people.'

"The witty sayings of Erasmus and the *Epistolæ Obscurorum Virorum* made our fathers laugh, while the French 'liberators' and the conquering German hosts swept away every vestige of their independence. Our forefathers, nevertheless, would not have tolerated the platitudes which we bandy in our day, and which, besides being unqualifiedly vulgar, are so distasteful to good breeding and religious sentiment.

"But, in these Middle Ages, who was the most determined enemy of monastic institutions? Who but this Frederick II., this German who issued the most atrocious laws against heresy, who was the friend of that dreadful tyrant, Ezzelino,—of that Ezzelino who was wont to say that he dreaded more the poor monk, Brother Anthony of Lisbon, than all the Guelphs in arms. There is an intimate connection between every kind of liberty, as there is between every kind of tyranny.

"Who were your predecessors in the last century? Two Austrians. I think I am reading the decrees of Joseph II., of Austria, when I read your laws prohibiting processions in the public streets, the erection of altars in the open air for the solemnities of Corpus Christi, the collecting of alms, the ringing of church-bells at certain hours, the opening of church-doors in the evening. You will not tolerate confessions in the hospitals; no assistant may be appointed in a parish, without the approbation of the Ministry. The episcopal seminaries are no longer free to teach as of yore; in fact, we have a reproduction of the petty vexations which made Frederick the Great call Joseph II. *My Brother the Sacristan*, and which ought to obtain for you the designation of the *Sacristan Parliament*.

"Mirabeau said of Joseph II.: 'This man's panegyrists ought to tell what justice there is in compelling any citizen to quit the calling he had embraced with the sanction of his country's laws.' I must declare very frankly that I see as much wrong in driving out a monk or a nun from their peaceful retreat as there is in expelling any lay-citizen from his own dwelling.

"I can surely speak before an Italian Parliament of this sovereign with the same freedom with which I wrote of him under the penalties of Austrian censure and the dread of the government which stripped me of all lucrative employment. I have blamed him for expelling the learned Bollandists, and selling at auction their library and manuscripts; I shall also remind you here that

this same improvident and unloved reformer said on his deathbed: 'I have not succeeded in a single one of my undertakings.'

"All this worked so well that in Lombardy no monks were left. Our childhood was not delighted by gifts of pictures and sugar-plums, nor frightened by the sight of long-bearded friars. Monks had no share in our education. They had been banished from every pulpit, from every professional chair; and, when a stray Capuchin appeared in our streets, we all ran to gaze at him, as if he were a Turk or a gipsy.

"This, perhaps, was one reason why we are free from these antipathies which you boast of. . . . We knew that our forefathers had been educated by monks, and we were not absurd enough to consider as brutes such men as Pini, Parini, Amoretti, Fontana, Oriani, Boscowich, Ferrari, Lechi, Verri, Beccaria, Frisi, all of whom were either monks or their pupils.

"Doubtless it was because our native soil was free of monks that it brought forth the Neo-Guelphs! We, the sons of a city destroyed by the Ghibelline leaders, we worshipped that Alexander III. who had put his foot on the neck of the German emperor; we were wont to go as pilgrims to the Convent of Pontida, where was founded the Free League of the Lombard cities,—in that district which has done you thrice in succession the discourtesy of sending you a Catholic member of Parliament.

"These men, in a calamitous period, well satisfied with the silent esteem of all good people, gave themselves up to meditation, to study, to the labor of preparing and seeking lovingly the reign of freedom, which had not yet been made an object of mere speculative admiration. . . . They loved liberty devotedly, not only in hatred of the men who oppressed it, but for its own sake,—for the sake of thinking, speaking, acting, worshipping, praying, solely directed and restrained in this by God and the laws He sanctioned.

"What was my astonishment, on setting foot in Piedmont, to witness people's aversion for the Jesuits, who were looked upon as the Polyphemuses of civilization! And yet, I remember that King Carlalberto, in a conversation I had with him, applauded the reappearance of Guelphic ideas, and the publication of Cesare Balbo's *Life of Dante*. I remember how, at Brussels, Gioberti lauded to the skies the virtues of the Piedmontese clergy, at the very time that he was writing his *Primato d'Italia*. And this choice band of men (the Neo-Guelphs), who only lived to foster in their own souls the flame of freedom, the will to establish and to preserve it in the nation,—were reared by monks, and these seeds of liberty which we had sown and developed in republican writings, grew up to sustain, at a later period, the throne of a national king. . . . We prepared for constitutional liberty a robust and

healthy growth. . . . The fruit is before you ; political freedom is ours henceforth. Under its reign there is room for all, for the king as for the priest, for the day laborer as for the millionaire, for the followers of Rothschild as for the Brothers of St. Vincent de Paul. Formerly a *regime* of exclusion prevailed, to-day the road is open to all. Henceforth men are not only free to believe, but free to worship, as they choose. Jews, Catholics, Freemasons,—we are sitting here all together ; we greet each other civilly in the street ; we respect those who keep holy the Sabbath day and those who hallow the Sunday ; we cast our votes together in this Chamber, and we observe toward each other the rules of courtesy and unite in the practice of brotherly charity."

From this retrospective glance at the Middle Ages, Cantù passed to the actual condition of monastic institutions in both hemispheres. He recalls to the Chamber the perfidious advice given, in 1827, to the English Government by an Italian nobleman, Count Ferdinand del Pozzo,—who did not want to see the Irish Catholics emancipated, and warned Wellington and Peel against granting liberties which would be turned to ill use, and which Catholic Austria would not grant to its own subjects.

"The English thought otherwise," the speaker continued, "and the world at present knows that the greater the advance in liberty made by England and her daughter, the great American republic, the more liberal are they toward religious associations. In both countries, Mormons, Moravians, and Barnabites are equally free. More than that,—because Quakers are conscientiously opposed to war, they are dispensed from military service. This little minority among two great nations is treated, as you see, with more respect than you show to the Catholic majority in Italy.

" In the United States the Church is entirely separated from the State. Every denomination supports its own ministers and worship. Every infraction of the law is punished by the civil magistrate. Will you ever have the courage to adopt so full a measure of freedom ? The President of that republic (Lincoln) has a salary of 100,000 lire, after having begun his life as a woodsman. But, in every great calamity he proclaims a day of public prayer, and all hasten to address their supplications to God.

"On the contrary, among peoples who know nothing of progress but revolutionary agitations, you will see them always beginning by the suppression of convents and the sequestration of ecclesiastical property. In Greece, in the Danubian principalities, in Mexico, and at this moment in Russia, nuns are driven forth from their convents because they say their prayers in Latin, and weep for the oppression of their native land.

"Our government is now printing documents, skilfully chosen,

to cast dishonor on Charles III. of Parma; and, among other wrong-doings attributed to him, he is accused of having expelled the Benedictines from Parma and the Lazarists from Piacenza."

Cantù felt, while thus attempting to shame the Italian revolutionists into some fair show of tolerance and moderation, that he was attempting the impossible. A man whose writings, whose sufferings, whose life of poverty and abnegation were all inspired by a consistent love and pursuit of liberty in its truest and widest sense, could successfully challenge the sincerity of the intolerant, persecuting, and irreligious mob who followed Cavour and Ratazzi. They hated and respected at the same time the courageous Neo-Guelph and the pure and incorruptible patriot.

Then, as the Italian Parliament and the advancing revolution became still more and more anti-Catholic, Pius IX. issued his famous prohibition, *Nè eletti nè elettori*; Catholics were neither to vote nor to allow themselves to be voted for.

Cantù, as well as his eloquent colleague, Count d'Ondes-Reggio, at once resigned his seat in Parliament, although questioning, as did very many sincere Catholics, the wisdom of the Pontifical prohibition, which left both Houses of Parliament,—or at least the Lower House,—without a single voice to defend the Catholic interests of Italy.

There was, however, much to say in favor of this absolute *abstention* under the then existing circumstances. The formula adopted by Pius IX. had been first used by the Abbate Margotti, the eloquent founder of the *Armonia*, of Turin, and the *Unita Cattolica*. This courageous priest had been duly elected to Parliament; but his election had been annulled without any other reason save that of Margotti's being a Catholic journalist and an opponent of the revolutionary majority. Cantù's election had been thrice annulled for a similar reason, in face of the unanimity and enthusiasm with which the great historian had been elected. Cantù had not allowed himself to be discouraged, but went again to the polls, was elected, and presented himself once more before Parliament, which was shamed into ratifying his election. Not so Margotti. He never asked for another vote; but denounced, with a power and an eloquence that thrilled all Italy, the brutal tyranny which had usurped the name and forms of a constitutional monarchy.

There was not in reality, save in a very few places, anything like freedom in polling votes. The men who dared to vote for a Catholic became at once the objects of a most bitter persecution, and not unfrequently ran very serious risks. In Parliament itself there was no freedom of discussion. An irresistible revolutionary current, set in movement by the majority, hurried both Houses to-

ward measures which it was vain to protest against. The presence of a few Catholic members only seemed to give an indirect sanction to laws which aimed at overturning all religion.

Then, as one State after another was swept into the "Kingdom of Italy," and among them the States of the Church, the former subjects of the Pope and the other lawful princes had scruples about taking the parliamentary oath, and thereby recognizing what they justly regarded as a usurpation. These scruples became still greater after 1870, when Rome itself became the capital of the new kingdom.

At the accession of Leo XIII., however, when it had become clear that the revolution was an accomplished fact, and that the existing political institutions were not likely to be overturned, all far-sighted Catholics in Italy began to ask themselves whether it were not wiser to use the ballot-box for the purpose of electing to municipal and parliamentary offices the very best men they could find, so as to resist the enactment of anti-Catholic legislation, and to repeal by degrees the disastrous existing laws against the Church and the Pope.

No sooner had the new Pontiff been crowned than he at once summoned to Rome Cesare Cantù. The latter had been singularly honored by Pius IX. at the assembling of the Vatican Council. He was appointed historian of the Council, and, as such, was the only layman admitted to all the private deliberations. This was a supreme approbation given to the life and labors of the invincible defender of Catholic principles,—to the courageous leader of the Neo-Guelphs, who still professed their faith and kept alive their hope in a Catholic and Papal Italy amid the triumph of their adversaries.

Leo XIII. at once asked the historian if some plan could not be devised of reconciling the sacred and inviolable rights of the Holy See with the exercise of citizenship under the kingdom of Italy. To devise some such conciliatory scheme, Cardinal Franchi and Cantù at once set to work. "You can imagine our delight," the latter writes, "when everything thus promised to be settled. . . . But thereupon Cardinal Franchi died, and there was an end to our negotiations."

At any rate, the attempt proved that the great mind of Leo XIII. saw clearly the irreparable injury done to religion in Italy by allowing the current of national life to flow on, generation after generation, controlled by the exclusive forces of an anti-Christian revolution. The lawful use of the ballot-box, and the putting of Catholics into every office where they can control education, legislation, and administration, would seem the only present practical

remedy for an evil which increases with each year, and threatens to become irremediable.

On returning to private life Cantù resumed with incredible ardor his literary labors. Omitting his minor publications, we need only mention some of the great works which have proceeded from his unwearied pen since he abandoned parliamentary life. In 1867 appeared his "History of the Heretics of Italy," a masterpiece which fills a void in ecclesiastical history. His history of Italian independence, in three large volumes, bears the title of *Cronistoria*, because narrating and describing events which were passing under his eyes, and with which he was himself mixed up, he performs the part of chronicler as well as that of historian. The work is full of anecdotes and personal souvenirs, which lend to it a great charm, and give it additional authority. In 1879 was published his *Storia di Trent' Anni*. And, as we write, the first volume of the tenth edition of his Universal History comes to us in semi-monthly numbers.

Through all these years the Christian education of youth never ceased to hold a foremost place in the heart of Cesare Cantù. Foreseeing the deplorable changes which the Freemason ministry of the French Republic were about to make in all the colleges and schools, Cantù, who is a corresponding member of the French Academy of Moral Sciences, wrote to his colleague, M. Parieu, the following admirable letter :

"SIR : There is a question far more important than the unity of the currency (about which I consulted your well-known competency); a question of the most extreme urgency, which interests both your country and mine, and the whole civilized world. You will understand me to allude to the liberty of teaching.

"The battle has long been carried on about this matter. It will soon be transferred to the French Senate, where, I feel certain, you will, as ever, show yourself devoted to the cause of liberty.

"We could never bring ourselves to believe that one Republic in France could oppose the free rivalry between schools, tear to pieces the educational charter given by another Republic, that of 1848, and deprive France of the educational liberty conquered in 1850.

"Here in Lombardy, during what they call the age of tyranny, under the Austrian rule, we had not this liberty, and the government kept a close watch on ecclesiastical education. One may conceive such things to exist under the successors of Joseph II. I therefore wrote on this subject a memoir crowned by the Academy of Modena.

"As soon as the Kingdom of Italy was inaugurated, the Casati

Law gave us liberty to teach, and affirmed the authority of every father of a family over his children's education.

"Later on, however, those who maintained the policy of Cavour omitted no exertion to restrain that liberty. They were impelled by one very evident motive, the fear of the clergy, whom they were wont to hold up to all as the worst-enemies of Italy.

"At present the great majority of Italians, who are devoted to the noble cause of Christian education, are anxious to build up a barrier against the torrent of materialistic ideas and selfish passions which prey upon the souls of youth. Those, on the other hand, who love this calculated corruption make a furious war on all schools which unite, in their teaching, the love of God to that of country and science.

"They starve out the ecclesiastical schools; they have confiscated the revenues of our seminaries and the property of our Bishops. The Holy Father (in an audience which he recently granted to me) complained to me that, at the very time when he feels the need of raising the education of priests to the lofty standard required by criticism and apologetics in our day, all means of doing so were taken away from him. This is the method of persecuting followed by Julian the Apostate.

"Are these the models that your Republic is about to follow? If lay establishments of education are afraid of the opposition of ecclesiastical, or rather Catholic, schools and universities, this is to confess that the education given in the latter is acknowledged to be the best, and is therefore supported by the majority of the nation.

"What a powerful encouragement is here for the men who, like yourself, resist the inundation of evil, in the applause of so many French parents and in the crusade which all good fathers are carrying on against this conspiracy of hatred!

"What an admirable spectacle is offered by the zealous exertions of the Episcopacy to counteract this disturbance of your religious peace—a peace as sadly needed in your country as in mine!

"Their courage, their unanimity shall serve as a good lesson to the Catholic party in Italy, who have condemned themselves to a fatal *abstention* from all political acts.

"We have been shouting: Let there be light, and let us perish! . . . Now we turn our eyes toward the French Republic, where you, sir, and your friends are going to show us how liberty can be conservative, while it is progressing and while aiming to achieve a purpose that is far above the accident of a monarchical or a republican form of government.

"Accept, my dear colleague, the expression of my feelings of respect and friendship,

"CESARE CANTÙ.

"MILAN, May 21st, 1879."

And here, for the moment at least, we leave this great life, so full of glorious performance, and still at its close so full of indefatigable and fruitful energy. One incident only we wish to mention here, and we are sure the young men who read this page, if not their elders, will be grateful to him who records it here.

On the 16th of last March the citizens of his native town of Brivio placed with great solemnity, on the wall of the house in which the great historian was born, a medallion portrait in his honor, with the inscription: *A Cesare Cantù vivo*—"To Cesare Cantù in his lifetime." This was in violation of the rule of art which he had laid down—that no living man should allow a statue or any similar monument to be erected in his honor. So spontaneous was the movement of the entire population, desirous of testifying their love and reverence to one so dear and so illustrious, that Cantù was induced to be present and to address the multitude.

"The dream which I had cherished in childhood," he said, "of spending an obscure existence in this lowly dwelling with my ten brothers and sisters, did not last long. Nor did that other dream of coming back to it, after more than one furious storm, as to the harbor where I should end my life, unenvied and unenvying, forgotten and forgetting.

"These accidents, which, if they do not force our will, at least direct it, have also kept me still separated from this spot where I was born, where lived my aged parents and their fathers before them, and a long series of ancestors who have left behind an honored memory.

"Still, although far away and busied with other thoughts and cares, I have never allowed my thoughts or my eyes to lose sight of my native country; and those who have read my books (too numerous, it may be, but not one of which gives me a pang of remorse) know how often I recall my own Brivio, our beautiful lake (Como), these mountains—whose every line we are as familiar with as with the features of our next neighbors, . . . the castle—all covered with shrubs and creeping-plants as with the mantle of a new life, the church where I have so often served Mass and joined in those sweet chants, those sublime rites which consecrate both our life and our death.

"And you made me a grateful return of kindness and good wishes, and you were heard to mention the name of him who, far

from you, 'and all alone with his courage and his hopes,' persevered obstinately in worshipping the True, the Beautiful, the Good; and perhaps you felt some pleasure in saying: He belongs to my native place.

"On other occasions, particularly when you followed me to the grave of my brother Ignatius, I expressed the wish to wait for the Resurrection in the cemetery where sleep my old parents, and so many good souls whom I have known, and my old schoolmates, only one of whom, perhaps, is now living, the man so dear and so honored by us all (Giosue Magni).

"But as death seems to forget me, you have wished to burn here in advance a grain of that incense which is only burned over the coffin of the dead.

"My own emotion blesses you for it, and thus you have enabled me to thank you.

"Therefore, oh, dear fellow-countrymen, whenever you may happen to show yonder portrait and this little house to your young people, you can also say to them: 'Beginning from a lowly station and with very scanty means, that man succeeded in honoring our native place by being true to his convictions, by respecting good sense and the dignity of manhood, by being ambitious, not of honors, but of HONOR, by persisting to think and to work. You, boys, can do the same, and your native spot will respect and love you.'"

CATHOLIC FREE SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES.

THEIR NECESSITY, CONDITION, AND FUTURE.

Fifth Annual Report of the Diocesan School Board, Diocese of Fort Wayne, Indiana, to Right Rev. Joseph Dwenger, D.D., for Scholastic Year 1882-83, July 26th, 1883. Fort Wayne, Indiana. 8vo., 95 pp.

HALF a century ago, in this country, it was deemed a duty of parents to give their children such training or education in school as their means and position permitted; and besides this, charity called upon the classes more favored with the goods of this world to afford to the children of the poorer or less thoughtful portion of the community such training in morality and the rudiments of education as would save them from becoming a burthen and a curse to society, and enable them, with ordinary exertion, to become creditable members of the commonwealth.

Religion was the underlying element of all education. The colleges and higher academies of the country were almost without exception created and controlled by the various religious denominations, and the schools for the education of the poor, then well styled, from the greatest of Christian virtues, charity schools, were nearly all maintained by the churches, New York having, in addition, a society formed expressly to look after the children of those whose parents were not under the influence of any of the recognized churches, known as the Public School Society.

The State governments encouraged all educational efforts; charters and grants had, from an early period, been made to Episcopalian, Congregational, Presbyterian, Dutch Reformed, and other sectarian colleges, academies, and schools. So long as the young received a suitable training, it was not deemed prejudicial, but, on the contrary, desirable, that each denomination should at the same time, according to its recognized faith, imbue the minds of children in their flock with the sound principles of religion and morality.

In no part of the country was the education more completely religious than in New England. Nowhere were the church and state more closely united or interwoven. Every town had its Congregational meeting-house, and its school under the control of the church, and every citizen was taxed to maintain both. Fifty years after the signing of the Declaration of Independence it was still held

that people of all denominations were liable to be taxed in order to maintain the Congregational meeting-house, and no one ventured to question the right of the town to tax all to maintain the Congregational school. All the New England colleges were originally strictly Congregational, and throughout the whole New England system, from the Dudleyan Lectures in Harvard to the New England Primer in the village school, the training was religious and sectarian. It sought to inculcate morality and religious doctrine according to the doctrines of the Westminster Confession of Faith. In other parts the church support and church-school support were voluntary. In New England they were compulsory. At the commencement, and for many years, all were required by law to attend as well as maintain the Congregational meeting-house and school, and though the state ultimately yielded on the point of attendance at the meeting-house, and very recently on the point of maintaining the same, they never yielded one iota as to the maintenance of the Congregational schools.

So intimate was the connection between the Congregational church and the district school that it was not always easy to draw the line between them. At this very moment a case is on trial in Connecticut to decide whether the district school at Bridgeport owns itself or whether it belongs to the Congregational society.

The case of Thoreau, a New England writer not long dead, shows how late the state-church theory was upheld; for, though he never set foot in the meeting-house, he was technically deemed to belong to it, and was actually imprisoned for refusing to pay his church-rates.

The principle of New England really was, and is, that any sect or combination of sects able to obtain control has the right to enforce in the schools maintained by general tax its own or their common religious views.

That such a principle is in harmony with the sound principles of liberty on which the Constitution of the United States and of the States generally rest, few, we think, would venture openly to maintain; yet, in fact, legislative and governmental action is every day based upon it.

New England, in time, broke away to some extent from the fetters of Congregationalism, but it is a melancholy fact that the minds of the people tended almost irresistibly not to reject the great Calvinistic errors, but to add a greater one by denying the divinity of our Lord, and, step by step, to deny the whole Christian system and the existence and providence of God.

But the machinery of meeting-house and school went on—a settled part of the work of the Commonwealth. Under the new tendency of the active minds of New England came the idea of using

the school to undermine Christianity as it had been used to uphold Congregationalism, of making education blank and colorless, excluding religion and morality as assiduously from its teachings as they had assiduously been made a paramount element. We have the direct testimony of Doctor Brownson, himself one of the very circle of thinkers, that this was a plan deliberately and carefully considered and formed.

We see the same plan carried out openly and without disguise in France, Belgium, and Italy. Here it was done covertly and by secret agencies, but as surely and systematically.

The denominations gradually took less interest in their schools, and began to rely almost exclusively on State aid. It needed only a pretext, and this would be withheld. The pretext came in New York. The Bethel Baptist church, to secure a larger grant, returned a fictitious number of pupils. The discovery of the fraud created everywhere a feeling against the denominational schools; grants were withdrawn, and nearly all the charity schools connected with churches dwindled away.

As the New England population emigrated to Pennsylvania, western New York, Ohio, and the territory beyond, they carried their system, and the new towns had a gospel lot and a school lot. The old religious element would have soon died out had not the Bible been taken as a school-book. Noah Webster, in one of his earlier essays, took strong ground against the use of the Bible in schools, a custom which, according to him, arose from the paucity of books. The lack of readers made it convenient to employ as a reading-book a volume to be found in almost every house.

The Bible got into the schools and remained, used by pupils as a reading-book in some places; in others, by the teacher, who read a portion as the text of a kind of homily.

Amid all this gradual change in the character of the schools, and the direct project for the exclusion of religion from them, the Catholic body in the United States, comparatively poor and scattered, adhered to their Church schools.

Catholic churches can scarcely be said to have existed here before the Revolution, but in the records of our earliest churches, as they arose, are evidences that with almost every one a school was connected, if not from the outset, at least from a very early period. Where the State encouraged their efforts to educate, the poor, Catholics accepted their share gratefully; where it was denied, they labored on, doing all their straitened circumstances permitted. They could not meet all the necessities of the case. Many Catholic children attended the Public School Society's establishments in New York, as well as the district schools in the country. The school-books forty years ago teemed with insulting and mendacious state-

ments against Catholics, as well as with doctrinal statements which the adherents of the ancient faith could not accept. The attempt of Catholics to obtain a modification of these, so that their children should not be compelled to study and repeat doctrine which they considered false, or statements which presented them in a hateful and disgraceful character, was not met in a kindly spirit. Minds imbued with the tradition of three centuries of anti-Catholic falsehood could not easily admit, even indirectly, that they had been deluded. If they sincerely believed that every Catholic was an idolater, an enemy of God and man, that his religion justified all sin, that priests sold absolution, and the like, was not this sufficient reason why every Catholic child in a public school should, under pain of expulsion, be required to learn as a lesson and repeat that he was an idolater, etc.? Such was their reasoning.

A bitter anti-Catholic feeling was engendered. A small but active body of fanatics, by working upon this, contrived to pervert and falsify the American conscience. They assumed, and you find them to this day assuming, that they, and they alone and exclusively, constitute the American people. They talked, and there are some yet idiotic enough to talk, of *their* granting Catholics this and that, as though Catholics did not grant them liberty just as really as they granted it to Catholics. The simple fact that the American people comprises Protestant, Catholic, Jew, and men of other religions is studiously ignored and kept out of view. Assuming that they, a few fanatics, and those who followed their lead, were, by some mysterious process, the depositaries of all power, they proceeded to state to their fellow-citizens how much of life, liberty, and happiness it was their sovereign pleasure they should enjoy.

A clear, logical statesman would have then built a plan by which every citizen could obtain for his children the highest possible education, with such religious training as he preferred. But a wretched compromise was attempted, and this is the system which has gained in several States, and is talked of as national. The old religious and moral teaching is abandoned. An eminent ecclesiastic from England was struck with this feature and remarked upon it. The *Journal of Education* denied the fact positively and indignantly, yet either voluntarily or blindly it made an assertion which it could not prove. Not even the Ten Commandments are now taught in schools, and there is certainly no textbook of religion or morality used in the schools, no course of lessons which is distinctly devoted to the inculcation of either. To talk of a religious and moral spirit pervading the whole system is mere nonsense; the very text-books now are colorless compared to those of half a century ago.

Yet, in establishing the new system of schools on the New England plan, deprived of the religious element, something had to be conceded to the fanatical element. Forty years ago the miscreants who burned the Catholic churches in Philadelphia made great professions of attachment to the Bible. The volume was paraded in all their processions; Catholics were held up as enemies of the Bible, and a perfunctory reading of the Bible was insisted upon as part of the school exercises. By Bible, of course, they meant a Protestant translation of a Protestant-arranged text of those books only in the Protestant canon. School was to be opened with prayer of Protestant type, and the exercises enlivened by Protestant hymns.

This made the schools such as Catholics could not accept; and while pupils were thus constantly imbued with Protestant ideas, and taught to accept them as the only true system, all direct moral teaching was arrested.

To this day it is a matter depending on caprice whether the Catholic or Jewish child who is absent from school, on a holiday obligatory by the rules of the church, can be expelled or mulcted with demerits for his conscientious absence. The schools are treated as Protestant, and all and everything not in harmony with Protestant ideas is matter of punishment.

After the agitation of the school question, now nearly half a century since, it became evident to Catholics that if their children were to be imbued during their school days with morality and religion, it must be in Catholic schools, established and supported by Catholics themselves.

The schools supported by the State were really an engine of proselytism to which the State weakly yielded. American liberty there received a serious wound. When, in so vital a matter as education, the rights, the wishes, the petitions of a portion of the community numbered by thousands and constantly increasing were set at naught, and the power of the State tamely transferred to a coalition of sects for their oppression, every principle for which our ancestors contended in 1776 was abandoned.

As we have remarked, the free school connected with the Church dates back in this country to the last century, but these establishments had not kept growth with the churches, and received comparatively little attention. The earliest of the series of Catholic almanacs, that issued for the year 1833, makes no allusion whatever to the charity or free schools then maintained by the Catholic body; the next year only three are mentioned, one in Baltimore, another in Boston, and the third in New York. The next year only six are reported; seven in 1836, nine in 1837. In 1841 we can see that attention was aroused, and that the schools were in-

creasing in number and efficiency, eight being enumerated in New York city alone. Yet, even in 1844, when a powerful political party was organized to deprive Catholics of their constitutional rights in the matter of education, and make them the bondmen of their religious antagonists, the annual record does not show twenty-five free schools maintained by them.

The earliest schools were under lay teachers, the Sisters of Charity being the first religious community which gave their services to the cause of gratuitous education. By 1850 the Catholic body was aroused to the necessity of making sacrifices to erect and maintain suitable schools, and dioceses in several parts of the country had introduced religious communities devoted especially to school work. Nearly fifty schools are mentioned, and we find the Brothers of the Christian Schools, Brothers of St. Patrick and St. Joseph, as well as the Sisters of Charity and St. Joseph, in charge of Catholic free schools.

The schools needed not only trained teachers, such as they were now obtaining, but text-books. The first attempts were made by reprinting works issued on the other side of the Atlantic, Andrews's Catholic School-book, Challoner's *Bible History*, the series of readers prepared by the Christian Brothers in Ireland. The histories and geographies used were those published in this country, full as they were of prejudice, and statements either false or malicious.

Though the First Council of Baltimore, in 1829, had taken action on these points, the progress in twenty years had not been great. The thirty-fourth decree of that council says: "We deem it absolutely necessary that schools be established in which the young may be taught the principles of faith and morals while they are instructed in letters." The thirty-fifth decree looked to the preparation of suitable school-books: "Since it not seldom happens that many things are found in the books generally used in schools in which the principles of our Faith are assailed, our doctrines misrepresented, and history itself perverted, so that the minds of the young are imbued with error, to the most grievous injury of souls, zeal for religion, a due education of youth, and the honor of the United States demand that so great an evil be remedied. For this reason, we ordain that, as soon as possible, books shall be issued for the use of schools, completely purged from errors, and approved by the judgment of the bishops, in which nothing is contained that can inspire hatred or ill-will towards the Catholic Faith."

In 1840, however, so little had been accomplished that the Fourth Council of Baltimore, as though the position taken ten years before had been rash and unavailing, looked in its sixth de-

cree rather to exertions to make the public schools available by obtaining exemption for Catholic children from participation in the Protestant prayers and hymns and Bible reading.

When, ten years later, a right spirit had been aroused, the Fathers of the First Plenary Council of Baltimore, convened in 1852, in their thirteenth canon, show how deeply the cause of Christian education had taken root in their hearts. "We exhort the bishops, and, in view of the immense evil resulting so generally from a want of proper education among the young, we implore them, by the bowels of God's mercy, to see that schools are established in connection with every church in their diocese, and if necessary, and the condition of affairs allow, provide that suitable teachers be obtained, to be maintained from the income of the church to which the school is annexed." All hope was lost that the State would ever recover the control of the public schools from the hands of the anti-Catholic fanatics to which it had surrendered them, or ever take steps to make education Christian. The council recognized the fact that the public schools, whether intensely Protestant or utterly Agnostic and Godless, must ever be a powerful engine in the war of error against Catholic truth.

Archbishop Hughes had not long before, in a circular to the clergy and laity of his diocese, uttered words that have become memorable, and were the motto of the new Catholic impulse: "It may not be out of place to urge upon you the necessity of providing for the primary education of your children in connection with the principles of our Holy Religion. I think the time is almost come when it will be necessary to build the school-house first, and the church afterwards. Our fellow-citizens have adopted a system of general education which, I fear, will result in consequences to a great extent the reverse of those which are anticipated. They have attempted to divorce religion, under the plea of excluding sectarianism, from elementary education and literature. There are some who seem to apprehend great mischief to the State if the children in our public schools should have an opportunity of learning the first elements of the Christian doctrine in connection with their daily lessons. Happily, they require of us only to contribute our portion of the expense necessary for the support of this system. . . . I shall not lose any opportunity that may offer of promoting the prospective purpose here indicated of providing Catholic education for Catholic children."

Under the impulse thus given, schools were begun at the greatest sacrifice, every parish that was able to struggle with its burthens assuming the additional charge of maintaining a free school. It is not possible, of course, here to trace the progress year by year. The immense stride may be seen in the fact that, in the

diocesan reports for 1860 there are specifically mentioned 365 parochial schools, with about 45,000 pupils, although for many important dioceses, such as New York, which had 39 parochial schools, and Newark, the number of pupils was not returned. There were, so far as we can judge, nearly 500 schools and 70,000 pupils. In these the boys were under the care of Brothers of the Christian Schools, Brothers of Mary, Brothers of the Holy Cross, Brothers of the Third Order of St. Francis, and the girls under Sisters of Charity of various branches, Sisters of Mercy, of the Holy Cross and of St. Joseph, School Sisters of Notre Dame, Ursulines, Ladies of the Sacred Heart, Visitation Nuns, and Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis.

By this time attempts had been made to give the parochial schools Catholic Readers, and histories as well as catechisms for more advanced classes. The Readers, prepared by the Sisters of the Holy Cross, were a vast improvement on anything yet presented, and they were widely and beneficially used.

The danger of schools from which religion is excluded, and the necessity of erecting Catholic schools and placing them under religious teachers if possible, is set forth in an Instruction from the Sacred Congregation *De Propaganda Fide*: "All care is to be taken to found Catholic schools where they are needed, or to enlarge them, and fit and organize them more perfectly, so as to equal in efficiency and discipline the public schools. To effect this holy and necessary design, the employment of members of religious communities will contribute greatly, and that the expense of this most necessary work be freely and abundantly supplied by the faithful, it is very necessary that pastors, at a seasonable opportunity, either in pastoral letters, sermons, or private conversation, make known that they would be grossly derelict in their duties if they did not with all care provide for Catholic schools."¹

After this, the progress of the parochial schools was wonderful; clergy and people united. What would have been deemed utterly beyond the means of the Catholic body was effected, and, like all that has been done in this country, by the constant small contributions of the many. In not a single case that has reached our notice has a school been founded or endowed by an individual. Ireland is dotted with the ruins of convents and monasteries, most of which were founded and endowed by individuals in the Ages of Faith. Spain, France, Belgium, Italy, Germany, show similar foundations; it is a reproach to the Catholics of the United States that their body has produced so few men actuated by large and charitable impulses that spring from faith. Yet, though the paro-

¹ Instructio S. C. de Propaganda Fide, Syn. Dioc. Neo Ebi. IV., p. 48.

chial schools were thus dependent for their creation and maintenance on the liberality of those on whom God had bestowed less in the matter of worldly goods, their number had risen in 1875 to 1444; in 1876, it rose to 1645; in 1879, to 1958; and in 1880, to 2246, with 405,234 pupils. At the commencement of the present year, 1884, the Catholic body in the United States, according to the statistics furnished by the several dioceses, taxed as they were to maintain State schools, which they could not conscientiously use for the education of their children, maintained 2532 parochial schools, in which the immense number of 481,834 children were educated. The late venerable and illustrious Pontiff Pius IX. had said: "We must make education Catholic;" certainly, the world has never witnessed so much accomplished in so short a time and at such sacrifices. The Catholic Almanac of 1834 records but three parochial schools; that of 1884, 2532, and nearly half a million of pupils. The total average attendance at the State sectarian schools in 1880 was 5,805,342 in a total population of fifty millions, a little over ten per cent.; while the Catholic community of eight millions had in its own free schools half a million, or nearly seven per cent. A few years will make the Catholic rate exceed that of the State school.

This wonderful growth was not under any general organization; each parish acted by itself, under the guidance of the pastor, on whose zeal all depended. Beside his other duties, he was forced to become builder, financier, and furnisher. When his school was open for pupils he was school superintendent; teachers were to be secured; a course of studies planned; school books introduced. If he could secure some members of a teaching order either for the boys or the girls, a great responsibility was taken from him, as he could confide his school safely to a body recognized and approved by his bishop; if he could not obtain religious Brothers or Sisters, he was forced to become examiner of the applicant for the position of teacher, and decide on the ability and fitness of the teacher as a guide for Catholic youth, and, of course, exercise a constant personal supervision.

The rapidity with which the schools increased taxed to the utmost the teaching orders; none could meet all the calls made upon them. Numerous as vocations were, members could not be formed to supply teachers for anything like the number that desired them. New teaching orders came from abroad, from England, Ireland, Belgium, Germany, and France.

The great demand for school-books stimulated publishers to get up series of books for all the different classes, and the competition led to a great improvement in the manufacture of our school-books, their typography, illustrations, etc. Even a Protestant pub-

lishing house adapted some of its books for Catholic schools by suppressing part of the plates and introducing Catholic matter, issuing the works thus modified under a name already known to Catholics. Competition between these publishers created difficulties; books already used for a time in classes would be given up in exchange for those issued by another house, which, like Aladdin's magician, gave new for old, with a view to future patronage. Such changes, and they were frequent, could not fail to exercise an injurious influence on the classes.

As each parish acted for itself, the classes were graded, and books introduced according to the standard of that parish, and four or five parochial schools in the same city, or in districts that touched each other, would have as many systems of teaching and as many sets of school-books. This, in old parishes in Europe, where little change takes place from year to year, would have been far less hurtful than here. In this country the workman changes his abode to be near his work, and the parents of a large majority of the children in our parochial schools are subject to frequent change. It becomes very burthensome to the parent who is forced to remove from one parish to another, to be compelled to purchase a new set of books at each new school, and discouraging to find that his child, graded by one system in one place, is put in a lower class in another school, where pupils were graded by a different study.

Hence it is clear that, now that the great bulk of schools immediately required have been established, and the people become accustomed to maintain them as they ungrudgingly do, steps must be taken to make the system of parochial schools permanent by introducing order into the vast collection of schools in each diocese. A school board with a superintendent to whom each bishop may commit the general management of parochial schools seems to have become an imperative demand. Such a body, under the direction of the archbishop or bishop of the diocese, could establish the grades for classes in all the schools; and, by a careful examination of all the available text-books, decide after obtaining the practical verdict of experienced teachers as to their degrees of merit when tested by actual use, and then establish a list of books to be used in all the schools of the diocese. This will relieve the parish priest of a burthen and responsibility, and deliver him from the importunity of publishers. It will give uniformity in the course of studies throughout a considerable district, and make the transfer of a pupil from one school to another a matter causing little difficulty to teacher or pupil.

This great step has not been the subject of legislation in any of the provincial or plenary councils yet held; but is one that

must soon be acted upon, to insure the permanency and success of our Catholic system. That men of wealth will, actuated by the spirit of former days, help to create diocesan school funds, all will most earnestly desire and pray, though there is little to encourage us to expect any immediate result.

The Catholic schools occupied the attention of the fathers of the second Plenary Council, who, in Title IX., renew the condemnation of the godless schools maintained by the State as destructive of the faith of Catholics, exhort pastors where possible to establish parochial schools, and, where this is impossible, to counteract, by assiduous instruction of the young in Christian doctrine, the infidel or vague and indifferent ideas inculcated in them by the mistaken system of the State schools. They urge the pastors to confide the parochial schools to teaching orders where possible; and when none can be obtained, to select teachers with the utmost care. The preparation of suitable text-books was also considered.¹

The first Council of Cincinnati (14) urged the erection of parochial schools, and the statutes of the diocese (ch. viii., sect. 2) and those of Fort Wayne (53, 54) enjoin on priests the due care and direction of them. The third Council of New Orleans, in 1873 (Dec. v., p. 20), urged the erection of parochial schools, and in an especial manner of schools for the instruction of colored children; the second Council of San Francisco, in 1883 (Dec. v.), enjoins that when a church is completed, the school should be erected and placed under the care of religious. The erection of schools, or where it is impossible, extraordinary exertions to save and instruct Catholic children, are urged in the constitutions of the diocese of Boston, 1868 (Tit. III., 29); statutes of the diocese of Pittsburg, 1869 (ch. v., 2); in the synod of Buffalo, 1871 (ch. xiii., 1); of Louisville, 1874 (ch. ix., 3); in the Decreta of Green Bay, 1877 (viii.); in the statutes of Newark, 1878 (12), and the prompt payment of teachers is there specially enjoined (148).

In the diocese of Fort Wayne a diocesan school board has been established, which, in July, 1883, made its fifth annual report. The board consists of eleven priests and a reverend secretary. It has drawn up a list of school-books deemed suitable for use; regulated the course of study to be pursued in the parochial schools; divided the diocese into districts, so as to be conveniently visited by members of the board, and adopted regulations in regard to the qualifications of teachers and changes to be made in the persons holding the position of instructors. Each district is visited by a member of the board once or twice a year. The reports are printed and distributed among the people to keep alive interest in the schools.

¹ Concilium Plen. Balt. II. pp. 218-225.

The confusion arising from a multiplicity of text-books is thus avoided, and uniformity in the method of instruction secured. As similar boards are established, meetings of representatives from them, by conferring as to the results attained, will lead by the experience thus gathered to still greater progress and efficiency in the great national Catholic school organization. The system adopted in this diocese has already been productive of great good in increasing the efficiency of the schools and lightening the labor of the teachers. It can scarcely fail to be generally adapted so as to bring order out of the present confusion, which was unavoidable from the circumstances under which most of the schools were begun, by isolated effort, when the parish priest had no one to consult, and no guide or rule of action but such as his own zeal suggested.

The diocese of Milwaukee has a normal school for the training of Catholic teachers; the course of studies for common schools extending to three years, and for those of a higher grade to five. A general establishment of this kind, when a uniform system of instruction and grading of classes is adopted, would give teachers for all dioceses, trained under the same system, and would gradually lead to a harmonious management of our Catholic schools, whether directed by religious or seculars.

We have every reason to be proud of our parochial schools, as they are the fruit of such immense sacrifices on the part of the clergy and people; and we are all interested in everything that will contribute to render them more efficient in saving Catholic children from the ever-increasing dangers to their faith which meet them on every side. The schools are not perfect; there was little time to think of systems; a great want was to be met, and met at once. Buildings have been erected, many of which are superior in construction and arrangement to the vaunted public schools, from which they have drawn away the great majority of Catholic pupils; and in public competitions it has been proved, to the satisfaction of Catholic parents, that their children make better and surer progress in our own schools than they did in those maintained by the State.

In the Exhibition now opened in London, Christian Brothers from this country challenge the world to examine the results of their teaching.

School boards will subserve also another end, and that is to bring our school system favorably to the notice of our more wealthy Catholics. It is not in human nature that they can be so different from their fellow-countrymen who have not received the gift of faith. Yet the list of great donations in life and bequests by will of Protestants for educational purposes which are made

annually in this country, excites deep regret that we cannot produce a similar list of public-spirited men, establishing professorships and scholarships in our colleges, founding and endowing parochial schools, in a word, giving to God's work part of the means God has confided to their hands, not as owners, but as stewards.

THE RECENT AGGRESSIONS OF EUROPEAN POWERS IN ASIA AND AFRICA.

A PECULIAR feature of recent history is the number of purely aggressive wars that have been waged by the Powers of Europe on their less-civilized neighbors. Since the close of the Russo-Turkish War, a passion for foreign conquests seems to have sprung up among European statesmen. Despotism Russia, Republican France, and the Constitutional Monarchy of Great Britain have alike been seized with the desire of enlarging their dominions at the expense of weaker nations. There was a time when civilized governments recognized, in theory at least, the rights of weak states to their existence so long as they gave no cause for attack. Of late, however, these rights seem to be wholly ignored, and the territory of any weak power is looked on as the legitimate prey of any power that covets its possession. The change in the public sentiment of the civilized world, during the last few years, is a startling one. Until a recent period, the distinction between just and unjust wars was fairly well recognized by the conscience of the civilized world. Such deeds as the partition of Poland, or the older Spanish conquest of Naples, were broadly distinguished from the wars resulting from mere national rivalry by the leaders of public thought. The existence of an international law, regulating the relations of independent nations, and protecting the weak against the violence of the strong, was recognized, at least in theory, by all thinking men. That such a public opinion was no slight protection, even in the absence of any tribunal to punish offences against international law, is shown by the prolonged existence in Europe of numerous small states, beside the great powers. Aggressions like the seizure of Strasburg by Louis XIV. have been very rare events, even among the constant wars of which Europe has been the theatre during the last three centuries. During the

years following the close of the Napoleonic wars the public feeling on the side of international law, as opposed to wars of ambition, appeared to be growing rapidly stronger. Indeed, not a few entertained the hope that the increase of intercourse among nations and the diffusion of knowledge would ultimately remove nearly all causes for war, and inaugurate an era of general peace.

Recent events have not borne out such hopes. Not to mention the great wars of the last thirty years on the European continent, the statesmen of Europe have lately been seized with a mania for foreign conquests, which recalls the days of the old Scandinavian vikings. During the last five or six years not less than ten distinctive wars of aggression have been waged in Africa and Asia by European powers. Russia has conquered one and annexed another of the two independent republics of Turkestan. England has seized Egypt on the plea of protecting British interests by occupying the road to India created by the genius of De Lesseps, and has unsuccessfully attempted to conquer the Dutch Republic in South Africa and the tribes of Afghanistan. France, which, a few years ago, so bitterly denounced the injustice of forcing a foreign rule on Alsace-Lorraine, has herself seized on Tunis and Annam, has bombarded Tamatave in Madagascar, and is now trying to exact a ransom from China in much the same fashion as the old Norse pirates levied tribute on Christian France and England a thousand years ago. In all these cases, it is scarcely disguised that the only reason for inflicting the horrors of war on defenceless or ill-armed populations is the desire of seizing their territory. It can hardly be the desire of glory that actuates attacks on such foes, and, indeed, the desire of extending their frontiers seems to be the only justification of any of those little wars which the great powers have put forward. The same plea would justify the deeds of the Algerine corsairs or of the West Indian buccaneers of a former generation. It is not a hopeful sign of modern progress, when its leaders thus return through half the world to a system of lawlessness which was believed to have been swept away as a matter of course by the spread of civilization.

That the policy of the great Powers of Europe has grown distinctively more lawless of late years is a fact which cannot be denied. Fifty years ago the piratical Algerines, whose hand had for ages been against all Christian nations, provoked a French invasion by outrages on Frenchmen, but it was only after satisfaction had been insultingly refused by the Dey that the hostilities were commenced which converted the country into a French province. Within the last five years a dispute between a few nomad tribes on the borders over pasturage was deemed a sufficient excuse to march a French army into Tunis, and oblige the Regent

to hand over his country to the rule of a foreign power. At the other extremity of Africa, England almost at the same time seized on the Transvaal, whose independence she had long formally recognized, without even a pretext of wrong done by the weaker side. The chance that the people of the little Dutch Republic might become involved in wars with their Zulu neighbors was deemed quite reason enough for the government of England to make war on both. The attempt, indeed, was unsuccessful, and a succession of disasters compelled the invaders ultimately to withdraw from both the Transvaal and Zululand; but, in other respects, no difference can be seen between the action of the constitutional government of England in the nineteenth century and that of a Norse pirate king in the ninth. Isolated cases of a similar kind have indeed occurred before in European history. The seizure of Strasburg by Louis XIV. and the bombardment of Copenhagen by Nelson are parallel to the seizure of the Transvaal and of Tunis; but, while such acts happened once in a century formerly, now they have to be chronicled almost every year. As in cities and nations, so in the community of nations there are times when the spirit of lawlessness seems to grow strong and defiant. There is such a thing as international lawlessness as well as international law, and in the old continent the present seems to be essentially a period of international lawlessness.

The moral responsibility for this state of affairs must be equally divided between Russia, England and France. The last named has been also the latest in the field of lawless conquest, and her rulers make no secret of their desire to follow the example of England in India as the sole justification for their policy. Having once decided that honesty is *not* the best policy, the French Republic has thrown itself, even more thoroughly than its rivals in robbery, into the work of seizing on everything that can be seized without danger. The absorption of Tunis was followed by a similar proceeding in Tonquin, where the capital was occupied by a French force, and the king obliged to hand the government of his country over to French officials. The extension of French trade up the Red River was the chief reason which the Paris authorities put forward for thus depriving a population of some twelve millions of their national independence, and for butchering without mercy such as opposed their invasion. If the accounts of correspondents are to be trusted, the French invaders of Tonquin acted at times like a horde of corsairs. No quarter was given to the luckless defenders of their native land, when the foreign invader was able to massacre them. We are told of an Annamite garrison, which had been isolated by the French troops, being obliged to run the gauntlet of a "feu d' enfer," in the vain attempt to escape from their burning

villages, and of the wounded afterwards being bayoneted by the soldiers. It is no excuse for such deeds to say that war excuses them. War has its laws as well as peace, and for over a century at least the massacre of wounded men, or even of a flying or helpless enemy, has been unknown in war among civilized nations. To the French Republic belongs the bad eminence of having, in this respect, re-introduced the war habits of savages among her civilized soldiers.

The ease with which Tonquin had been converted into a French dependency by the agency of rifled cannon and Chassepot guns has only whetted the new French appetite for plunder. Annam had for centuries been a tributary to the Chinese Empire, and the Chinese government naturally protested against the right of France to seize it without indemnity. They soon found that "right" has no meaning in the diplomacy of modern Europe. An attack on China itself was threatened in answer to the Chinese complaints, and finally the timid government at Peking was scared into ceding its rights over Annam without any other equivalent than that of escaping an attack on its defenceless towns. Even that, however, was not granted in exchange for the cession of a territory larger than France itself. The French troops had scarcely waited for the signature of the treaty to occupy the newly acquired country, and at Lung Lou a detachment was refused admission by the Chinese. The commander pleaded that he had received no instructions from his own government to give up the place, a matter quite possible under the circumstances. The French, however, did not retire, and a skirmish ensued in which the invaders suffered some loss, though the garrison, we believe, was afterwards withdrawn. In Europe the affair would have been regarded as an awkward *contretemps* to be settled by at most the dismissal of some officers and the tender of an apology. During the evacuation of France itself by the Germans a similar collision happened, we think, at Verdun, between a French detachment which came to take possession on the departure of the foreigners, and the latter, who had not left as soon as was expected. A slight disturbance occurred, whereon the French were placed under arrest, and the Parisian press admitted the justice of the proceeding on the part of the Prussian commander. In China, however, it was quite another thing, and the Government of Jules Ferry demanded an indemnity of no less than two hundred million francs from China for not having abandoned its own soil to the invaders with sufficient rapidity. As China naturally demurred to this demand, a French fleet proceeded to bombard Foo Chow, and destroy the arsenal there without any declaration of war except the fire of the French artillery. Writers on primitive history tell us that in the early stages of so-

ciety, stranger and enemy were synonymous terms, and that it was only with the advance of civilization that foreigners were recognized as possessing any rights of humanity. The conduct of the French in China would indicate that the law of ancient barbarism is again being adopted by the heads of modern civilization.

The annexation of two such territories as Tunis and Annam in the course of four years has not been enough to satisfy the new greed of France for foreign conquests, where they can be effected without risk. The old Portuguese possessions on the Congo and the independent native tribes of the adjoining country have also had to submit to incorporation with the French dominions. M. De Brazza has been the pioneer of this new aggression, with French gunboats to back him up by force. England and Germany, however, have shown a willingness to take a share in the seizure of West Africa, and consequently some hesitation has been shown in pushing matters too fast in that region. Whatever agreement will be ultimately made between the European powers for the division of the spoil, will probably matter little to the natives, whose rights have as little chance of recognition from Bismarck or Gladstone as from Jules Ferry. As the *London Saturday Review* grimly remarks, the best days of the West African populations have already passed with the advent of European colonization to the Congo. A civilization which recognizes no law but its own greed and its own fears, is not likely to win a plundered and enslaved population from barbarism, and such in all essentials is the character which European culture has now assumed in West Africa.

On the east of the same continent another little war has been commenced with Madagascar. The great African Island has for the last two or three generations been united into a single monarchy which has made commendable efforts to organize the population and establish civilized law throughout the island. Christianity has made considerable progress of late years, and in 1883 the Catholic schools alone were educating nearly twenty thousand children throughout the island. Friendly relations have been maintained with the different European States for many years, and the Hova kingdom is on all principles of right as fully entitled to its independence as Belgium or Switzerland. Unlike the latter, however, Madagascar has no powerful neighbors, on whose jealousy she might rely for protection, and accordingly a short time ago the French took occasion to pick a quarrel. Some speculators had attempted to obtain a grant of public land contrary to the Hova law, and failing in their project, the French officials took up their cause. Tamatave, the chief port of the kingdom, was bombarded about a year ago and subsequently occupied. The principle of seizing territory wherever it could be seized, and slay-

ing the possessors when they objected, was the only apparent motive of this cowardly aggression. M. Jules Ferry in the French Chambers defended the action of his subordinates on the avowed grounds that a civilized power has the right to attack a less civilized one whenever she judges it expedient as a mere matter of police,—in other words, that weak nations have no rights which strong ones are under any obligation to respect, is the rule of foreign policy for the Government of modern France. It has been reserved for our day to see the pirates' code put forward unblushingly by the head of a civilized nation as its standard of morality, and this in the name of morality itself.

While such principles are openly proclaimed by the heads of a nation like France, it need scarcely be wondered at that they should be adopted elsewhere. Russia, during the last twenty years, has been pushing her conquests over Asia with as little scruple as and scarcely less barbarity than her old rivals, the Turks, did in former days. Since 1864 the three Tartar khanates of Khokand, Bokhara, and Khiva, and the two Tekke republics which occupied the district between Afghanistan and the Caspian Sea, have all been reduced under the Government of the Czar. The details of the successive invasions by which a territory of nearly a million of square miles, with a population of eight or ten millions, has been thus deprived of its independence, have not been brought as prominently before the world as those of the French conquests, but the principle actuating them is essentially the same. The nomad Khirgiz tribes were first attacked on the ground that a civilized State like Russia could not tolerate such neighbors; and the better organized khanates were then attacked on the ground of their quarrels with those very nomads. Marauders on the Russian frontier must be conquered for the interests of civilization, but once conquered they must be protected in their quarrels with their more civilized neighbors, for the interests of the empire. Such were the theories alternately put forward by the Russian Chancellor, as the forces of the empire successively attacked the Khirgiz wandering tribes, or the kingdoms of Bokhara or Khiva. In 1864 Prince Gortschakoff, in a circular to the cabinets of Europe, announced definitely that the only object of his sovereign in advancing his frontiers was to bring the wandering tribes under control of a strong government as a matter of self-defence, but that the independence of the civilized States beyond them would be carefully respected.

"Very frequently of late years," wrote the Prince, "the civilization of the neighboring countries of Asia has been assigned to Russia as her special mission. We are accomplishing the first part of our task in carrying our frontier to the limit where the necessary

conditions (for repressing the nomads) are to be found. The second part we shall accomplish by making every effort to prove to the States adjoining us that Russia is not their enemy, that she entertains no idea of subjugating them, and that peaceful commercial relations with her are more profitable than disorder, pillage, and a chronic state of war.

"The Imperial Cabinet, in assuming this task, has a right to expect that its conduct and principles will be justly appreciated."

There is no mistaking the meaning of this declaration, and yet within the next year Taskend, the largest city of Turkestan, with a population of three hundred thousand, was bombarded and captured, and during the next ten years Khokand, Bokhara, and Khiva were in succession invaded and forced to accept the dominion of the "white Czar." Prince Gortschakoff, in his circular, remarked with touching simplicity that "it is a peculiarity of Asiatics to respect nothing but force, palpable and visible; the moral power of reason and the interests of civilization have as yet no hold on them."

It would certainly be a peculiar view of the "moral power of reason," and the "interests of civilization," that the dwellers of Turkestan could receive from the precepts and practice of their Russian neighbors.

Two examples of the civilization which the invaders had to offer to the conquered tribes will suffice to show its character. The Khirgiz tribes, under a leader named Kutebar Khan, the Abd el Kadir of the steppes, commenced a series of fierce attacks on the Russian outposts in 1853. General Perovsky bribed a nomad chief to murder the daring leader and bring his head to the camp. The plot failed, and for five years the Turcoman chieftain continued to bid defiance to the force and fraud of his civilized foes, who thus applied the "moral power of reason" to further their ends. Still later, in 1881, General Skobeleff, having stormed Akkal Tekke, the capital of Geok Tepe, and captured the women and children of the place, first stripped them of all their ornaments and property, and then by proclamation threatened to abandon them to the licentiousness of his followers, unless their relatives, who were still in arms, should surrender themselves within a given time. Such are the means by which civilization is carried forward in Central Asia in our own day by the arms of Russia.

England, though of late years her aggressions have been less fortunate than those of Russia and France, has been equally regardless of any law except "British interests" in her relations with the weaker powers of Africa and Asia. We have already spoken of the annexation of the Transvaal and the invasion of Zululand without any pretext of injury from either of the peoples thus assailed.

The ambition of the late Earl of Beaconsfield to extend the limits of the empire was the only apparent motive for both raids, and no one was louder in denouncing them than his great rival, Mr. Gladstone. The changes of politics within a few months threw the control of the Government into the hands of the latter, but in this altered state of things he showed no inclination to undo the wrong which he had fiercely denounced. The demand of the Boers for the restoration of their independence was met by despatching fresh troops to maintain the foreign rule imposed on them, and it was only after three defeats, and the death of the British commander, that the English Minister reluctantly conceded the claim whose justice he had so loudly proclaimed a few months before.

The invasion of Afghanistan, after the close of the Russo-Turkish war, is an equally striking example of disregard for national rights. The sovereign of that country had been recognized, in the most formal manner, as an independent ruler, by the English Government. During many years friendly relations had been maintained between the two powers, and the aid of the Afghan Ameer had been sought and obtained by the English Government during the great mutiny. Lord Beaconsfield, however, felt anxious to strike a blow somewhere to counterbalance the prestige which Russia had acquired by the Turkish war, and Afghanistan was considered as a fitting conquest to be attempted. The only alleged grievance was that a Russian envoy had been received in Cabul, and that the Ameer declined to admit an English embassy accompanied by a large military escort. By the common law of nations he was perfectly within the right in both measures, but on the plea that Asiatics recognized no power but force, the English Government deems itself justified in adopting a similar rule for its own conduct, purely in the interests of civilization. A formidable army accordingly invaded Afghanistan, and after a slight resistance occupied its capital, while the Ameer took refuge in a distant province and died shortly afterwards. A British protégé was installed in Cabul, and a British resident with a strong guard left in the capitol, and the conquest of Afghanistan was assumed to be complete. The rising of the natives against the foreigners, the massacre of the resident minister and his escort, the subsequent invasion of the British troops, and the disastrous battles of Cabul and Maiwand followed in close succession. The expenses of the Afghan invasion amounted to a hundred million dollars, and the invaders found it impossible to hold their ground without sacrifices which they were unprepared for; and so, after two years' bloodshed, the country was again abandoned, and a son of the deceased Ameer acknowledged as sovereign of Cabul. The sole reason for the expedition had been British "interests," not

British rights, and its fate was such as wanton aggression richly merited.

The invasion of Egypt is, perhaps, a still more flagrant instance of the disregard of international right. Unlike Afghanistan and Zululand, Egypt has, for many years, held a recognized place among civilized nations. Though nominally a province of Turkey, her practical independence has long been acknowledged both by the Sultan and by the Christian nations of Europe, and her government and administration approached nearer to the standard of European civilization than that of any other Mohammedan state. Indeed, the heaviest burthen on Egypt in recent years has been the usurious interest exacted by her foreign creditors for loans contracted by her rulers for various purposes of improvement. Through various financial manipulations a debt of several hundred million dollars had been piled up in less than twenty-five years, although scarcely half that amount had been actually advanced to the Egyptian treasury. The burden, finally, became unbearable, and even the patient Arab population rose in revolt, and through the mouths of the army demanded a voice in the administration of their government, and a diminution of the unbearable taxes. The Khedive, as many European rulers have done in similar circumstances, bowed to the inevitable and accepted Arabi Pasha, the popular leader, as his minister. Nothing in the whole affair gave any lawful pretext for foreign intervention. The debt was beyond the capabilities of the government to pay, and its partial or total repudiation would have been only what any civilized power would have done, and what in fact many of them have done in similar cases. The European powers had no claim on Egypt, and, if their subjects had invested in Egyptian securities at exorbitant interest, they had done so expressly as private speculators, and that of, by no means, the most reputable kind. England, however, since the completion of the Suez Canal, has been specially anxious to obtain its control. She had thrown all obstacles she could in the way of the enterprise of De Lesseps, but she longed to seize the work which others had accomplished. A street disturbance in Alexandria furnished a pretext for a complaint, and in 1882 a British fleet bombarded and seized that city, and shortly afterwards a British army attacked the luckless Egyptians and took virtual possession of the country. The Khedive was nominally restored, but his government was placed under the control of English officials, and thus by brute force an independent nation was converted into a British province. The subsequent expeditions to the Soudan and the slaughter of the natives at Suakim are deeds whose wanton violence is only paralleled by their aimless blundering. The offer of a bribe by the English Admiral for the murder, by any means, of the chief op-

posed to him shows how the standard of morality in war has retrograded among civilized nations, of late years, at least where civilized armies have ill-armed foes to face.

In the history of the world, as in that of separate nations, there are periods of comparative peace, and others when a spirit of lawlessness seems to take full sway over men. The time of the break-up of the Roman Empire; that of the Norse vikings, and later the early occupation of America, were among the periods when established laws of right seemed to be, for a time, forgotten. Wars and deeds of violence among the nations of European race have to be recorded in every age; but, at such times as we have named, war degenerates into piracy, and nations recognize no law but their own strength. The dealings of the European Powers with the less civilized races during the last few years indicate another period of international lawlessness. The law of the Buccaneers seems to be the only one recognized by most of the statesmen of civilized Europe. An eminent German political writer, the Baron Von Hellwald, in his apology for the Russian policy in Asia, sums up his own ideas thus:

"We do not belong to the whining hypocrites of this age, who have not yet learned the lessons written in history, that the development of mankind or of nations is not accomplished according to any moral law; that the highest ideals must give way to material advantages; that *humanity, freedom, justice, magnanimity, and so many other qualities are but empty words and must unhesitatingly be set aside* where it is a question of existence."

Baron Von Hellwald is, no doubt, well aware of the sentiments of his friends, when he thus defends their conduct. Nearly two centuries ago Swift mockingly justified the statesmen of his times on such principles as the German publicist now puts forward. It would be hard to find a stronger illustration of the utter corruption of public sentiment than is given by this fact.

In this country, our politicians have had, fortunately, no temptation to assume the character and morals of pirates for the sake of the national interests, and it is to be hoped they never will. The experience of history teaches us that foreign conquests are ruinous to domestic freedom, and, even as a purely temporal matter, we believe that freedom at home is preferable to empire abroad. The spirit of lawlessness is, however, unfortunately as contagious among nations as among men, and we may expect before long to see the piratical expeditions of England and France held up as models before our own aspiring politicians, just as English dress and English manners are proposed for the imitation of our society beaux and belles. It is, certainly, time to point out what in fact are the principles that actuate the civilized governments of Europe to-day,

and what manner of expeditions their "little wars" are. We can find no difference between them and the razzias of the pirates of a former age. Piracy, like slavery, gradually disappeared before the force of Christian public sentiment. It seems to be raising its head again under other names, and it is well that the true character of such measures as the seizure of Tunis and Egypt should be clearly known and branded with the proper title.

It should not be forgotten that politics, like every other field of human action, is subject to the unchangeable law of right. An organized nation has no more right to assail a neighbor for the sake of plunder than an individual has to rob his fellow whenever he feels a desire for his property. It is often said that governments have neither souls to save nor bodies to kill. It is forgotten that a government is made up of intelligent human beings, and that each member of it is responsible before God for his share in its actions. When Las Casas, in the sixteenth century, denounced the cruelties practiced on the Indians by the Court of Spain, he boldly warned Philip II. and his ministers that each of them would have to answer with his own soul for their public, not less than their private, acts. In our days the control of governments has passed, in a great measure, from a few hereditary rulers to the body of citizens. Civil power has its responsibilities as well as its rights, and in a varying degree the warning so solemnly addressed to the Spanish Court is applicable to every citizen of a representative government. Material interests, whether for a nation or an individual, can never be an excuse for wrongdoing. Society itself can only exist by a respect for law among its members, and the rule applies to the society of nations not less than to that of individuals. The recognition of this principle is sufficient to condemn the whole series of aggressions which have formed the ground of these remarks, and which seem to be regarded with such approbation by the public mind of the European world to-day.

THE INTERNATIONAL ELECTRICAL EXHIBITION
OF PHILADELPHIA.

SEPTEMBER 2D—OCTOBER 11TH, 1884.

"The Franklin Institute of Pennsylvania for the promotion of the electrical arts, in pursuance of the object for which it was incorporated in 1824, and in accordance with the history of the organization, has inaugurated another of its periodical exhibitions. This display will be limited to electrical appliances and articles properly associated therewith, and will be the first electro-technical exhibition held in America."—*Circular of the Franklin Institute of Pennsylvania.*

THE holding of special exhibitions devoted to the interests of electricity seems to have been rendered necessary by the vast strides which this important branch of physical science has taken during the past few years. The number and diversity of electrical inventions are now so great, their use in common life so important and so varied, that no adequate display of them could be made in any merely subordinate section of a general scientific or industrial exhibition. Special exhibitions have therefore been organized of late years at Paris, London, Munich, and Vienna, in which the many inventions connected with electricity may be so compared that some idea of their relative merit and utility can be gained, not by the scientist or practical electrician only, but by the general public as well.

It is with no little satisfaction, then, that we behold our own country, true to the spirit which led it to so materially help on the growth of this science in the past, able at length in our own day to inaugurate a world's electrical exhibition within its own domain. We may add—and we are sure that the feeling is quite a pardonable one—that we are proud of the great event; for the Philadelphia exhibition, if we except the one detail of its arrangement, shows a marked advance not only in the extent of the buildings erected for it, but also in the number, quality, and importance of the exhibits, beyond those of the European capitals mentioned in the beginning. A somewhat thorough examination of the arrangements at Paris in 1881, enables the writer to testify that the opinion uttered some months ago by the Superintendent of construction of the Philadelphia exhibition has been fully verified, and that "it is already certain that the exhibition will, in its importance and extent, excel all its predecessors." It is to be regretted that the really scientific arrangement of the exhibits which the programme of the Committee would lead one to expect, was not in practice

altogether adhered to, and that the interest of particular houses and individual exhibitors was looked to rather than the convenience of science-loving visitors. We could not help noticing, too, that the exhibition was, in fact, less of an international one than any of those which have thus far been held in Europe. The explanation of this fact is not far to seek. One can easily understand how the difficulties of transportation, and the comparatively small gain to be expected (for,—shall we say the truth?—these things weigh with the exhibitors), should deter European houses from sending their instruments to such a far-off place as Philadelphia. Much more might be said on this point, but it is at present outside of the object of this article, so we pass on.

The opening of an exhibition of such magnitude as that of Philadelphia has suggested to us the expediency of making a short review of the progress made in electricity from its first faint beginnings down to those later and more mature developments which have resulted in the marvellous inventions we are now so familiar with. Of course, in a review of this sort, we shall devote our attention not so much to the details of new instruments as to the principles involved in their construction; some of which are indeed wonderfully utilized. In following out this plan, however, we shall avoid on the one side all mathematical demonstration as well as a too close consideration of merely technical details, while on the other we shall be careful to give more than a bare sketch of the objects exhibited. It is plain, of course, that we cannot include all, nor do all need to be included within the limits of a paper like this. That would be to write a catalogue, and we must disclaim any intention of that sort.

As far as we can call to mind the disposition of the Paris exhibition of 1881, the programme issued by our own of Philadelphia follows, for the most part, the same plan. As we pointed out before, this really excellent arrangement, for some cause or other, was not carried out in apportioning off the spaces allotted to the various exhibits. For the sake of clearness, therefore, we shall be obliged to follow the plan of the programme, and not that of the actual exhibition. There are seven sections. Of these the first three are set apart for the production of electricity, electric conductors, and electric measurements; the fourth, divided again into two sub-sections A and B, comprises the application of electrical currents of high and low tension; while the fifth is devoted to terrestrial physics, and the last two to historical, educational, and bibliographical exhibits. Each of these is subdivided into a certain number of classes, varying according to the requirements of the objects. We shall pass them briefly in review, dealing with them only in so far as they will answer our purpose. As far as possible the chrono-

logical order of discovery will be followed; as in this way a better idea of the gradual advance which has been made in the study of electricity will be had, and the way will be opened to us for a few remarks on the intrinsic nature of this powerful physical agent.

The discovery of electrical phenomena has not been the work of one man, nor of one epoch. It has been brought about by the labor of many generations of scientists, each of them profiting by the discoveries of those already gone before, and thus working in their turn for the men that were to come after them. The seemingly futile and childish attempts of these beginners have been useful to us in more ways than one. They have not merely put us in possession of important knowledge; they have taught us a lesson in scientific methods as well. They have shown us that there is nothing small or of no interest in the physical world. They have taught us to be patient in the study of details which may appear trivial at first, but which may at some not very distant day produce great results. We know, for instance, what apparently insignificant things have led to the present advanced state of chemical knowledge. The long-despised work of the old alchemists opened our eyes to facts which have since served as the starting points for further progress.

The first mention of phenomena now classed as electrical dates from Thales, 600 years before Christ, who speaks of the attraction of amber for light bodies. But although allusions to the same property are not wanting in the following centuries, it was not before Gilbert (1540-1603) that the subject was treated in a manner approaching anything like a truly scientific method. From that time, slowly, as was natural, at first, our knowledge of electricity has ever been on the increase. In the seventeenth century Otto von Guericke perfected, if he did not invent, the first electrical machine, which consisted of a sulphur sphere revolving on an axis and rubbed by the hand. Newton discovered that electrical action was exerted through glass. Then gradually in that and the beginning of the following century came the discovery of the different degrees of conductivity of various bodies with regard to electricity, and of the difference between positive and negative electricity. Inventors also arrived at the form of the rotating frictional machine known as Ramsden's. About the middle of the eighteenth century the Leyden jar and electrical condensation and induction were discovered. It was Epinus, in 1759, who first applied mathematical methods in his investigations of electrical phenomena. Among the foremost scientific investigators of this period was our own Benjamin Franklin, who proved, by the famous experiment of the kite flown in a thunderstorm, the identity of these phenomena with those of electricity. This took place at Philadelphia. The laws of

electrical attraction and repulsion were perhaps the principal facts known before the beginning of the present century. It is remarkable that the frictional electric machines of that time were essentially the same as ours; though we have now much more perfect apparatus producing the same kind of electricity, and founded on induction. As the type of these induction machines may be mentioned the well known Holtz machine. The house of Queen and Company, of Philadelphia, have several of these instruments in their fine exhibit. Two of them are of Toepler's modification, one having two very large plates, the other, four, and somewhat smaller. These two last mentioned are among the very best of their kind. Among the frictional and induction machines we might include here the hydro-electric machines. These are, in fact, frictional machines. They produce electricity by the friction of water-bubbles carried on with steam, and rubbing against the tubes through which they pass. All apparatus of this kind generate what is generally termed *statical* electricity. Electricity produced in this way is called *statical* or at rest, as opposed to *dynamical* electricity, or electricity in motion, because while in the latter we consider a continuous flow of electricity, in the former we regard especially the phenomena which take place when the agent is at rest. Statical electricity is often called *frictional* electricity with reference to the method of its generation; though heat or cleavage produce it as well. For some years back this kind of electricity has not attracted the attention of practical scientists to any great extent. The very small quantity in which it is necessarily gathered renders the usefulness of its effects comparatively trifling; while the tension it exerts makes its control and management a matter of great difficulty. Hence, with the exception of its employment for the firing of mines and lighting of gas—ends which could be attained as easily by other means—its applications to the uses of practical life are extremely limited. Its importance, however, is not to be measured by this standard. The form of electrical energy generated by friction puts before us a number of phenomena not to be observed elsewhere. It helps us to have a clearer notion of atmospheric electricity, a fact of the highest importance in these days, when so much study is devoted to meteorological science. The instruments which belong to atmospheric electricity must be classified by themselves, and we shall have something to say on this very important subject. Under this head, too, allusion must be made to the induction coils. Though depending for their action on a different source, they produce, nevertheless, the same kind of phenomena. This source is electro dynamical induction, about which a word in its own place.

Messrs. Queen and Company, of whose exhibit mention has

already been made, have several of these instruments in their collection. The large and powerful Ruhmkorff coil shown in this set is the work of Carpentier. These instruments form the connecting link between statical and dynamical electricity; the latter being had in what is usually termed the electric or voltaic current. These two kinds do not in reality differ, however unlike they may seem to be, either in the manner of their production, or in the phenomena they present. At present no doubt exists as to their essential identity. Dynamical or galvanic electricity was discovered only towards the beginning of this century; for although some of its effects were known at a much earlier period, they were attributed to statical electricity. We need not repeat the oft-told story of how Galvani came to its discovery, after a series of experiments on the muscular action of recently killed animals. What Galvani really discovered was animal electricity, an agent which certainly exists, but which must be counted as a mere nothing in comparison with dynamical electricity produced by other causes. After this came the famous controversy as to the origin of dynamical electricity, in which Volta and his contemporaries took so prominent a part. The dispute waxed hot. Some were for the contact theory; others for the theory of chemical action. And so the question has come down to our own times. That it is necessary to have recourse to chemical action in order to have an electric current of great quantity is plain from experience; yet after the experiments made by the defenders of the contact theory from Volta to Sir William Thomson, it seems undoubted that simple contact of heterogeneous substances produces an electric current. We may be allowed to hazard an opinion on the subject. It is another instance of the knights and the shield. There is truth on both sides; and the two theories in reality agree at bottom. Contact produces electricity, but only in small quantity, when the contact is simple. In order to have a large quantity of electric energy we must have a very intimate contact, and one which is rapidly renewed. Now this is had only in chemical action.

To proceed with order, we shall follow the classification of the programme. The second class of the first section has reference to the production of electricity, and is devoted to the exhibits of batteries, which constitute the source of voltaic currents. Their number is almost legion, and the number of accessories to these batteries is quite as large. This great variety of apparatus arises from the diversity of the objects aimed at in their construction. Sometimes constancy and uniformity in the current is desired; sometimes great strength or electro-motive force. In some simplicity is the thing intended; in others cheapness; and so on almost *ad infinitum*.

For a long time after the discoveries of Galvani, Volta, and their contemporaries, no great headway was made in electrical science, though applications of it to various purposes were by no means wanting. Thus, about the year 1800, Nicholson and Carlisle decomposed water by means of electricity, founding thereby the science of electro-chemistry. Davy advanced a step further, and in 1807 decomposed the alkalies. It was about this time, also, that he succeeded, by the use of a strong battery, in producing the electric light, since become so common. Until the invention of dynamo machines this light was an affair of so much trouble and expense that its universal introduction was practically impossible. Among other discoveries of this period must be mentioned that of thermo-electricity, or the production of electric currents by means of heat. The apparatus for this purpose belong to Class 3d of the present section. The currents thus generated by heat are very feeble, though they are remarkable for their constancy. This tends to make them available for many purposes in which great strength is not required. They also furnish us with the best means of ascertaining varieties in temperature, even at a distance. The application of this fact to the thermo-multiplier has helped Melloni, Tyndall, and others to arrive at some very remarkable results in the study of radiant heat. But, as we have said before, no progress worthy of the name was accomplished in electrical knowledge until 1818, when Oersted discovered the action of the current on a magnetic needle. This was the beginning of a new era. It was the first step in that series of experiments, which was soon to lead scientists to the knowledge of electro-magnetism. Indeed, it was not long after Oersted's discovery that Ampère, in France, took up the subject and established by experiments, as simple as they were ingenious, the laws of electro-dynamics. The work of Faraday served to confirm these results, and, together with that of Oersted, Ampère, and others, established the true theory of magnetism. That theory was the one proposed by Ampère. As the steps by which this eminent scientist arrived at his conclusions are generally known, and the theory itself fully confirmed by all modern discoveries, we shall confine ourselves to a bare statement of what it lays down. In magnetic substances such as iron, steel, and the like, every molecule, Ampère tells us, is surrounded by an electric current. These various currents move in different planes, but are capable of rotation around the molecules as centres. Now, one electric current, as experiment shows, exerts an attractive force on another, when the two are parallel in direction and flow towards the same quarter; the force is repulsive, if the currents, though parallel, flow in opposite directions. Hence it follows that the collective action of the molecular currents on any

outside substance must be null and void, so long as these currents remain in their diverse planes; because the action of each one will be neutralized by some other of a contrary direction. The magnetization of such a substance consists in giving to all these currents such a position that they will be parallel, and flow in the same direction, so that their energies will be combined. The best means of rendering these molecular currents homogeneous is an electric current passing in a coil of insulated wire around the bar to be magnetized. When such a magnetic substance as steel has great coercive force, the currents remain parallel, and we have a permanent magnet. Temporary magnets consisting of a bar of soft iron surrounded by a coil of wire are called electro-magnets, and, it is claimed, were first used by our own Professor Henry, the organizer of the Smithsonian Institution.

This in brief is Ampère's theory of magnetism, and it is accepted as undoubted by the majority of scientific men to-day. It is evident that this hypothesis, confirmed as it is by facts, establishes a very close relation between magnetism and electricity, and, in fact, reduces magnetism to the position of a subordinate class of electric phenomena. Following upon Ampère's work, as we have said, came Faraday's splendid discovery of dynamic induction. He found that when a wire in which a current passes constantly and uniformly is near another wire whose ends are joined together, no effect is produced in the second wire. But if the current in the first wire either begins or ceases, if it even increases or diminishes in strength, a current of short duration is set up in the second wire. The same phenomenon is noticed when a coil through which a constant current travels is brought near to or removed from the wire. In both cases the currents are known as electro-dynamical induction currents. They are called magneto-electric, if instead of the coil a magnet is used. (The magnet in Ampère's theory is comparable to a coil.) As it is by means of induction currents that most of the modern appliances of electricity are worked, one can understand the importance of their explanation. What we have said thus far will help us to understand the principles involved in the construction of magneto-electric and electro-dynamic machines. The number of electro-magnetic apparatus exhibited is quite large. As the instrument known as the Clarke machine may be considered as the type on which machines of this sort are constructed, it will not be out of place to give some idea of its nature and mode of working here. In this instrument a pair of bobbins of insulated wire with soft iron cores—true electro-magnets—are made to revolve rapidly before a magnetic battery, or set of strong magnets. Now, in a complete revolution each of these bobbins is brought under the influence of the magnets twice, and is as often removed from

them. Hence, four instantaneous induction currents are successively produced in each bobbin. These, however, so coalesce as to form only two distinct and successive currents for each revolution. The bobbins also are wound in such a manner that their currents coincide in direction, and so are added together. The currents thus rapidly reproduced flow in opposite directions, or are, as it is called, alternately positive and negative. When this does not interfere with the effects to be produced, they can be kept as such, that is, as alternating currents; or, they can be rectified by a commutator, if currents flowing continuously in the same direction be the thing required. Progress in science has helped inventors to simplify or increase the power of such apparatus. It was in this way that the Siemens armature and the Gramme ring originated. In several modern machines the armature and ring replace the bobbin with advantage, though the action of induction is essentially the same as in Clarke's apparatus.

As mentioned before, with the magneto-electric machines ought to be classified the dynamos or large machines, similar to the former, in which the inducing agent, instead of being a permanent magnet, is an electro-magnet, which can be made much stronger than the best permanent magnets. These machines, on account of the great electro-dynamic repulsion to be overcome, require great motive power, usually furnished either by steam or gas, or, where it is available, by water. It is by steam or gas that those at the exhibition are moved. In the dynamos, as well as in the magneto-electric machines, mechanical work is transformed into electricity. The great power required to move the dynamo produces, as might be expected, greater effects, giving us the enormous currents we are now grown familiar with in these machines. From what we have already laid down, it will be seen that in the dynamo we must consider the inductor, or electro-magnet, known as the field-magnet, and the armature which serves to receive the influence of the first, and is, essentially, the same as the bobbins in the Clarke instrument. According to the differences of the various dynamos in these two essential parts, as also in their commutators, we divide them into classes. Thus, with regard to the field-magnet, we distinguish those which are excited by the current of another machine entirely distinct from the armature, those in which the undivided current produced in the armature magnetizes the field before being utilized, and lastly, those in which the field is excited by this same current, but divided or *shunted*, as it is technically called; that is to say, by means of a suitable resistance coil the current produced in the armature is divided, one part passing around the field-magnet, while the other goes to the line. All dynamos are reduced to some one of these classes. Some can be used with

either arrangement. Many of them, as the Gramme, Brush, Thompson-Houston, Weston, and others, belong to the second class, though they could be used as those of the first or third are. Mr. Edison's incandescent light dynamo belongs to the third. It would be difficult to discuss all the dynamos now in use. Their number is necessarily very great, because they differ not only, as just said, in the mode of magnetizing the field, but also, and especially, in their armatures and commutators, as well as in a different combination of both of these elements or in other details, some of them very important. Thus, for example, some of them have the contact-brushes or receivers of the commutator movable, allowing different arrangements which produce currents of different intensity. To this class belong the Maxim and the Thompson-Houston dynamos, the latter having an automatic regulator very useful in practice, when one or more lights are cut off from a multiple circuit. This, with many other details, too many to be enumerated here, make this machine one of the best in use. The Unipolar or Ball's dynamo has the advantage of being light in weight, while it is, at the same time, very powerful. Nearly every inventor claims some special advantage for his machine; and the duty of examining them will devolve upon the appointed committee. It would be useless to enter into a more detailed account of the dynamos, the method of producing the current being fundamentally the same as that of the magneto-electric apparatus. We shall merely observe that of those we saw at work during the first days of the exhibition, all were of American make, and none producing alternating currents, similar to those used in England and France in connection with Jablochhoff candles.

Section the second, devoted to Electrical Conductors, must be passed over with a bare mention. For practical electricians and the manufacturers of electric supplies it may be a division of some importance; but to the casual visitor, while it affords him a great many proofs of the skill and ingenuity of the inventors, it gives no idea of theoretical progress. There are, however, a few exhibits in this section which merit our attention. We might mention the newly invented telegraphic conductor, consisting of a steel wire which has been coppered. The conducting power of copper is thus combined with the great tensile strength of steel. This is not the only advantage; for, as the compound wire has a considerably smaller surface than would be exposed in an iron wire of equal conducting power, the loss due to electro-static induction is in great measure remedied.

Following the order of classification, we now pass from electrical conductors to a consideration of the instruments for electrical measurements. In doing this, we notice how beautifully theory

and practice assist each other. Every applied science is a sort of collective result. Theory comes forward with its principles; application develops them. The scientist casts the seed to earth; the practical inventor watches over its growth, and in time collects the fruit; his own labor helping in its turn to the production of new theories. With reason, therefore, did the late Clerk Maxwell some eleven years ago write: "The important applications of electro-magnetism to telegraphy have reacted on pure science by giving a commercial value to accurate electrical measurements, and by affording to electricians the use of apparatus on a scale which greatly transcends that of an ordinary laboratory." So that we are able to say with Jenkins: "There exist now two sciences of electricity, that of the treatises on Physics, and that more or less known of the electricians." This section of measurements contains appliances of the second order and is divided into four classes. The first three regard measurements of dimensions, such as standards and gauges, measurements of speed, force and energy, as speed counters and dynamometers, and lastly, photometric measurements, for the purpose of examining the luminous power of different electric lights. These three classes include objects not having special reference to electricity. Many of them are very ingenious, and forcibly remind us how the new needs which science has created for us are forever stimulating the ingenuity of inventive minds.

The fourth class, which comprises instruments more properly classed as electrical, brings us back to our subject. Some of these apparatus are of American make, but the greater number of them have come from France, Germany and England. Among the English instruments in this division are many from the London house of Elliott.

Before recent industrial and theoretical developments, most, if not all, electric measurements were of the qualitative sort; that is to say, the existence of the currents could be detected, and their kind noted, but if their other elements were to be measured, it was done in a very general way, and only by comparison more or less accurate with some other current. On the laying of the first cable across the Atlantic, the necessity for more exact methods of measurement was made plain to English electricians. Their results have since been generalized so as to extend to land telegraphy and all other modern electrical appliances. The characteristic elements to be examined in a current are, above all, difference of potential, electro-motive force, intensity, and the resistance presented by the conductor. No better idea can be formed of these elements, than by comparing the electric current with water flowing through a pipe. If water flows, there must be a difference of level which generates pressure or force, and so puts the liquid in motion. In

the same way, whenever we have a current of electricity, there must be between the point from which it is coming and that to which it is going a difference of electrical condition, or *difference of potential*, often, but incorrectly, called *tension*, which generates the electro-motive force, or force putting the electricity in motion. Were such a difference not to exist, there would be no electro-motive force, and consequently no current; as, were there no difference of level in the water-pipe—to return to our comparison—no pressure would be produced, and the water would remain at rest. Let us continue the instance. When water flows in a pipe, we can consider the quantity or volume of water passing in a second, and the resistance that is had from friction or other causes. So, when a current passes, resistance is offered by the wire or conductor, and we must consider this resistance as well as the quantity of electricity passing in a second, or the intensity of the current. These characteristic elements of a current bear a certain relation to each other which may be expressed by the law deduced from mathematical considerations by the late Professor Ohm, and verified experimentally by Pouillet. This law, known as Ohm's law, may be stated as follows: *The intensity of a current in an electric circuit is in direct proportion to the electro-motive force and in inverse proportion to the resistance.* In order, then, to take exact electric measurements, we must measure the resistance, the electro-motive force, and the intensity; and when there is question of a condenser, or apparatus in which electricity is accumulated, the quantity must be taken into account also. To do all this, it is first necessary to fix upon certain units; and electricians have agreed upon what is termed a system of absolute electric and magnetic units. The word absolute, it should be observed, is here used only as opposed to relative, and does not imply at all that the measure is absolutely accurate. It means that the measurements, instead of being simple comparisons with an arbitrary quantity of the same kind to be measured, are referred to the fundamental units of time, space, and mass. Let us make a comparison. To measure a force in horse-power is a relative measurement; to do so in foot-pounds, or the force which is capable of raising one pound through one foot, is an absolute one. In the same way, to say that a boiler has a pressure of five atmospheres is to express the measurement of its force relatively; but to say that it has a pressure of seventy-five pounds to the square inch, would be to give the estimate in absolute units. It is evident that relative measurements can be changed into absolute; but they are not expressed in the same way.

In 1863, the British Association appointed a committee composed of the most eminent electricians of Great Britain, to fix upon a standard of electric measurements. After eight years of work, this

commission published a very detailed report, and adopted a system of units founded on the centimetre, gramme, and second, as fundamental units of space, mass, and time. As a notice of the deliberations of this committee would be far too long and of too intricate and technical a nature to be given here, we shall content ourselves with a passing allusion to their results; observing that they are at present generally adopted, and have come into use since the last two Electrical Congresses of 1881 and 1884. They are known as British Association Units, in contradistinction to the arbitrary units formerly adopted, which varied for different countries, and sometimes even in the same country. The names of these British Association Units are taken from those of well-known scientists. The Unit of Resistance is called the *Ohm*. As determined by the last Congress in Paris, in April, 1884, it is the resistance presented to the current of electricity by a column of pure mercury at 0° C., having a section of one square millimetre (0.0155 square inch), and a length of 106 centimetres (41.733 inch). This is very nearly the same as the Siemens unit, used by many before.

The Unit of Electro-motive Force is called the *Volt*, and is very nearly that of a Daniell cell, whose exact value is 1.079 Volts. When electro-motive force only is considered, the size of the cell need not be taken into account, as this affects merely the internal resistance.

Intensity is measured in *Ampères*, sometimes called *Webers*, though this name is now generally abandoned. An Ampère is the intensity of a current which will be produced by an electro-motive force of one Volt, through a resistance of one Ohm.

The Unit of Quantity is the *Coulomb*, and represents the quantity of electricity passing through a conductor in a second, when the current has an intensity of one Ampère.

Lastly, the *Farad* is the Unit of Capacity, and represents that of a Condenser which contains one Coulomb, when charged at the potential of one Volt.

After these remarks, tedious perhaps, but necessary to our purpose, one can easily understand the meaning of Ohmmeters, Voltmeters, Ampèremeters and Coulombmeters. Many of these instruments may be seen at the exhibition. They serve as practical means to make the desired measurements, and may be used even by persons not very well acquainted with their theory. They might be compared to ordinary gas or water meters, which serve at a single reading to gauge the amount of gas or water which has passed through them in a given time. For more scientific researches, however, or for measurements of very variable quantity, more delicate instruments are needed. These last are used as standards in the construction of the meters we have mentioned.

These, too, have their place in the exhibition. One that we noticed was the Resistance Coil with the Wheatstone bridge used for measuring great resistance where the column of mercury, alluded to above, would be practically impossible. For the electro-motive force, it is necessary to have standard cells. Many of these are shown in the same section, together with a great variety of galvanometers, which serve to register the intensity of currents. The principle of action of these last is very simple. Magnetic needles, as is well-known, are deviated by a current toward the east or west, according to the direction in which the current is moving. This fact is made use of in all ordinary galvanometers, the intensity being measured by the angle of deviation. Where a Sine or Tangent galvanometer is employed, this intensity is found to be proportional—as may be easily demonstrated—to the sine or tangent of the angle of deviation, as the case may be.

The largest and beyond all doubt the richest display of the exhibition, is that of the Applications of Electricity. As was said before, it is divided into two great sub-sections, according as the instruments require currents of low or high power. In the first sub-section are nineteen classes devoted to telegraphs, telephones, and every sort of apparatus for giving signals by electricity—fire-alarms, burglar-alarms, electric-clocks, and so on through the long list of possible applications. The number is bewildering. There are applications to dentistry and surgery, to the industries, as spinning and weaving, to mining and blasting, to warfare and to music, a heterogeneous list having nothing in common save that electricity has ministered to their wants. There are organs with bellows moved by electricity; and an electric-motor runs the printing-press of the *Electric World*. In the not very large display of exhibits made by the United States Navy, there is an ingenious contrivance for exploding torpedoes. As an offset to this rather murderous exhibit, there is a new and remarkable refractor of foreign invention known as the Mangin Projector, designed for the use of light-houses.

The second sub-section of the exhibits devoted to the applications of electricity, requiring strong currents, is divided into seven classes, and contains whatever instruments are connected with electric-lighting, whether by the arc or incandescent light, electro-metallurgy, storage batteries or accumulators, and electro-motors, those especially which are used to transmit power to a distance. In such a multitudinous display it would be impossible to do more than explain what is of recent invention. We shall omit, therefore, whatever is well known, and turn our attention to those machines only which it is important to understand.

Let us take up telegraphy. However diverse the many instru-

ments used in this branch of applied electricity may be, they depend, nevertheless, on the same principle of electro-magnetism pointed out before. The Morse telegraph is the one still most generally in use, although printing telegraphs have come to be quite common also. The advances which have been made in this department of electrical science are really very remarkable. There has been a growth not merely in the improvement of details, but in the nature of the system itself. Thus, for instance, we have the duplex and quadruplex telegraph now employed so largely in this country and in Europe; and lastly, and most wonderful of all, comes the latest development, known as the Delany Synchronous Multiplex System, which helps us to send as many as seventy-two different dispatches at the same time, over the same wire, and in either direction. This invention, which has been perfected only within the past few months, may be used with the ordinary Morse apparatus, using either six or twelve sending and recording instruments. To give any adequate notion of the system would entail a description which it would be impossible to fully take in without diagrams. We shall therefore be very general. This invention, like all great inventions, is not the product of any individual mind; though, perhaps, in this particular instance, the details that Mr. Delany has introduced are so numerous as to justify its being called the Delany System. As the inventor himself acknowledges, the device is founded on the Phonic Wheel of Poul la Cour of Copenhagen. It is extremely complicated in its arrangements; but the following remarks will give some idea of its nature. La Cour's wheel is a flat cylinder having a metallic brush at a point in its circumference, which, while revolving with the wheel with uniform motion, touches successively a number of metallic uprights placed under the revolving cylinder. By this arrangement the wheel is made to act as a commutator or switch for the electric current. Now let us conceive two such commutators, turning rapidly and in perfect unison, one at each end of the line. Suppose each brush to pass in succession over six of the metallic uprights, thereby making as many successive contacts, so that at the sending end of the line the current from the battery passes in succession through six instruments or keys during one revolution of the cylinder; while at the other end of the line, and during precisely the same interval, it passes through six receivers. Now, it is very clear that a signal sent by the first key will be recorded by the first receiver, one by the second key to the second receiver, and so on for the four others. If the signals are very short, a single passage of the brush over the corresponding contact point will send them entirely to the corresponding receiver at the other end of the line; if the signal, however, be long, two or three contacts will send but

one, because the action of the current on each instrument is the same as if it were continuous. The intermittent action of the current does not affect the relay at the receiving station, because, instead of the ordinary kind, polarized relays are used. These do not move except when the current is reversed. The use of pole-changers instead of simple make-and-break keys causes this reversal to take place at the end of the signal, whereas the current is not changed, but only interrupted so long as the signal is sending. These main principles of the Delany System are not peculiar to it. The distinguishing feature of the invention is the means by which the originator obtains perfect synchronism in the revolving commutators. This is done by the use of tuning-forks in unison, which serve to make and break the circuit at each oscillation, and when the forks are not in unison, by a system of correcting currents, which retard or accelerate one of the commutators as many as three times in a revolution, just as the commutator mentioned happens to be beyond or behind the other. This is accomplished by means of a contrivance so ingenious as to place Mr. Delany's invention among the most noteworthy of the day. When the ordinary Morse telegraph is to be used, the commutator can be divided into six parts, each connected with its instrument: in this case six operators can work as quickly as they like. If they are satisfied with the average speed of ordinary messages, then the commutator is divided into twelve parts, and twelve operators can work at as many instruments. With printing receivers, the number may be increased to eighteen, thirty-six, or seventy-two, the commutator, of course, being divided into as many parts. By this arrangement perfect secrecy of the dispatches may be had. The expense, too, of keeping up the line being very greatly diminished, the cost of dispatches may be lessened in proportion. The number of repeaters which may be used in Mr. Delany's invention is not limited, a remarkable advantage which enables the system to work at any distance. These are the main features of this new Multiplex System of telegraphy. Its importance can hardly be overrated; and it deservedly occupies a place of honor in the immediate neighborhood of the great fountain illuminated every night at the exhibition.

Want of space obliges us to pass over many interesting details in the contrivances of modern telegraphy. The telephonic systems too must be set aside for the same reason. Of these last, three only are exhibited. The explanation of this paucity is to be sought after, we suppose, in the many lawsuits which have lately taken place on this head, some of which are yet pending. The Photophone of Professor Bell is quite a wonderful thing, though not an invention of recent date. An adequate idea of the principle involved in its working cannot be given here. It will be enough to

say that its inventor has utilized light as a medium for the transmission of sound, and its reproduction by means of electricity in a telephone. The action of light on the rare chemical element known as Selenium is the fact which has served as the foundation of the discovery. As far as we have learned, no practical application of Professor Bell's invention has as yet been made. Its importance is altogether theoretical. Yet we have no doubt that the time is not far off when even this discovery will find its use in the everyday walks of life.

The principal exhibits of the second sub-section, consisting of apparatus requiring a source of electricity of high tension, are not less important than those we have already described. Attractive as is the display of electric lighting, it contains little that is new since the last exhibition. We have now grown so familiar with the arc-light in the streets of our great cities that its effects are too well known to justify a description of them here. Rival companies have done their utmost to make the best possible display of their respective exhibits; and it is a matter of regret to us that we cannot make more than a passing mention of many machines and instruments that certainly deserve a more careful consideration. The automatic regulator of the strength of currents in the Thompson-Houston system is one of these. All who are familiar with any of the great dynamos, the standard Gramme for example, know that the best effect is produced when the conducting brushes touch the ends of the coils midway between the poles of the electro-magnet or inducing field. Now, if we conceive the brush to be turned around and displaced one way or the other, the current will diminish. The automatic regulator in question is based precisely on this idea. When one or more lights are shut off from a circuit, or when by any cause the driving engine makes the dynamo revolve faster, the current tends to increase. An electro-magnet, however, introduced into the circuit, attracts a movable armature connected with the conducting brushes; the brushes are displaced by the action of the armature, and the current diminished, that is to say, it regains the lower intensity it had before. If a new lamp be introduced, or the speed of the dynamo be diminished, the electro-magnet will attract the armature less strongly, and allow a retractile spring to draw the brushes into such a position as to increase the current.

Great headway has certainly been made in the various methods of arc lighting; but with all our advances, we are yet far off from what is desired. The inventor that shall produce perfect steadiness in the light and remove the disagreeable hissing of the arc—a defect which has been greatly reduced but not altogether corrected—will leave very little to be improved on. That such a wished-for

consummation will be attained at no very distant day, there is every reason to suppose, when we are brought face to face with these wonders that the exhibition has called together.

In many respects the incandescent system of lighting is preferable to the arc system, especially when we take into account the constancy of the light and its method of distribution. This form of illumination is becoming daily more common. Steamers, public buildings, hotels, private dwellings are now lighted with the incandescent lamp. For purposes of this kind, as well as for the lighting of mines, its greater safety gives it so obvious and decided a superiority over gas, that one ought to apologize for alluding to it. The *Electric World*, for June 21st of this year, gives us some important information on this point. There are, it tells us, over one hundred steamers, among which are not a few great ocean vessels, that carry, all told, some eighteen thousand lamps; and the number of these vessels is daily increasing.

During the first days of the exhibition there was a great tower building under the direction of the Edison Company. It was proposed to surround the structure with over two thousand incandescent lamps of different colors. When completed, it surely must have formed one of the most attractive features of the whole display. There was a large dynamo prepared for the lamps, on which the good-humored public, evidently at a loss for any more expressive name, was pleased to bestow the appellation Jumbo.

Next in importance to the contrivances for electric lighting, among the exhibits of this section, we must class the storage batteries or electric accumulators. We regret, however, to say that but few were put on exhibition, and those mostly of foreign make; many of our own manufacturers having nothing at all to show in that line, at least during the early part of the exhibition. Some years ago, when Faure first introduced his modification of Planté's secondary battery—the storage battery, as it is now called,—great hopes were entertained of its success. These batteries do not themselves produce electricity, but merely serve to accumulate it; or rather, were we to speak more exactly, we would say that they only shut up or imprison, in the form of chemical energy, electricity, which may at any moment be set free again. They consist essentially of lead plates, covered over with red oxide of lead and immersed in dilute sulphuric acid. When a current is passed through them, a chemical change or decomposition takes place, which serves to absorb and store up energy, so efficiently, too, that it is possible to regain a very large percentage of the electricity used in bringing about the change. Many of the dynamos that are used for illuminating purposes are at rest during the day, and it was thought that the powerful currents which might be generated

by them during that time could be conducted into these electrical reservoirs, from which one could draw a steady supply at any time, day or night. Small batteries also would, by accumulation of their action, produce intense effect. Moreover, the numerous and constant sources of power furnished us by nature in waterfalls and rapidly running streams, could, with very little trouble, be made to turn our dynamos at all hours, and so by means of these power-condensers supply a useful, and in many ways available, working force during the day, and illumination at night.

These hopes, though realized in great part, have, however, not been entirely fulfilled, and many considerations, notably that of expense, have been found to interfere with their practical working in the manner at first proposed. Experiment has put beyond all doubt the principle of accumulation of energy, transformable into electricity; and we have reason to expect that the storage battery will be soon brought to such perfection as to carry out fully the idea of its inventor, and perhaps perform more than was intended. If these expectations be ever perfected in practice, then a new class of electrical appliances, already a partial success, will be brought much more before the public—we mean the electric motors on exhibition in this same section.

It is now about fifty years since electric motors were first thought of, and some such machines were made, rather crude and imperfect it is true, but really demonstrating the possibility of using electro-magnetism as a motive power. If we imagine a soft iron armature revolving in front of a series of electro-magnets, and suppose that, by means of a suitable switch, a current is allowed to pass successively into each electro-magnet while the armature is approaching it, and is cut off when the soft iron is directly opposite the poles, we shall have the fundamental idea of all electric motors. If a primary battery be employed to generate the motive power, these electric engines are practicable indeed, but rather too expensive. But if the storage battery ever attains what is expected, if it can enable us to utilize and concentrate power of natural or artificial origin, in the manner already hinted at, then will electric motors become far more useful than they are at present. The great variety of form in the many on exhibition is quite noticeable, but they all rest either on the principle above mentioned or on that of the dynamos. Those belonging to the latter class may be made very powerful, and can be advantageously used for the transmission of power to great distances. In fact, all dynamos that generate continuous currents, as the Gramme, the Siemens, the Thompson-Houston, etc., may be used for this purpose on the principle of reversibility, enunciated first by Carnot. Mechanical power is, we have seen, transformed by the dynamo into electricity,

and by the dynamo, too, electricity may be again converted into power. The immense advantage of this conversion and reconversion may readily be pictured without any flight of fancy. Innumerable water-falls and swift streams are to be found throughout the land, hiding in their onward rush almost incalculable force. At present, a very large proportion of this power is allowed to go to waste. These falls could be made to turn dynamos, and the electric current thus produced, being conducted to neighboring towns or even to great distances, could be utilized at night for illumination, and during the day to turn other dynamos, thus reproducing, for general purposes, a high percentage of the power expended. Thus we have transported the effect of the water-fall, and lost very little on the journey; from the experiments recently made in France, fully eighty per cent. of the original power was carried to a distance of ten miles. The practical application of this method is evident to every one, and may in time receive greater encouragement. Some utilitarians have even proposed to transmit, in this way, to New York the twenty millions horse-power that now goes to waste at Niagara Falls. But besides the fact that such an attempt would mar the beauty of that wonderful cataract, it would hardly be practicable on account of the great distance and expense.

We must now pass to the department of Terrestrial Physics. This is a subject of the highest importance, for it is intimately connected with Meteorology, which is at present attracting so much attention in the scientific world. An intelligent following of Meteorology in its rapid advance requires in the student as accurate a knowledge as possible of atmospheric electricity; because to this are directly due most luminous atmospheric phenomena, as the lightning, the aurora borealis, etc. Indirectly, also, it is connected with nearly all the other events that tend to disturb the peace of our airy envelope. And so it is highly probable that, when this study becomes more developed, electrical observations will predict for us the motion of storms and will perhaps supplant the barometer as a quicker and more delicate indicator of approaching weather changes. Many of the instruments used in the examination of atmospheric electricity are on exhibition in different parts of the building, though they all belong to the same section. To enter, however, upon a discussion of the principles, or to describe the intricate detail of this class of apparatus, would be of interest only to experts. Together with these instruments that enable us to get at and examine the electric fluid as found in the atmosphere, we have others to ward it off from ourselves and our more or less destructible buildings. These lightning-rods, or "deductors," if we may so call them, are nothing but modifications of the old rod of Franklin. In connection with this section, we

must not forget to mention the beautiful display made by the Weather Signal Service Corps, for to that efficient body is due the merit of having brought about the great progress made by Meteorology in this country during these past years.

Next, in the same section, come the apparatus for the observation of Terrestrial Magnetism. In the many instruments of this class shown to the public, there are no new features; but at present, especially with the aid of Photography, they are of the greatest utility in exploring the vast field of terrestrial magnetism, which, as Maxwell truly says, "is as profound as it is extensive." It is a department of science as yet almost entirely unexplored; and the little we actually do know forces us to acknowledge, to borrow Maxwell's words again, "that we are yet unacquainted with one of the most powerful agents in nature."

We shall not stop to consider in detail the various historical, educational, and bibliographical exhibits, to be seen near the lecture room of the exhibition. It will be enough to remark that the display shows us how wonderful are the results that have thus far been attained, and how great are those that may be looked for in the future. It ought to be a matter of congratulation to all who are really anxious for the true welfare of the physical sciences, and who feel that they have nothing to lose, but rather everything to gain, in the light that researches will shed upon the ways of life, that electricity is taught not in technical schools only—which, by the way, are by no means as widespread as electricians would like to see them—but in the ordinary educational institutions scattered up and down through the land. This inspires us with the hope that in future no one will be found altogether ignorant of this growing branch of science.

Incomplete as this paper of ours must seem to be, it has already gone beyond the limits we proposed to ourselves in the beginning. Before closing, however, we may be allowed to add a few words. It may be asked—Is the nature of this powerful physical agent known? Do study and the facts elicited by so many new applications give us any idea of its intrinsic nature? Whatever advances electrical science has made up to these times, it is not yet so well known, that we may answer the query with certainty. We have, it is true, a much better insight into its nature than the pioneers that have gone before us had. But, as was pointed out in the able paper read before the American Association for the Advancement of Science by the Vice-President of the Section of Physics, our knowledge is far from satisfactory.

Not many years ago, physicists were accustomed to speak of four imponderable agents. It was thought that four different fluids produced the phenomena known as heat, light, electricity and mag-

netism. It is held now that they are all only modifications of the same one agent to which the name of *ether* has been given, merely, as the late President Spottiswoode of the Royal Society said, "for want of a better name." Recent advances in the study of the phenomena of heat and light, especially in those known as *interference* and *polarization*, have led scientists to conclude that these apparently diverse agents are really due to vibrations of the ether, performed in planes perpendicular to that of their propagation. The difference in the number of these vibrations constitutes the difference between heat and light. As was said before, electricity and magnetism, according to the theory proposed by Ampère, are also two different forms of the same one agent. Now, a comparison of these four classes of phenomena, and of their several relations to each other, shown, for instance, in the rotation, by the electric current, of the plane of polarization of light, and especially in the transformation of energy, justifies the conclusion that it is the same agent which, by its various modifications, produces the phenomena of heat, light, electricity and magnetism. The first two are produced by vibratory motions. Can the same be said of the other two? There are some physicists who contend that electrical and magnetic phenomena are to be attributed to a transference of the fluid ether itself. Others again—and we are inclined to follow their opinion, though want of space prevents us from giving our reasons for so doing—hold that electrical phenomena are due to vibratory motion. Clerk Maxwell has shown that, in this view of the theory, the vibrations of electricity and magnetism may be conceived as taking place at right angles with those of heat and light; being thus perfectly comparable to the vibrations of sound.

And this brings us to the end. We have endeavored to give some idea of the progress made in electrical science, especially during our own times, in order that our readers may appreciate the value of such an exhibition as is now holding at Philadelphia. It is good to stop and look back now and then, especially when the course passed over is such that the difficulties mastered in it are so many pledges of greater triumphs yet to follow. The Philadelphia exhibition enables us to do this. It shows us how much has been done in the past; how much we may hope for in the future. It helps us to realize how mighty a harvest may be reaped from a handful of seed, when there are faithful husbandmen ever near to watch over the growth. What results time will bring about, we know not; but surely, with the marvels of the Philadelphia exhibition before us, we may look up to God and allow our hearts to be filled with unspeakable hope.

BOOK NOTICES.

THE WORKS OF ORESTES A. BROWNSON. Collected and Arranged by *Henry F. Brownson*. Volumes X., XI., XII., XIII. Detroit: Thorndike Nourse, Publisher. 1884.

We are glad to see the rapid progress made by the editor and publisher of the works of Dr. Brownson, in issuing successive volumes of them from the press. They will form, when the series shall have been finished, one of the most complete collections of essays on questions of metaphysics, history, social and political philosophy, we know of in the English language. To the Christian controvertist and the student desirous of mastering principles which go to the heart of subjects which have been discussed with utmost earnestness, and will continue so to be as long as mankind continues to exist, the work will be of very great value.

The first of the volumes before us (Vol. X.) contains the first part of Dr. Brownson's writings on Christianity and Heathenism in Politics and Society. Some of the essays in this volume are on subjects of general and permanent interest, such as Catholicity Necessary to Sustain Popular Liberty, Labor and Association, Authority and Liberty, Civil and Religious Toleration, Paganism in Education, Liberalism and Socialism, Protestantism and Government, Christianity and Heathenism. Others are on local and transient topics, so far as regards their immediate occasions; such as Native Americanism, Ventura's Funeral Oration, Channing on Social Reform, Willitoft on Protestant Persecution, the *Edinburgh Review* on Ultramontane Doubts. These last-named subjects are discussed with constant reference to the principles which underlie them and which perpetually are more or less active.

Volume XI. contains the second part of Brownson's writings on Christianity and Heathenism in Politics and Society and are chiefly directed against Gallicanism and political Atheism. These are as pertinent in their exposure of the dominant spirit and tendencies of the age as they were when first written. Among these are Temporal and Spiritual, The Spiritual not for the Temporal, The Spiritual Order Supreme, The Temporal Power of the Pope, Mission of America, etc.

The essays on The Papacy and the Supremacy of the Spiritual Order, on The Normal Relations of the Church and the State, and on The Power Exercised by the Popes over Temporal Sovereigns during the Middle Ages were not, at the time of their first publication, received with universal favor by the Hierarchy and Clergy of the Church in this country. By some they were strongly opposed, not as unorthodox, but as inopportune and imprudent, and likely to expose the Church to unnecessary odium. But now, since the publication of the Encyclical of Pius IX., and of the Syllabus of December 8th, 1864, and the Acts and Decrees of the Holy Council of the Vatican, these objections have no force. Dr. Brownson's object in writing these papers, which are specially addressed to Catholics, was to check the liberalism and latitudinarianism which he saw were spreading among them. This, he thought, was of far more importance at the time than to direct his efforts chiefly to the conversion of non-Catholics. The idea that there ought to be, or could be, a separation of Church and State, he held was

political Atheism. In other words, it was equivalent to assuming that the political order is independent of the law of God ; that God is not sovereign in the State, and that for the State there is no God. To meet these pernicious errors, Dr. Brownson asserted the supremacy of the spiritual order ; that is, the sovereignty of God, and of the Pope as the representative of the spiritual order.

Subsequently, however, after the removal of Brownson's *Quarterly Review* to New York, in 1855, Dr. Brownson was led to change its tone and policy, though not its principles or doctrines. Highly esteemed friends urged him to make his *Review* auxiliary to a special movement, which they contemplated for the conversion of non-Catholic Americans. He had done, it was argued, nearly all that he could do in opposition to Liberalism, Socialism, and political Atheism ; now it was important for him to labor to convince and convert non-Catholics. Dr. Brownson accepted the urgent invitation. He labored to present the Church in a light that would be as little offensive to the prejudices of non-Catholics as he could without sacrificing orthodoxy. In doing this "he was obliged to confine himself to what was strictly of faith ; to insist on nothing that had not been formally defined to be *de fide*, and to content himself with presenting the minimum instead of the maximum of Catholic doctrine"—the very opposite of the course he had previously pursued. Thus "he fell insensibly into the poor policy of exhibiting Catholicity in its weakness, instead of its strength"—a policy he had previously rejected and ridiculed.

This lost Dr. Brownson, to a great extent, the confidence of the Catholic public, and not a few entertained the belief that he was on the point of returning to Protestantism or infidelity. "The attempt to make the *Review* the organ of a movement for the conversion of the country to the Church by converting the Church to the country" did not succeed, as the movement itself could not. The *Review* was suspended in October, 1864.

Very soon Dr. Brownson clearly realized his mistake. It was a mistake of policy, not of belief ; a mistake in the manner in which, for a time, he presented Catholic doctrine, but not as to its substance. Though the decrees of the Vatican Council had not then been formulated and even the Syllabus had not then been published, Dr. Brownson held and never ceased to hold as true the doctrines they subsequently enunciated.

Dr. Brownson was not at any time "a minimiser." He clearly understood and was firmly convinced that there are many things which have never been defined that no one is at liberty to deny ; that in fact nothing is judicially defined, till it has been controverted. He strenuously maintained this against Cardinal Newman's theory of the development of Christian doctrine, which assumes that nothing is of faith till it is defined. Brownson ever held and maintained that the definition does not make the faith, but in reality only explicitly opposes the faith to the error that contradicts it.

After a few years suspension his *Review* was revived, and the successive numbers that appeared, until failing sight and strength compelled its permanent closing, furnish incontestable evidence that his faith had never wavered, and that it was clear and firm on points respecting which many other Catholics were undecided until the decrees of the Vatican Council authoritatively removed all room for question or doubt. In June, 1872, he wrote : "Whatever else I may be, I am not a Liberal Catholic, but heartily accept the Syllabus and the decrees of the Vatican. . . . I am content with the Church as she is. I came to the

Church in 1844, in order to be liberated from my bondage to Satan and to save my soul. It was not so much my intellectual wants as the need of moral help, of the spiritual assistance of divine grace, in recovering moral purity and integrity of life, that led me to her door to beg admission into her communion. I came not to reform her, but that she might reform me. If I have even for a moment seemed to forget this, it has been unconsciously, and I ask pardon of God and man."

Volume XII. contains the third part of Dr. Brownson's writings on Christianity and Heathenism in Politics and in Society. The importance of the particular topics ably and lucidly discussed in this volume, as well as their direct bearing upon living, burning questions of to-day, will appear from their titles, some of which are :

The Church and the Republic, or The Church Necessary to the Republic, and the Republic Compatible with the Church; Christianity and the Church Identical; The Church an organism; The Day-Star of Freedom; The Church and Modern Civilization; Present Catholic Dangers; The English Schism; Père Felix on Progress; Public and Parochial Schools; Christianity or Gentilism; Manahan's Triumph of the Church; Christian Politics; The Papal Power; Rights of the Temporal; Separation of Church and State; Pope and Emperor; The Reunion of all Christians; Catholic Education; and Three Essays on the Reformation.

Volume XIII. contains the fourth and last part of Dr. Brownson's writings on Christianity and Heathenism in Politics and in Society. Its scope may be inferred from the titles of some of its leading articles:

Liberalism and the Church; Independence of the Church; The Church and Monarchy; Union of State and Church; The Bishops of Rome; Future of Protestantism and Catholicity under the fourfold division of The Secular Spirit, National Wealth, Civil and Political Liberty, Religious Liberty; The School Question; The Secular not Supreme; The Papacy and the Republic; Whose is the Child; Bismarck and the Church; Papal Infallibility and Civil Allegiance; Education and the Republic; The Public School System; The Family, Christian and Pagan; Protestant Journalism.

The importance of these subjects is self-evident. They embrace in the principles which form their basis every question which to-day, and, we may add, in all time, is involved in the controversy between the world and the Church, between infidelity and faith, religion and irreligion. These questions are discussed by Dr. Brownson in an eminently practical way, and with direct reference to the immediate circumstances with which they were connected at the time he wrote. Yet these questions have changed so little in their form, and not at all in the issues they fundamentally involve, that his discussions of them are as fresh and pertinent to-day as when they were first published. In accordance, too, with the analytical character of Dr. Brownson's intellectual methods,—an inborn tendency confirmed by his habits of searching investigation—his discussions always refer directly to the fundamental principles involved in the subjects on which he writes, and incidental circumstances are only alluded to so far as they serve to elucidate those principles. This gives a permanent value to his papers, and will cause them to live and to be read with interest in aftertimes as well as to-day.

Whatever may be thought of Dr. Brownson's metaphysical theories, few men have had clearer ideas of the philosophy of history and of the real meaning and fundamental issues involved in the various and, as regards their outward aspect, changing conflicts, between the Church and

the world, the spirit of belief and unbelief, of rationalism and of faith, which seemingly present a series of dissolving views in the constant panorama which the march of ages presents. He recognizes in them all the common principle which unites them, and in virtue of which they are only variations in the strategy of the unceasing war which the synagogue of Satan carries on against the Church, of the opposition of the spirit of unbelief to that of faith, of absorbing love for this world against that of belief and hope in the blissful realities of the world beyond the grave, of the refusal to acknowledge the supremacy of the spiritual over the natural order of things.

Opening the volume now before us (the XIII., and last that we have received), and turning almost at random to Brownson's four articles on the "Future of Protestantism and Catholicity," and to his paper on "Döllinger and the Papacy," you find them going directly to the very heart of their respective subjects. Take the following as an instance of his keen analysis and power of logical statement:

"The affirmative propositions held by Protestants are simply fragments of Catholic truth taught and held fast in their integrity by the Church long ages before Luther and Calvin were born, and constitute no part of Protestantism. The Protestantism is all in the perversion, corruption, or denial of Catholic truth. There is nothing in it of its own but its negations and hatred of the Church, of her faith, her discipline, and her worship, to be continued, or that can be the subject of any predicate. Protestantism receives into its bosom one form of error as readily as another, and complete unbelief as the inchoate apostasy called heresy; though we readily grant that the majority of Protestants are not, as yet, prepared to accept infidelity pure and simple, and many of them, we trust, are, in their intentions and dispositions, prepared to accept and obey the truth when made known to them, and may yet in God's gracious providence find their way into the Catholic communion and be saved."

"The 'Reformers,' or the fathers of the modern Protestant movement, did not give up Christianity or the Church. They thought they could reject the Papacy and the Sacerdotal Order, and still retain the Christian faith and the Christian Church. But they were not slow to discover that this was impracticable, and that, if they gave up the Papacy and the Sacerdotal Order, they must give up the Sacraments, save as unmeaning rites, infused grace, the merit of good works, the Church as a living organism, the whole mediatorial work of Christ in our actual regeneration, and fall back on immediatism, and deny all living or present mediation between God and man. Their successors have found out that an irresistible logic carries them further still, and requires them to reject all creeds and dogmas as superfluous, to resolve faith into confidence, and to rely solely on the immediate supernatural operations of the Spirit. There is but one step further, and you have reached the goal, that of resolving God himself into the human soul, or the identification of God with man and man with God; and not a few have already taken it."

Take the following, too, from the article on "Döllinger and the Papacy":

"The only conservative power in the Church—and I might say in society—is the Papacy. Reject the Papacy, the supremacy of Peter in his successors, make the Church simply episcopal, presbyterian, or congregational, and she inevitably becomes national, and splits up into a thousand and one conflicting sects. A church, really Catholic, is inconceivable without the Papacy, as was always believed by the Church

and defined by the Council of the Vatican. Without the Pope as the source and centre of authority, the Church, as the kingdom of God on earth, has and can have no unity, and without unity it can have no Catholicity. Catholicity cannot be produced by aggregation, any more than infinity can be obtained by the addition of numbers. Only that which is essentially One can be Catholic."

"The Papacy is, therefore, essential to the very conception of the Church as Catholic. It is as essential to the Church organism as the central cell, or organite, as physiologists say, to every living organism, in which all in the organism takes its rise, and from which it proceeds, or by which it is produced. The organite, or central cell, in all organisms, generates or produces the whole organism. It must, therefore, be living and energetic, and, of course, does not and cannot derive its life or energy from the organism, which cannot exist without it; it must derive both life and the *vis generatrix aliunde*. Hence the spontaneous generation, asserted by some scientists, or socialists rather, is impossible and absurd."

"The Church is defined by the blessed Apostle to be the body of Christ, and must be an organism, like every living body, not a simple organization or association of individuals. The Pope, as its central cell, organite, or germ, cannot, then, derive his life, his *vis generatrix*, from the Church organism, for, without him, that can no more exist than can the generated without the generator, or the creature without the creator. The Pope derives his Papal life or generative energy through the Holy Ghost from Christ, and by Him teaches and governs the Universal Church; he is, as Pope, vitally connected, through the Holy Ghost, with Christ Himself, and is His representative or Vicar through whom the life of Christ flows to all who are in communion with Him, and brings them into living union with Christ the Son, who is one in the unity of the Holy Ghost with God the Father." . . .

"Among Catholics the Church always means the visible body of Christ, mystically, or, as we have said, vitally united to Him through the Holy Ghost in the Sacraments and communion with His Vicar, the spiritual father of all the faithful. The 'Old Catholics' cannot fall back on the invisible church of Protestants, without giving up all pretence of being Catholics at all, in any recognized sense of the term. . . . If the Lord founded His Church on Peter,—that is, the Papacy,—it follows necessarily that, if you take away the Papacy, you take from the Church her foundation, and consequently leave her to fall through."

To go back to a preceding part of this article, the following paragraph sets forth, with admirable clearness and conciseness, the logical consequence of the Protestant principle:

" The generality of Protestants acknowledge a Catholic Church in words at least; but very few of them hold her *visible* unity and Catholicity, and most of them take refuge in the assertion of the *invisible* Catholic Church. They, in fact, recognize no church organism at all, and the visible churches they do recognize are simply aggregations or associations of individuals more or less numerous. They recognize no Church in communion with Christ, and deriving its life from Him and imparting it to its members. In their view, the Church, as such, is severed from Christ, and has no vital relation to Him, except through its members. It derives its life from the individuals associated, who must obtain their Christian life, if they have any, and give evidence of living it, before they can be aggregated to the society. Hence, their churches serve no purpose, count for nothing in the economy of grace, or Christian life and salvation; and, accordingly, we

find Protestants gradually, as they recede further and further from the Church of Rome, coming to the conclusion that union with the Church is not essential, and that one can live the Christian life, and be saved, outside of all church organizations as well as inside of them, a conclusion strictly logical from protestant principles.

"To deny the visibility of the Catholic Church is to deny our Lord has founded any church, or set up His kingdom on earth for the spiritual instruction, discipline, and government of men and nations. Catholic theologians distinguish, indeed, between the body of the Church and the soul of the Church, and maintain that only those who belong to the soul of the Church can be saved; but they do not maintain, so far as I am aware, that no one can belong to the soul, without belonging, *vel re, vel voto*, to the body of the Church. The soul of the Church is Christ Himself, and Christ cannot be distinct from Christ. The invisible Church is not a church that Christ founds or creates, but is Christ Himself, without a visible body, organs, or representative; that is, no church distinguishable from the incarnate Word himself." . . .

With regard to Papal infallibility, Dr. Brownson, from the same article from which we have been latterly quoting, thus summarily yet conclusively disposes of the chief objections to it:

"I have listened with what patience I could to the facts and arguments adduced to prove that the Pope has erred in matters of faith; but even the great Bossuet was obliged to confess that he could not prove that any pope had ever erred when speaking *ex cathedra* and defining a point of faith, or condemning an error opposed to it. The strongest case is that of Pope Honorius, in relation to the two wills and two operations in our Lord. That the Pope was negligent and failed to do his duty of crushing out the insurgent error at once with the authority of Peter, no one disputes; but that he did not fall into heresy, or err in doctrine, the learned Bishop Hefele fully concedes. The erudite historian of the Councils, who had no unwillingness to find that the Pope had erred—for he was an opponent, not an advocate, of Papal infallibility—winds up his long discussion of the question of Pope Honorius, by asserting that the Pope was orthodox; a conclusion I came to years ago, from the Pope's own letter to Sergius. Nobody pretends that the Pope is impeccable; but a moral fault is not necessarily a doctrinal error, and it is only for a moral fault that Pope Leo II. confirms the censure of his predecessor."

With like conciseness and vigor Dr. Brownson disposes of the pretexts under which the secular powers of Europe opposed the definition and promulgation of the dogma of Papal infallibility:

"The pretence, that the definitions of the Council of the Vatican infringe on the rights of sovereigns and impair the obligations of existing concordats, is hardly worthy of serious consideration. They change nothing in the previously existing relations of the Church and State, or in the obligations of the concordats conceded by the Church to the State. The Pope acquires by them, in relation to the Church or the State, no new power, and no power he has not in all ages and nations claimed and exercised, or which has not been conceded by every sovereign State that has negotiated with him a concordat. The very fact of negotiating with him a concordat, recognizes him as Sovereign Pontiff or supreme governor of the universal or Catholic Church; and this is all that the Council has defined as to Papal supremacy. Whether the Church holds the Pope to be infallible or not in teaching the universal Church, is no concern of the State as such; for the State, in consideration of certain concessions to it by the Pope in the concordat,

guarantees her full liberty of doctrine and worship, and the State can take no cognizance of what she teaches her children. Infallible or not, a Papal constitution of doctrine has always been binding by every concordat on the State in its relation with Catholics or the Catholic Church ; and, in all cases where Catholic rights or duties were involved, is and always has been the supreme law for the civil courts. A Papal constitution could not be lawfully resisted before the definition, any more than it can be now. Dr. Döllinger knows this as well as we do, and he cannot have made his objection in good faith."

"The Papal infallibility assures nations, governments, and individuals that the Pope can declare nothing to be the word of God which is not His word, or to be the law of God which is not His law ; and no one has ever had the right to disbelieve the word of God, or to disobey the law of God, as declared by the Pope. The definition, therefore, imposes upon men or nations no new obligation of faith or obedience, and the Papal infallibility offers the very guaranty that all men and nations want ; that nothing but the infallible word of God shall be proposed to the faith of either in morals or practice not enjoined by the divine law infallibly applied. . . . Almighty God could give, confer no greater boon on the human race than in the institution of a living and visible organ of such infallibility, accessible to all the world. The infallible Pope is in the spiritual firmament what the sun is to the material, and gives light, life, and warmth, and health to all on whom he sheds his radiance. The great difficulty men have in believing it, is that it seems too good to be true. But is there anything too good for Him to give us, who freely gave up His only begotten son to die for us ; or is there any good that the Son, who freely humbled Himself, took on Him the form of a servant, and for His love of us submitted to the death of the cross, and to Whom is given by His Father all power in heaven and on earth, will withhold from us ? Do we forget that the Gospel is the gospel of infinite goodness, love and mercy ?

"Infallibility in teaching is a necessity, if men would know or believe the truth. Without infallibility somewhere and practically available in believing, there can be no true belief or faith, human or divine ; for a belief that is not certain is simple opinion, and without infallibility there is no certainty. Hence all men, who hold that certainty in any thing is attainable, assert infallibility."

Thus, ably and eloquently, and with irrefutable logic, did Dr. Brownson advocate and defend the supremacy of the Pope and the infallibility of his *ex cathedra* teaching, both before and after the decrees of the Vatican Council. In the course of his long life, and not only when he was a Protestant and a rationalist but afterwards, Dr. Brownson made mistakes, as who has not ? But to his praise be it said, he was ever submissive to authority, and when brought to the perception of his mistakes, no one could be swifter to frankly confess them, and energetically to labor to correct them and undo their consequences.

His works, when fully republished, will be a monument of his personal sincerity, whole-souled earnestness, learning, and eminent ability ; and those which were written after he became a Catholic are clear and striking instances of the power of the *Faith* in giving additional force and strength to human genius and knowledge. Dr. Brownson's writings before he became a Catholic showed his bright intellectual gifts, but the productions of his pen after he was received into the Church, have clearly and incontestably a power of reasoning, an elevation of thought and mastery over the subjects he discusses, which far transcend the

ability he previously displayed. We await with eager interest the subsequent volumes of his collected and republished writings.

LUTHER : An Historical Portrait. By *J. Verres, D.D.* London : Burns & Oates. New York : Catholic Publication Society. 1884.

Of lives and sketches of Martin Luther, it might seem that already we have had quite enough. The recent celebrations of the fourth centenary of his birth by almost all sects of Protestants and free-thinkers produced a huge bulk of sermons, speeches, lectures, newspaper articles, pamphlets and books respecting him. In these his character and actions have been depicted with all the variety of perspective shading and coloring which ingenuity taxed to the utmost could devise, and yet all combining, so far as these pictures have been painted by non-Catholics, to make him out a hero of the highest type, a scholar, a sage and law-giver, a prophet and a soldier of Christ, of most exemplary life, profound prayerfulness, firm faith and undaunted courage ; the regenerator of his age, and the father of modern civilization. His acknowledged weaknesses were represented as evidences of his robust strength, his faults as excellencies, and his vices as virtues. The coarseness and vulgarity, the passion and brutality and obscenity, which constantly come to view in his writings, were systematically suppressed, and detached sentences and paragraphs expressive of pious thought, were gathered and carefully put together, in order to furnish proofs of his virtuous and devout habit of life.

Thus, the old traditionary falsehood respecting Luther was perpetuated in the public mind, and the truth suppressed. This was all the more easily done, because the vulgarity, the profanity and obscenity of Luther's habitual utterances so thoroughly permeate most of his works, that, to publish a faithful translation of them in the English language is impossible, without subjecting both the translator and the publisher to condemnation by the law of the State, as well as by the law of common decency.

On the other hand, numerous other sketches and lives of Luther have been written and published by Catholic writers. These have brought out the truth respecting him, yet not the *whole* truth. For the reasons above referred to rendered this impossible. Still what they did bring to light, abundantly supported by undeniable historic proof, amply sufficed to show what manner of man Luther really was. But, as regards these writings, in judging of the objects they will subserve, it has to be said, and we say it with regret, that, in great degree, they fail to accomplish the object they are intended to accomplish. At most they subserve it only to a limited extent, and among those, too, who scarcely need to have their already correct though only general and perhaps indefinite ideas of Martin Luther confirmed. It is the fact, lamentable as it may be, that Protestants, and not only Protestants but non-Catholics, with few exceptions, do not and will not read a historic or religious work that is written from a Catholic point of view. The imprint of a Catholic publisher upon the title-page is sufficient to deter them from even glancing over the subsequent pages. And, even if the work be sent forth from a non-Catholic publishing house, by a subtle instinct, born of seemingly invincible prejudice, they immediately discover the spirit of the writer, and turn away from the book without reading it.

Then as regards Catholics, the multitude, the less highly educated and the only partially educated, on general principles regard, and it must be acknowledged rightly regard, the question as one that has been long

ago settled, and which they have no need to re-investigate. The conviction is fixed in their minds, that whatever may or may not be the details of Martin Luther's character and conduct, he was an arch-heretic, the founder of a schismatical sect, the propagator of pernicious heresies. If they want proofs of this they need not search history. They can find them in abundance, in the present condition of the sects which have sprung from him or his co-workers and from the errors they disseminated.

As for educated Catholics they are not excusable on the grounds we have mentioned. However strong may be their convictions with regard to the so-called Reformation, and the men who were the leaders of that satanic revolt against divine authority, both in Church and in State, they ought to employ their intellectual advantages in more thoroughly acquainting themselves with the historical, philosophical and theological reasons for their faith, and thus let the light which they possess shine forth for the convincing and confirming of others. But the fact is, a fact which cannot be too deeply deplored, that the vast majority of our educated Catholics purchase and read very few Catholic books. They turn away from Catholic literature, and give their attention and their leisure time to making themselves acquainted with what non-Catholic writers have to say on the various secular, literary or historical subjects of the day. Thus, while they become familiar with the ideas, hostile to their faith, which permeate the literature of the day, they are unarmed with specific answers to those ideas, and have no other defence against their pernicious influence than the general opposite convictions they have received and are unwilling to give up. They are powerless, too, in society to confute those erroneous ideas, and can only oppose them with arguments based on grounds which, however true in themselves, are unsatisfactory to their non-Catholic associates.

Before closing these general remarks we must add that there are other reasons why we think that exhibitions of the characters, inconsistencies, and flagitious lives of the so-called Reformers are, generally speaking, not calculated now to do much good. One of these reasons is that the public in general seems to care very little what their personal character really was. It looks upon them as exponents of a general movement towards free thinking. It attaches no importance to religious creeds, those either of the Reformers or of the Church. It believes in free thought, and to a very great extent in free living. All it really requires is such a regard for decency as throws a covering over indulgence in vice sufficient to hide its naked ugliness from public view.

Another and deeper reason is that Martin Luther and his fellow "Reformers" were not really the progenitors and fathers of that movement. It was not they that produced it. They were its representatives, its trumpets, its instrumentalities. It spoke through them. It used them for its own purposes. But they did not create it or produce it. It would have come if they had never lived. It had its roots and causes in a logical necessity. That necessity was not abuses in the Church. Abuses did exist, though their extent is commonly greatly exaggerated. The necessity we refer to was the logical necessity of false ideas and principles of error and sin and severance from God, working themselves out to their legitimate consequences. The peoples of Europe had been rescued by the Church from ignorance, and the social and civil confusion consequent upon the destruction of ancient pagan civilization, and the deluge of savage barbarism which poured down upon Europe from Scythia and Scandinavia. Ignorance, under her fostering care, had been supplanted by knowledge, political confusion and rudeness by social and civil order, poverty and misery by prosperity and wealth. Then en-

sued a repetition of the old, old story so often recounted in the history of nations: "The beloved grew fat and kicked; he grew fat and thick and gross; he forsook God who made him, and departed from God, his Saviour." Secular rulers became conscious of their power, and their peoples proud of their prosperity. Both forgot to whom they owed what they possessed. Learning increased and with it came intellectual pride.

The classic literatures of pagan Greece and Rome were studied with idolatrous devotion, and pagan figures of speech, pagan allusions, fancies, and ideas permeated the literature of the age. Intellectual pride supplanted Christian faith and humility, and, in short, the civilization which the Church had created, contemptuously turned its back upon its own creator and promoter, and declared its independence of her.

It was a logical, a natural necessity of this spirit, this state of things, that princes and peoples alike should revolt against the spiritual authority of the Church, and that, it being denied and resisted, they should array themselves against each other, princes becoming arbitrary tyrants, and peoples becoming defiantly rebellious subjects. As regards literature, philosophy, theology and morality, the same logical necessity led to the contemptuous throwing overboard of Christian Scholastic philosophy, to the denial of the powers and functions of true reason, and the exaltation of arbitrary free-thinking in their stead. The revolt against authority, therefore, was identical in principle, though different in form, with that of the "Reign of Terror" in France. Luther was, in fact and truth, the precursor of Voltaire. Yet the one as little as the other was the creator of the movements which they have the infamous discredit of producing. They were their creatures, their satanic prophets and precursors, the exponents of the false principles and impious errors those movements embodied.

While, therefore, we deprecate the mistake of seeming to attach undue importance to Luther's character, actions and writings, by bringing them so prominently to notice, overpowering as is their testimony against the satanic movement mis-called "the Reformation," yet we make an exception in favor of the work before us. It is written by a scholar and a thinker; by one who has not skimmed superficially over Luther's life and writings and actions, but has examined them carefully and exhaustively. He is a master, too, in the art of compression, and knows how to go directly to the heart of subjects, omitting matters of secondary importance, and seizing upon and bringing to view those only which are of primary significance. He understands, too, how to be analytical without becoming technical, and philosophical without becoming abstruse and dry. Hence his treatise has the interest of a direct and continuous narrative, and yet the logicalness and thoroughness of an analytical, philosophical treatise. While it lacks the fulness, as regards the facts of Luther's actions and conduct, of Audin's *Life of Martin Luther*, it yet furnishes a clearer insight into his real personal character, the false principles by which he was actuated, his intensely wicked spirit, and the fundamental ideas and tendencies of his utterances and writings.

He does not bring out the worst of these, for regard for decency forbids. But what he does bring to view, and what in addition he suggests, confirmed by all sufficient proof, abundantly suffices to give the reader a true idea of who and what Martin Luther was and did.

The work is valuable, too, in another respect. It gives a more correct idea, supported with abundance of historic proof, of the real condition, the prosperous and comparatively happy condition, of the people in the sixteenth century; and of the fact that it was their prosperity,

their intelligence, their possession of civil rights and power that became a snare to them and their temporal rulers ; and that seduced the people into revolt against authority on the one side, and the princes, on the other, into arbitrary tyranny and oppression.

CONFESSION AND ABSOLUTION. By *Right Rev. Monsignor Capel, D.D.*, Domestic Prelate of His Holiness, Leo XIII., happily reigning, and Member of the Congregation of the Segnatura. New York : D. & J. Sadlier & Co. 1884.

CATHOLIC : An Essential and Exclusive Attribute of the True Church. By *Right Rev. Monsignor Capel, D.D.* New York : Wilcox & O'Donnell Co., and D. & J. Sadlier & Co. 1884.

The first-mentioned of these publications is an enlargement of a discourse by Right Rev. Monsignor Capel on "God's Conditions for Pardoning Sin," delivered in the Cathedral, at Philadelphia, and subsequently published at the request of many of his hearers.

In treating of his subject, the Right Rev. writer first shows the nature of mortal sin in putting us at enmity with God, and depriving us of all claim upon Him on any ground of justice. He then shows that pardon and forgiveness of mortal sin can only be obtained through the infinite mercy of God by fulfilling the conditions which God has imposed for reconciling the sinner to divine favor, and thus restoring him to his lost sonship.

One of these conditions flows from the infinite holiness of the divine nature, namely: contrition on the part of the sinner. "The other, which is judicial absolution from sin, implying previous confession of it, is imposed by the revealed law of God, and is, therefore, a divine command obliging all—Popes, Bishops, Priests, and people."

The true nature of contrition or repentance is thus concisely shown, and the distinction clearly made between sorrow and grief for sin, accompanied with a purpose of amendment, from purely human motives, and the true sorrow for sin, which alone is acceptable to God, and which springs from a supernatural motive, the soul being excited thereto by divine grace.

The Right Rev. writer then shows that for the purpose of enabling contrite sinners to obtain judicial absolution from sin, it has pleased God to institute a human and visible Ministry of Reconciliation. He shows that this Ministry of Reconciliation possesses judicial power ; this being conclusively implied in the fact that to it is committed the authority of remitting or retaining sins. Also, that it is a primary condition of just judgment that the judge should not only be cognizant of the law which is to be administered, but also of the cause which is submitted for judgment. Applying this to the exercise of the judicial power with which the Apostles and their successors are invested, the writer shows that two things are needed : First, that they should know the law and the conditions on which sin is to be remitted or retained. This they can only learn of God. Second, that they should know the sin committed, its nature and its circumstances. But sin is in the soul. It is only the individual offender who can know the sins for which he seeks forgiveness, and the disclosure of them can only come from him. Confession, therefore, is the necessary and preliminary condition for seeking absolution from sin. Consequently, the honest, humble, contrite accusation of all deadly sins constitutes the essential character of such confession or avowal of transgressions.

The Right Rev. writer then shows that interior contrition is to be followed by the judicial sentence of a duly-appointed Priest, to whom

confession has been previously made, is the unanimous teaching of Christian writers from the earliest date. He proves this not only from citations from the Church Fathers, but also from heretical sects and schisms from the earliest ages up to modern times. Finally, he proves that the Sacrament of Penance is supported by the reason of things, and adduces numerous testimonies, unintended and unwilling, of Protestants and infidels in its favor.

The argument is concise yet clear, logical, and conclusive. The historic proofs cited in its support are gathered from very many sources, some of them not easily accessible in this country.

We have given so much space to the first-mentioned of Monsignor Capel's publications, that we must, with regret, dismiss the last and more comprehensive and important, with only a few words.

It deals with the general and all-important issue between the countless sects which contend to be Christian, and the Church—who is the lawful possessor of the title CATHOLIC.

This, in fact, is the real question with all who claim to be Christians, understanding what the claim actually involves. For that the Church which Christ founded was intended to be "Catholic" is an indisputable fact conceded by all, whether infidels, Protestants, or members of the Holy Roman Catholic Church. To the answer of the crucial question to whom and to what society or organization does the title CATHOLIC exclusively belong, Monsignor Capel devotes himself in the work of which we have already given the title.

The immediate occasion for writing it was a discussion in the last Convention of the "Protestant Episcopal Church." It was then and there proposed that the title of its "Book of Common Prayer" be changed by striking out the words "Protestant Episcopal" and inserting "Holy Catholic" in their stead. The proposal was rejected, and, whatever the convention consciously intended, it proved by its own action that it, and those it represented, had no claim to being regarded as "Catholics" either by themselves or others.

But the value of Monsignor Capel's work goes far beyond the special occasion which induced its preparation and publication. It is a complete resumé of the evidences, theological and historical, that the Holy Roman Apostolic Church, and it alone, has right to the title CATHOLIC. The argument is clear and conclusive, and the historical citations are as full as can be compressed into the compass of nearly one hundred and fifty octavo pages.

IRÈNE OF CORINTH; A Historical Romance of the First Century. By *Rev. P. J. Harrold*. Lewiston, New York: Index Publishing Company. 1884.

An interesting story, carrying the reader through many of the scenes, and reciting with substantial historic accuracy many of the events, of the times of Vespasian and Nero.

MAN A CREATIVE FIRST CAUSE Two discourses, delivered at Concord, Mass., by *Rowland G. Hazard, LL.D.* Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1883.

Mr. Hazard is an idealist of idealists. According to him, man lives in a universe of ideas of his own creation. Man's "constructing this universe within his own mind is the principal if not the sole end of life."

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